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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Sun Mar 01, 2020 8:36 pm

CriticalPoint wrote:
With that said Unreliable Airspeed is the most difficult procedure for pilots. Aircraft fly in 3 dimensions and when you are in the clouds or at night with no horizon it is impossible to get your mind to overcome spatial disorientation. When you lose an AOA and or other sensor and you AP kicks off you have to figure out which data being given to you is correct.

I don’t care how experienced you are it is a struggle. Add in top of that an 8 page Boeing checklist filled with what is no longer working or may be working plus additional procedures that must be accomplished and it gets ugly. The main goal is to not crash. And if you can successfully recover the aircraft it doesn’t matter how ugly everything in between was.

If the FAA demands perfection they will never get it. It is too complicated. The fact that these pilots survived in the sim is a major plus and good for them.

Apparently this is not how FAA is viewing things, at least according to Bloomberg's reporting of FAA's letter to Boeing.

I wonder if FAA would deem JT043 a failure because procedures weren't followed yet everyone on board survived without injury.

I wonder if pass/fail criteria other than survival can be developed, given how many different scenarios there are.
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Ertro
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Sun Mar 01, 2020 9:31 pm

In this kind of topic where new data comes constantly to potentionally contradict previous datapoints it is silly to lock ones position so hard that there is even a need to claim consistency. 99% of writers have managed their position better meaning avoiding painting themselves into a corner where they cannot take new data with open arms without fear that some unexpected new data would ruin their consistency. I am not consistent and I am proud of that. I can take completely new viewpoint tomorrow if there is new data that supports that change.
 
hivue
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Sun Mar 01, 2020 9:38 pm

CriticalPoint wrote:
If the FAA demands perfection they will never get it. It is too complicated. The fact that these pilots survived in the sim is a major plus and good for them.


:checkmark: The " the FAA wants more training" story seems to imply that the FAA will not let the MAX fly again until no pilot needs to "struggle" with emergency procedures, IRL or in the sim. If this is the case then the posters saying the MAX will never RTS are correct.
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Sun Mar 01, 2020 10:31 pm

hivue wrote:
CriticalPoint wrote:
If the FAA demands perfection they will never get it. It is too complicated. The fact that these pilots survived in the sim is a major plus and good for them.

:checkmark: The " the FAA wants more training" story seems to imply that the FAA will not let the MAX fly again until no pilot needs to "struggle" with emergency procedures, IRL or in the sim. If this is the case then the posters saying the MAX will never RTS are correct.

The fact is we all want pilots who do not struggle with emergency procedures. I think the main area of contention will be how to decide if the pilot is struggling or not. I don't know if FAA is looking for perfection. The Bloomberg article said:

The tests are part of federal requirements that airliner systems must be relatively intuitive and average pilots can perform the procedures necessary to respond to failures and emergencies.

Ref: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... -be-needed

I think this can be problematic for Boeing since they will be tasked with coming up with a set of procedures that all the world's regulators agree are relatively intuitive and can be performed by average pilots. Even though the 737 has been flying for decades and has been approved by regulators at least three times now, I think the regulators are going to use this opportunity to raise the bar. There will be a lot of subjective analysis going on, and that is very hard to get agreement on, it is always that way when dealing with other humans.
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Ertro
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Sun Mar 01, 2020 10:49 pm

It is a problem if there exist something that can be said to be objective proof that something does not conform to regulations. I don't think it is raising the bar or an opportunity. Previously there was no objective proof and now there is proof for both the problem existing and also for the severity of it. It is natural that this results in some kind of change.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Sun Mar 01, 2020 11:05 pm

Ertro wrote:
It is a problem if there exist something that can be said to be objective proof that something does not conform to regulations. I don't think it is raising the bar or an opportunity. Previously there was no objective proof and now there is proof for both the problem existing and also for the severity of it. It is natural that this results in some kind of change.

The most specific part of the Bloomberg article is:

The pilots, who had received additional training proposed by the company, failed to finish emergency checklists related to the automated system involved in both 737 Max crashes, known as Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System.

In addition, they had difficulty with emergency procedures related to sensor failures, erroneous altitude and airspeed readings and the autopilot, among others, according to the letter.

The tests also showed that some pilots were confused about how the autopilot behaved in some circumstances and their interactions with the plane’s automated warning systems were distracting.

I'm not sure this provides objective proof for the problem existing. How much confusion is too much? The article used the terms "systems must be relatively intuitive" -- how can that be measured objectively?

Unfortunately the Bloomberg report didn't call out any specific failure to conform to regulations, it just said the pilots made extensive errors in performing emergency procedures.
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CriticalPoint
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Sun Mar 01, 2020 11:16 pm

hivue wrote:
CriticalPoint wrote:
If the FAA demands perfection they will never get it. It is too complicated. The fact that these pilots survived in the sim is a major plus and good for them.


