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mjoelnir
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Wed Feb 19, 2020 12:14 pm

NonTechAvLover wrote:
scbriml wrote:
max999 wrote:

Just to reinforce my point about Boeing's cheapening of quality...The Seattle Times reported in January 2019 that Boeing is firing nearly 1,000 quality control inspectors. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... nspectors/


The evidence might suggest they're getting fired because they're not very good at their job?


Well, if nearly a thousand people turn out to be not very good at the job they were hired to do, the evidence might suggest a lot of things, none looking good for the person in charge of hiring and the company, unless they have 50,000 of these jobs or some such number.

Does anybody know how many quality control inspectors Boeing has and what will happen to those 1,000 positions? One logical explanation would be the grounding and the suspension of MAX production, I.e., these people will be hired again once production resumes?


Boeing did advertise the fact that they would reduce the number of inspectors as they were not needed, because advances in production would make them redundant. It could be that Boeing was overly optimistic.
 
NonTechAvLover
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Wed Feb 19, 2020 12:30 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
NonTechAvLover wrote:
scbriml wrote:

The evidence might suggest they're getting fired because they're not very good at their job?


Well, if nearly a thousand people turn out to be not very good at the job they were hired to do, the evidence might suggest a lot of things, none looking good for the person in charge of hiring and the company, unless they have 50,000 of these jobs or some such number.

Does anybody know how many quality control inspectors Boeing has and what will happen to those 1,000 positions? One logical explanation would be the grounding and the suspension of MAX production, I.e., these people will be hired again once production resumes?


Boeing did advertise the fact that they would reduce the number of inspectors as they were not needed, because advances in production would make them redundant. It could be that Boeing was overly optimistic.


Automation, or as politicians refer to it, the jobs China and other countries are stealing from us. I just read the article (I am fluent in English and have an intermediate knowledge of business school speak) and it is scary how Orwellian the world is becoming. A new gentleman tasked with squeezing the living life out of employees in exchange for profits states that they are changing their quality philosophy by doing things right the first time and eliminating the need for final quality checks. Errr, does that mean your previous philosophy did not involve doing things right the first time in the aircraft manufacturing business? Again, I am not fluent in business school speak, maybe I misinterpreted, but doesn’t it sound bad for the company to say “we will start doing things right the first time?”
 
Amiga500
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Wed Feb 19, 2020 12:59 pm

max999 wrote:
Just another sign of Boeing's endemic cultural problems. Shareholder value is priority first, second, and third at the expense of cheapening everything else like safety and quality.


It is a really dangerous game Boeing are playing.

Imagine if another 737 were to crash as a result of a design or manufacturing fault shortly after the RTS?

Confidence in the model - and in the company - would be shattered. While the latter would be repairable, the former probably wouldn't.
 
upright
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Wed Feb 19, 2020 1:35 pm

max999 wrote:
Just another sign of Boeing's endemic cultural problems. Shareholder value is priority first, second, and third at the expense of cheapening everything else like safety and quality.

@Amiga500: It is a really dangerous game Boeing are playing.

Yes, Wall Street loves it when people getting fired in forcast of more efficiency.
Boeing also has less need for employees, as long as significantly less is produced, among other things like MAX probable to be dead and lots of money needs to be saved.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Wed Feb 19, 2020 2:07 pm

asdf wrote:
planecane wrote:
maint123 wrote:
Not a stunt. It's the job of the test pilots to test the planes in all scenarios. And especially scenarios which have killed hundreds in a few months gap.
The lions pilots had no idea of mcas but the Ethiopian crew did try to follow Boeing's instructions.


A test with MCAS off is not similar in any way, shape or form to the failures faced by the crash crews. They didn't crash because MCAS was off, they crashed because it was on and commanded trim that it wasn't supposed to.


You didn't flew that ships. Good thanks, me neither.

We both can not know how much the problematic aerodynamic behavior of the 737MAX was - besides of the MCAS triggered situations - partly responsible for that both crash.


Yes we do. The behavior would have at least been mentioned in the final lion air accident report. I guess I can't make an absolute statement on ET for a few weeks.

Stop inventing theories with no evidence.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Wed Feb 19, 2020 2:11 pm

NonTechAvLover wrote:
scbriml wrote:
max999 wrote:

Just to reinforce my point about Boeing's cheapening of quality...The Seattle Times reported in January 2019 that Boeing is firing nearly 1,000 quality control inspectors. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... nspectors/


The evidence might suggest they're getting fired because they're not very good at their job?


Well, if nearly a thousand people turn out to be not very good at the job they were hired to do, the evidence might suggest a lot of things, none looking good for the person in charge of hiring and the company, unless they have 50,000 of these jobs or some such number.

Does anybody know how many quality control inspectors Boeing has and what will happen to those 1,000 positions? One logical explanation would be the grounding and the suspension of MAX production, I.e., these people will be hired again once production resumes?


The referenced article was from January 2019. This was 3 months before the ET crash and grounding.
 
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JetBuddy
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Wed Feb 19, 2020 2:48 pm

TTailedTiger wrote:
Can anyone explain why both Boeing and Airbus have used such old processors in their new aircraft? I didn't even know the 286 processor was still being produced. Do newer more powerful processors have cooling issues or something?


1st reason is bit flip issues due to cosmic rays. The problem with scaling down to smaller, more modern chips is that electrons are more likely to jump.

An early 1980s 80286 chip is built on a 1.5 micrometer architecture. That is 1500 nanometers. The latest Intel chips are currently at 14 nanometers. AMD is at 7 nanometers. The more dense the architecture, the more risk for bit flip, but also more efficient and faster chip.

