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Stitch
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Fri Jun 19, 2020 5:15 pm

Revelation wrote:
I think there is an issue that these half-and-half people are probably going to be made to feel like whistleblowers rather than feel like they're just doing the FAA half of their job to the best of their abilities. It's really hard to have divided roles when 100% of their paycheck comes from Boeing.


With Boeing cutting payroll again, especially with their senior engineers (via incentives to retire), what the FAA (and Congress, via funding) should be doing is hiring these folks as they leave Boeing and then that way they have the direct knowledge and experience with how Boeing does certification as well as familiarity with company processes and the products themselves that the FAA would need to be truly effective at managing and supervising the certification process.

Honestly, I'd like to see EASA also hire some of these ex-Boeing folks as well as see the FAA hire some ex-Airbus folks as they roll off. That way both agencies can improve their processes since we're unlikely to see "blanket acceptance" of each other's Airworthiness Certificates going forward.
 
smartplane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Fri Jun 19, 2020 8:43 pm

Revelation wrote:
MSPNWA wrote:
But once again that "moment" assumes that commercial goals driving "unacceptable" engineering decisions and the subsequent crashes is the actual cause and effect. We can speculate all we want about what happened in development, but short of hard, directly linked evidence between the two events, which there none has been made public so far, this shouldn't be assumed. And even then it's a nebulous theory that could be theoretically applied to practically any crash. In hindsight we can always look and say, "if we had only spent more money here." And what is the difference between an "acceptable" and "unacceptable" engineering decision anyway? So you may be waiting for a message that doesn't even apply to this situation. What it sounds more like is the salve to the belief that no matter what, someone or something has to be blamed.

Yes, no doubt, a "smoking gun" needs to be produced, I've said this all along. I'm confident after reading the text message dump that it wasn't Forkner on his own who decided he needed to play Jedi mind tricks to get FAA and others to fast track MAX certification. Maybe other executives were more careful on what they committed to electronic form, maybe the investigators didn't ask the right questions or read the right content, maybe they did and they are sitting on the evidence, who knows.

When you read the message dump and its clear description of management motivations from Forkner and others, and add to it what ST's lead article on MCAS gives as the faults of Boeing's safety assessment of MCAS:

The safety analysis:
  • Understated the power of the new flight control system, which was designed to swivel the horizontal tail to push the nose of the plane down to avert a stall. When the planes later entered service, MCAS was capable of moving the tail more than four times farther than was stated in the initial safety analysis document.
  • Failed to account for how the system could reset itself each time a pilot responded, thereby missing the potential impact of the system repeatedly pushing the airplane’s nose downward.
  • Assessed a failure of the system as one level below “catastrophic.” But even that “hazardous” danger level should have precluded activation of the system based on input from a single sensor — and yet that’s how it was designed.

Ref: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... air-crash/

... it's hard to attribute all this to random incompetence rather than the "effect" of management insisting engineers take the low cost route at every juncture and abuse their positions as both Boeing employees and FAA inspectors to get that outcome.

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... ng-safety/ from Wednesday provides even more examples of the issues:

Seattle Times reports last year revealed that Boeing managers limited some certification testing performed by the company’s own engineers; that FAA safety engineers were pressured to give cursory approvals to Boeing analyses; and that changes to MCAS made late in the program’s development went largely under the FAA’s radar.

And the perverse effects:

Stumo also called for Boeing to drop a defense its lawyers are using in court, where they have argued that the company should be immune from liability for the crashes because the FAA certified the MAX.

In an interview from her home in England, Kuria said she was disgusted to learn of this legal argument during the hearing.

“I was completely stunned by the audacity of Boeing to ask for immunity,” she said. “I felt that it was a form of admission of wrongdoing. Because what do you need immunity for if you are innocent?”

When Sen. Ed Markey, D -Mass.,raised the issue with Dickson, the FAA chief agreed that “the responsibility to produce a safe product does belong with Boeing.”

In effect Boeing used Jedi mind tricks to get FAA to certify the plane, and now they're saying "don't blame us, FAA certified the plane!".

It'd be nice if we could put these hi-jinks to an end, but it seems we aren't going to be able to.

TFA suggests FAA has been less than cooperative with Congress:

He said that even after a personal plea to Dickson within the last week for answers to specific questions and access to specific internal documents, no progress was made.

“This record of delay and unresponsiveness clearly shows at best an unwillingness to cooperate with congressional oversight,” Wicker said. “Your team at the FAA has deliberately tried to keep us in the dark.

“It’s hard not to characterize our relationship during this entire process as being adversarial on the part of the FAA,” he added. “The agency stonewalling of my investigation suggests discomfort for what might ultimately be revealed.”

At one point Sen. Richard Blumenthal, D – Conn., told Dickson: “I see no way you can continue in this job if you fail to be more responsive.”

It suggests FAA has some skeletons in its closet, and that Dickson has not been an agent of change.

Good summation.

Perhaps explains why EASA, ANAC, CAAC, JCAB and CAA are meeting with and without FAA reps. Is FAA reverting to past form, no longer as receptive on MAX (and X) certification areas of interest / concern?
 
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Stitch
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Fri Jun 19, 2020 9:41 pm

smartplane wrote:
Perhaps explains why EASA, ANAC, CAAC, JCAB and CAA are meeting with and without FAA reps. Is FAA reverting to past form, no longer as receptive on MAX (and X) certification areas of interest / concern?


I would hope not because doing so would be counter-productive not just to the FAA, but also to Boeing, since I believe all those other agencies intend to not accept the FAA restoration of the 737 MAX's Airworthiness Certificate prima facie.
 
sgrow787
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Sat Jun 20, 2020 11:32 am

Revelation wrote:
MSPNWA wrote:
But once again that "moment" assumes that commercial goals driving "unacceptable" engineering decisions and the subsequent crashes is the actual cause and effect. We can speculate all we want about what happened in development, but short of hard, directly linked evidence between the two events, which there none has been made public so far, this shouldn't be assumed. And even then it's a nebulous theory that could be theoretically applied to practically any crash. In hindsight we can always look and say, "if we had only spent more money here." And what is the difference between an "acceptable" and "unacceptable" engineering decision anyway? So you may be waiting for a message that doesn't even apply to this situation. What it sounds more like is the salve to the belief that no matter what, someone or something has to be blamed.

Yes, no doubt, a "smoking gun" needs to be produced, I've said this all along. I'm confident after reading the text message dump that it wasn't Forkner on his own who decided he needed to play Jedi mind tricks to get FAA and others to fast track MAX certification. Maybe other executives were more careful on what they committed to electronic form, maybe the investigators didn't ask the right questions or read the right content, maybe they did and they are sitting on the evidence, who knows.

When you read the message dump and its clear description of management motivations from Forkner and others, and add to it what ST's lead article on MCAS gives as the faults of Boeing's safety assessment of MCAS:

The safety analysis:
  • Understated the power of the new flight control system, which was designed to swivel the horizontal tail to push the nose of the plane down to avert a stall. When the planes later entered service, MCAS was capable of moving the tail more than four times farther than was stated in the initial safety analysis document.
  • Failed to account for how the system could reset itself each time a pilot responded, thereby missing the potential impact of the system repeatedly pushing the airplane’s nose downward.
  • Assessed a failure of the system as one level below “catastrophic.” But even that “hazardous” danger level should have precluded activation of the system based on input from a single sensor — and yet that’s how it was designed.