:checkmark: The " the FAA wants more training" story seems to imply that the FAA will not let the MAX fly again until no pilot needs to "struggle" with emergency procedures, IRL or in the sim. If this is the case then the posters saying the MAX will never RTS are correct.


I fly the 787 and Airspeed unreliable is a struggle. It’s the most difficult procedure Iv ever faced
 
FluidFlow
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 5:33 am

Wouldn‘t it be great if Boeing had a system that would help the pilots identify a problem? Like you know a system that displays what is wrong and so it is a bit more intuitive to do the right thing? It can even have a crazy abbreviation like EICAS or something...
 
rheinwaldner
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 7:03 am

Revelation wrote:
bgm wrote:
Aren't pilots put through full sim proficiency checks every 6 months? Pretty sure emergency procedures skills would be tested during that.

Yes, which is why the "extensive" issues (Bloomberg's quote of the FAA letter) is pretty troubling.

Either the FAA is exaggerating, or they are documenting the need for a revamp of training and of proficiency evaluation.

Or the MAX is worse than other aircraft. I am not sure, whether development teams of any other aircraft were ever calling themselves "clowns, supervised by monkeys". So it could be, that building an intuitive cockpit is just too hard if all you´ve got is the antiquated system mess of the 737.
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 8:46 am

CriticalPoint wrote:
hivue wrote:
CriticalPoint wrote:
If the FAA demands perfection they will never get it. It is too complicated. The fact that these pilots survived in the sim is a major plus and good for them.


:checkmark: The " the FAA wants more training" story seems to imply that the FAA will not let the MAX fly again until no pilot needs to "struggle" with emergency procedures, IRL or in the sim. If this is the case then the posters saying the MAX will never RTS are correct.


I fly the 787 and Airspeed unreliable is a struggle. It’s the most difficult procedure Iv ever faced

Interesting to know, but an "airspeed unreliable" alone will probably not make the 787 trim the stab nose down.
:stirthepot: 737-8 MAX: "For all speeds higher than 220 Kts and trim set at a value of 2.5 units, the difficulity level of turning the manual trim wheel was level A (trim wheel not movable)." :stirthepot:
 
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scbriml
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 9:35 am

Revelation wrote:
I'm not sure that's what you were told, but I am sure that is what you heard.


Really?

oschkosch wrote:
I am quite sure that nearly all readers of the grounding threads are fully aware of the way it was "beaten to death" that the accidents were to blame on third world/non USA pilots and that the accidents would never happen in the USA due to the extremely well trained pilots. You may want to throw a blanket over that, but the majority of us will not forget it. I for one am very glad that this new info has come to the public.


So, not just me then?
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swallow
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 10:53 am

[quote="CriticalPoint"][quote="oschkosch"][quote="Revelation"]

The foreign trained pilots did not hit the two switches that are memory items and would have saved their lives......and so they died.

"The crew of Ethiopian Airlines ET302, which crashed with 157 people on board, used the prescribed Stabilator Trim Cut-Out switches to stop MCAS", according to the Wall Street Journal on April 3, 2019.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/ethiopian- ... 1554263276
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Spiderguy252
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 11:08 am

From this discussion it's apparent that the MAX is no closer to RTS than it was at any point in 2019.

Note to Boeing-heads: "The light at the end of the tunnel has been turned off until further notice."
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Aesma
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 11:22 am

hivue wrote:
CriticalPoint wrote:
If the FAA demands perfection they will never get it. It is too complicated. The fact that these pilots survived in the sim is a major plus and good for them.


:checkmark: The " the FAA wants more training" story seems to imply that the FAA will not let the MAX fly again until no pilot needs to "struggle" with emergency procedures, IRL or in the sim. If this is the case then the posters saying the MAX will never RTS are correct.


The pilots knew that they were going to be dealing with MCAS and related problems so they should have had no problem at all.
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planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 11:32 am

Aesma wrote:
hivue wrote:
CriticalPoint wrote:
If the FAA demands perfection they will never get it. It is too complicated. The fact that these pilots survived in the sim is a major plus and good for them.


:checkmark: The " the FAA wants more training" story seems to imply that the FAA will not let the MAX fly again until no pilot needs to "struggle" with emergency procedures, IRL or in the sim. If this is the case then the posters saying the MAX will never RTS are correct.


The pilots knew that they were going to be dealing with MCAS and related problems so they should have had no problem at all.

This is what I don't get. Unless they've been on the moon for the last year, these pilots had to know what they would be tested on. If the FAA selected ME (not a pilot) for this test, I would react instantly because I know exactly what was coming.