And the 2nd reason is that the aircraft was designed or updated at the time this was a proven chip. So all the systems are designed around those processors. Switching them now would cause a whole cascade of other things to be updated as well.
 
djpearman
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Wed Feb 19, 2020 3:27 pm

JetBuddy wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:
Can anyone explain why both Boeing and Airbus have used such old processors in their new aircraft? I didn't even know the 286 processor was still being produced. Do newer more powerful processors have cooling issues or something?


1st reason is bit flip issues due to cosmic rays. The problem with scaling down to smaller, more modern chips is that electrons are more likely to jump.

An early 1980s 80286 chip is built on a 1.5 micrometer architecture. That is 1500 nanometers. The latest Intel chips are currently at 14 nanometers. AMD is at 7 nanometers. The more dense the architecture, the more risk for bit flip, but also more efficient and faster chip.

And the 2nd reason is that the aircraft was designed or updated at the time this was a proven chip. So all the systems are designed around those processors. Switching them now would cause a whole cascade of other things to be updated as well.


To add to this and flyingturtle's reply:

To my knowledge, software written for aircraft systems require a certified toolchain (compiler and whatnot) - you can't just use any one you want. These toolchains are only certified for specific architectures or family of processors with a specific architecture, since it's somewhat costly to do. So, when a processor has a certified toolchain, it is advantageous to keep on using it until there is a necessity (e.g. processing power) to move to a newer one.

Also, the 286 processor is not that old yet - when considering the lifetime of an aircraft. The 286 was discontinued in 1991 which is around the time the 777, A320, A330 and A340 were introduced using FBW control systems. So if you were involved in the development of any of these, the 286 would have been reasonably current but already proven processor to choose.
 
GSPSPOT
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Wed Feb 19, 2020 6:03 pm

Not exactly grounding-related, but certainly not good news: https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/n ... 805099002/
Great Lakes, great life.
 
oschkosch
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Wed Feb 19, 2020 6:09 pm

GSPSPOT wrote:
Not exactly grounding-related, but certainly not good news: https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/n ... 805099002/
already reported up thread!

Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk
:stirthepot: :airplane: "This airplane is designed by clowns, who in turn are supervised by monkeys" :airplane: :stirthepot:
 
MrBretz
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Wed Feb 19, 2020 6:40 pm

Here’ a new problem for the MAX. It involves falcons and pigeon corpses. It is a humorous read.

https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/st ... on-737-max
 
asdf
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Thu Feb 20, 2020 12:33 am

planecane wrote:
asdf wrote:
planecane wrote:

A test with MCAS off is not similar in any way, shape or form to the failures faced by the crash crews. They didn't crash because MCAS was off, they crashed because it was on and commanded trim that it wasn't supposed to.


You didn't flew that ships. Good thanks, me neither.

We both can not know how much the problematic aerodynamic behavior of the 737MAX was - besides of the MCAS triggered situations - partly responsible for that both crash.


Yes we do. The behavior would have at least been mentioned in the final lion air accident report. I guess I can't make an absolute statement on ET for a few weeks.

Stop inventing theories with no evidence.


stop playing down statements, issued by a international regulator.
the „problematic aerodynamical behavior“ is not my invention

it is a result of a official investigation
 
beechnut
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Thu Feb 20, 2020 1:10 am

planecane wrote:

A test with MCAS off is not similar in any way, shape or form to the failures faced by the crash crews. They didn't crash because MCAS was off, they crashed because it was on and commanded trim that it wasn't supposed to.


It commanded trim it wasn't supposed to because it relied on erroneous AOA data without any cross-check. V2.0 should disable MCAS if AOA data is unreliable (mismatched). Because MCAS V2.0 is reliant on only two AOA sensors, there is still less redundancy than on say an A320. Therefore there's a greater chance that an AOA disagree disables MCAS than on the A320.

It then becomes important to evaluate the aircraft's raw aerodynamic behaviour without MCAS. Boeing developed MCAS for a reason: aerodynamic behaviour was either unsatisfactory without it, or sufficiently different from the NG to make a common type rating impossible.

Which is it? AFAIK Boeing has not come clean on this, so the certifying authorities need to evaluate it.

Beech
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Thu Feb 20, 2020 1:21 am

Amiga500 wrote:
Imagine if another 737 were to crash as a result of a design or manufacturing fault shortly after the RTS?

Confidence in the model - and in the company - would be shattered. While the latter would be repairable, the former probably wouldn't.

A USA government funded agency charged with safety of the USA aviation industry is keeping the MAX grounded of almost one year with potential RTS in the summer and your thought today includes a design error?
I can see a manufacturing error but design after over 12 months of grounding and review by the FAA and others?
 
MSPNWA
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Thu Feb 20, 2020 1:33 am

max999 wrote:
Just another sign of Boeing's endemic cultural problems. Shareholder value is priority first, second, and third at the expense of cheapening everything else like safety and quality.


This myth needs to end. There is no shareholder value if you don't produce safe, quality products. They all tie in together. You cannot remove one link and satisfy the other two.

If that is the criteria for smearing a company, there's plenty of ammo to sling at the one based in the EU as well.
 
TTailedTiger
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Thu Feb 20, 2020 1:38 am

beechnut wrote:
planecane wrote:

A test with MCAS off is not similar in any way, shape or form to the failures faced by the crash crews. They didn't crash because MCAS was off, they crashed because it was on and commanded trim that it wasn't supposed to.


