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Stitch
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Tue Jun 16, 2020 3:49 pm

889091 wrote:
I am just trying to get an idea of how long we have to wait post RTS, where MCAS is triggered in real-life, to validate that the fixes really work.


I would expect they will force it to trigger during the recertification flight tests to validate their models conform to expected behavior.


Revelation wrote:
Also suggests to me the 3rd AOA input probably isn't needed.


If it can be done, IMO it should be done, but requiring at least two to be present is better than the previous situation where only one was considered sufficient.


Revelation wrote:
One thing we did learn from MCAS 1.0 was that adding more features to old tech can lead to unintended consequences, poorly understood failure modes, etc. It might be better to focus on making sure the pilots understand what the current tech can/cannot do rather than to try to get to full envelope protection one bug fix at a time.


What we also learned is don't keep the pilots in the dark about the systems installed on their planes - especially ones that operate or influence critical flight controls.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Tue Jun 16, 2020 3:51 pm

Revelation wrote:
Let's not personalize this. If this is about me, I'd have flown in a MAX after the first fixes around a year ago, before the bit flip changes, and with a bunch of iPad training to explain MCAS and its updated fix.

I'm just saying it's troubling that the regulators seem to be hedging their bets by saying a change is needed (when it probably is not) yet we'll fly without it (opening up Pandora's box and leading to a 2nd grounding if there is an accident/incident before it is implemented).

Its in no way different from tank inerting requirement - which was implemented over long period and totally waived for some older frames, or grandfathering safety requirements (10 g floors come to mind). Those are risks, but those are small enough to actually take them.
What would you suggest - keeping MAX grounded until there is a proper fix, maybe for another 3-4 years?
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Tue Jun 16, 2020 4:07 pm

Re-reading the Air Current article ( https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safe ... ts-return/ ) gives one the sense that not much closure has been reached over the last few months.

The software review is said to have been completed yet it seems to have kicked off some additional clean up tasks since the article suggests development is not quite complete.

The false alarm with the horizontal stab issue apparently needed a software respin.

Once the software is signed, sealed and delivered another set of sim flights will be needed before the magic certification flight.

The certification flight may happen this month, but not a certainty.

Boeing has issued a draft of the training requirements but apparently it can't be approved till after the certification flight happens and the JOEB meets.

Lord knows if JOEB is close to consensus or not.

EASA is requiring completion of ISSA before any (EASA-specific?) certification flight, but this has never been done for any 737 model ever.

Industry sources are suggesting ISSA is fundamentally incompatible with the MAX's "two alternating sensors for air data on a mechanically-driven flight control system" approach.

The whole AOA integrity issue surfaced last September, it seems the approach will be to eventually add a synthetic or mechanical third AOA source, as above this seems dubious to me.

Apparently the synthetic source has some challenging failure modes that will take time to resolve and will add more training requirements.

Back in January or so we had a milestone diagram, seems at best all we can say is the software audit was completed yet even now there is no claim the final software is ready.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Tue Jun 16, 2020 4:14 pm

If you consider the sensors, there is imho no way (except through faulty calibration) that a sensor could show the correct airspeed but wrong AoA on a 737. So if you want to isolate the faulty one, comparing the airspeed to a synthetic baseline is enough.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Tue Jun 16, 2020 4:22 pm

kalvado wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Let's not personalize this. If this is about me, I'd have flown in a MAX after the first fixes around a year ago, before the bit flip changes, and with a bunch of iPad training to explain MCAS and its updated fix.

I'm just saying it's troubling that the regulators seem to be hedging their bets by saying a change is needed (when it probably is not) yet we'll fly without it (opening up Pandora's box and leading to a 2nd grounding if there is an accident/incident before it is implemented).

Its in no way different from tank inerting requirement - which was implemented over long period and totally waived for some older frames, or grandfathering safety requirements (10 g floors come to mind). Those are risks, but those are small enough to actually take them.
What would you suggest - keeping MAX grounded until there is a proper fix, maybe for another 3-4 years?

The tank inerting issue came with some well known conditions that could be avoided such as having small amounts of fuel in the center tank on an extremely hot day. You can't say that with regard to AoA integrity with the two alternating mechanical sensor approach. There's lots of conditions where the sensors can be erroneous, and a third reference is needed to detect the error.
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kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Tue Jun 16, 2020 4:44 pm

Revelation wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Let's not personalize this. If this is about me, I'd have flown in a MAX after the first fixes around a year ago, before the bit flip changes, and with a bunch of iPad training to explain MCAS and its updated fix.

I'm just saying it's troubling that the regulators seem to be hedging their bets by saying a change is needed (when it probably is not) yet we'll fly without it (opening up Pandora's box and leading to a 2nd grounding if there is an accident/incident before it is implemented).

Its in no way different from tank inerting requirement - which was implemented over long period and totally waived for some older frames, or grandfathering safety requirements (10 g floors come to mind). Those are risks, but those are small enough to actually take them.
What would you suggest - keeping MAX grounded until there is a proper fix, maybe for another 3-4 years?

The tank inerting issue came with some well known conditions that could be avoided such as having small amounts of fuel in the center tank on an extremely hot day. You can't say that with regard to AoA integrity with the two alternating mechanical sensor approach. There's lots of conditions where the sensors can be erroneous, and a third reference is needed to detect the error.

Yet NG and classic flew with such arrangement for a while. MCAS and high AoA maneuvering are the only relevant difference, and those are somehow addressed
The way I see EASA approach is to enable smoother operations with more redundancy before MCAS is disabled hence fewer "mayday" calls due to a simple sensor failure.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Tue Jun 16, 2020 5:18 pm

kalvado wrote:
planecane wrote:
How do you handle an engine failure? There is a procedure to follow.

How do you handle an AoA mismatch? There will be a procedure to follow.

The real issue with only 2 sensors is both failing in the same direction within 5° of each other. Then the FCC won't know there is a failure. I imagine the probability of that is incredibly low and within regulations.

