Moderators: jsumali2, richierich, ua900, PanAm_DC10, hOMSaR

 
User avatar
PixelFlight
Posts: 1026
Joined: Thu Nov 08, 2018 11:09 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 10, 2020 2:04 pm

planecane wrote:
Something conspicuously missing from the CVR excerpts in the ET interim report is ANY mention of ANY checklist or even discussion of the problem. Forget about the runaway stabilizer NNC that the AD specified but no checklist for any problem.

The discussion/action to cutout the stab trim switches just came out of thin air. It wasn't part of running a checklist.

Either these discussions were left out to hide something contained in them or they didn't take place. I'm going to assume the latter.

If this is the case it shows some level of pilot error for not following any training or CRM.

Well, this thread was already flooded of debates about the runaway NNC. The last argument that have barely survived was the excessive speed due to not disengage the A/T as per the NCC, if not taking in account that deceasing speed would not help to raise the altitude, and if not taking in account that the VMO is not the speed above where an aircraft is uncontrollable. The ET302 interim report definitively kill that argument by showing that an out-of-trim of 2.5 is impossible to fix with the manual trim wheel for any speed above 220 kts, violating the out-of-trim regulation. That speed is very low and was reached already before the flaps was commanded up and before the MCAS first erratic action. There is probably nobody at that time that did know that a 2.5 out-of-trim is so dangerous on a 737 NG and 737 MAX, and consequently the runaway NCC was totally inadequate because it was never designed with this life or death critical safety information in mind. Only a very non-intuitive and illogical order of reading the NCC could have produced the right actions. No training was ever set to address that case.
:stirthepot: 737-8 MAX: "For all speeds higher than 220 Kts and trim set at a value of 2.5 units, the difficulity level of turning the manual trim wheel was level A (trim wheel not movable)." :stirthepot:
 
XRAYretired
Posts: 870
Joined: Fri Mar 15, 2019 11:21 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 10, 2020 2:28 pm

planecane wrote:
Flying-Tiger wrote:
Something conspicuously missing from the CVR excerpts in the ET interim report is ANY mention of ANY checklist or even discussion of the problem. Forget about the runaway stabilizer NNC that the AD specified but no checklist for any problem.

The discussion/action to cutout the stab trim switches just came out of thin air. It wasn't part of running a checklist.

Either these discussions were left out to hide something contained in them or they didn't take place. I'm going to assume the latter.

If this is the case it shows some level of pilot error for not following any training or CRM.


Or, quite simple, no time to dig into the manuals, just trying to keep the bird in the air. If you´re only a couple of 100 ft above the ground over rugged train and travelling at 300ü mph it´s probably more important to gain altitute to get to a position to work through the problem and to rectify it. Ever tried to read a manual when traveling 100 mph on a motorway? No good idea... Aviate, navigage, communicate.


Except they communicated with ATC which is supposed to be last on the list. They didn't discuss memory items. They didn't mention the EAD. They didn't discuss much of what was going on. They stayed airborne for several minutes. If it was a quick loss of control situation then I would understand just doing whatever was instinctive.

There is no CVR transcript. It is selective for a narrative as was the preliminary report. If we get to see a transcript, then you can draw conclusions about what was or was not communicated between the pilots, but not before.

Ray
 
jollo
Posts: 396
Joined: Mon Aug 08, 2011 7:24 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Tue Mar 10, 2020 3:45 pm

planecane wrote:
First, I think it should be clarified that when out of trim it is almost impossible to bring back using the manual wheel. It is possible with the electric trim switches. [...] It seems to me that the design of the wheel from the beginning was to be the backup in the event the actuators failed and that the normal use would start with an in-trim or close to in-trim state.


PixelFlight wrote:
About your first part, I share the concern about understanding why all the existing FDR data on the MCAS induced out-of-trim, from JT043, JT610, and ET302, shows consistently that all the pilots stopped too early the manual electric trim correction just before using the STAB TRIM CUTOUT. I think that the badly redacted procedure play a big role here. In that procedure, the worst and imminently fatal situation is documented at his end in a small notice. The procedure should have been designed to survive the worst and urgent case first in bold. The training must also be more specific on that point. Finally I also suspect that the pilots, for some reasons, did not feel correctly when the stab trim neutralize the elevator pitch. I speculate that this could be when both pilots activate the yoke pitch: the pilot using the electric stab trim stop when he feel the pitch force neutralized on his yoke, without taking account of the pitch force on the other yoke. Regardless of the reason, this neutralization issue should deserve a better analysis in my opinion.



My non-professional opinion - as a lowly PPL - is that pilots are simply not used to use electric trim continuously for several seconds on end (e.g. more than 5 seconds). In normal operations there's simply no reason for the stab to be so severely out of trim that several seconds of continuous AND or ANU inputs are required to stabilize the aircraft. Long trim inputs are actively disouraged and reprimanded by instructors during initial training, and a lifetime of practice cements the muscle memory imperative "trim inputs shall be short and to the point; repeat if needed".

Of course, this does not explain why the ET302 pilot repeatedly seem to stop trimming at exactly the same stab position (i.e. way too early); maybe he simply kept trimming for the maximum number of seconds he felt were safe, wich was the same number in both occurrences. I am aware of your hypothesis about both pilots pulling on connected yokes, but this also does not explain why the trim movement stopped repeatedly at the same stab position (unless one of the pilots kept imperturbably pulling with constant force throughout the whole mishap duration).

I agree, this is something still to be explained satisfactorily.

PixelFlight wrote:
Note: All of this should have been different if the 737 MAX still allowed to cutout the FCC stab trim without cutting the manual electrical trim, as in early 737 models.

