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XRAYretired
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 5:53 pm

pune wrote:
Revelation wrote:
I think we should seek high standards but should not throw out the baby with the bath water. I think that the passengers on JT043 are happier with their fate than those on JT610. A happy medium needs to be found. We still don't know the nature of what Bloomberg says FAA referred to "extensive errors" were. We don't know if they equate to narrowly miss killing people as some might suggest. Unfortunately this is the only info we have on how FAA is reacting to Boeing's initial submission with regard to training.

I want to point out that all three of the following could be true:
  • Boeing did a terrible job on the design and implementation of MCAS
  • Boeing relied too much on what it thought the pilot's reactions would be, i.e. the "3 second rule"
  • The ET and JT pilots did not perform emergency procedures to a high standard and we should review global pilot training standards

For the 3rd point, let's see what an article quoting Airbus's head of global flight training had to say:

Airbus is adopting a “lead by example” approach. The national authority of a pilot training organization is responsible for approving its programs. “Our implementing a program with this standard is encouraging the authority to follow us and raise the bar at other schools,” says Jean-Michel Bigarre, head of global flight training at Airbus.

Ref: AvWeek: Airbus Takes Aim At Inconsistent Pilot Training Quality

So Airbus's global head of training is saying the bar needs to be raised.


another pay-walled link but thank you for sharing the bits you shared :)

Its Twelve Months old. If you google the title you will find free to view versions.

He ran it as an authored topic a year ago, why he wanted to re-run the topic is questionable.
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 5:53 pm

kalvado wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
Sorry for you, but the future (post 737 MAX) will be full authority FBW for all majors commercial civil aircraft that will carry the very large part of the passengers on this planet. You very personal method to improve safety will not apply anymore. The "big red button and fly manually" is simply an obsolete approach that could possibly only apply to the 737 that wrongly hide a flight control software into the autopilot computers never designed for the level of safety required to run a flight control software.

you're conviniently forgetting A300 and Tu154 along with DC-9 and a family! { /sarcasm]

Yea, brand new stuff with bright future ahead... :crazy:
:stirthepot: 737-8 MAX: "For all speeds higher than 220 Kts and trim set at a value of 2.5 units, the difficulity level of turning the manual trim wheel was level A (trim wheel not movable)." :stirthepot:
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 6:17 pm

XRAYretired wrote:
...why he wanted to re-run the topic...

To address the criticism, I feel some people just can't seem to let go of the "US pilot" vs the "non-US pilot" sub thread. In fact they seem to enjoy the controversy it engenders and bring it up every chance they get. I'm hoping that reiterating that Airbus sees pilot training as a global problem helps people let go of that. I doubt it will, but I can try. A single global standard applied uniformly would be very helpful, that's the point the Airbus head of training was making, and it's one I agree with. If US pilots are falling short of the mark, it should be addressed. If non-US pilots are falling short of the mark, it should be addressed. Simple, I think.
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pune
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 6:24 pm

XRAYretired wrote:
pune wrote:
Revelation wrote:
I think we should seek high standards but should not throw out the baby with the bath water. I think that the passengers on JT043 are happier with their fate than those on JT610. A happy medium needs to be found. We still don't know the nature of what Bloomberg says FAA referred to "extensive errors" were. We don't know if they equate to narrowly miss killing people as some might suggest. Unfortunately this is the only info we have on how FAA is reacting to Boeing's initial submission with regard to training.

I want to point out that all three of the following could be true:
  • Boeing did a terrible job on the design and implementation of MCAS
  • Boeing relied too much on what it thought the pilot's reactions would be, i.e. the "3 second rule"
  • The ET and JT pilots did not perform emergency procedures to a high standard and we should review global pilot training standards

For the 3rd point, let's see what an article quoting Airbus's head of global flight training had to say:


Ref: AvWeek: Airbus Takes Aim At Inconsistent Pilot Training Quality

So Airbus's global head of training is saying the bar needs to be raised.


another pay-walled link but thank you for sharing the bits you shared :)

Its Twelve Months old. If you google the title you will find free to view versions.

He ran it as an authored topic a year ago, why he wanted to re-run the topic is questionable.


I wasn't able to but thank you all the same :)
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 6:50 pm

Of interest from ST's article on COV and the aviation conference now running in Austin:

ALC’s Plueger said his team is “engaged with the Boeing company on a much more detailed basis” about exactly which of its grounded MAXs will be delivered first and when. This suggests that — regarding regulator approval for the MAX to fly again — “Boeing is still confident the midsummer schedule will hold true,” he said.

Ref: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... -shrivels/

Of course, they are confident right up to the point the plans change, but they and Spirit and others all show every sign of restarting production albeit at a slow rate this month.
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 7:09 pm

Revelation wrote:
A single global standard applied uniformly would be very helpful, that's the point the Airbus head of training was making, and it's one I agree with. Simple, I think.

How simple exactly, Airbus FBW system is vastly different from Boeing's even the basic core functionality is different, the critics who jumped on Boeing's initial thought is that the basic mantra that the pilot must have final say in basic flight modes should go bye bye.
So unless you want everyone to use the Airbus system, this will be decades in the making if not more.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 8:18 pm

par13del wrote:
Revelation wrote:
A single global standard applied uniformly would be very helpful, that's the point the Airbus head of training was making, and it's one I agree with. Simple, I think.

How simple exactly, Airbus FBW system is vastly different from Boeing's even the basic core functionality is different, the critics who jumped on Boeing's initial thought is that the basic mantra that the pilot must have final say in basic flight modes should go bye bye.
So unless you want everyone to use the Airbus system, this will be decades in the making if not more.

Sorry, but as you say that is not feasible, the idea is that all 737 pilots should be trained to the standard for that aircraft, etc.

BTW tech did not stop in 1987, one of our a.net members is convinced the A220 cockpit is quite superior to A320, so maybe the suggestion should be all A320s get an upgrade to meet the A220 world standard? At A220 is an "Airbus standard" (ahem) but Rockwell Collins will be very happy if your suggestion takes hold.
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seahawk
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 8:44 pm

Yes, pilot training is important just not for the MAX crashes, simply because the system was not in the books, not in the sims and the basic assessment of the system was way off. When the regular time interval of system activation is longer than the time you expect the pilots to cut off the system in a failure condition, it is a design error.

We can then add old memory procedures, checklists that require the interpretation and so on.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 9:32 pm

Revelation wrote:
Sorry, but as you say that is not feasible, the idea is that all 737 pilots should be trained to the standard for that aircraft, etc.
BTW tech did not stop in 1987, one of our a.net members is convinced the A220 cockpit is quite superior to A320, so maybe the suggestion should be all A320s get an upgrade to meet the A220 world standard? At A220 is an "Airbus standard" (ahem) but Rockwell Collins will be very happy if your suggestion takes hold.

The 737 is an outlier here because it will never be FBW, any attempt to do that will result in a new build frame as nothing from the 737 will be allowed over.
I guess my fault is when these things are bought up in the 737 threads I take them to mean new build and nothing to do with the MAX, my bad.
 
sgrow787
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 9:46 pm

planecane wrote:
sgrow787 wrote:
planecane wrote:
This is what I don't get. Unless they've been on the moon for the last year, these pilots had to know what they would be tested on. If the FAA selected ME (not a pilot) for this test, I would react instantly because I know exactly what was coming.

