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beechnut
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Wed Apr 15, 2020 7:06 pm

Revelation wrote:
TropicalSky wrote:
Another 34 MAX cancellation-this time by GOL
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boei ... SKCN21W247

We already have a thread for that ( viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1444647 ). It's not clear if this is mcas driven or covid driven or both. Probably best to discuss it there.

milhaus wrote:
Morisond wrote MCAS was easily fixed...but everyone now knows that this fix does not work. Boeing has to start again and propose better fix. This fix should include tripple sensor redundancy and way more powerfull computers.

"Everyone" does not know this. What we do know from the aviation media is the software went through its audit with a few small problems that are being addressed, and before the covid shutdown the airplane was a few weeks away from the certification test flight. We do not have any credible report that suggests "Boeing has to start again".

beechnut wrote:
I doubt a couple of hundred order reductions due to market conditions will change their narrative. But if say AC were to cancel all their remaining MAX and put the ones they have parked up for sale saying "we no longer have confidence in this aircraft and your ability to return it to service", you don't think that might have oh, just a wee impact on Boeing's confidence in the future of the program?

AC did walk away from A320 when it chose MAX, and the A320 program somehow survived.

AC will not do what you suggested. It would not be in its interest to publicly slag one of the two major vendors, the blow back could be severe and the benefit would be minimal. If they ever do want to walk away from MAX they will find a way to do so that doesn't involve willy wagging.


Until there is RTS, the MAX is vapourware. AC’s finance VP is on record, pre-pandemic, as saying that their mitigation strategies to fill in the absence of MAX in the schedule would only last until the end of the year, after that a more stable solution would need to be found. Of course the pandemic puts that off quite a bit, so it may be a moot point, but the pandemic will also delaying RTS. It may not end up be willy wagging but it may end up being lawyer tongue wagging...

Beech
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Wed Apr 15, 2020 7:41 pm

beechnut wrote:
Until there is RTS, the MAX is vapourware. AC’s finance VP is on record, pre-pandemic, as saying that their mitigation strategies to fill in the absence of MAX in the schedule would only last until the end of the year, after that a more stable solution would need to be found. Of course the pandemic puts that off quite a bit, so it may be a moot point, but the pandemic will also delaying RTS. It may not end up be willy wagging but it may end up being lawyer tongue wagging...

From what we read, all airplane contracts are vaporware. The only way the vendors could get the large blocks of orders they wanted/needed to get to large volumes needed for large profits was to accept a lot of risk via small down payments, multiple exit points, force majeure clauses, etc. All products and all vendors are exposed. There will be a lot of lawyer tongue wagging to come, and it won't just be AC lawyers talking to Boeing lawyers.
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astuteman
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Wed Apr 15, 2020 7:44 pm

2175301 wrote:
Let me try to get ahead of Covid-19 and how it will affect the 737Max (and Airbus 320 family). I actually think that it's likely that both Airbus and Boeing will see in the range of 1000 narrow body cancellations each as a fallout from Covid-19. Another reality is that still leaves very large multi thousands of aircraft on order for each company. The remaining aircraft on order will likely have their deliveries extended at least for the next few years. Overall; I believe that both Airbus and Boeing will do well to be able to operate at 75% of their previous delivery rate for the next 18 months after restarting their plants (and it might only be 50%). Both companies will have financial difficulties.. and I believe that both companies will survive.

I have no idea on how to speculate on how Bombardier or Embraer will do with the fallout from Covid-19.

Have a great day,


Thanks for giving the "getting ahead" a go.

I sincerely hope that Boeing do way better than 75% of their previous delivery rate - which was exactly 0 :)
I'm sure they will.

I think there are a couple of factors here that play into the possible scenarios.

Firstly, the MAX order book was already going backwards before COVID-19 was a thing, whereas the A320NEO family was powering ahead.
I think a lot of readers (including me) would read into this that the MAX orderbook is more vulnerable
I don't think anyone doubts that the backlogs of both types was probably overheated.

The current backlog of MAX is 4,000 and shrinking even when there are zero deliveries
The A320 backlog is 6,300, and prior to COVID-19 wasn't shrinking despite record output.

Your "go" at predicting 1000 cancellations each would leave the relative backlogs at 3,000 for the MAX and 5,300 for the A320NEO
A "go" at 1,000 cancellations for the NEO and 1,500 for the MAX (reflecting its lack of momentum in the market) would leave the backlogs at 2,500 for the MAX and 5,300 for the NEO
A "go" at 2,000 cancellations each, would leave 2,000 in the MAX backlog and 4,300 in the NEO backlog (I think this scenario is quite possible)

Either of the latter scenarios would leave the NEO with double the backlog of the MAX, and easily support 600 or 700 deliveries per year once the market comes back - something I feel a backlog of 2,000 - 2,500 for the MAX wouldn't.

Both Companies will have financial impacts.
Both will survive.
My "go" at getting ahead of COVID-19 struggles to see any scenario that looks as good for the MAX as it does for the NEO.
The future is never guaranteed, but I fell there's a good chance the MAX will come out of this at not much more than 50% of the market penetration of the NEO, implying a 67%/33% split.

That may not be the outcome. But its clear that whatever the outcome is, Boeing at least are going to be living with it for all of the next decade and beyond.

Rgds
 
Aither
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Wed Apr 15, 2020 7:57 pm

I'm not sure at all airplanes contracts are vaporware. OEM are expert making these contracts : they make these contracts every week while an airline is making one every X years...

What is not vaporware also is a delivery slot. Most of the narrow body products are flying domestic routes. And it seems that domestic routes could be back at 80% of the capacity within the next 6 months.
Yet Airbus is cutting A320 production rates by 30% and the 737 max is going nowhere.
I'm sure if we ask for the delivery of an A320 today we can get one. But if you cancel a 2021 slot today and place an order later there is no guarantee you will get your aircraft before 2027.
Never trust the obvious
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Wed Apr 15, 2020 9:09 pm

Aither wrote:
I'm not sure at all airplanes contracts are vaporware. OEM are expert making these contracts : they make these contracts every week while an airline is making one every X years...

What is not vaporware also is a delivery slot. Most of the narrow body products are flying domestic routes. And it seems that domestic routes could be back at 80% of the capacity within the next 6 months.
Yet Airbus is cutting A320 production rates by 30% and the 737 max is going nowhere.
I'm sure if we ask for the delivery of an A320 today we can get one. But if you cancel a 2021 slot today and place an order later there is no guarantee you will get your aircraft before 2027.

Lightsaber gave a thorough rendition on one of the threads of how contracts have changed over the years. I can't find it now, but will try later. It really is not difficult to get out of a contract 18 months before production starts. After that point a bit more money is involved but it's still not significant if the alternative is taking an airplane you have no money to pay for nor no way to finance. Smartplane has posted the aviation finance market has no appetite for covering any aircraft for the next year and quite likely longer. Most stuff being produced today is probably only being produced because all the parts are already paid for and the planes will largely end up parked as vendors and customers fight over delivery dates. Boeing is at rate zero, Airbus has reduced production by a third and will re-evaluate monthly. For many, 2027 delivery slots are much more desirable than 2021 delivery slots.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
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2175301
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Thu Apr 16, 2020 1:01 am

Aither wrote:
I'm not sure at all airplanes contracts are vaporware. OEM are expert making these contracts : they make these contracts every week while an airline is making one every X years...

What is not vaporware also is a delivery slot. Most of the narrow body products are flying domestic routes. And it seems that domestic routes could be back at 80% of the capacity within the next 6 months.
Yet Airbus is cutting A320 production rates by 30% and the 737 max is going nowhere.
I'm sure if we ask for the delivery of an A320 today we can get one. But if you cancel a 2021 slot today and place an order later there is no guarantee you will get your aircraft before 2027.



