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YYZYYT
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Fri Feb 07, 2020 2:49 pm

abies111 wrote:


I think that a 2020 five star Euro NCAP car is a much safer and desirable mean of transportation than a 1998 old Euro NCAP rule two star car, the drivers being exactly as competent, alert and trained. Passive safety matters, specially for non very high energy non survivable crashes. A lot.


WIederling wrote:
marcelh wrote:
bikerthai wrote:
Wow, just saw a photo of the crash site from the Independent web site. If you drive 50 different models of cars of that cliff at 60 kph, how many in those cars would survive?

bt

Let's take a 1960s Cadillac and a 1980s Volvo.....


Take a 1961 Volvo ( like the PV 544 )
or compare a 1950ties designed Mercedes Benz against any US car till about Ralph Nader :-)

crumple zones with no petrol tanks,
deformation resistant passenger space,
collapsible steering columns,
savety belts.
Mercedes first then Volvo were in the lead.


StdTank80002 wrote:

The modern equivalent then being the 2007 Grayrigg derailment. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grayrigg_derailment

Here a Alstom Class 390 Pendolino derailed at 95mph, with most carriages rolling down an embankment into the farmland adjacent. Google images show you the height. The carriages stayed in tact and only one person died, I believe a heat attack induced by the accident. Many injured. Most seem to have survived this incident too of course. But the carriages themselves stayed in a relatively good state.

The trains themselves are very heavy though and can be a nuisance to those maintaining the track!


Agree with these sentiments (others have posted them as well).

For a very graphic demonstration, there's a video of a crash test done by the IIHS. 1959 Chevy v. 2009 Chevy, into each other. The difference that modern tech makes is stunning.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C_r5UJrxcck
 
marcelh
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Fri Feb 07, 2020 3:02 pm

bgm wrote:
Interesting article from a pilot who has flown both the 737NG and the A320 series.

Speaking of landings, the Airbus is much easier to land smoothly and, for pilots, it goes a long way to stroke our already-inflated egos. If you can consistently grease a 737NG landing, you’re a better pilot than most. The problem with that airplane, especially the long-bodied models, is that it lands so fast. Because tail strikes are a big threat for the long, low-slung airplanes, approach speeds are in the 150- to 160-knot range, which is about 40 knots or more above stall speed. All that extra speed keeps the long-bodied 737s flat to avoid tail strikes, but it also causes them to skip right back in the air at initial touchdown—just a few inches. It’s just long enough for the ground-spoiler system to sense wheel spin, at which point the spoilers deploy—right now! And it’s that second plop to the ground that makes the NGs one of the more difficult airplanes to consistently land well.

This also brings up a safety issue. There have been more than a few runway overruns in long-bodied 737s. They are heavy, they land fast, and they have only four main-wheel brakes—unlike a 757, which has eight brakes. Pilots who like to use all of the runway’s touchdown zone trying to squeak out a good landing are playing with fire in this airplane, especially on wet or contaminated runways. Remember, style points don’t count if you run off the end of the runway.


https://www.aopa.org/news-and-media/all ... ilot/t_bva


Pegasus flies both types and we may assume that the pilots are equal trained. And in runway overruns it is a clear 3-0. I’m not saying that a landing with an A320 with a lot of tailwind would have had a different result, but IMHO three overruns in a row with 1 type cannot be only a coincidence.
 
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bikerthai
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Fri Feb 07, 2020 3:04 pm

YYZYYT wrote:
The difference that modern tech makes is stunning.


As far as I know,. Until the 787 and A350, airplane designers do not dwell on crumple zone.

Most of the safety improvements to aircrafts seems to be in the improved systems. To which he A320 probably has the advantage. Systems improvement on the MAX should have made the plane safer. Unfortunately the additional flaw made it worst.

bt
Intelligent seeks knowledge. Enlightened seeks wisdom.
 
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DeltaMD90
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Fri Feb 07, 2020 3:22 pm

PlymSpotter wrote:
DeltaMD90 wrote:
Yes, I understand, I still think it's a silly debate. A 737 flying off a cliff at 60 knots and breaking into 3 pieces vs an A320 flying off a cliff and... breaking up into just 1 or something?

There is plenty to discuss in the 737 vs A320 debate but I think it's kinda pointless to think how another airframe would handle flying off this cliff


I disagree - it absolutely is not pointless when a crash in which the aircraft maintains structural integrity is more likely to be survivable than one where the fuselage breaks apart.

I can agree with that, but not in a case like this.

Using an extreme examples to demonstrate a point, let's fly a 737 and an A320 into the ground from FL320. Would we care if the 737 broke into more pieces than the A320? Of course not.

Some incidents are just unfortunate and plugging in different airframes just doesn't make any sense. If they went off into the grass at 40 knots and the A320 was ok and the 737 was obliterated, ok we have a problem. But this thing went off a cliff at a fairly high speed. For that, I cannot fault any airliner for the result.

Now maybe you can blame the airliner for ending up in that situation, but again, the pilots choosing to land the thing on a wet runway and absurd tailwind? How is THAT the 737s fault? Higher approach speed? No "quit landing with such a strong tailwind you dummy" aural warning? Irrelevant if the pilots choose to fly the thing way outside of a safe environment

737 vs A320 survivability is a valid debate. Not in this case, IMO.
 
WIederling
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Fri Feb 07, 2020 5:52 pm

CALTECH wrote:
The EASA, FAA and other civilian aircraft regulatory agencies around the world need to be contacted immediately. This 'trend' of 737 fuselages breaking apart on overrun incidents must be stopped.

https://static.independent.co.uk/s3fs-p ... turkey.jpg


Just fast enough to go over the brink. What do you expect to happen here ( to prove something or not ) ?
Murphy is an optimist
 
kayik
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Fri Feb 07, 2020 7:15 pm

3 ladies lost their lives. Media says they were sitting side by side on the 6th row. Not sure how accurate is this info but better to note the 6th row on 737. Trapped between seats.
 
kayik
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Fri Feb 07, 2020 7:22 pm

So, the 16g thing is not a joke.
 
morrisond
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Fri Feb 07, 2020 7:38 pm

kayik wrote:
So, the 16g thing is not a joke.


16G is not that much.

An 80KG Belted Person will experience 16G in an 28.5KM/h crash. 5G is 16KM/h - it's not that big of a difference.