Ref: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... air-crash/

... it's hard to attribute all this to random incompetence rather than the "effect" of management insisting engineers take the low cost route at every juncture and abuse their positions as both Boeing employees and FAA inspectors to get that outcome.

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... ng-safety/ from Wednesday provides even more examples of the issues:

Seattle Times reports last year revealed that Boeing managers limited some certification testing performed by the company’s own engineers; that FAA safety engineers were pressured to give cursory approvals to Boeing analyses; and that changes to MCAS made late in the program’s development went largely under the FAA’s radar.

And the perverse effects:

Stumo also called for Boeing to drop a defense its lawyers are using in court, where they have argued that the company should be immune from liability for the crashes because the FAA certified the MAX.

In an interview from her home in England, Kuria said she was disgusted to learn of this legal argument during the hearing.

“I was completely stunned by the audacity of Boeing to ask for immunity,” she said. “I felt that it was a form of admission of wrongdoing. Because what do you need immunity for if you are innocent?”

When Sen. Ed Markey, D -Mass.,raised the issue with Dickson, the FAA chief agreed that “the responsibility to produce a safe product does belong with Boeing.”

In effect Boeing used Jedi mind tricks to get FAA to certify the plane, and now they're saying "don't blame us, FAA certified the plane!".

It'd be nice if we could put these hi-jinks to an end, but it seems we aren't going to be able to.

TFA suggests FAA has been less than cooperative with Congress:

He said that even after a personal plea to Dickson within the last week for answers to specific questions and access to specific internal documents, no progress was made.

“This record of delay and unresponsiveness clearly shows at best an unwillingness to cooperate with congressional oversight,” Wicker said. “Your team at the FAA has deliberately tried to keep us in the dark.

“It’s hard not to characterize our relationship during this entire process as being adversarial on the part of the FAA,” he added. “The agency stonewalling of my investigation suggests discomfort for what might ultimately be revealed.”

At one point Sen. Richard Blumenthal, D – Conn., told Dickson: “I see no way you can continue in this job if you fail to be more responsive.”

It suggests FAA has some skeletons in its closet, and that Dickson has not been an agent of change.


Well said. I'd go further and say, competent aircraft manufacturers go beyond the minimum to meet certification requirements. In the case of the Max, Boeing skirted the requirements for a critical system at just about every turn in the process.

Now that we agree, can we just put some of these board members and upper management in jail and quietly move on? Surely some deterrence, along with a little more oversight, will be the right medicine to curtail this from happening again.
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Sat Jun 20, 2020 4:24 pm

sgrow787 wrote:
Well said. I'd go further and say, competent aircraft manufacturers go beyond the minimum to meet certification requirements. In the case of the Max, Boeing skirted the requirements for a critical system at just about every turn in the process.

It's particularly galling that we have the text messages with the Boeing employees saying they used Jedi mind tricks to get FAA to certify the plane, and now Boeing is saying in court to the victims "don't blame us, FAA certified the plane!". It's interesting, given many of the "FAA inspectors" involved in the certification are in fact Boeing employees. I hope the victim's layers rip that argument to shreds.

sgrow787 wrote:
Now that we agree, can we just put some of these board members and upper management in jail and quietly move on? Surely some deterrence, along with a little more oversight, will be the right medicine to curtail this from happening again.

I can't think of a legal avenue that would produce such a result, and as above the "smoking gun" has yet to appear. It seems the main path towards influencing better behavior is going to be the huge financial losses Boeing is taking on MAX. There also may be some impact on various people's conscious about what they did or did not do, but I suspect most will be out of the industry before they have to make similar decisions. It's also going to have an impact on how 77X goes through certification. It seems 77X has two strikes against it already, to use a baseball expression.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
TropicalSky
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Sat Jun 20, 2020 6:28 pm

What are the 2 strikes against the 777X?

quote="Revelation"]
sgrow787 wrote:
Well said. I'd go further and say, competent aircraft manufacturers go beyond the minimum to meet certification requirements. In the case of the Max, Boeing skirted the requirements for a critical system at just about every turn in the process.

It's particularly galling that we have the text messages with the Boeing employees saying they used Jedi mind tricks to get FAA to certify the plane, and now Boeing is saying in court to the victims "don't blame us, FAA certified the plane!". It's interesting, given many of the "FAA inspectors" involved in the certification are in fact Boeing employees. I hope the victim's layers rip that argument to shreds.

sgrow787 wrote:
Now that we agree, can we just put some of these board members and upper management in jail and quietly move on? Surely some deterrence, along with a little more oversight, will be the right medicine to curtail this from happening again.

I can't think of a legal avenue that would produce such a result, and as above the "smoking gun" has yet to appear. It seems the main path towards influencing better behavior is going to be the huge financial losses Boeing is taking on MAX. There also may be some impact on various people's conscious about what they did or did not do, but I suspect most will be out of the industry before they have to make similar decisions. It's also going to have an impact on how 77X goes through certification. It seems 77X has two strikes against it already, to use a baseball expression.[/quote]
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Sat Jun 20, 2020 6:39 pm

TropicalSky wrote:
What are the 2 strikes against the 777X?

IMO they are the current economic climate (airlines have no demand for any new planes never mind the ones at the large end of the scale) and the current regulatory climate (shifting ground around the role of vendor vs home regulator vs international regulators).
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
TropicalSky
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Sat Jun 20, 2020 8:51 pm

Ahhh yes! Those are both legitimate cause for concerns



Revelation wrote:
TropicalSky wrote:
What are the 2 strikes against the 777X?

IMO they are the current economic climate (airlines have no demand for any new planes never mind the ones at the large end of the scale) and the current regulatory climate (shifting ground around the role of vendor vs home regulator vs international regulators).
 
oschkosch
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Sun Jun 21, 2020 3:19 pm

Seems to be more details from a whistleblower employee at Boeing. Faa yet to see the contents though.

https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/boeing-whis ... -1.1453371



Boeing Co. and the Federal Aviation Administration flouted regulations and ignored systemic safety concerns in the original certification of the 737 Max jetliner, a company whistleblower told a U.S. Senate committee.
In a letter dated June 5, Curtis Ewbank, a flight-deck engineer who worked on the Max, called on the U.S. regulator to modernize its oversight and create an independent channel for engineers to raise safety issues. He wrote the letter before FAA Administrator Steve Dickson testified before the Senate Commerce Committee on June 17.
“The 737 Max’s original certification was accomplished with hand-waving and deception to hide the numerous ways the 1960s-era design of the 737 does not meet current regulatory standards or a modern concept of aviation safety,” Ewbank wrote. He faulted Boeing and the FAA for “allowing such reckless disregard of regulations and aviation safety.”



ST has more details though.
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... th-737-max


The following statement I did find slightly disturbing.