This makes no sense. They had to have thrown different failures at them. If they were given similar scenarios to the crash flights and didn't respond properly at this point then I'm very concerned about the quality of the average pilot.
 
asdf
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 11:33 am

Aesma wrote:
hivue wrote:
CriticalPoint wrote:
If the FAA demands perfection they will never get it. It is too complicated. The fact that these pilots survived in the sim is a major plus and good for them.


:checkmark: The " the FAA wants more training" story seems to imply that the FAA will not let the MAX fly again until no pilot needs to "struggle" with emergency procedures, IRL or in the sim. If this is the case then the posters saying the MAX will never RTS are correct.


The pilots knew that they were going to be dealing with MCAS and related problems so they should have had no problem at all.



absolutely

this have been 737MAX crews, they are used to deal with the 737MAX cockpit layouts

they got instructions
they got lessons
they got a course

and they simply had to deal with the issue they have been trained for

and they failed ...
 
StTim
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 11:42 am

I still take issue with the runaway stabiliser comment. The checklist has to my mind a couple of key wording issues that mean it isn't applicable.

1, If the trim switches do not halt the movement it is a runaway. They did - so it wasn't a runaway.

2, The autotrim moves continuously it is a runaway. My view is that continuous is without a break. MCAS didn't operate continuously. It did recur so a better adjective would be continually.
 
asdf
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 11:58 am

Revelation wrote:
hivue wrote:
CriticalPoint wrote:
If the FAA demands perfection they will never get it. It is too complicated. The fact that these pilots survived in the sim is a major plus and good for them.

:checkmark: The " the FAA wants more training" story seems to imply that the FAA will not let the MAX fly again until no pilot needs to "struggle" with emergency procedures, IRL or in the sim. If this is the case then the posters saying the MAX will never RTS are correct.

The fact is we all want pilots who do not struggle with emergency procedures. I think the main area of contention will be how to decide if the pilot is struggling or not. I don't know if FAA is looking for perfection. The Bloomberg article said:

The tests are part of federal requirements that airliner systems must be relatively intuitive and average pilots can perform the procedures necessary to respond to failures and emergencies.

Ref: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... -be-needed

I think this can be problematic for Boeing since they will be tasked with coming up with a set of procedures that all the world's regulators agree are relatively intuitive and can be performed by average pilots. Even though the 737 has been flying for decades and has been approved by regulators at least three times now, I think the regulators are going to use this opportunity to raise the bar. There will be a lot of subjective analysis going on, and that is very hard to get agreement on, it is always that way when dealing with other humans.


is it?

its a simple task to figure out how intuitive it is to regain/do not loose control over an aircraft with a sensor malfunction or over an aircraft with TWO sensors malfunction at the same time

in a manual controlled aircraft, concept based in the 1960, its a pretty extensive task and the logic behind a checklist has to be very smart to get a grip in case of a malfunction

in a fly-by-wire aircraft its a non-event
the crew gets an info about it
thats it
because there are three, four or five sensors of a kind
no need for a extensiv and training intensive check list


you simply have to pay a price if you fly 1960ies Technologie
in the last decades FAA discounts, because they never check on compliance with rules and regulations
now the are doing their job

good for the flying public
not so good for boeing shareholders
 
uta999
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 12:04 pm

Hypothetically, how do you ever recover from building 750 new MAX a/c that will never fly again? What can be salvaged, removed and used again and on what? Could some MAX's be used by the military or cargo operators with modifications? I think up to 85% would need to be written off or scrapped.

Then there is the other small problem of the 5+ years of building no NB at all, while Boeing go back to the drawing board. Bankruptcy or taken over by Airbus seems easier.
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planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 12:24 pm

StTim wrote:
I still take issue with the runaway stabiliser comment. The checklist has to my mind a couple of key wording issues that mean it isn't applicable.

1, If the trim switches do not halt the movement it is a runaway. They did - so it wasn't a runaway.

2, The autotrim moves continuously it is a runaway. My view is that continuous is without a break. MCAS didn't operate continuously. It did recur so a better adjective would be continually.


#1 isn't stated like that in the NNC. As for #2, perhaps they should have used a different word for clarity but your view is not the complete definition of "continuously."

It can also be defined as "repeatedly without exceptions or reversals" which would fit MCAS.

As a check airman with a 737 type certificate has posted on here, if the trim is doing something undesired and uncommanded it should be treated as a runaway, regardless of semantics in the NNC.
 
Noshow
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 12:30 pm

Semantics are highly important. How can the pilots trouble shoot under pressure if the checklist wording is not precise? I wouldn't classify interrupted, uncommanded trim movements as trim runaway neither.
 
asdf
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 12:41 pm

planecane wrote:
... if the trim is doing something undesired and uncommanded it should be treated as a runaway, regardless of semantics in the NNC.


so every activation of MCAS 1.0 should have been classified as a "trim runaway" ?
why did they install it in the first way if they expect the crew to (search for the replaced and renamed cut-out switches and) flip the switches?
Last edited by asdf on Mon Mar 02, 2020 12:42 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 12:42 pm

planecane wrote:
This makes no sense. They had to have thrown different failures at them. If they were given similar scenarios to the crash flights and didn't respond properly at this point then I'm very concerned about the quality of the average pilot.