It commanded trim it wasn't supposed to because it relied on erroneous AOA data without any cross-check. V2.0 should disable MCAS if AOA data is unreliable (mismatched). Because MCAS V2.0 is reliant on only two AOA sensors, there is still less redundancy than on say an A320. Therefore there's a greater chance that an AOA disagree disables MCAS than on the A320.

It then becomes important to evaluate the aircraft's raw aerodynamic behaviour without MCAS. Boeing developed MCAS for a reason: aerodynamic behaviour was either unsatisfactory without it, or sufficiently different from the NG to make a common type rating impossible.

Which is it? AFAIK Boeing has not come clean on this, so the certifying authorities need to evaluate it.

Beech


Oh I am quite positive it has been evaluated. The FAA seems to have done everything in their power to try and keep the Max grounded. They have finally run out of tricks and begrudgingly know they have to sign off on it. If disabling MCAS caused flight control issues, we would know about it.
 
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767333ER
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Thu Feb 20, 2020 6:57 am

MSPNWA wrote:
max999 wrote:
Just another sign of Boeing's endemic cultural problems. Shareholder value is priority first, second, and third at the expense of cheapening everything else like safety and quality.


This myth needs to end. There is no shareholder value if you don't produce safe, quality products. They all tie in together. You cannot remove one link and satisfy the other two.

If that is the criteria for smearing a company, there's plenty of ammo to sling at the one based in the EU as well.

The evidence suggests they don’t tie together considering the fact that Boeing stock has done relatively ok and actually quite fantastic for a company that has had its main product rendered temporary not legal for use for about a year now and now out of production for over a month.

If people that have worked there, other people in the industry, and many of us average joes all see this faulty culture, it Moses than likely exists. Ask yourself how they handled the 737 PCU issue or the 747 cargo doors. Consider the production nonconformity issues that were reported years ago with the 737NG where employees were told not to do anything about it basically because it would cost the company money? How about the 787 and Charleston... and their poor build quality there? Why did they want to keep the 737 type certificate despite the lack of safety features that are required on new aircraft? Human’s by nature look for patterns and there’s one here. Deflecting to Airbus only shows you have no logical or reasonable defence for Boeing. Airbus is not pertinent in this particular discussion and won’t be until they make a plane that kills 346 people due to a catastrophic failure mode single point of failure system.
Been on: 732 733 734 73G 738 752 763 A319 A320 A321 CRJ CR7 CRA/CR9 E145 E175 E190 F28 MD-82 MD-83 C172R C172S P2006T PA-28-180

2 ears for spatial hearing, 2 eyes for depth perception, 2 ears for balance... How did Boeing think 1 sensor was good enough?!
 
oschkosch
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Thu Feb 20, 2020 7:29 am

TTailedTiger wrote:
The FAA seems to have done everything in their power to try and keep the Max grounded. They have finally run out of tricks and begrudgingly know they have to sign off on it.



Care to elaborate on the tricks the FAA has been using?
:stirthepot: :airplane: "This airplane is designed by clowns, who in turn are supervised by monkeys" :airplane: :stirthepot:
 
asdf
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Thu Feb 20, 2020 8:52 am

oschkosch wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:
The FAA seems to have done everything in their power to try and keep the Max grounded. They have finally run out of tricks and begrudgingly know they have to sign off on it.



Care to elaborate on the tricks the FAA has been using?


It's obvious! An irresponsible attempt is being made to ruin a successful aircraft manufacturer!
Rules and regulations are for losers. The manufacturer will already know what to do. Lousy bureaucrats sniff out every stupid determination whether it was adhered to. This is degrading and a threat to national security. That has to stop, immediately. These planes are excellent anyway ...
 
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2nd2none
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Thu Feb 20, 2020 9:24 am

asdf wrote:
oschkosch wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:
The FAA seems to have done everything in their power to try and keep the Max grounded. They have finally run out of tricks and begrudgingly know they have to sign off on it.



Care to elaborate on the tricks the FAA has been using?


It's obvious! An irresponsible attempt is being made to ruin a successful aircraft manufacturer!
Rules and regulations are for losers. The manufacturer will already know what to do. Lousy bureaucrats sniff out every stupid determination whether it was adhered to. This is degrading and a threat to national security. That has to stop, immediately. These planes are excellent anyway ...


Why not also claim they are Airbus Employees, Russian, Chinese and North Korean agents?
 
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Francoflier
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Thu Feb 20, 2020 9:33 am

MSPNWA wrote:
max999 wrote:
Just another sign of Boeing's endemic cultural problems. Shareholder value is priority first, second, and third at the expense of cheapening everything else like safety and quality.


This myth needs to end. There is no shareholder value if you don't produce safe, quality products. They all tie in together. You cannot remove one link and satisfy the other two.

If that is the criteria for smearing a company, there's plenty of ammo to sling at the one based in the EU as well.


While I don't disagree, there is a disconnect nowadays between the intrinsic quality of a product and its value to business managers and shareholders.

The MBA types who control corporations nowadays and those who invest in their companies absolutely do not care in the quality of the product offered, they only care about one metric, and that is ROI. The fastest they make their money back, and the higher the share price rises, the happier their are. They couldn't care less if Boeing made airplanes out of paper mache, as long they they sold and delivered more this year than the last and figures and dividends reflect that, they're happy.

Do not think for a moment that the suits in corporate care about the quality or safety of the product more than they care about maximizing returns to their investors (and themselves). This would not be the first company that took cost cutting too far for the lust of a fatter balance sheet, regardless of the longer term consequences... To hell with long term sustainability. In fact, it's almost a trend nowadays. Whoever can cut the most from a business wins the prize. The signs that this was happening at Boeing are ominously starting to gather.
MBAs are not engineers. In fact, they despise them.
I'll do my own airline. With Blackjack. And hookers. In fact, forget the airline.
 