Question is about the procedure to be used. It may turn out that MCAS out procedure ends up more invasive than engine-out procedure, and estimated risk is still higher.


How would an MCAS disabled procedure be more invasive than an engine out or have a higher risk? All of the known incidents occurred during takeoff or climb out when flaps were still extended where MCAS is not operational or needed. Under this scenario, the procedure would be not to accelerate above flaps speed and return to the airport that you just departed from. If it happens on landing it doesn't matter because flaps are already extended. You would just have to be aware not to accelerate past flaps speed if you had to execute a go around.

I don't know the rate of AoA vanes failing randomly at cruise but if it happens with flaps retracted, the procedure will just be to take precautions not to enter the part of the flight envelope where MCAS is active, possibly with diversion to nearest suitable airport.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Tue Jun 16, 2020 5:23 pm

planecane wrote:
kalvado wrote:
planecane wrote:
How do you handle an engine failure? There is a procedure to follow.

How do you handle an AoA mismatch? There will be a procedure to follow.

The real issue with only 2 sensors is both failing in the same direction within 5° of each other. Then the FCC won't know there is a failure. I imagine the probability of that is incredibly low and within regulations.

Question is about the procedure to be used. It may turn out that MCAS out procedure ends up more invasive than engine-out procedure, and estimated risk is still higher.


How would an MCAS disabled procedure be more invasive than an engine out or have a higher risk? All of the known incidents occurred during takeoff or climb out when flaps were still extended where MCAS is not operational or needed. Under this scenario, the procedure would be not to accelerate above flaps speed and return to the airport that you just departed from. If it happens on landing it doesn't matter because flaps are already extended. You would just have to be aware not to accelerate past flaps speed if you had to execute a go around.

I don't know the rate of AoA vanes failing randomly at cruise but if it happens with flaps retracted, the procedure will just be to take precautions not to enter the part of the flight envelope where MCAS is active, possibly with diversion to nearest suitable airport.

Question is what exactly "not to enter the part of the flight envelope where MCAS is active" means. From my perspective, it may mean positively avoiding harsh maneuvering: no go-arounds and/or even remote possibility of collision or TCAS activation. Full ground stop at landing airport and 10-20 mile clear zone around emergency airplane may sound an overkill, but I suspect that SOP would be along those lines. Really not a big deal in many regional airports, though.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Tue Jun 16, 2020 6:22 pm

kalvado wrote:
Question is what exactly "not to enter the part of the flight envelope where MCAS is active" means. From my perspective, it may mean positively avoiding harsh maneuvering: no go-arounds and/or even remote possibility of collision or TCAS activation. Full ground stop at landing airport and 10-20 mile clear zone around emergency airplane may sound an overkill, but I suspect that SOP would be along those lines. Really not a big deal in many regional airports, though.


Why no go arounds? Flaps are extended prior to going around. I know in a normal go around they will be retracted similar to a normal takeoff but I don't see why the procedure with AoA disagree/MCAS disabled wouldn't just be to stay below max flaps speed and keep them deployed since MCAS is not needed aerodynamically with flaps deployed no matter what maneuver is being performed.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Tue Jun 16, 2020 6:59 pm

planecane wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Question is what exactly "not to enter the part of the flight envelope where MCAS is active" means. From my perspective, it may mean positively avoiding harsh maneuvering: no go-arounds and/or even remote possibility of collision or TCAS activation. Full ground stop at landing airport and 10-20 mile clear zone around emergency airplane may sound an overkill, but I suspect that SOP would be along those lines. Really not a big deal in many regional airports, though.


Why no go arounds? Flaps are extended prior to going around. I know in a normal go around they will be retracted similar to a normal takeoff but I don't see why the procedure with AoA disagree/MCAS disabled wouldn't just be to stay below max flaps speed and keep them deployed since MCAS is not needed aerodynamically with flaps deployed no matter what maneuver is being performed.

Basically this means a yet separate memory procedure on top of already double abnormal operation - unreliable air data and reduced envelope. What can go wrong in such scenario, other than anything and everything?
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Tue Jun 16, 2020 7:19 pm

kalvado wrote:
planecane wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Question is what exactly "not to enter the part of the flight envelope where MCAS is active" means. From my perspective, it may mean positively avoiding harsh maneuvering: no go-arounds and/or even remote possibility of collision or TCAS activation. Full ground stop at landing airport and 10-20 mile clear zone around emergency airplane may sound an overkill, but I suspect that SOP would be along those lines. Really not a big deal in many regional airports, though.


Why no go arounds? Flaps are extended prior to going around. I know in a normal go around they will be retracted similar to a normal takeoff but I don't see why the procedure with AoA disagree/MCAS disabled wouldn't just be to stay below max flaps speed and keep them deployed since MCAS is not needed aerodynamically with flaps deployed no matter what maneuver is being performed.

Basically this means a yet separate memory procedure on top of already double abnormal operation - unreliable air data and reduced envelope. What can go wrong in such scenario, other than anything and everything?


I would think that not going around when conditions call for a go around is far more dangerous than a slight modification to the go around procedure, or even far more dangerous than just doing a normal go around without MCAS active. Unless, of course, the non-MCAS behavior puts the aircraft on the razor's edge of stalling. Considering the low speed implementation was added after flight tests, I assume the aircraft wasn't on the brink of falling out of the sky when the test pilots discovered the problem areas. I think that information would have leaked out by now.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Tue Jun 16, 2020 8:30 pm

planecane wrote:
kalvado wrote:
planecane wrote:

Why no go arounds? Flaps are extended prior to going around. I know in a normal go around they will be retracted similar to a normal takeoff but I don't see why the procedure with AoA disagree/MCAS disabled wouldn't just be to stay below max flaps speed and keep them deployed since MCAS is not needed aerodynamically with flaps deployed no matter what maneuver is being performed.

