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seahawk
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 5:50 pm

morrisond wrote:
seahawk wrote:
planecane wrote:

#1 isn't stated like that in the NNC. As for #2, perhaps they should have used a different word for clarity but your view is not the complete definition of "continuously."

It can also be defined as "repeatedly without exceptions or reversals" which would fit MCAS.

As a check airman with a 737 type certificate has posted on here, if the trim is doing something undesired and uncommanded it should be treated as a runaway, regardless of semantics in the NNC.


The problem is that the checklist remained unchanged between the NG and the MAX and continuous means different things in both types.


Which was a definite issue with Lionair as they had no knowledge that MCAS existed (although it did take them minutes to find any checklist - which is a training issue).

However for ET - according to ET themselves and supposedly documented in the manual's there crews were fully informed on MCAS and what to look for - in that if it was intermittent - and if experienced in flight run runaway trim checklist.

It's all in the back of the ET preliminary report.


I think nobody disputes that the main factor for the ET crash was crew error. Imho way too much energy has been spent on finding faults of the 737 and way too little has been spent on training better crews for all airliners.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 5:56 pm

PW100 wrote:
It is my understanding (or interpretation, might be wrong though) that there were two main issues:

1) Cascading indications, that were not necessarily representative for the failure at hand. And therefore Checklist/NNC selection was not intuitive.
Such may not be problem with a low risk failure (such as IFSD) where - apart from uncontrollable engine fire – time is not most critical. But would not fly on a high-risk failure scenario (Catastrophic category) such as runaway MCAS/trim.

2) Cascading failure scenarios, not necessarily related to each other. Checklists/NNC were considered not sufficiently aligned with cockpit indications and/or vice versa.
This is were EICAS would be most helpful.

Is it understanding/interpretation, or intuition? It's hard to interpret so much from the little we've been given, IMO.

Regardless, for the sake of argument let's go with your interpretation, and such an interpretation is quite problematic for Boeing.

As I wrote several times my interpretation is the "cosmic ray fix" wasn't simple but it was relatively straight forward and was well covered by prior art in the computer science field. It sounded messy, but really you were keeping the core logic of the system intact and just adding some comparators to the edges of the system and improving the existing active/standby mechanisms to handle an active/active system. You weren't, for instance, changing the logic of the autopilot or automatic landing system.

If it turns out that these "extensive errors" can't be fixed by more focused training and needs something akin to EICAS, my interpretation would be that it's a huge problem for Boeing. We know P-8 is based on 737 and has an EICAS, but P-8 was developed right from the start with the decision to do EICAS in place so all the required changes to bring the required information into the unit were made before the first one was built.

I was going to type in more, but google led me to a ST article:

However, Boeing’s 737, its oldest jet, doesn’t even have EICAS. Behind its sleek-looking pilot flight displays, the jet’s legacy avionics systems have been upgraded piecemeal over 50 years, and the overall system architecture won’t support EICAS.

Installing EICAS on the 737 “would be challenging,” said Mike Carriker, Boeing’s chief pilot for product development, in a brief interview. “There aren’t enough sensors on the 737.” Even if it were possible, it would require a new type certificate and new pilot training.

During development of the MAX, Boeing’s customer airlines made clear they don’t want to pay for such an upgrade.

Ref: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... le-alerts/

It also echos what I said about the bar being raised for future approvals:

Schulze said the NTSB is also recommending that the FAA develop new improved alerting systems that give pilots a clear priority of what to do, for example, telling them which checklist they need to run first when different error messages pop up at the same time.

EICAS does some of that. We think we need to go to the next level,” Schulze said. “We want to see the FAA work with the manufacturers and human factors experts to develop a better design standard.”

That’s a future aspiration.

Boeing's CEO stated concerns about the need for changes in the cockpit was one part of why Boeing shelved NMA.
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 6:20 pm

flyingphil wrote:
So Boeing on a hiring spree in anticipation of re-starting production.
Seems they are now playing high stakes poker and betting on getting the all clear from the FAA in the near future.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... on-737-max

I wish I was as confident as Boeing about RTS, it could all end in tears.
I hope they are not betting the company on the 737MAX

If I recall correctly, they tried hiring folks last year for Moses Lake and other sites for preparing the stored frames, I don't believe they had much success then, maybe things have changed in the employment environment.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 6:31 pm

par13del wrote:
flyingphil wrote:
So Boeing on a hiring spree in anticipation of re-starting production.
Seems they are now playing high stakes poker and betting on getting the all clear from the FAA in the near future.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... on-737-max

I wish I was as confident as Boeing about RTS, it could all end in tears.
I hope they are not betting the company on the 737MAX

If I recall correctly, they tried hiring folks last year for Moses Lake and other sites for preparing the stored frames, I don't believe they had much success then, maybe things have changed in the employment environment.

To be clear, the basis of the article is data showing they are hiring more people even after the decision to stop production was announced.

The data comes from the union that the new employees are obligated to join.
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morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 6:37 pm

Revelation wrote:
PW100 wrote:
It is my understanding (or interpretation, might be wrong though) that there were two main issues:

1) Cascading indications, that were not necessarily representative for the failure at hand. And therefore Checklist/NNC selection was not intuitive.
Such may not be problem with a low risk failure (such as IFSD) where - apart from uncontrollable engine fire – time is not most critical. But would not fly on a high-risk failure scenario (Catastrophic category) such as runaway MCAS/trim.

2) Cascading failure scenarios, not necessarily related to each other. Checklists/NNC were considered not sufficiently aligned with cockpit indications and/or vice versa.
This is were EICAS would be most helpful.

Is it understanding/interpretation, or intuition? It's hard to interpret so much from the little we've been given, IMO.

Regardless, for the sake of argument let's go with your interpretation, and such an interpretation is quite problematic for Boeing.

As I wrote several times my interpretation is the "cosmic ray fix" wasn't simple but it was relatively straight forward and was well covered by prior art in the computer science field. It sounded messy, but really you were keeping the core logic of the system intact and just adding some comparators to the edges of the system and improving the existing active/standby mechanisms to handle an active/active system. You weren't, for instance, changing the logic of the autopilot or automatic landing system.

If it turns out that these "extensive errors" can't be fixed by more focused training and needs something akin to EICAS, my interpretation would be that it's a huge problem for Boeing. We know P-8 is based on 737 and has an EICAS, but P-8 was developed right from the start with the decision to do EICAS in place so all the required changes to bring the required information into the unit were made before the first one was built.

I was going to type in more, but google led me to a ST article:

However, Boeing’s 737, its oldest jet, doesn’t even have EICAS. Behind its sleek-looking pilot flight displays, the jet’s legacy avionics systems have been upgraded piecemeal over 50 years, and the overall system architecture won’t support EICAS.

Installing EICAS on the 737 “would be challenging,” said Mike Carriker, Boeing’s chief pilot for product development, in a brief interview. “There aren’t enough sensors on the 737.” Even if it were possible, it would require a new type certificate and new pilot training.

During development of the MAX, Boeing’s customer airlines made clear they don’t want to pay for such an upgrade.

Ref: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... le-alerts/

It also echos what I said about the bar being raised for future approvals:

Schulze said the NTSB is also recommending that the FAA develop new improved alerting systems that give pilots a clear priority of what to do, for example, telling them which checklist they need to run first when different error messages pop up at the same time.

EICAS does some of that. We think we need to go to the next level,” Schulze said. “We want to see the FAA work with the manufacturers and human factors experts to develop a better design standard.”

That’s a future aspiration.

Boeing's CEO stated concerns about the need for changes in the cockpit was one part of why Boeing shelved NMA.


Or if something bizarre happens you don't understand - just hit the big red button and fly manually. My way of saying dumb it down and turn off all computer assist.

