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seahawk
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 8:52 am

morrisond wrote:
Gremlinzzzz wrote:
morrisond wrote:
I do not know where some of you guys get these ideas from. If you are having flight control issues, and one where you know that the plane is in danger of crashing, the idea is not to go towards the Great Rift Valley and gain some few thousand freaking feet. The idea is to land the aircraft as soon as possible, in an airport that is not far away, the same airport you took off from.

Boeing is having to analyze their assumptions once again because they notice that not everyone is a test pilot, and the FAA having to look at everything they missed from the bit flip scenarios, problems with how data is managed by the flight computer, needed redundancy etc. There is a reason why this plane is still grounded, and it has nothing to do with how incompetent pilots were.


The origin of the Great Rift Valley argument was that people in the beginning were arguing that they couldn't afford to lose 1 foot of altitude from 7,000 AGL by reducing thrust and not going over Vmo where the controls would become ineffective as there were mountains directly in front of them - the track actually had them (before they turned around) heading over the plateau floor towards the valley where even more altitude opened up. They had options and could have tried to reduce thrust at least once. Aviate, Navigate, Communicate.


Basic flying skills are needed in every aircraft and the pilots that crashed the MAX lacked those. Thrust speed and pitch are 2 basic things to look at, they failed miserably. Those pilots would have crashed any plane that develops a fault.

But in the end safety only comes from better training of the pilots and from less and less severe faults by the machines.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 12:30 pm

enzo011 wrote:
We have how many examples of non-FBW being safer than FBW? Could the NG just be an outlier to the evidence that since the FBW was widely introduced aviation has become safer? This is with the problem of airlines needing more pilots than ever and as has been said many times the training and skill of pilots these days are lacking because they are thrown in with less skill and hours than when flying was less safe.

The 737 series of a/c is the outlier, what other commercial a/c is being produced today that is not FBW?

As stated before, the debate as it relates to the MAX is not about whether FBW a/c are safer than non-FBW a/c, the issue is whether the MAX can be made safe to fly without FBW.
If the answer is no then the regulators should state that and cancel the a/c.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 12:38 pm

ltbewr wrote:
The problems with the 737MAX will go down among the worst aircraft engineering disasters since the Comet. I wouldn't be surprised that between the 737MAX and the pandemic economic crash, that BCA will have to file for bankruptcy protections, get US Federal loan bailouts including stock warrants issued to the Government as part of the deal to protect the 10's of 1000's of jobs at BCA and sub-contractors.
While I hope that the 737MAX can be fixed and pilots trained to fly safely, it may be too little, too late to save it. Attempts to create a new from scratch replace of the 737 series in a rush could backfire with another major design flaw. Airbus will be able to exploit Boeing's problems, although the A380 may be their big blunder that will haunt them for a decade.

Except the FAA is a federal body, and the bulk of Boeing workers and their supply chain are there for MAX production, so do they need to make a decision on the MAX before the government involvement, if after, conflict of interest will forever be hung around the heads of Boeing and the Feds.

As for Airbus, why are they even mentioned?
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 12:56 pm

aerolimani wrote:
morrisond wrote:
enzo011 wrote:


You seem to be blaming Airbus now for pilots being overwhelmed in a Boeing.


No just that i don't think non-back driven controls are a good idea - pilots lose the feel for actually flying and become systems operators.

That's fine if that is where we are headed - but all designs still assume pilots can actually fly.

I don't think it would be idea to move to a future cockpit that effectively can be flown by systems operators and back port that to existing designs for new builds - which should be easy if they are FBW. Yes - that means no MAX.

But until the time that more manual designs - including existing FBW - pilot's actually need to be able to fly.

I would put forward that the ability to read and understand your instruments is VASTLY more important than feeling physical feedback from the flight controls. It is all too easy for the human senses to be fooled. If it came to a choice between physical feedback or instruments, I am 100% positive that all pilots of commercial transport aircraft will choose instruments over physical feedback.

Flying a Cessna 172 is not even comparable to flying a Q400. In the 172, you can react in real-time to what you are feeling and seeing. In Q400, an E190, an A220, a 737, 767, A330, 787, A380… you have to be waaaaay out front of that aircraft. Were you reacting to physical feedback to fly these machines, you would already be waaaaay too late for whatever is happening.

So, I will take a competent “systems operator” any day, over some person reliant on “feeling” the aircraft.


Good point - and make sure to keep an eye on the airspeed.

Just to be clear - you dismiss my opinions for only having 100+ hours in an 172 - however many seem to think that putting someone with my lack of experience plus another 30-40 hours into an 737 is perfectly fine.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 1:00 pm

aerolimani wrote:
par13del wrote:
aerolimani wrote:
I would put forward that the ability to read and understand your instruments is VASTLY more important than feeling physical feedback from the flight controls. It is all too easy for the human senses to be fooled. If it came to a choice between physical feedback or instruments, I am 100% positive that all pilots of commercial transport aircraft will choose instruments over physical feedback.

It may well be more important, the ability to have instruments display accurate information to pilots while it has decreased accidents and made flying safer has also opened up a flaw of what to do when accurate information is not available. Honestly, I would have thought that if one was in level flight and a sensor failed, continue as is would be the default while blaring a warning, but since autopilot can be engaged at any point in flight from climbing to landing, that logic could not fly.
Yes we have had accidents due to pilots not trusting their instruments, but that can be trained and drilled.

Also, the FBW designs all have much better fault reporting than any model of 737. So, at least, when things go wrong, there’s a much better chance of making the correct decisions regarding how to respond.

It’s pretty tough to argue against the evidence that FBW designs, despite there absolute reliance on accurate instrumentation, have provided a much greater margin of safety versus the fully manual aircraft of the vintage of the original 737.


I don't have access to the numbers but wasn't it reported in these pages many times that the 737 has a lower fatality rate than the A320? Or if higher not statistically significant to be considered worse? This may have just been for the 737 NG which has been around for most of the life of the A320.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 1:03 pm

Revelation wrote:
morrisond wrote:
Revelation wrote:
IMO it's pretty dubious that one engineer's decision to rely on the three second rule is the root cause of MCAS, but that's what CEO Calhoun is telling us, and so far no one is pushing back on this much if at all. Instead the world focused on the two potty mouthed training pilots who tricked the regulator on the training aspects, but no one cares to look at how MCAS's crap design made it through the countless engineering processes since those bodies are buried and no one wants to dig them up.

If they can skate on this now, chances are they'll be willing to risk it again in the future.

In that regard I feel they aren't being held accountable.

Yes it is pretty dubious - they screwed up plain and simple.

The A team was working on 777X (after finishing the bulk of work on 787), B team on 787-10 and C team on the MAX - which was supposed to be simple.