Michael Stumo, whose daughter Samya died in last year’s MAX crash in Ethiopia, on Thursday also received a copy of Ewbank’s letter. “This is the most comprehensive engineering analysis I’ve seen yet,” Stumo said. “It calls into question whether the MAX should ever fly again.

Ewbank notes that he left Boeing in 2015 “in protest of management actions to rationalize the poor design of the 737 MAX. I did not think I could do my duty as an engineer to protect the safety of the public in the environment created by management at Boeing.”Hetsior to my departure in 2015, my manager argued against the design changes I wanted to make by stating, ‘People have to die before Boeing will change things.'”
Being’s statement adds that “when the MAX returns to service, it will be one of the most thoroughly scrutinized aircraft in history, and we have full confidence in its safety.”
:stirthepot: :airplane: "This airplane is designed by clowns, who in turn are supervised by monkeys" :airplane: :stirthepot:
 
bennett123
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Sun Jun 21, 2020 5:10 pm

If these allegations stand up, I do not see the MAX back in service this year.

Particularly a problem for large, all B737 operators like WN and FR.
 
FTMCPIUS
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Sun Jun 21, 2020 5:23 pm

bennett123 wrote:
If these allegations stand up, I do not see the MAX back in service this year.

Particularly a problem for large, all B737 operators like WN and FR.

What is FR?
 
StTim
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Sun Jun 21, 2020 5:38 pm

FR = Ryanair
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Sun Jun 21, 2020 8:18 pm

[quote="bennett123"]If these allegations stand up, I do not see the MAX back in service this year.
/quote]
So you think these are new allegations?
 
Chemist
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Mon Jun 22, 2020 12:41 am

Relevant to Boeing management and culture...

As some may know, the Boeing Starliner test capsule flew into orbit in late 2019. It ended up with a number of issues, mostly software which was not properly tested. The mission failed its primary objective to redezvous and dock with the International Space Station, and a last-minute software fix had to be uploaded during the mission to avoid potential loss of capsule during re-entry sequence.

This further highlights Boeing's poor approach to software testing and safety.

Boeing was also competing on bids for the NASA Lunar Lander project. Boeing did not end up getting an award. Doug Loverro of NASA was terminated for what appears to be inappropriate contacts to Boeing to clue them in on aspects of the bidding process and competitors. Boeing tried to make late changes to it's proposal, perhaps based upon this insider information, in violation of the Integrity and Fair Procurement Act. Boeing is being investigated for this matter.

From the Washington Post, fair use excerpt:

Boeing tried to amend bid after guidance from NASA official, raising concerns it received inside information
The incident has sparked a NASA inspector general investigation and led to Doug Loverro’s resignation


https://www.washingtonpost.com/technolo ... bid-probe/

If this is as it looks, it further reinforces the apparent disregard for safety, and ethics, of the current Boeing Corporation.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Mon Jun 22, 2020 10:00 am

sgrow787 wrote:
Revelation wrote:
MSPNWA wrote:
But once again that "moment" assumes that commercial goals driving "unacceptable" engineering decisions and the subsequent crashes is the actual cause and effect. We can speculate all we want about what happened in development, but short of hard, directly linked evidence between the two events, which there none has been made public so far, this shouldn't be assumed. And even then it's a nebulous theory that could be theoretically applied to practically any crash. In hindsight we can always look and say, "if we had only spent more money here." And what is the difference between an "acceptable" and "unacceptable" engineering decision anyway? So you may be waiting for a message that doesn't even apply to this situation. What it sounds more like is the salve to the belief that no matter what, someone or something has to be blamed.

Yes, no doubt, a "smoking gun" needs to be produced, I've said this all along. I'm confident after reading the text message dump that it wasn't Forkner on his own who decided he needed to play Jedi mind tricks to get FAA and others to fast track MAX certification. Maybe other executives were more careful on what they committed to electronic form, maybe the investigators didn't ask the right questions or read the right content, maybe they did and they are sitting on the evidence, who knows.

When you read the message dump and its clear description of management motivations from Forkner and others, and add to it what ST's lead article on MCAS gives as the faults of Boeing's safety assessment of MCAS:

The safety analysis:
  • Understated the power of the new flight control system, which was designed to swivel the horizontal tail to push the nose of the plane down to avert a stall. When the planes later entered service, MCAS was capable of moving the tail more than four times farther than was stated in the initial safety analysis document.
  • Failed to account for how the system could reset itself each time a pilot responded, thereby missing the potential impact of the system repeatedly pushing the airplane’s nose downward.
  • Assessed a failure of the system as one level below “catastrophic.” But even that “hazardous” danger level should have precluded activation of the system based on input from a single sensor — and yet that’s how it was designed.

Ref: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... air-crash/

... it's hard to attribute all this to random incompetence rather than the "effect" of management insisting engineers take the low cost route at every juncture and abuse their positions as both Boeing employees and FAA inspectors to get that outcome.

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... ng-safety/ from Wednesday provides even more examples of the issues:

Seattle Times reports last year revealed that Boeing managers limited some certification testing performed by the company’s own engineers; that FAA safety engineers were pressured to give cursory approvals to Boeing analyses; and that changes to MCAS made late in the program’s development went largely under the FAA’s radar.

And the perverse effects:

Stumo also called for Boeing to drop a defense its lawyers are using in court, where they have argued that the company should be immune from liability for the crashes because the FAA certified the MAX.

In an interview from her home in England, Kuria said she was disgusted to learn of this legal argument during the hearing.

“I was completely stunned by the audacity of Boeing to ask for immunity,” she said. “I felt that it was a form of admission of wrongdoing. Because what do you need immunity for if you are innocent?”

When Sen. Ed Markey, D -Mass.,raised the issue with Dickson, the FAA chief agreed that “the responsibility to produce a safe product does belong with Boeing.”

In effect Boeing used Jedi mind tricks to get FAA to certify the plane, and now they're saying "don't blame us, FAA certified the plane!".

It'd be nice if we could put these hi-jinks to an end, but it seems we aren't going to be able to.

TFA suggests FAA has been less than cooperative with Congress:

He said that even after a personal plea to Dickson within the last week for answers to specific questions and access to specific internal documents, no progress was made.

“This record of delay and unresponsiveness clearly shows at best an unwillingness to cooperate with congressional oversight,” Wicker said. “Your team at the FAA has deliberately tried to keep us in the dark.

“It’s hard not to characterize our relationship during this entire process as being adversarial on the part of the FAA,” he added. “The agency stonewalling of my investigation suggests discomfort for what might ultimately be revealed.”

At one point Sen. Richard Blumenthal, D – Conn., told Dickson: “I see no way you can continue in this job if you fail to be more responsive.”

It suggests FAA has some skeletons in its closet, and that Dickson has not been an agent of change.


Well said. I'd go further and say, competent aircraft manufacturers go beyond the minimum to meet certification requirements. In the case of the Max, Boeing skirted the requirements for a critical system at just about every turn in the process.

Now that we agree, can we just put some of these board members and upper management in jail and quietly move on? Surely some deterrence, along with a little more oversight, will be the right medicine to curtail this from happening again.