Aircraft are not crash structures you are lucky to walk away from any air crash with the typical speeds they operate at.

https://www.omnicalculator.com/physics/car-crash-force

But yes if you happen to hit something at less than 28.5km/h but more than 16 km/h in an A320 you have a higher likelihood of no injury.
 
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zeke
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Sat Feb 08, 2020 12:41 pm

BA777FO wrote:
I am stunned that you condone landing beyond the touchdown zone, especially if you're a TRI/TRE. You're absolutely correct that a rejected landing can be flown right up until reverse selection, so why engage in a normalisation of deviance? A rejected landing is safer than a landing beyond the TDZ. Where do you draw the line? Happy landing halfway down a dry 3,000m runway? What about a wet one? A wet one with a 10kt tailwind? 2,500m with a 10kt tailwind? How would you determine that you're not beyond halfway down the runway when the TDZ markings have long disappeared behind you?


Could I ask you to describe your decision process fuel a fuel diversion at your destination, do you use a minimum indicated and departure - burn as your decision point, i.e. do you use the amount of fuel you have remaining or do you use the amount of fuel you started with ?

The answer to your question is a landing distance assessment prior to landing, nominating the runway exit, and knowing remaining margin after the factored landing distance, much the same logic used for when to divert for fuel. By knowing your remaining margin I have a feature normally a taxiway exit which is my line. Yes in an ideal world every landing should be in the zone, but the world is not ideal.

The conditions they had on the day are not uncommon for DXB, tailwind on final becoming a 20 kts positive shear, OAT of 49 degrees. I wold have briefed the possibility of the positive shear, that with the high temperature could result in thermals and and its tendency to cause a float. Our company airport notes for DXB have had cautions of low level shear in them for longer than I can remember.

If I were to ask any of your colleagues if a 777 would stop on a remaining amount of dry runway, with 8 kts of headwind, I would expect every single one of them would say no issue. The amount of runway behind you is a useless metric, that is like quoting the maximum capacity of your fuel tank when running on fumes.

If I recall the report they did the numbers, they determined that the aircraft could have successfully completed the landing with the remaining runway distance without even using reverse.

BA777FO wrote:
Interesting interpretation of the Emirates incident though; their failing was hitting TO/GA expecting the thrust levers to advance despite the AFDS TO/GA mode being unavailable at low radio altitudes. The PF didn't monitor the FMAS, otherwise he'd have realised he didn't have THR / TOGA / TOGA. The PF didn't follow the thrust levers otherwise he'd have realised his selection of TO/GA did nothing. Neither of them had the N1 in their scan, the FMAs or thrust lever position. Their lack of awareness was in flying the aircraft, not how much runway they had infront of them.


If I recall correctly the report stated there was no rejected landing procedure in their manuals, ie how to go around after the wheels had touched the runway.

BA777FO wrote:
How many flights have experienced a runway excursion when the aircraft met the stable approach criteria at 1,000ft and maintained them all the way to touchdown and landed within the touchdown zone? Just about every excursion I can think of was either the result of an unstable approach, a touchdown beyond the touchdown zone or both.


Lots, landing in the zone off a stable approach does not guarantee anything. It is much better now after the Southwest overrun.
“Don't be a show-off. Never be too proud to turn back. There are old pilots and bold pilots, but no old, bold pilots.” E. Hamilton Lee, 1949
 
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bikerthai
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Sat Feb 08, 2020 3:19 pm

kayik wrote:
3 ladies lost their lives. Media says they were sitting side by side on the 6th row.


So if this is true, can someone corellate whether the 6th row would have been at the fuselage break?

It would only go so far to attribute the deaths in the 737 breaking up as the rear section also broke.

Again, we will not get the whole story until the investigation is complete. But now is the time to speculate.

bt
Intelligent seeks knowledge. Enlightened seeks wisdom.
 
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DeltaMD90
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Sat Feb 08, 2020 3:35 pm

bikerthai wrote:
kayik wrote:
3 ladies lost their lives. Media says they were sitting side by side on the 6th row.


So if this is true, can someone corellate whether the 6th row would have been at the fuselage break?

It would only go so far to attribute the deaths in the 737 breaking up as the rear section also broke.

Again, we will not get the whole story until the investigation is complete. But now is the time to speculate.

bt

The cause of the accident is landing on a wet runway with a huge tailwind and going off the end at ~60knots down a cliff

I feel like I'm the crazy one, this seems so obvious but people are talking about weak fuselages and stuff... The pilots made a huge error and put the plane in a situation where it is ridiculous to expect any aircraft to stay in one piece

I'm probably just repeating myself and need to stop posting, I know I plenty apparently disagree with me, but does anyone agree with me? It's weird looking at a situation that is so obvious yet so many come to a different conclusions, makes one feel crazy :splat:
 
AABusDrvr
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Sat Feb 08, 2020 4:12 pm

zeke wrote:
BA777FO wrote:
I am stunned that you condone landing beyond the touchdown zone, especially if you're a TRI/TRE. You're absolutely correct that a rejected landing can be flown right up until reverse selection, so why engage in a normalisation of deviance? A rejected landing is safer than a landing beyond the TDZ. Where do you draw the line? Happy landing halfway down a dry 3,000m runway? What about a wet one? A wet one with a 10kt tailwind? 2,500m with a 10kt tailwind? How would you determine that you're not beyond halfway down the runway when the TDZ markings have long disappeared behind you?


Could I ask you to describe your decision process fuel a fuel diversion at your destination, do you use a minimum indicated and departure - burn as your decision point, i.e. do you use the amount of fuel you have remaining or do you use the amount of fuel you started with ?

The answer to your question is a landing distance assessment prior to landing, nominating the runway exit, and knowing remaining margin after the factored landing distance, much the same logic used for when to divert for fuel. By knowing your remaining margin I have a feature normally a taxiway exit which is my line. Yes in an ideal world every landing should be in the zone, but the world is not ideal.

The conditions they had on the day are not uncommon for DXB, tailwind on final becoming a 20 kts positive shear, OAT of 49 degrees. I wold have briefed the possibility of the positive shear, that with the high temperature could result in thermals and and its tendency to cause a float. Our company airport notes for DXB have had cautions of low level shear in them for longer than I can remember.