If the computer can figure out which checklist to use - it can run the checklist itself and reconfigure the aircraft - or turn off all the assist systems if something goes wrong it doesn't understand.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 6:44 pm

Interesting comments from the CEO of a supplier to Boeing, Senior Plc:

Squires said he expects to restart production for the Max in the second quarter. Even if the jet’s re-certification is pushed back beyond a target of mid-year for resumed flights, Boeing may not slow things down, he said, having “a pretty clear idea of what they want to do with the supply chain to keep it healthy.”

Ref: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... four-years

This, and the earlier Bloomberg article posted above, seem to indicate that Boeing feels the risk of having the supply chain decay is worse than the risk of building up too much inventory.

It certainly doesn't seem to be the move they would make if they felt FAA was going to make them implement a new system architecture that would support an advanced version of EICAS.
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 7:45 pm

Revelation wrote:
It certainly doesn't seem to be the move they would make if they felt FAA was going to make them implement a new system architecture that would support an advanced version of EICAS.

Not sure if the answer will be allowed to stand, but hhhhmmmmmm...................
Based on how some say the process works, the FAA says make the a/c safer and it is up to Boeing how and what they do, the FAA then checks if it meets their criteria, so time will tell.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 8:18 pm

I think we should seek high standards but should not throw out the baby with the bath water. I think that the passengers on JT043 are happier with their fate than those on JT610. A happy medium needs to be found. We still don't know the nature of what Bloomberg says FAA referred to "extensive errors" were. We don't know if they equate to narrowly miss killing people as some might suggest. Unfortunately this is the only info we have on how FAA is reacting to Boeing's initial submission with regard to training.

I want to point out that all three of the following could be true:
  • Boeing did a terrible job on the design and implementation of MCAS
  • Boeing relied too much on what it thought the pilot's reactions would be, i.e. the "3 second rule"
  • The ET and JT pilots did not perform emergency procedures to a high standard and we should review global pilot training standards

For the 3rd point, let's see what an article quoting Airbus's head of global flight training had to say:

Airbus is adopting a “lead by example” approach. The national authority of a pilot training organization is responsible for approving its programs. “Our implementing a program with this standard is encouraging the authority to follow us and raise the bar at other schools,” says Jean-Michel Bigarre, head of global flight training at Airbus.

Ref: AvWeek: Airbus Takes Aim At Inconsistent Pilot Training Quality

So Airbus's global head of training is saying the bar needs to be raised.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
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sgrow787
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 8:43 pm

planecane wrote:
Aesma wrote:
hivue wrote:

:checkmark: The " the FAA wants more training" story seems to imply that the FAA will not let the MAX fly again until no pilot needs to "struggle" with emergency procedures, IRL or in the sim. If this is the case then the posters saying the MAX will never RTS are correct.


The pilots knew that they were going to be dealing with MCAS and related problems so they should have had no problem at all.

This is what I don't get. Unless they've been on the moon for the last year, these pilots had to know what they would be tested on. If the FAA selected ME (not a pilot) for this test, I would react instantly because I know exactly what was coming.

This makes no sense. They had to have thrown different failures at them. If they were given similar scenarios to the crash flights and didn't respond properly at this point then I'm very concerned about the quality of the average pilot.


MCAS 2.0 was tested against average pilots. The test failed. Is it the pilot or is it MCAS?
Scenario 1
--MCAS activates due to high AOA on both sensors, but for only 1 cycle (as designed)
--Is the Max aerodynamically stable enough for the pilots to recover the high AOA without further help from MCAS?
Scenario 2
--MCAS fails, as designed, to activate during high AOA, when one AOA is bad with offset 20 deg while the other one reads correct high AOA.
--Is the Max aerodynamically stable enough for the pilots to recover the high AOA without any help from MCAS?
--Complicate these scenarios with clouds, low visibility, low altitude.
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.
 
IADFCO
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 9:07 pm

sgrow787 wrote:
[...snip...]
--Is the Max aerodynamically stable enough for the pilots to recover the high AOA without further help from MCAS?
[...snip...]

I agree 100%.

Almost a year has gone by, and still nobody knows (outside Boeing, maybe FAA), what's going on aerodynamically at the engine/pylon/leading edge interface, i.e., the root cause of the MAX problems. No flight test results, no wind tunnel test results, no CFD results.

I thought that some information would come out as part of litigation, but I was wrong. I thought that someone (university? research organization?) would give it a try, at least in simulation -- a RANS analysis might suffice, but I was wrong here too.

We are left with a year-old half-leak from one of the early NYT articles, which would point (maybe, triple maybe) to some form of shock induced separation somewhere around the nacelle, for the high-speed high-g turn case. Nothing for the low speed case. Nothing concerning post-stall behavior.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 9:46 pm

IADFCO wrote:
sgrow787 wrote:
[...snip...]
--Is the Max aerodynamically stable enough for the pilots to recover the high AOA without further help from MCAS?
[...snip...]

I agree 100%.

Almost a year has gone by, and still nobody knows (outside Boeing, maybe FAA), what's going on aerodynamically at the engine/pylon/leading edge interface, i.e., the root cause of the MAX problems. No flight test results, no wind tunnel test results, no CFD results.

I thought that some information would come out as part of litigation, but I was wrong. I thought that someone (university? research organization?) would give it a try, at least in simulation -- a RANS analysis might suffice, but I was wrong here too.

We are left with a year-old half-leak from one of the early NYT articles, which would point (maybe, triple maybe) to some form of shock induced separation somewhere around the nacelle, for the high-speed high-g turn case. Nothing for the low speed case. Nothing concerning post-stall behavior.

Yes this as scary as this is unexpected.
How the regulators could be so paranoid on all the details but ignore the big picture ?
How the pilots could fly an aircraft with some unknown characteristics in case of a single AoA sensor failure ?
Without clear facts, the trust would be difficult to recover.
:stirthepot: 737-8 MAX: "For all speeds higher than 220 Kts and trim set at a value of 2.5 units, the difficulity level of turning the manual trim wheel was level A (trim wheel not movable)." :stirthepot:
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Mon Mar 02, 2020 10:52 pm

seahawk wrote:
morrisond wrote:
seahawk wrote:

The problem is that the checklist remained unchanged between the NG and the MAX and continuous means different things in both types.


Which was a definite issue with Lionair as they had no knowledge that MCAS existed (although it did take them minutes to find any checklist - which is a training issue).

However for ET - according to ET themselves and supposedly documented in the manual's there crews were fully informed on MCAS and what to look for - in that if it was intermittent - and if experienced in flight run runaway trim checklist.

It's all in the back of the ET preliminary report.


I think nobody disputes that the main factor for the ET crash was crew error. Imho way too much energy has been spent on finding faults of the 737 and way too little has been spent on training better crews for all airliners.


But did the ET crew have adequate MCAS simulation time, even if they knew about it? Was there a simple solution where if each crew knew about it these accidents would not have happened?
 
hivue
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 1:28 am

PixelFlight wrote:
IADFCO wrote:
sgrow787 wrote:
[...snip...]
--Is the Max aerodynamically stable enough for the pilots to recover the high AOA without further help from MCAS?
[...snip...]

I agree 100%.

Almost a year has gone by, and still nobody knows (outside Boeing, maybe FAA), what's going on aerodynamically at the engine/pylon/leading edge interface, i.e., the root cause of the MAX problems. No flight test results, no wind tunnel test results, no CFD results.

I thought that some information would come out as part of litigation, but I was wrong. I thought that someone (university? research organization?) would give it a try, at least in simulation -- a RANS analysis might suffice, but I was wrong here too.

We are left with a year-old half-leak from one of the early NYT articles, which would point (maybe, triple maybe) to some form of shock induced separation somewhere around the nacelle, for the high-speed high-g turn case. Nothing for the low speed case. Nothing concerning post-stall behavior.