Given Covid-19 they are all vaporware. All major contracts have a force majeure clause; and any airline can claim that the Covid-19 shutdown and effect on the world economy and their reduced demand for new aircraft falls under force majeure.

This also extends beyond aviation. It would be idiotic for any company to challenge the claim as its a textbook case of what a force majeure situation is.

In my past I canceled a multi-year coal contract for a Power Plant using the force majeure clause. Not any objection from the coal company as they knew our situation.

Have a great day,
 
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767333ER
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Thu Apr 16, 2020 2:44 am

Revelation wrote:
Everyone" does not know this. What we do know from the aviation media is the software went through its audit with a few small problems that are being addressed, and before the covid shutdown the airplane was a few weeks away from the certification test flight. We do not have any credible report that suggests "Boeing has to start again".

Sure that’s what they said a few weeks ago. That’s what they also said a few months ago, half a year ago, even a year ago, and every point in between. The RTS isn’t close, in this case where the boy cried wolf until he was blue in the face, until it’s happened. We don’t know when they stop lying about RTS and start actually telling the truth. Up until a few weeks ago it was all show but no go.
Been on: 732 733 734 73G 738 752 763 A319 A320 A321 CRJ CR7 CRA/CR9 E145 E175 E190 F28 MD-82 MD-83 C172R C172S P2006T PA-28-180

2 ears for spatial hearing, 2 eyes for depth perception, 2 ears for balance... How did Boeing think 1 sensor was good enough?!
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Thu Apr 16, 2020 2:49 am

enzo011 wrote:
morrisond wrote:
It was a relatively easy fix until they discovered the bit flip issue which made things exponentially more complicated.



Unless the bit flip is not related to the MCAS fix, then it wasn't a relatively easy fix surely. So was the bit flip a totally new problem totally separate from the MCAS fix?

If I understand what the FAA did, they went looking for things to activate MCAS regardless of how rare they were or may happen in normal operations.
So my thinking, it was not whether MCAS was fixed or still faulty, but whether it could still be activated outside of its design requirements.
The redundancy of the computers in such a scenario would not be to fix how MCAS operates but to allow the system to detect abnormal activity and prevent activation.
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2019/08/0 ... ping_test/
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Thu Apr 16, 2020 2:58 am

767333ER wrote:
Sure that’s what they said a few weeks ago. That’s what they also said a few months ago, half a year ago, even a year ago, and every point in between. The RTS isn’t close, in this case where the boy cried wolf until he was blue in the face, until it’s happened. We don’t know when they stop lying about RTS and start actually telling the truth. Up until a few weeks ago it was all show but no go.

Funny thing, Boeing being negative and the FAA being optimistic, go figure.
https://leehamnews.com/2020/01/22/analy ... ification/

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51244769
 
astuteman
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Thu Apr 16, 2020 4:58 am

2175301 wrote:
Aither wrote:
I'm not sure at all airplanes contracts are vaporware. OEM are expert making these contracts : they make these contracts every week while an airline is making one every X years...

What is not vaporware also is a delivery slot. Most of the narrow body products are flying domestic routes. And it seems that domestic routes could be back at 80% of the capacity within the next 6 months.
Yet Airbus is cutting A320 production rates by 30% and the 737 max is going nowhere.
I'm sure if we ask for the delivery of an A320 today we can get one. But if you cancel a 2021 slot today and place an order later there is no guarantee you will get your aircraft before 2027.



Given Covid-19 they are all vaporware. All major contracts have a force majeure clause; and any airline can claim that the Covid-19 shutdown and effect on the world economy and their reduced demand for new aircraft falls under force majeure.

This also extends beyond aviation. It would be idiotic for any company to challenge the claim as its a textbook case of what a force majeure situation is.

In my past I canceled a multi-year coal contract for a Power Plant using the force majeure clause. Not any objection from the coal company as they knew our situation.

Have a great day,


Like you I have operated in the Force Majeure arena, albeit a long time ago

A good link here regarding FM.

https://leehamnews.com/2020/04/09/is-co ... ure-event/

The three main criteria which affect the contracts are:-

the event must be beyond the reasonable control of the affected party;
the affected party’s ability to perform its obligations under the contract must have been prevented, impeded or hindered by the event; and
the affected party must have taken all reasonable steps to seek to avoid or mitigate the event or its consequences.


Of course Force Majeure will work both ways..

For the OEM

For the receiving airline

Rgds
 
beechnut
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Thu Apr 16, 2020 12:33 pm

Revelation wrote:
beechnut wrote:
Until there is RTS, the MAX is vapourware. AC’s finance VP is on record, pre-pandemic, as saying that their mitigation strategies to fill in the absence of MAX in the schedule would only last until the end of the year, after that a more stable solution would need to be found. Of course the pandemic puts that off quite a bit, so it may be a moot point, but the pandemic will also delaying RTS. It may not end up be willy wagging but it may end up being lawyer tongue wagging...

From what we read, all airplane contracts are vaporware. The only way the vendors could get the large blocks of orders they wanted/needed to get to large volumes needed for large profits was to accept a lot of risk via small down payments, multiple exit points, force majeure clauses, etc. All products and all vendors are exposed. There will be a lot of lawyer tongue wagging to come, and it won't just be AC lawyers talking to Boeing lawyers.


In the case of the MAX, it is the aircraft, not the contracts, that is vapourware. Or perhaps more accurately, its supposed software fix, promised to be « soon » for over a year, and still remains uncertified. Until it is, the MAX is a beer can with wings.

« Soon » for Boeing is beginning to sound like « soon » for the Vatican where anything less than eternity is considered « soon ».

Beech
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Thu Apr 16, 2020 1:08 pm

beechnut wrote:
In the case of the MAX, it is the aircraft, not the contracts, that is vapourware.

If you want to take that myopic view, fine, but pretty much all customers now can't afford new aircraft and can exit any contract at will, and all vendors will be impacted. If you want to take the myopic view that just because it's taking longer than planned to get angry regulators to approve fixes then the aircraft is worthless, fine. In the long term you will be wrong, but in the short term you can thump your chest.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
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Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
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beechnut
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Thu Apr 16, 2020 2:26 pm

Well, even before the pandemic severely restricted the FAA and other agencies' ability to certify the MAX, a year had already passed since Boeing promised a RTS by mid-2019.

I agree that many customers will use the pandemic to step back from their orders, simply because they have to to survive. But it is far from myopic to say that Boeing has missed projection after projection on getting an approved software fix out there. Until they do, that fix is mostly vapourware. Having worked in the software business for some years (forensics, healthcare, electronic medical records), I have a jaded eye when it comes to delivery promises. Show me the goods.

Any bad luck that Boeing has was brought on entirely by their own myopia. Had the RTS happened in mid-2019, or better yet had the MAX been properly designed in the first place, Boeing itself would be in a much better position to ride the pandemic effects. There would already be about 1000 MAX criss-crossing the skies instead of 800 of them parked with no end in sight.

Beech
 
ShamrockBoi330
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Thu Apr 16, 2020 4:08 pm

A question for the more knowledgeable here;

The sizable inventory built up by BA and now sitting idle, can airlines refuse to take these planes that have been mothballed >1 yr and will need a yet to be known amount of rework, and then insist on new builds to fulfill orders, or does this not matter as it comes more down to cycles and hours in air when determining second hand values?

Could this be an excuse used to kick commitments down the road per sé?

I assume this would be built into comp claims?