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seahawk
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Thu Feb 20, 2020 9:41 am

Shareholder value drives engineering today in nearly every larger cooperation. In the past, the questions you had to answer where:

Will it work?
Is it safe?
Can we build it?
Can we build it within the budget or what the customer wants to pay?

Today it is more like:
Can we build it for less?
Is it cheaper if it just works 90% of the time?
Can we have a bigger margin if we make it cheap?

After that it goes to the lawyers who determine the risk of delivering a suboptimal solution and how to do this without being liable.

And imho this is not Boeing specific, but an illness for all co-operations around the globe.

In fact even working for a regulator you today have to consider the financial impact. Even if you discover a design fault and demand a correction, you still have to show that there is no way to fix the problem which would create less costs for the OEM.
 
Aviator34ID
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Thu Feb 20, 2020 10:17 am

Yawn. After several days break this thread is back to more endless Boeing bashing opinion. No facts, just mostly unsubstantiated opinion.
Hopefully just a couple of weeks to go now before the certification flight and something substantial to talk about.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Thu Feb 20, 2020 11:32 am

beechnut wrote:
planecane wrote:

A test with MCAS off is not similar in any way, shape or form to the failures faced by the crash crews. They didn't crash because MCAS was off, they crashed because it was on and commanded trim that it wasn't supposed to.


It commanded trim it wasn't supposed to because it relied on erroneous AOA data without any cross-check. V2.0 should disable MCAS if AOA data is unreliable (mismatched). Because MCAS V2.0 is reliant on only two AOA sensors, there is still less redundancy than on say an A320. Therefore there's a greater chance that an AOA disagree disables MCAS than on the A320.

It then becomes important to evaluate the aircraft's raw aerodynamic behaviour without MCAS. Boeing developed MCAS for a reason: aerodynamic behaviour was either unsatisfactory without it, or sufficiently different from the NG to make a common type rating impossible.

Which is it? AFAIK Boeing has not come clean on this, so the certifying authorities need to evaluate it.

Beech


I don't disagree with anything you say. My post was in response to the suggestion that the "baseline" aerodynamic behavior of the MAX had something to do with the two crashes. That assertion is clearly not the case as it is known that the extreme nose down trim commanded by MCAS is what caused the crews to be unable to control the aircraft. The aerodynamic issue is a pitch up tendency. If there was a stall involved in either crash then that could have had something to do with it. Neither accident flight had any evidence that pitching UP was a problem that was part of the cause of the crash.
 
max999
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Thu Feb 20, 2020 11:41 am

MSPNWA wrote:
max999 wrote:
Just another sign of Boeing's endemic cultural problems. Shareholder value is priority first, second, and third at the expense of cheapening everything else like safety and quality.


This myth needs to end. There is no shareholder value if you don't produce safe, quality products. They all tie in together. You cannot remove one link and satisfy the other two.

If that is the criteria for smearing a company, there's plenty of ammo to sling at the one based in the EU as well.


As a member of the flying public, I care about Boeing's cultural problems because they have the potential to be lethal to me (i.e., dying in a crash caused by a poorly designed or badly built 737 MAX).
All the things I really like to do are either immoral, illegal, or fattening.
 
benbeny
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Thu Feb 20, 2020 12:50 pm

Excuse my ignorance, but can an airplane be stalled in 0 G or negative G maneuver? IIRC the plane won't need any lift in those kind of maneuver, but can the plane be stalled?
 
beechnut
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Thu Feb 20, 2020 1:10 pm

planecane wrote:
I don't disagree with anything you say. My post was in response to the suggestion that the "baseline" aerodynamic behavior of the MAX had something to do with the two crashes. That assertion is clearly not the case as it is known that the extreme nose down trim commanded by MCAS is what caused the crews to be unable to control the aircraft. The aerodynamic issue is a pitch up tendency. If there was a stall involved in either crash then that could have had something to do with it. Neither accident flight had any evidence that pitching UP was a problem that was part of the cause of the crash.


Yes you are correct, the disabling of MCAS was not a factor in the crashes. Quite the opposite, it was overactive!

But as part of the total evaluation and because the odds of MCAS being disabled by an AOA disagree are not insignificant given the sensitivity of AOA sensors to damage, etc., it is important to evaluate the raw aerodynamic behaviour without it.

Since now Boeing is saying that sim training will be necessary for the upgrade from NG to MAX, if the reason for MCAS was simply because of a behaviour difference between NG and MAX and simply necessary for a common type rating, perhaps MCAS won't be needed any longer, or V2.0 based on two AOAs will suffice. If, however, it's to correct unacceptable aerodynamic behaviour, then re-certification might be problematic. Boeing might have to come up with either a third physical AOA sensor, or some sort of synthetic (computed) AOA as third input (based on other data such as speed, rate of change of speed, and attitude), in order to reduce the chance of the aircraft flying without MCAS protection. That may be a rather longer task, and might explain why this is taking so long.

Beech
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Thu Feb 20, 2020 1:35 pm

planecane wrote:
I don't disagree with anything you say. My post was in response to the suggestion that the "baseline" aerodynamic behavior of the MAX had something to do with the two crashes. That assertion is clearly not the case as it is known that the extreme nose down trim commanded by MCAS is what caused the crews to be unable to control the aircraft. The aerodynamic issue is a pitch up tendency. If there was a stall involved in either crash then that could have had something to do with it. Neither accident flight had any evidence that pitching UP was a problem that was part of the cause of the crash.