In testing is it really about the failures themselves or their proper response to the failures?

We know these were test in the simulators, we know that a number of the emergency procedures are now different from what they were on the first version of the MAX, there have been no leaks so my assumption is that the first time they saw these procedures is when they were briefed for the sessions.
MCAS was changed to not turn the a/c into a lawn dart, response to that must have changed.
Dual use computers, procedure to identify if one is faulty is new, since they no longer alternate, spinning up the standby is no longer relevant.
If all the new warning indicators are now active, that is another issue.
How easy would it have been for them to fall back on their old NG or MAX training which are no longer relevant?

We are told that all of them were able to recover, but that is not the issue, the failure is to follow the proper procedure.

So a question, would it have been better to take non-737 pilots give them full conversion training for the MAX which would include all the new procedures and see how they perform?
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 12:57 pm

StTim wrote:
I still take issue with the runaway stabiliser comment. The checklist has to my mind a couple of key wording issues that mean it isn't applicable.

1, If the trim switches do not halt the movement it is a runaway. They did - so it wasn't a runaway.

2, The autotrim moves continuously it is a runaway. My view is that continuous is without a break. MCAS didn't operate continuously. It did recur so a better adjective would be continually.

Ok, this is all related to what, the initial MAX where MCAS truns the a/c into a lawn dart or the new MAX with changes mandated by the FAA, EASA and whoever else? I take it there has been a leak of the new procedures for all the changes made to the emergency and other training manuals?
 
StTim
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 1:04 pm

par13del wrote:
StTim wrote:
I still take issue with the runaway stabiliser comment. The checklist has to my mind a couple of key wording issues that mean it isn't applicable.

1, If the trim switches do not halt the movement it is a runaway. They did - so it wasn't a runaway.

2, The autotrim moves continuously it is a runaway. My view is that continuous is without a break. MCAS didn't operate continuously. It did recur so a better adjective would be continually.

Ok, this is all related to what, the initial MAX where MCAS truns the a/c into a lawn dart or the new MAX with changes mandated by the FAA, EASA and whoever else? I take it there has been a leak of the new procedures for all the changes made to the emergency and other training manuals?

Sorry we had got back to blaming the pilots for not just popping the two circuit breakers leading to the crash.
 
mjoelnir
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 1:07 pm

planecane wrote:
StTim wrote:
I still take issue with the runaway stabiliser comment. The checklist has to my mind a couple of key wording issues that mean it isn't applicable.

1, If the trim switches do not halt the movement it is a runaway. They did - so it wasn't a runaway.

2, The autotrim moves continuously it is a runaway. My view is that continuous is without a break. MCAS didn't operate continuously. It did recur so a better adjective would be continually.


#1 isn't stated like that in the NNC. As for #2, perhaps they should have used a different word for clarity but your view is not the complete definition of "continuously."

It can also be defined as "repeatedly without exceptions or reversals" which would fit MCAS.

As a check airman with a 737 type certificate has posted on here, if the trim is doing something undesired and uncommanded it should be treated as a runaway, regardless of semantics in the NNC.


If you mean repeatedly you should say repeatedly. If you say continuous, you should say continuous.
If repeatedly and continuously both apply, say repeatedly or continuously.
Semantics are important. Be accurate. This wishy washy approach you talk about is dangerous. A checklist should not allow interpretations.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 1:12 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
planecane wrote:
StTim wrote:
I still take issue with the runaway stabiliser comment. The checklist has to my mind a couple of key wording issues that mean it isn't applicable.

1, If the trim switches do not halt the movement it is a runaway. They did - so it wasn't a runaway.

2, The autotrim moves continuously it is a runaway. My view is that continuous is without a break. MCAS didn't operate continuously. It did recur so a better adjective would be continually.


#1 isn't stated like that in the NNC. As for #2, perhaps they should have used a different word for clarity but your view is not the complete definition of "continuously."

It can also be defined as "repeatedly without exceptions or reversals" which would fit MCAS.

As a check airman with a 737 type certificate has posted on here, if the trim is doing something undesired and uncommanded it should be treated as a runaway, regardless of semantics in the NNC.


If you mean repeatedly you should say repeatedly. If you say continuous, you should say continuous.
If repeatedly and continuously both apply, say repeatedly or continuously.
Semantics are important. Be accurate. This wishy washy approach you talk about is dangerous. A checklist should not allow interpretations.