If I were to ask any of your colleagues if a 777 would stop on a remaining amount of dry runway, with 8 kts of headwind, I would expect every single one of them would say no issue. The amount of runway behind you is a useless metric, that is like quoting the maximum capacity of your fuel tank when running on fumes.

If I recall the report they did the numbers, they determined that the aircraft could have successfully completed the landing with the remaining runway distance without even using reverse.

BA777FO wrote:
Interesting interpretation of the Emirates incident though; their failing was hitting TO/GA expecting the thrust levers to advance despite the AFDS TO/GA mode being unavailable at low radio altitudes. The PF didn't monitor the FMAS, otherwise he'd have realised he didn't have THR / TOGA / TOGA. The PF didn't follow the thrust levers otherwise he'd have realised his selection of TO/GA did nothing. Neither of them had the N1 in their scan, the FMAs or thrust lever position. Their lack of awareness was in flying the aircraft, not how much runway they had infront of them.


If I recall correctly the report stated there was no rejected landing procedure in their manuals, ie how to go around after the wheels had touched the runway.

BA777FO wrote:
How many flights have experienced a runway excursion when the aircraft met the stable approach criteria at 1,000ft and maintained them all the way to touchdown and landed within the touchdown zone? Just about every excursion I can think of was either the result of an unstable approach, a touchdown beyond the touchdown zone or both.


Lots, landing in the zone off a stable approach does not guarantee anything. It is much better now after the Southwest overrun.



Does your airline have a policy about landing past the TDZ? FOQA program? At my shop, we MUST go around if we have not touched down within the touchdown zone. There isn't any pilot "judgement" allowed. I'm not saying I agree with the policy at all times, but it is what it is. All of our airplanes are FOQA equipped, so if you don't go around (or fly a stable approach/taxi too fast, or a volume of other infractions) the airplane will transmit that, and you will be receiving at phone call, at best.
 
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zeke
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Sat Feb 08, 2020 4:33 pm

AABusDrvr wrote:
Does your airline have a policy about landing past the TDZ? FOQA program?


Our policy is how I outlined above, landing distance assessments, identify runway exit/decision point, and stable by 1000’ AAL.

Normal touchdown should be 1500 plus minus 500, touchdown beyond that it’s up to the captain to assess. Performance limited landings must be flown by the captain.

All aircraft part of FDAP, triggers for fast/slow, long/short, tailwind, spoilers, reverse, auto brake plus lots of others.
“Don't be a show-off. Never be too proud to turn back. There are old pilots and bold pilots, but no old, bold pilots.” E. Hamilton Lee, 1949
 
cuban8
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Sat Feb 08, 2020 4:59 pm

DeltaMD90 wrote:
bikerthai wrote:
kayik wrote:
3 ladies lost their lives. Media says they were sitting side by side on the 6th row.


So if this is true, can someone corellate whether the 6th row would have been at the fuselage break?

It would only go so far to attribute the deaths in the 737 breaking up as the rear section also broke.

Again, we will not get the whole story until the investigation is complete. But now is the time to speculate.

bt

The cause of the accident is landing on a wet runway with a huge tailwind and going off the end at ~60knots down a cliff

I feel like I'm the crazy one, this seems so obvious but people are talking about weak fuselages and stuff... The pilots made a huge error and put the plane in a situation where it is ridiculous to expect any aircraft to stay in one piece

I'm probably just repeating myself and need to stop posting, I know I plenty apparently disagree with me, but does anyone agree with me? It's weird looking at a situation that is so obvious yet so many come to a different conclusions, makes one feel crazy :splat:

Lol, I don’t think you are crazy at all:))
I think everyone agrees with you regarding the cause of the accident. Huge tailwind, wet runway, non stabilized approach and beyond late touchdown are all factors which points in the direction of poor pilot judgement/decision.
That being said, there are many more holes (details) in the Swiss cheese which can be and are being discussed:
- Training of the pilots and their decision making.
- Tower decision to keep the runway in use with the actual winds and weather.
- Location of the airport, especially in relation to the new Istanbul airport departure routing.
- Actual fuel situation and planning.
- Potential management pressure.
- High percentage of Boeing 737 overruns.
- Structure of the Boeing 737 and its requirements.

While I strongly believe this will fall in the severe pilot error category, many sub-categories can be discussed.
When business goes to hell, you get rid of three things. Your private jet, your yacht and your mistress..........and most importantly in that order.
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kayik
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Sat Feb 08, 2020 5:15 pm

cuban8 wrote:
DeltaMD90 wrote:
bikerthai wrote:

So if this is true, can someone corellate whether the 6th row would have been at the fuselage break?

It would only go so far to attribute the deaths in the 737 breaking up as the rear section also broke.

Again, we will not get the whole story until the investigation is complete. But now is the time to speculate.

bt

The cause of the accident is landing on a wet runway with a huge tailwind and going off the end at ~60knots down a cliff

I feel like I'm the crazy one, this seems so obvious but people are talking about weak fuselages and stuff... The pilots made a huge error and put the plane in a situation where it is ridiculous to expect any aircraft to stay in one piece

I'm probably just repeating myself and need to stop posting, I know I plenty apparently disagree with me, but does anyone agree with me? It's weird looking at a situation that is so obvious yet so many come to a different conclusions, makes one feel crazy :splat:

Lol, I don’t think you are crazy at all:))
I think everyone agrees with you regarding the cause of the accident. Huge tailwind, wet runway, non stabilized approach and beyond late touchdown are all factors which points in the direction of poor pilot judgement/decision.
That being said, there are many more holes (details) in the Swiss cheese which can be and are being discussed:
- Training of the pilots and their decision making.
- Tower decision to keep the runway in use with the actual winds and weather.
- Location of the airport, especially in relation to the new Istanbul airport departure routing.
- Actual fuel situation and planning.
- Potential management pressure.
- High percentage of Boeing 737 overruns.
- Structure of the Boeing 737 and its requirements.

While I strongly believe this will fall in the severe pilot error category, many sub-categories can be discussed.


I agree with both of you. It is a severe pilot error.
I will not fly on any form of B737 for the rest of my life, even if it is in "kitten" shape.
For those who can not avoid the monster, little precautions may be of help, you can avoid the 6th row.
 
Winterapfel
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Sat Feb 08, 2020 7:30 pm

For those who want to compare, this map shows the injuries during the Turkish Airlines crash at Schiphol, where the airplane crash in a nose up position and broke into three pieces.