The assertion is indirectly true: it include two design steps.

The first step is that the "baseline" aerodynamic behavior of the MAX is affected by the LEAP engines location on the wings. While we still don't know the exact extend of it, it's an established fact that if affect the aerodynamic behavior of the MAX both somewhere at high speed with high load and somewhere at low speed. Boeing designed the MCAS to mitigate both the high speed with high load issue, that was expected early in the design, and the low speed issue, that was unexpectedly fixed late in the design.

The second step is that the dual but only one active side architecture inherited from the first 737 model was terribly inappropriate to implement the MCAS with the today safety standard and expectation. But the exiting STS system was already there, working relatively well with the 737 NG, and the ideal framework to implement the MCAS. The mistake was to not understand that the STS was already near the edge of what could be safely done that way. The MCAS was too aggressive to be safely handle in case of sensor malfunction, and the only one active side architecture make it dependent to a single sensor.

The important point to understand is that the two accidents (and one more incident) was not caused by the expected normal MCAS function but by the MCAS malfunction caused by a single sensor erratic value.

I think there is at least 4 initials points to make the link:
1) The dual but only one active side architecture.
2) The "baseline" aerodynamic behavior of the MAX.
3) The very high promises and expectations of the MAX == NG.
4) The Boeing culture at this time that make the bad choice when the 3 above points was obviously creating a safety unacceptable solution: a hidden MCAS.
:stirthepot: 737-8 MAX: "For all speeds higher than 220 Kts and trim set at a value of 2.5 units, the difficulity level of turning the manual trim wheel was level A (trim wheel not movable)." :stirthepot:
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Thu Feb 20, 2020 2:16 pm

beechnut wrote:
planecane wrote:
I don't disagree with anything you say. My post was in response to the suggestion that the "baseline" aerodynamic behavior of the MAX had something to do with the two crashes. That assertion is clearly not the case as it is known that the extreme nose down trim commanded by MCAS is what caused the crews to be unable to control the aircraft. The aerodynamic issue is a pitch up tendency. If there was a stall involved in either crash then that could have had something to do with it. Neither accident flight had any evidence that pitching UP was a problem that was part of the cause of the crash.


Yes you are correct, the disabling of MCAS was not a factor in the crashes. Quite the opposite, it was overactive!

But as part of the total evaluation and because the odds of MCAS being disabled by an AOA disagree are not insignificant given the sensitivity of AOA sensors to damage, etc., it is important to evaluate the raw aerodynamic behaviour without it.

Since now Boeing is saying that sim training will be necessary for the upgrade from NG to MAX, if the reason for MCAS was simply because of a behaviour difference between NG and MAX and simply necessary for a common type rating, perhaps MCAS won't be needed any longer, or V2.0 based on two AOAs will suffice. If, however, it's to correct unacceptable aerodynamic behaviour, then re-certification might be problematic. Boeing might have to come up with either a third physical AOA sensor, or some sort of synthetic (computed) AOA as third input (based on other data such as speed, rate of change of speed, and attitude), in order to reduce the chance of the aircraft flying without MCAS protection. That may be a rather longer task, and might explain why this is taking so long.

Beech


I think it somewhat depends on data which I do not have access to. IF data shows that 99.99999% of AoA vane failures happen on takeoff or landing then the MCAS inactive behavior might not be all that important. The AoA disagree procedure would be to either abort the takeoff or don't retract flaps and return to the airport. My logic being that, as in the case of all three known MAX AoA sensor failures, the failure will have occurred either before takeoff or very early on in the flight. MCAS isn't active with flaps deployed which indicates that the aerodynamic behavior is fine with flaps deployed.

If there is an unacceptable likelihood of an AoA disagree during all phases of flight then it is important to understand the behavior. However, if the unacceptable behavior is truly limited to certain specific edges of the flight envelope, that could be mitigated by an AoA disagree procedure that keeps the aircraft away from those conditions while diverting.

From the MAX being in service, it seems like an AoA sensor failure occurs somewhere around 1 in 50,000 flights. It will be a slight hit on dispatch reliability but I doubt enough to justify the expense of a 3rd sensor or artificial AoA. There is no way the existing FCC architecture can handle a 3rd AoA sensor as an input for it wouldn't even exist, let alone the processing of it.

My solution if one was required would be to create a completely separate AoA processing module. It would have the 3 AoA inputs and its own internal processor redundancy. It would output the "agreed upon" AoA to both FCCs. If the processing module couldn't determine a valid AoA, then it would output different AoAs to each FCC (with at least 5.5 degrees of difference) to cause the FCCs to detect an AoA disagree, display the warning and disable MCAS. The module would have to somehow indicate that a single AoA was bad so that it would be fixed. Otherwise a single bad sensor would be masked and no error would be seen until another one failed, at which point the module couldn't provide a valid AoA.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Thu Feb 20, 2020 2:20 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
planecane wrote:
I don't disagree with anything you say. My post was in response to the suggestion that the "baseline" aerodynamic behavior of the MAX had something to do with the two crashes. That assertion is clearly not the case as it is known that the extreme nose down trim commanded by MCAS is what caused the crews to be unable to control the aircraft. The aerodynamic issue is a pitch up tendency. If there was a stall involved in either crash then that could have had something to do with it. Neither accident flight had any evidence that pitching UP was a problem that was part of the cause of the crash.

The assertion is indirectly true: it include two design steps.