Yes this as scary as this is unexpected.
How the regulators could be so paranoid on all the details but ignore the big picture ?
How the pilots could fly an aircraft with some unknown characteristics in case of a single AoA sensor failure ?
Without clear facts, the trust would be difficult to recover.


Why this speculation about hypothetical, exotic stall types? If a pilot stalled the MAX with or without MCAS 1.0 active (and it could happen in either situation) why could it not be be a common garden variety aerodynamic stall?
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Francoflier
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 1:59 am

seahawk wrote:
I think nobody disputes that the main factor for the ET crash was crew error. Imho way too much energy has been spent on finding faults of the 737 and way too little has been spent on training better crews for all airliners.


I know you are stirring the pot as usual but yes, many people do. Including all the aviation authorities around the World which have grounded this dangerously botched design for one year now.

Not that this will stop you and the cohort of those who'd rather try to deflect blame away from a greedy corporation they are somehow enamored with.
I'll do my own airline. With Blackjack. And hookers. In fact, forget the airline.
 
IADFCO
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 2:32 am

hivue wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
IADFCO wrote:
I agree 100%.

Almost a year has gone by, and still nobody knows (outside Boeing, maybe FAA), what's going on aerodynamically at the engine/pylon/leading edge interface, i.e., the root cause of the MAX problems. No flight test results, no wind tunnel test results, no CFD results.

I thought that some information would come out as part of litigation, but I was wrong. I thought that someone (university? research organization?) would give it a try, at least in simulation -- a RANS analysis might suffice, but I was wrong here too.

We are left with a year-old half-leak from one of the early NYT articles, which would point (maybe, triple maybe) to some form of shock induced separation somewhere around the nacelle, for the high-speed high-g turn case. Nothing for the low speed case. Nothing concerning post-stall behavior.

Yes this as scary as this is unexpected.
How the regulators could be so paranoid on all the details but ignore the big picture ?
How the pilots could fly an aircraft with some unknown characteristics in case of a single AoA sensor failure ?
Without clear facts, the trust would be difficult to recover.


Why this speculation about hypothetical, exotic stall types? If a pilot stalled the MAX with or without MCAS 1.0 active (and it could happen in either situation) why could it not be be a common garden variety aerodynamic stall?


I am not speculating about anything.

I am just pointing out what I see as lack of fact-based technical information.

If you have any, please do share.
 
rheinwaldner
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 7:29 am

Revelation wrote:
We still don't know the nature of what Bloomberg says FAA referred to "extensive errors" were. We don't know if they equate to narrowly miss killing people as some might suggest.

Correct, we don't know these things.

But don't use this to blurry things. We know this:
Image

Which makes your three point list a poor attempt to evade from the glaring issue.

Secondly, Point 1 and 2 in your list are the same (relying too much on the "3 second rule" was doing a terrible job by Boeing)

And finally, why did you not write "[*] The AA, UA and SWA pilots did not perform emergency procedures to a high standard"? (as it would have been correct in the context of your post?)
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seahawk
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 8:05 am

Francoflier wrote:
seahawk wrote:
I think nobody disputes that the main factor for the ET crash was crew error. Imho way too much energy has been spent on finding faults of the 737 and way too little has been spent on training better crews for all airliners.


I know you are stirring the pot as usual but yes, many people do. Including all the aviation authorities around the World which have grounded this dangerously botched design for one year now.

Not that this will stop you and the cohort of those who'd rather try to deflect blame away from a greedy corporation they are somehow enamored with.


I have a very simple position on it. If you say it is crew error, it means that you need to define crew training requirements to handle the problem. And as it seems from the FAA tests, it would need quite a lot training to get the crews fully capable to handle the problems and it does not absolve Boeing either, as they defined crew training requirements and wrote the checklists. I think what the FAA is doing at the moment is the most important aspect, they are finally looking at the man to machine interface. And if one is honest the 737 is probably the worst in this regard, as it is stuck in the 1960ies.
 
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enzo011
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 8:14 am

Ok, let me try again,

Revelation wrote:
Yes, that is so. The Bloomberg article make it clear this wasn't just a test of scenarios that would trigger MCAS:


Well wasn't the common theme in both aircraft going down that it wasn't just the stabilizer trimming down but they were dealing with both airspeed and altitude disagreement before MCAS kicked in? So it makes sense to test the new system on its own and with other failures and to see how pilots react and then learn from that if the assumptions made by both Boeing and the FAA are still accurate on how an average pilot will react. If pilots today after the crashes aren't able to properly follow the procedures then sympathy to the crews who didn't have the information we have now.

Revelation wrote:
Actually all pilots being tested (some were Mexican so it wasn't "US pilots") did land the plane so I'd say they did reach the expected outcome.


But how long can you continue with procedures that doesn't make sense from a safety perspective or that pilots cannot follow before one of the aircraft doesn't make it back safely? Would you be happy if the FAA mission statement was, "Doesn't matter how as long as they land safely."?

morrisond wrote:
You need to read the last few pages of the ET pre-lim - there was more than enough information in there for any pilot to know what to do - if in fact ET actually gave it to the crews.

You are missing the point several of us are trying to make - it's not Boeing struggling to set up decent training - it's that any crew is struggling with running emergency checklists.


Do you understand why people are reacting strongly to your posts? You have spent many posts, even with some trying to minimize it, blaming the pilots for not just following a simple procedure. Now that pilots trained in new procedures with the new system with experience and qualifications recognized by the FAA struggles with multiple failures and following the procedures you still try to pivot the blame away from Boeing. That does nothing to make anyone think you aren't a paid shill for Boeing.

I will say it before the final report is released on the ET flight. There will most likely be a time during their flight where they could have made different decisions that could have saved them from crashing. This is true for most accidents, what we know today is that crews are still struggling following the prescribed checklists when there are multiple failures. I implore you not to jump on one or two instances and to keep hammering those because most of us don't care about that. If I am to fly on a MAX in a few years time I don't care if the ET pilots made mistakes, I care if Boeing sorted out their failures because they are the ones that can make a difference, not those who aren't here any longer.

flyingphil wrote:
So Boeing on a hiring spree in anticipation of re-starting production.
Seems they are now playing high stakes poker and betting on getting the all clear from the FAA in the near future.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... on-737-max

I wish I was as confident as Boeing about RTS, it could all end in tears.
I hope they are not betting the company on the 737MAX


I think all indications are that we are very close to a RTS for the MAX. If they are already testing the new system in a sim with all the updates it means they are close. They just have to sort out the checklists and procedures so it seems to me that the physical work on the frame may be sorted and an end to the grounding is in sight.


morrisond wrote:
Or if something bizarre happens you don't understand - just hit the big red button and fly manually. My way of saying dumb it down and turn off all computer assist.

If the computer can figure out which checklist to use - it can run the checklist itself and reconfigure the aircraft - or turn off all the assist systems if something goes wrong it doesn't understand.


Aviation safety has been getting better and better with the introduction of automation to help pilots. But your solution seems to be to go back to a less safe time, all to save one company from criticism. Are you sure that is what you want to happen?
 
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enzo011
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 8:20 am

seahawk wrote:
I have a very simple position on it. If you say it is crew error, it means that you need to define crew training requirements to handle the problem. And as it seems from the FAA tests, it would need quite a lot training to get the crews fully capable to handle the problems and it does not absolve Boeing either, as they defined crew training requirements and wrote the checklists. I think what the FAA is doing at the moment is the most important aspect, they are finally looking at the man to machine interface. And if one is honest the 737 is probably the worst in this regard, as it is stuck in the 1960ies.



It must be nice to live in a black and white world without grey. Pilots couldn't deal with failures of a design from Boeing and the checklists from Boeing may have not been fit for purpose, but those pilots are to blame...grrr pilots.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 8:43 am

enzo011 wrote:
seahawk wrote:
I have a very simple position on it. If you say it is crew error, it means that you need to define crew training requirements to handle the problem. And as it seems from the FAA tests, it would need quite a lot training to get the crews fully capable to handle the problems and it does not absolve Boeing either, as they defined crew training requirements and wrote the checklists. I think what the FAA is doing at the moment is the most important aspect, they are finally looking at the man to machine interface. And if one is honest the 737 is probably the worst in this regard, as it is stuck in the 1960ies.