This makes no sense. They had to have thrown different failures at them. If they were given similar scenarios to the crash flights and didn't respond properly at this point then I'm very concerned about the quality of the average pilot.


MCAS 2.0 was tested against average pilots. The test failed. Is it the pilot or is it MCAS?
Scenario 1
--MCAS activates due to high AOA on both sensors, but for only 1 cycle (as designed)
--Is the Max aerodynamically stable enough for the pilots to recover the high AOA without further help from MCAS?
Scenario 2
--MCAS fails, as designed, to activate during high AOA, when one AOA is bad with offset 20 deg while the other one reads correct high AOA.
--Is the Max aerodynamically stable enough for the pilots to recover the high AOA without any help from MCAS?
--Complicate these scenarios with clouds, low visibility, low altitude.


Since the reports are that they are trying to address training issues, I think that aerodynamic instability is highly unlikely to be causing the test failures. If a pilot can't recover due to aerodynamic instability, what good would training do?

For scenario 1, given that a failure seems to occur once in 50,000 flights, the chances of both AoA vanes failing would be once in 2.5 billion flights. Both failing high and within 5 degrees would make that even lower. With those statistics, does it really matter? I think that failure rate would exceed any certification requirement anyway.


Scenario 1 didn't say that the AOA sensor data was bad. It said the opposite, a "entering-stall" scenario. (i.e. the odds of both AOA failing high simultaneously are very low - beyond the catastrophic odds of 1E-9)
Last edited by sgrow787 on Tue Mar 03, 2020 9:51 pm, edited 2 times in total.
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 9:49 pm

Revelation wrote:
par13del wrote:
Revelation wrote:
A single global standard applied uniformly would be very helpful, that's the point the Airbus head of training was making, and it's one I agree with. Simple, I think.

How simple exactly, Airbus FBW system is vastly different from Boeing's even the basic core functionality is different, the critics who jumped on Boeing's initial thought is that the basic mantra that the pilot must have final say in basic flight modes should go bye bye.
So unless you want everyone to use the Airbus system, this will be decades in the making if not more.

Sorry, but as you say that is not feasible, the idea is that all 737 pilots should be trained to the standard for that aircraft, etc.

BTW tech did not stop in 1987, one of our a.net members is convinced the A220 cockpit is quite superior to A320, so maybe the suggestion should be all A320s get an upgrade to meet the A220 world standard? At A220 is an "Airbus standard" (ahem) but Rockwell Collins will be very happy if your suggestion takes hold.

The 737 pilots will probably be required to a specific training to operate the MAX, as the last available information suggest, we will see how exactly. What's more clear to me, is that the 737 type license, even for the 737 MAX, will be unusable for the next Boeing design that will replace the 737 MAX in the future, because the dual sides but only one active AP that hide a FC code is a dead end architecture. Pilots will be then required to learn a new type. As for the pilots that have learn to fly the 777 or the 787 after having learn to fly the 737. I don't think this will be a so big issue for this industry. I expect that the 737 MAX replacement will share a common type rating with the 777 and the 787.

To a less extend, this apply to the A320 pilots that require a big differential training to fly the A330 and more recent Airbus, even if the difference of the architecture is far less than with the 737. I also expect big changes in the cockpit of the Airbus that will one day replace the A320 neo.
:stirthepot: 737-8 MAX: "For all speeds higher than 220 Kts and trim set at a value of 2.5 units, the difficulity level of turning the manual trim wheel was level A (trim wheel not movable)." :stirthepot:
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 9:58 pm

par13del wrote:
The 737 is an outlier here because it will never be FBW, any attempt to do that will result in a new build frame as nothing from the 737 will be allowed over.

PixelFlight wrote:
The 737 pilots will probably be required to a specific training to operate the MAX, as the last available information suggest, we will see how exactly. What's more clear to me, is that the 737 type license, even for the 737 MAX, will be unusable for the next Boeing design that will replace the 737 MAX in the future, because the dual sides but only one active AP that hide a FC code is a dead end architecture. Pilots will be then required to learn a new type. As for the pilots that have learn to fly the 777 or the 787 after having learn to fly the 737. I don't think this will be a so big issue for this industry. I expect that the 737 MAX replacement will share a common type rating with the 777 and the 787.

To a less extend, this apply to the A320 pilots that require a big differential training to fly the A330 and more recent Airbus, even if the difference of the architecture is far less than with the 737. I also expect big changes in the cockpit of the Airbus that will one day replace the A320 neo.

The Boeing CEO is making it clear that a new cockpit has to be not just FBW but full envelope protection.

The real question relevant to this thread is can the MAX pass the current FAA regs the way the current FAA is enforcing them?
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CRJockey
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 10:04 pm

par13del wrote:
CRJockey wrote:
As good as it sounds for the layman and the nervous public, going back to that figurative big red button would be the worst mistake in a long time, regarding aviation safety.

Even the most proficient pilots from all continents and all upbringing and prior career have crashed all types of aircraft through spatial disorientation and CFIT, especially when flying manually in IMC. Having a complex failure mode at hand, you don't want crews to quickly disconnect the autopilot.

In the aviation industry today, it is not about crews disconnecting the autopilot, it is about the autopilot disconnecting itself without much if any prior warning of why it is disconnecting.


Well, maybe, though my professional life hasn't brought a single unexpected disconnect.

Regardless of my personal experience, my reply was to deliberate big red button pushing. Not autopilot or system failure modes.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 10:11 pm

Revelation wrote:
The real question relevant to this thread is can the MAX pass the current FAA regs the way the current FAA is enforcing them?

Well when Boeing said they estimate mid-summer for RTS the Head of the FAA said Boeing was too conservative, one has to hope that if the MAX cannot pass the FAA new requirements the head of the FAA would know that by now. The issues coming up recently were hardware like wire bundles, nacelle, etc. the training issues in terms of what they want to see should have been known from last year.

Unless the head of the FAA was just preparing Wall St. to keep the stock up so that when they refuse to RTS the stock would not tank.
 
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PW100
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 10:18 pm

Revelation wrote:
PW100 wrote:
It is my understanding (or interpretation, might be wrong though) that there were two main issues:
1) Cascading indications, . . . .
2) Cascading failure scenarios, . . .

Is it understanding/interpretation, or intuition? It's hard to interpret so much from the little we've been given, IMO.
. . .
We know P-8 is based on 737 and has an EICAS, but P-8 was developed right from the start with the decision to do EICAS in place so all the required changes to bring the required information into the unit were made before the first one was built.
However, Boeing’s 737, its oldest jet, doesn’t even have EICAS. Behind its sleek-looking pilot flight displays, the jet’s legacy avionics systems have been upgraded piecemeal over 50 years, and the overall system architecture won’t support EICAS.

Installing EICAS on the 737 “would be challenging,” said Mike Carriker, Boeing’s chief pilot for product development, in a brief interview. “There aren’t enough sensors on the 737.” Even if it were possible, it would require a new type certificate and new pilot training.