Image
 
bennett123
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Sat Feb 08, 2020 9:09 pm

According to Google Translate the heading are as follows;

fatally injured
critical condition
badly injured
Light Injury
unknown injury
unoccupied seat
 
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DeltaMD90
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Sun Feb 09, 2020 2:30 am

cuban8 wrote:
- High percentage of Boeing 737 overruns.

I won't deny this. But why?

I've seen people say "it's not A, B, C... X, Y, or Z, so the only commonality is the 737, therefore it's the 737." That would be true if the only possiblities were what is listed plus the 737 being flawed, but there are a ton more possibilities. I haven't seen a good reason that actually points to it being a 737 problem.

Of course it could be, but absence of evidence against isn't evidence for.

And again, there may be overall 737 structural issues, but this incident is a poor case study IMO, just like it crashing from altitude would be pretty worthless. No plane was designed nor should be designed to withstand this crash

kayik wrote:
I will not fly on any form of B737 for the rest of my life, even if it is in "kitten" shape.
For those who can not avoid the monster, little precautions may be of help, you can avoid the 6th row.

Really though? I think we are having first world problems, and avoiding 737s is pretty dramatic. I'd fly a not-fixed MAX right now if I had to. Flying these days is absurdly safe, it takes thousands and thousands of flights to actually put yourself in danger even on an aircraft such as the MAX. Even with the 2 MAX crashes, you'd have to fly on (tens of?) THOUSANDS of flights before hitting these incidents

Idk, I find myself pretty cautious but also realistic. I think anyone that drives around in a car is in more danger than flying a non-fixed MAX, let alone any 737. I can't blame someone for choosing a 320 over a 737 given the choice, but to freak out over one...? Sounds like living-in-a-plastic-bubble level of caution
 
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bikerthai
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Sun Feb 09, 2020 3:39 pm

Agreed with those who think it is blaming the death on the airframe is premature.

But that chart provided by Winterapfel is really interesting and seems to confirm the general feeling that the wing box is the safest place to be during a survivable crash for any aircraft.

The other interesting tidbit is that the ailse seat is seems to be more vulnerable. The could be some reason for this, also the floor may deflect more at the middle.

When I fly with my family, I know now to take the ailse seat and save the window side to my family.


bt

PS. Note that the middle seats seems to care the best. Perhaps this is because of the location of the seat legs and how the end seats get more whipping action from the cantelever effect.
Intelligent seeks knowledge. Enlightened seeks wisdom.
 
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Aesma
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Sun Feb 09, 2020 5:00 pm

I don't know if this was discussed in relation to fuselages breaking up :

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TACA_Flight_390
New Technology is the name we give to stuff that doesn't work yet. Douglas Adams
 
Bhoy
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Sun Feb 09, 2020 5:02 pm

bikerthai wrote:
Agreed with those who think it is blaming the death on the airframe is premature.

But that chart provided by Winterapfel is really interesting and seems to confirm the general feeling that the wing box is the safest place to be during a survivable crash for any aircraft.

The other interesting tidbit is that the ailse seat is seems to be more vulnerable. The could be some reason for this, also the floor may deflect more at the middle.

When I fly with my family, I know now to take the ailse seat and save the window side to my family.


bt

PS. Note that the middle seats seems to care the best. Perhaps this is because of the location of the seat legs and how the end seats get more whipping action from the cantelever effect.

There’s a similar chart in the AAIB report for the crash of BD92, 737-400 G-OBME in 1989.

It shows that apart from rows 5-9, where the fuselage cracked, there were survivors all over the Aircraft, although there were a lot of serious injuries as the floor failed, except in the wing box section.

The chart’s at Appendix 5 here: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.u ... Append.pdf
 
BA777FO
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Sun Feb 09, 2020 6:47 pm

zeke wrote:
BA777FO wrote:
I am stunned that you condone landing beyond the touchdown zone, especially if you're a TRI/TRE. You're absolutely correct that a rejected landing can be flown right up until reverse selection, so why engage in a normalisation of deviance? A rejected landing is safer than a landing beyond the TDZ. Where do you draw the line? Happy landing halfway down a dry 3,000m runway? What about a wet one? A wet one with a 10kt tailwind? 2,500m with a 10kt tailwind? How would you determine that you're not beyond halfway down the runway when the TDZ markings have long disappeared behind you?


Could I ask you to describe your decision process fuel a fuel diversion at your destination, do you use a minimum indicated and departure - burn as your decision point, i.e. do you use the amount of fuel you have remaining or do you use the amount of fuel you started with ?


I divert when the fuel gets to the bottom line I've set. Just as on landing, my bottom line is the end of the touchdown zone. Or do you divert after you've already used some of your diversion fuel because hey ho, you've got some reserve fuel anyway? Like I said, this is about avoiding the normalisation of deviance because that's when you start lining up the holes in your swiss cheese. It's a dangerous, slippery slope.

zeke wrote:
The answer to your question is a landing distance assessment prior to landing, nominating the runway exit, and knowing remaining margin after the factored landing distance, much the same logic used for when to divert for fuel. By knowing your remaining margin I have a feature normally a taxiway exit which is my line. Yes in an ideal world every landing should be in the zone, but the world is not ideal.


Ah, a feature. Why not use the end of the touchdown zone as your feature? I have to be honest, when I'm focused on landing I notice the end of the touchdown zone, I don't really notice the fire station in my peripheral vision half down on the left hand side. You're right, the world isn't ideal, but a go-around buys you another go.

zeke wrote:
The conditions they had on the day are not uncommon for DXB, tailwind on final becoming a 20 kts positive shear, OAT of 49 degrees. I wold have briefed the possibility of the positive shear, that with the high temperature could result in thermals and and its tendency to cause a float. Our company airport notes for DXB have had cautions of low level shear in them for longer than I can remember.


Yep. You'd also brief the go-around and a rejected landing too, right?

If I were to ask any of your colleagues if a 777 would stop on a remaining amount of dry runway, with 8 kts of headwind, I would expect every single one of them would say no issue. The amount of runway behind you is a useless metric, that is like quoting the maximum capacity of your fuel tank when running on fumes.