It must be nice to live in a black and white world without grey. Pilots couldn't deal with failures of a design from Boeing and the checklists from Boeing may have not been fit for purpose, but those pilots are to blame...grrr pilots.


I think you miss understood me. I am trying to say that fixing MCAS and the hardware is not enough. One has to consider that the basic runaway trim checklist alone is still based on the Jurassic 737, where the only case in which a runaway trim could happen was when the electric trim motor froze and kept moving the trim in one direction. It also had a larger trim wheel.

And that is the case which is still the basis for the checklist today, and basically the failure mode that any NG sim and MAX sim would have simulated before the grounding.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 11:16 am

sgrow787 wrote:
planecane wrote:
Aesma wrote:

The pilots knew that they were going to be dealing with MCAS and related problems so they should have had no problem at all.

This is what I don't get. Unless they've been on the moon for the last year, these pilots had to know what they would be tested on. If the FAA selected ME (not a pilot) for this test, I would react instantly because I know exactly what was coming.

This makes no sense. They had to have thrown different failures at them. If they were given similar scenarios to the crash flights and didn't respond properly at this point then I'm very concerned about the quality of the average pilot.


MCAS 2.0 was tested against average pilots. The test failed. Is it the pilot or is it MCAS?
Scenario 1
--MCAS activates due to high AOA on both sensors, but for only 1 cycle (as designed)
--Is the Max aerodynamically stable enough for the pilots to recover the high AOA without further help from MCAS?
Scenario 2
--MCAS fails, as designed, to activate during high AOA, when one AOA is bad with offset 20 deg while the other one reads correct high AOA.
--Is the Max aerodynamically stable enough for the pilots to recover the high AOA without any help from MCAS?
--Complicate these scenarios with clouds, low visibility, low altitude.


Since the reports are that they are trying to address training issues, I think that aerodynamic instability is highly unlikely to be causing the test failures. If a pilot can't recover due to aerodynamic instability, what good would training do?

For scenario 1, given that a failure seems to occur once in 50,000 flights, the chances of both AoA vanes failing would be once in 2.5 billion flights. Both failing high and within 5 degrees would make that even lower. With those statistics, does it really matter? I think that failure rate would exceed any certification requirement anyway.

For scenario 2, that would cause an AoA disagree warning. I can only assume that there is an update to the AoA disagree procedure to ensure that the aircraft doesn't enter into the part of the flight envelope where MCAS is required. It is possible that the pilots in the test have not been able to perform this new NNC properly or give it enough priority if there are other concurrent failures.

The aircraft is only "aerodynamically unstable" in a small part of the flight envelope. Nobody here knows exactly what airspeed/AoA combinations create the trigger conditions but it is known that there are specific conditions because MCAS is not active all the time. If it was, 737 pilots that previously flew the NG and then flew the MAX would have put the word out that the aircraft was trimming under all kinds of unexpected conditions in manual flight. It is also known that this instability does not exist with flaps deployed since it is documented that MCAS does not activate with flaps deployed.

I think it is important to note that this "aerodynamic instability" does not mean uncontrollability and planes falling out of the sky without MCAS. It is "unstable" in the sense that a control input can have more effect than expected based on the force applied to the control column, thus potentially making it easier to stall under certain conditions. However, given that it takes some level of effort/incompetence to stall an NG, being "easier" to stall does not mean likely to happen.
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 11:23 am

hivue wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
IADFCO wrote:
I agree 100%.

Almost a year has gone by, and still nobody knows (outside Boeing, maybe FAA), what's going on aerodynamically at the engine/pylon/leading edge interface, i.e., the root cause of the MAX problems. No flight test results, no wind tunnel test results, no CFD results.

I thought that some information would come out as part of litigation, but I was wrong. I thought that someone (university? research organization?) would give it a try, at least in simulation -- a RANS analysis might suffice, but I was wrong here too.

We are left with a year-old half-leak from one of the early NYT articles, which would point (maybe, triple maybe) to some form of shock induced separation somewhere around the nacelle, for the high-speed high-g turn case. Nothing for the low speed case. Nothing concerning post-stall behavior.

Yes this as scary as this is unexpected.
How the regulators could be so paranoid on all the details but ignore the big picture ?
How the pilots could fly an aircraft with some unknown characteristics in case of a single AoA sensor failure ?
Without clear facts, the trust would be difficult to recover.


Why this speculation about hypothetical, exotic stall types? If a pilot stalled the MAX with or without MCAS 1.0 active (and it could happen in either situation) why could it not be be a common garden variety aerodynamic stall?

The MCAS existence is not a speculation (anymore). The problem is that no pilots have been informed to date precisely about the situations where the MCAS is required and, most critically important for the safety, how to handle those situations in case the MCAS is not available for any reason (that could be as simple as a AoA sensor failure). From the little available information, pilots can expect to face situations with a yet unknown flight characteristic not in conformity with the regulation, so there current level of training will be not able to help them in those situations.

This is an unexpected scary bipolar situation for this time:
In one side the regulators have grounded the 737-8/9 MAX a full year waiting on Boeing for a very safe MCAS update in all the details, emphasis to the extreme how critically important the MCAS is to safely flight the 737-8/9 MAX.
In the other side the regulators is ok with a MCAS that can disable itself anytime and still no information on how the pilots could identify that case and must handle that case, as if the MCAS is an auxiliary gadget far from the safety critical radar (but the fact is that the MCAS can act on the most critical control surface of the aircraft is a strong hint that this is not the case).

From my point of view, the MCAS trim schedule table must be published. Only that row fact will allow a constructive discussion and training.
:stirthepot: 737-8 MAX: "For all speeds higher than 220 Kts and trim set at a value of 2.5 units, the difficulity level of turning the manual trim wheel was level A (trim wheel not movable)." :stirthepot:
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 11:52 am

planecane wrote:
sgrow787 wrote:
planecane wrote:
This is what I don't get. Unless they've been on the moon for the last year, these pilots had to know what they would be tested on. If the FAA selected ME (not a pilot) for this test, I would react instantly because I know exactly what was coming.

This makes no sense. They had to have thrown different failures at them. If they were given similar scenarios to the crash flights and didn't respond properly at this point then I'm very concerned about the quality of the average pilot.


MCAS 2.0 was tested against average pilots. The test failed. Is it the pilot or is it MCAS?
Scenario 1
--MCAS activates due to high AOA on both sensors, but for only 1 cycle (as designed)
--Is the Max aerodynamically stable enough for the pilots to recover the high AOA without further help from MCAS?
Scenario 2
--MCAS fails, as designed, to activate during high AOA, when one AOA is bad with offset 20 deg while the other one reads correct high AOA.
--Is the Max aerodynamically stable enough for the pilots to recover the high AOA without any help from MCAS?
--Complicate these scenarios with clouds, low visibility, low altitude.


Since the reports are that they are trying to address training issues, I think that aerodynamic instability is highly unlikely to be causing the test failures. If a pilot can't recover due to aerodynamic instability, what good would training do?

For scenario 1, given that a failure seems to occur once in 50,000 flights, the chances of both AoA vanes failing would be once in 2.5 billion flights. Both failing high and within 5 degrees would make that even lower. With those statistics, does it really matter? I think that failure rate would exceed any certification requirement anyway.

For scenario 2, that would cause an AoA disagree warning. I can only assume that there is an update to the AoA disagree procedure to ensure that the aircraft doesn't enter into the part of the flight envelope where MCAS is required. It is possible that the pilots in the test have not been able to perform this new NNC properly or give it enough priority if there are other concurrent failures.