The dual stab trim cutout switch design originated in early 737 models, but the possibility for pilots to disable FCC stab trim inputs without completely cutting out the electric stab trim motor is still there in all NGs flying as of today. This possibility was only removed with the MAX, and then willfully mis-documented as a mere "labelling change" of cutout switches. In my opinion, the explanation that this (apparently absurd) design decision "just happened" coincidentally with MCAS introduction (and it's obfuscation in FCOM, and mis-representation in certification documents) just doesn't fly.
 
oschkosch
Posts: 598
Joined: Mon Oct 29, 2018 3:41 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Wed Mar 11, 2020 11:40 am

I am hoping for a CVR excerpt, where it clearly says "f**k the damn trim wheel won't turn"
:stirthepot: :airplane: "This airplane is designed by clowns, who in turn are supervised by monkeys" :airplane: :stirthepot:
 
User avatar
flyingphil
Posts: 312
Joined: Wed May 16, 2007 2:56 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Wed Mar 11, 2020 12:20 pm

oschkosch wrote:
I am hoping for a CVR excerpt, where it clearly says "f**k the damn trim wheel won't turn"


To correct the mis-trim they would have had to turn the trim wheel 40 times .. while pulling 94 Ibs on the yoke ! and this was with MCAS turned off..

https://www.flightglobal.com/safety/eth ... 52.article

The prospect of a return to service in spring 2020 is looking remote.
 
User avatar
cosyr
Posts: 1475
Joined: Thu Jul 26, 2012 3:23 pm

Will history remember the MAX as a mistake?

Wed Mar 11, 2020 12:29 pm

I completely understand the reasons why Boeing opted to make the MAX instead of a clean sheet new narrowbody 737 replacement: The A320NEO was going to gut the 737NG market, so they had to do something, they were still reeling from the development costs of the 787, and neither Boeing nor Airbus wants to make the first move, since it will cost billions and the other company can just improve on what the first did and be a step ahead for decades (though, that's kind of what Airbus already did, designing the A320 20 year after the 737).

BUT, Has Boeing stretched the limits of 737 design too far, and made too many compromises as a result? The 737 was originally designed in the 60's when infrastructure was poor, and high bypass engines didn't exist. As a result, the plane was low to the ground, since jet bridges didn't exist everywhere, and it often carried it's own stairs. Engines were not large in those days, so this was easy to do, but even by the 737-300 this decision was already beginning to be a problem, and forced a unique design for the engines to fit the low stance of the plane and allow Boeing to not redesign the landing gear to lift the plane up.

With the 737NG, the engines were still limited in their diameter growth, and by the time they stretched the plane to the -900 length, they were already running into more imbalance problems. Don't -900's have to be unloaded in a different arrangement than other planes since the plane has the potential to be too tail heavy?

Finally, 4th generation of the 737 with the MAX and the 10 had to have a complex new style of landing gear to try and support the growing imbalance of the growing fuselage, and the engines grew again, but still were forced to be a smaller diameter than the NEO. I've read that the MCAS system had to be developed because the new plane was inherently unbalanced, or at least struggled to remain in natural balance, which is why it is not on the 777X developed after it.

And why were there all these compromises? All to retain a design from almost 60 years ago, for an infrastructure problem that no longer exists? No question it would have cost more to develop a brand new plane, but the costs associated with the grounding are adding up, and they have to redesign the 737 at some point anyway, so they can't avoid that. Will history look back at Boeing and say, "you went one step too far. You compromised too much to retain an old design for the wrong reasons."?
 
FlyingBlueKLM
Posts: 223
Joined: Sun Jan 05, 2020 9:52 am

Re: Will history remember the MAX as a mistake?

Wed Mar 11, 2020 12:41 pm

cosyr wrote:
And why were there all these compromises? All to retain a design from almost 60 years ago, for an infrastructure problem that no longer exists? No question it would have cost more to develop a brand new plane, but the costs associated with the grounding are adding up, and they have to redesign the 737 at some point anyway, so they can't avoid that. Will history look back at Boeing and say, "you went one step too far. You compromised too much to retain an old design for the wrong reasons?

I think so.
KJFK - EGLL:

Concorde: 2 hours, 52 minutes, and 59 seconds

Boeing 747: 4 hours and 56 minutes
 
User avatar
Revelation
Posts: 24613
Joined: Wed Feb 09, 2005 9:37 pm

Re: Will history remember the MAX as a mistake?

Wed Mar 11, 2020 1:26 pm

cosyr wrote:
And why were there all these compromises? All to retain a design from almost 60 years ago, for an infrastructure problem that no longer exists? No question it would have cost more to develop a brand new plane, but the costs associated with the grounding are adding up, and they have to redesign the 737 at some point anyway, so they can't avoid that. Will history look back at Boeing and say, "you went one step too far. You compromised too much to retain an old design for the wrong reasons."?

The main reason was competitive pressure. Customers were not willing to wait for a clean sheet, they could get an A32x with most of the benefits of a clean sheet much sooner. Customers weren't even willing to allow major changes to the 737 cockpit such as addition of EICAS, they wanted the ability to move pilots back and forth to NG with just a tablet training session. I think these are well established facts. If you for instance read our current KLM A321 thread the main thing MAX10 offers is compatibility with existing 737s. They also are convenient truths for Boeing, because it made the most profits for them too.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
djpearman
Posts: 19
Joined: Thu Feb 06, 2020 9:02 pm

Re: Will history remember the MAX as a mistake?

Wed Mar 11, 2020 1:31 pm

cosyr wrote:
And why were there all these compromises? All to retain a design from almost 60 years ago, for an infrastructure problem that no longer exists? No question it would have cost more to develop a brand new plane, but the costs associated with the grounding are adding up, and they have to redesign the 737 at some point anyway, so they can't avoid that. Will history look back at Boeing and say, "you went one step too far. You compromised too much to retain an old design for the wrong reasons."?