I don't think we have the evidence to conclude that the 737 engineers were not as talented as other Boeing engineers. I think it's a reasonable supposition, but just that. I also think it's a valid supposition that the various influences that led to the wrong safety categorization of MCAS being made and never challenged have a common origin, but it's just supposition. FBI/DOJ has all the emails, not just the ones they've chosen to release. Hopefully some day we know more.



Yes you are right - I should have "My guess is".

I think we would all love to see those emails.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 1:11 pm

ltbewr wrote:
The problems with the 737MAX will go down among the worst aircraft engineering disasters since the Comet. I wouldn't be surprised that between the 737MAX and the pandemic economic crash, that BCA will have to file for bankruptcy protections, get US Federal loan bailouts including stock warrants issued to the Government as part of the deal to protect the 10's of 1000's of jobs at BCA and sub-contractors.
While I hope that the 737MAX can be fixed and pilots trained to fly safely, it may be too little, too late to save it. Attempts to create a new from scratch replace of the 737 series in a rush could backfire with another major design flaw. Airbus will be able to exploit Boeing's problems, although the A380 may be their big blunder that will haunt them for a decade.


So far it looks like Boeing is not going to go down the road of the Bailout and choose plan B which is very unfortunate for Boeing workers.

Plan B is where they don't take money to support the workers and instead rightsize the company (they have offered buyouts to all 160,000 BCA employees) to the current production reality which it appears they can do without the bailout or Chapter 11.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 1:31 pm

morrisond wrote:
So far it looks like Boeing is not going to go down the road of the Bailout and choose plan B which is very unfortunate for Boeing workers.

Plan B is where they don't take money to support the workers and instead rightsize the company (they have offered buyouts to all 160,000 BCA employees) to the current production reality which it appears they can do without the bailout or Chapter 11.

We know hindsight is 20 / 20, we say stock buy backs was a bad idea, continuing production of 400+ a/c after grounding was also a bad idea, if the government is paying salaries to keep folks sustained while no production is done, Boeing could have done the same at cheaper cost preserving cash, unfortunately, that is the reality of hind sight. The legacy of that decision will be around for awhile, parking may be cheap but the logistics of getting those a/c updated to RTS specifications has a cost.

So now, it may well be that until RTS is approved, Boeing will not restart the line, they may use as many workers as they can to get the 400+ a/c sitting around ready for delivery, and with the slow down in travel, restarting the line and upping the production rate could be a multi-year process. The 400+ a/c sitting down will not be taken up immediately, there will be deferrals among them, even cancellation, and this is independent of the backlog not yet in production.
 
Alfons
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 1:49 pm

par13del wrote:
The question no one really wants to address despite evidence staring us in the face from the NG, is whether a non-FBW a/c can be as safe as a FBW one.


Yes, if the rest is done well... .

But if time pressure will make you start to glue 30 horsepower engines on bicycles, because you have no time to build a new motorbike from scratch, then things you don't like will occure. In my eyes, the question is not yes FBW or no FBW.
 
MartijnNL
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 2:27 pm

seahawk wrote:
Basic flying skills are needed in every aircraft and the pilots that crashed the MAX lacked those. Thrust speed and pitch are 2 basic things to look at, they failed miserably. Those pilots would have crashed any plane that develops a fault.

Ridiculous comment. The ET pilot had over 8,000 hours. Other well trained pilots crashed as well, when the flight was redone in a simulator. The dead pilots didn't lack basic flying skills. They had to fly a faulty aircraft delivered by greedy Boeing.

How can you even state this? The MAX still isn't certified to fly again after an entire year. Pilots are not to blame here, Boeing is.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 2:56 pm

MartijnNL wrote:
seahawk wrote:
Basic flying skills are needed in every aircraft and the pilots that crashed the MAX lacked those. Thrust speed and pitch are 2 basic things to look at, they failed miserably. Those pilots would have crashed any plane that develops a fault.

Ridiculous comment. The ET pilot had over 8,000 hours. Other well trained pilots crashed as well, when the flight was redone in a simulator. The dead pilots didn't lack basic flying skills. They had to fly a faulty aircraft delivered by greedy Boeing.

How can you even state this? The MAX still isn't certified to fly again after an entire year. Pilots are not to blame here, Boeing is.


Because both pilots only had about 150 hours before being made First Officers on big jets.

Most of his 8,000 hours were as Fist Officer.

Boeing is to blame but others aren't blameless - the system which is supposed to help catch and or mitigate these faults failed - you can jump and down all you want but those are the facts.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 4:33 pm

Alfons wrote:
par13del wrote:
The question no one really wants to address despite evidence staring us in the face from the NG, is whether a non-FBW a/c can be as safe as a FBW one.

Yes, if the rest is done well... .

But if time pressure will make you start to glue 30 horsepower engines on bicycles, because you have no time to build a new motorbike from scratch, then things you don't like will occure. In my eyes, the question is not yes FBW or no FBW.

The standard is supposed to be the aviation regulations. If you can meet them without FBW, fine. Chances are good you can, since they were written before FBW was a thing, and as far as I can tell FBW is not a requirement. The regulations also provide a procedure for older aircraft being granted exemptions. There obviously has been a lot of gamesmanship around these, first by Boeing, and it seems now by the regulators unhappy about how Boeing has played them in the past.
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Gremlinzzzz
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 4:35 pm

seahawk wrote:
morrisond wrote:
Gremlinzzzz wrote:
I do not know where some of you guys get these ideas from. If you are having flight control issues, and one where you know that the plane is in danger of crashing, the idea is not to go towards the Great Rift Valley and gain some few thousand freaking feet. The idea is to land the aircraft as soon as possible, in an airport that is not far away, the same airport you took off from.

Boeing is having to analyze their assumptions once again because they notice that not everyone is a test pilot, and the FAA having to look at everything they missed from the bit flip scenarios, problems with how data is managed by the flight computer, needed redundancy etc. There is a reason why this plane is still grounded, and it has nothing to do with how incompetent pilots were.


The origin of the Great Rift Valley argument was that people in the beginning were arguing that they couldn't afford to lose 1 foot of altitude from 7,000 AGL by reducing thrust and not going over Vmo where the controls would become ineffective as there were mountains directly in front of them - the track actually had them (before they turned around) heading over the plateau floor towards the valley where even more altitude opened up. They had options and could have tried to reduce thrust at least once. Aviate, Navigate, Communicate.


Basic flying skills are needed in every aircraft and the pilots that crashed the MAX lacked those. Thrust speed and pitch are 2 basic things to look at, they failed miserably. Those pilots would have crashed any plane that develops a fault.

But in the end safety only comes from better training of the pilots and from less and less severe faults by the machines.
The FAA did some tests, not every pilot recovered the plane. Sometimes we need to call it as is, poorly designed plane, poor assumptions, poor certification, and putting profit before people. It is not as if some airlines did not ask for training, and correct me if I am wrong, the 737 Max sims did not simulate MCAS.