Just curious if BA will find themselves with NTU MAXs and if it was a wise decision to keep on building as many as it did, as long as it did.
 
milhaus
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Thu Apr 16, 2020 8:14 pm

Morisond, I am sorry that You feel offended. Let me introduce myself little bit, I am B1 engineer with rating for all 737 except jurrasic, 787, A320 all engines,
A330 and ATR. So I know systems of the aircraft little bit. AD MAX, I have two problems with current fix, one is that MCAS system redundancy with just two sensors and two computers is still less than in other aircraft. For example when You loose one AOA MCAS is off and there is some posibility that You will need it. Remember when You loose one AOA, You will get unreliable speed indication too. When pilots have unreliable speed there is possibility that they put aircraft to attitude when MCAS should kick in. Second those old FCCs does not have power to copy with increased workload. Third, as shown on simulator with airline pilots sometime in december, failure presentation is not clear enough to find correct procedure in required time for big percentage of them. It means that aircraft lack ECAM or EICAS to clearly inform crews about the failures and possible concequences to other systems.
 
Lewton
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Fri Apr 17, 2020 12:31 am

This pandemic gives a great opportunity to airlines to get out of the obligation to buy an obsolete and dangerous aircraft.
We will hopefully see much more cancellations in the coming weeks.
From Hamburg with love.
 
oldJoe
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Fri Apr 17, 2020 12:46 am

Lewton wrote:
This pandemic gives a great opportunity to airlines to get out of the obligation to buy an obsolete and dangerous aircraft.
We will hopefully see much more cancellations in the coming weeks.


be sure there will be many cancellations, but not only for Boeing
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Fri Apr 17, 2020 2:21 am

milhaus wrote:
Morisond, I am sorry that You feel offended. Let me introduce myself little bit, I am B1 engineer with rating for all 737 except jurrasic, 787, A320 all engines,
A330 and ATR. So I know systems of the aircraft little bit. AD MAX, I have two problems with current fix, one is that MCAS system redundancy with just two sensors and two computers is still less than in other aircraft. For example when You loose one AOA MCAS is off and there is some posibility that You will need it. Remember when You loose one AOA, You will get unreliable speed indication too. When pilots have unreliable speed there is possibility that they put aircraft to attitude when MCAS should kick in. Second those old FCCs does not have power to copy with increased workload. Third, as shown on simulator with airline pilots sometime in december, failure presentation is not clear enough to find correct procedure in required time for big percentage of them. It means that aircraft lack ECAM or EICAS to clearly inform crews about the failures and possible concequences to other systems.


Thanks for restating the obvious on the lack of sensor redundancy that we all know.

The December testing big eye opener was not that it had a lack of EICAS or ECAM - I think the big finding that shocked everyone was modern pilots inability to follow a checklist hence why Boeing has gone back to the drawing board for its next design and is talking about a cockpit that is a lot simpler and isn't so reliant on checklists.

Probably why Airbus is focusing on Pilot training as well for its designs so that they are very practised in following checklists until they can design a next generation cockpit that is not reliant upon pilots executing many critical steps in an emergency.

Hence the big red button to put it straight and level using a back up independent auto-pilot that uses different sensors. Then talk to the experts on the ground and they can tell you what to do.

Not to belabour the point but the December tests also highlighted the need for better Pilot training worldwide that I have been calling for for over a year now and people continually pillared me for it.
 
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enzo011
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Fri Apr 17, 2020 8:17 am

morrisond wrote:
Not to belabour the point but the December tests also highlighted the need for better Pilot training worldwide that I have been calling for for over a year now and people continually pillared me for it.



Is this our, " We remember Budapest differently" moment? I seem to recall you focusing a lot on the lack of training at the particular airlines involved in the crash and that this was one of the main causes. You spent a lot of time trying to tell people it was the lack of training and following of procedures at these airlines that caused everything to line up and led to the crashes. Now you seem to say that it is all pilots everywhere that needs to sharpen up to follow the prescribed checklists. I guess there is only so many people to blame before you finally get to Boeing yourself, progress at least.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Fri Apr 17, 2020 2:15 pm

enzo011 wrote:
morrisond wrote:
Not to belabour the point but the December tests also highlighted the need for better Pilot training worldwide that I have been calling for for over a year now and people continually pillared me for it.



Is this our, " We remember Budapest differently" moment? I seem to recall you focusing a lot on the lack of training at the particular airlines involved in the crash and that this was one of the main causes. You spent a lot of time trying to tell people it was the lack of training and following of procedures at these airlines that caused everything to line up and led to the crashes. Now you seem to say that it is all pilots everywhere that needs to sharpen up to follow the prescribed checklists. I guess there is only so many people to blame before you finally get to Boeing yourself, progress at least.


No you need to read more and try not to assign beliefs to others and not personally attack them on the forums.

I said it was a worldwide training issue and gave multiple examples before the December tests and also said Boeing was definitely at fault for the design error, the FAA for the omission in oversight and those particular airlines for many faults in training/procedures and maintenance as outlined in the reports and the media.

The sad thing is that no entity in the tragic incidents came out looking clean - major issues everywhere which is what happens when complacency takes over.
 
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aerolimani
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Fri Apr 17, 2020 8:33 pm

morrisond wrote:
enzo011 wrote:
morrisond wrote:
Not to belabour the point but the December tests also highlighted the need for better Pilot training worldwide that I have been calling for for over a year now and people continually pillared me for it.



Is this our, " We remember Budapest differently" moment? I seem to recall you focusing a lot on the lack of training at the particular airlines involved in the crash and that this was one of the main causes. You spent a lot of time trying to tell people it was the lack of training and following of procedures at these airlines that caused everything to line up and led to the crashes. Now you seem to say that it is all pilots everywhere that needs to sharpen up to follow the prescribed checklists. I guess there is only so many people to blame before you finally get to Boeing yourself, progress at least.


No you need to read more and try not to assign beliefs to others and not personally attack them on the forums.

I said it was a worldwide training issue and gave multiple examples before the December tests and also said Boeing was definitely at fault for the design error, the FAA for the omission in oversight and those particular airlines for many faults in training/procedures and maintenance as outlined in the reports and the media.

The sad thing is that no entity in the tragic incidents came out looking clean - major issues everywhere which is what happens when complacency takes over.

You assign too much blame to the FAA. That blame should be on the politicians who chose to listen to Boeing’s lobbyists, who reduced the FAA’s role to virtual rubber-stamping, and handed the powers of self-certification to Boeing.

On top of this, you have Boeing who lobbied against extra training requirements. You can try and blame the airlines (like Southwest) for that, but still, it’s Boeing who chose to accept it, and subsequently pursue that end with vigor.

Unfortunately for Boeing, all this has left them with no one else to blame for their massive screw-ups.

So, you can apply the Swiss-cheese model all you want, and you’re not wrong. However, at the end of the day, Boeing had all the opportunities to prevent the Swiss-cheese problem from happening, and they used absolutely none of them. It was all profit and shareholder value for Boeing.
 
milhaus
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Fri Apr 17, 2020 9:19 pm

Morisond, more training is always better, but inabilty to follow checklist is qiute different thing with old technology(MAX) then on A320/330, 777,787 and others new aircraft. In Max there is book with checklists, You have to open it, find correct page, read it, recheck with Your copilot, then perform it. On 320 and others You wil get failure, consequences, requested actions, limitations to display in front of You. So for example when installed on MAX it should warn crew no to retract flaps.... As I remember during simulator testing in December most of pilots saved aircraft even with wrong checklist, or checklist not followed correctly, so they were not badly trained pilots either. It is possible thst checklists were not as good and exhaustive as expected. Anyway proud airliner builder like Boeing, which introduced EICAS system almost 40 years ago on 757/767 should built aircraft with higher technology standard than MAX is.
 