AFAICT, the compromises and in particular the installation of MCAS were solely for the purpose of making the MAX behave just like any other 737, thus not requiring a specifically trained pool of pilots to fly. So, basically, business case beats aerospace engineering in this decision.
 
mjoelnir
Posts: 9391
Joined: Sun Feb 03, 2013 11:06 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Wed Mar 11, 2020 3:51 pm

The main problem was Boeing's decision to run the 737MAX on the same type as the 737NG, keeping transfer cost between the NG and MAX low. That decision ruled all main decisions on the MAX. When Boeing realized, that the MAX had different flight characteristics than the NG, they tried to hide that fact behind the secret MCAS.

Installing EICAS? Impossible would lead to a different type and simulator training. New trim wheel, impossible see before. And you can go down the line.
Than you had deficiencies already demonstrated on the NG. To high heat in the tanks or surface of the tanks. The hand trim wheel not working.
The wire problems. It is not on the ground of problems with the NG, but this are new rules coming into force after the NG was designed. Those rules were made after years of investigating electrical problems in different frames, that lead to accidents.

Nothing against doing the MAX instead of a new clean sheet, but why keep old exemptions that could be cleared up with a new model. Exemptions that are partly over 35 years old (EICAS + 16G).
The MAX should have been cleaned up and become a new type.
 
questions
Posts: 2337
Joined: Thu Sep 15, 2011 4:51 am

Re: Will history remember the MAX as a mistake?

Wed Mar 11, 2020 5:13 pm

Revelation wrote:
The main reason was competitive pressure. Customers were not willing to wait for a clean sheet, they could get an A32x with most of the benefits of a clean sheet much sooner. Customers weren't even willing to allow major changes to the 737 cockpit such as addition of EICAS, they wanted the ability to move pilots back and forth to NG with just a tablet training session. I think these are well established facts. If you for instance read our current KLM A321 thread the main thing MAX10 offers is compatibility with existing 737s. They also are convenient truths for Boeing, because it made the most profits for them too.


Just to clarify:
1. Customers were not willing to wait for a clean sheet Boeing when they could get an A32X (with most of the benefits Boeing would offer in a clean sheet aircraft) sooner
2. Customers wanted commonality of cockpits among 737 types so that they could move pilots (scheduling, training, contract clauses) easily from 737 to 737

Correct?

So customers would have been willing to purchase a clean sheet design if the benefits of the new aircraft outweighed the added complexity of managing pilots across aircraft types?

Correct?

Does this suggest Boeing lacked a well thought out *strategy* for ending the 737 program — a long-running, highly successful program with high sales; a large number of aircraft still flying; and single aircraft type customers — vs just offering a new, clean sheet aircraft type?
 
Interested
Posts: 887
Joined: Thu May 19, 2016 12:19 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Wed Mar 11, 2020 6:32 pm

Just looked at the share price. First time in a while.

I knew it had gone down but never expected it to be that low

199 now!!

Edit - correction 196 now

It dropped 3 more whilst I logged on here and wrote the post

I've no idea what the implications are but they can't be good?
 
SteinarN
Posts: 178
Joined: Mon Dec 29, 2014 1:26 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Wed Mar 11, 2020 7:01 pm

Down to 195 now. Thats down from all time high of 440 on March 01, 2019, or a 56 percent decline. (in dollars)
Edit: Down to 191.

Airbus at 85, down from all time high of 139 January 24, 2020 or a 39 percent decline. (In Euros)
 
packsonflight
Posts: 386
Joined: Tue Jan 12, 2010 2:55 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Wed Mar 11, 2020 8:25 pm

Boeing must have known well in advance that Airbus was going to do the NEO, at least the engine manufactures who offered the engines CFM/GE and Pratt where in the know
.
When the NEO was finally offered in 2011 Boeing initially insisted on doing nothing. Randys famous words: "they are just catching up"
Then Boeing changed tone and said they where doing something new sometimes, and it is going to be awesome. very vague, and hardly any commitment involved so it left the airlines no choice but to order the NEO

If Boeing would have bin more firm on what they where going to build, (instead of this MOMish PR talk) and what it would look like I am sure many airlines would have waited.
 
kayik
Posts: 116
Joined: Thu Mar 14, 2019 10:58 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Wed Mar 11, 2020 8:32 pm

Market value is down to $110B from $192B in a month. The loan they want to withdraw now is more than 10% of the company value.
 
744SPX
Posts: 254
Joined: Mon Jan 27, 2020 6:20 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Wed Mar 11, 2020 8:55 pm

Closed at 189. The party is definitely over
 
User avatar
Revelation
Posts: 24613
Joined: Wed Feb 09, 2005 9:37 pm

Re: Will history remember the MAX as a mistake?

Wed Mar 11, 2020 9:12 pm

questions wrote:
Does this suggest Boeing lacked a well thought out *strategy* for ending the 737 program — a long-running, highly successful program with high sales; a large number of aircraft still flying; and single aircraft type customers — vs just offering a new, clean sheet aircraft type?

What strategy could have made up for the loss of compatibility with 737, similar tech relative to the competitor, but huge R&D bill and many years with no product to offer while waiting for the new product to be designed and tested, and production line ramped up?

I don't blame Boeing's executives for going ahead with MAX, the strategy was sound. The real issue was engineering not correctly evaluating the implications of the no sim training requirement and pushing back appropriately. They fudged the process to come up with the desired answer rather than letting the process tell them what the right answer was.