Boeing's CEO stated concerns about the need for changes in the cockpit was one part of why Boeing shelved NMA.


It was not my intention to "force on" EICAS-like system. Sorry if I came over like that.
However the thought pattern would be that without the benefit of EICAS, procedures and NNC need a higher level of intuitiveness and clearness.

You were correct, with the little information we have it is difficult to reach conclusions. My message was intended to provide some further angles on the possible issues in the RtS effort, as I don’t think the issues are limited to just MCAS 2.0. Which, as you brought forward, would be relatively straight forward and fairly well understood by now.

I’m inclined to believe that the bigger issue now is how the Max cockpit (not necessarily limited to MCAS 2.0) interacts with the crew on cascading failures, and how some single failures may be disguised by instrumentation logic, making NNC checklist selection far from intuitive.

If one has time on its hands, than that usually would be no big deal, but when an MCAS-off situation depends on a 3-second rule to make the right decision or NNC selection, I can see how regulators could be having some serious thoughts with that, and associated training requirements.
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 03, 2020 10:34 pm

Revelation wrote:
par13del wrote:
The 737 is an outlier here because it will never be FBW, any attempt to do that will result in a new build frame as nothing from the 737 will be allowed over.

PixelFlight wrote:
The 737 pilots will probably be required to a specific training to operate the MAX, as the last available information suggest, we will see how exactly. What's more clear to me, is that the 737 type license, even for the 737 MAX, will be unusable for the next Boeing design that will replace the 737 MAX in the future, because the dual sides but only one active AP that hide a FC code is a dead end architecture. Pilots will be then required to learn a new type. As for the pilots that have learn to fly the 777 or the 787 after having learn to fly the 737. I don't think this will be a so big issue for this industry. I expect that the 737 MAX replacement will share a common type rating with the 777 and the 787.

To a less extend, this apply to the A320 pilots that require a big differential training to fly the A330 and more recent Airbus, even if the difference of the architecture is far less than with the 737. I also expect big changes in the cockpit of the Airbus that will one day replace the A320 neo.

The Boeing CEO is making it clear that a new cockpit has to be not just FBW but full envelope protection.

The real question relevant to this thread is can the MAX pass the current FAA regs the way the current FAA is enforcing them?

Good new for the next Boeing design and for the flight safety.

And good question about the MAX and the FAA... It's now very clear that this is really not a simple task ! My understanding is that the actual FAA requirement on the MAX is forcing Boeing to definitively terminate the "dual sides but only one active AP that hide FC code" to enter the area of "dual sides one active AP that together form a kind of virtual dual redundant FCC". I don't think that anybody have done a such Frankenplan computer before, so there is effectively some risks that this effort could fail, and the fact that his submission to the FAA was delay so many times let's suggest that this risk is not as low as expected initially. Now, in the case this effort really fail, this don't automatically obliterate the 737-8/9 RTS, but most probably will force even more changes in the flight control system. The limit is the extend of the specific training that will be requires to handle those flight control system difference from the 737 NG experience. I think this is why there is actually so much unknown about the 737 MAX specific training: the FAA first want to see a design in conformity with the safety regulation, and only then will define the required specific training.

Taking this change requirements to the extreme, this could be a completely new flight control system architecture, as requested once by the Ethiopian Airline CEO, with the associated big training to handle that new architecture and type rating. At this point the FAA will maybe prohibit to still call it a 737 to avoid any mistake about what pilot are qualified to fly it. This could then be the real end of the 737 name, and since "The Boeing CEO is making it clear that a new cockpit has to be not just FBW but full envelope protection.", I don't expect that design to be able to carry the 737 name. I am fully speculating here.
:stirthepot: 737-8 MAX: "For all speeds higher than 220 Kts and trim set at a value of 2.5 units, the difficulity level of turning the manual trim wheel was level A (trim wheel not movable)." :stirthepot:
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Wed Mar 04, 2020 1:29 am

sgrow787 wrote:
planecane wrote:
sgrow787 wrote:

MCAS 2.0 was tested against average pilots. The test failed. Is it the pilot or is it MCAS?
Scenario 1
--MCAS activates due to high AOA on both sensors, but for only 1 cycle (as designed)
--Is the Max aerodynamically stable enough for the pilots to recover the high AOA without further help from MCAS?
Scenario 2
--MCAS fails, as designed, to activate during high AOA, when one AOA is bad with offset 20 deg while the other one reads correct high AOA.
--Is the Max aerodynamically stable enough for the pilots to recover the high AOA without any help from MCAS?
--Complicate these scenarios with clouds, low visibility, low altitude.


Since the reports are that they are trying to address training issues, I think that aerodynamic instability is highly unlikely to be causing the test failures. If a pilot can't recover due to aerodynamic instability, what good would training do?

For scenario 1, given that a failure seems to occur once in 50,000 flights, the chances of both AoA vanes failing would be once in 2.5 billion flights. Both failing high and within 5 degrees would make that even lower. With those statistics, does it really matter? I think that failure rate would exceed any certification requirement anyway.


Scenario 1 didn't say that the AOA sensor data was bad. It said the opposite, a "entering-stall" scenario. (i.e. the odds of both AOA failing high simultaneously are very low - beyond the catastrophic odds of 1E-9)


I misread your scenario. If MCAS operates as designed I would assume the answer is yes since it passed the initial certification tests with MCAS active.
 
mjoelnir
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Wed Mar 04, 2020 10:18 am

Revelation wrote:
par13del wrote:
The 737 is an outlier here because it will never be FBW, any attempt to do that will result in a new build frame as nothing from the 737 will be allowed over.

PixelFlight wrote:
The 737 pilots will probably be required to a specific training to operate the MAX, as the last available information suggest, we will see how exactly. What's more clear to me, is that the 737 type license, even for the 737 MAX, will be unusable for the next Boeing design that will replace the 737 MAX in the future, because the dual sides but only one active AP that hide a FC code is a dead end architecture. Pilots will be then required to learn a new type. As for the pilots that have learn to fly the 777 or the 787 after having learn to fly the 737. I don't think this will be a so big issue for this industry. I expect that the 737 MAX replacement will share a common type rating with the 777 and the 787.

To a less extend, this apply to the A320 pilots that require a big differential training to fly the A330 and more recent Airbus, even if the difference of the architecture is far less than with the 737. I also expect big changes in the cockpit of the Airbus that will one day replace the A320 neo.

The Boeing CEO is making it clear that a new cockpit has to be not just FBW but full envelope protection.

The real question relevant to this thread is can the MAX pass the current FAA regs the way the current FAA is enforcing them?


If the current FAA regulations would be taken seriously, the 737MAX should not pass. Not having EICAS is already an exemption from the rules. I can go down the list, there are many more exemptions. So only through exemptions from the rules the 737MAX can be certified. The question is rather, how many exemptions and are those exemptions reasonable.
 
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glideslope
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Wed Mar 04, 2020 10:54 am

Revelation wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:
...why he wanted to re-run the topic...