MSPNWA
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Fri Apr 17, 2020 11:50 pm

aerolimani wrote:
You assign too much blame to the FAA. That blame should be on the politicians who chose to listen to Boeing’s lobbyists, who reduced the FAA’s role to virtual rubber-stamping, and handed the powers of self-certification to Boeing.

On top of this, you have Boeing who lobbied against extra training requirements. You can try and blame the airlines (like Southwest) for that, but still, it’s Boeing who chose to accept it, and subsequently pursue that end with vigor.

Unfortunately for Boeing, all this has left them with no one else to blame for their massive screw-ups.

So, you can apply the Swiss-cheese model all you want, and you’re not wrong. However, at the end of the day, Boeing had all the opportunities to prevent the Swiss-cheese problem from happening, and they used absolutely none of them. It was all profit and shareholder value for Boeing.


Doesn't get more contradictory than in the same post saying the swiss cheese model isn't wrong to apply and then proceed to exonerate one of the layers of cheese, conversely heap the blame on a different layer and blame it for the failure of both layers, and finally only blaming that lone layer for not preventing everything. And then for good measure you go an smear it with a lie. Sorry, but your post content says that you believe the swiss cheese model is wrong to apply. There is no swiss cheese in your view. There's only one layer/one party/one blame.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sat Apr 18, 2020 1:55 am

milhaus wrote:
Morisond, more training is always better, but inabilty to follow checklist is qiute different thing with old technology(MAX) then on A320/330, 777,787 and others new aircraft. In Max there is book with checklists, You have to open it, find correct page, read it, recheck with Your copilot, then perform it. On 320 and others You wil get failure, consequences, requested actions, limitations to display in front of You. So for example when installed on MAX it should warn crew no to retract flaps.... As I remember during simulator testing in December most of pilots saved aircraft even with wrong checklist, or checklist not followed correctly, so they were not badly trained pilots either. It is possible thst checklists were not as good and exhaustive as expected. Anyway proud airliner builder like Boeing, which introduced EICAS system almost 40 years ago on 757/767 should built aircraft with higher technology standard than MAX is.


Even with EICAS the A320 QRH still seems to be hundreds of pages http://www.rentasad.de/wp-content/uploa ... 20_QRH.pdf

EICAS is great but if Boeing didn't understand what the problem was how could they program EICAS to fix it or display the right procedure? It would not have helped.

Think of AF447 of an example where they had to reprogram EICAS.

ET302 had plenty of time to look up and follow the appropriate checklist. It should have been top of mind given what happened to Lionair - if they were even given it in the first place.
 
Gremlinzzzz
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sat Apr 18, 2020 2:08 am

morrisond wrote:

ET302 had plenty of time to look up and follow the appropriate checklist
. It should have been top of mind given what happened to Lionair - if they were even given it in the first place.
They knew what they ought to have done, they followed that up. However, the problem happened straight after take off, and they did not have altitude on their side.

There is a reason why tests were taken once again and it was found that previous assumptions did not hold true that it would be easy to recover the plane. There is a reason why Boeing is not looking to have pilot training before they are allowed to fly the plane once again.
 
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aerolimani
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sat Apr 18, 2020 2:44 am

MSPNWA wrote:
aerolimani wrote:
You assign too much blame to the FAA. That blame should be on the politicians who chose to listen to Boeing’s lobbyists, who reduced the FAA’s role to virtual rubber-stamping, and handed the powers of self-certification to Boeing.

On top of this, you have Boeing who lobbied against extra training requirements. You can try and blame the airlines (like Southwest) for that, but still, it’s Boeing who chose to accept it, and subsequently pursue that end with vigor.

Unfortunately for Boeing, all this has left them with no one else to blame for their massive screw-ups.

So, you can apply the Swiss-cheese model all you want, and you’re not wrong. However, at the end of the day, Boeing had all the opportunities to prevent the Swiss-cheese problem from happening, and they used absolutely none of them. It was all profit and shareholder value for Boeing.


Doesn't get more contradictory than in the same post saying the swiss cheese model isn't wrong to apply and then proceed to exonerate one of the layers of cheese, conversely heap the blame on a different layer and blame it for the failure of both layers, and finally only blaming that lone layer for not preventing everything. And then for good measure you go an smear it with a lie. Sorry, but your post content says that you believe the swiss cheese model is wrong to apply. There is no swiss cheese in your view. There's only one layer/one party/one blame.

I think your allergy to blaming Boeing causes you to misunderstand me. The difference here is that you suggest a general training problem. Observation of the aviation world, and its remarkably excellent safety record, suggest that there is not a general problem of large proportions. It doesn’t mean there isn’t room for improvement, as Airbus has indicated, but it certainly doesn’t show evidence of the kind of problem you suggest.

I suggest a model-specific problem. That is to say, the MAX-specific training which Boeing consciously avoided at all costs.
And, we know that this was done for profit reasons. The million dollar discount per aircraft in the Southwest sale, if extra training was required to transition, is now infamous. I don’t know how to describe that as anything but profit-driven.

And, are you trying to suggest that self-certification wasn’t Boeing’s idea? And, that the motive for it is not profit?

The Swiss cheese model points to the problems that need to be fixed. I put Boeing to blame as the root of all the problems, yes. However, to think that only the root of the problem is what needs attention is a very limited view of problem-solving. For instance, self-certification was Boeing’s idea. I hold them responsible for generating this idea in spite of the obvious safety conflict of interest. However, the problem needs to be corrected legislatively.

I can happily lay the ultimate blame at one layer of cheese, while simultaneously recognizing that other layers need fixing too. It it is a more nuanced view, which allows the ultimate blame to be placed where it belongs, but still permits all the fixes necessary to improve safety.

And what lie? Me saying that Boeing put profit ahead of safety??? When you make a sales pitch promising no training, and then force your engineers to design according to that promise, how is that anything but profit before safety? Sales dictating design requirements??? And after the fact, we have direct evidence of Boeing employees twisting the arms of aviation safety agencies to not require training.

Ugh. I’m so tired of the deflection from Boeing. When it comes to the problems of the MAX, the “worldwide training” suggestion is barely worth the kB it takes to store the words “worldwide training problem.”
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sat Apr 18, 2020 2:57 am

Gremlinzzzz wrote:
morrisond wrote:

ET302 had plenty of time to look up and follow the appropriate checklist
. It should have been top of mind given what happened to Lionair - if they were even given it in the first place.
They knew what they ought to have done, they followed that up. However, the problem happened straight after take off, and they did not have altitude on their side.

There is a reason why tests were taken once again and it was found that previous assumptions did not hold true that it would be easy to recover the plane. There is a reason why Boeing is not looking to have pilot training before they are allowed to fly the plane once again.


They were 7,000' above ground and right in front of them was the Great Rift Valley which would have given them another few thousand feet of altitude.

The tests outlined that the pilot response time that was used to certify many airplanes was insufficient and that pilots couldn't follow checklists hence why Boeing is looking at designing a cockpit much simpler than anything that exists today.

You also have to look at what point in the accident sequence they put the pilots in the Sim. It was way beyond the point of time where they should have started to run the appropriate procedure and where the airplane was recoverable.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sat Apr 18, 2020 3:02 am

Add another major cancellation: 69 aircraft cancelled by GECAS:

https://www.businessinsider.com/ge-airc ... ers-2020-4

General Electric's aircraft leasing subsidiary on Friday canceled 69 orders for Boeing's grounded 737 Max jets as it evaluates its order book during the coronavirus pandemic, the latest setback for the US planemaker.

The unit, GECAS, maintains 29 Max aircraft in its fleet and has an additional 82 jets still on order from Boeing, it said. Demand for airplanes has taken a beating as the pandemic has brought air travel to a virtual halt, forcing several airlines to defer deliveries of planes to a later date.