I don't think Calhoun will be around very long. His reign is already tainted, IMO. Hopefully whomever is next does an honest evaluation of what Boeing can or cannot do and acts accordingly, even if that means exiting certain markets. The status quo is not good enough. At least Calhoun seems to understand he needs to be thinking in terms of all new tech in the next cockpit. The real question is can the current stock driven company talk itself into making the kinds of changes needed to develop seriously good tech? They have a lot of catching up to do in the hottest segment of the market.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
art
Posts: 3494
Joined: Tue Feb 08, 2005 11:46 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Wed Mar 11, 2020 10:07 pm

SteinarN wrote:
Down to 195 now. Thats down from all time high of 440 on March 01, 2019, or a 56 percent decline. (in dollars)
Edit: Down to 191.

Airbus at 85, down from all time high of 139 January 24, 2020 or a 39 percent decline. (In Euros)


I think they would both be down

- stock exchanges are down considerably due to coronavirus disruption
- airlines are taking a severe hammering financially due to novel coronavirus disruption of service and load factors
- due to above some airlines will go bust, making their used frames available for sale
 
questions
Posts: 2337
Joined: Thu Sep 15, 2011 4:51 am

Re: Will history remember the MAX as a mistake?

Wed Mar 11, 2020 10:29 pm

Revelation wrote:
questions wrote:
Does this suggest Boeing lacked a well thought out *strategy* for ending the 737 program — a long-running, highly successful program with high sales; a large number of aircraft still flying; and single aircraft type customers — vs just offering a new, clean sheet aircraft type?

What strategy could have made up for the loss of compatibility with 737, similar tech relative to the competitor, but huge R&D bill and many years with no product to offer while waiting for the new product to be designed and tested, and production line ramped up?

I don't blame Boeing's executives for going ahead with MAX, the strategy was sound. The real issue was engineering not correctly evaluating the implications of the no sim training requirement and pushing back appropriately. They fudged the process to come up with the desired answer rather than letting the process tell them what the right answer was.

I don't think Calhoun will be around very long. His reign is already tainted, IMO. Hopefully whomever is next does an honest evaluation of what Boeing can or cannot do and acts accordingly, even if that means exiting certain markets. The status quo is not good enough. At least Calhoun seems to understand he needs to be thinking in terms of all new tech in the next cockpit. The real question is can the current stock driven company talk itself into making the kinds of changes needed to develop seriously good tech? They have a lot of catching up to do in the hottest segment of the market.


I actually think we may be in agreement, at least partially. Boeing had and has no strategy to exit the 737 program. Given the number of aircraft flying and single type operators, Boeing can not simply offer a new aircraft like they have done in the past and expect customers to follow. The success and popularity of the 737 makes the scale of the situation unique vs other aircraft types that have simply been replaced. Boeing has never done this before on a similar scale. It will not be easy.
 
strfyr51
Posts: 5033
Joined: Tue Apr 10, 2012 5:04 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Wed Mar 11, 2020 11:04 pm

In all of this rhetoric I do not see any productive input ! The first thing? Boeing made the Angle of attack INDICATION an option rather THAN Standard equipment./
And where does the indication came from? The cap's and First officer's Angle of attack VANES!! But? If you have NO angle of attack Indication on the EHSI? then exactly How would you even know the Vane is working at ALL? The reason nobody Else had this problem? Was because most all of the Other Carriers HAD previous versions of the 737 WITH Angle of attack indication!! And with the AOA sensor being a highly vulnerable appendage on the nose of the airplane? It could be damaged by a bird strike? or even weather should it's internal heater fail. Yet Boeing? Made the AOA indication an OPTION, Can you dig that? Then tied the MCAS system to it and ONLY on the Captain's side no less instead of a comparator system between the left and right side Vanes. So the fix is? Limit the MCAS system to a few degrees of trim input? Install a Trim warning that the MCAS is even inputting trim. then? Install the AOA indication as Standard equipment! Then? Certify the Max as a separate series of airplane with an amended type rating and simulator training.
 
bravoindia
Posts: 219
Joined: Thu Jun 23, 2016 5:07 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 12, 2020 4:12 am

Maybe best thing that happened for the max is a virus.
 
User avatar
flyingphil
Posts: 312
Joined: Wed May 16, 2007 2:56 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 12, 2020 5:57 am

“Boeing said Air Canada canceled 11 Max aircraft while some other customers converted orders for larger planes. For example, aircraft leasing firm Air Lease converted nine Max planes into three 787s. Oman Air converted 10 Maxes into four 787s.”

Air Canada are saying they are still fully committed to the 737MAX and this is an adjustment to the original order.

https://www.flightglobal.com/fleets/air ... 92.article

I wonder if MOL at Ryanair will make a move, or just sit tight and take the Boeing compensation.
 
User avatar
hilram
Posts: 753
Joined: Wed Aug 20, 2014 11:12 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 12, 2020 7:13 am

In these contracts, when can Airlines walk away from it, cancel and demand the full amount of their pre-payments back? How long can Boeing put them on hold?
Flown on: A319, 320, 321, 332, 333, 343 | B732, 734, 735, 736, 73G, 738, 743, 744, 772, 77W | CRJ9 | BAe-146 | DHC-6, 7, 8 | F50 | E195 | MD DC-9 41, MD-82, MD-87
 
User avatar
seahawk
Posts: 9677
Joined: Fri May 27, 2005 1:29 am

Re: Will history remember the MAX as a mistake?

Thu Mar 12, 2020 8:12 am

Revelation wrote:
questions wrote:
Does this suggest Boeing lacked a well thought out *strategy* for ending the 737 program — a long-running, highly successful program with high sales; a large number of aircraft still flying; and single aircraft type customers — vs just offering a new, clean sheet aircraft type?

What strategy could have made up for the loss of compatibility with 737, similar tech relative to the competitor, but huge R&D bill and many years with no product to offer while waiting for the new product to be designed and tested, and production line ramped up?