If there ever was a poor job, this was it. One pilot once said 'we know more about MCAS fron the media than from Boeing.
 
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seahawk
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 5:02 pm

Gremlinzzzz wrote:
seahawk wrote:
morrisond wrote:

The origin of the Great Rift Valley argument was that people in the beginning were arguing that they couldn't afford to lose 1 foot of altitude from 7,000 AGL by reducing thrust and not going over Vmo where the controls would become ineffective as there were mountains directly in front of them - the track actually had them (before they turned around) heading over the plateau floor towards the valley where even more altitude opened up. They had options and could have tried to reduce thrust at least once. Aviate, Navigate, Communicate.


Basic flying skills are needed in every aircraft and the pilots that crashed the MAX lacked those. Thrust speed and pitch are 2 basic things to look at, they failed miserably. Those pilots would have crashed any plane that develops a fault.

But in the end safety only comes from better training of the pilots and from less and less severe faults by the machines.
The FAA did some tests, not every pilot recovered the plane. Sometimes we need to call it as is, poorly designed plane, poor assumptions, poor certification, and putting profit before people. It is not as if some airlines did not ask for training, and correct me if I am wrong, the 737 Max sims did not simulate MCAS.

If there ever was a poor job, this was it. One pilot once said 'we know more about MCAS fron the media than from Boeing.


Better training would probably not have saved the 2 MAX, yet if you look at the crew coordination and reaction times, they would still struggle with a serious fault in any modern airliner. Any FBW design with a sensor error and going into direct law with back up instruments would have been critical.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 5:23 pm

seahawk wrote:
Gremlinzzzz wrote:
seahawk wrote:

Basic flying skills are needed in every aircraft and the pilots that crashed the MAX lacked those. Thrust speed and pitch are 2 basic things to look at, they failed miserably. Those pilots would have crashed any plane that develops a fault.

But in the end safety only comes from better training of the pilots and from less and less severe faults by the machines.
The FAA did some tests, not every pilot recovered the plane. Sometimes we need to call it as is, poorly designed plane, poor assumptions, poor certification, and putting profit before people. It is not as if some airlines did not ask for training, and correct me if I am wrong, the 737 Max sims did not simulate MCAS.

If there ever was a poor job, this was it. One pilot once said 'we know more about MCAS fron the media than from Boeing.


Better training would probably not have saved the 2 MAX, yet if you look at the crew coordination and reaction times, they would still struggle with a serious fault in any modern airliner. Any FBW design with a sensor error and going into direct law with back up instruments would have been critical.

Question is, how much it takes to have such a failure mode.
A single sensor failure in 737 cascaded into muti-pronged failure mode. I suspect it has to be compared to something like a hand grenade going off in a more modern cockpit in terms of number of presented failures.
 
Lewton
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 5:59 pm

morrisond wrote:
I don't have access to the numbers but wasn't it reported in these pages many times that the 737 has a lower fatality rate than the A320? Or if higher not statistically significant to be considered worse? This may have just been for the 737 NG which has been around for most of the life of the A320.

"Most of the life" means that its first flight was 10 years later.
Indeed the NG has a slightly better track record than the whole A320 ceo family, however 10 years out of a total history of less than 35 years is more than 25%. And no, the NG has not had a 25% better track record.
On the other hand if you compare the total A320 family to the total 737 family, the A320 has a clearly better track record.

I believe that nobody has the relevant data to make a fully fair comparison, that would be something like comparing every A320 produced since 2000 to every 737 produced since 2000.
From Hamburg with love.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 6:07 pm

kalvado wrote:
Question is, how much it takes to have such a failure mode.
A single sensor failure in 737 cascaded into muti-pronged failure mode. I suspect it has to be compared to something like a hand grenade going off in a more modern cockpit in terms of number of presented failures.

Is that really a current question, or is it still valid because RTS has not been granted and any adjustments made since then is still unofficial?

We know dual sensor redundancy has been applied, EASA has said they would like 3 but 2 is acceptable, the computers are now operating simultaneously versus alternatively, latest challenge seems to be that the procedures for failure recovery are not as simple as regulators would like, maybe even not as rigid either since we have leaks that a/c were recovered using different methods during the sim sessions.
 
Gremlinzzzz
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 6:18 pm

seahawk wrote:
Better training would probably not have saved the 2 MAX, yet if you look at the crew coordination and reaction times, they would still struggle with a serious fault in any modern airliner. Any FBW design with a sensor error and going into direct law with back up instruments would have been critical.
Lion Air asked for more training on the Max, Boeing dissuaded them from that. When the plane crashed, no one at the time even knew what MCAS was.

Ethiopian Airlines had a Max simulator, and it did not simulate MCAS or its failure. What more were these airlines to do?

Where were they going to get this better training when they were being told all you need is an Ipad course?

Boeing used their test pilots and came to certain assumptions that are all wrong because it is skewed data from the onset. They put in a system that could take down a plane, notified no pilots and ensured that it had zero redundancy. When the first plane crashed, they reasoned that another situation was so far off, they could take their sweet time coming up with a solution. The regulator whose statistics models showed more crashes on the way, who had slept on the job, continued sleeping on the job.

Two airlines, one asked for training and was told they did not need it. The other invested in a simulator that did not cover everything, the very thing that brought down a plane could not be simulated. Second crash happened and most aviation bodies ground the type; that regulator that slept on the job was last to do the right thing. It stopped being about the pilots then, and the more they have looked at the plane, the more issues they have uncovered. That training that was not needed so that the jet could get to market as soon as possible, pilots will be getting it.
 
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enzo011
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 6:26 pm

par13del wrote:
The 737 series of a/c is the outlier, what other commercial a/c is being produced today that is not FBW?

As stated before, the debate as it relates to the MAX is not about whether FBW a/c are safer than non-FBW a/c, the issue is whether the MAX can be made safe to fly without FBW.
If the answer is no then the regulators should state that and cancel the a/c.



Well I think we can agree the 737 of old is not the same as the 737 being produced now (or 5 years ago as no 737s were being produced even before covid-19 :duck: ), so even trying to say it is an outlier is muddled with grey when trying to assert that FBW is a problem when it comes to these accidents.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 6:55 pm

enzo011 wrote:
par13del wrote:
The 737 series of a/c is the outlier, what other commercial a/c is being produced today that is not FBW?

As stated before, the debate as it relates to the MAX is not about whether FBW a/c are safer than non-FBW a/c, the issue is whether the MAX can be made safe to fly without FBW.
If the answer is no then the regulators should state that and cancel the a/c.



Well I think we can agree the 737 of old is not the same as the 737 being produced now (or 5 years ago as no 737s were being produced even before covid-19 :duck: ), so even trying to say it is an outlier is muddled with grey when trying to assert that FBW is a problem when it comes to these accidents.