Boeing halted production of the Max in January after two fatal crashes in five months forced the plane's grounding in March 2019. Boeing has said it hopes to win approval from the US Federal Aviation Administration to return the plane to service in mid-2020.

"Today's agreement will help GECAS better align our available fleet with the needs of our global customer base," Greg Conlon, chief executive officer of GECAS, said in a statement.
 
Gremlinzzzz
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sat Apr 18, 2020 3:19 am

morrisond wrote:
Gremlinzzzz wrote:
morrisond wrote:
[b]

They were 7,000' above ground and right in front of them was the Great Rift Valley which would have given them another few thousand feet of altitude.

The tests outlined that the pilot response time that was used to certify many airplanes was insufficient and that pilots couldn't follow checklists hence why Boeing is looking at designing a cockpit much simpler than anything that exists today.

You also have to look at what point in the accident sequence they put the pilots in the Sim. It was way beyond the point of time where they should have started to run the appropriate procedure and where the airplane was recoverable.
I do not know where some of you guys get these ideas from. If you are having flight control issues, and one where you know that the plane is in danger of crashing, the idea is not to go towards the Great Rift Valley and gain some few thousand freaking feet. The idea is to land the aircraft as soon as possible, in an airport that is not far away, the same airport you took off from.

Boeing is having to analyze their assumptions once again because they notice that not everyone is a test pilot, and the FAA having to look at everything they missed from the bit flip scenarios, problems with how data is managed by the flight computer, needed redundancy etc. There is a reason why this plane is still grounded, and it has nothing to do with how incompetent pilots were.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sat Apr 18, 2020 12:56 pm

Gremlinzzzz wrote:
morrisond wrote:
Gremlinzzzz wrote:
I do not know where some of you guys get these ideas from. If you are having flight control issues, and one where you know that the plane is in danger of crashing, the idea is not to go towards the Great Rift Valley and gain some few thousand freaking feet. The idea is to land the aircraft as soon as possible, in an airport that is not far away, the same airport you took off from.

Boeing is having to analyze their assumptions once again because they notice that not everyone is a test pilot, and the FAA having to look at everything they missed from the bit flip scenarios, problems with how data is managed by the flight computer, needed redundancy etc. There is a reason why this plane is still grounded, and it has nothing to do with how incompetent pilots were.


The origin of the Great Rift Valley argument was that people in the beginning were arguing that they couldn't afford to lose 1 foot of altitude from 7,000 AGL by reducing thrust and not going over Vmo where the controls would become ineffective as there were mountains directly in front of them - the track actually had them (before they turned around) heading over the plateau floor towards the valley where even more altitude opened up. They had options and could have tried to reduce thrust at least once. Aviate, Navigate, Communicate.

The problem is is that when a lot of these rules were written (that all modern aircraft are certified too) the vast majority of pilots were ex military or had thousands of hours flying less complicated equipment of many various types so they learned that all aircraft had quirks and your piloting skills didn't just come from flying a trainer around for 150 hours before they put you in a 737. You actually had to have a feel for an aircraft and how it flew and know what it would do in certain circumstances. Manually controlling a piston twin in IMC on approach taught many pilots a lot about how to really fly. That's a lot harder in the era of non-back driven side sticks when you only have that 150 hours in an Cessna.

The crashes and the subsequent tests opened a lot eyes in terms of how much they have to dumb down future cockpits and procedures to adapt to the current level of Pilot ability and what will most likely be coming out of the training mills in the future - namely systems operators - not pilots who have an inherent understanding of what their aircraft will do in certain circumstances.

This has now been realized by Boeing, the FAA and even Airbus as evidenced by their new focus on establishing new training centres to bring the level of piloting up (the annocuements happened after the MAX crashes and AF447 and AirAsia 8501).

The underlying problem is Boeings screwup - but the incidents showed they are a lot of other problems in the system as well that need to be fixed. You can't just bury your head in the sand and deny they exist.

There is a big disconnect between the existing certification rules and the average pilot. They were not written assuming Pilots only have 150 hours of experience before flying a passenger Jet with the potential loss of life large.

It's my opinion and on these forums you are allowed to have one of those.

If you disagree and think 150 hours of experience is fine before strapping on a big jet - that's fine - that's your prerogative.
 
brindabella
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding News and Reference Thread 2020

Sat Apr 18, 2020 1:46 pm

747megatop wrote:
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/14/boeing-customers-cancel-staggering-number-of-737-max-orders.html

If cancellations go on at this rate over the next few months it doesn't look good for Boeing. They may have to take a really hard look at the MAX then.


Long long way to go IMO; and much to play for (as the Brits say :D ).

Preamble:
No-one knows where the industry is going.
Nobody. :rotfl:


But let's look at a "Polyanna" scenario :

Such that quite soon everything resets from the here-and-now to where it was pre-COVID.

In this new-but-old world AB has 7,000 orders with the A321neo being the star for them.

BA has 2,000 orders with the B737-8 being the star for them.

Each frame is dominant in it's area. EG:

A321neo is dominant at 190+ seats (with range flexibility).
B737-8 is dominant 140+ seats. (Basically competitive at any range).


Which OEM has delivery slots to sell?

Which frame will have buyers lining up?

In that (sadly unlikely) world, that is?

cheers

:sigh:
Billy
 
Gremlinzzzz
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sat Apr 18, 2020 2:14 pm

morrisond wrote:
The origin of the Great Rift Valley argument was that people in the beginning were arguing that they couldn't afford to lose 1 foot of altitude from 7,000 AGL by reducing thrust and not going over Vmo where the controls would become ineffective as there were mountains directly in front of them - the track actually had them (before they turned around) heading over the plateau floor towards the valley where even more altitude opened up. They had options and could have tried to reduce thrust at least once. Aviate, Navigate, Communicate.

The problem is is that when a lot of these rules were written (that all modern aircraft are certified too) the vast majority of pilots were ex military or had thousands of hours flying less complicated equipment of many various types so they learned that all aircraft had quirks and your piloting skills didn't just come from flying a trainer around for 150 hours before they put you in a 737. You actually had to have a feel for an aircraft and how it flew and know what it would do in certain circumstances. Manually controlling a piston twin in IMC on approach taught many pilots a lot about how to really fly. That's a lot harder in the era of non-back driven side sticks when you only have that 150 hours in an Cessna.

The crashes and the subsequent tests opened a lot eyes in terms of how much they have to dumb down future cockpits and procedures to adapt to the current level of Pilot ability and what will most likely be coming out of the training mills in the future - namely systems operators - not pilots who have an inherent understanding of what their aircraft will do in certain circumstances.

This has now been realized by Boeing, the FAA and even Airbus as evidenced by their new focus on establishing new training centres to bring the level of piloting up (the annocuements happened after the MAX crashes and AF447 and AirAsia 8501).

The underlying problem is Boeings screwup - but the incidents showed they are a lot of other problems in the system as well that need to be fixed. You can't just bury your head in the sand and deny they exist.

There is a big disconnect between the existing certification rules and the average pilot. They were not written assuming Pilots only have 150 hours of experience before flying a passenger Jet with the potential loss of life large.

It's my opinion and on these forums you are allowed to have one of those.

If you disagree and think 150 hours of experience is fine before strapping on a big jet - that's fine - that's your prerogative.
I hate this thing where a plane crashes and it has evident flaws and people start saying the pilots should have done this and that. It is not that easy when you consider that some tests were run on a simulator and not everyone was able to recover the plane from a dive. These were people that should have known how to handle the situation, and they were not fighting for their lives.....something that means that you have a lot of thoughts running through your head.