It would have been an investment into the future. And it is a problem large manufacturing cooperation's face regularly. Your old and well established product design is reaching obsolescence, you then need to do a new design, even if it is just going to meet the capabilities of the product of the competitor after they did a more simple up-date.
 
uta999
Posts: 927
Joined: Mon Jun 14, 2010 11:10 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 12, 2020 8:41 am

Wouldn’t an iPad based ‘dumb’ EICAS system be easy to setup?

Although not linked to the actual aircraft, it would provide full checklists and solutions for any event with a simple search, based on the stage of the flight in real time.

It would know the a/c approximate speed, altitude, heading, attitude and flight phase and display what’s needed accordingly.
Your computer just got better
 
User avatar
flyingphil
Posts: 312
Joined: Wed May 16, 2007 2:56 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 12, 2020 10:48 am

It was only a short time ago that Boeing went on a hiring spree... now that has come to an abrupt halt.

“Given that the company is "haemorrhaging cash," Richard Aboulafia, an aerospace analyst at the Teal Group, a consulting firm, said "it makes sense" that Boeing would freeze hiring. The company had been on a bit of a hiring spree as it worked to return the 737 Max line to service, he said.”

https://www.smh.com.au/business/compani ... 5497q.html

With no sign of a 737MAX return to service how long can Boeing continue burning through cash? A few months ago talk of Government intervention and Chapter 11 protection seemed far fetched. The Corona virus may change things..
 
User avatar
par13del
Posts: 10355
Joined: Sun Dec 18, 2005 9:14 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 12, 2020 12:29 pm

flyingphil wrote:
With no sign of a 737MAX return to service how long can Boeing continue burning through cash? A few months ago talk of Government intervention and Chapter 11 protection seemed far fetched. The Corona virus may change things..

Well the production line is still shut down, so any guess on when it will return, I am thinking much more than 3 months from Jan-2020.

As for RTS, have not seen anything from the head of the FAA recently, so until he speaks, all else is .......
 
User avatar
MrBren
Posts: 329
Joined: Wed Jun 15, 2016 11:44 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 12, 2020 12:32 pm

RIP 737 MAX and all casualties.
 
maint123
Posts: 396
Joined: Sun Nov 04, 2018 4:18 pm

Re: Will history remember the MAX as a mistake?

Thu Mar 12, 2020 4:08 pm

Revelation wrote:
cosyr wrote:
And why were there all these compromises? All to retain a design from almost 60 years ago, for an infrastructure problem that no longer exists? No question it would have cost more to develop a brand new plane, but the costs associated with the grounding are adding up, and they have to redesign the 737 at some point anyway, so they can't avoid that. Will history look back at Boeing and say, "you went one step too far. You compromised too much to retain an old design for the wrong reasons."?

The main reason was competitive pressure. Customers were not willing to wait for a clean sheet, they could get an A32x with most of the benefits of a clean sheet much sooner. Customers weren't even willing to allow major changes to the 737 cockpit such as addition of EICAS, they wanted the ability to move pilots back and forth to NG with just a tablet training session. I think these are well established facts. If you for instance read our current KLM A321 thread the main thing MAX10 offers is compatibility with existing 737s. They also are convenient truths for Boeing, because it made the most profits for them too.

Totally misleading post. Blaming the customers for Boeing's incompetence, callousness and blunders. No customer asked Boeing to give a unsafe plane. And if a American airlines did , no reason to sell this faulty plane to the other 99 customers who did not ask.
 
beechnut
Posts: 933
Joined: Wed Apr 21, 2004 12:27 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 12, 2020 4:09 pm

uta999 wrote:
Wouldn’t an iPad based ‘dumb’ EICAS system be easy to setup?



Foreflight.

Beech
 
User avatar
Revelation
Posts: 24613
Joined: Wed Feb 09, 2005 9:37 pm

Re: Will history remember the MAX as a mistake?

Thu Mar 12, 2020 4:28 pm

seahawk wrote:
It would have been an investment into the future. And it is a problem large manufacturing cooperation's face regularly. Your old and well established product design is reaching obsolescence, you then need to do a new design, even if it is just going to meet the capabilities of the product of the competitor after they did a more simple up-date.

This is not what we see in the aviation industry. A300, A380, 727, 757 all were built till the orders stopped coming in. MAX got 4,500 orders. Customers were happy to order a NG with a better engine. They didn't see it as obsolete.

uta999 wrote:
Wouldn’t an iPad based ‘dumb’ EICAS system be easy to setup?

Although not linked to the actual aircraft, it would provide full checklists and solutions for any event with a simple search, based on the stage of the flight in real time.

That would not be an EICAS, it would just be a online manual. Boeing's chief pilot was quoted in this thread saying 737 as delivered does not have an architecture that can support a genuine EICAS.

Revelation wrote:
maint123 wrote:
The main reason was competitive pressure. Customers were not willing to wait for a clean sheet, they could get an A32x with most of the benefits of a clean sheet much sooner. Customers weren't even willing to allow major changes to the 737 cockpit such as addition of EICAS, they wanted the ability to move pilots back and forth to NG with just a tablet training session. I think these are well established facts. If you for instance read our current KLM A321 thread the main thing MAX10 offers is compatibility with existing 737s. They also are convenient truths for Boeing, because it made the most profits for them too.

Blaming the customers for Boeing's incompetence, callousness and blunders. No customer asked Boeing to give a unsafe plane. And if a American airlines did , no reason to sell this faulty plane to the other 99 customers who did not ask.

I blame the customers for not wanting to wait longer or accept higher costs for a clean sheet. They too would benefit from the increase in automation and efficiency a clean sheet presumably would have delivered, but they preferred cheap and quick. I blame Boeing for delivering the terrible MCAS 1.0 design and implementation.

beechnut wrote:
uta999 wrote:
Wouldn’t an iPad based ‘dumb’ EICAS system be easy to setup?

Foreflight.