Ah now, because the cables and hydraulics that existed when the first 737 was made are still there today in the MAX, hence the reason why it is not FBW, cannot be made FBW and any talk of how FBW will make the MAX safer is a non-starter since we can all agree that it cannot happen. As far as I know, no one is claiming that FBW has anything to do with the MAX accidents, or did I miss something?
I know that I have said bringing FBW into the discussion of the MAX RTS is not helpful since in that regard FBW means no RTS.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 6:58 pm

par13del wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Question is, how much it takes to have such a failure mode.
A single sensor failure in 737 cascaded into muti-pronged failure mode. I suspect it has to be compared to something like a hand grenade going off in a more modern cockpit in terms of number of presented failures.

Is that really a current question, or is it still valid because RTS has not been granted and any adjustments made since then is still unofficial?

We know dual sensor redundancy has been applied, EASA has said they would like 3 but 2 is acceptable, the computers are now operating simultaneously versus alternatively, latest challenge seems to be that the procedures for failure recovery are not as simple as regulators would like, maybe even not as rigid either since we have leaks that a/c were recovered using different methods during the sim sessions.

What I am talking about - MCAS failure was pretty much fully against cockpit design and piloting philosophy. Crew getting lost in such a situation is almost a given.
 
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aerolimani
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 7:06 pm

Revelation wrote:
Alfons wrote:
par13del wrote:
The question no one really wants to address despite evidence staring us in the face from the NG, is whether a non-FBW a/c can be as safe as a FBW one.

Yes, if the rest is done well... .

But if time pressure will make you start to glue 30 horsepower engines on bicycles, because you have no time to build a new motorbike from scratch, then things you don't like will occure. In my eyes, the question is not yes FBW or no FBW.

The standard is supposed to be the aviation regulations. If you can meet them without FBW, fine. Chances are good you can, since they were written before FBW was a thing, and as far as I can tell FBW is not a requirement. The regulations also provide a procedure for older aircraft being granted exemptions. There obviously has been a lot of gamesmanship around these, first by Boeing, and it seems now by the regulators unhappy about how Boeing has played them in the past.

The question, for me, is whether it is possible to construct a non-FBW aircraft (of RJ size and larger) which meets the efficiency expectations of the customers, as well as the safety regulations. From the A320 onwards, I believe all the manufacturers have chosen FBW for their new designs. So, clearly there must be advantages.

In the case of the MAX, it appears to be a Herculean task to meet efficiency expectations within the limits of the 737 design. The next question with the MAX is how much of the difficulty is caused by design limits [artificially] imposed by grandfathering, and how much is generally endemic to a non-FBW design.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 7:23 pm

aerolimani wrote:
The question, for me, is whether it is possible to construct a non-FBW aircraft (of RJ size and larger) which meets the efficiency expectations of the customers, as well as the safety regulations. From the A320 onwards, I believe all the manufacturers have chosen FBW for their new designs. So, clearly there must be advantages.

In the case of the MAX, it appears to be a Herculean task to meet efficiency expectations within the limits of the 737 design. The next question with the MAX is how much of the difficulty is caused by design limits [artificially] imposed by grandfathering, and how much is generally endemic to a non-FBW design.

"Better" and "good enough" are two different things.

Also, keep in mind A320 also still has memory items and paper procedures that the pilots are expected to perform.

If the standard becomes Collins Fusion level integration or beyond, then Airbus has a lot of work to do.

Yet for now I think it's clear the regulators aren't saying that 737 can't meet the current regulations.

As far as we know Boeing was completing a few items turned up by the audits and was close to scheduling a test flight when COVID hit.

I suppose they could be waiting till after the test flight to drop a bomb, but I don't think that's likely.
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 7:58 pm

kalvado wrote:
par13del wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Question is, how much it takes to have such a failure mode.
A single sensor failure in 737 cascaded into muti-pronged failure mode. I suspect it has to be compared to something like a hand grenade going off in a more modern cockpit in terms of number of presented failures.

Is that really a current question, or is it still valid because RTS has not been granted and any adjustments made since then is still unofficial?

We know dual sensor redundancy has been applied, EASA has said they would like 3 but 2 is acceptable, the computers are now operating simultaneously versus alternatively, latest challenge seems to be that the procedures for failure recovery are not as simple as regulators would like, maybe even not as rigid either since we have leaks that a/c were recovered using different methods during the sim sessions.

What I am talking about - MCAS failure was pretty much fully against cockpit design and piloting philosophy. Crew getting lost in such a situation is almost a given.

Which has already been accepted, the aircraft is grounded and has been for more than 12 months, I think we all know that if it ever RTS those issues which caused the fatal crashes and additional safety measures will be put in place, mechanical and procedural.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 8:06 pm

par13del wrote:
kalvado wrote:
par13del wrote:
Is that really a current question, or is it still valid because RTS has not been granted and any adjustments made since then is still unofficial?

We know dual sensor redundancy has been applied, EASA has said they would like 3 but 2 is acceptable, the computers are now operating simultaneously versus alternatively, latest challenge seems to be that the procedures for failure recovery are not as simple as regulators would like, maybe even not as rigid either since we have leaks that a/c were recovered using different methods during the sim sessions.

What I am talking about - MCAS failure was pretty much fully against cockpit design and piloting philosophy. Crew getting lost in such a situation is almost a given.

Which has already been accepted, the aircraft is grounded and has been for more than 12 months, I think we all know that if it ever RTS those issues which caused the fatal crashes and additional safety measures will be put in place, mechanical and procedural.

Grounding is a good start, but Boeing really has to prove if they are still capable of doing proper design to begin with. With MAX saga going along, "no" seems to be the emerging answer.
I really wonder if Boeing retains enough knowledgeable people after everything MAX is said and done, or they will have to rely on NCGs doing their first job, and if pandemic would help or hurt HR aspect of the issue.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 8:12 pm

aerolimani wrote:
The question, for me, is whether it is possible to construct a non-FBW aircraft (of RJ size and larger) which meets the efficiency expectations of the customers, as well as the safety regulations. From the A320 onwards, I believe all the manufacturers have chosen FBW for their new designs. So, clearly there must be advantages.

Who is trying to bring a new build commercial a/c to the market that is not FBW, even Boeing last new build was FBW.
aerolimani wrote:
In the case of the MAX, it appears to be a Herculean task to meet efficiency expectations within the limits of the 737 design. The next question with the MAX is how much of the difficulty is caused by design limits [artificially] imposed by grandfathering, and how much is generally endemic to a non-FBW design.