In what example of a "competent aircraft manufacturer" has one spent more than necessary to go beyond minimum for certification? Pre-CAD and CFD designs don't count as they couldn't design so close to requirements without those tools.
 
Ertro
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Mon Jun 22, 2020 11:00 am

planecane wrote:
sgrow787 wrote:
Well said. I'd go further and say, competent aircraft manufacturers go beyond the minimum to meet certification requirements. In the case of the Max, Boeing skirted the requirements for a critical system at just about every turn in the process.

In what example of a "competent aircraft manufacturer" has one spent more than necessary to go beyond minimum for certification? Pre-CAD and CFD designs don't count as they couldn't design so close to requirements without those tools.


There are some aspects of design where going beyond the minimum costs additional money either in design or manufacturing phase.
However there are multiple places where it is actually more expensive to be borderline minimum acceptable and it is cheaper to be far away on the acceptable side.

For example intuitive and safe man-machine interface design is the one that can be designed fast and does not cost any additional money in manufacturing phase. The only thing that is needed for that is competence in the early design phase so that right decisions are made in the start which allows every further detail to be easy to design to be good. Going borderline is the expensive route.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Mon Jun 22, 2020 12:42 pm

Ertro wrote:
planecane wrote:
sgrow787 wrote:
Well said. I'd go further and say, competent aircraft manufacturers go beyond the minimum to meet certification requirements. In the case of the Max, Boeing skirted the requirements for a critical system at just about every turn in the process.

In what example of a "competent aircraft manufacturer" has one spent more than necessary to go beyond minimum for certification? Pre-CAD and CFD designs don't count as they couldn't design so close to requirements without those tools.


There are some aspects of design where going beyond the minimum costs additional money either in design or manufacturing phase.
However there are multiple places where it is actually more expensive to be borderline minimum acceptable and it is cheaper to be far away on the acceptable side.

For example intuitive and safe man-machine interface design is the one that can be designed fast and does not cost any additional money in manufacturing phase. The only thing that is needed for that is competence in the early design phase so that right decisions are made in the start which allows every further detail to be easy to design to be good. Going borderline is the expensive route.

I understand that. The implication of the post I replied to was that a "competent manufacturer" would have spent extra money to make MCAS either unnecessary or work better even if the cheaper option satisfied the certification requirements.

If Boeing thought they would have saved money by doing it better then they would certainly have done it better
 
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keesje
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Mon Jun 22, 2020 12:59 pm

Curtis Ewbank confirms what we know & try to generalize / go away.

- Boeing / Congress overpowering the FAA (jobs, competition, stock value in reality easily beat safety as priority) check 2010-1018 FAA reauthorizations.
- Cockpit emergency warning systems not meeting requirements (known since e.g. TK1951)
- Rebirth / acceptance of aggressive grandfathering of requirements and design, after the 2010 NEO whammy
- If certifying the MAX as an amended version of the 737NG pushed boundaries, the 777X ain't done yet.
"Never mistake motion for action." Ernest Hemingway
 
Opus99
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Mon Jun 22, 2020 1:16 pm

keesje wrote:
Curtis Ewbank confirms what we know & try to generalize / go away.

- Boeing / Congress overpowering the FAA (jobs, competition, stock value in reality easily beat safety as priority) check 2010-1018 FAA reauthorizations.
- Cockpit emergency warning systems not meeting requirements (known since e.g. TK1951)
- Rebirth / acceptance of aggressive grandfathering of requirements and design, after the 2010 NEO whammy
- If certifying the MAX as an amended version of the 737NG pushed boundaries, the 777X ain't done yet.

He’s main gripe with amended version certification is the omission of human factor consideration. Something that is being dealt with now as far as we understand it. As for the 777X I expect the certification to be as a new type in everything but name. I feel Calhoun made that mistake for a reason. That’s why there’s a TAB for that program. The thought that the FAA will make the same mistake twice? Even for Boeing. Even if it’s a money thing. The 737Max has sucked them dry for trying to avoid the proper way of doing things. That will just be a disaster
 
oschkosch
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Mon Jun 22, 2020 9:19 pm

QR has cancelled their max order! But being AAB, take it with a grain of salt!


https://simpleflying.com/qatar-airways- ... cellation/

Qatar Airways has told Boeing that it won’t be taking up its order for 30 Boeing 737 MAX aircraft, according to the airline’s CEO, Akbar al-Baker. He mentioned that the airline now does not need the type, following the withdrawal of its investment in the aircraft’s target airline.

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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Mon Jun 22, 2020 10:02 pm

oschkosch wrote:
QR has cancelled their max order! But being AAB, take it with a grain of salt!


https://simpleflying.com/qatar-airways- ... cellation/

Qatar Airways has told Boeing that it won’t be taking up its order for 30 Boeing 737 MAX aircraft, according to the airline’s CEO, Akbar al-Baker. He mentioned that the airline now does not need the type, following the withdrawal of its investment in the aircraft’s target airline.

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Well, BA still is still committed for 200. https://boeing.mediaroom.com/2019-06-18 ... -Airplanes

All jokes aside, the airlines hate to see their competitive options being limitted. They want alternatives, fall back options, price competition.

If there is only 1 realistic supplier, the only thing you can do during price negotiations, is suggest you might not buy anything.
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Scotron12
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 25, 2020 4:23 am

EASA and Transport Canada requiring Boeing to upgrade their flight control systems on the 737MAX. FAA has ordered Boeing to comply to satisfy their concerns.

Upgrades must be ASAP after RTS.

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... -controls/
 
FluidFlow
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 25, 2020 6:03 am

Scotron12 wrote:
EASA and Transport Canada requiring Boeing to upgrade their flight control systems on the 737MAX. FAA has ordered Boeing to comply to satisfy their concerns.

Upgrades must be ASAP after RTS.

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... -controls/


The upgrades have to be inplemented first on the MAX-10 and then rolled over. The MAX-10 can only be certified with the new flight controls.

So ASAP depends on how quick Boeing wants the MAX-10 in the air. Or how fast they can implemenent a non-botched version...
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 25, 2020 7:20 am

According to the Seattle Times article EASA wants a 3rd AOA sensor (physical or virtual), and some warning system. They are concerned that a single bad sensor can cause numerous warnings.

Canada wants updates to flight manual to pull circuit breakers for stick shaker when system is clearly wrong, rather than leaving it running for the rest of the flight. FAA doesn’t want pilots pulling circuit breakers in flight and wants a different solution.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 25, 2020 12:26 pm

The stick shaker requirement is the only one that is new to me, I may have missed some post, but the need for changes other than the fix to MCAS has been documented previously and has created a host of other issues for Boeing to repair, the dual use of the computers has been the largest, with "bits" still to be resolved.
The desire for a 3rd sensor was previously reported, the "synthetic sensor" as on the 787 seems to be the preferred option, which also has "issues".