The aircraft is only "aerodynamically unstable" in a small part of the flight envelope. Nobody here knows exactly what airspeed/AoA combinations create the trigger conditions but it is known that there are specific conditions because MCAS is not active all the time. If it was, 737 pilots that previously flew the NG and then flew the MAX would have put the word out that the aircraft was trimming under all kinds of unexpected conditions in manual flight. It is also known that this instability does not exist with flaps deployed since it is documented that MCAS does not activate with flaps deployed.

I think it is important to note that this "aerodynamic instability" does not mean uncontrollability and planes falling out of the sky without MCAS. It is "unstable" in the sense that a control input can have more effect than expected based on the force applied to the control column, thus potentially making it easier to stall under certain conditions. However, given that it takes some level of effort/incompetence to stall an NG, being "easier" to stall does not mean likely to happen.

Two points here.

1) Pilots training is actually expected to handle approach to stall, and eventually stall recovering, on aircraft in conformity with flight characteristic regulation. There is a critical obvious safety problem if pilots will fly an aircraft that can be anytime not in conformity with flight characteristic regulation. Fact is that if a pilot have to handle an approach to stall, or a stall recovery, he is already in a very safety critical situation for an other reason, requiring very high workload to execute fast and precise actions. The last thing a pilot need in that situation is an unexpected unknown flight characteristic. Regulators can't accept that.

Fact is that the big chunk of the regulation on that matter was historically done to improve safety after many loss of lives. The longitudinal control is the most safety critical aspect of flying since the beginning of the aviation.

2) While I found scandalous that nobody outside Boeing, including regulators, "knows exactly what airspeed/AoA combinations create the trigger conditions", I strongly expect that Boeing is very aware of that knowledge.

If not, then I expect a yet another collapse in the 737 MAX trust.
:stirthepot: 737-8 MAX: "For all speeds higher than 220 Kts and trim set at a value of 2.5 units, the difficulity level of turning the manual trim wheel was level A (trim wheel not movable)." :stirthepot:
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 12:18 pm

seahawk wrote:
Francoflier wrote:
seahawk wrote:
I think nobody disputes that the main factor for the ET crash was crew error. Imho way too much energy has been spent on finding faults of the 737 and way too little has been spent on training better crews for all airliners.


I know you are stirring the pot as usual but yes, many people do. Including all the aviation authorities around the World which have grounded this dangerously botched design for one year now.

Not that this will stop you and the cohort of those who'd rather try to deflect blame away from a greedy corporation they are somehow enamored with.


I have a very simple position on it. If you say it is crew error, it means that you need to define crew training requirements to handle the problem. And as it seems from the FAA tests, it would need quite a lot training to get the crews fully capable to handle the problems and it does not absolve Boeing either, as they defined crew training requirements and wrote the checklists. I think what the FAA is doing at the moment is the most important aspect, they are finally looking at the man to machine interface. And if one is honest the 737 is probably the worst in this regard, as it is stuck in the 1960ies.


I think it is more than the man to machine interface. As we have seen from most of the tragedies in the past 10-15 years Pilots are not following the right procedures when faced with something out of the ordinary - regardless what type they are flying - that is a training issue. Or all designs need to be dumbed down significantly.

When Pilots can't even follow simple checklists in a simulator - that is a training issue. We have to make it simpler for all designs.

Hit the big Red Button and fly manually vs fighting the computers. That should not be that hard to train and not beyond the abilities of any pilot.

Get the plane flying straight and level without any computers intervening and then diagnose with help from experts on the ground. In this day and age no pilot's should be alone in diagnosing issues. They should be able to instantly connect 24/7 to on call experts at the manufacturers who have full access to the system feeds remotely.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 12:19 pm

rheinwaldner wrote:
Revelation wrote:
We still don't know the nature of what Bloomberg says FAA referred to "extensive errors" were. We don't know if they equate to narrowly miss killing people as some might suggest.

Correct, we don't know these things.

But don't use this to blurry things. We know this:
Image

Which makes your three point list a poor attempt to evade from the glaring issue.

Secondly, Point 1 and 2 in your list are the same (relying too much on the "3 second rule" was doing a terrible job by Boeing)

And finally, why did you not write "[*] The AA, UA and SWA pilots did not perform emergency procedures to a high standard"? (as it would have been correct in the context of your post?)


What aircraft were not certified under the 3 second rule?
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 1:21 pm

morrisond wrote:
seahawk wrote:
Francoflier wrote:

I know you are stirring the pot as usual but yes, many people do. Including all the aviation authorities around the World which have grounded this dangerously botched design for one year now.

Not that this will stop you and the cohort of those who'd rather try to deflect blame away from a greedy corporation they are somehow enamored with.


I have a very simple position on it. If you say it is crew error, it means that you need to define crew training requirements to handle the problem. And as it seems from the FAA tests, it would need quite a lot training to get the crews fully capable to handle the problems and it does not absolve Boeing either, as they defined crew training requirements and wrote the checklists. I think what the FAA is doing at the moment is the most important aspect, they are finally looking at the man to machine interface. And if one is honest the 737 is probably the worst in this regard, as it is stuck in the 1960ies.


I think it is more than the man to machine interface. As we have seen from most of the tragedies in the past 10-15 years Pilots are not following the right procedures when faced with something out of the ordinary - regardless what type they are flying - that is a training issue. Or all designs need to be dumbed down significantly.

When Pilots can't even follow simple checklists in a simulator - that is a training issue. We have to make it simpler for all designs.

Hit the big Red Button and fly manually vs fighting the computers. That should not be that hard to train and not beyond the abilities of any pilot.

Get the plane flying straight and level without any computers intervening and then diagnose with help from experts on the ground. In this day and age no pilot's should be alone in diagnosing issues. They should be able to instantly connect 24/7 to on call experts at the manufacturers who have full access to the system feeds remotely.

Sorry for you, but the future (post 737 MAX) will be full authority FBW for all majors commercial civil aircraft that will carry the very large part of the passengers on this planet. You very personal method to improve safety will not apply anymore. The "big red button and fly manually" is simply an obsolete approach that could possibly only apply to the 737 that wrongly hide a flight control software into the autopilot computers never designed for the level of safety required to run a flight control software.
:stirthepot: 737-8 MAX: "For all speeds higher than 220 Kts and trim set at a value of 2.5 units, the difficulity level of turning the manual trim wheel was level A (trim wheel not movable)." :stirthepot:
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 1:37 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
morrisond wrote:
seahawk wrote:

I have a very simple position on it. If you say it is crew error, it means that you need to define crew training requirements to handle the problem. And as it seems from the FAA tests, it would need quite a lot training to get the crews fully capable to handle the problems and it does not absolve Boeing either, as they defined crew training requirements and wrote the checklists. I think what the FAA is doing at the moment is the most important aspect, they are finally looking at the man to machine interface. And if one is honest the 737 is probably the worst in this regard, as it is stuck in the 1960ies.


I think it is more than the man to machine interface. As we have seen from most of the tragedies in the past 10-15 years Pilots are not following the right procedures when faced with something out of the ordinary - regardless what type they are flying - that is a training issue. Or all designs need to be dumbed down significantly.

When Pilots can't even follow simple checklists in a simulator - that is a training issue. We have to make it simpler for all designs.

Hit the big Red Button and fly manually vs fighting the computers. That should not be that hard to train and not beyond the abilities of any pilot.

Get the plane flying straight and level without any computers intervening and then diagnose with help from experts on the ground. In this day and age no pilot's should be alone in diagnosing issues. They should be able to instantly connect 24/7 to on call experts at the manufacturers who have full access to the system feeds remotely.