To address the criticism, I feel some people just can't seem to let go of the "US pilot" vs the "non-US pilot" sub thread. In fact they seem to enjoy the controversy it engenders and bring it up every chance they get. I'm hoping that reiterating that Airbus sees pilot training as a global problem helps people let go of that. I doubt it will, but I can try. A single global standard applied uniformly would be very helpful, that's the point the Airbus head of training was making, and it's one I agree with. If US pilots are falling short of the mark, it should be addressed. If non-US pilots are falling short of the mark, it should be addressed. Simple, I think.


You're efforts are always appreciated. :checkmark:
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sgrow787
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 05, 2020 3:46 am

planecane wrote:
sgrow787 wrote:
planecane wrote:

Since the reports are that they are trying to address training issues, I think that aerodynamic instability is highly unlikely to be causing the test failures. If a pilot can't recover due to aerodynamic instability, what good would training do?

For scenario 1, given that a failure seems to occur once in 50,000 flights, the chances of both AoA vanes failing would be once in 2.5 billion flights. Both failing high and within 5 degrees would make that even lower. With those statistics, does it really matter? I think that failure rate would exceed any certification requirement anyway.


Scenario 1 didn't say that the AOA sensor data was bad. It said the opposite, a "entering-stall" scenario. (i.e. the odds of both AOA failing high simultaneously are very low - beyond the catastrophic odds of 1E-9)


I misread your scenario. If MCAS operates as designed I would assume the answer is yes since it passed the initial certification tests with MCAS active.


In engineering, a design can work exactly to the specification/requirements, and still not be good enough to solve the problem for which it was tasked. You answered yes, the Max is aerodynamically stable enough for the pilots to recover [from disabled MCAS during a entering-stall event]. How do you know that?
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.
 
TaromA380
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 05, 2020 12:36 pm

seahawk wrote:
morrisond wrote:
seahawk wrote:

The problem is that the checklist remained unchanged between the NG and the MAX and continuous means different things in both types.


Which was a definite issue with Lionair as they had no knowledge that MCAS existed (although it did take them minutes to find any checklist - which is a training issue).

However for ET - according to ET themselves and supposedly documented in the manual's there crews were fully informed on MCAS and what to look for - in that if it was intermittent - and if experienced in flight run runaway trim checklist.

It's all in the back of the ET preliminary report.


I think nobody disputes that the main factor for the ET crash was crew error. Imho way too much energy has been spent on finding faults of the 737 and way too little has been spent on training better crews for all airliners.

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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 05, 2020 12:44 pm

How many 737NG have these inadequately trained pilots crashed since March 2019?

I am not stating that training shouldn't be improved - but we also have to remember that Boeing designed and pushed through certification in a way to minimize any additional training.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 05, 2020 1:27 pm

Can the COVID-19 kill the 737 MAX production ?

The scenario is a such major airlines collapsing that annihilate so much orders than the Airbus capacity to deliver the A32x neo obliterate the production of additional 737 MAX. The risk is probably very low now as to happens the remaining orders need to be in the range of a full year of A32x neo production. That means a collapsing of about 90% of the orders worldwide.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 05, 2020 2:37 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
Can the COVID-19 kill the 737 MAX production ?

The scenario is a such major airlines collapsing that annihilate so much orders than the Airbus capacity to deliver the A32x neo obliterate the production of additional 737 MAX. The risk is probably very low now as to happens the remaining orders need to be in the range of a full year of A32x neo production. That means a collapsing of about 90% of the orders worldwide.

This is what struck me this morning as well. Global Aviation Market is going to take a massive hit in 2020. I think we will see a lot of airlines collapse. It would not surprise me if some airlines took the opportunity of the grounding to simly cancel some orders.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 05, 2020 3:21 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
Can the COVID-19 kill the 737 MAX production ?

The scenario is a such major airlines collapsing that annihilate so much orders than the Airbus capacity to deliver the A32x neo obliterate the production of additional 737 MAX. The risk is probably very low now as to happens the remaining orders need to be in the range of a full year of A32x neo production. That means a collapsing of about 90% of the orders worldwide.


I think that scenario is pretty unlikely that only MAX orders would be cancelled - it's a big change for a lot of 737 airlines to switch over.

However that being said I can see the order books of all manufacturers taking a big hit on NB and WB's - it won't be hard to get a lot in the next few years if you want one.

I suspect the MAX will never get over rate 40 and the NEO won't increase from today's rate at best.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 05, 2020 4:32 pm

morrisond wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
Can the COVID-19 kill the 737 MAX production ?

The scenario is a such major airlines collapsing that annihilate so much orders than the Airbus capacity to deliver the A32x neo obliterate the production of additional 737 MAX. The risk is probably very low now as to happens the remaining orders need to be in the range of a full year of A32x neo production. That means a collapsing of about 90% of the orders worldwide.


I think that scenario is pretty unlikely that only MAX orders would be cancelled - it's a big change for a lot of 737 airlines to switch over.

However that being said I can see the order books of all manufacturers taking a big hit on NB and WB's - it won't be hard to get a lot in the next few years if you want one.

I suspect the MAX will never get over rate 40 and the NEO won't increase from today's rate at best.


If you look at order book, production rate and other economic factors, the two hardest hit frames will most probably be the A330 and the 777X. Both are niche and not really needed for most airlines. Hits to 787 and A350 will hurt the manufacturers but they are advanced enough. Airbus can compensate with the NB line up as airlines will switch from WB to NB and the A321 is the best product. The 737 will be ok but Boeing needs a new NB.

Only thing I think is Boeing will need to take a 10bn write off on the 787 program if cancellations force a reduction to 6-8 frames a month as the deferred costs will just not be compensated anymore. Especially as massivediscounts will be needed to get orders at all.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 05, 2020 5:21 pm

StTim wrote:
How many 737NG have these inadequately trained pilots crashed since March 2019?

I am not stating that training shouldn't be improved - but we also have to remember that Boeing designed and pushed through certification in a way to minimize any additional training.

That's the interesting thing: FAA is saying pilots trained to the standard FAA approved (i.e. before MCAS updates) by instructors who passed FAA tests are having problems with typical emergency procedures. It says a lot about Boeing, but it also says a lot about FAA. It must be a mess to sort out. If they raise the bar a lot they are admitting they ran a lax operation for a long time, if they do not they will be ignoring key data regarding performance of emergency procedures. In the end I'm sure they will be raising the bar and dealing with the blow back, but exactly how much to raise the bar and how to train to get to that point is probably a hotly debated topic right now.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 05, 2020 5:39 pm

morrisond wrote:
I think that scenario is pretty unlikely that only MAX orders would be cancelled - it's a big change for a lot of 737 airlines to switch over.

However that being said I can see the order books of all manufacturers taking a big hit on NB and WB's - it won't be hard to get a lot in the next few years if you want one.

I suspect the MAX will never get over rate 40 and the NEO won't increase from today's rate at best.

FluidFlow wrote:
If you look at order book, production rate and other economic factors, the two hardest hit frames will most probably be the A330 and the 777X. Both are niche and not really needed for most airlines. Hits to 787 and A350 will hurt the manufacturers but they are advanced enough. Airbus can compensate with the NB line up as airlines will switch from WB to NB and the A321 is the best product. The 737 will be ok but Boeing needs a new NB.