Basically this means a yet separate memory procedure on top of already double abnormal operation - unreliable air data and reduced envelope. What can go wrong in such scenario, other than anything and everything?


I would think that not going around when conditions call for a go around is far more dangerous than a slight modification to the go around procedure, or even far more dangerous than just doing a normal go around without MCAS active. Unless, of course, the non-MCAS behavior puts the aircraft on the razor's edge of stalling. Considering the low speed implementation was added after flight tests, I assume the aircraft wasn't on the brink of falling out of the sky when the test pilots discovered the problem areas. I think that information would have leaked out by now.

True, not going around when go around is warranted is a bad idea - but eliminating as many possibilities for a go-around as possible may be warranted. So - nobody moves at the airport, runway vacated well in advance and so on.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Tue Jun 16, 2020 9:50 pm

On the synthetic issue found the below, the second one is from issues they had on the 787, so if they have issues on the 787 with its greater computer power, I don't think it will be as simple on the 737, but I stand to be corrected.
https://www.slideshare.net/artemkatranz ... lated_from

https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/5773029/a ... -final.pdf
 
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Stitch
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Tue Jun 16, 2020 10:08 pm

par13del wrote:
On the synthetic issue found the below, the second one is from issues they had on the 787, so if they have issues on the 787 with its greater computer power, I don't think it will be as simple on the 737, but I stand to be corrected.


Well the 787 also had three sensors feeding the computer so I guess we should just scrap the demand for the third AoA sensor on the MAX since it seems it can be made irrelevant in unique conditions. :angel: :duck:

Seriously, the cause appears not to be related to the 787's computers not being powerful enough to deal with the information. And there was a subsequent increase in the time period a "No Computed Data" event needed to exist before triggering the reversion of the flight control system to secondary mode. I'd be interested to know if the JetStar crew tried to cycle the Primary Flight Computers to restore primary mode as the KLM crew did when they encountered a similar issue.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Wed Jun 17, 2020 6:18 am

planecane wrote:
kalvado wrote:
planecane wrote:
How do you handle an engine failure? There is a procedure to follow.

How do you handle an AoA mismatch? There will be a procedure to follow.

The real issue with only 2 sensors is both failing in the same direction within 5° of each other. Then the FCC won't know there is a failure. I imagine the probability of that is incredibly low and within regulations.

Question is about the procedure to be used. It may turn out that MCAS out procedure ends up more invasive than engine-out procedure, and estimated risk is still higher.


How would an MCAS disabled procedure be more invasive than an engine out or have a higher risk? All of the known incidents occurred during takeoff or climb out when flaps were still extended where MCAS is not operational or needed. Under this scenario, the procedure would be not to accelerate above flaps speed and return to the airport that you just departed from. If it happens on landing it doesn't matter because flaps are already extended. You would just have to be aware not to accelerate past flaps speed if you had to execute a go around.

I don't know the rate of AoA vanes failing randomly at cruise but if it happens with flaps retracted, the procedure will just be to take precautions not to enter the part of the flight envelope where MCAS is active, possibly with diversion to nearest suitable airport.


The problem with MCAS is (or was) that is makes active control inputs and worse that these control inputs are needed in small corner of the flight envelope to get the plane ready for certification.
 
pugman211
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Wed Jun 17, 2020 7:33 am

What about when a flaps up landing is required? ( due to asymmetric flaps fault etc etc)
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Wed Jun 17, 2020 9:13 am

Linnking to the "Boeing 737MAX Grounding News and Reference Thread 2020"

BoeingVista wrote:
Transport Canada certified MAX in 2017 despite not getting answers from FAA / Boeing on MCAS questions posed in 2016

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/boeing ... -1.5492306


Thanks for the link .. :wideeyed: :scared:

Stitch wrote:
FAA response to 737 MAX crash report preserves Boeing’s big role in certifying its own planes

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on Tuesday said it plans changes to how new airplane models are certified, but will preserve Boeing’s central role in that process — despite criticism that Boeing mistakes in certifying the 737 MAX allowed design flaws that killed 346 people in two crashes.


https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... wn-planes/

Link to 737MAX News Discussion Thread: viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1445841


Let's hope EASA, CAAC and Transport Canada endorse that direction.My question would be: why to preserves Boeing’s big role in certifying its own planes?


Revelation wrote:
Seattle Times has reported In wake of 737 MAX crashes, Senate proposal would strengthen FAA oversight of Boeing plane designs

A proposed bill to tighten controls on how federal aviation safety regulators oversee and approve Boeing’s design of new jets has been hammered out by a Senate committee after backroom negotiations and a pressure campaign by families of the 346 people who died in two crashes of the 737 MAX.

If passed, the bill would reverse the years-long trend of delegating more and more control of the process to Boeing itself, and would shift the balance of oversight responsibility back toward the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

Commentary in main thread, please.


Ah, good there was an intervention.

In general I must say reading through "Boeing 737MAX Grounding News and Reference Thread 2020" is depressing.
The upbeat "FAA flight test in a few weeks", "deliveries expected to restart in 2 months" newsflashes seem gone.
"Never mistake motion for action." Ernest Hemingway
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Wed Jun 17, 2020 2:04 pm

AvWeek ( https://aviationweek.com/air-transport/ ... ty-changes ) has its article out on the Senate bill on FAA reform:

A bipartisan U.S. Senate bill targeting FAA certification improvements places substantial emphasis on human-factors research and funding, echoing several reports produced in the wake of the Boeing 737 MAX accidents and subsequent grounding.
...
Arguably the most glaring weaknesses cited in the FAA’s certification process stem from a lack of consistent, sufficient involvement by human-factors specialists.

It seems everyone is going with Boeing's rationale that they put too much faith in the four second rule (and in turn, on in the pilots) rather than more systemic failures such as giving MCAS too much authority, letting it have multiple activations, never doing a test with a failed AoA sensor, etc.