Every single one of them would say that if the main gear hadn't touched down by the end of the runway they'd go-around too. I bet the guys in the AF A340 that landed half way down the runway in Toronto thought they'd stop too. Same with the AA guys in Kingston that thought their 737 would stop when they landed half way down the runway too. This is the problem with the normalisation of deviance - you get away with landing half way down the runway in Dubai? So you think it'll be fine when you do it on runway 27 at BOM. Then you get really arrogant and think you can land halfway down the runway in SAN...

zeke wrote:
If I recall correctly the report stated there was no rejected landing procedure in their manuals, ie how to go around after the wheels had touched the runway.


It's in the 777 FCOM. Normal Procedures > Amplified Procedures > Rejected Landing Procedure. It's pretty common sense stuff: increase thrust and rotate at Vref, then when airborne the usual TO/GA, go-around flap 20 procedure.

zeke wrote:
Lots, landing in the zone off a stable approach does not guarantee anything. It is much better now after the Southwest overrun.


Can you tell me which flights resulted in a runway excursion when they landed after a stable approach from 1,000ft to touchdown and they touched down within the touchdown zone when their inflight landing calculation determined their required stop distance was less than LDA? The Southwest overrun in Midway assumed a smaller tailwind component and more rapid deployment of reverse thrust, which makes a much bigger difference on a contaminated runway. After all, you wouldn't run takeoff performance for a dry runway when it was covered in 3mm of slush, would you?

A safe landing policy has two components: first, a stable approach all the way to touchdown within the touchdown zone and second, an accurate in-flight landing distance calculation that indicates an adequete stop distance within the LDA. If you land beyond the touchdown zone then your IFLD calculation is invalid.
 
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zeke
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Mon Feb 10, 2020 1:56 am

BA777FO wrote:
I divert when the fuel gets to the bottom line I've set. Just as on landing, my bottom line is the end of the touchdown zone. Or do you divert after you've already used some of your diversion fuel because hey ho, you've got some reserve fuel anyway?


There is no requirement under EU OPS to keep diversion fuel intact at the destination. The fuel I divert with is normally not what is on the flight plan, I will use the realistic flight path and approach to the diversion based upon the actual conditions and our actual weights. The airport that is on the flight plan may not be the airport I choose for a diversion based upon the information I have at the time, not when the flight plan was constructed maybe 20 hours before.

BA777FO wrote:
Ah, a feature. Why not use the end of the touchdown zone as your feature?


Because like EK, in our operation it is not compulsory to perform a go-around or rejected landing if touching down beyond the touchdown zone. Just because BA have that COMPANY POLICY, does not make it a worldwide standard. The EK policy per teh report "The policy of the Operator for aircraft touchdown was stated in OM-A ̶ Touchdown section. Pilots were required to land on the touchdown zone markings (TDZ) and touchdown should be at 1,000 ft, or 300 m, from the threshold if TDZ markings are not available. If touchdown cannot be accomplished within the desired touchdown zone, a go-around should be considered."

BA777FO wrote:
I don't really notice the fire station in my peripheral vision half down on the left hand side. You're right, the world isn't ideal, but a go-around buys you another go.


I notice where the actual touchdown point is, as well as the wind and other factors as that is often a point of discussion when training and checking. With the EK incident it is unlikely that another go would have had much different conditions, you always get those low level shear and thermals when the temperature is above 40 deg C.

BA777FO wrote:
Yep. You'd also brief the go-around and a rejected landing too, right?


Our procedures are to keep briefs relevant, concise and to the point, normal procedures are not briefed.

BA777FO wrote:
Every single one of them would say that if the main gear hadn't touched down by the end of the runway they'd go-around too.


That wasn't my question, my question was with the available runway they had in-front of them when they landed, would they land or go around.

from the report
"The evaluation showed that, to remain within the LDA (3,600 m) of runway 12L, an autobrake level of at least ‘3’, or application of maximum manual braking, with or without the use of reverse thrust, would have been required. If autobrake level ‘2’ was selected, additional application of manual brake would have the effect of reducing the stopping distance to stay within the LDA. For UAE521 flight, of the four selectable autobrake levels, the flight crew had selected level ‘3’ for the landing. "

BA777FO wrote:
I bet the guys in the AF A340 that landed half way down the runway in Toronto thought they'd stop too.


Our procedures involve doing a landing distance assessment before landing, that assessment would have shown it was a performance limited runway with the prevailing conditions. It would have been a captains landing, with the objective of landing exactly on the touchdown point firmly on the wet runway. Wet runways or a tailwind our procedures is to always use maximum reverse unless the landing distance assessment shows that a landing can be achieved with a medium-poor condition.

BA777FO wrote:
It's in the 777 FCOM. Normal Procedures > Amplified Procedures > Rejected Landing Procedure. It's pretty common sense stuff: increase thrust and rotate at Vref, then when airborne the usual TO/GA, go-around flap 20 procedure.


Its in the BA FCOM, it was not in the EK FCOM at the time of the incident.

from the report

"The training manuals used by the flight crew, FCTM, FCOM and the Operator’s B777 training manual, did not contain information that the A/T will not advance the thrust levers to increase engine thrust if the TO/GA switches are pushed before touchdown and the aircraft is below 2 ft radio altitude for more than 3 seconds. Similarly, the training manuals do not mention that the A/T go-around mode becomes available when the aircraft radio altitude increases above 2 ft. The FCOM did not contain procedures for a go-around initiated after touchdown. The FCTM contained a section entitled Go-Around after Touchdown, but the procedure in this section did not differentiate between go-arounds initiated before and after touchdown.
The FCTM stated:
“If a go-around is initiated before touchdown and touchdown occurs, continue with normal go-around procedures. The F/D [flight director] go-around mode will continue to provide go-around guidance commands throughout the maneuver. If a go-around is initiated after touchdown but before thrust reverser selection, continue with normal go-around procedures. As thrust levers are advanced auto speedbrakes retract and autobrakes disarm. The F/D go-around mode will not be available until go-around is selected after becoming airborne.”
For a rejected landing maneuver, the FCTM – Rejected Landing, states:
“A rejected landing maneuver is trained and evaluated by some operators and regulatory agencies. Although the FCOM/QRH does not contain a procedure or maneuver titled Rejected Landing, the requirements of this maneuver can be accomplished by doing the Go-Around Procedure if it is initiated before touchdown. Refer to Chapter 5, Go-Around after Touchdown, for more information on this subject.”