As Boeing is requesting suppliers to slow down, it may be financially beneficial to have the various state governments continue their employee assistance programs while Boeing takes the lull in demand to implement the fixes BEFORE RTS, that way they do not have to struggle and fight to get foreign inspectors to the USA while the Europeans and various USA states are implementing quarantines. The Federal Government trillion dollar program is not specifically targeted at Boeing, so funds are available to assist workers impacted by the slow down and possible shut down of the line for a second time. 400+ a/c to be modified is no small thing, continuing to produce a/c to be added to the pile does not seem economic.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 25, 2020 1:42 pm

The NG had an almost enviable safety record. Unfortunately it went into Boeing's head(quarters) as prideful. With politics in their favor they took advantage of everyone in sight, no one was a stakeholder except overpaid executives and Wall Street. Screwed everyone. This time stockholders have been removed from that group. Only overpaid executives are stakeholders. Now all of the political winds are against Boeing, unfairly so in my estimation. But who, in their right mind, would give any benefit of doubt to Boeing. This is almost classical Greek Tragedy. With MCAS fixed I have read nothing which implies the admittedly out of date kludge of flight control on the NG or MAX would lead to accidents in the real world. This is somewhat admitted in this Seattle Times article, the plane can safely fly without all things being fixed immediately. And Canada is right, you should be able to turn off the GD stick shaker.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 25, 2020 1:45 pm

FluidFlow wrote:
Scotron12 wrote:
EASA and Transport Canada requiring Boeing to upgrade their flight control systems on the 737MAX. FAA has ordered Boeing to comply to satisfy their concerns.

Upgrades must be ASAP after RTS.

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... -controls/

The upgrades have to be inplemented first on the MAX-10 and then rolled over. The MAX-10 can only be certified with the new flight controls.

So ASAP depends on how quick Boeing wants the MAX-10 in the air. Or how fast they can implemenent a non-botched version...

I think TFA describes things a bit differently:

Two sources familiar with the discussions said regulators want the permanent design changes done on a relatively tight timetable. “We are looking for this to be implemented at the latest by the time of the certification of the 737 MAX 10,” said one. The second source verified this as the target.

I think it will be hard to officially link the two.

How can you officially say -8 can fly without the improvements yet -10 cannot?

Yet unofficially I think such linkage will exist, and I think it is wise for EASA et al to make such a linkage while they have the leverage to do so.

TFA says:

To add a synthetic system to the MAX now would be costly. All its interactions with existing systems would have to be tested and certified, and Boeing will have to convince regulators the information it produces is as reliable or better than a physical sensor.

According to the person familiar with the FAA’s deliberations — who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the ongoing discussions between the regulators — EASA’s demand for the equivalent of a three-sensor system arises from a fundamentally different design philosophy between Airbus and Boeing.
...
“For Airbus and EASA, three Angle of Attack sensors is just what you do,” said the person. “For Boeing and the FAA, it’s not necessary, because in addition to the two Angle of Attack sensors, you have that physical connection with the aircraft.”

Still, the FAA has told Boeing it must address EASA’s concern.

To me this seems like they are trying to get 737 to become a FBW one bug fix at a time, which is never a good approach.

It also puts into question any other two-sensor aircraft in revenue service.

And this should reawaken the poster who is sensitive to FAA ceding authority to EASA, TC, et al, for some pretty obvious reasons.

Yet this is all real politik, and if I were Boeing I would get out the drill for the hole for the 3rd AoA sensor and get on with it.

Every other option such as dicking around with synthetic airspeed to the point the regulators will accept it seems worse.

If the unofficial deadline is MAX-10 EIS, Boeing wants that end 2021 so you need a solution pretty much immediately.

Given how long it takes to get things done in aerospace, this very well could delay MAX-10 EIS.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 25, 2020 2:12 pm

frmrCapCadet wrote:
The NG had an almost enviable safety record. Unfortunately it went into Boeing's head(quarters) as prideful. With politics in their favor they took advantage of everyone in sight, no one was a stakeholder except overpaid executives and Wall Street. Screwed everyone. This time stockholders have been removed from that group. Only overpaid executives are stakeholders. Now all of the political winds are against Boeing, unfairly so in my estimation. But who, in their right mind, would give any benefit of doubt to Boeing. This is almost classical Greek Tragedy. With MCAS fixed I have read nothing which implies the admittedly out of date kludge of flight control on the NG or MAX would lead to accidents in the real world. This is somewhat admitted in this Seattle Times article, the plane can safely fly without all things being fixed immediately. And Canada is right, you should be able to turn off the GD stick shaker.

NG was the golden standard in 2000, no question about that. However, there were improvements since then - 787, 380 and 350 still have crispy clean fatality record, 777 is damn close to that.
DOes it make sense to drag naroowbodies to the same level of safety? Is it cost effective? And given a much larger cohort of pilots?
By the time last MAX retires, 737 line can easily celebrate 100 years...
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 25, 2020 2:53 pm

frmrCapCadet wrote:
The NG had an almost enviable safety record. Unfortunately it went into Boeing's head(quarters) as prideful. With politics in their favor they took advantage of everyone in sight, no one was a stakeholder except overpaid executives and Wall Street. Screwed everyone. This time stockholders have been removed from that group. Only overpaid executives are stakeholders. Now all of the political winds are against Boeing, unfairly so in my estimation. But who, in their right mind, would give any benefit of doubt to Boeing. This is almost classical Greek Tragedy. With MCAS fixed I have read nothing which implies the admittedly out of date kludge of flight control on the NG or MAX would lead to accidents in the real world. This is somewhat admitted in this Seattle Times article, the plane can safely fly without all things being fixed immediately. And Canada is right, you should be able to turn off the GD stick shaker.

I think the thing to do is have the regulations be the measuring stick. TFA says the changes requested by EASA and TC go beyond FAA regulations yet FAA is insisting they be followed. Fine, so update the regulations to reflect what is actually needed.

kalvado wrote:
NG was the golden standard in 2000, no question about that. However, there were improvements since then - 787, 380 and 350 still have crispy clean fatality record, 777 is damn close to that.
DOes it make sense to drag naroowbodies to the same level of safety? Is it cost effective? And given a much larger cohort of pilots?
By the time last MAX retires, 737 line can easily celebrate 100 years...

I think that is an interesting historical artifact. I recall statements that originally DC9, 737, etc were held to lower standards with regard to redundancy etc since the number of people on them and the distance they flew reduced the risk of major calamity. Well, now we have cross country 737 flights with 200+ pax on them yet the regulations didn't force Boeing to do major improvements in the flight control architecture from the original 737 till MAX.

Keep in mind most inter-continental travel started with narrow bodies (707, DC8, etc) so it's really not a wide vs narrow thing, it's more a pax + range thing.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 25, 2020 2:57 pm

kalvado wrote:
frmrCapCadet wrote:
The NG had an almost enviable safety record. Unfortunately it went into Boeing's head(quarters) as prideful. With politics in their favor they took advantage of everyone in sight, no one was a stakeholder except overpaid executives and Wall Street. Screwed everyone. This time stockholders have been removed from that group. Only overpaid executives are stakeholders. Now all of the political winds are against Boeing, unfairly so in my estimation. But who, in their right mind, would give any benefit of doubt to Boeing. This is almost classical Greek Tragedy. With MCAS fixed I have read nothing which implies the admittedly out of date kludge of flight control on the NG or MAX would lead to accidents in the real world. This is somewhat admitted in this Seattle Times article, the plane can safely fly without all things being fixed immediately. And Canada is right, you should be able to turn off the GD stick shaker.