These guys followed the checklist, and did not get any luck. Their speed was the issue, but had they reduced it and tried trimming the plane, would have that worked when there issues with the amount of energy needed to turn the very same trim wheels......something brought up by other regulators? This particular plane has issues with wiring, MCAS, the flight control computer, trim wheels, and the list just goes on and on.

We also have to note that automation is in place to reduce the workload on pilots, and automation when done right is is a highly predictable tool that takes away some of the variance that exists in humans. It is automation that led to navigators losing their jobs in the flight deck, and it was automation that led to flight engineers also being booted out. It is a great feature when done right, something that allows for predictable performance while driving down costs to operate, and the tendency is always to add more of it where needed.

That said, I think people have the wrong view of how airlines particularly Ethiopian work and even Kenya Airways which are the two biggest airlines in East Africa. They start training pilots when they are young, push them on regional routes as they transition them over time toward the bigger jets. The only way they will ever get time to fly is by actually flying the damn aircraft, and when you look at ET302, the co-pilot actually knew what they were supposed to do. In Indonesia, where they recognized that Lion Air had issues with maintenance, they also came to the conclusion that the manufacturer shared a big part of the blame.

If aviation is to get better, we have to come to a honest conclusion every time there is an accident. This is not about taking sides or defending one party, a honest conclusion as to what is needed in a modern airline. When you look at the Max, the rushed development to counter the A320Neo, the self certification and disdain that Boeing employees had for the FAA, changes they made e.g. on MCAS without notifying the authority, and the FAA running its models, knowing that there would be more crashes and keeping the jet airborne. Deregulation has had its positives, but in aviation, and in this particular case, it is a full negative.

If the FAA had done its job, they wouldn't have to be doing the same thing right now. Or calling outside regulators in a move to restore faith in the plane, which is what all of this is; they cannot be seen to go it alone. Had they done their job, this plane would not be grounded for a year plus and pilots would not have been in the position they were put in. Had they done their job, there would be full redundancy across all systems, a basic design policy followed when designing any plane........it is the simple things that they missed, the simple things that demand that one has care and a passion for what they do. These same young pilots, or 'inexperienced pilots have been flying A320's, they have been flying the NG, they have been flying the Embraer E-jets and competently so, and before that they possibly were on some turbo prop. If you go to the gulf, they have been training up not only young male pilots, but putting some really young female crew who are fantastic on the biggest jet in the world.

All of these pilots have to start somewhere, and they have to fly to gain experience. Those same people that you praise in the Navy similarly have to gain experience on some aircraft. If there is no trust, there is no progress, and no new jobs created. As already written elsewhere, and to death, the problems that the Max has are not new issues, they are issues that were pretty much solved in the late 70's and in the 80's when we had the first fly by wire aircraft, these are things that they themselves have implemented on their aircraft. But let us blame the pilots with 150 hours who seem to have no big problems with other aircraft, or compare it to accidents that have no similarity to this, at all.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding News and Reference Thread 2020

Sat Apr 18, 2020 2:20 pm

Stitch wrote:
Boeing is working on restarting commercial aircraft production by the end of next week: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/busi ... virus.html


Mad fools!

don't they know that Boeing is doomed?

Just look at the Boeing-haters on this forum who have predicting just that forever.

Hint: you are wrong yet again.

Despite the unbelievable management screw-ups going back into the 1990s and through into the 2020s, Boeing is noowhere finished.

Even facing Airbus official corruption and EU-subsidies.

But surely, if they go back to MBA-Powerpoint (1990s) and financial engineering (Muilenberg) then Boeing will surely, finally go under.

One of the things that history will puzzle-over is that the 1990+s idiocy was presided-over by an Engineer(Condit), as was the 2110+s idiocy (Muilenberg).

So if you can't rely upon an Engineer to understand the complexity and risks of building a modern airliner, what do you do?

:ashamed:

cheers
Billy
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sat Apr 18, 2020 2:47 pm

morrisond wrote:
The underlying problem is Boeings screwup - but the incidents showed they are a lot of other problems in the system as well that need to be fixed. You can't just bury your head in the sand and deny they exist.

The reality is that all of those problems and simplicity of cockpits and warnings CANNOT be fixed on the MAX, a new cockpit will have to come with a new frame as it will bypass the 777 and 787 architecture which are in advance of the MAX basic structure, in simple terms the MAX cannot be made full FBW which is required for this new simple fool proof cockpit.
So the regulators have to state now what level of redundancy lower than perfection is acceptable on the MAX, if none, then they need to state now that it will never be re-certified.
EASA already said they would like 3 sensors but 2 is acceptable, that is a compromise which lowers perfection from 100%.

I am somewhat surprised that a new thread on cockpit system, redundancy and warnings have not been created to remove this debate from the MAX thread, when raised here, it just means that the MAX cannot RTS and the discussions quickly degenerate into MAX this and MAX that when this is a topic way beyond the MAX, indeed if we look at the new CEO of Boeing's comments on the NMA / MOM, one might get the impression that he is also using that mantra to restart all the discussions around that project.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sat Apr 18, 2020 5:01 pm

morrisond wrote:
That's a lot harder in the era of non-back driven side sticks when you only have that 150 hours in an Cessna.



You seem to be blaming Airbus now for pilots being overwhelmed in a Boeing.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sat Apr 18, 2020 6:06 pm

aerolimani wrote:
And what lie? Me saying that Boeing put profit ahead of safety??? When you make a sales pitch promising no training, and then force your engineers to design according to that promise, how is that anything but profit before safety? Sales dictating design requirements??? And after the fact, we have direct evidence of Boeing employees twisting the arms of aviation safety agencies to not require training.

To me this is the heart of the matter.

Every successful company I've been with has a system where marketing PROPOSES requirements, then engineers accept or do not accept requirements. Then there can be a few rounds of negotiations where marketing may relax requirements to the point where engineers can accept them, or requirements are categorized as "best effort" or "stretch goal" and marketing MUST come up with a way to deal with the fact that the requirement indeed may not be met. Every company I've been with that FORCES engineers to do something has been a failure. I parachuted out of one such enterprise recently, and good riddance!

The thing is we do not know if this is indeed what went down in Boeing or not. The party line is engineering accepted the requirement but didn't evaluate it correctly: engineering relied on the "industry standard" three second rule but ended up putting "too much workload on the pilots", oops.

And we're not likely to get much more out of Boeing on this topic because the party line leads them into the realm of human error and away from the realm of liability. I was hoping FBI/DOJ would get to the bottom of the matter, but there's no evidence of that so far.

Yet if Boeing is not held accountable we'll get more of the same old stuff, with some poor engineer in the trenches being made responsible for a tragedy that really started off by management/marketing forcing unworkable requirements on engineering.

I've posted some thoughts in viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1443337 along the lines that Boeing is putting money ahead of safety with their decision to restart production despite so much COVID-19 risk. I think it's an awful look for Boeing in the post-MCAS world. I hope they don't end up regretting this decision.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sat Apr 18, 2020 6:20 pm

astuteman wrote:
2175301 wrote:
Aither wrote:
I'm not sure at all airplanes contracts are vaporware. OEM are expert making these contracts : they make these contracts every week while an airline is making one every X years...

What is not vaporware also is a delivery slot. Most of the narrow body products are flying domestic routes. And it seems that domestic routes could be back at 80% of the capacity within the next 6 months.
Yet Airbus is cutting A320 production rates by 30% and the 737 max is going nowhere.
I'm sure if we ask for the delivery of an A320 today we can get one. But if you cancel a 2021 slot today and place an order later there is no guarantee you will get your aircraft before 2027.



Given Covid-19 they are all vaporware. All major contracts have a force majeure clause; and any airline can claim that the Covid-19 shutdown and effect on the world economy and their reduced demand for new aircraft falls under force majeure.