The first step is that the "baseline" aerodynamic behavior of the MAX is affected by the LEAP engines location on the wings. While we still don't know the exact extend of it, it's an established fact that if affect the aerodynamic behavior of the MAX both somewhere at high speed with high load and somewhere at low speed. Boeing designed the MCAS to mitigate both the high speed with high load issue, that was expected early in the design, and the low speed issue, that was unexpectedly fixed late in the design.

The second step is that the dual but only one active side architecture inherited from the first 737 model was terribly inappropriate to implement the MCAS with the today safety standard and expectation. But the exiting STS system was already there, working relatively well with the 737 NG, and the ideal framework to implement the MCAS. The mistake was to not understand that the STS was already near the edge of what could be safely done that way. The MCAS was too aggressive to be safely handle in case of sensor malfunction, and the only one active side architecture make it dependent to a single sensor.

The important point to understand is that the two accidents (and one more incident) was not caused by the expected normal MCAS function but by the MCAS malfunction caused by a single sensor erratic value.

I think there is at least 4 initials points to make the link:
1) The dual but only one active side architecture.
2) The "baseline" aerodynamic behavior of the MAX.
3) The very high promises and expectations of the MAX == NG.
4) The Boeing culture at this time that make the bad choice when the 3 above points was obviously creating a safety unacceptable solution: a hidden MCAS.


Indirectly that is true. If the "baseline" aerodynamic behavior didn't have any issue then MCAS wouldn't have been needed and, therefore, MCAS wouldn't have existed to command full nose down trim. However, the underlying aerodynamic behavior/instability had absolutely nothing to do with controllability during the events that led to the crashes which is what was suggested by the post I replied to.
 
maint123
Posts: 396
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Thu Feb 20, 2020 3:00 pm

planecane wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
planecane wrote:
I don't disagree with anything you say. My post was in response to the suggestion that the "baseline" aerodynamic behavior of the MAX had something to do with the two crashes. That assertion is clearly not the case as it is known that the extreme nose down trim commanded by MCAS is what caused the crews to be unable to control the aircraft. The aerodynamic issue is a pitch up tendency. If there was a stall involved in either crash then that could have had something to do with it. Neither accident flight had any evidence that pitching UP was a problem that was part of the cause of the crash.

The assertion is indirectly true: it include two design steps.

The first step is that the "baseline" aerodynamic behavior of the MAX is affected by the LEAP engines location on the wings. While we still don't know the exact extend of it, it's an established fact that if affect the aerodynamic behavior of the MAX both somewhere at high speed with high load and somewhere at low speed. Boeing designed the MCAS to mitigate both the high speed with high load issue, that was expected early in the design, and the low speed issue, that was unexpectedly fixed late in the design.

The second step is that the dual but only one active side architecture inherited from the first 737 model was terribly inappropriate to implement the MCAS with the today safety standard and expectation. But the exiting STS system was already there, working relatively well with the 737 NG, and the ideal framework to implement the MCAS. The mistake was to not understand that the STS was already near the edge of what could be safely done that way. The MCAS was too aggressive to be safely handle in case of sensor malfunction, and the only one active side architecture make it dependent to a single sensor.

The important point to understand is that the two accidents (and one more incident) was not caused by the expected normal MCAS function but by the MCAS malfunction caused by a single sensor erratic value.

I think there is at least 4 initials points to make the link:
1) The dual but only one active side architecture.
2) The "baseline" aerodynamic behavior of the MAX.
3) The very high promises and expectations of the MAX == NG.
4) The Boeing culture at this time that make the bad choice when the 3 above points was obviously creating a safety unacceptable solution: a hidden MCAS.


Indirectly that is true. If the "baseline" aerodynamic behavior didn't have any issue then MCAS wouldn't have been needed and, therefore, MCAS wouldn't have existed to command full nose down trim. However, the underlying aerodynamic behavior/instability had absolutely nothing to do with controllability during the events that led to the crashes which is what was suggested by the post I replied to.

Baseline aerodynamic behavior is a issue
Leads to
Badly designed MCAS
Leads to
Crashes

That's why check the aerodynamic behavior without mcas.
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Thu Feb 20, 2020 3:44 pm

planecane wrote:
Indirectly that is true. If the "baseline" aerodynamic behavior didn't have any issue then MCAS wouldn't have been needed and, therefore, MCAS wouldn't have existed to command full nose down trim. However, the underlying aerodynamic behavior/instability had absolutely nothing to do with controllability during the events that led to the crashes which is what was suggested by the post I replied to.

It's not how I read the thread: "maint123" explicitly wrote "test the planes in all scenarios", not just "during the events that led to the crashes".
:stirthepot: 737-8 MAX: "For all speeds higher than 220 Kts and trim set at a value of 2.5 units, the difficulity level of turning the manual trim wheel was level A (trim wheel not movable)." :stirthepot:
 
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JetBuddy
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Thu Feb 20, 2020 5:00 pm

benbeny wrote:
Excuse my ignorance, but can an airplane be stalled in 0 G or negative G maneuver? IIRC the plane won't need any lift in those kind of maneuver, but can the plane be stalled?


I'm not exactly sure what you mean. But it can certainly stall in a traditional sense.

It's a matter of airflow over the wings and flight surfaces. If you reduce speed low enough, any airplane will stall. It loses lift and the control surfaces are less effective.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Thu Feb 20, 2020 11:25 pm

Wonder if they are being too optimistic
https://caymannewsservice.com/2020/02/m ... ce-flight/
 
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flyingphil
Posts: 313
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Fri Feb 21, 2020 8:56 am

par13del wrote:
Wonder if they are being too optimistic
https://caymannewsservice.com/2020/02/m ... ce-flight/


Worth reading for the comments from the Cayman islanders :worried:
Got to feel a bit sorry for this small airline as all their future plans were dependant on the 737MAX.
 