NG was the golden standard in 2000, no question about that. However, there were improvements since then - 787, 380 and 350 still have crispy clean fatality record, 777 is damn close to that.


And the A340 from since 1991.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 25, 2020 3:22 pm

Revelation wrote:
I think that is an interesting historical artifact. I recall statements that originally DC9, 737, etc were held to lower standards with regard to redundancy etc since the number of people on them and the distance they flew reduced the risk of major calamity. Well, now we have cross country 737 flights with 200+ pax on them yet the regulations didn't force Boeing to do major improvements in the flight control architecture from the original 737 till MAX.

Keep in mind most inter-continental travel started with narrow bodies (707, DC8, etc) so it's really not a wide vs narrow thing, it's more a pax + range thing.

Well, 9 people still can travel with 1 pilot, and 19 don't need TSA... GOod point about upscale.
I was more thinking in terms of A320 FBW propagating upward to 380, while 737 still holds. However latest A&B clean sheets were widebodies. Would be interesting to see service record of later B&E designs in this context.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 25, 2020 4:12 pm

I agree with Revelation that adding a third physical AoA sensor seems the most prudent course of action for the MAX. As I understand it, the standard is a single AoA sensor, but dual AoA sensors are an option so the MAX's system is designed to handle multiple physical AoA sensor inputs. Modifying it to handle a third physical AoA system should not be that much more complicated - at least compared to all the changes necessary to integrate a synthetic one, which I imagine requires a fair bit more processing power and pulls data from more sources.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 25, 2020 4:52 pm

I wouldn't necessarily discard synthetic airspeed as a solution. For one, it's all software, assuming that it's not the tipping point for the need of more computers. You wouldn't give it authority to do anything, except to suggest arbitration between the two physical AoA sensors. As in: the two sensors have a disagreement of more than x degrees, you get on a display two bars from the sensors and a line with the synthetic value, and then let the pilot decide which physical sensor to believe and what to do next.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 25, 2020 5:09 pm

Stitch wrote:
I agree with Revelation that adding a third physical AoA sensor seems the most prudent course of action for the MAX. As I understand it, the standard is a single AoA sensor, but dual AoA sensors are an option so the MAX's system is designed to handle multiple physical AoA sensor inputs. Modifying it to handle a third physical AoA system should not be that much more complicated - at least compared to all the changes necessary to integrate a synthetic one, which I imagine requires a fair bit more processing power and pulls data from more sources.



Adding a 3rd sensor will require computer software changes.... as we have learned from the bit flip software changes that could take a year or more.

I suspect its not so easy as you suggest. If it were actually easy Boeing likely would have done it already.

A key issue is that this is beyond the scope of the FAA requirements... It's great to ask Boeing if they could reasonably do it. But, the FAA is treading on thin grounds legally by requiring it. How does anyone build anything if they don't know the standards that will have to meet.

By my reading of the current treaties related to international approvals and work groups as it relates to aircraft certification. I think that in this case the other major parties would have to accept a 2 sensor solution if the FAA certifies it. Otherwise, those countries are telling the world that agreed upon treaties and compromises are worthless. Which affect far far more than aviation.

Have a great day,
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 25, 2020 5:20 pm

1 - Thinking as a person with a background in Project Management, it seems pretty unfair to decide over a year after the grounding that "here are some new design requirements you must meet".
2 - On the other hand, from a karma perspective, Boeing deserves everything that this has done to them.

I'm still having trouble aligning my two thoughts above. :shock:
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 25, 2020 5:38 pm

2175301 wrote:
Adding a 3rd sensor will require computer software changes.... as we have learned from the bit flip software changes that could take a year or more.

I suspect its not so easy as you suggest. If it were actually easy Boeing likely would have done it already.


I am not implying it would be easy, just perhaps not as complicated as adding a synthetic sensor which according to The Seattle Times article would also require testing and certification of all the existing systems - and then convince regulators that information is as good as the third physical sensor.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 25, 2020 5:53 pm

IADFCO wrote:
I wouldn't necessarily discard synthetic airspeed as a solution. For one, it's all software, assuming that it's not the tipping point for the need of more computers. You wouldn't give it authority to do anything, except to suggest arbitration between the two physical AoA sensors. As in: the two sensors have a disagreement of more than x degrees, you get on a display two bars from the sensors and a line with the synthetic value, and then let the pilot decide which physical sensor to believe and what to do next.

I think we're a bit prejudiced by knowing it works on 787. The big difference is that on 787 it was integrated into the product early enough that the whole system was tested with it in place. With 737 it's an add-on so it'd need a lot of re-testing with it active, especially if it were to run on the main FCC computer as opposed to a new add-on computer dedicated to the task. Of course a new computer would bring its own challenges so there is no easy way out.

In this regard our "whistleblower" was right: it would have been easier to do if it had been done as a main part of MAX development, yet it seems the MAX chief engineer was focused on wringing the last penny out of the dollar.

Chemist wrote:
1 - Thinking as a person with a background in Project Management, it seems pretty unfair to decide over a year after the grounding that "here are some new design requirements you must meet".
2 - On the other hand, from a karma perspective, Boeing deserves everything that this has done to them.

I'm still having trouble aligning my two thoughts above. :shock:

EASA's Patrik Ky sent the letter last September advising Boeing/FAA: "Still no appropriate response to Angle of Attack integrity issues", it's been a sticking point for months now. The new wrinkle is FAA is just accepting the requirement, whether it is a part of the FARs or not.

Ref: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/ ... iginal.pdf

The karma thing rings true. Boeing had so many opportunities to look into the mirror and never really seems to have done so. The first crash gave them enough concern to start working on fixing the software, but not enough to voluntarily ground the plane before the situation became an even bigger catastrophe. After the 2nd crash they were working the levers to try to avoid a grounding. It took China of all people to say stop that nonsense. I think there are still more shoes to drop. It seems Boeing has chosen the "death of a thousand cuts" over the "rip off the scab" approach to crisis management.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 25, 2020 6:12 pm

kalvado wrote:
Well, 9 people still can travel with 1 pilot, and 19 don't need TSA... GOod point about upscale.
I was more thinking in terms of A320 FBW propagating upward to 380, while 737 still holds. However latest A&B clean sheets were widebodies. Would be interesting to see service record of later B&E designs in this context.

Well, from Airbus there's only the NEO with 0 fatalities in 4 years.
Bombardier developed the (FBW) CSeries with also 0 fatalities in 4 years.
Embraer developed the (simplified FBW) E-Jets with 1 fatal accident in 16 years (excluding malicious acts).

Both the Embraer and Bombardier jets feature much larger range for their size compared to earlier aircraft. I don't think that there's purely an argument between FBW / non-FBW, though. The clean sheet aircraft simply don't have to take all the grandfathered aspects into account and can create a "clean" solution. And they can afford some delay better than a derivative that was late to the party already; in particular the CSeries' FBW was plagued with problems initially.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 25, 2020 7:05 pm

mxaxai wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Well, 9 people still can travel with 1 pilot, and 19 don't need TSA... GOod point about upscale.
I was more thinking in terms of A320 FBW propagating upward to 380, while 737 still holds. However latest A&B clean sheets were widebodies. Would be interesting to see service record of later B&E designs in this context.

