I don't disagree with anything you say. My post was in response to the suggestion that the "baseline" aerodynamic behavior of the MAX had something to do with the two crashes. That assertion is clearly not the case as it is known that the extreme nose down trim commanded by MCAS is what caused the crews to be unable to control the aircraft. The aerodynamic issue is a pitch up tendency. If there was a stall involved in either crash then that could have had something to do with it. Neither accident flight had any evidence that pitching UP was a problem that was part of the cause of the crash.
The assertion is indirectly true: it include two design steps.
The first step is that the "baseline" aerodynamic behavior of the MAX is affected by the LEAP engines location on the wings. While we still don't know the exact extend of it, it's an established fact that if affect the aerodynamic behavior of the MAX both somewhere at high speed with high load and somewhere at low speed. Boeing designed the MCAS to mitigate both the high speed with high load issue, that was expected early in the design, and the low speed issue, that was unexpectedly fixed late in the design.
The second step is that the dual but only one active side architecture inherited from the first 737 model was terribly inappropriate to implement the MCAS with the today safety standard and expectation. But the exiting STS system was already there, working relatively well with the 737 NG, and the ideal framework to implement the MCAS. The mistake was to not understand that the STS was already near the edge of what could be safely done that way. The MCAS was too aggressive to be safely handle in case of sensor malfunction, and the only one active side architecture make it dependent to a single sensor.
The important point to understand is that the two accidents (and one more incident) was not caused by the expected normal MCAS function but by the MCAS malfunction caused by a single sensor erratic value.
I think there is at least 4 initials points to make the link:
1) The dual but only one active side architecture.
2) The "baseline" aerodynamic behavior of the MAX.
3) The very high promises and expectations of the MAX == NG.
4) The Boeing culture at this time that make the bad choice when the 3 above points was obviously creating a safety unacceptable solution: a hidden MCAS.