I don't disagree but it isn't really wishy-washy if the word has multiple meanings. During a bombing on a city there are continuous explosions reported. The bombs don't explode non-stop.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 1:13 pm

asdf wrote:
planecane wrote:
... if the trim is doing something undesired and uncommanded it should be treated as a runaway, regardless of semantics in the NNC.


so every activation of MCAS 1.0 should have been classified as a "trim runaway" ?
why did they install it in the first way if they expect the crew to (search for the replaced and renamed cut-out switches and) flip the switches?

The way the NNC was written they could be. Using the "rule of thumb" approach, the trim wouldn't be noticed as "undesired."
 
StTim
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 1:16 pm

The first definition for continuously is "without interruption or gaps".

That is always the definition that should be used in a checklist.
 
Exeiowa
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 1:17 pm

I think people have missed the point.

A checklist was developed to help with an MCAS failure. This checklist seems to either be in adequate or difficult to follow in the situations presented not giving the expected outcomes.

Secondly when writing a checklist it would need to be considered that at the beginning of running a checklist list in scenario the actual problem is unknown, running the correct list becomes important and if you are always thinking MCAS you might go off in the wrong direction initially. That all these planes were recovered in the scenario might seem okay but maybe they expect this to be possible within a shorter time window. Because a safety window is expected. The fact that pilots prepared for the exercise did not meet expectations has probably caused a lot of rethinking.
 
Exeiowa
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 1:19 pm

If we have to get into a discussion of the real meaning of a word in a checklist then we either have a problem or it's covered by explanation in training for those expected to use it.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 2:19 pm

StTim wrote:
par13del wrote:
StTim wrote:
I still take issue with the runaway stabiliser comment. The checklist has to my mind a couple of key wording issues that mean it isn't applicable.

1, If the trim switches do not halt the movement it is a runaway. They did - so it wasn't a runaway.

2, The autotrim moves continuously it is a runaway. My view is that continuous is without a break. MCAS didn't operate continuously. It did recur so a better adjective would be continually.

Ok, this is all related to what, the initial MAX where MCAS truns the a/c into a lawn dart or the new MAX with changes mandated by the FAA, EASA and whoever else? I take it there has been a leak of the new procedures for all the changes made to the emergency and other training manuals?

Sorry we had got back to blaming the pilots for not just popping the two circuit breakers leading to the crash.

So you think the MAX is still grounded because the FAA and EASA want Boeing to go back to implementing that procedure or that the changes they have been mandating are just for show?
 
StTim
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 2:26 pm

par13del wrote:
StTim wrote:
par13del wrote:
Ok, this is all related to what, the initial MAX where MCAS truns the a/c into a lawn dart or the new MAX with changes mandated by the FAA, EASA and whoever else? I take it there has been a leak of the new procedures for all the changes made to the emergency and other training manuals?

Sorry we had got back to blaming the pilots for not just popping the two circuit breakers leading to the crash.

So you think the MAX is still grounded because the FAA and EASA want Boeing to go back to implementing that procedure or that the changes they have been mandating are just for show?


No. I also don't want posters implying the grounding is due to poor piloting!
 
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seahawk
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 3:07 pm

planecane wrote:
StTim wrote:
I still take issue with the runaway stabiliser comment. The checklist has to my mind a couple of key wording issues that mean it isn't applicable.

1, If the trim switches do not halt the movement it is a runaway. They did - so it wasn't a runaway.

2, The autotrim moves continuously it is a runaway. My view is that continuous is without a break. MCAS didn't operate continuously. It did recur so a better adjective would be continually.


#1 isn't stated like that in the NNC. As for #2, perhaps they should have used a different word for clarity but your view is not the complete definition of "continuously."

It can also be defined as "repeatedly without exceptions or reversals" which would fit MCAS.

As a check airman with a 737 type certificate has posted on here, if the trim is doing something undesired and uncommanded it should be treated as a runaway, regardless of semantics in the NNC.


The problem is that the checklist remained unchanged between the NG and the MAX and continuous means different things in both types.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 3:32 pm

seahawk wrote:
planecane wrote:
StTim wrote:
I still take issue with the runaway stabiliser comment. The checklist has to my mind a couple of key wording issues that mean it isn't applicable.

1, If the trim switches do not halt the movement it is a runaway. They did - so it wasn't a runaway.

2, The autotrim moves continuously it is a runaway. My view is that continuous is without a break. MCAS didn't operate continuously. It did recur so a better adjective would be continually.


#1 isn't stated like that in the NNC. As for #2, perhaps they should have used a different word for clarity but your view is not the complete definition of "continuously."

It can also be defined as "repeatedly without exceptions or reversals" which would fit MCAS.

As a check airman with a 737 type certificate has posted on here, if the trim is doing something undesired and uncommanded it should be treated as a runaway, regardless of semantics in the NNC.


The problem is that the checklist remained unchanged between the NG and the MAX and continuous means different things in both types.