Only thing I think is Boeing will need to take a 10bn write off on the 787 program if cancellations force a reduction to 6-8 frames a month as the deferred costs will just not be compensated anymore. Especially as massivediscounts will be needed to get orders at all.

I think 777x is going to be fine. Its real ramp up doesn't start till next year and the companies that have it on order are the blue chips that will be the survivors. If anything CV might benefit them in the long run by killing off some competitors (Norwegian and AAX are said to be the most at risk). At some point A380s will become too expensive to operate and 777x will get a good chunk of the replacement business.

737 is in a problematic position. The new CEO is calling out the need for improvement in the cockpit as a reason for postponing NMA, which shines a bad light onto 737 with its old tech cockpit. I think it will sell into its captive installed base pretty well, and we'll find bargain hunters ala BA's large order, but it's hard to see too many airlines wanting to buy into the model when it will be replaced by a clean sheet in the not too distant future. I think the new CEO has not been as careful as the last one with regard to protecting the brand. I think the call on rate 40 is a good one. If they shoot too much past it, they may end up like 787 where they cash in for a few quarters but then need to shrink back for quite a while. Yet as before, Boeing have no other workable alternative but to harvest whatever revenue they can from 737.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 05, 2020 7:42 pm

XRAYretired wrote:
Calhoun blames Muilenburg.
Calhoun blames pilots.
Calhoun blames Forkner.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/05/busi ... lhoun.html

Boeing still avoiding their responsibilities. Morally bankrupt. I guess there is no chapter 11 for moral bankruptcy.

Ray

Interesting how he sits back as a former member of the BoD who blessed a lot of DM's decisions like boosting the production rates to pump up the stock and now he's throwing DM under the bus.

Calhoun is definitely pissing on DM's grave. I guess he feels confident that there's enough in DM's golden parachute to keep him from pushing back on such abuse. It's at best disingenuous and very cynical. I guess he feels immune to karma?

He says the board endorses the CEO till it doesn't, so he should watch his back.

He leans heavily on the three second rule and re-ignites the whole US vs non-US pilot sub thread:

But he implied that the pilots from Indonesia and Ethiopia, “where pilots don’t have anywhere near the experience that they have here in the U.S.,” were part of the problem, too.

Asked whether he believed American pilots would have been able to handle a malfunction of the software, Mr. Calhoun asked to speak off the record. The Times declined to do so.

“Forget it,” Mr. Calhoun then said. “You can guess the answer.”

That is of course the wrong attitude to have. You would think that recent FAA letter would have informed him on the struggles of US pilots doing standard emergency procedures. That whole take makes him come across as uninformed and bigoted and bound to piss off a large fraction of his customer base.

The only positive I could find in the interview was:

He said he would focus on insulating engineers from business pressures and that he wasn’t done shaking up the company’s leadership.

And some verbiage about changing the culture, working towards reasonable and achievable targets, being disciplined, hunting for bad news and dealing with it instead of burying it.

It's good he's calling out DM's focus on setting unrealistic targets to goose the stock price and good that he's implying he will get rid of others in the leadership that act the same way, but it's terrible that he's leaning in to the three second rule covering all sins and drawing a distinction between US and non-US pilots.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 05, 2020 7:51 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
Can the COVID-19 kill the 737 MAX production ?

The scenario is a such major airlines collapsing that annihilate so much orders than the Airbus capacity to deliver the A32x neo obliterate the production of additional 737 MAX. The risk is probably very low now as to happens the remaining orders need to be in the range of a full year of A32x neo production. That means a collapsing of about 90% of the orders worldwide.


The 737 Max program, currently in shutdown mode, is certainly going to benefit from a slow-down in commercial air travel. But only if their engineers aren't too afraid to come to work everyday and continue development on it. Boeing could build their own hospital, stock it with ventilators, and put their younger workers to work, quarantining them on site. That would keep the paycheck coming. They could stay in contact with their families through Facetime.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 05, 2020 9:37 pm

Revelation wrote:
StTim wrote:
How many 737NG have these inadequately trained pilots crashed since March 2019?

I am not stating that training shouldn't be improved - but we also have to remember that Boeing designed and pushed through certification in a way to minimize any additional training.

That's the interesting thing: FAA is saying pilots trained to the standard FAA approved (i.e. before MCAS updates) by instructors who passed FAA tests are having problems with typical emergency procedures. It says a lot about Boeing, but it also says a lot about FAA. It must be a mess to sort out. If they raise the bar a lot they are admitting they ran a lax operation for a long time, if they do not they will be ignoring key data regarding performance of emergency procedures. In the end I'm sure they will be raising the bar and dealing with the blow back, but exactly how much to raise the bar and how to train to get to that point is probably a hotly debated topic right now.


Revelation, how long is the piece of string though? If they can say that about the 737, they can probably also say that about the 747, 767, 777, 787, P8, KC46.....A "damned if you do, damned if you don't" type of situation. It'll be opening a big can of worms though.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 05, 2020 10:26 pm

“Boeing Max Overhaul Sparks U.S.-Canada Rift Over Pilot Guidance“

So those pesky Canadians have their own ideas and think the pilots should be able to cut power to the stick-shaker in the event of a MCAS type event.. the FAA disagrees.

So here we go .. maybe the other regulators will start to insist on their own requirements.

Not sure if this would apply just to Canadian 737MAXs or 737MAXs that enter Canadian airspace? Yet another can of worms opened.

“ Canadian aviation regulators are at odds with their U.S. counterparts over guidance for pilots of the Boeing Co. 737 Max during an emergency, threatening to open a schism between nations critical to the plane’s return to service.”

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... t-guidance
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 05, 2020 10:38 pm

sgrow787 wrote:
You answered yes, the Max is aerodynamically stable enough for the pilots to recover [from disabled MCAS during a entering-stall event]. How do you know that?


That's pretty easy for anyone to know. The MAX can be stalled with MCAS (1.0, 2.0. whatever.0) active. MCAS does not prevent stalls. So if the MAX is aerodynamically stable enough when MCAS is not -- and is not supposed to be -- active to meet certification requirements for stall recovery (and no one I've heard claims this is not the case) it's necessarily aerodynamically stable enough to meet certification requirements for stall recovery when MCAS IS supposed to be active but is disabled (or failing). The FAA has made plenty of MAX mistakes, but it isn't likely it certified the airplane if the airplane can't meet general stall recovery requirements.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 05, 2020 11:37 pm

Revelation wrote:
That's the interesting thing: FAA is saying pilots trained to the standard FAA approved (i.e. before MCAS updates) by instructors who passed FAA tests are having problems with typical emergency procedures. It says a lot about Boeing, but it also says a lot about FAA. It must be a mess to sort out. If they raise the bar a lot they are admitting they ran a lax operation for a long time, if they do not they will be ignoring key data regarding performance of emergency procedures. In the end I'm sure they will be raising the bar and dealing with the blow back, but exactly how much to raise the bar and how to train to get to that point is probably a hotly debated topic right now.