This also extends beyond aviation. It would be idiotic for any company to challenge the claim as its a textbook case of what a force majeure situation is.

In my past I canceled a multi-year coal contract for a Power Plant using the force majeure clause. Not any objection from the coal company as they knew our situation.

Yes, Force Majeure will be at play for both the customer, and the manufacturer. Likely ending up in an unresolvable situation at best if invoked. Thanks for reminding folks it's use is a 2-Way St.

Have a great day,


Like you I have operated in the Force Majeure arena, albeit a long time ago

A good link here regarding FM.

https://leehamnews.com/2020/04/09/is-co ... ure-event/

The three main criteria which affect the contracts are:-

the event must be beyond the reasonable control of the affected party;
the affected party’s ability to perform its obligations under the contract must have been prevented, impeded or hindered by the event; and
the affected party must have taken all reasonable steps to seek to avoid or mitigate the event or its consequences.


Of course Force Majeure will work both ways..

For the OEM

For the receiving airline

Rgds


Yes it does. Thanks for reminding us.
To know your Enemy, you must become your Enemy.” Sun Tzu
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sat Apr 18, 2020 6:41 pm

Revelation wrote:
Yet if Boeing is not held accountable

Is there any thought that Boeing is not being held responsible?
Based on some comments (not yours), unless Boeing goes into liquidation, they will not be held responsible. The issue no one seems willing to put on paper is what punishment they think is warranted, what level of continuation as a business, stand alone, subsidiary, Chpt.11 to wipe out existing investors, what, after an entire year of grounding and all the revelations, we would think that something should at least be in draft form by now, even if a national plan by congress to preserve the industry, it worked in Europe, why not in the USA?

When you look at the billions Boeing has already lost and the sums set aside for compensation to airlines, the compensation to the actual victims is small and most likely being held hostage for other reasons. Imagine if they had set a reasonable amount and used compensation to the airlines as leverage for the various governments to allow the payments? I can see the comments now which will follow the same principle, what is reasonable compensation to the families of the actual victims, and I means those who died in the two crashes.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sat Apr 18, 2020 7:19 pm

par13del wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Yet if Boeing is not held accountable

Is there any thought that Boeing is not being held responsible?
Based on some comments (not yours), unless Boeing goes into liquidation, they will not be held responsible. The issue no one seems willing to put on paper is what punishment they think is warranted, what level of continuation as a business, stand alone, subsidiary, Chpt.11 to wipe out existing investors, what, after an entire year of grounding and all the revelations, we would think that something should at least be in draft form by now, even if a national plan by congress to preserve the industry, it worked in Europe, why not in the USA?

When you look at the billions Boeing has already lost and the sums set aside for compensation to airlines, the compensation to the actual victims is small and most likely being held hostage for other reasons. Imagine if they had set a reasonable amount and used compensation to the airlines as leverage for the various governments to allow the payments? I can see the comments now which will follow the same principle, what is reasonable compensation to the families of the actual victims, and I means those who died in the two crashes.

My point is not that they aren't being punished, it's that it's still not clear they are being punished for the right thing, thus aren't going to work on fixing the right thing.

Sure, they are taking a big hit financially and reputationally, but so far they are hanging on to human error defense (an engineer made a bad decision) rather than a liability defense (our financial targets meant that many engineers had to make improper decisions with regard to safety and training).

IMO it's pretty dubious that one engineer's decision to rely on the three second rule is the root cause of MCAS, but that's what CEO Calhoun is telling us, and so far no one is pushing back on this much if at all. Instead the world focused on the two potty mouthed training pilots who tricked the regulator on the training aspects, but no one cares to look at how MCAS's crap design made it through the countless engineering processes since those bodies are buried and no one wants to dig them up.

If they can skate on this now, chances are they'll be willing to risk it again in the future.

In that regard I feel they aren't being held accountable.
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morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sat Apr 18, 2020 11:26 pm

enzo011 wrote:
morrisond wrote:
That's a lot harder in the era of non-back driven side sticks when you only have that 150 hours in an Cessna.



You seem to be blaming Airbus now for pilots being overwhelmed in a Boeing.


No just that i don't think non-back driven controls are a good idea - pilots lose the feel for actually flying and become systems operators.

That's fine if that is where we are headed - but all designs still assume pilots can actually fly.

I don't think it would be idea to move to a future cockpit that effectively can be flown by systems operators and back port that to existing designs for new builds - which should be easy if they are FBW. Yes - that means no MAX.

But until the time that more manual designs - including existing FBW - pilot's actually need to be able to fly.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sat Apr 18, 2020 11:28 pm

Revelation wrote:
par13del wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Yet if Boeing is not held accountable

Is there any thought that Boeing is not being held responsible?
Based on some comments (not yours), unless Boeing goes into liquidation, they will not be held responsible. The issue no one seems willing to put on paper is what punishment they think is warranted, what level of continuation as a business, stand alone, subsidiary, Chpt.11 to wipe out existing investors, what, after an entire year of grounding and all the revelations, we would think that something should at least be in draft form by now, even if a national plan by congress to preserve the industry, it worked in Europe, why not in the USA?

When you look at the billions Boeing has already lost and the sums set aside for compensation to airlines, the compensation to the actual victims is small and most likely being held hostage for other reasons. Imagine if they had set a reasonable amount and used compensation to the airlines as leverage for the various governments to allow the payments? I can see the comments now which will follow the same principle, what is reasonable compensation to the families of the actual victims, and I means those who died in the two crashes.

My point is not that they aren't being punished, it's that it's still not clear they are being punished for the right thing, thus aren't going to work on fixing the right thing.

Sure, they are taking a big hit financially and reputationally, but so far they are hanging on to human error defense (an engineer made a bad decision) rather than a liability defense (our financial targets meant that many engineers had to make improper decisions with regard to safety and training).

IMO it's pretty dubious that one engineer's decision to rely on the three second rule is the root cause of MCAS, but that's what CEO Calhoun is telling us, and so far no one is pushing back on this much if at all. Instead the world focused on the two potty mouthed training pilots who tricked the regulator on the training aspects, but no one cares to look at how MCAS's crap design made it through the countless engineering processes since those bodies are buried and no one wants to dig them up.

If they can skate on this now, chances are they'll be willing to risk it again in the future.

In that regard I feel they aren't being held accountable.


Yes it is pretty dubious - they screwed up plain and simple.

The A team was working on 777X (after finishing the bulk of work on 787), B team on 787-10 and C team on the MAX - which was supposed to be simple.
 
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aerolimani
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 12:55 am

morrisond wrote:
enzo011 wrote:
morrisond wrote:
That's a lot harder in the era of non-back driven side sticks when you only have that 150 hours in an Cessna.



You seem to be blaming Airbus now for pilots being overwhelmed in a Boeing.


No just that i don't think non-back driven controls are a good idea - pilots lose the feel for actually flying and become systems operators.

That's fine if that is where we are headed - but all designs still assume pilots can actually fly.

I don't think it would be idea to move to a future cockpit that effectively can be flown by systems operators and back port that to existing designs for new builds - which should be easy if they are FBW. Yes - that means no MAX.

But until the time that more manual designs - including existing FBW - pilot's actually need to be able to fly.

I would put forward that the ability to read and understand your instruments is VASTLY more important than feeling physical feedback from the flight controls. It is all too easy for the human senses to be fooled. If it came to a choice between physical feedback or instruments, I am 100% positive that all pilots of commercial transport aircraft will choose instruments over physical feedback.

Flying a Cessna 172 is not even comparable to flying a Q400. In the 172, you can react in real-time to what you are feeling and seeing. In Q400, an E190, an A220, a 737, 767, A330, 787, A380… you have to be waaaaay out front of that aircraft. Were you reacting to physical feedback to fly these machines, you would already be waaaaay too late for whatever is happening.