AvWeek seems to feel the bill is missing the mark:

Each of those regulations emanated from a major flightdeck human-factors study completed in 1996. But the new regulations and guidance did not change some key industry tenets, including the assumptions Boeing relied on when evaluating a maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS)-related uncommanded stabilizer scenario. Boeing’s reliance on such assumptions—specifically that a crew would identify and react to a runaway stabilizer within 4 sec.—combined with questionable system design decisions and the FAA’s lack of objections, helped set the stage for both MAX accidents. The model has been grounded since just after the second accident.

Yet that paragraph is the limit of their objection, the article spends much more time on the other aspects of the bill.

It seems as if the Senate feels a well placed human factors expert would have been in the right place to figure out that whatever MCAS was doing could not be resolved reliably in four seconds, then push back on the entire development team and insist MCAS be recategorized and redesigned. I'm pretty dubious about this. The pattern of behavior was that management pushed the no new training rule very hard and engineers followed their lead. It seems to me objectivity was compromised. It seems to me they could find a way to bypass or browbeat this human factors expert. It seems the main result of the bill will be to produce a better scapegoat than the anonymous four second guy that Calhoun has said he has spoken with, and doesn't address fundamental questions like why didn't you test taking off with a stuck AoA sensor.

The now classic ST article on MCAS gave the faults of Boeing's safety assesement of MCAS as;

The safety analysis:
  • Understated the power of the new flight control system, which was designed to swivel the horizontal tail to push the nose of the plane down to avert a stall. When the planes later entered service, MCAS was capable of moving the tail more than four times farther than was stated in the initial safety analysis document.
  • Failed to account for how the system could reset itself each time a pilot responded, thereby missing the potential impact of the system repeatedly pushing the airplane’s nose downward.
  • Assessed a failure of the system as one level below “catastrophic.” But even that “hazardous” danger level should have precluded activation of the system based on input from a single sensor — and yet that’s how it was designed.

Ref: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... air-crash/

I'm not seeing how this bill addresses these items. I suppose an optimist can say perhaps re-establishing more direct reporting lines for Boeing employees working on FAA's behalf can help, and having more emphasis on human factors can help, but that's about it.

Of course FAA has its own skeletons in its closet:
The Federal Aviation Administration's internal probe of Boeing's 737 Max approval process has reportedly found that senior agency officials failed to review key safety assessments of the plane's flight-control system that was later implicated in two fatal crashes.

https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/14/faa-rep ... 7-max.html

So in the end the Senate seems to want to be looking like they're "doing something" and at best hoping their emphasis on increased FAA authority and increased human factors participation will be able to improve the process and perhaps avoid this kind of episode, but they're not doing anything to address the text message dump that clearly shows that Jedi mind tricks are already a big problem and Boeing was not acting in good faith nor were its own managers who were ideologically biased towards delegating more to Boeing regardless of safety impact.
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kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Wed Jun 17, 2020 2:46 pm

keesje wrote:
Let's hope EASA, CAAC and Transport Canada endorse that direction.My question would be: why to preserves Boeing’s big role in certifying its own planes?

I am a bit on a fence here. Apparently, an engineer doing governmental paperwork on a full time basis would professionally degrade pretty quickly. We're talking some cutting edge technologies being used - and college background may not last long enough for a long career.
Besides, certefication is a burst task: 1-2 years of new model certification followed by 10 years of almost nothing. Hiring and firing people on demand is not the way government work.
Hiring retirees may or may not be a good idea.
Science research got a concept called "peer review", when colleagues from a different organization are reviewing papers before they are published. Would Boeing be open enough to, say, Lockheed verification? I don't know.

However, in case of MCAS issue was raised by for example Brazilian and Canadian authorities - so it should be fairly obvious in review, it was just Boeing bad will - hinting self-certification may not be the best.

However, in grand scheme of things - european CE certification program works way better than US NRTL program - and certainly doesn't lead to increased accident rate in EU. So I see not that much wrong with self-certification in general... It may be a company, not the principle. Pressing regulators into compliance should be fairly easy...
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Wed Jun 17, 2020 2:52 pm

Revelation wrote:
So in the end the Senate seems to want to be looking like they're "doing something" and at best hoping their emphasis on increased FAA authority and increased human factors participation will be able to improve the process and perhaps avoid this kind of episode, but they're not doing anything to address the text message dump that clearly shows that Jedi mind tricks are already a big problem and Boeing was not acting in good faith nor were its own managers who were ideologically biased towards delegating more to Boeing regardless of safety impact.



So politicians doing politician things. I didn't really expect the Senator to ask for big changes in an election year. I believe the saying, their bark is worse than their bite is appropriate here.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Wed Jun 17, 2020 3:19 pm

[threeid][/threeid]
pugman211 wrote:
What about when a flaps up landing is required? ( due to asymmetric flaps fault etc etc)

In what percentage of flights is a flaps up landing required? In what percentage of flights will there be an AoA disagree that disables MCAS after flaps retraction?

Multiply the two probablilities together to get the probability of that scenario. My instinct says it will be well below regulatory requirements. Even if it did happen, the aircraft will still be flyable.

When thinking about these scenarios where MCAS is needed but disabled due to AoA disagreement, remember the report a year ago where the test pilot was only OK with using MCAS (vs a hardware fix) when the low speed issue was discovered because it would almost never activate in flight.
 
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Stitch
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Wed Jun 17, 2020 3:33 pm

enzo011 wrote:
So politicians doing politician things. I didn't really expect the Senator to ask for big changes in an election year. I believe the saying, their bark is worse than their bite is appropriate here.


Because it is an election year is the primary reason there is any movement on this. :worried: But as this is something well outside their areas of expertise and all they probably know about it is that the pilots were overloaded so let's focus on lightening their load via legislation.

As Revelation's post outlined, pilot overload was just one contributor to the two accidents and quite possibly one of the lesser ones. There were systemic failures throughout the stack and they all need to be addressed, but politicians are focusing on the one thing they heard about.
 