As it relates to this thread, I think we have to wait to see the specifics, obviously the raising of the bar is much different for a non-FBW a/c like the MAX to the 777 or 787 which are FBW.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 05, 2020 11:50 pm

Revelation wrote:
That's the interesting thing: FAA is saying pilots trained to the standard FAA approved (i.e. before MCAS updates) by instructors who passed FAA tests are having problems with typical emergency procedures. It says a lot about Boeing, but it also says a lot about FAA. It must be a mess to sort out. If they raise the bar a lot they are admitting they ran a lax operation for a long time, if they do not they will be ignoring key data regarding performance of emergency procedures. In the end I'm sure they will be raising the bar and dealing with the blow back, but exactly how much to raise the bar and how to train to get to that point is probably a hotly debated topic right now.


It says a lot about . . . Boeing? What? It says a lot more about global regulators and global airlines than it ever will about the manufacturers (plural, not singular). They are the ones in charge of ensuring we have skilled professionals in the cockpit.

Revelation wrote:
But he implied that the pilots from Indonesia and Ethiopia, “where pilots don’t have anywhere near the experience that they have here in the U.S.,” were part of the problem, too.

Asked whether he believed American pilots would have been able to handle a malfunction of the software, Mr. Calhoun asked to speak off the record. The Times declined to do so.

“Forget it,” Mr. Calhoun then said. “You can guess the answer.”

That is of course the wrong attitude to have. You would think that recent FAA letter would have informed him on the struggles of US pilots doing standard emergency procedures. That whole take makes him come across as uninformed and bigoted and bound to piss off a large fraction of his customer base.

The only positive I could find in the interview was:


Expect what he said about experience is true, and his implied opinion about American pilots is supported by the facts. How is telling the truth the "wrong attitude"? It can't be, unless you don't want to hear the truth. If we continue to push industry safety through a politically correct/incorrect filter as we have done with the MAX, we will see further degradation of industry safety. I thought the airline industry was above this, but clearly it is not, and the trend is continuing downward.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Fri Mar 06, 2020 12:19 am

flyingphil wrote:
“Boeing Max Overhaul Sparks U.S.-Canada Rift Over Pilot Guidance“

So those pesky Canadians have their own ideas and think the pilots should be able to cut power to the stick-shaker in the event of a MCAS type event.. the FAA disagrees.

So here we go .. maybe the other regulators will start to insist on their own requirements.

Not sure if this would apply just to Canadian 737MAXs or 737MAXs that enter Canadian airspace? Yet another can of worms opened.

“ Canadian aviation regulators are at odds with their U.S. counterparts over guidance for pilots of the Boeing Co. 737 Max during an emergency, threatening to open a schism between nations critical to the plane’s return to service.”

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... t-guidance

So how exactly is the FAA preventing Canada from having their own emergency procedures for the MAX?
We are told often enough that every airline has their own training procedures some of which are different than the OEM's, so what's the issue here especially when they are not asking for any physical changes to the a/c? Is the FAA so paranoid that they want all regulators to use their procedures with no customization whatsoever?
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Fri Mar 06, 2020 1:39 am

hivue wrote:
sgrow787 wrote:
You answered yes, the Max is aerodynamically stable enough for the pilots to recover [from disabled MCAS during a entering-stall event]. How do you know that?


That's pretty easy for anyone to know. The MAX can be stalled with MCAS (1.0, 2.0. whatever.0) active.

MCAS does not prevent stalls.


It doesn't prevent stalls by itself, but does play a part in the process of preventing a stall, err entering of a stall.

So if the MAX is aerodynamically stable enough when MCAS is not -- and is not supposed to be -- active to meet certification requirements for stall recovery (and no one I've heard claims this is not the case) it's necessarily aerodynamically stable enough to meet certification requirements for stall recovery when MCAS IS supposed to be active but is disabled (or failing).


Agree with the hypothetical, not with the premise.

The FAA has made plenty of MAX mistakes, but it isn't likely it certified the airplane if the airplane can't meet general stall recovery requirements.


But you don't know that. And neither does planecane.

EDIT: In the stall scenarios I laid out, MCAS is inactive by either (Scenario2) exhausting one cycle per high AOA event, and therefore is inactive after 10 sec of the event, or (Scenario1) not activated at all due to AOA disagree. Both are as designed by Boeing and do not involve using the stab cutouts to disable MCAS.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Fri Mar 06, 2020 4:00 am

889091 wrote:
Revelation wrote:
That's the interesting thing: FAA is saying pilots trained to the standard FAA approved (i.e. before MCAS updates) by instructors who passed FAA tests are having problems with typical emergency procedures. It says a lot about Boeing, but it also says a lot about FAA. It must be a mess to sort out. If they raise the bar a lot they are admitting they ran a lax operation for a long time, if they do not they will be ignoring key data regarding performance of emergency procedures. In the end I'm sure they will be raising the bar and dealing with the blow back, but exactly how much to raise the bar and how to train to get to that point is probably a hotly debated topic right now.

Revelation, how long is the piece of string though? If they can say that about the 737, they can probably also say that about the 747, 767, 777, 787, P8, KC46.....A "damned if you do, damned if you don't" type of situation. It'll be opening a big can of worms though.

I think all those but 737 have two or more inputs for AoA and pitot active at a time (didn't P8 get more?) and don't just revert to manual mode when they disagree and of course have EICAS so I think the emergency handling procedures are more straight forward so there's no need to move the bar.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Fri Mar 06, 2020 4:12 am

MSPNWA wrote:
Revelation wrote:
That's the interesting thing: FAA is saying pilots trained to the standard FAA approved (i.e. before MCAS updates) by instructors who passed FAA tests are having problems with typical emergency procedures. It says a lot about Boeing, but it also says a lot about FAA. It must be a mess to sort out. If they raise the bar a lot they are admitting they ran a lax operation for a long time, if they do not they will be ignoring key data regarding performance of emergency procedures. In the end I'm sure they will be raising the bar and dealing with the blow back, but exactly how much to raise the bar and how to train to get to that point is probably a hotly debated topic right now.

It says a lot about . . . Boeing? What? It says a lot more about global regulators and global airlines than it ever will about the manufacturers (plural, not singular). They are the ones in charge of ensuring we have skilled professionals in the cockpit.

It says a lot about Boeing and FAA. The context you deleted was "we also have to remember that Boeing designed and pushed through certification in a way to minimize any additional training" which is true. Boeing deceived the FAA. How do we know this? We have its employees sending emails saying they used "jedi mind tricks" with no one on the email thread objecting to such characterization. Boeing should have done better as it CEO ex board member belatedly says, and so should FAA.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Fri Mar 06, 2020 4:19 am

Speaking of FAA, and in particular FAA chief Dickson:

We’re working though the last few software review and documentation issues and then I think within a matter of a few weeks we should be seeing a certification flight,” Dickson said at a Washington aviation conference.

Ref: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... t-guidance

To me this is a strong sign that FAA sees no show stoppers on the tech side. Training, on the other hand....
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Fri Mar 06, 2020 5:39 am

sgrow787 wrote:
hivue wrote:
The FAA has made plenty of MAX mistakes, but it isn't likely it certified the airplane if the airplane can't meet general stall recovery requirements.