Well, from Airbus there's only the NEO with 0 fatalities in 4 years.
Bombardier developed the (FBW) CSeries with also 0 fatalities in 4 years.
Embraer developed the (simplified FBW) E-Jets with 1 fatal accident in 16 years (excluding malicious acts).

Both the Embraer and Bombardier jets feature much larger range for their size compared to earlier aircraft. I don't think that there's purely an argument between FBW / non-FBW, though. The clean sheet aircraft simply don't have to take all the grandfathered aspects into account and can create a "clean" solution. And they can afford some delay better than a derivative that was late to the party already; in particular the CSeries' FBW was plagued with problems initially.

I am not thinking about it strictly as FBW, more in terms of how old the system is and how approaches changed between now and then. It happened that baseline went from manual to FBW at some point, but that may or may not be the key. It is more about integrity of solution, acceptable compromises, assumptions. I would say that it is including "seat of the pants" as effectively third sensor into 737 logic to arbitrate between disagreeing readings is a telling part of the older approach. It is difficult to formalize that for FBW computer, so there is some relation - but that is only one of the aspects of having redundancy. Key message is - it is greater overall system complexity among other things that allows for more robustness at some edge situations. Engineering tools did evolve to allow that.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 25, 2020 8:49 pm

Article from Sept 2019 highlighting EASA's concern about AoA:

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... f=l2iXOaTx

It is also strong evidence that EASA was willing to consider a post-EIS solution back then.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Fri Jun 26, 2020 5:34 pm

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... f=ez43dC45 says:

Boeing Co. and federal regulators are preparing to hold a critical set of test flights on the 737 Max early next week, which would mark a milestone in its return to service after being grounded for more than 15 months.

Aviation industry officials briefed on the plans, which still haven’t been finalized, indicate that the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration has reviewed Boeing’s extensive safety analysis of fixes it has made and is comfortable moving to the next step: putting the plane through its paces with test pilots.
...
Conducting test flights is one of the final steps in the process of certifying a jetliner and aviation regulators wouldn’t have scheduled it if their review of Boeing’s proposed fixes had revealed significant additional issues.

Kinda feels like a date that won't move this time, since we seem to have approval that FAA and EASA are in alignment with the path to RTS. Of course every other supposed date has slipped so odds should favor yet another postponement.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Fri Jun 26, 2020 5:38 pm

Revelation wrote:
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-26/key-faa-test-flight-of-boeing-s-737-max-jet-expected-next-week?sref=ez43dC45 says:

Boeing Co. and federal regulators are preparing to hold a critical set of test flights on the 737 Max early next week, which would mark a milestone in its return to service after being grounded for more than 15 months.

Aviation industry officials briefed on the plans, which still haven’t been finalized, indicate that the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration has reviewed Boeing’s extensive safety analysis of fixes it has made and is comfortable moving to the next step: putting the plane through its paces with test pilots.
...
Conducting test flights is one of the final steps in the process of certifying a jetliner and aviation regulators wouldn’t have scheduled it if their review of Boeing’s proposed fixes had revealed significant additional issues.

Kinda feels like a date that won't move this time, since we seem to have approval that FAA and EASA are in alignment with the path to RTS. Of course every other supposed date has slipped so odds should favor yet another postponement.

Sources say a confirmed date could come this afternoon.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Fri Jun 26, 2020 9:43 pm

Spirit will deliver just 72 fuselage shipments in 2020, instead of 104 announced earlier.

Spirit AeroSystems has again slashed its expected output of Boeing 737 fuselages and other components to just 72 shipments in 2020, while warning it could breach financial agreements before year-end.

The 72 shipments expected for 2020 include 35 fuselages already delivered to Boeing and 37 that Spirit will manufacture through December, the company said on 22 June.


So much for "restarting" production.

Also in January, Spirit said it had reached an agreement with Boeing to deliver components for 216 737s in 2020. In May, Spirit reduced that figure to 125 fuselages, then on 10 June further cut the number to no more than 104 fuselages.


More job cuts are expected.

Spirit cuts 737 production again, warns of financial fallout
Good moaning!
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Fri Jun 26, 2020 11:03 pm

Opus99 wrote:
Revelation wrote:
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-26/key-faa-test-flight-of-boeing-s-737-max-jet-expected-next-week?sref=ez43dC45 says:

Boeing Co. and federal regulators are preparing to hold a critical set of test flights on the 737 Max early next week, which would mark a milestone in its return to service after being grounded for more than 15 months.

Aviation industry officials briefed on the plans, which still haven’t been finalized, indicate that the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration has reviewed Boeing’s extensive safety analysis of fixes it has made and is comfortable moving to the next step: putting the plane through its paces with test pilots.
...
Conducting test flights is one of the final steps in the process of certifying a jetliner and aviation regulators wouldn’t have scheduled it if their review of Boeing’s proposed fixes had revealed significant additional issues.

Kinda feels like a date that won't move this time, since we seem to have approval that FAA and EASA are in alignment with the path to RTS. Of course every other supposed date has slipped so odds should favor yet another postponement.

Sources say a confirmed date could come this afternoon.


Someone mentioned in the AA fleet thread that AA was moving some of their Max's from ROW to TUL,
indicating they're gathering all their Max's in preparations for the required RTS mods
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Sat Jun 27, 2020 7:47 am

Stitch wrote:
I agree with Revelation that adding a third physical AoA sensor seems the most prudent course of action for the MAX. As I understand it, the standard is a single AoA sensor, but dual AoA sensors are an option so the MAX's system is designed to handle multiple physical AoA sensor inputs. Modifying it to handle a third physical AoA system should not be that much more complicated - at least compared to all the changes necessary to integrate a synthetic one, which I imagine requires a fair bit more processing power and pulls data from more sources.


I'm thinking synthetic airspeed can be computed with the ProFusion glass cockpit computers, then the value sent to the FCCs. Does anyone know how synthetic airspeed is computed? And once it's computed, it's compared to the onside Computed Airspeed (CAS), and if that doesn't checkout, then compare to the offside CAS. Whichever side the compare didn't checkout, that side AOA was deactivated from MCAS consideration, and deactivated from SMYD.

IIRC, CAS is the airspeed corrected by angle of attack. I could be wrong.
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.
 
IADFCO
Posts: 190
Joined: Sun May 22, 2016 4:20 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Sat Jun 27, 2020 7:42 pm

sgrow787 wrote:
Stitch wrote:
I agree with Revelation that adding a third physical AoA sensor seems the most prudent course of action for the MAX. As I understand it, the standard is a single AoA sensor, but dual AoA sensors are an option so the MAX's system is designed to handle multiple physical AoA sensor inputs. Modifying it to handle a third physical AoA system should not be that much more complicated - at least compared to all the changes necessary to integrate a synthetic one, which I imagine requires a fair bit more processing power and pulls data from more sources.