BA777FO wrote:
Can you tell me which flights resulted in a runway excursion when they landed after a stable approach from 1,000ft to touchdown and they touched down within the touchdown zone when their inflight landing calculation determined their required stop distance was less than LDA?


Have a look though this list, you ill find many https://aviation-safety.net/database/ev ... ?Event=REO

BA777FO wrote:
The Southwest overrun in Midway assumed a smaller tailwind component and more rapid deployment of reverse thrust, which makes a much bigger difference on a contaminated runway. After all, you wouldn't run takeoff performance for a dry runway when it was covered in 3mm of slush, would you?


I base my decisions upon the best available information at the time.

BA777FO wrote:
A safe landing policy has two components: first, a stable approach all the way to touchdown within the touchdown zone and second, an accurate in-flight landing distance calculation that indicates an adequete stop distance within the LDA.


That is the BA policy, that is not a certification or regulatory requirement.

BA777FO wrote:
If you land beyond the touchdown zone then your IFLD calculation is invalid.


That is not true. IFLD is a performance calculation based on the weight, CG, MEL/CDL, environment etc at the time touching down 7 seconds or 1500 ft, not at 3000 ft. The result will be the amount of runway required to stop, it will also provide the margin available. You can still land within the touchdown zone and not have enough runway (eg if you only had 200 ft of margin), and you can safely stop if you have a margin of 3500 ft.
“Don't be a show-off. Never be too proud to turn back. There are old pilots and bold pilots, but no old, bold pilots.” E. Hamilton Lee, 1949
 
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bikerthai
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Mon Feb 10, 2020 3:21 am

Bhoy wrote:
bikerthai wrote:
Agreed with those who think it is blaming the death on the airframe is premature.

But that chart provided by Winterapfel is really interesting and seems to confirm the general feeling that the wing box is the safest place to be during a survivable crash for any aircraft.

The other interesting tidbit is that the ailse seat is seems to be more vulnerable. The could be some reason for this, also the floor may deflect more at the middle.

When I fly with my family, I know now to take the ailse seat and save the window side to my family.


bt

PS. Note that the middle seats seems to care the best. Perhaps this is because of the location of the seat legs and how the end seats get more whipping action from the cantelever effect.

There’s a similar chart in the AAIB report for the crash of BD92, 737-400 G-OBME in 1989.

It shows that apart from rows 5-9, where the fuselage cracked, there were survivors all over the Aircraft, although there were a lot of serious injuries as the floor failed, except in the wing box section.

The chart’s at Appendix 5 here: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.u ... Append.pdf


Just scan through the last part. Very interesting. The data on death and injuries seems to corelate with the chart from above.

The other interesting bit is that the fuselage saw G-force higher than the 16g the regulation require.

bt
Intelligent seeks knowledge. Enlightened seeks wisdom.
 
BA777FO
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Mon Feb 10, 2020 6:32 am

zeke wrote:
.


Goodness. All I can say I'm glad I don't know who you operate for so I can be in ignorant bliss if I'm ever on one of your flights.
 
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bikerthai
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Mon Feb 10, 2020 5:56 pm

bikerthai wrote:
The other interesting bit is that the fuselage saw G-force higher than the 16g the regulation require.


Having a little time to think about this a little more. Consider how much higher would the g-force at the seats if the fuselage did not rip, thus disipating some of the crash energy.

Not to say that this energy disipation is significant enough to save those at the break, but it does give pause to any implication that just because the fuselage broke, the design was more detremental to the passengers (all the passengers).

bt
Intelligent seeks knowledge. Enlightened seeks wisdom.
 
asdf
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Mon Feb 10, 2020 6:56 pm

Bhoy wrote:
It shows that apart from rows 5-9, where the fuselage cracked, there were survivors all over the Aircraft, although there were a lot of serious injuries as the floor failed, except in the wing box section.


well
but the wing box section seats are those affected in case of a unconfined engine failure, aren`t they?
 
chimborazo
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Mon Feb 10, 2020 6:59 pm

BA777FO wrote:
zeke wrote:
.


Goodness. All I can say I'm glad I don't know who you operate for so I can be in ignorant bliss if I'm ever on one of your flights.


I suspect there is a clue in the Airbus type training captain’s avatar...

Fascinating discussion between you two here. Zeke makes a good point though: just because your company does things one way doesn’t mean everyone does. And further it does not mean that they are wrong.
 
BA777FO
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Mon Feb 10, 2020 7:10 pm

chimborazo wrote:
BA777FO wrote:
zeke wrote:
.


Goodness. All I can say I'm glad I don't know who you operate for so I can be in ignorant bliss if I'm ever on one of your flights.


I suspect there is a clue in the Airbus type training captain’s avatar...

Fascinating discussion between you two here. Zeke makes a good point though: just because your company does things one way doesn’t mean everyone does. And further it does not mean that they are wrong.


I can appreciate that point. There are plenty of things that are relatively unique to us: the monitored approach, on Boeing fleets the PM selecting reverse thrust etc. But some things are done a certain way to avoid lining up the proverbial holes in the swiss cheese. Normalisation of deviance does just that.

I see the avatar now...interestingly I believe his airline was the reason we moved our stable approach criteria to 1,000ft aal. I'm a big believer in sharing best practice.
 
WIederling
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Mon Feb 10, 2020 7:30 pm

bikerthai wrote:
Not to say that this energy disipation is significant enough to save those at the break, but it does give pause to any implication that just because the fuselage broke, the design was more detremental to the passengers (all the passengers).

bt

Energy wise the best outcome for passengers is being decelerated with the core fuselage mass.

Energy is consumed via deforming the surroundings.
Being thrown out is deadly. ( Like out of a broken fuselage due seats shorn off.)
Being released ( with seat, without ) and then coming up hard against parts of the airplane is deadly.

compare to car accidents. Leaving via doors coming open or through the windshield ist
much deadlier than being well attached to the seat that again is well attached to the car body
inside the deformation resistant passenger cell surrounded by crumple zones.
I am regularly surprised that after car crashes with complex "flight" path ( rolled, tumbled, against obstacles )
and for a high end car passengers can often get out or be extracted with only comparatively minor injuries.
Murphy is an optimist
 
chimborazo
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Mon Feb 10, 2020 7:50 pm

WIederling wrote:
bikerthai wrote:
Not to say that this energy disipation is significant enough to save those at the break, but it does give pause to any implication that just because the fuselage broke, the design was more detremental to the passengers (all the passengers).

bt

Energy wise the best outcome for passengers is being decelerated with the core fuselage mass.