But you don't know that. And neither does planecane.


I guess I'm not that much into skeptic philosophy. At some point you have to give the FAA (and Boeing) credit for doing SOMETHING right. There have been a number of posts through all these threads calling the MAX a complete piece of junk that should be pitched on the scrap heap. This just isn't accurate description of the airplane.

But, yeah, I don't KNOW that.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Fri Mar 06, 2020 5:59 am

Revelation wrote:
Speaking of FAA, and in particular FAA chief Dickson:

We’re working though the last few software review and documentation issues and then I think within a matter of a few weeks we should be seeing a certification flight,” Dickson said at a Washington aviation conference.

Ref: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... t-guidance

To me this is a strong sign that FAA sees no show stoppers on the tech side. Training, on the other hand....


We have seen many times that FAA is not in the business of trying to guess and publish some technical problems before they actually happen.
All FAA timeschedules are bureucratic in a sense that they take the date when Boeing says it will be submitting something and then FAA takes a look at their books how many weeks the book says it takes do some processing for the Boeing submission and that's it. If there is some problem that is later found out in the testing FAA cannot know it at this moment and they do not try to guess whether that is going to happen. It is not their job to guess "oh we are going to find out a problem that nobody at this moment has any reason to believe exists and it is going to take a month for boeing to fix before we are actually flying the plane".

Therefore FAA feels it is a big problem if Boeing as a surprise publishes dates that FAA thinks are too optimistic because FAA timetables are the most realistically optimistic that are possible.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Fri Mar 06, 2020 7:02 am

Revelation wrote:
It says a lot about Boeing and FAA. The context you deleted was "we also have to remember that Boeing designed and pushed through certification in a way to minimize any additional training" which is true. Boeing deceived the FAA. How do we know this? We have its employees sending emails saying they used "jedi mind tricks" with no one on the email thread objecting to such characterization. Boeing should have done better as it CEO ex board member belatedly says, and so should FAA.


The only reason the lack of StTim's quoted post is a legitimate complaint is if your post didn't stay consistent with its context. Deceived the FAA? And you complain about deleting context when making conclusions with Forkner's statements that have an unknown context? You know, you're actually degrading the FAA by saying Forkner was able to deceive the FAA. And yet now you appear to fully trust them. Makes no sense.

It says very little about Boeing. What you appear to be doing is conflating general global training/skill issues that are being uncovered with a specific MAX issue and blaming both on the manufacturer. There's a huge difference between desiring to limit additional training requirements with a new type (every manufacturer, airline, and regulator desires this, and it's the optimal result for society), and the regulators/airlines allowing a certain standard for global pilot performance. Boeing doesn't control the latter, and that's where the inadequacy is being uncovered. Emergencies, malfunctions, and checklists aren't limited to Boeing aircraft.

StTim actually makes a good point that I don't think was intended. If this says so much about Boeing, then what about the NG/MAX minus MCAS 1.0 that's contradicts the argument? The issues mentioned in the article aren't limited to the MAX, the 737, or even Boeing. Are we really going to blame Boeing for the inadequate skills of those that operate it? I guess some are. Are we going to hold the MAX to a higher pilot standard than other aircraft? I guess the industry is. Meanwhile we have planes in the air that could go down with a coffee spill. Common sense is departing this industry.

Revelation wrote:
To me this is a strong sign that FAA sees no show stoppers on the tech side. Training, on the other hand....


Welcome to 2019. Not only is that not a strong sign, it isn't even a sign at all. The FAA is the boy who cried wolf. Their statements on the timeline own no credibility.

The fact of the matter is that the FAA isn't stating they are definitively closer to a cert flight than news reports said months ago. Clearly there has been at least one "showstopper" since last summer. The only question is if it's a reasonable one, of course that is a mystery. If all one reads is the latest news article, it's easy for the FAA to keep the charade going.
 
pune
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Fri Mar 06, 2020 9:10 am

MSPNWA wrote:

The only reason the lack of StTim's quoted post is a legitimate complaint is if your post didn't stay consistent with its context. Deceived the FAA? And you complain about deleting context when making conclusions with Forkner's statements that have an unknown context? You know, you're actually degrading the FAA by saying Forkner was able to deceive the FAA. And yet now you appear to fully trust them. Makes no sense.

It says very little about Boeing. What you appear to be doing is conflating general global training/skill issues that are being uncovered with a specific MAX issue and blaming both on the manufacturer. There's a huge difference between desiring to limit additional training requirements with a new type (every manufacturer, airline, and regulator desires this, and it's the optimal result for society), and the regulators/airlines allowing a certain standard for global pilot performance. Boeing doesn't control the latter, and that's where the inadequacy is being uncovered. Emergencies, malfunctions, and checklists aren't limited to Boeing aircraft.


You seem to contradict yourself quit a bit. From what we have learnt from the various threads is that lot of FAA activity was delegated to Boeing, why ? Because U.S. Congress which should have made the funds available for the same hasn't done so. In fact, it has tightened the purse strings as well as Boeing lobbyists lobbying so the work was delegated Boeing. The two disasters are due to Boeing doing hasty work, not documenting things and not sharing the solutions as well (even today they are questions which we have seen plenty in this thread alone.) Questions, which boeing needs to answer but perhaps won't.

If the House Transportation Committee of the U.S. Govt. does call the new Boeing chief for questioning, he will fall back on ' I don't know' or ' I don't remember' which is the essentially the line of defence the last chief did.

Now coming to how much training should be given to pilots for a procedure is not only the regulator but also the manufacturer and more so when the manufacturer is overlooking some of the regulatory work (which is a conflict of interest, but for the moment let's keep that aside.)

I am genuinely non-plussed with your statement where you say less training is good for society while at the same time blaming pilots for not having enough skills. To know the skill-sets of U.S. pilots or lack of, shouldn't the results of the tests be made public. After all, these tests were made with taxpayer money. Having more documentation would also help other regulators to devise their own set of tests which would raise the bar as well. There is another thing, when a pilot or co-pilot shares that x or Y person has x numbers of flying hours, how do we know if that includes or excludes sim-training as well as how much of the landings and taking off were automated or auto-assisted and how many were manual. From what I know there doesn't seem to any disclosure norms to flying passengers, who have paid not just good money but also trusting their lives in the pilot's hand. This is of course a consumer protection question as well as something to be asked of both the regulators as well as manufacturers. Please let me know if somebody has filed RTI's or Freedom of Information Requests for the same under the U.S. law.

MSPNWA wrote:
StTim actually makes a good point that I don't think was intended. If this says so much about Boeing, then what about the NG/MAX minus MCAS 1.0 that's contradicts the argument? The issues mentioned in the article aren't limited to the MAX, the 737, or even Boeing. Are we really going to blame Boeing for the inadequate skills of those that operate it? I guess some are. Are we going to hold the MAX to a higher pilot standard than other aircraft? I guess the industry is. Meanwhile we have planes in the air that could go down with a coffee spill. Common sense is departing this industry.


answered above.