Which was a definite issue with Lionair as they had no knowledge that MCAS existed (although it did take them minutes to find any checklist - which is a training issue).

However for ET - according to ET themselves and supposedly documented in the manual's there crews were fully informed on MCAS and what to look for - in that if it was intermittent - and if experienced in flight run runaway trim checklist.

It's all in the back of the ET preliminary report.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 4:05 pm

planecane wrote:
Aesma wrote:
hivue wrote:
:checkmark: The " the FAA wants more training" story seems to imply that the FAA will not let the MAX fly again until no pilot needs to "struggle" with emergency procedures, IRL or in the sim. If this is the case then the posters saying the MAX will never RTS are correct.

The pilots knew that they were going to be dealing with MCAS and related problems so they should have had no problem at all.

This is what I don't get. Unless they've been on the moon for the last year, these pilots had to know what they would be tested on. If the FAA selected ME (not a pilot) for this test, I would react instantly because I know exactly what was coming.

This makes no sense. They had to have thrown different failures at them. If they were given similar scenarios to the crash flights and didn't respond properly at this point then I'm very concerned about the quality of the average pilot.

Yes, that is so. The Bloomberg article make it clear this wasn't just a test of scenarios that would trigger MCAS:

The pilots, who had received additional training proposed by the company, failed to finish emergency checklists related to the automated system involved in both 737 Max crashes, known as Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System.

In addition, they had difficulty with emergency procedures related to sensor failures, erroneous altitude and airspeed readings and the autopilot, among others, according to the letter.

The tests also showed that some pilots were confused about how the autopilot behaved in some circumstances and their interactions with the plane’s automated warning systems were distracting.

We don't know how pilots of other more automated aircraft did, but I suspect the findings would be similar if not worse. Unfortunately FAA did not test other pilots in other aircraft to serve as a control group.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 4:06 pm

CriticalPoint wrote:
oschkosch wrote:
Revelation wrote:
I'm not sure that's what you were told, but I am sure that is what you heard.

I am quite sure that nearly all readers of the grounding threads are fully aware of the way it was "beaten to death" that the accidents were to blame on third world/non USA pilots and that the accidents would never happen in the USA due to the extremely well trained pilots. You may want to throw a blanket over that, but the majority of us will not forget it. I for one am very glad that this new info has come to the public.


The foreign trained pilots did not hit the two switches that are memory items and would have saved their lives......and so they died.
These US trained pilots lived.....seems like prof of training there.


The foreign pilots were handed MCAS 1.0, with bare minimum info and training.

The US pilots were handed MCAS 2.0, received the newly training and failed to reach the expected outcome.

Not sure what point you are trying to make.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 4:06 pm

morrisond wrote:
CriticalPoint wrote:
The foreign trained pilots did not hit the two switches that are memory items and would have saved their lives......and so they died.
These US trained pilots lived.....seems like prof of training there.


I've been pretty consistent through all this - "It's a Worldwide training issue" and gave examples of western pilots who didn't know the trim wheel existed.

The runaway stabilizer procedure is the same for the MAX as the NG. If they couldn't run it for the MAX they wouldn't be able to run it on the NG.

Emergency procedures are taught but as detailed in these pages not all procedures are taught and practiced every Sim session. Time pressures dictate that only one or a few are gone over at a time - it may be years between practising one procedure.


Runaway stabilizer does not equal runaway MCAS.

Therefore comparison to the NG is weak, at best.

You have indeed been pretty consistent in not recognizing the issue is in fact the MAX itself.

But I would agree that poor design in cockpit-pilot interface requires extraordinary training and skills to reach the same safety levels as other planes that do not depend on extraordinary training and skills to reach similar safety levels.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 4:14 pm

CriticalPoint wrote:
The foreign trained pilots did not hit the two switches that are memory items and would have saved their lives......and so they died.

These US trained pilots lived.....seems like prof of training there.

That’s not proof of anything as there is nothing to substantiate this as proof.

In the first case of the “third world” pilots crashing they did not know anything about MCAS and did not recognize it as traditional runaway trim because it is not.

In the second case they did use those almighty switches and then still crashed because the stab was basically out of trim and the manual wheel requires too much force.

In the simulators in the US they were specifically there to test their procedures. They knew exactly why there where there and that it was going to happen. This gets one in the mindset and would have the memory items and procedures and such somewhat cued in their memory; however, they still failed on some level. I believe one of the test groups was also from Mexico not the US and they didn’t crash either.