Energy is consumed via deforming the surroundings.
Being thrown out is deadly. ( Like out of a broken fuselage due seats shorn off.)
Being released ( with seat, without ) and then coming up hard against parts of the airplane is deadly.

compare to car accidents. Leaving via doors coming open or through the windshield ist
much deadlier than being well attached to the seat that again is well attached to the car body
inside the deformation resistant passenger cell surrounded by crumple zones.
I am regularly surprised that after car crashes with complex "flight" path ( rolled, tumbled, against obstacles )
and for a high end car passengers can often get out or be extracted with only comparatively minor injuries.


And it seems that it’s always the drunk and dangerous driving scumbag that gets the protection of the superb engineering that goes into modern car safety and the poor innocent who gets caught up in it that happens to just been in the wrong place to exploit where the weakness may be in the design.

Back OT: the energy to rip open a reinforced tube as strong as a plane fuselage (even an old design) like a tin can is massive. Ironically, although it may be there that has caused the fatal and possibly other life-changing energies, the tearing may have dissipated energy that saved others elsewhere from more serious injuries. As you stated: the ones who stay strapped in place generally get less affected as the structure around deforms them.
 
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bikerthai
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Mon Feb 10, 2020 8:15 pm

asdf wrote:
wellbut the wing box section seats are those affected in case of a unconfined engine failure, aren`t they?


Actually, this is a somewhat complex question. Typically there is two types of unconfined blade failures: The Fan blades and the compressor/turbine blades.

Fan blades contains massive amount of energy. that is why the fan case have the typical Kevlar armor. Although with the composite fan blades, the blades would shatter and the only potential projectile would comes from the root which usually do not come off the disc. Fan blades failure usually causes the fan blade parts to go sideway and forward (section 43) and not at the wing box.

Turbine blades and compressor blades are smaller. These are the one that potentially hit the wing box. But at their size, hopefully the blade would be stopped by the wing box. It's the ones that miss the wing box that has potential to kill someone.

bt
Intelligent seeks knowledge. Enlightened seeks wisdom.
 
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zeke
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Mon Feb 10, 2020 8:32 pm

chimborazo wrote:
Fascinating discussion between you two here. Zeke makes a good point though: just because your company does things one way doesn’t mean everyone does. And further it does not mean that they are wrong.


Exactly, it’s ignorant to think every airline has the same procedures in their operations manual and FCOM as BA, they are manuals that are approved and maintained for a specific operator. It has been possible in BA to get a narrow body command after only a year or two of joining the company, their company procedures need to be written for the lowest common denominator which could be an very inexperienced commander. Every airline has subtle differences, there is no single definition for a stabilized approach, our procedures closely follow the Flight Safety Foundations “Go-Around Decision-Making and Execution Project”. https://flightsafety.org/wp-content/upl ... _final.pdf

That report states

“Environmental variability can have a significant effect on landing performance and desired touchdown points. Operators should consider giving flight crews the tools and guidelines to determine when it makes sense to modify or adjust landing and go-around policies for safety, and possibly operational efficiency. It can be difficult for some operators to consider allowing a crew to land beyond the TDZ; however, landing performance, combined with sound guidance and policies for operating outside normal definitions, makes sense when safe operations are assured.

Problems can develop when environmental conditions are such that operating outside established policies makes sense, but there are no guiding principles on how to accomplish this. For example, an aircraft landing on a 12,000-ft (3.7-km) runway requires a 3,500-ft (1-km) landing distance. Although the company policy states that a go-around should be initiated if touchdown does not occur inside the TDZ, is it the best course of action as opposed to an option of extending the touchdown point to 4,000 ft (1.2 km), for example? Certainly, the answer is yes, if the 4,000-ft mark is not definable. However, if the flight crew can identify this point and if they have briefed the revision to the policy, is it still the best course of action to go around? In this case, the transfer of risk to a go-around is questionable. A revised touchdown point can be determined by citing a known distance point along the runway (e.g., taxiway marking, runway distance marker or time period — one second approximates 250 ft (76 m) in distance).”

The Flight Safety Foundation has been studying aircraft landing accidents for some time now in an attempt to raise awareness, and develop guidelines to reduced the number of accidents in this phase of flight, their studies have shown that 52% of runway excursions develop from stabilized approaches.

Image from https://www.icao.int/SAM/Documents/2014 ... Making.pdf
“Don't be a show-off. Never be too proud to turn back. There are old pilots and bold pilots, but no old, bold pilots.” E. Hamilton Lee, 1949
 
chimborazo
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Tue Feb 11, 2020 7:08 pm

zeke wrote:
chimborazo wrote:
Fascinating discussion between you two here. Zeke makes a good point though: just because your company does things one way doesn’t mean everyone does. And further it does not mean that they are wrong.


Exactly, it’s ignorant to think every airline has the same procedures in their operations manual and FCOM as BA, they are manuals that are approved and maintained for a specific operator. It has been possible in BA to get a narrow body command after only a year or two of joining the company, their company procedures need to be written for the lowest common denominator which could be an very inexperienced commander. Every airline has subtle differences, there is no single definition for a stabilized approach, our procedures closely follow the Flight Safety Foundations “Go-Around Decision-Making and Execution Project”. https://flightsafety.org/wp-content/upl ... _final.pdf

That report states

“Environmental variability can have a significant effect on landing performance and desired touchdown points. Operators should consider giving flight crews the tools and guidelines to determine when it makes sense to modify or adjust landing and go-around policies for safety, and possibly operational efficiency. It can be difficult for some operators to consider allowing a crew to land beyond the TDZ; however, landing performance, combined with sound guidance and policies for operating outside normal definitions, makes sense when safe operations are assured.