XRAYretired
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Fri Feb 21, 2020 10:32 am

Boeing faces more fines/litigation in regard to non-disclosure and non-compliance with regulations.
https://www.msn.com/en-us/finance/compa ... r-BB10ew86

Ray
 
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Francoflier
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Fri Feb 21, 2020 10:54 am

XRAYretired wrote:
Boeing faces more fines/litigation in regard to non-disclosure and non-compliance with regulations.
https://www.msn.com/en-us/finance/compa ... r-BB10ew86

Ray


Does this say the the AoA disagree warning had been mandated by the FAA and disregarded by Boeing despite their claim that it was not necessary for certification?
I'll do my own airline. With Blackjack. And hookers. In fact, forget the airline.
 
XRAYretired
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Fri Feb 21, 2020 11:04 am

Francoflier wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:
Boeing faces more fines/litigation in regard to non-disclosure and non-compliance with regulations.
https://www.msn.com/en-us/finance/compa ... r-BB10ew86

Ray


Does this say the the AoA disagree warning had been mandated by the FAA and disregarded by Boeing despite their claim that it was not necessary for certification?

No? AOA disagree warning was part of the declared design configuration as certified and was not functional. Boeing have not claimed it was not necessary for certification? don't know where that came from.

Ray
 
Tristarsteve
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Fri Feb 21, 2020 11:06 am

TTailedTiger wrote:
Can anyone explain why both Boeing and Airbus have used such old processors in their new aircraft? I didn't even know the 286 processor was still being produced. Do newer more powerful processors have cooling issues or something?


If you changed the chip in any flight related computor, then you would need to certify the computor again. This could involve flight testing for months, and may not be economically justifiable.

The B744 had a Flight Management Computor with the same chip and memory until the B747-8 was certified. The last few years involved much work by the navigation team, trying to fit the database into the old computor. When the B747-8 certification was delayed, they were about to split the B744 fleet into two that flew over different routes.
No one would pay for a new memory module to be fitted and flight tested. With B747-8 certification, the FMC was purchased and fitted to the B744 as well.
 
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scbriml
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Fri Feb 21, 2020 11:11 am

Francoflier wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:
Boeing faces more fines/litigation in regard to non-disclosure and non-compliance with regulations.
https://www.msn.com/en-us/finance/compa ... r-BB10ew86

Ray


Does this say the the AoA disagree warning had been mandated by the FAA and disregarded by Boeing despite their claim that it was not necessary for certification?


I think the issue is that Boeing unilaterally decided they didn't need to fix it or notify the FAA about it. From the article: “A manufacturer cannot alter the airplane’s features after it has been certified,” the then-acting head of the FAA, Daniel Elwell, said in a letter to lawmakers last July, referring to the malfunctioning alert.

We've known about this for some time, but I think the news of possible large fines is new.
Time flies like an arrow. Fruit flies like a banana!
There are 10 types of people in the World - those that understand binary and those that don't.
 
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TurboJet707
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Fri Feb 21, 2020 11:16 am

TTailedTiger wrote:
Oh I am quite positive it has been evaluated. The FAA seems to have done everything in their power to try and keep the Max grounded. They have finally run out of tricks and begrudgingly know they have to sign off on it. If disabling MCAS caused flight control issues, we would know about it.


Sorry, but you're making a fool of yourself. After writing thousands of posts on these boards blaming the Ethiopian and Lionair pilots, you've recently switched to blaming the FAA for not ungrounding the MAX without any valid reason. So if the MAX would be perfectly safe to fly now, after whatever 'fix' Boeing has deployed, what interest would the FAA have to keep the MAX on the ground? Would you suggest there's some conspiracy keeping the FAA from approving the MAX? What evidence would there be for that? I would suggest that you either show some solid evidence or stop posting this BS. I got the impression you're trying to help Boeing, but what you achieve is exactly the opposite.
 
flilot
Posts: 24
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Fri Feb 21, 2020 11:25 am

Tristarsteve wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:
Can anyone explain why both Boeing and Airbus have used such old processors in their new aircraft? I didn't even know the 286 processor was still being produced. Do newer more powerful processors have cooling issues or something?


If you changed the chip in any flight related computor, then you would need to certify the computor again. This could involve flight testing for months, and may not be economically justifiable.

The B744 had a Flight Management Computor with the same chip and memory until the B747-8 was certified. The last few years involved much work by the navigation team, trying to fit the database into the old computor. When the B747-8 certification was delayed, they were about to split the B744 fleet into two that flew over different routes.
No one would pay for a new memory module to be fitted and flight tested. With B747-8 certification, the FMC was purchased and fitted to the B744 as well.


That's not how you spell "computer".
 
bgm
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Fri Feb 21, 2020 11:34 am

TurboJet707 wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:
Oh I am quite positive it has been evaluated. The FAA seems to have done everything in their power to try and keep the Max grounded. They have finally run out of tricks and begrudgingly know they have to sign off on it. If disabling MCAS caused flight control issues, we would know about it.


Sorry, but you're making a fool of yourself. After writing thousands of posts on these boards blaming the Ethiopian and Lionair pilots, you've recently switched to blaming the FAA for not ungrounding the MAX without any valid reason. So if the MAX would be perfectly safe to fly now, after whatever 'fix' Boeing has deployed, what interest would the FAA have to keep the MAX on the ground? Would you suggest there's some conspiracy keeping the FAA from approving the MAX? What evidence would there be for that? I would suggest that you either show some solid evidence or stop posting this BS. I got the impression you're trying to help Boeing, but what you achieve is exactly the opposite.