What the grounding has revealed is not a herculean task but what has been deemed an oversight or quick fix, what is not yet clear is whether this was a deliberate oversight and if so, how far up the chain does the oversight go.
We know that it took them from March to June 2019 to make adjustments to MCAS then June to Nov-2019 to switch the computers to simultaneous operation. If both were deemed high risk during the design process I suspect both would have been worked on simultaneously versus sequentially and the additional delay if any would have been minimal, more effort appears to have been spent on pushing the marketing mantra versus just doing the physical changes, which hindsight is showing is doable.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 8:16 pm

kalvado wrote:
Grounding is a good start, but Boeing really has to prove if they are still capable of doing proper design to begin with. With MAX saga going along, "no" seems to be the emerging answer.
I really wonder if Boeing retains enough knowledgeable people after everything MAX is said and done, or they will have to rely on NCGs doing their first job, and if pandemic would help or hurt HR aspect of the issue.

Well all you have to go with is the 777X and the new Air Force trainer both of which we can say are AFTER the MAX, if they are not enough, we will just have to wait and see if they survive the current crisis and store up and apply our doubts to their next new build, whether that is the MOM / NMA / NSA / FSA or whatever ABC they come up with.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 8:26 pm

par13del wrote:
aerolimani wrote:
The question, for me, is whether it is possible to construct a non-FBW aircraft (of RJ size and larger) which meets the efficiency expectations of the customers, as well as the safety regulations. From the A320 onwards, I believe all the manufacturers have chosen FBW for their new designs. So, clearly there must be advantages.

Who is trying to bring a new build commercial a/c to the market that is not FBW, even Boeing last new build was FBW.
aerolimani wrote:
In the case of the MAX, it appears to be a Herculean task to meet efficiency expectations within the limits of the 737 design. The next question with the MAX is how much of the difficulty is caused by design limits [artificially] imposed by grandfathering, and how much is generally endemic to a non-FBW design.

What the grounding has revealed is not a herculean task but what has been deemed an oversight or quick fix, what is not yet clear is whether this was a deliberate oversight and if so, how far up the chain does the oversight go.
We know that it took them from March to June 2019 to make adjustments to MCAS then June to Nov-2019 to switch the computers to simultaneous operation. If both were deemed high risk during the design process I suspect both would have been worked on simultaneously versus sequentially and the additional delay if any would have been minimal, more effort appears to have been spent on pushing the marketing mantra versus just doing the physical changes, which hindsight is showing is doable.

Doable, yes, but perhaps not within the timeframe that management/customers were demanding.

As to FBW vs non, my thoughts are venturing well into the hypothetical, and away from the MAX. Maybe someday I will start a thread on this topic. It is interesting to me, when old ideas get revised, but with new technological advantages. For example, in the world of hi-fi, sometimes people take very old circuit designs, Which haven’t been used for many years, and build them with very modern components. In this case, what would it look like… a clean sheet, non-FBW aircraft, designed around modern engines, with modern avionics fully integrated, and a modern EICAS system. Again, this is very hypothetical, and needs another thread, I know.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Sun Apr 19, 2020 8:58 pm

par13del wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Grounding is a good start, but Boeing really has to prove if they are still capable of doing proper design to begin with. With MAX saga going along, "no" seems to be the emerging answer.
I really wonder if Boeing retains enough knowledgeable people after everything MAX is said and done, or they will have to rely on NCGs doing their first job, and if pandemic would help or hurt HR aspect of the issue.

Well all you have to go with is the 777X and the new Air Force trainer both of which we can say are AFTER the MAX, if they are not enough, we will just have to wait and see if they survive the current crisis and store up and apply our doubts to their next new build, whether that is the MOM / NMA / NSA / FSA or whatever ABC they come up with.

777X is still to be proven, and I wouldn't bet on program living to do that in a current situation.
On a separate note, I still remember me applying those doubts to X in "777X first flight" thread about 13 months ago - only to be lectured that everything is on track, X will fly in April, and the company is running top-notch cranking out "the best narrowbody ever". ET302 crashed 3 days later.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Mon Apr 20, 2020 5:18 am

Gremlinzzzz wrote:
seahawk wrote:
Better training would probably not have saved the 2 MAX, yet if you look at the crew coordination and reaction times, they would still struggle with a serious fault in any modern airliner. Any FBW design with a sensor error and going into direct law with back up instruments would have been critical.
Lion Air asked for more training on the Max, Boeing dissuaded them from that. When the plane crashed, no one at the time even knew what MCAS was.

Ethiopian Airlines had a Max simulator, and it did not simulate MCAS or its failure. What more were these airlines to do?

Where were they going to get this better training when they were being told all you need is an Ipad course?

Boeing used their test pilots and came to certain assumptions that are all wrong because it is skewed data from the onset. They put in a system that could take down a plane, notified no pilots and ensured that it had zero redundancy. When the first plane crashed, they reasoned that another situation was so far off, they could take their sweet time coming up with a solution. The regulator whose statistics models showed more crashes on the way, who had slept on the job, continued sleeping on the job.

Two airlines, one asked for training and was told they did not need it. The other invested in a simulator that did not cover everything, the very thing that brought down a plane could not be simulated. Second crash happened and most aviation bodies ground the type; that regulator that slept on the job was last to do the right thing. It stopped being about the pilots then, and the more they have looked at the plane, the more issues they have uncovered. That training that was not needed so that the jet could get to market as soon as possible, pilots will be getting it.


Safety is not a do we fix problem 1 or problem 2 question, it always means fixing problem 1 and problem 2, even if problem 1 was the root cause.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Mon Apr 20, 2020 8:11 am

seahawk wrote:
Safety is not a do we fix problem 1 or problem 2 question, it always means fixing problem 1 and problem 2, even if problem 1 was the root cause.
And we are getting there. The FAA might not get everything right, but they will try and get as much right as they possibly can. If they cannot, then who trusts anything they do from here on?

Boeing may not get everything right, but they know that if they do a shoddy job, this plane is done, and no replacement in sight. They will also make sure that these pilots who had no issue flying the NG or prior models know plane systems and all the changes that they brought in.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Mon Apr 20, 2020 12:49 pm

seahawk wrote:
Gremlinzzzz wrote:
seahawk wrote:
Better training would probably not have saved the 2 MAX, yet if you look at the crew coordination and reaction times, they would still struggle with a serious fault in any modern airliner. Any FBW design with a sensor error and going into direct law with back up instruments would have been critical.
Lion Air asked for more training on the Max, Boeing dissuaded them from that. When the plane crashed, no one at the time even knew what MCAS was.

Ethiopian Airlines had a Max simulator, and it did not simulate MCAS or its failure. What more were these airlines to do?

Where were they going to get this better training when they were being told all you need is an Ipad course?

Boeing used their test pilots and came to certain assumptions that are all wrong because it is skewed data from the onset. They put in a system that could take down a plane, notified no pilots and ensured that it had zero redundancy. When the first plane crashed, they reasoned that another situation was so far off, they could take their sweet time coming up with a solution. The regulator whose statistics models showed more crashes on the way, who had slept on the job, continued sleeping on the job.