Sorry for you, but the future (post 737 MAX) will be full authority FBW for all majors commercial civil aircraft that will carry the very large part of the passengers on this planet. You very personal method to improve safety will not apply anymore. The "big red button and fly manually" is simply an obsolete approach that could possibly only apply to the 737 that wrongly hide a flight control software into the autopilot computers never designed for the level of safety required to run a flight control software.

you're conviniently forgetting A300 and Tu154 along with DC-9 and a family! { /sarcasm]
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 1:43 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
morrisond wrote:
seahawk wrote:

I have a very simple position on it. If you say it is crew error, it means that you need to define crew training requirements to handle the problem. And as it seems from the FAA tests, it would need quite a lot training to get the crews fully capable to handle the problems and it does not absolve Boeing either, as they defined crew training requirements and wrote the checklists. I think what the FAA is doing at the moment is the most important aspect, they are finally looking at the man to machine interface. And if one is honest the 737 is probably the worst in this regard, as it is stuck in the 1960ies.


I think it is more than the man to machine interface. As we have seen from most of the tragedies in the past 10-15 years Pilots are not following the right procedures when faced with something out of the ordinary - regardless what type they are flying - that is a training issue. Or all designs need to be dumbed down significantly.

When Pilots can't even follow simple checklists in a simulator - that is a training issue. We have to make it simpler for all designs.

Hit the big Red Button and fly manually vs fighting the computers. That should not be that hard to train and not beyond the abilities of any pilot.

Get the plane flying straight and level without any computers intervening and then diagnose with help from experts on the ground. In this day and age no pilot's should be alone in diagnosing issues. They should be able to instantly connect 24/7 to on call experts at the manufacturers who have full access to the system feeds remotely.

Sorry for you, but the future (post 737 MAX) will be full authority FBW for all majors commercial civil aircraft that will carry the very large part of the passengers on this planet. You very personal method to improve safety will not apply anymore. The "big red button and fly manually" is simply an obsolete approach that could possibly only apply to the 737 that wrongly hide a flight control software into the autopilot computers never designed for the level of safety required to run a flight control software.


I fully expect the next design will be FBW. But when HAL tries to kill you there will need to be the big red button - that or pull Circuits - but we know how that turned out on Air Asia 8501 as they lacked the basic skills to fly in Direct Law.

For some reason you think Computers and software that are designed by imperfect people will be perfect. I'm not so naive. Parts will fail or they will miss something in the software leading to unexpected consequences.

The 737 MCAS design screw up is proof of this. They missed something.

Instead of having to know a bunch of different procedures and be able to instantly diagnose - take that burden off the pilots and let them do what they should be trained to do and that is fly straight and level while they diagnose the problem with help from the ground.

If that is too difficult a task then a simple completely separate AP that is reliant on totally different sensors than the primary ones on a separate circuit would not be a bad idea either.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 1:52 pm

morrisond wrote:
Instead of having to know a bunch of different procedures and be able to instantly diagnose - take that burden off the pilots and let them do what they should be trained to do and that is fly straight and level while they diagnose the problem with help from the ground.

If that is too difficult a task then a simple completely separate AP that is reliant on totally different sensors than the primary ones on a separate circuit would not be a bad idea either.

Problem is, with your approach aircraft has to be certifiable for direct control - which MAX is not. I am glad you actually support the idea of closing MAX program, but did you think about all the implications it brings to Boeing?
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 2:05 pm

kalvado wrote:
morrisond wrote:
Instead of having to know a bunch of different procedures and be able to instantly diagnose - take that burden off the pilots and let them do what they should be trained to do and that is fly straight and level while they diagnose the problem with help from the ground.

If that is too difficult a task then a simple completely separate AP that is reliant on totally different sensors than the primary ones on a separate circuit would not be a bad idea either.

Problem is, with your approach aircraft has to be certifiable for direct control - which MAX is not. I am glad you actually support the idea of closing MAX program, but did you think about all the implications it brings to Boeing?


A - We are talking about future designs.

B- From what we know if MCAS 2.0 has a problem then it would be flown without Computer intervention in direct control - it sounds like the regulators are going to let that through. Personally I don't believe that should be that big of an issue - as the odds of it happening are very remote - and even with today's poor standards of pilots skills I would hope that the Pilot's have an ability to keep it away from stall or situations where aggressive maneuvering is needed.

But then again that requires they have basic flying skills - which if they don't they should not be anywhere near a cockpit as those basic skills are still required by regulation. However it seems like many on here would be happy to see that requirement waived.
 
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JetBuddy
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 2:09 pm

Has EASA been allowed to fly the MAX without the MCAS automation activated yet?
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 2:59 pm

rheinwaldner wrote:
Correct, we don't know these things.

But don't use this to blurry things. We know this:
Image

To make sure I understand that chart correctly, that is 2020 and not 2019 when the MAX was grounded?
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 3:05 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
2) While I found scandalous that nobody outside Boeing, including regulators, "knows exactly what airspeed/AoA combinations create the trigger conditions", I strongly expect that Boeing is very aware of that knowledge.
.

EASA has said that they will audit the FAA and the MAX once the FAA has completed it's RTS requirements, so at least you know that the information will become available.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 3:07 pm

morrisond wrote:
seahawk wrote:
Francoflier wrote:

I know you are stirring the pot as usual but yes, many people do. Including all the aviation authorities around the World which have grounded this dangerously botched design for one year now.

Not that this will stop you and the cohort of those who'd rather try to deflect blame away from a greedy corporation they are somehow enamored with.


I have a very simple position on it. If you say it is crew error, it means that you need to define crew training requirements to handle the problem. And as it seems from the FAA tests, it would need quite a lot training to get the crews fully capable to handle the problems and it does not absolve Boeing either, as they defined crew training requirements and wrote the checklists. I think what the FAA is doing at the moment is the most important aspect, they are finally looking at the man to machine interface. And if one is honest the 737 is probably the worst in this regard, as it is stuck in the 1960ies.


I think it is more than the man to machine interface. As we have seen from most of the tragedies in the past 10-15 years Pilots are not following the right procedures when faced with something out of the ordinary - regardless what type they are flying - that is a training issue. Or all designs need to be dumbed down significantly.

When Pilots can't even follow simple checklists in a simulator - that is a training issue. We have to make it simpler for all designs.

Hit the big Red Button and fly manually vs fighting the computers. That should not be that hard to train and not beyond the abilities of any pilot.

Get the plane flying straight and level without any computers intervening and then diagnose with help from experts on the ground. In this day and age no pilot's should be alone in diagnosing issues. They should be able to instantly connect 24/7 to on call experts at the manufacturers who have full access to the system feeds remotely.


First of all it a man to machine interface problem.

- only one sensor failed, yet the plane was unable to identify the faulty sensor nor give a clear indication of the fault
- there was no general logic behind the turning off of automatic system in such a failure.
- there was no clear and obvious red button to turn off the automatic systems
- the authority of the back-up control system was limited

nothing of this was transparent to the pilots, not through the plane nor through the training recommended by the OEM.
 
rheinwaldner
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 3:08 pm

par13del wrote:
rheinwaldner wrote:
Correct, we don't know these things.

But don't use this to blurry things. We know this:
Image

To make sure I understand that chart correctly, that is 2020 and not 2019 when the MAX was grounded?

Its the same. Since the grounding no RPKs have been added and also no fatalities. Therefore the ratio between the two is constant since then. For the time being, this is the MAX safety stat.
Many things are difficult, all things are possible!
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 3:17 pm

rheinwaldner wrote:
par13del wrote:
rheinwaldner wrote:
Correct, we don't know these things.

But don't use this to blurry things. We know this:
Image

To make sure I understand that chart correctly, that is 2020 and not 2019 when the MAX was grounded?

Its the same. Since the grounding no RPKs have been added and also no fatalities. Therefore the ratio between the two is constant since then. For the time being, this is the MAX safety stat.


Yes and has been stated many times if MAX returns to service with MCAS 1.0 then that would be relevant.