So, I will take a competent “systems operator” any day, over some person reliant on “feeling” the aircraft.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 2:18 am

aerolimani wrote:
I would put forward that the ability to read and understand your instruments is VASTLY more important than feeling physical feedback from the flight controls. It is all too easy for the human senses to be fooled. If it came to a choice between physical feedback or instruments, I am 100% positive that all pilots of commercial transport aircraft will choose instruments over physical feedback.

It may well be more important, the ability to have instruments display accurate information to pilots while it has decreased accidents and made flying safer has also opened up a flaw of what to do when accurate information is not available. Honestly, I would have thought that if one was in level flight and a sensor failed, continue as is would be the default while blaring a warning, but since autopilot can be engaged at any point in flight from climbing to landing, that logic could not fly.
Yes we have had accidents due to pilots not trusting their instruments, but that can be trained and drilled.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 3:11 am

morrisond wrote:
Revelation wrote:
IMO it's pretty dubious that one engineer's decision to rely on the three second rule is the root cause of MCAS, but that's what CEO Calhoun is telling us, and so far no one is pushing back on this much if at all. Instead the world focused on the two potty mouthed training pilots who tricked the regulator on the training aspects, but no one cares to look at how MCAS's crap design made it through the countless engineering processes since those bodies are buried and no one wants to dig them up.

If they can skate on this now, chances are they'll be willing to risk it again in the future.

In that regard I feel they aren't being held accountable.

Yes it is pretty dubious - they screwed up plain and simple.

The A team was working on 777X (after finishing the bulk of work on 787), B team on 787-10 and C team on the MAX - which was supposed to be simple.

I don't think we have the evidence to conclude that the 737 engineers were not as talented as other Boeing engineers. I think it's a reasonable supposition, but just that. I also think it's a valid supposition that the various influences that led to the wrong safety categorization of MCAS being made and never challenged have a common origin, but it's just supposition. FBI/DOJ has all the emails, not just the ones they've chosen to release. Hopefully some day we know more.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
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aerolimani
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 3:31 am

par13del wrote:
aerolimani wrote:
I would put forward that the ability to read and understand your instruments is VASTLY more important than feeling physical feedback from the flight controls. It is all too easy for the human senses to be fooled. If it came to a choice between physical feedback or instruments, I am 100% positive that all pilots of commercial transport aircraft will choose instruments over physical feedback.

It may well be more important, the ability to have instruments display accurate information to pilots while it has decreased accidents and made flying safer has also opened up a flaw of what to do when accurate information is not available. Honestly, I would have thought that if one was in level flight and a sensor failed, continue as is would be the default while blaring a warning, but since autopilot can be engaged at any point in flight from climbing to landing, that logic could not fly.
Yes we have had accidents due to pilots not trusting their instruments, but that can be trained and drilled.

Also, the FBW designs all have much better fault reporting than any model of 737. So, at least, when things go wrong, there’s a much better chance of making the correct decisions regarding how to respond.

It’s pretty tough to argue against the evidence that FBW designs, despite there absolute reliance on accurate instrumentation, have provided a much greater margin of safety versus the fully manual aircraft of the vintage of the original 737.
 
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aerolimani
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 3:33 am

Revelation wrote:
morrisond wrote:
Revelation wrote:
IMO it's pretty dubious that one engineer's decision to rely on the three second rule is the root cause of MCAS, but that's what CEO Calhoun is telling us, and so far no one is pushing back on this much if at all. Instead the world focused on the two potty mouthed training pilots who tricked the regulator on the training aspects, but no one cares to look at how MCAS's crap design made it through the countless engineering processes since those bodies are buried and no one wants to dig them up.

If they can skate on this now, chances are they'll be willing to risk it again in the future.

In that regard I feel they aren't being held accountable.

Yes it is pretty dubious - they screwed up plain and simple.

The A team was working on 777X (after finishing the bulk of work on 787), B team on 787-10 and C team on the MAX - which was supposed to be simple.

I don't think we have the evidence to conclude that the 737 engineers were not as talented as other Boeing engineers. I think it's a reasonable supposition, but just that. I also think it's a valid supposition that the various influences that led to the wrong safety categorization of MCAS being made and never challenged have a common origin, but it's just supposition. FBI/DOJ has all the emails, not just the ones they've chosen to release. Hopefully some day we know more.

Talent? Or, perhaps just sufficient seniority/courage to push back against their managers?
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 5:25 am

aerolimani wrote:
Also, the FBW designs all have much better fault reporting than any model of 737. So, at least, when things go wrong, there’s a much better chance of making the correct decisions regarding how to respond.

It’s pretty tough to argue against the evidence that FBW designs, despite there absolute reliance on accurate instrumentation, have provided a much greater margin of safety versus the fully manual aircraft of the vintage of the original 737.

Which is a point I don't think anyone argues, indeed even those who bash the MAX say the NG has a very good safety record, and we all know that the NG nor the MAX will ever attain the FBW creds of the A320 which made its appearance over 30 years ago.

The question no one really wants to address despite evidence staring us in the face from the NG, is whether a non-FBW a/c can be as safe as a FBW one. We can always deflect the question by saying why would we want to, then we get into grandfathering, cost of certification, etc etc etc and around and around we go.
 
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scbriml
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 7:53 am

aerolimani wrote:
I would put forward that the ability to read and understand your instruments is VASTLY more important than feeling physical feedback from the flight controls. It is all too easy for the human senses to be fooled.


Airbus sidestick is just a red herring. Look at Atlas 3591, Turkish 1951 and Asiana 214 (just off the top of my head) - all flown into the ground with yokes and all the feedback you could want.
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enzo011
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 8:36 am

morrisond wrote:
No just that i don't think non-back driven controls are a good idea - pilots lose the feel for actually flying and become systems operators.

That's fine if that is where we are headed - but all designs still assume pilots can actually fly.

I don't think it would be idea to move to a future cockpit that effectively can be flown by systems operators and back port that to existing designs for new builds - which should be easy if they are FBW. Yes - that means no MAX.

But until the time that more manual designs - including existing FBW - pilot's actually need to be able to fly.


Look at the accidents when feedback driven controlled aircraft was all the rage in the 1970's and 1980's and then look at it when non-back driven became more prevalent from 1990 onwards. You may personally feel that way, but if the recent crapshows all over the world has taught me anything it is that feelings should not be used as a guide for anything that takes more than 10 seconds to think about.

par13del wrote:
The question no one really wants to address despite evidence staring us in the face from the NG, is whether a non-FBW a/c can be as safe as a FBW one. We can always deflect the question by saying why would we want to, then we get into grandfathering, cost of certification, etc etc etc and around and around we go.


We have how many examples of non-FBW being safer than FBW? Could the NG just be an outlier to the evidence that since the FBW was widely introduced aviation has become safer? This is with the problem of airlines needing more pilots than ever and as has been said many times the training and skill of pilots these days are lacking because they are thrown in with less skill and hours than when flying was less safe.
 
ltbewr
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 8:39 am

The problems with the 737MAX will go down among the worst aircraft engineering disasters since the Comet. I wouldn't be surprised that between the 737MAX and the pandemic economic crash, that BCA will have to file for bankruptcy protections, get US Federal loan bailouts including stock warrants issued to the Government as part of the deal to protect the 10's of 1000's of jobs at BCA and sub-contractors.
While I hope that the 737MAX can be fixed and pilots trained to fly safely, it may be too little, too late to save it. Attempts to create a new from scratch replace of the 737 series in a rush could backfire with another major design flaw. Airbus will be able to exploit Boeing's problems, although the A380 may be their big blunder that will haunt them for a decade.

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