Two airlines, one asked for training and was told they did not need it. The other invested in a simulator that did not cover everything, the very thing that brought down a plane could not be simulated. Second crash happened and most aviation bodies ground the type; that regulator that slept on the job was last to do the right thing. It stopped being about the pilots then, and the more they have looked at the plane, the more issues they have uncovered. That training that was not needed so that the jet could get to market as soon as possible, pilots will be getting it.


Safety is not a do we fix problem 1 or problem 2 question, it always means fixing problem 1 and problem 2, even if problem 1 was the root cause.

Thing is, problem #2 does not exist. MCAS failure presents a situation that should NEVER EVER occur in a moderately shitty design. Eliminating that class of failures should actually mean that the crew never has to deal with that type of failure.
Training for unknown unknowns is in a different realm than line pilot training. Yes, Apollo program training probably included that - but even then we know what was the response for "Try SCE to AUX"
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Mon Apr 20, 2020 1:11 pm

The report for the Lion Air points out quite some concerning points in chapter 2.3. Nothing that would have changed the outcome, yet many things that can not be considered acceptable.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Mon Apr 20, 2020 1:20 pm

seahawk wrote:
The report for the Lion Air points out quite some concerning points in chapter 2.3. Nothing that would have changed the outcome, yet many things that can not be considered acceptable.

Well, as I said - I have never been to Indonesia, and I am not planning to; I never flew Lion and I am not planning to. On the other hand, I flew 2 legs on Boeing aircraft this year alone before the virus strike.
I imagine there is something between Lion, their insurers and government - but, as you acknowledge, it doesn't radically change the outcome. So I care about their training... I also care about weather on Mars to about the same extent as it can affect rover missions.
But there are much better things to worry about, like certain Chicago company providing safe and reliable machinery.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Mon Apr 20, 2020 1:42 pm

kalvado wrote:
seahawk wrote:
The report for the Lion Air points out quite some concerning points in chapter 2.3. Nothing that would have changed the outcome, yet many things that can not be considered acceptable.

Well, as I said - I have never been to Indonesia, and I am not planning to; I never flew Lion and I am not planning to. On the other hand, I flew 2 legs on Boeing aircraft this year alone before the virus strike.
I imagine there is something between Lion, their insurers and government - but, as you acknowledge, it doesn't radically change the outcome. So I care about their training... I also care about weather on Mars to about the same extent as it can affect rover missions.
But there are much better things to worry about, like certain Chicago company providing safe and reliable machinery.


Wow - so why not just go straight to 737's in primary training then. No need to bother with non-fbw Piston Trainers.

Just hope a sensor (or three of them freeze) never fails or a solder in an electrical connection in a Rudder transfer Control Unit fails.

I want Airliners designed that are a perfect as possible (but you can never design out all faults), Regulators that do their Job, Maintenance organizations that don't ground aircraft when they should and training organizations that thoroughly train their pilots in all phases of flight/emergencies and make sure 100% that their pilots understand any new procedure that might save there lives.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Mon Apr 20, 2020 2:21 pm

morrisond wrote:
Wow - so why not just go straight to 737's in primary training then. No need to bother with non-fbw Piston Trainers.

Cost saving, as always.
And "we know it better in US" (actually "had known" is better by now) - as a lot of cheap GA available in US (producing hundreds of dead bodies a year as a byproduct)
As we know, cadet programs do exist - and result seems to be comparable, if not better (especially considering those who drop out of GA via crash). 1500 hour requirement is considered excessive by many, but 0 hours may be too low - primarily for psychological reasons. So some trainer aircraft is needed to weed out those who cannot handle it without putting hours on 737. I suspect doing so in a small jet would actually be comparable in efficiency and better for skill development.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Mon Apr 20, 2020 2:27 pm

kalvado wrote:
morrisond wrote:
Wow - so why not just go straight to 737's in primary training then. No need to bother with non-fbw Piston Trainers.

Cost saving, as always.
And "we know it better in US" (actually "had known" is better by now) - as a lot of cheap GA available in US (producing hundreds of dead bodies a year as a byproduct)
As we know, cadet programs do exist - and result seems to be comparable, if not better (especially considering those who drop out of GA via crash). 1500 hour requirement is considered excessive by many, but 0 hours may be too low - primarily for psychological reasons. So some trainer aircraft is needed to weed out those who cannot handle it without putting hours on 737. I suspect doing so in a small jet would actually be comparable in efficiency and better for skill development.


Yes - some small Jet time would be great thing - at least 100 hours.

I'm not sure 1,500 hours is needed either - but I believe it's a lot more than 150.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Mon Apr 20, 2020 2:38 pm

Even some time in something like a Cirrus Vision Jet would be a good thing.

And guess what - it has a big red button https://cirrusaircraft.com/totalsafety/
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Mon Apr 20, 2020 3:15 pm

Ab initio training has been standard outside the US for decades and it works. But you need to be honest when choosing candidates make sure that only really suitable candidates proceed. In the Lion air case the co-pilot was really not up to the task on that day. I will wait for the final report on the ET before making comments about that incident.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Mon Apr 20, 2020 3:49 pm

kalvado wrote:
Grounding is a good start, but Boeing really has to prove if they are still capable of doing proper design to begin with. With MAX saga going along, "no" seems to be the emerging answer.
I really wonder if Boeing retains enough knowledgeable people after everything MAX is said and done, or they will have to rely on NCGs doing their first job, and if pandemic would help or hurt HR aspect of the issue.

I think what remains to be proven is can management fund engineering to the levels needed to do a proper job (hint: legacy systems with "architectures" that date back to the 60s need more effort to work with than more integrated ones) and stay out of the way till the job is done, instead of reminding everyone about how WN will hit them with a $1M per airplane penalty if they can't figure out how to avoid sim training.

kalvado wrote:
Thing is, problem #2 does not exist. MCAS failure presents a situation that should NEVER EVER occur in a moderately shitty design. Eliminating that class of failures should actually mean that the crew never has to deal with that type of failure.
Training for unknown unknowns is in a different realm than line pilot training. Yes, Apollo program training probably included that - but even then we know what was the response for "Try SCE to AUX"

Right, MCAS never should have left Boeing, it should have been discovered and fixed in-house. I think the reason it wasn't was that management was pushing the "it's no different than the NG" party line so hard and engineers chose to conform rather than push back. That's how we ended up with MCAS not being judged to be a critical function and no one actually testing what would happen if you took off in a MAX with the AOA sensors disagreeing.

But now that we have had MCAS, I think it's a step forward for the industry to have clear evidence that pilots are not following checklists as written and aren't finding and executing them as fast as some designers assume. Let the chips fall where they may!

