Chemist wrote:https://pizzainmotion.boardingarea.com/ ... simulator/
I keep reading these WN comments and I've asked before and never received an answer:
1 - Where is the evidence on the WN $1Mil per aircraft if training needed?
2 - It's been implied it is somehow WN's demands that caused the lack of training on MCAS. If I'm WN and I say "Can you supply a re-engined 737 that doesn't need simulator training?", it is incumbent upon BOEING to say yes or no. If they say yes then it's their responsibility to do that and for having made that committment.
3 - Do we know that the $1Mill/aircraft stipulation was required by WN, or OFFERED by Boeing? Again, the customer could ask for ANYTHING, it's the manufacturer that is repsponsible for delivering a good solution or saying No.
I'm tired of it being implied that this is WN's fault. If there's evidence to that fact, please present it.
says the source is a WSJ interview with a Boeing cockpit engineer:
A recent Wall Street Journal article sheds new light on a potential financial incentive for Boeing to work hard to avoid requiring simulator time for pilots flying the 737 MAX. The goal with the 737 MAX was to make it fly as closely as possible to earlier versions of the 737, such that pilots would need minimal training.
The focus of the Wall Street Journal is on the myriad steps required for a pilot to perform correctly in the span of seconds to avoid such crashes. However, they mention a detail, unconfirmed, that’s fairly compelling:
The company had promised its biggest customer for the MAX, Southwest Airlines Co. , that it would pay it $1 million per plane ordered if pilots needed to do additional simulator training, according to Rick Ludtke, a Boeing engineer who worked on the jet’s cockpit systems, and another person who had been involved in the airplane’s development.
It doesn't tell us if WN asked for such a penalty, or if Boeing offered such a penalty knowing WN would not want to pay to bring each pilot to a simulator before flying MAX. Like many things related to the MAX tragedy, we may never know the details.
I don't have a WSJ subscription so I can't go to the source, but there is another fuller rendering:
Rick Ludtke, a former Boeing engineer who worked on 737 MAX cockpit features but not the MCAS system, told the Journal that midlevel managers told their staff members that Boeing had committed to paying Southwest Airlines -- which has ordered 280 MAX aircraft -- $1 million per plane if the 737 MAX ended up requiring pilots to spend more time training on simulators.
Ludtke said, “We had never, ever seen commitments like that before." Southwest and Boeing declined to comment to the Journal on this.
Ref: https://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan ... s-737-max/
So we don't know who initiated the idea, but we do know it was unprecedented, and we do know Boeing mid-level managers telling engineers of its existence, presumably to pressure them to meet the requirement, presuming we trust Ludke and the "other person" WSJ says they talked to.
Clearly Boeing made it a selling point, according to a NYT article:
This is a Boeing proprietary slide provided to the US House Committee on Transport and Infrastructure.
Clearly it mattered to WN:
Southwest made its first Max order in 2011 based on Boeing’s promise that the airline wouldn’t have to educate its pilots on simulators, which can cost tens of millions of dollars to operate over the life of an aircraft. Instead, airline pilots who were certified to fly the 737 NG took a short course on an iPad to become familiar with the Max.
“You’re out there trying to buy an airplane and negotiate a price and produce your schedule based on a PowerPoint, and you just need to have some guarantees,” Mike Van de Ven, Southwest’s chief operating officer, said in an interview last month.
Ref: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/busi ... ining.html
I agree that when push comes to shove it was up to Boeing Engineering to evaluate the requirement from marketing, and tell them to piss off if it could not be met. Unfortunately we don't seem to have the details of that conversation either. It could all be due to one engineer relying on the three second rule, as CEO Calhoun suggests. It could be several key engineers making decisions one would think were independent all made bad decisions. It could be management telling engineers that their future career prospects were dim if they could not make the no sim requirement work. It could be engineers deciding their holdings of Boeing stock would be more valuable if they could meet the no sim requirement. So far we don't know what is the truth.