This has probably been covered earlier, but Boeing has said a software patch is the cure for what brought down those airliners, but wasn’t relying on a single AOA sensor a contributing factor as well?
What are they going to do about that?
MCAS used one sensor at a time. It changed from left to right (or the opposite) every flight. The new software will instead use both sensors all the time, and MCAS won't activate if the two sensors aren't in agreement about the angle of attack : if there is a disagreement, it means one sensor is broken, the system can't know which one, so will disable itself.
So in that event, the MAX will be flying without MCAS at all. So how can that be okay, but deleting MCAS altogether not? It makes no sense.
How that can be okay? Well, an AoA disagree tells the crew that there is a disagree, so stay away from high AoA work in manual flight, and nothing will happen. Pull high AoA on the yoke, and you may experience weird control, especially if you have a relatively aft CoG.
Isn't that a vast improvement over present situation when the plane tells nothing to the crew, but silently goes into kamikaze mode?
If the authorities will accept that simple dual sensor layout, I don't know. But there are many cases where a system failure on a plane degrades the functionality and warns the crew accordingly. A dual sensor MCAS with disabling of MCAS in case of single sensor failure would be no exception.
Of course the real 21st century way to do business is minimum triple sensors and no system degrade in case of single failure. But that will cost more money to implement.
Bear in mind, MCAS is there to repair a minor aerodynamic problem at an edge of the envelope. Thousands of MAX crews will likely spend a whole career of 25,000 hours flying the MAX without even activating MCAS a single time.