Chemist
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Wed Jun 17, 2020 4:51 pm

Why do I have the feeling that we will be well into next year before RTS occurs?
2020 feels like a replay of 2019: new date, promises, delays, repeat.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Wed Jun 17, 2020 6:46 pm

Chemist wrote:
Why do I have the feeling that we will be well into next year before RTS occurs?
2020 feels like a replay of 2019: new date, promises, delays, repeat.
you might be right!

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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Wed Jun 17, 2020 6:48 pm

Chemist wrote:
Why do I have the feeling that we will be well into next year before RTS occurs?
2020 feels like a replay of 2019: new date, promises, delays, repeat.

Difference this year is that Boeing are the ones pushing summer and the head of the FAA is the one saying that timeline is too conservative, so the role of playing to Wall St. has switched players.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Wed Jun 17, 2020 9:03 pm

Chemist wrote:
Why do I have the feeling that we will be well into next year before RTS occurs?
2020 feels like a replay of 2019: new date, promises, delays, repeat.


The following was posted 19 Dec 2019 to Twitter:

Image
Ref: https://twitter.com/LeehamNews/status/1 ... 3657516033

Since then, the workload evaluation was done, with some reports that although all pilots recovered the plane some pilots did not follow procedures, even knowing what the subject matter was going to be well in advance.

Regardless, only one more block has been checked off in six months.

The next block is the certification test, and we're not even confident that will happen this month.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Wed Jun 17, 2020 9:41 pm

par13del wrote:
Chemist wrote:
Why do I have the feeling that we will be well into next year before RTS occurs?
2020 feels like a replay of 2019: new date, promises, delays, repeat.

Difference this year is that Boeing are the ones pushing summer and the head of the FAA is the one saying that timeline is too conservative, so the role of playing to Wall St. has switched players.


Checks weather outside. Yep, summery.

Checks calendar. Mid June.

[FX: Voice-over man] From the team that brought you 2019's blockbusting "RTS Early 4th Quarter" comes the sequel everyone's been waiting for "RTS 2. Summer Flying"

Obviously I'm jesting and we can't ignore the impact that a global pandemic has had on everything, including MAX RTS, but the lack of hard news is starting to make RTS in summer (depending exactly how you define that) look challenging.
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Stitch
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Wed Jun 17, 2020 9:47 pm

As scbriml referenced, I imagine the pandemic is directly impacting many of these milestones since the various working groups (regulatory, development, test, etc.) are not being forced to work in solitude or very controlled situations and are unable to just get together whenever.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 18, 2020 1:41 am

We hard reports last month of whether international participants would get special permission to travel to the USA especially after travel from Europe was curtailed, so we know covid has pushed the conservative Boeing estimate further, so yes, 4th qtr 2020 may now be in play.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 18, 2020 3:52 am

par13del wrote:
We hard reports last month of whether international participants would get special permission to travel to the USA especially after travel from Europe was curtailed, so we know covid has pushed the conservative Boeing estimate further, so yes, 4th qtr 2020 may now be in play.


2020 or Q4 2021? Lol.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 18, 2020 4:08 am

I stand corrected, 4th qtr may now be in play.
Thanks
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 18, 2020 5:32 am

Stitch wrote:
Because it is an election year is the primary reason there is any movement on this. :worried: But as this is something well outside their areas of expertise and all they probably know about it is that the pilots were overloaded so let's focus on lightening their load via legislation.

As Revelation's post outlined, pilot overload was just one contributor to the two accidents and quite possibly one of the lesser ones. There were systemic failures throughout the stack and they all need to be addressed, but politicians are focusing on the one thing they heard about.



I am very cynical about politicians. In the UK you had one standing in a queue to vote due to new coronavirus procedures and he was saying, in a video posted to social media, what was happening is a joke and a waste of time. He promptly voted to keep the same system. So I think just about the status quo is just fine with politicians in a year that could have a lot of upheaval. I agree though, this doesn't address much of the problems that led to the failures at either the FAA or Boeing though. :sigh:
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 18, 2020 2:12 pm

enzo011 wrote:
Stitch wrote:
Because it is an election year is the primary reason there is any movement on this. :worried: But as this is something well outside their areas of expertise and all they probably know about it is that the pilots were overloaded so let's focus on lightening their load via legislation.

As Revelation's post outlined, pilot overload was just one contributor to the two accidents and quite possibly one of the lesser ones. There were systemic failures throughout the stack and they all need to be addressed, but politicians are focusing on the one thing they heard about.

I am very cynical about politicians. In the UK you had one standing in a queue to vote due to new coronavirus procedures and he was saying, in a video posted to social media, what was happening is a joke and a waste of time. He promptly voted to keep the same system. So I think just about the status quo is just fine with politicians in a year that could have a lot of upheaval. I agree though, this doesn't address much of the problems that led to the failures at either the FAA or Boeing though. :sigh:

After stepping back a bit, I guess the Senate can't really do what we want which is get to the bottom of what happened and identify the bad actors that caused the whole MAX tragedy. When they had the time to interview DM and other Boeing execs it seemed they were more concerned about their salaries and compensation packages as to what happened to cause the tragedy. The law seems to address the main issue that FAA had ceded too much authority and control to Boeing. I hope it's effective at doing so.

What we don't seem to have had was the "come to Jesus" moment where Boeing admits it let commercial goals drive a series of unacceptable engineering decisions and FAA admits it left Boeing to its own devices far too much. At best we had some apologies without admissions. I can imagine that behind the scenes people who were closely associated with the decisions that led to the tragedy have been pushed aside or shown the door, but that's only my imagination at work. It's kind of scary to think Boeing may have some of the same decision makers in place whose pressure led employees to resort to Jedi mind tricks to get the regulators and customers to make some unsafe and unwise decisions. It seems many executives have chosen to retire or have left. I wonder what happened to the middle managers who accepted the program priorities without apparent push back and applied the pressure to find a way to make big changes yet not require sim training for such changes.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 18, 2020 3:53 pm

Revelation wrote:
What we don't seem to have had was the "come to Jesus" moment where Boeing admits it let commercial goals drive a series of unacceptable engineering decisions and FAA admits it left Boeing to its own devices far too much.