Then have a look at incident reports and safety reports at any North American airline and you’ll see that many many unsafe things happen all the time... I imagine you would know this working at an airline. Air Canada’s incident at SFO was seconds away from being a far worse disaster than these and they’re not a third world carrier unless you subscribe to the a particularly nationalist type of American exceptionalism that believes Canada basically is the third world...
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 4:14 pm

PW100 wrote:
CriticalPoint wrote:
oschkosch wrote:
I am quite sure that nearly all readers of the grounding threads are fully aware of the way it was "beaten to death" that the accidents were to blame on third world/non USA pilots and that the accidents would never happen in the USA due to the extremely well trained pilots. You may want to throw a blanket over that, but the majority of us will not forget it. I for one am very glad that this new info has come to the public.


The foreign trained pilots did not hit the two switches that are memory items and would have saved their lives......and so they died.
These US trained pilots lived.....seems like prof of training there.



The US pilots were handed MCAS 2.0, received the newly training and failed to reach the expected outcome.

.


With MCAS 2.0, the pilots should be able to maintain control using the elevator even if they didn't do anything else to solve the issue. That's why I'd be interested in specifically what the FAA called a "failure" in this testing.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 4:18 pm

PW100 wrote:
The foreign pilots were handed MCAS 1.0, with bare minimum info and training.

The US pilots were handed MCAS 2.0, received the newly training and failed to reach the expected outcome.

Not sure what point you are trying to make.

Actually all pilots being tested (some were Mexican so it wasn't "US pilots") did land the plane so I'd say they did reach the expected outcome.

While none of the crews committed such egregious mistakes that they lost their planes, the errors were extensive, according to the FAA letter.

Ref: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... -be-needed

As I wrote earlier, it's not clear what standard FAA is applying to these tests nor what the pass/fail criteria is or should be. It's all very subjective, which IMO is very problematic.

Keep in mind all of these folks are certified pilots so someone somewhere thought they were capable of a high standard of flying and signed documents attesting to such, and they all have received passing grades on sim checks every six months of their flying careers. This is why I wrote it seems FAA is raising the bar.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 4:24 pm

PW100 wrote:
morrisond wrote:
CriticalPoint wrote:
The foreign trained pilots did not hit the two switches that are memory items and would have saved their lives......and so they died.
These US trained pilots lived.....seems like prof of training there.


I've been pretty consistent through all this - "It's a Worldwide training issue" and gave examples of western pilots who didn't know the trim wheel existed.

The runaway stabilizer procedure is the same for the MAX as the NG. If they couldn't run it for the MAX they wouldn't be able to run it on the NG.

Emergency procedures are taught but as detailed in these pages not all procedures are taught and practiced every Sim session. Time pressures dictate that only one or a few are gone over at a time - it may be years between practising one procedure.


Runaway stabilizer does not equal runaway MCAS.

Therefore comparison to the NG is weak, at best.

You have indeed been pretty consistent in not recognizing the issue is in fact the MAX itself.

But I would agree that poor design in cockpit-pilot interface requires extraordinary training and skills to reach the same safety levels as other planes that do not depend on extraordinary training and skills to reach similar safety levels.


So what procedure were they supposed to run if they ran into a MCAS problem then?
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 4:24 pm

planecane wrote:
StTim wrote:
I still take issue with the runaway stabiliser comment. The checklist has to my mind a couple of key wording issues that mean it isn't applicable.

1, If the trim switches do not halt the movement it is a runaway. They did - so it wasn't a runaway.

2, The autotrim moves continuously it is a runaway. My view is that continuous is without a break. MCAS didn't operate continuously. It did recur so a better adjective would be continually.


A) #1 isn't stated like that in the NNC. As for #2, perhaps they should have used a different word for clarity but your view is not the complete definition of "continuously."

B) It can also be defined as "repeatedly without exceptions or reversals" which would fit MCAS.

C) As a check airman with a 737 type certificate has posted on here, if the trim is doing something undesired and uncommanded it should be treated as a runaway, regardless of semantics in the NNC.


While I understand what you're saying, just opbserving that your line A) and C) are 100% contradicting each other.

In A) you are saying it is not in the NNC. OK (never mind fundamental discussion of how something can be considered runaway if it obeys to pilot command).

Then in C) you apply your own interpretation (rightfully or not). But then your remark A) would apply to C) as well . . . Can't have it both ways.

Checklists, and especially NNC should be crystral clear, with no room for one's own interpretation.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 4:30 pm

morrisond wrote:
PW100 wrote:
Runaway stabilizer does not equal runaway MCAS.

Therefore comparison to the NG is weak, at best.

You have indeed been pretty consistent in not recognizing the issue is in fact the MAX itself.

But I would agree that poor design in cockpit-pilot interface requires extraordinary training and skills to reach the same safety levels as other planes that do not depend on extraordinary training and skills to reach similar safety levels.


So what procedure were they supposed to run if they ran into a MCAS problem then?


Bingo!

It's called (one of the) root causes to both accidents, considering the limited training and information revealed to flight crew on MCAS 1.0 . . .