"Flight planning, aviation weather, maps and charts" != EICAS.

Ref: foreflight.com
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
User avatar
Revelation
Posts: 24613
Joined: Wed Feb 09, 2005 9:37 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 12, 2020 5:26 pm

As per Stitch in our news thread, Boeing will do the wiring bundle separation mod during the RTS processing and is not anticipating this will change the RTS time line.

Boeing does not view the retrofits as delaying the plane’s estimated return to service in the middle of the year at the earliest, one of the people added. Boeing expects changes to take roughly one week per aircraft, but it will do some of the work as it goes through the process of removing aircraft from storage, he said.

Ref: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boei ... SKBN20Y3E3
Last edited by Revelation on Thu Mar 12, 2020 5:28 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
User avatar
seahawk
Posts: 9677
Joined: Fri May 27, 2005 1:29 am

Re: Will history remember the MAX as a mistake?

Thu Mar 12, 2020 5:33 pm

Revelation wrote:
seahawk wrote:
It would have been an investment into the future. And it is a problem large manufacturing cooperation's face regularly. Your old and well established product design is reaching obsolescence, you then need to do a new design, even if it is just going to meet the capabilities of the product of the competitor after they did a more simple up-date.

This is not what we see in the aviation industry. A300, A380, 727, 757 all were built till the orders stopped coming in. MAX got 4,500 orders. Customers were happy to order a NG with a better engine. They didn't see it as obsolete.


That is not a decision that the customer has to make, but one that the company has to make. And if one considers the costs of the grounding the MAX will probably never make a profit.

And to be honest the aviation industry is not different, they just enjoy the joys of little competition and long product cycles, so in the past the original product was often so obsolete that an up-date did not work, or the market for the product was gone. (like quad airliners)
 
User avatar
par13del
Posts: 10355
Joined: Sun Dec 18, 2005 9:14 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 12, 2020 5:35 pm

Revelation wrote:
As per Stitch in our news thread, Boeing will do the wiring bundle separation mod during the RTS processing and is not anticipating this will change the RTS time line.

Boeing does not view the retrofits as delaying the plane’s estimated return to service in the middle of the year at the earliest, one of the people added. Boeing expects changes to take roughly one week per aircraft, but it will do some of the work as it goes through the process of removing aircraft from storage, he said.

Ref: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boei ... SKBN20Y3E3

So this puts the head of the FAA RTS timeline in sync with Boeing's earlier mid-summer timeline?
Cool
 
User avatar
par13del
Posts: 10355
Joined: Sun Dec 18, 2005 9:14 pm

Re: Will history remember the MAX as a mistake?

Thu Mar 12, 2020 5:38 pm

seahawk wrote:
Revelation wrote:
seahawk wrote:
It would have been an investment into the future. And it is a problem large manufacturing cooperation's face regularly. Your old and well established product design is reaching obsolescence, you then need to do a new design, even if it is just going to meet the capabilities of the product of the competitor after they did a more simple up-date.

This is not what we see in the aviation industry. A300, A380, 727, 757 all were built till the orders stopped coming in. MAX got 4,500 orders. Customers were happy to order a NG with a better engine. They didn't see it as obsolete.


That is not a decision that the customer has to make, but one that the company has to make. And if one considers the costs of the grounding the MAX will probably never make a profit.

And to be honest the aviation industry is not different, they just enjoy the joys of little competition and long product cycles, so in the past the original product was often so obsolete that an up-date did not work, or the market for the product was gone. (like quad airliners)

So Boeing is using that same flawed logic by not launching the NMA or MOM even though they can see the glaring hole in their product lineup?
 
User avatar
Revelation
Posts: 24613
Joined: Wed Feb 09, 2005 9:37 pm

Re: Will history remember the MAX as a mistake?

Thu Mar 12, 2020 6:20 pm

seahawk wrote:
That is not a decision that the customer has to make, but one that the company has to make.

A company that makes decisions that run counter to its customer's wishes doesn't last very long.

A company that speculates it knows what the customer wants before it wants it is taking on a big risk (ref: A380).

seahawk wrote:
And if one considers the costs of the grounding the MAX will probably never make a profit.

The ones making the decisions in 2011 did not know the engineers would screw up the design and the implementation and use jedi mind tricks to find workarounds for inconvenient truths.

seahawk wrote:
And to be honest the aviation industry is not different, they just enjoy the joys of little competition and long product cycles, so in the past the original product was often so obsolete that an up-date did not work, or the market for the product was gone. (like quad airliners)

The long product cycles (both during development and after) and the huge spend needed to launch a new product is what makes it different.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
afriwing
Posts: 90
Joined: Wed Mar 12, 2008 11:39 am

Re: Will history remember the MAX as a mistake?

Thu Mar 12, 2020 6:34 pm

Revelation wrote:
This is not what we see in the aviation industry. A300, A380, 727, 757 all were built till the orders stopped coming in. MAX got 4,500 orders. Customers were happy to order a NG with a better engine. They didn't see it as obsolete.


Well, yes but as in the case of 727 & 757 etc the manufacturer didn't resort to adding questionable elements just to keep the orders coming. When they found the old model can't be safely updated they did the honourable thing and refused to update it. AND the customers accepted that decision that the model is now obsolete. Some waited for the new product and some didn't. The manufacturer simply needs to accept those losses.
Afriwings
 
kayik
Posts: 116
Joined: Thu Mar 14, 2019 10:58 pm

Re: Will history remember the MAX as a mistake?

Thu Mar 12, 2020 6:53 pm

Revelation wrote:
A company that speculates it knows what the customer wants before it wants it is taking on a big risk (ref: A380).


Lets not forget that the same company became world's leading aircraft producer in just 40 years by introducing a product nobody asked for and ever dreamed of. Taking risks can be very fruitful.
 