We will never see the former because of the financial and criminal liability it would open up, but we could see the later since you can't sue the US Government unless the US Government allows it.


Revelation wrote:
I can imagine that behind the scenes people who were closely associated with the decisions that led to the tragedy have been pushed aside or shown the door, but that's only my imagination at work.


Well there has been some culling at Boeing at the senior management and executive level, but I don't see that as something that is going to fundamentally change the culture as enough people remain who adhere to the "shareholder value" mantra. And to be honest, I am not sure that can be culled in today's corporate business culture. But what I do hope can happen is that rapaciousness is tamed a bit with the realization that "a penny saved today could be a quarter spent later" when looking at the money Boeing lost prior to COVID-19 (and how much worse it could be if COVID-19 did not happen and air traffic had not imploded and airlines were impatient to take new planes) and that spending more to do it right the first time is better than cutting corners to make some extra money and then lose all of it - by many multiples - when those decisions come back and blow up in your face.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 18, 2020 4:29 pm

Stitch wrote:
Well there has been some culling at Boeing at the senior management and executive level, but I don't see that as something that is going to fundamentally change the culture as enough people remain who adhere to the "shareholder value" mantra. And to be honest, I am not sure that can be culled in today's corporate business culture. But what I do hope can happen is that rapaciousness is tamed a bit with the realization that "a penny saved today could be a quarter spent later" when looking at the money Boeing lost prior to COVID-19 (and how much worse it could be if COVID-19 did not happen and air traffic had not imploded and airlines were impatient to take new planes) and that spending more to do it right the first time is better than cutting corners to make some extra money and then lose all of it - by many multiples - when those decisions come back and blow up in your face.

Excellent post, Stitch. Commercial needs play a part in every business. Having been an engineer for decades now, we engineers are all too happy to play with tech and never produce a product. Yet Boeing of course should now realize what swinging too far towards commercial needs can create temptation to override sound engineering practices. It's an unfortunate part of engineering to have to push back on commercial needs when they are leading the company into risky territory, even if it means suffering some career damage. Unfortunately in this case it seems all the key individuals were willing to go along with the flow. Hopefully the steep price in dollars and lives will make people see the cost of doing so.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 18, 2020 4:35 pm

Stitch wrote:
Revelation wrote:
What we don't seem to have had was the "come to Jesus" moment where Boeing admits it let commercial goals drive a series of unacceptable engineering decisions and FAA admits it left Boeing to its own devices far too much.


We will never see the former because of the financial and criminal liability it would open up, but we could see the later since you can't sue the US Government unless the US Government allows it.


Revelation wrote:
I can imagine that behind the scenes people who were closely associated with the decisions that led to the tragedy have been pushed aside or shown the door, but that's only my imagination at work.


Well there has been some culling at Boeing at the senior management and executive level, but I don't see that as something that is going to fundamentally change the culture as enough people remain who adhere to the "shareholder value" mantra. And to be honest, I am not sure that can be culled in today's corporate business culture. But what I do hope can happen is that rapaciousness is tamed a bit with the realization that "a penny saved today could be a quarter spent later" when looking at the money Boeing lost prior to COVID-19 (and how much worse it could be if COVID-19 did not happen and air traffic had not imploded and airlines were impatient to take new planes) and that spending more to do it right the first time is better than cutting corners to make some extra money and then lose all of it - by many multiples - when those decisions come back and blow up in your face.

100% agree with this post. That I think is the message that will be ringing with Boeing. Not everything is about cutting costs. Spend the money now and secure a future of safe and reliable aircrafts
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 18, 2020 5:12 pm

Revelation wrote:
What we don't seem to have had was the "come to Jesus" moment where Boeing admits it let commercial goals drive a series of unacceptable engineering decisions and FAA admits it left Boeing to its own devices far too much. At best we had some apologies without admissions. I can imagine that behind the scenes people who were closely associated with the decisions that led to the tragedy have been pushed aside or shown the door, but that's only my imagination at work. It's kind of scary to think Boeing may have some of the same decision makers in place whose pressure led employees to resort to Jedi mind tricks to get the regulators and customers to make some unsafe and unwise decisions. It seems many executives have chosen to retire or have left. I wonder what happened to the middle managers who accepted the program priorities without apparent push back and applied the pressure to find a way to make big changes yet not require sim training for such changes.


Indeed, Revelation. It would have been interesting to know who did what and why, and how the system failed. I would also have loved to get some actual engineering data about the performance, parameters, and limits of various systems, but alas, we don't have that either.

It is not that I'm unhappy with the regulators checking the changes, I am actually very convinced they will do their best and will certify only a safe plane. It is just my engineering mind that would have wanted to know more of the details...
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 18, 2020 5:43 pm

Revelation wrote:
What we don't seem to have had was the "come to Jesus" moment where Boeing admits it let commercial goals drive a series of unacceptable engineering decisions and FAA admits it left Boeing to its own devices far too much.

So a question, in your stepping back and reviewing, have you given up on the FBI that they would find legal liability and their investigation reveal the truth and not opinions?
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 18, 2020 9:32 pm

par13del wrote:
Revelation wrote:
What we don't seem to have had was the "come to Jesus" moment where Boeing admits it let commercial goals drive a series of unacceptable engineering decisions and FAA admits it left Boeing to its own devices far too much.

So a question, in your stepping back and reviewing, have you given up on the FBI that they would find legal liability and their investigation reveal the truth and not opinions?

No, I don't think we've heard the last of the DoJ/FBI probe.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Thu Jun 18, 2020 11:38 pm

Fixing the MAX and getting it back in the air is only half the problem for Boeing. The other half will be finding airlines that actually need, want and can afford to take those hugely optimistic orders.