It's like quoting engine shut down stats for A320NEO with GTF's and carrying that over to the LEAP Version.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 3:19 pm

seahawk wrote:
morrisond wrote:
seahawk wrote:

I have a very simple position on it. If you say it is crew error, it means that you need to define crew training requirements to handle the problem. And as it seems from the FAA tests, it would need quite a lot training to get the crews fully capable to handle the problems and it does not absolve Boeing either, as they defined crew training requirements and wrote the checklists. I think what the FAA is doing at the moment is the most important aspect, they are finally looking at the man to machine interface. And if one is honest the 737 is probably the worst in this regard, as it is stuck in the 1960ies.


I think it is more than the man to machine interface. As we have seen from most of the tragedies in the past 10-15 years Pilots are not following the right procedures when faced with something out of the ordinary - regardless what type they are flying - that is a training issue. Or all designs need to be dumbed down significantly.

When Pilots can't even follow simple checklists in a simulator - that is a training issue. We have to make it simpler for all designs.

Hit the big Red Button and fly manually vs fighting the computers. That should not be that hard to train and not beyond the abilities of any pilot.

Get the plane flying straight and level without any computers intervening and then diagnose with help from experts on the ground. In this day and age no pilot's should be alone in diagnosing issues. They should be able to instantly connect 24/7 to on call experts at the manufacturers who have full access to the system feeds remotely.


First of all it a man to machine interface problem.

- only one sensor failed, yet the plane was unable to identify the faulty sensor nor give a clear indication of the fault
- there was no general logic behind the turning off of automatic system in such a failure.
- there was no clear and obvious red button to turn off the automatic systems
- the authority of the back-up control system was limited

nothing of this was transparent to the pilots, not through the plane nor through the training recommended by the OEM.


I don't disagree with this - that is why I said it's more than a man-machine interface problem - meaning that there is a problem with that but also with training on emergency procedures.
 
asdf
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 3:23 pm

JetBuddy wrote:
Has EASA been allowed to fly the MAX without the MCAS automation activated yet?


last statements said the EASA (only) gets a simulator ride
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 3:27 pm

asdf wrote:
JetBuddy wrote:
Has EASA been allowed to fly the MAX without the MCAS automation activated yet?


last statements said the EASA (only) gets a simulator ride



That seems wrong to me - what is the harm?

Where did you see the statements?
 
asdf
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 3:33 pm

morrisond wrote:
rheinwaldner wrote:
par13del wrote:
To make sure I understand that chart correctly, that is 2020 and not 2019 when the MAX was grounded?

Its the same. Since the grounding no RPKs have been added and also no fatalities. Therefore the ratio between the two is constant since then. For the time being, this is the MAX safety stat.


Yes and has been stated many times if MAX returns to service with MCAS 1.0 then that would be relevant.


NO
the problem is not the MCAS automation
so not a lot will chance with MCAS 2.0

the problem is the underlying aerodynamical behavior of the 737MAX - as regulator JATR stated a year ago

the aerodynamical misbehavior of the 737MAX will stay forever
and so will the probability of an incident or accident
Last edited by asdf on Tue Mar 03, 2020 3:34 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
asdf
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 3:34 pm

morrisond wrote:
asdf wrote:
JetBuddy wrote:
Has EASA been allowed to fly the MAX without the MCAS automation activated yet?


last statements said the EASA (only) gets a simulator ride



That seems wrong to me - what is the harm?

Where did you see the statements?



last official statement of FAA or boeing
dont know

that statement as they provided the timeline
 
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seahawk
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 3:36 pm

Mostly the problem was to find the correct procedure and follow it through. That requires the plane to give clear understandable error messages, it requires that no system with direct flight control is hidden from the pilot and it requires clearly written checklist that need no interpretation. Checklist must be so simple that non native English speakers can follow them through under high stress levels and they should not be forced to consider possible meanings of the words used. That is in addition that no automatic system should have the authority to fly the plane into the ground without tripple sensor providing control of the system and a back-up system doing the same constantly.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 3:47 pm

asdf wrote:
morrisond wrote:
rheinwaldner wrote:
Its the same. Since the grounding no RPKs have been added and also no fatalities. Therefore the ratio between the two is constant since then. For the time being, this is the MAX safety stat.


Yes and has been stated many times if MAX returns to service with MCAS 1.0 then that would be relevant.


NO
the problem is not the MCAS automation
so not a lot will chance with MCAS 2.0

the problem is the underlying aerodynamical behavior of the 737MAX - as regulator JATR stated a year ago

the aerodynamical misbehavior of the 737MAX will stay forever
and so will the probability of an incident or accident


As the regulator speculated a year ago - as they have not flown the test flights it cannot be stated as fact.

BTW - how many MAX crashed because of this alleged instability? Zero.

Even if there is an issue with Aerodynamics the odds that an aircraft in commercial service gets that close to that part of the envelope without a properly functioning MCAS are so small that it sounds like they may certify it this way anyways (allowing MCAS to be turned off if there is a sensor issue).
 
CRJockey
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 4:07 pm

asdf wrote:
JetBuddy wrote:
Has EASA been allowed to fly the MAX without the MCAS automation activated yet?


last statements said the EASA (only) gets a simulator ride


Doesn't work that way. The EASA, the FAA or any other CAA, will get what they need to see prior certifying, not what the OEM thinks needs to be shown.
 
CRJockey
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 4:15 pm

morrisond wrote:
Revelation wrote:
PW100 wrote:
It is my understanding (or interpretation, might be wrong though) that there were two main issues:

1) Cascading indications, that were not necessarily representative for the failure at hand. And therefore Checklist/NNC selection was not intuitive.
Such may not be problem with a low risk failure (such as IFSD) where - apart from uncontrollable engine fire – time is not most critical. But would not fly on a high-risk failure scenario (Catastrophic category) such as runaway MCAS/trim.

2) Cascading failure scenarios, not necessarily related to each other. Checklists/NNC were considered not sufficiently aligned with cockpit indications and/or vice versa.
This is were EICAS would be most helpful.

Is it understanding/interpretation, or intuition? It's hard to interpret so much from the little we've been given, IMO.

Regardless, for the sake of argument let's go with your interpretation, and such an interpretation is quite problematic for Boeing.

As I wrote several times my interpretation is the "cosmic ray fix" wasn't simple but it was relatively straight forward and was well covered by prior art in the computer science field. It sounded messy, but really you were keeping the core logic of the system intact and just adding some comparators to the edges of the system and improving the existing active/standby mechanisms to handle an active/active system. You weren't, for instance, changing the logic of the autopilot or automatic landing system.

If it turns out that these "extensive errors" can't be fixed by more focused training and needs something akin to EICAS, my interpretation would be that it's a huge problem for Boeing. We know P-8 is based on 737 and has an EICAS, but P-8 was developed right from the start with the decision to do EICAS in place so all the required changes to bring the required information into the unit were made before the first one was built.

I was going to type in more, but google led me to a ST article:

However, Boeing’s 737, its oldest jet, doesn’t even have EICAS. Behind its sleek-looking pilot flight displays, the jet’s legacy avionics systems have been upgraded piecemeal over 50 years, and the overall system architecture won’t support EICAS.

Installing EICAS on the 737 “would be challenging,” said Mike Carriker, Boeing’s chief pilot for product development, in a brief interview. “There aren’t enough sensors on the 737.” Even if it were possible, it would require a new type certificate and new pilot training.

During development of the MAX, Boeing’s customer airlines made clear they don’t want to pay for such an upgrade.

Ref: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... le-alerts/

It also echos what I said about the bar being raised for future approvals:

Schulze said the NTSB is also recommending that the FAA develop new improved alerting systems that give pilots a clear priority of what to do, for example, telling them which checklist they need to run first when different error messages pop up at the same time.

