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Stitch
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Sun Jul 12, 2020 3:27 pm

pugman211 wrote:
Actually MCAS was the problem for the simple fact it did not have stabiliser authority limit. It just kept trimming down and down and down for each cycle.


As I understand it, that was not the original design as presented to the FAA - the original design did have a limit in how often MCAS could activate, but Boeing later added that unlimited authority and then didn't tell the FAA they'd changed it nor did they update the FCOM so even an airline training department that was paying close attention would have been operating under the original operating regimen. And the FAA never went back to check that the original implementation was still in effect and did not press Boeing on what changes had been made after the loss of the Lion Air frame, which led to the loss of the Ethiopian frame.
 
BowlingShoeDC9
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Sun Jul 12, 2020 4:39 pm

Stitch wrote:
Cdydatzigs wrote:
Not if the very things that make the MAX different than the NG are why MCAS was needed and therefore indirectly led to two MAX's crashing the way they did. As much as Boeing didn't want their customers to realize it, the MAX and NG are different aircraft and the pilots should have been trained as such. But their alleged "sameness" was the MAX's main selling point, and that's why we're here today.


Again, MCAS in and of itself was not the problem. It was, as you noted, the lack of knowledge about it being there and how it operated that was the problem. I recall reading that on a previous flight of either the Lion Air or the Ethiopian frame MCAS activated but the PIC knew about it and successfully recovered the frame.



Lets not get carried away here. What MCAS tries to do is not inherently a problem. How it was implemented was very much a problem. Its error handling of a mission critical task was atrocious. One AoA sensor for a system that can control a plane? Seriously? Also there is the lack of/high limits on the number of interventions.

All of those are still poor programing and engineering practices even if you tell the pilots about it. :banghead:
 
TropicalSky
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Sun Jul 12, 2020 6:27 pm

i believe these flights are the pilot demo flights
https://flightaware.com/live/flight/BOE ... /KBFI/KMWH
https://flightaware.com/live/flight/BOE ... /KMWH/KBFI

Noshow wrote:
Have any of those FAA "airline pilot demo flights" happened or are they already scheduled?
 
Noshow
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Sun Jul 12, 2020 8:28 pm

Thanks very much. Must have missed those.
 
sgrow787
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Mon Jul 13, 2020 7:16 am

Revelation wrote:
Clearly no one at Boeing thought through the implications of a bad AoA sensor triggering repeated MCAS activations. To me that is the major part of the problem.


Yet Boeing didn't ground the plane until after the 2nd crash. And it would be silly to pretend Boeing didn't know what brought the first plane down. And they fought to keep the new MCAS system out of the manuals, thereby containing the number of people in the know to a few dozen from potentially thousands. And they attempted a 2-sensor solution initially, and one that used onside sensors only, so they knew the importance of using more than one sensor.

If it was possible to get the cross-side AOA data, Boeing would have done so long before now and gotten the plane certified. One more sensor and the problem goes away. Therefore, the likelihood is that the cross-side data is not readily available for whatever reason - although likely due to antiquated hardware - and the bean counters at Boeing just couldn't take no for an answer. Someone somewhere up the chain of command said "%@#$ it, let's stop waxing apples", even though they obviously didn't know what kind of apples they were dealing with.

And repeated MCAS activations isn't the problem. MCAS is needed or it isn't. It's the single point of failure that's the problem. Which underlines the current problem with the Max - if AOA's disagree, the FAA is trying to sell us on the idea the plane is still safe to fly. Even if they can do a test flight without MCAS, it's either essential or it isn't. If you have high angle of attack, you need MCAS repeating activations until the high angle of attack is arrested.
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.
 
Noshow
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Mon Jul 13, 2020 10:36 am

If fed with some erroneous trigger signal MCAS 1.0 will trim until the plane is not controllable anymore. MCAS 1.0 very well was part of the problem. It was not limited.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Mon Jul 13, 2020 12:54 pm

sgrow787 wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Clearly no one at Boeing thought through the implications of a bad AoA sensor triggering repeated MCAS activations. To me that is the major part of the problem.


Yet Boeing didn't ground the plane until after the 2nd crash. And it would be silly to pretend Boeing didn't know what brought the first plane down. And they fought to keep the new MCAS system out of the manuals, thereby containing the number of people in the know to a few dozen from potentially thousands. And they attempted a 2-sensor solution initially, and one that used onside sensors only, so they knew the importance of using more than one sensor.