User avatar
Revelation
Posts: 24613
Joined: Wed Feb 09, 2005 9:37 pm

Re: Will history remember the MAX as a mistake?

Thu Mar 12, 2020 6:55 pm

afriwing wrote:
Revelation wrote:
This is not what we see in the aviation industry. A300, A380, 727, 757 all were built till the orders stopped coming in. MAX got 4,500 orders. Customers were happy to order a NG with a better engine. They didn't see it as obsolete.

Well, yes but as in the case of 727 & 757 etc the manufacturer didn't resort to adding questionable elements just to keep the orders coming. When they found the old model can't be safely updated they did the honourable thing and refused to update it. AND the customers accepted that decision that the model is now obsolete. Some waited for the new product and some didn't. The manufacturer simply needs to accept those losses.

727 was obsolete, its third engine and third crew member could no longer be justified in the face of twin engine two person cockpit competition. 757 had reached its end of life: everyone who wanted one had one and most airlines found A320/737NG could cover most of the market space with much better efficiency. It wasn't a matter of being an upgrade away from having an attractive product, as much as some on this site insist otherwise. Putting LEAP on 737 made for an attractive product, thousands of orders were booked, something like 180 airframes were in service when the 2nd crash happened so clearly it cannot be said to be obsolete. What we can say is that it's design and implementation were botched.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
User avatar
seahawk
Posts: 9677
Joined: Fri May 27, 2005 1:29 am

Re: Will history remember the MAX as a mistake?

Thu Mar 12, 2020 7:00 pm

Revelation wrote:
seahawk wrote:
That is not a decision that the customer has to make, but one that the company has to make.

A company that makes decisions that run counter to its customer's wishes doesn't last very long.

A company that speculates it knows what the customer wants before it wants it is taking on a big risk (ref: A380).


And a company that makes promises to the customer that it can´t keep does also not do too well, the same goes for a company that cheats with certification procedures.

Imho there were at least 2 clear windows of opportunity to avoid this disaster.

1. option one was to actually do a new single aisle design around 2008, when it became obvious that new engines with a larger diameter were indeed coming
2. option was when the need for MCAS became obvious, then an up-date to the flight control system could still have saved the day

In both cases Boeing tried to get away with the cheapest option and now they are paying for that.

And in general you seem to understand uncompetitive as obsolete, which is not the case. A product can still be competitive, but fail to meet current safety standards, which makes it obsolete.
 
User avatar
Revelation
Posts: 24613
Joined: Wed Feb 09, 2005 9:37 pm

Re: Will history remember the MAX as a mistake?

Thu Mar 12, 2020 7:24 pm

seahawk wrote:
And a company that makes promises to the customer that it can't keep does also not do too well, the same goes for a company that cheats with certification procedures.

There's no reason to think the people making the decisions in 2011 knew either of those things would be true.

seahawk wrote:
Imho there were at least 2 clear windows of opportunity to avoid this disaster.

1. option one was to actually do a new single aisle design around 2008, when it became obvious that new engines with a larger diameter were indeed coming

That was right in the middle of the 787 troubles, which unfortunately pushed off all thoughts of a new aisle. Also by 2011 Boeing's engineering team was not convinced they could meet the requirements of a NSA with regard to production rate or cost. There really was not a workable single aisle design on the table.

seahawk wrote:
2. option was when the need for MCAS became obvious, then an up-date to the flight control system could still have saved the day

Perhaps. I guess we'll never know if someone within Boeing was arguing for such a thing.

seahawk wrote:
In both cases Boeing tried to get away with the cheapest option and now they are paying for that.

Hindsight is a wonderful thing.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
User avatar
seahawk
Posts: 9677
Joined: Fri May 27, 2005 1:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 12, 2020 7:51 pm

That is not hindsight but something Boeing should actually do, reassessing the decisions from the past and how and why they were made. If there ever was a program that needed a thorough program review, it is the MAX.

Btw. I missed a third option where they could have avoided the problem. They could have also decided to make the MAX up-date bigger and give and higher landing gear.
 
User avatar
par13del
Posts: 10355
Joined: Sun Dec 18, 2005 9:14 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 12, 2020 8:06 pm

seahawk wrote:
That is not hindsight but something Boeing should actually do, reassessing the decisions from the past and how and why they were made. If there ever was a program that needed a thorough program review, it is the MAX.

Unless the FAA, EASA and others are just waiting around, that is taking place now.
seahawk wrote:
Btw. I missed a third option where they could have avoided the problem. They could have also decided to make the MAX up-date bigger and give and higher landing gear.

Hence the reason why we actually have the MAX, if they tried to do any major change to the gear and size it would need all new certification in which case it would be cheaper to do a new build and incorporate all the latest technology, such thinking on upgrade is what essentially led to the NG then the MAX.
 
kalvado
Posts: 2897
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 12, 2020 8:13 pm

seahawk wrote:
That is not hindsight but something Boeing should actually do, reassessing the decisions from the past and how and why they were made. If there ever was a program that needed a thorough program review, it is the MAX.

Btw. I missed a third option where they could have avoided the problem. They could have also decided to make the MAX up-date bigger and give and higher landing gear.

We talked about it many times. Significant modification of NG would require a chain of upgrades akin of clean sheet...
 
User avatar
seahawk
Posts: 9677
Joined: Fri May 27, 2005 1:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 12, 2020 8:35 pm

kalvado wrote:
seahawk wrote:
That is not hindsight but something Boeing should actually do, reassessing the decisions from the past and how and why they were made. If there ever was a program that needed a thorough program review, it is the MAX.

Btw. I missed a third option where they could have avoided the problem. They could have also decided to make the MAX up-date bigger and give and higher landing gear.

We talked about it many times. Significant modification of NG would require a chain of upgrades akin of clean sheet...