The finance and market has simply evaporated and may not return for 5-10 years, by which time technology will have moved on. The environment, Emissions and noise will be far more important than it is now. The MAX was late to the market in 2011. It’s now ten years later.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Fri Jun 19, 2020 12:19 am

It is not unheard of, even when legislation successfully addresses substantial issues, that it avoids criticizing those at fault. Naming Boeing and the FAA may have upset more apple carts than was worthwhile.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Fri Jun 19, 2020 3:25 am

Revelation wrote:
What we don't seem to have had was the "come to Jesus" moment where Boeing admits it let commercial goals drive a series of unacceptable engineering decisions and FAA admits it left Boeing to its own devices far too much. At best we had some apologies without admissions. I can imagine that behind the scenes people who were closely associated with the decisions that led to the tragedy have been pushed aside or shown the door, but that's only my imagination at work. It's kind of scary to think Boeing may have some of the same decision makers in place whose pressure led employees to resort to Jedi mind tricks to get the regulators and customers to make some unsafe and unwise decisions. It seems many executives have chosen to retire or have left. I wonder what happened to the middle managers who accepted the program priorities without apparent push back and applied the pressure to find a way to make big changes yet not require sim training for such changes.


But once again that "moment" assumes that commercial goals driving "unacceptable" engineering decisions and the subsequent crashes is the actual cause and effect. We can speculate all we want about what happened in development, but short of hard, directly linked evidence between the two events, which there none has been made public so far, this shouldn't be assumed. And even then it's a nebulous theory that could be theoretically applied to practically any crash. In hindsight we can always look and say, "if we had only spent more money here." And what is the difference between an "acceptable" and "unacceptable" engineering decision anyway? So you may be waiting for a message that doesn't even apply to this situation. What it sounds more like is the salve to the belief that no matter what, someone or something has to be blamed.

To this day what "scares" me most is that we've clearly not applied industry safety regulations on an unbiased, level scale worldwide, and treating Boeing as an example without focusing on other very serious weaknesses will likely decrease overall safety in the long run. That's the chilling aspect of this saga.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Fri Jun 19, 2020 3:41 am

uta999 wrote:
Fixing the MAX and getting it back in the air is only half the problem for Boeing. The other half will be finding airlines that actually need, want and can afford to take those hugely optimistic orders.

The finance and market has simply evaporated and may not return for 5-10 years, by which time technology will have moved on. The environment, Emissions and noise will be far more important than it is now. The MAX was late to the market in 2011. It’s now ten years later.


Agreed. Boeing should be focusing all efforts on NSA. It may bee seen by some as a moon shot, but the TTBW (Transonic Truss Braced Wing) is Boeing's best bet for getting a long step ahead... Drop the unmitigated disaster that is the MAX.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Fri Jun 19, 2020 10:01 am

https://www.forbes.com/sites/willhorton ... -downturn/

Ryanair looking to close the max10 by Christmas or next spring
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Fri Jun 19, 2020 1:55 pm

MSPNWA wrote:
But once again that "moment" assumes that commercial goals driving "unacceptable" engineering decisions and the subsequent crashes is the actual cause and effect. We can speculate all we want about what happened in development, but short of hard, directly linked evidence between the two events, which there none has been made public so far, this shouldn't be assumed. And even then it's a nebulous theory that could be theoretically applied to practically any crash. In hindsight we can always look and say, "if we had only spent more money here." And what is the difference between an "acceptable" and "unacceptable" engineering decision anyway? So you may be waiting for a message that doesn't even apply to this situation. What it sounds more like is the salve to the belief that no matter what, someone or something has to be blamed.

Yes, no doubt, a "smoking gun" needs to be produced, I've said this all along. I'm confident after reading the text message dump that it wasn't Forkner on his own who decided he needed to play Jedi mind tricks to get FAA and others to fast track MAX certification. Maybe other executives were more careful on what they committed to electronic form, maybe the investigators didn't ask the right questions or read the right content, maybe they did and they are sitting on the evidence, who knows.

When you read the message dump and its clear description of management motivations from Forkner and others, and add to it what ST's lead article on MCAS gives as the faults of Boeing's safety assessment of MCAS:

The safety analysis:
  • Understated the power of the new flight control system, which was designed to swivel the horizontal tail to push the nose of the plane down to avert a stall. When the planes later entered service, MCAS was capable of moving the tail more than four times farther than was stated in the initial safety analysis document.
  • Failed to account for how the system could reset itself each time a pilot responded, thereby missing the potential impact of the system repeatedly pushing the airplane’s nose downward.
  • Assessed a failure of the system as one level below “catastrophic.” But even that “hazardous” danger level should have precluded activation of the system based on input from a single sensor — and yet that’s how it was designed.

Ref: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... air-crash/

... it's hard to attribute all this to random incompetence rather than the "effect" of management insisting engineers take the low cost route at every juncture and abuse their positions as both Boeing employees and FAA inspectors to get that outcome.

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... ng-safety/ from Wednesday provides even more examples of the issues:

Seattle Times reports last year revealed that Boeing managers limited some certification testing performed by the company’s own engineers; that FAA safety engineers were pressured to give cursory approvals to Boeing analyses; and that changes to MCAS made late in the program’s development went largely under the FAA’s radar.

And the perverse effects:

Stumo also called for Boeing to drop a defense its lawyers are using in court, where they have argued that the company should be immune from liability for the crashes because the FAA certified the MAX.

In an interview from her home in England, Kuria said she was disgusted to learn of this legal argument during the hearing.

“I was completely stunned by the audacity of Boeing to ask for immunity,” she said. “I felt that it was a form of admission of wrongdoing. Because what do you need immunity for if you are innocent?”

When Sen. Ed Markey, D -Mass.,raised the issue with Dickson, the FAA chief agreed that “the responsibility to produce a safe product does belong with Boeing.”

In effect Boeing used Jedi mind tricks to get FAA to certify the plane, and now they're saying "don't blame us, FAA certified the plane!".