^^ This.

Trying to blame anyone and everyone, except for the party whos fault it is, just looks foolish.
 
StTim
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Fri Feb 21, 2020 11:41 am

flilot wrote:

That's not how you spell "computer".


So bleeding what?

Did it stop you understanding the post?

This is an aviation forum not an English spelling forum. I am English and am not brilliant at spelling - let alone my poor typing skills.
 
Fiend
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Fri Feb 21, 2020 11:56 am

asdf wrote:
oschkosch wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:
The FAA seems to have done everything in their power to try and keep the Max grounded. They have finally run out of tricks and begrudgingly know they have to sign off on it.



Care to elaborate on the tricks the FAA has been using?


It's obvious! An irresponsible attempt is being made to ruin a successful aircraft manufacturer!
Rules and regulations are for losers. The manufacturer will already know what to do. Lousy bureaucrats sniff out every stupid determination whether it was adhered to. This is degrading and a threat to national security. That has to stop, immediately. These planes are excellent anyway ...


Rules and regulations are there to protect the safety of the public... not to ruin a company... A company that flouts rules and regulations is dangerous to the public...
BAC 1-11, A300, A320, A321, A330, A340, A350, A380, B737, B747, B757, B777, B787, L1011, Fokker 100, ATR 72, MD83
 
NonTechAvLover
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Fri Feb 21, 2020 1:27 pm

XRAYretired wrote:
Boeing faces more fines/litigation in regard to non-disclosure and non-compliance with regulations.
https://www.msn.com/en-us/finance/compa ... r-BB10ew86

Ray


Just another piece of evidence of irresponsibility, recklessness and, dare I say, even criminal behavior from a rogue organization. I find this hard to believe. When will someone put an end to this, the FAA is completely out of control! Just because Boeing put a light in the cockpit, the FAA is now saying, after the fact, that the light had to work and trying to punish Boeing when it does not, without ever asking Boeing whether Boeing actually intended the light to work and if the public really wants the light to work. Maybe Boeing designed the light as mood lighting that works from time to time, maybe to improve the overall aesthetics of the panels. The FAA, full of vengeance and fury, is using the fact that the light may or may not be working against Boeing and pretending that anyone gives a rat’s ass about sensors disagreeing about the angle of attack. The flying public does not even know what the angle of attack is and does not care whether the light is working. Sure, some techy guy sitting in the cockpit might care, but does the public really care? Shame on the FAA for deliberately delaying the RtS and return to the public of its beloved plane!
 
Wallsendmag
Posts: 21
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Fri Feb 21, 2020 3:44 pm

NonTechAvLover wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:
Boeing faces more fines/litigation in regard to non-disclosure and non-compliance with regulations.
https://www.msn.com/en-us/finance/compa ... r-BB10ew86

Ray


Just another piece of evidence of irresponsibility, recklessness and, dare I say, even criminal behavior from a rogue organization. I find this hard to believe. When will someone put an end to this, the FAA is completely out of control! Just because Boeing put a light in the cockpit, the FAA is now saying, after the fact, that the light had to work and trying to punish Boeing when it does not, without ever asking Boeing whether Boeing actually intended the light to work and if the public really wants the light to work. Maybe Boeing designed the light as mood lighting that works from time to time, maybe to improve the overall aesthetics of the panels. The FAA, full of vengeance and fury, is using the fact that the light may or may not be working against Boeing and pretending that anyone gives a rat’s ass about sensors disagreeing about the angle of attack. The flying public does not even know what the angle of attack is and does not care whether the light is working. Sure, some techy guy sitting in the cockpit might care, but does the public really care? Shame on the FAA for deliberately delaying the RtS and return to the public of its beloved plane!

If the light is there it should work otherwise it shouldn't be there
 
Amiga500
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Fri Feb 21, 2020 5:05 pm

par13del wrote:
Amiga500 wrote:
Imagine if another 737 were to crash as a result of a design or manufacturing fault shortly after the RTS?

Confidence in the model - and in the company - would be shattered. While the latter would be repairable, the former probably wouldn't.

A USA government funded agency charged with safety of the USA aviation industry is keeping the MAX grounded of almost one year with potential RTS in the summer and your thought today includes a design error?
I can see a manufacturing error but design after over 12 months of grounding and review by the FAA and others?


The source of the error would be irrelevant - I don't expect either design or manufacturing to cause problems. I'm saying "imagine if".


Basically, the public will trust the FAA/EASA/Boeing to have examined the plane and decide its safe. If it then turns out to not be safe - for whatever reason (that is not clearly and obviously operational error) - their collective reputation will be in the gutters.

Since EASA and the FAA don't make aircraft, it'll be Boeing dealing more directly with the fallout.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Fri Feb 21, 2020 11:48 pm

Amiga500 wrote:
Basically, the public will trust the FAA/EASA/Boeing to have examined the plane and decide its safe. If it then turns out to not be safe - for whatever reason (that is not clearly and obviously operational error) - their collective reputation will be in the gutters.
.

So this is about EASA tying themselves to FAA as we already know that the FAA like Boeing has already lost trust.
Ok...point taken.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, February 2020

Fri Feb 21, 2020 11:52 pm

CRJockey wrote:
All in all, the FAA is finally doing its job.

So the head of the FAA saying he will not grant RTS until he personally flies a MAX with his family in it is........
If I was not looking thru fanboy eyes I would say the head of the FAA is being personal rather the professional....but what do I know...

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