As for "unknown unknowns" a lot of pilots who have taken ATPL tests hate how much minutia they must study to pass the test. A lot of them say "the computer is doing the flying, why do I need to know all this stuff". Well, we're still going to have "unknown unknowns" emerge, and it is the pilot's job to become test pilot when that happens. Obviously we can't expect them to save the day in every situation, but the system tries to give them a solid understanding of what is going on so they can at least have a chance to save the day.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Mon Apr 20, 2020 3:54 pm

ltbewr wrote:
Attempts to create a new from scratch replace of the 737 series in a rush could backfire with another major design flaw.


Not with a new airplane. Part of the reason the MAX issue came to be was the fact that it was a 50-year old fuselage shape being forced to accommodate modern engines that were too big for it in the first place.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Mon Apr 20, 2020 4:06 pm

Cdydatzigs wrote:
ltbewr wrote:
Attempts to create a new from scratch replace of the 737 series in a rush could backfire with another major design flaw.


Not with a new airplane. Part of the reason the MAX issue came to be was the fact that it was a 50-year old fuselage shape being forced to accommodate modern engines that were too big for it in the first place.


I understand your point, but let us not forget the issues of the 'new from scratch' 787 with the batteries and some engines. Those did cause groundings, but not deaths as with the 737MAX as well as a fix developed and put in a reasonable period of time. You also have issues with the 777X from testing. Hopefully Boeing will reform their culture to limit outsourcing of key components, take time and greater care to limit potential problems.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Mon Apr 20, 2020 4:23 pm

As per https://www.reuters.com/article/boeing- ... SL4N2C800K in our news thread, lessor China Development Bank has canceled 29 MAXes.

What's interesting to me is they kept 70 they had on order.

This is similar to earlier cancellations: they cancel some but not all. Why? Are there some they cannot get out from, or do they think they will eventually want some? Or are they dumping orders as deposits become due and will continue to do so? I guess we can all speculate.

Also they are shifting all MAX10 orders to MAX8. Is this because they don't think MAX10 will happen, or it won't gain market acceptance, or it's just being delayed so they don't want to wait?

It also says 20 orders are deferred to 2024-6. This could mean they are shifting them out till later so Boeing can save face and will cancel them later, or it could mean they really think these slots may have value in 2024-6.

Posts on this forum suggest that deferment usually means the customer has made a bigger commitment to eventually take the aircraft but we saw with things like VS's A380 order that simply wasn't true.

Is this at core due to COVID-19 and its impact on the market, or due to MCAS, or both?

So many questions I know... I like the fact we're being given the information, but it'd be nice if the media could find out more about what strategy the lessor is following.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Mon Apr 20, 2020 4:26 pm

ltbewr wrote:
Cdydatzigs wrote:
ltbewr wrote:
Attempts to create a new from scratch replace of the 737 series in a rush could backfire with another major design flaw.

Not with a new airplane. Part of the reason the MAX issue came to be was the fact that it was a 50-year old fuselage shape being forced to accommodate modern engines that were too big for it in the first place.

I understand your point, but let us not forget the issues of the 'new from scratch' 787 with the batteries and some engines. Those did cause groundings, but not deaths as with the 737MAX as well as a fix developed and put in a reasonable period of time. You also have issues with the 777X from testing. Hopefully Boeing will reform their culture to limit outsourcing of key components, take time and greater care to limit potential problems.

Yep, 787 had other major problems, such as incorrect Side of Body joint, fire in the electrical panel forcing a landing, etc that people seem to forget about. Chances are there were many other issues we never heard about. A clean sheet comes with significant risks, IMO.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Mon Apr 20, 2020 4:59 pm

Revelation wrote:
I think the reason it wasn't was that management was pushing the "it's no different than the NG" party line so hard and engineers chose to conform rather than push back. That's how we ended up with MCAS not being judged to be a critical function and no one actually testing what would happen if you took off in a MAX with the AOA sensors disagreeing.

That still means engineering didn't do proper safety analysis. Until there is an email explicitly describing the failure mode - and a management rebrutal in responce - it remains squarely on engineering.
Assumptions of 3 second rule were also explained by now - and Boeing engineering didn't understand that.
Of course it is management fault - oh wait, this is Trump's fault. I am still waiting for Putin to be blamed for MAX situation.



Revelation wrote:
. Obviously we can't expect them to save the day in every situation, but the system tries to give them a solid understanding of what is going on so they can at least have a chance to save the day.

1 out of 3 is that you get when you recruit average line pilot into a test domain without a subject briefing. Boeing needs to add ejection seats to those planes if that is the plan.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Mon Apr 20, 2020 5:46 pm

kalvado wrote:
That still means engineering didn't do proper safety analysis. Until there is an email explicitly describing the failure mode - and a management rebrutal in responce - it remains squarely on engineering.

Engineering is the answer to "what happened", the answer to "why did it happen" is not as simple, IMO. In an ideal world engineers be driven by professional standards and ethics. I think we have a lot of evidence that we do not live in an ideal world.

kalvado wrote:
1 out of 3 is that you get when you recruit average line pilot into a test domain without a subject briefing. Boeing needs to add ejection seats to those planes if that is the plan.

I don't think we have enough data points to draw that conclusion. We definitely don't have the final Boeing response on fixes and on training. If we ask questions about "unknown unknowns", all aircraft will need ejection seats for all pilots and passengers to be considered safe, and even then people will find ways to strangle themselves in the parachute leads.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Mon Apr 20, 2020 6:53 pm

Revelation wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Grounding is a good start, but Boeing really has to prove if they are still capable of doing proper design to begin with. With MAX saga going along, "no" seems to be the emerging answer.
I really wonder if Boeing retains enough knowledgeable people after everything MAX is said and done, or they will have to rely on NCGs doing their first job, and if pandemic would help or hurt HR aspect of the issue.

I think what remains to be proven is can management fund engineering to the levels needed to do a proper job (hint: legacy systems with "architectures" that date back to the 60s need more effort to work with than more integrated ones) and stay out of the way till the job is done, instead of reminding everyone about how WN will hit them with a $1M per airplane penalty if they can't figure out how to avoid sim training.



I keep reading these WN comments and I've asked before and never received an answer:
1 - Where is the evidence on the WN $1Mil per aircraft if training needed?
2 - It's been implied it is somehow WN's demands that caused the lack of training on MCAS. If I'm WN and I say "Can you supply a re-engined 737 that doesn't need simulator training?", it is incumbent upon BOEING to say yes or no. If they say yes then it's their responsibility to do that and for having made that committment.
3 - Do we know that the $1Mill/aircraft stipulation was required by WN, or OFFERED by Boeing? Again, the customer could ask for ANYTHING, it's the manufacturer that is repsponsible for delivering a good solution or saying No.

I'm tired of it being implied that this is WN's fault. If there's evidence to that fact, please present it.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Mon Apr 20, 2020 6:56 pm

Cdydatzigs wrote:
ltbewr wrote:
Attempts to create a new from scratch replace of the 737 series in a rush could backfire with another major design flaw.