EICAS does some of that. We think we need to go to the next level,” Schulze said. “We want to see the FAA work with the manufacturers and human factors experts to develop a better design standard.”

That’s a future aspiration.

Boeing's CEO stated concerns about the need for changes in the cockpit was one part of why Boeing shelved NMA.


Or if something bizarre happens you don't understand - just hit the big red button and fly manually.


As good as it sounds for the layman and the nervous public, going back to that figurative big red button would be the worst mistake in a long time, regarding aviation safety.

Even the most proficient pilots from all continents and all upbringing and prior career have crashed all types of aircraft through spatial disorientation and CFIT, especially when flying manually in IMC. Having a complex failure mode at hand, you don't want crews to quickly disconnect the autopilot.

Yes, there are situations where disconnecting might lead to improved safety or a "lucky outcome" of an unforeseen problem, but history has shown more than enough, that task saturation is quickly reached when trying to fly by hand and solve complex problems.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 4:22 pm

CRJockey wrote:
morrisond wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Is it understanding/interpretation, or intuition? It's hard to interpret so much from the little we've been given, IMO.

Regardless, for the sake of argument let's go with your interpretation, and such an interpretation is quite problematic for Boeing.

As I wrote several times my interpretation is the "cosmic ray fix" wasn't simple but it was relatively straight forward and was well covered by prior art in the computer science field. It sounded messy, but really you were keeping the core logic of the system intact and just adding some comparators to the edges of the system and improving the existing active/standby mechanisms to handle an active/active system. You weren't, for instance, changing the logic of the autopilot or automatic landing system.

If it turns out that these "extensive errors" can't be fixed by more focused training and needs something akin to EICAS, my interpretation would be that it's a huge problem for Boeing. We know P-8 is based on 737 and has an EICAS, but P-8 was developed right from the start with the decision to do EICAS in place so all the required changes to bring the required information into the unit were made before the first one was built.

I was going to type in more, but google led me to a ST article:


Ref: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... le-alerts/

It also echos what I said about the bar being raised for future approvals:


Boeing's CEO stated concerns about the need for changes in the cockpit was one part of why Boeing shelved NMA.


Or if something bizarre happens you don't understand - just hit the big red button and fly manually.


As good as it sounds for the layman and the nervous public, going back to that figurative big red button would be the worst mistake in a long time, regarding aviation safety.

Even the most proficient pilots from all continents and all upbringing and prior career have crashed all types of aircraft through spatial disorientation and CFIT, especially when flying manually in IMC. Having a complex failure mode at hand, you don't want crews to quickly disconnect the autopilot.

Yes, there are situations where disconnecting might lead to improved safety or a "lucky outcome" of an unforeseen problem, but history has shown more than enough, that task saturation is quickly reached when trying to fly by hand and solve complex problems.


That is a conundrum in IMC - hence why maybe the standby AP that runs on a completely separate Bus, power source and sensors that basically can return the aircraft to straight and level is a good idea incorporating a TAWS system as well. Just a manual switch to cut over to it if the Pilot cannot easily take control of the aircraft.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 4:30 pm

CRJockey wrote:
As good as it sounds for the layman and the nervous public, going back to that figurative big red button would be the worst mistake in a long time, regarding aviation safety.

Even the most proficient pilots from all continents and all upbringing and prior career have crashed all types of aircraft through spatial disorientation and CFIT, especially when flying manually in IMC. Having a complex failure mode at hand, you don't want crews to quickly disconnect the autopilot.

In the aviation industry today, it is not about crews disconnecting the autopilot, it is about the autopilot disconnecting itself without much if any prior warning of why it is disconnecting.
 
pune
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 4:51 pm

Revelation wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:
'...Boeing said. “Ultimately, it will be the regulators who determine the training requirements.”...'
https://www.thenational.ae/business/avi ... x-1.986016

Does this mean that Boeing have forsworn:
'The covering up they did last year'
'Jedi mind tricks'
Treating regulators like 'Dogs watching TV'
Calling customers 'Dumb' for being manipulated.

Hope so. Perhaps the commitment to recommending SIM training as part of the package and paying for it will give encouragement to that hope.

I read a recent WSJ post on this topic ( ref: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22444727 ).

It spend a lot of time stating the incredibly obvious, that FAA employees were likely unhappy with the contents of the Boeing message dumps, but did not name any one specific FAA employee nor even reported any concrete outcome of such unhappiness.

The only operative stuff I found amongst the innuendo was:

Boeing and the FAA, however, first need to resolve differing approaches on the content of training. The company initially proposed that pilots practice, one by one, a handful of selected maneuvers. The FAA, by contrast, favors more expansive training that highlights longer scenarios featuring the interplay of different emergencies, according to the officials.

This all reminds me of what became apparent right around the time DM was made to walk the plank: Boeing has pretty much lost all ability to steer events, and now faces the daunting challenge of trying to please multiple regulatory entities all of whom are pretty unhappy with Boeing's recent behavior, and with no real motivation beyond professionalism to be cooperative, and with the rare opportunity to make industry do whatever they want.


wish there was a non-paywall link :(
 
pune
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 5:16 pm

Revelation wrote:
Ertro wrote:
It is a problem if there exist something that can be said to be objective proof that something does not conform to regulations. I don't think it is raising the bar or an opportunity. Previously there was no objective proof and now there is proof for both the problem existing and also for the severity of it. It is natural that this results in some kind of change.

The most specific part of the Bloomberg article is:

The pilots, who had received additional training proposed by the company, failed to finish emergency checklists related to the automated system involved in both 737 Max crashes, known as Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System.

In addition, they had difficulty with emergency procedures related to sensor failures, erroneous altitude and airspeed readings and the autopilot, among others, according to the letter.

The tests also showed that some pilots were confused about how the autopilot behaved in some circumstances and their interactions with the plane’s automated warning systems were distracting.

I'm not sure this provides objective proof for the problem existing. How much confusion is too much? The article used the terms "systems must be relatively intuitive" -- how can that be measured objectively?

Unfortunately the Bloomberg report didn't call out any specific failure to conform to regulations, it just said the pilots made extensive errors in performing emergency procedures.


It seems to me that the pilots were expecting some sort of feedback which they didn't get. I wish there was a follow-up with the pilots which told FAA what other feedback they were looking for and didn't get or why they were confused ? People usually work from what they know and have used from past. This would have been better for FAA and Boeing to take that feedback and pass it back to engineers so solutions can be worked upon. I wish Boeing would have done such testing on their accord and used that feedback but then I perhaps am expecting Boeing to behave as a responsible corporate citizen and events of recent months and at least last couple of years seem to suggest they are far from that.
 
pune
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 5:45 pm

Revelation wrote:
I think we should seek high standards but should not throw out the baby with the bath water. I think that the passengers on JT043 are happier with their fate than those on JT610. A happy medium needs to be found. We still don't know the nature of what Bloomberg says FAA referred to "extensive errors" were. We don't know if they equate to narrowly miss killing people as some might suggest. Unfortunately this is the only info we have on how FAA is reacting to Boeing's initial submission with regard to training.

I want to point out that all three of the following could be true:
  • Boeing did a terrible job on the design and implementation of MCAS
  • Boeing relied too much on what it thought the pilot's reactions would be, i.e. the "3 second rule"
  • The ET and JT pilots did not perform emergency procedures to a high standard and we should review global pilot training standards

For the 3rd point, let's see what an article quoting Airbus's head of global flight training had to say:

Airbus is adopting a “lead by example” approach. The national authority of a pilot training organization is responsible for approving its programs. “Our implementing a program with this standard is encouraging the authority to follow us and raise the bar at other schools,” says Jean-Michel Bigarre, head of global flight training at Airbus.

Ref: AvWeek: Airbus Takes Aim At Inconsistent Pilot Training Quality

So Airbus's global head of training is saying the bar needs to be raised.


another pay-walled link but thank you for sharing the bits you shared :)
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