Revelation wrote:
To me this is a strong sign that FAA sees no show stoppers on the tech side. Training, on the other hand....


Welcome to 2019. Not only is that not a strong sign, it isn't even a sign at all. The FAA is the boy who cried wolf. Their statements on the timeline own no credibility.

The fact of the matter is that the FAA isn't stating they are definitively closer to a cert flight than news reports said months ago. Clearly there has been at least one "showstopper" since last summer. The only question is if it's a reasonable one, of course that is a mystery. If all one reads is the latest news article, it's easy for the FAA to keep the charade going.[/quote]

If it's a charade happening why isn't Boeing through their fancy lawyers and lobbyists doing about it. Also would Boeing take the responsibility if a third one falls from the skies, just like the other two if something similar happens or would they continue to peddle that everybody else is bad, inept etc. except them. People would hold FAA responsible for for allowing an unsafe plane into the skies. As it is FAA has lost lot of trust of the public.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Fri Mar 06, 2020 11:40 am

Ertro wrote:
Therefore FAA feels it is a big problem if Boeing as a surprise publishes dates that FAA thinks are too optimistic because FAA timetables are the most realistically optimistic that are possible.

Well that flies in the face of reality. Boeing last communication was mid summer, the head of the FAA said Boeing was too conservative and it would / could be sooner but they were setting no time line, so what wrong here, its the reverse of what you are saying.
Boeing has learned its lesson....
 
marcelh
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Fri Mar 06, 2020 12:59 pm

MSPNWA wrote:

It says a lot about . . . Boeing? What? It says a lot more about global regulators and global airlines than it ever will about the manufacturers (plural, not singular). They are the ones in charge of ensuring we have skilled professionals in the cockpit.

BS. The manufacturer sets the bar. Boeing didn't mention MCAS to the pilots, joked about requests of some silly 3rd world customers about simulator training and didn't tell the FAA that MCAS didn't work exactly as they were told before.....
 
889091
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Fri Mar 06, 2020 1:27 pm

Revelation wrote:
Speaking of FAA, and in particular FAA chief Dickson:

We’re working though the last few software review and documentation issues and then I think within a matter of a few weeks we should be seeing a certification flight,” Dickson said at a Washington aviation conference.

Ref: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... t-guidance

To me this is a strong sign that FAA sees no show stoppers on the tech side. Training, on the other hand....


Any ideas which frame will be used for certification with the latest fixes? Heck, does Boeing even have a flying MAX 8 test bed anymore?
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Fri Mar 06, 2020 3:38 pm

pune wrote:
You seem to contradict yourself quit a bit. From what we have learnt from the various threads is that lot of FAA activity was delegated to Boeing, why ? Because U.S. Congress which should have made the funds available for the same hasn't done so. In fact, it has tightened the purse strings as well as Boeing lobbyists lobbying so the work was delegated Boeing. The two disasters are due to Boeing doing hasty work, not documenting things and not sharing the solutions as well (even today they are questions which we have seen plenty in this thread alone.) Questions, which boeing needs to answer but perhaps won't.

Boeing is getting the outcome they asked for.

marcelh wrote:
BS. The manufacturer sets the bar. Boeing didn't mention MCAS to the pilots, joked about requests of some silly 3rd world customers about simulator training and didn't tell the FAA that MCAS didn't work exactly as they were told before.....

Deceived itself by promoting the notion that MCAS on 737 was the same as MCAS on 767 and that pilots could deal with whatever they throw at them in three seconds without ever putting either hypothesis to the test. The internal correspondence makes it clear that they decided up front that they needed no sim training to hit the financial goals they set for themselves, and they were going to convince themselves of whatever tenuous proposition they needed to have to get to the no sim training goal, with no fear whatsoever of what would happen if they got it wrong.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
MIflyer12
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Fri Mar 06, 2020 3:54 pm

pune wrote:
I am genuinely non-plussed with your statement where you say less training is good for society while at the same time blaming pilots for not having enough skills. To know the skill-sets of U.S. pilots or lack of, shouldn't the results of the tests be made public. After all, these tests were made with taxpayer money. Having more documentation would also help other regulators to devise their own set of tests which would raise the bar as well. There is another thing, when a pilot or co-pilot shares that x or Y person has x numbers of flying hours, how do we know if that includes or excludes sim-training as well as how much of the landings and taking off were automated or auto-assisted and how many were manual. From what I know there doesn't seem to any disclosure norms to flying passengers, who have paid not just good money but also trusting their lives in the pilot's hand. This is of course a consumer protection question as well as something to be asked of both the regulators as well as manufacturers.


Your expectations for routine disclosure of pilot hours, sim hours, auto landings and training scores are completely unrealistic. The surgeon doesn't have a plaque on his door:

Board score in thoracic surgery, 92%
Number of operations performed: 168
People killed so far: just 2!

It seems your understanding of norms of Congressional oversight and pilot qualifications (FAA and carrier) is rather lacking. Can you point to a nation where your expectations for pilot qualifications disclosure are met? (Didn't think so.)
 
pune
Posts: 398
Joined: Tue Feb 12, 2019 9:18 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Fri Mar 06, 2020 4:31 pm

MIflyer12 wrote:
pune wrote:
I am genuinely non-plussed with your statement where you say less training is good for society while at the same time blaming pilots for not having enough skills. To know the skill-sets of U.S. pilots or lack of, shouldn't the results of the tests be made public. After all, these tests were made with taxpayer money. Having more documentation would also help other regulators to devise their own set of tests which would raise the bar as well. There is another thing, when a pilot or co-pilot shares that x or Y person has x numbers of flying hours, how do we know if that includes or excludes sim-training as well as how much of the landings and taking off were automated or auto-assisted and how many were manual. From what I know there doesn't seem to any disclosure norms to flying passengers, who have paid not just good money but also trusting their lives in the pilot's hand. This is of course a consumer protection question as well as something to be asked of both the regulators as well as manufacturers.


Your expectations for routine disclosure of pilot hours, sim hours, auto landings and training scores are completely unrealistic. The surgeon doesn't have a plaque on his door:

Board score in thoracic surgery, 92%
Number of operations performed: 168
People killed so far: just 2!

It seems your understanding of norms of Congressional oversight and pilot qualifications (FAA and carrier) is rather lacking. Can you point to a nation where your expectations for pilot qualifications disclosure are met? (Didn't think so.)


My question is and was for those people who question third-world/third-country pilots. The contradiction is Boeing wants to sell its planes to third-world countries i.e. Asia and Africa. At the same time, as seen in the above crashes, it was Boeing itself with it's 'jedi mind tricks' and what not that they bull-dozed airlines who wanted to have additional training. Calling names to Indian and Indonesian regulators etc. And this is probably just a scratch on the surface. Is this how an aircraft manufacturer should behave and talk about its customers and regulators. Is it wonder that Boeing has lost repute not just for faulty aircraft but the culture pervading through the company. Even the new head seems to be cut from the same cloth.

What I echoed is something that most travellers want to know. It also would form a basis for those 'real world hands-on' training that boeing lobbyists and apologists have talked about it in this thread and as well as others.

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