Not with a new airplane. Part of the reason the MAX issue came to be was the fact that it was a 50-year old fuselage shape being forced to accommodate modern engines that were too big for it in the first place.


The 747-8 couldn't use it's rear stab tank due to flutter issues.
The 787 had onboard battery fires and that was a new airplane. It also had a problem with the wing to body join strength that had to be retroactively fixed.
The A380 had wing cracking issues.

New airplanes have significant design flaws all the time. Given Boeing's recent track record, that could be more likely.

Boeing's CST-100 "Starliner"(lol) had its first unmanned test flight a few months ago. It failed to dock with the ISS due to fuel issues caused by a software timing problem. It also had a separation from its service module problem that required a software patch DURING THE FLIGHT. NASA has since found >60 significant problems and Boeing will be re-flying the unmanned test due to all the problems. This is Boeing building a space capsule, something we did >50 years ago, and failing to do proper testing pre-launch. Not the aircraft division, but perhaps indicative of the systemic rot through the entire company.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Mon Apr 20, 2020 7:21 pm

Revelation wrote:
As per https://www.reuters.com/article/boeing- ... SL4N2C800K in our news thread, lessor China Development Bank has canceled 29 MAXes.

What's interesting to me is they kept 70 they had on order.

This is similar to earlier cancellations: they cancel some but not all. Why? Are there some they cannot get out from, or do they think they will eventually want some? Or are they dumping orders as deposits become due and will continue to do so? I guess we can all speculate.

Also they are shifting all MAX10 orders to MAX8. Is this because they don't think MAX10 will happen, or it won't gain market acceptance, or it's just being delayed so they don't want to wait?

It also says 20 orders are deferred to 2024-6. This could mean they are shifting them out till later so Boeing can save face and will cancel them later, or it could mean they really think these slots may have value in 2024-6.

Posts on this forum suggest that deferment usually means the customer has made a bigger commitment to eventually take the aircraft but we saw with things like VS's A380 order that simply wasn't true.

Is this at core due to COVID-19 and its impact on the market, or due to MCAS, or both?

So many questions I know... I like the fact we're being given the information, but it'd be nice if the media could find out more about what strategy the lessor is following.


For what its worth I had a quick and dirty look at the 6 or 7 more substantial MAX cancellations this last couple of months, and on average, some 37% of remaining orders were cancelled, ranging from about 50% in the case of Avolon, GECAS and Oman, to 10% in the case of AerCap.
It was quick and dirty, so happy to be corrected.

If that were representative of the whole MAX backlog, it would result in about 1,500 of the 4,000 backlog being cancelled.
Of course the picture is so complex that it would be naïve to suggest that this number actually IS representative.

Interesting, though, inasmuch as it begs the questions you ask.

Rgds
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, April 2020

Mon Apr 20, 2020 7:26 pm

Chemist wrote:
I keep reading these WN comments and I've asked before and never received an answer:
1 - Where is the evidence on the WN $1Mil per aircraft if training needed?
2 - It's been implied it is somehow WN's demands that caused the lack of training on MCAS. If I'm WN and I say "Can you supply a re-engined 737 that doesn't need simulator training?", it is incumbent upon BOEING to say yes or no. If they say yes then it's their responsibility to do that and for having made that committment.
3 - Do we know that the $1Mill/aircraft stipulation was required by WN, or OFFERED by Boeing? Again, the customer could ask for ANYTHING, it's the manufacturer that is repsponsible for delivering a good solution or saying No.

I'm tired of it being implied that this is WN's fault. If there's evidence to that fact, please present it.

https://pizzainmotion.boardingarea.com/ ... simulator/ says the source is a WSJ interview with a Boeing cockpit engineer:

A recent Wall Street Journal article sheds new light on a potential financial incentive for Boeing to work hard to avoid requiring simulator time for pilots flying the 737 MAX. The goal with the 737 MAX was to make it fly as closely as possible to earlier versions of the 737, such that pilots would need minimal training.

The focus of the Wall Street Journal is on the myriad steps required for a pilot to perform correctly in the span of seconds to avoid such crashes. However, they mention a detail, unconfirmed, that’s fairly compelling:

The company had promised its biggest customer for the MAX, Southwest Airlines Co. , that it would pay it $1 million per plane ordered if pilots needed to do additional simulator training, according to Rick Ludtke, a Boeing engineer who worked on the jet’s cockpit systems, and another person who had been involved in the airplane’s development.


It doesn't tell us if WN asked for such a penalty, or if Boeing offered such a penalty knowing WN would not want to pay to bring each pilot to a simulator before flying MAX. Like many things related to the MAX tragedy, we may never know the details.

I don't have a WSJ subscription so I can't go to the source, but there is another fuller rendering:

Rick Ludtke, a former Boeing engineer who worked on 737 MAX cockpit features but not the MCAS system, told the Journal that midlevel managers told their staff members that Boeing had committed to paying Southwest Airlines -- which has ordered 280 MAX aircraft -- $1 million per plane if the 737 MAX ended up requiring pilots to spend more time training on simulators.

Ludtke said, “We had never, ever seen commitments like that before.
" Southwest and Boeing declined to comment to the Journal on this.

Ref: https://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan ... s-737-max/

So we don't know who initiated the idea, but we do know it was unprecedented, and we do know Boeing mid-level managers telling engineers of its existence, presumably to pressure them to meet the requirement, presuming we trust Ludke and the "other person" WSJ says they talked to.

Clearly Boeing made it a selling point, according to a NYT article:

Image

This is a Boeing proprietary slide provided to the US House Committee on Transport and Infrastructure.

Clearly it mattered to WN:

Southwest made its first Max order in 2011 based on Boeing’s promise that the airline wouldn’t have to educate its pilots on simulators, which can cost tens of millions of dollars to operate over the life of an aircraft. Instead, airline pilots who were certified to fly the 737 NG took a short course on an iPad to become familiar with the Max.

“You’re out there trying to buy an airplane and negotiate a price and produce your schedule based on a PowerPoint, and you just need to have some guarantees,” Mike Van de Ven, Southwest’s chief operating officer, said in an interview last month.

Ref: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/busi ... ining.html

I agree that when push comes to shove it was up to Boeing Engineering to evaluate the requirement from marketing, and tell them to piss off if it could not be met. Unfortunately we don't seem to have the details of that conversation either. It could all be due to one engineer relying on the three second rule, as CEO Calhoun suggests. It could be several key engineers making decisions one would think were independent all made bad decisions. It could be management telling engineers that their future career prospects were dim if they could not make the no sim requirement work. It could be engineers deciding their holdings of Boeing stock would be more valuable if they could meet the no sim requirement. So far we don't know what is the truth.
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