I'm thinking synthetic airspeed can be computed with the ProFusion glass cockpit computers, then the value sent to the FCCs. Does anyone know how synthetic airspeed is computed? And once it's computed, it's compared to the onside Computed Airspeed (CAS), and if that doesn't checkout, then compare to the offside CAS. Whichever side the compare didn't checkout, that side AOA was deactivated from MCAS consideration, and deactivated from SMYD.

IIRC, CAS is the airspeed corrected by angle of attack. I could be wrong.


I don't know the details of how synthetic airspeed/angle of attack is calculated in the 787, it may be proprietary and therefore not in the public domain. However, I would expect it to be some form of Kalman Filter (KF). A KF essentially reconstructs a mathematical model of the aircraft, computes its response in real time (e.g., speed, pitch, roll, etc.), and continuously corrects it based on the difference between what this computer model predicts, and what the aircraft is really doing (as measured by multiple sensors).

An intriguing technical tidbit is that it is much easier to design a KF if the system is linear (in our case, think well below stall) or at least linearizable (near stall) vs. nonlinear (in stalled conditions). Almost a year and a half after grounding we still don't know what is going on aerodynamically on the MAX, especially the interaction between nacelle, pylon, and wing, and how it affects stall entry and recovery. Designing a KF for a linear system (e.g., to compute a synthetic airspeed and angle of attack) is something undergraduates learn in introductory control systems and introductory flight dynamics. As nonlinearities increase, a proper design gets harder and harder.
 
sgrow787
Posts: 450
Joined: Fri May 16, 2014 8:12 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Sat Jun 27, 2020 9:39 pm

IADFCO wrote:
sgrow787 wrote:
Stitch wrote:
I agree with Revelation that adding a third physical AoA sensor seems the most prudent course of action for the MAX. As I understand it, the standard is a single AoA sensor, but dual AoA sensors are an option so the MAX's system is designed to handle multiple physical AoA sensor inputs. Modifying it to handle a third physical AoA system should not be that much more complicated - at least compared to all the changes necessary to integrate a synthetic one, which I imagine requires a fair bit more processing power and pulls data from more sources.


I'm thinking synthetic airspeed can be computed with the ProFusion glass cockpit computers, then the value sent to the FCCs. Does anyone know how synthetic airspeed is computed? And once it's computed, it's compared to the onside Computed Airspeed (CAS), and if that doesn't checkout, then compare to the offside CAS. Whichever side the compare didn't checkout, that side AOA was deactivated from MCAS consideration, and deactivated from SMYD.

IIRC, CAS is the airspeed corrected by angle of attack. I could be wrong.


I don't know the details of how synthetic airspeed/angle of attack is calculated in the 787, it may be proprietary and therefore not in the public domain. However, I would expect it to be some form of Kalman Filter (KF). A KF essentially reconstructs a mathematical model of the aircraft, computes its response in real time (e.g., speed, pitch, roll, etc.), and continuously corrects it based on the difference between what this computer model predicts, and what the aircraft is really doing (as measured by multiple sensors).

An intriguing technical tidbit is that it is much easier to design a KF if the system is linear (in our case, think well below stall) or at least linearizable (near stall) vs. nonlinear (in stalled conditions). Almost a year and a half after grounding we still don't know what is going on aerodynamically on the MAX, especially the interaction between nacelle, pylon, and wing, and how it affects stall entry and recovery. Designing a KF for a linear system (e.g., to compute a synthetic airspeed and angle of attack) is something undergraduates learn in introductory control systems and introductory flight dynamics. As nonlinearities increase, a proper design gets harder and harder.


And we know at least one person who knows this information - Curtis Ewbank, the Boeing engineer whose synthetic airspeed proposal was vetoed in 2014:

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/02/busi ... ashes.html

I'm curious why a new jet like the 787 is using synthetic airspeed. Don't they have three AOAs? (I worked on the electric brake system only)
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.
 
beechnut
Posts: 927
Joined: Wed Apr 21, 2004 12:27 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Sat Jun 27, 2020 10:00 pm

sgrow787 wrote:

IIRC, CAS is the airspeed corrected by angle of attack. I could be wrong.


The acronym "CAS" would be "calibrated airspeed". Wikipedia:

Calibrated airspeed (CAS) is indicated airspeed corrected for instrument and position error.

When flying at sea level under International Standard Atmosphere conditions (15 °C, 1013 hPa, 0% humidity) calibrated airspeed is the same as equivalent airspeed (EAS) and true airspeed (TAS). If there is no wind it is also the same as ground speed (GS). Under any other conditions, CAS may differ from the aircraft's TAS and GS.

Calibrated airspeed in knots is usually abbreviated as KCAS, while indicated airspeed is abbreviated as KIAS.

In some applications, notably British usage, the expression rectified airspeed is used instead of calibrated airspeed.[1]


Beech
 
kalvado
Posts: 2863
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Sat Jun 27, 2020 10:06 pm

sgrow787 wrote:

I'm curious why a new jet like the 787 is using synthetic airspeed. Don't they have three AOAs?

Diversifying information sources? Common mode failures are a real thing.
 
sgrow787
Posts: 450
Joined: Fri May 16, 2014 8:12 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Sat Jun 27, 2020 10:13 pm

beechnut wrote:
sgrow787 wrote:

IIRC, CAS is the airspeed corrected by angle of attack. I could be wrong.


The acronym "CAS" would be "calibrated airspeed". Wikipedia:

Calibrated airspeed (CAS) is indicated airspeed corrected for instrument and position error.

When flying at sea level under International Standard Atmosphere conditions (15 °C, 1013 hPa, 0% humidity) calibrated airspeed is the same as equivalent airspeed (EAS) and true airspeed (TAS). If there is no wind it is also the same as ground speed (GS). Under any other conditions, CAS may differ from the aircraft's TAS and GS.

Calibrated airspeed in knots is usually abbreviated as KCAS, while indicated airspeed is abbreviated as KIAS.

In some applications, notably British usage, the expression rectified airspeed is used instead of calibrated airspeed.[1]


Beech


Ok, thanks for that. From http://www.skybrary.aero:

https://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Air ... 20altitude.

Remembering the relationship between the various speeds and understanding the conversion from one to another can be facilitated by use of the acronym "ICE T" in which the letters represent Indicated, Calibrated, Equivalent and True. The relationships between the speeds are as follows:

Indicated Airspeed is the speed shown on the airspeed indicator.
Calibrated Airspeed is indicated airspeed corrected for position installation error.
Equivalent Airspeed is calibrated airspeed corrected for compressibility.
True Airspeed is equivalent airspeed corrected for temperature and pressure altitude.


So 'I' feeds into 'C' feeds into 'E' feeds into 'T':
I-->C-->E-->T

No mention of AOA, so it's safe to assume that that correction happens at or near the airspeed sensor (eg Air Data Computer).

One mention of "Computed Airspeed" from DutchOps:
http://www.dutchops.com/Plane_Tech/Inst ... cator.html

The computer compensates also for position errors which is called the Computed airspeed. The Computed airspeed is used the calculate the CAS.

So if 'CO' represents Computed Airspeed, we have:

I-->CO-->C-->E-->T
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.

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