And it seems Boeing is struggling to set up a decent training sylabus using existing standards for MCAS 2.0.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 4:37 pm

morrisond wrote:
Which was a definite issue with Lionair as they had no knowledge that MCAS existed (although it did take them minutes to find any checklist - which is a training issue).

However for ET - according to ET themselves and supposedly documented in the manual's there crews were fully informed on MCAS and what to look for - in that if it was intermittent - and if experienced in flight run runaway trim checklist.

It's all in the back of the ET preliminary report.


I just can not remotely comprehend, that even now as MCAS 2.0 training issues are not yet resolved, with all the hindsight info we have today on MCAS 1.0 and 2.0, you continue this line of ËT pilots were fully informed. If that was true, then surely FAA would have no problems today signing off MCAS 2.0 and its associated training (which, unlike the AD, does include sim training sessions).
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 4:38 pm

PW100 wrote:
morrisond wrote:
PW100 wrote:
Runaway stabilizer does not equal runaway MCAS.

Therefore comparison to the NG is weak, at best.

You have indeed been pretty consistent in not recognizing the issue is in fact the MAX itself.

But I would agree that poor design in cockpit-pilot interface requires extraordinary training and skills to reach the same safety levels as other planes that do not depend on extraordinary training and skills to reach similar safety levels.


So what procedure were they supposed to run if they ran into a MCAS problem then?


Bingo!

It's called (one of the) root causes to both accidents, considering the limited training and information revealed to flight crew on MCAS 1.0 . . .

And it seems Boeing is struggling to set up a decent training sylabus using existing standards for MCAS 2.0.


Bingo? I have never heard of that procedure. Is that the one where they just start throwing random switches in the cockpit?

You need to read the last few pages of the ET pre-lim - there was more than enough information in there for any pilot to know what to do - if in fact ET actually gave it to the crews.

You are missing the point several of us are trying to make - it's not Boeing struggling to set up decent training - it's that any crew is struggling with running emergency checklists.

Hence why it looks like the FAA is going to mandate stricter rules for crew response time going forward on all types.

It may have been some years (decades) since Boeing or EASA put real crews into cockpits and tested there reactions to emergency situations vs Test pilots intimately familiar with the procedures demonstrating them during test flights.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 4:41 pm

PW100 wrote:
And it seems Boeing is struggling to set up a decent training sylabus using existing standards for MCAS 2.0.

Is a part of setting up these training scenarios having independent pilots review them in a simulator to see if the assumptions and risk analysis made by the OEM is valid or is this all supposed to be done and completed by the experts with no user review?
Additionally, does the FAA check their requested changes have been implemented prior to testing by users?
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 4:45 pm

morrisond wrote:
PW100 wrote:
morrisond wrote:

I've been pretty consistent through all this - "It's a Worldwide training issue" and gave examples of western pilots who didn't know the trim wheel existed.

The runaway stabilizer procedure is the same for the MAX as the NG. If they couldn't run it for the MAX they wouldn't be able to run it on the NG.

Emergency procedures are taught but as detailed in these pages not all procedures are taught and practiced every Sim session. Time pressures dictate that only one or a few are gone over at a time - it may be years between practising one procedure.


Runaway stabilizer does not equal runaway MCAS.

Therefore comparison to the NG is weak, at best.

You have indeed been pretty consistent in not recognizing the issue is in fact the MAX itself.

But I would agree that poor design in cockpit-pilot interface requires extraordinary training and skills to reach the same safety levels as other planes that do not depend on extraordinary training and skills to reach similar safety levels.


So what procedure were they supposed to run if they ran into a MCAS problem then?


I think that is a question they were struggling to find the answer to.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 4:49 pm

Revelation wrote:
. . . .

Yes, that is so. The Bloomberg article make it clear this wasn't just a test of scenarios that would trigger MCAS:

. . .

We don't know how pilots of other more automated aircraft did, but I suspect the findings would be similar if not worse. Unfortunately FAA did not test other pilots in other aircraft to serve as a control group.


It is my understanding (or interpretation, might be wrong though) that there were two main issues:

1) Cascading indications, that were not necessarily representative for the failure at hand. And therefore Checklist/NNC selection was not intuitive.
Such may not be problem with a low risk failure (such as IFSD) where - apart from uncontrollable engine fire – time is not most critical. But would not fly on a high-risk failure scenario (Catastrophic category) such as runaway MCAS/trim.


2) Cascading failure scenarios, not necessarily related to each other. Checklists/NNC were considered not sufficiently aligned with cockpit indications and/or vice versa.
This is were EICAS would be most helpful.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 5:40 pm

So Boeing on a hiring spree in anticipation of re-starting production.
Seems they are now playing high stakes poker and betting on getting the all clear from the FAA in the near future.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... on-737-max

I wish I was as confident as Boeing about RTS, it could all end in tears.
I hope they are not betting the company on the 737MAX
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