It'd be nice if we could put these hi-jinks to an end, but it seems we aren't going to be able to.

TFA suggests FAA has been less than cooperative with Congress:

He said that even after a personal plea to Dickson within the last week for answers to specific questions and access to specific internal documents, no progress was made.

“This record of delay and unresponsiveness clearly shows at best an unwillingness to cooperate with congressional oversight,” Wicker said. “Your team at the FAA has deliberately tried to keep us in the dark.

“It’s hard not to characterize our relationship during this entire process as being adversarial on the part of the FAA,” he added. “The agency stonewalling of my investigation suggests discomfort for what might ultimately be revealed.”

At one point Sen. Richard Blumenthal, D – Conn., told Dickson: “I see no way you can continue in this job if you fail to be more responsive.”

It suggests FAA has some skeletons in its closet, and that Dickson has not been an agent of change.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Fri Jun 19, 2020 2:55 pm

Revelation wrote:
At one point Sen. Richard Blumenthal, D – Conn., told Dickson: “I see no way you can continue in this job if you fail to be more responsive.”

It suggests FAA has some skeletons in its closet, and that Dickson has not been an agent of change.[/quote]
Hmm...to be sarcastic, maybe, just maybe he has been so busy getting his recurrent training updated for his test flight, as well as holding Boeing to order for all their wrongs that he forgot that one hand did not clap in this issue, so he has been overlooking - not deliberately - but overlooking the fixes that need to be done at the organization that he is now responsible for, let's cut him some slack. However, it does make me wonder why he was more optimistic than Boeing on the summer RTS, what was he thinking?
 
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Stitch
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Fri Jun 19, 2020 3:14 pm

Revelation wrote:
It suggests FAA has some skeletons in its closet, and that Dickson has not been an agent of change.


Well Dickson was appointed in August 2019 so he has not even been on the job for a year. As such, he's probably still trying to establish his authority over the bureaucracy and I can very much see subordinates wanting to keep their culpability in the "certification railroad" obscured as long as possible.

And not to drag general politics into this, but considering how the current Administration views Congress, some of it could just be intransigence for the sake of intransigence.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Fri Jun 19, 2020 3:22 pm

par13del wrote:
Revelation wrote:
At one point Sen. Richard Blumenthal, D – Conn., told Dickson: “I see no way you can continue in this job if you fail to be more responsive.”

It suggests FAA has some skeletons in its closet, and that Dickson has not been an agent of change.

Hmm...to be sarcastic, maybe, just maybe he has been so busy getting his recurrent training updated for his test flight, as well as holding Boeing to order for all their wrongs that he forgot that one hand did not clap in this issue, so he has been overlooking - not deliberately - but overlooking the fixes that need to be done at the organization that he is now responsible for, let's cut him some slack. However, it does make me wonder why he was more optimistic than Boeing on the summer RTS, what was he thinking?

In https://www.flightglobal.com/airframers ... 85.article Dickson pushes back hard on the claims that FAA was not responsive.

It also gives yet another update on RTS:

Dickson also reviewed steps that must be completed before the FAA clears the 737 Max to fly. Boeing has said it expects the type, which has been grounded since March 2019, will be cleared by the third quarter.

Dickson provides no timeline. The FAA still must complete a flight test, and a Joint Operations Evaluation Board (JOEB) – a body composed of representatives from the FAA, other countries’ regulators and pilots – must complete a pilot assessment. A Flight Standardisation Board will then release a public report addressing the JOEB’s finding, Dickson says.

A multi-agency Technical Advisory Board must also evaluate final Max design documents and the FAA must approve airlines’ pilot training programmes.

Lastly, the FAA will issue an airworthiness directive laying out actions airlines must take to return Max to the skies. Dickson, a pilot, will also fly the jet himself before signing off, he says.

So, in short, we have Flight Test -> JOEB -> FSB -> TAB -> Training Approval -> AD along with Dickson's flight squeezed in along the way.

Hard to see all that happening "by the third quarter", whatever that means.
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Fri Jun 19, 2020 3:59 pm

Regarding whistleblowers, https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... h-737-max/ ends with a good summation of what the law tries to do:

... legislation to tighten controls on the FAA’s delegation of work and ensure direct communication between FAA and Boeing technical experts on certification details.

The whole set up depends on people who are both Boeing employees AND FAA inspectors at the same time because the true experts reside within industry not government. The theory is that these people were overly influenced by Boeing's commercial imperatives and the "correction" will be to give back more control to FAA (which, interestingly, FAA's chief doesn't seem to want in some cases, see below) and to make sure lines of communication stay open.

I think there is an issue that these half-and-half people are probably going to be made to feel like whistleblowers rather than feel like they're just doing the FAA half of their job to the best of their abilities. It's really hard to have divided roles when 100% of their paycheck comes from Boeing.

BTW, above I refer to:

Cantwell expressed surprise when Dickson failed to endorse a requirement that the FAA rather than Boeing select and appoint the company engineers who will represent the agency during the certification process. That change is “not something I believe would add to the safety of the process,” Dickson said.

Ref: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... ng-safety/
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q2 2020

Fri Jun 19, 2020 4:36 pm

All the FAA has to do is to submit a new budget request to congress on paying for these new resources and let congress run with, the idea that the FAA came up with all the cost cutting measures is laughable.
We can blame the FAA for all the money and time wasted on getting the ATC system modernized, maybe that is also a part of the problem, they needed to pour more money into that project so they looked to see where they could cut corners, congress was a willing participant, we need say nothing about Boeing.

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Night Photos Beautiful shots taken while the sun is below the horizon

Accidents Accident, incident and crash related photos

Air to Air Photos taken by airborne photographers of airborne aircraft

Special Paint Schemes Aircraft painted in beautiful and original liveries

Airport Overviews Airport overviews from the air or ground

Tails and Winglets Tail and Winglet closeups with beautiful airline logos