Problems can develop when environmental conditions are such that operating outside established policies makes sense, but there are no guiding principles on how to accomplish this. For example, an aircraft landing on a 12,000-ft (3.7-km) runway requires a 3,500-ft (1-km) landing distance. Although the company policy states that a go-around should be initiated if touchdown does not occur inside the TDZ, is it the best course of action as opposed to an option of extending the touchdown point to 4,000 ft (1.2 km), for example? Certainly, the answer is yes, if the 4,000-ft mark is not definable. However, if the flight crew can identify this point and if they have briefed the revision to the policy, is it still the best course of action to go around? In this case, the transfer of risk to a go-around is questionable. A revised touchdown point can be determined by citing a known distance point along the runway (e.g., taxiway marking, runway distance marker or time period — one second approximates 250 ft (76 m) in distance).”

The Flight Safety Foundation has been studying aircraft landing accidents for some time now in an attempt to raise awareness, and develop guidelines to reduced the number of accidents in this phase of flight, their studies have shown that 52% of runway excursions develop from stabilized approaches.

Image from https://www.icao.int/SAM/Documents/2014 ... Making.pdf


Third paragraph: Which is why in my view we have, and always will have, a human captain (and likely still +1 or more other flight crew) on commercial passenger aeroplanes.
 
kayik
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Thu Feb 20, 2020 3:56 pm

FDR and CVR says it is the runway, not the pilots according ro Turkish media.
 
kayik
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Thu Feb 20, 2020 4:07 pm

1. Lightning strike juat before landing, FO was focused on the electronics.
2. The tower informed the pilots about the 2 planes that chose to go around before them, in turkish. Dutch FO did not understand it. Captain did.
3. Tail wind was below the tolerance limits.
4. Pilots saw the plane took off confirming that everything was normal.
5.They slowed the plane down to 98km/h. No hard brake. They made the announcement for the use of cell phones. At 5hat point tail wind inreased to 51km/h from 26, pushed the plane.
6. Pilots decided to use the last exit. Started breaking again.
7. Last 700 meters brakes did not hold. The plane was actually sliding, because of the rubber on this end of the runway..
8. Stopway was not sufficient
9. The cliff and the wall holding the cliff resulted in hull loss.

http://www.diken.com.tr/pegasus-kazasin ... un-pistte/
 
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zeke
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Thu Feb 20, 2020 4:38 pm

kayik wrote:
7. Last 700 meters brakes did not hold. The plane was actually sliding, because of the rubber on this end of the runway.


There was a NOTAM indicating rubber deposits on the runway at the time

LTFJ-A0678/20
From: 3/2/2020 20:30 UTC
To: 21/2/2020 12:30 UTC
TIRE TRACK REMOVEL WORKING FOR RWY 06/24 ALL TFC ADVICE ATC INST.

Often the wording used is “Rubber deposit removal in process”.

In the touchdown zone for the far end which is the last 700 meters where there is rubber from landings in the opposite direction, often there is also a thin film of fuel and oil, that combined with rain becomes a deadly combination.

The way to overcome this is actually counterintuitive, take the feet off the brakes, let the wheels spin up and regain traction then brake again.
“Don't be a show-off. Never be too proud to turn back. There are old pilots and bold pilots, but no old, bold pilots.” E. Hamilton Lee, 1949
 
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bikerthai
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Thu Feb 20, 2020 5:26 pm

zeke wrote:
The way to overcome this is actually counterintuitive, take the feet off the brakes, let the wheels spin up and regain traction then brake again.


?? I thought all commercial planes now have anti-lock brakes??

Is this not the case, or would it not have helped anyway?

bt
Intelligent seeks knowledge. Enlightened seeks wisdom.
 
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zeke
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Thu Feb 20, 2020 5:46 pm

bikerthai wrote:
?? I thought all commercial planes now have anti-lock brakes??

Is this not the case, or would it not have helped anyway?

bt


The reference to the rubber on the runway and the account presented is indicative of viscous hydroplaning to me, where anti-skid is better for aquaplaning (dynamic hydroplaning).

Think of it with your car, anti-skid will work on a wet road, on an icy road normal tyres don’t work as the underlying surface friction to enable braking is not there, so you have winter tyres and chains.
“Don't be a show-off. Never be too proud to turn back. There are old pilots and bold pilots, but no old, bold pilots.” E. Hamilton Lee, 1949
 
asuflyer
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Tue Feb 25, 2020 1:56 am

The captain of the flight has been arrested. The FO told investigators that the aircraft was struck by lightning.

https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2020/0 ... plane.html
https://www.sabah.com.tr/dunya/2020/02/ ... flas-karar
 
CO764
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Re: Pegasus Airlines Flight PC2193 Runway Overrun at Istanbul (SAW)

Wed Feb 26, 2020 12:02 am

This article has some more details on captain Arslan's testimony: https://www.news1.news/2020/02/details- ... pilot.html

It's apparently a direct translation of this article in Turkish: https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/tutuklan ... vIlXWqGFQg

A few important points:

He defends his decision to land, apparently claiming that the aircraft had previously been struck by lightning and he wanted to get on the ground ASAP: "My fault [sic] here was to land safely on the landing due to lightning. The values ​​in question were within the limit." Not entirely sure what he means here; this could be a mistranslation.

"The company states that it should not be landed in tail winds higher than 15 knots. On the day of the incident, the tail wind of my plane is 14 knots. It does not constitute an obstacle for our landing." I'm no pilot, but does 190 kts GS at < 1000 feet in a 737 really correspond to a 14-knot tailwind?! (assuming their IAS was relatively close to Vapp)

"When Mahmut Arslan was noticed that the speed of the plane was 84 knots due to the rear wind, and that he did not slow down spontaneously, 6 seconds after the manual brake was asked, “It is not possible to follow the speed of the plane after landing. This task belongs to the auxiliary pilot because I have to follow the runway after landing. The observation of all abnormalities belongs to the auxiliary pilot. I was not warned by the co-pilot. Therefore, when I noticed after 6 seconds, I might have braked."" So, he blames his co-pilot for his own decision not to begin manual braking sooner. Class act.

He also blames the airport for not cleaning tire tracks on the end of the runway: "The runway we used was 06 track. But the end of the runway was in the direction of 2-4 landing runway. For this reason there were plenty of tire tracks. These tire tracks should be cleaned periodically. [...] The runway has not been cleaned periodically and slippery ground has been formed. In addition, there is no asphalt arrangement required for the drainage of the water on the runways. In addition, the absence of a stopway area at the end of the runway and the abyss in the continuation is the chain of faults in the occurrence of this accident."

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