Which is a point where they could or should have come to a different decision.

There where imho at least 3 points in which they should have seen that the way they were going was wrong. The basic problem is they went from "we do not need a new single aisle and it won´t be superior enough" to "we must not change the 737" disregarding all obvious problems on the way. Imho all those decisions where not driven by engineering needs but by commercial interests.
 
majano
Posts: 276
Joined: Sun Oct 14, 2018 10:45 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 12, 2020 8:51 pm

Revelation wrote:
As per Stitch in our news thread, Boeing will do the wiring bundle separation mod during the RTS processing and is not anticipating this will change the RTS time line.

Boeing does not view the retrofits as delaying the plane’s estimated return to service in the middle of the year at the earliest, one of the people added. Boeing expects changes to take roughly one week per aircraft, but it will do some of the work as it goes through the process of removing aircraft from storage, he said.

Ref: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boei ... SKBN20Y3E3

Do people actually believe this narrative? That it will take five days to relay the wires and return to service will not be impacted? The northern hemisphere summer is only a few weeks away...
 
User avatar
Revelation
Posts: 24613
Joined: Wed Feb 09, 2005 9:37 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 12, 2020 9:13 pm

majano wrote:
Revelation wrote:
As per Stitch in our news thread, Boeing will do the wiring bundle separation mod during the RTS processing and is not anticipating this will change the RTS time line.

Boeing does not view the retrofits as delaying the plane’s estimated return to service in the middle of the year at the earliest, one of the people added. Boeing expects changes to take roughly one week per aircraft, but it will do some of the work as it goes through the process of removing aircraft from storage, he said.

Ref: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boei ... SKBN20Y3E3

Do people actually believe this narrative? That it will take five days to relay the wires and return to service will not be impacted? The northern hemisphere summer is only a few weeks away...

Why not? It's not like they have to re-route every wire, it's that they have to separate some wires related to the stab trim control. There's no reason why they can't start once the mod is approved and they have a lot of workers idled right now. New builds will come through with the mod in place and those will go to customers first.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
oschkosch
Posts: 598
Joined: Mon Oct 29, 2018 3:41 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 12, 2020 9:36 pm

Revelation wrote:
majano wrote:
Revelation wrote:
As per Stitch in our news thread, Boeing will do the wiring bundle separation mod during the RTS processing and is not anticipating this will change the RTS time line.


Ref: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boei ... SKBN20Y3E3

Do people actually believe this narrative? That it will take five days to relay the wires and return to service will not be impacted? The northern hemisphere summer is only a few weeks away...

Why not? It's not like they have to re-route every wire, it's that they have to separate some wires related to the stab trim control. There's no reason why they can't start once the mod is approved and they have a lot of workers idled right now. New builds will come through with the mod in place and those will go to customers first.
yeah, it will be a piece of cake. And cost literally nothing.

Which is why Boeing tried to avert it.

Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk
:stirthepot: :airplane: "This airplane is designed by clowns, who in turn are supervised by monkeys" :airplane: :stirthepot:
 
User avatar
par13del
Posts: 10355
Joined: Sun Dec 18, 2005 9:14 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 12, 2020 9:45 pm

Revelation wrote:
Why not? It's not like they have to re-route every wire, it's that they have to separate some wires related to the stab trim control. There's no reason why they can't start once the mod is approved and they have a lot of workers idled right now. New builds will come through with the mod in place and those will go to customers first.

I am thinking that with the additional FAA delays and the Boeing summer estimate looking more likely the stored frames will get higher priority.
I don't think the line will restart in March as some estimated, the virus effect is not helping, heck even the FAA seem to be slowing down. By now we should have heard more about finalizing training procedures, they saw the failures, knew what they were trying to run so unless they are looking for additional hardware training, a rewrite / reformat and retest should be close by, unless the FAA still cannot get a consensus....
 
User avatar
par13del
Posts: 10355
Joined: Sun Dec 18, 2005 9:14 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, March 2020

Thu Mar 12, 2020 9:48 pm

oschkosch wrote:
Revelation wrote:
majano wrote:
Do people actually believe this narrative? That it will take five days to relay the wires and return to service will not be impacted? The northern hemisphere summer is only a few weeks away...

Why not? It's not like they have to re-route every wire, it's that they have to separate some wires related to the stab trim control. There's no reason why they can't start once the mod is approved and they have a lot of workers idled right now. New builds will come through with the mod in place and those will go to customers first.
yeah, it will be a piece of cake. And cost literally nothing.

Which is why Boeing tried to avert it.

Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk

Well you do know that the a/c is now grounded because 300+ persons died in two crashes, so what they wanted to avoid years ago is no longer relevant, unless you think they are still trying to RTS the MAX with MCAS 1.0, iPad training and jedi mind tricks.

Popular Searches On Airliners.net

Top Photos of Last:   24 Hours  •  48 Hours  •  7 Days  •  30 Days  •  180 Days  •  365 Days  •  All Time

Military Aircraft Every type from fighters to helicopters from air forces around the globe

Classic Airliners Props and jets from the good old days

Flight Decks Views from inside the cockpit

Aircraft Cabins Passenger cabin shots showing seat arrangements as well as cargo aircraft interior

Cargo Aircraft Pictures of great freighter aircraft

Government Aircraft Aircraft flying government officials

Helicopters Our large helicopter section. Both military and civil versions

Blimps / Airships Everything from the Goodyear blimp to the Zeppelin

Night Photos Beautiful shots taken while the sun is below the horizon

Accidents Accident, incident and crash related photos

Air to Air Photos taken by airborne photographers of airborne aircraft

Special Paint Schemes Aircraft painted in beautiful and original liveries

Airport Overviews Airport overviews from the air or ground

Tails and Winglets Tail and Winglet closeups with beautiful airline logos