If it was possible to get the cross-side AOA data, Boeing would have done so long before now and gotten the plane certified. One more sensor and the problem goes away. Therefore, the likelihood is that the cross-side data is not readily available for whatever reason - although likely due to antiquated hardware - and the bean counters at Boeing just couldn't take no for an answer. Someone somewhere up the chain of command said "%@#$ it, let's stop waxing apples", even though they obviously didn't know what kind of apples they were dealing with.

And repeated MCAS activations isn't the problem. MCAS is needed or it isn't. It's the single point of failure that's the problem. Which underlines the current problem with the Max - if AOA's disagree, the FAA is trying to sell us on the idea the plane is still safe to fly. Even if they can do a test flight without MCAS, it's either essential or it isn't. If you have high angle of attack, you need MCAS repeating activations until the high angle of attack is arrested.


Or you just do what any Pilot should be capable of - push the control column forward.
 
sgrow787
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Mon Jul 13, 2020 1:07 pm

Noshow wrote:
If fed with some erroneous trigger signal MCAS 1.0 will trim until the plane is not controllable anymore. MCAS 1.0 very well was part of the problem. It was not limited.


It's trivial whether you want to include data validation as part of MCAS or not. In modern aircraft systems, input validation occurs within data concentrators, at which point the validated data is sent to downstream systems.
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.
 
sgrow787
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Mon Jul 13, 2020 1:13 pm

morrisond wrote:
Or you just do what any Pilot should be capable of - push the control column forward.


Well obviously the Max needs more than elevator input to correct for high AOA events.
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.
 
Wallsendmag
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Mon Jul 13, 2020 4:08 pm

sgrow787 wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Clearly no one at Boeing thought through the implications of a bad AoA sensor triggering repeated MCAS activations. To me that is the major part of the problem.


Yet Boeing didn't ground the plane until after the 2nd crash.

Boeing didn't ground the plane though did they.
 
BowlingShoeDC9
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Mon Jul 13, 2020 5:14 pm

sgrow787 wrote:
Revelation wrote:
And repeated MCAS activations isn't the problem. MCAS is needed or it isn't. It's the single point of failure that's the problem. Which underlines the current problem with the Max - if AOA's disagree, the FAA is trying to sell us on the idea the plane is still safe to fly. Even if they can do a test flight without MCAS, it's either essential or it isn't. If you have high angle of attack, you need MCAS repeating activations until the high angle of attack is arrested.


I think the flight crew of Lion Air would disagree with your assumption that repeated MCAS activation wasn’t part of the problem. Interestingly a limit on the number of interventions of MCAS is part of the fix from Boeing, which seems to suggest it is part of the problem.

https://www.boeing.com/commercial/737ma ... dates.page
 
Vicenza
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Mon Jul 13, 2020 7:02 pm

[quote="morrisond"

Or you just do what any Pilot should be capable of - push the control column forward.[/quote]

I would say they were very capable of doing so, but would you so close to the ground and with a planeful of passengers, while trying to actually figure out something which Boeing deliberately hid from all airlines? It wasn't a Cesna they were swanning around in!
 
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SamYeager2016
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Mon Jul 13, 2020 7:11 pm

morrisond wrote:
Or you just do what any Pilot should be capable of - push the control column forward.

Don't tell me we're back to the refrain of "It was all the fault of those foreign pilots! Nothing wrong with the plane at all!" :sarcastic:
 
sgrow787
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Mon Jul 13, 2020 9:09 pm

BowlingShoeDC9 wrote:
I think the flight crew of Lion Air would disagree with your assumption that repeated MCAS activation wasn’t part of the problem. Interestingly a limit on the number of interventions of MCAS is part of the fix from Boeing, which seems to suggest it is part of the problem.

https://www.boeing.com/commercial/737ma ... dates.page


You either need MCAS or you don't.
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.
 
sgrow787
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Mon Jul 13, 2020 9:23 pm

Wallsendmag wrote:
sgrow787 wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Clearly no one at Boeing thought through the implications of a bad AoA sensor triggering repeated MCAS activations. To me that is the major part of the problem.


Yet Boeing didn't ground the plane until after the 2nd crash.

Boeing didn't ground the plane though did they.


I'll restate:

Boeing didn't ground the plane before the 2nd crash.
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.
 
Wallsendmag
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Mon Jul 13, 2020 9:25 pm

sgrow787 wrote:
Wallsendmag wrote:
sgrow787 wrote:

Yet Boeing didn't ground the plane until after the 2nd crash.

Boeing didn't ground the plane though did they.


I'll restate:

Boeing didn't ground the plane before the 2nd crash.

Strange I was under the impression that every aviation authority around the World grounded it not the OEM


Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk Pro
 
sgrow787
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Mon Jul 13, 2020 10:04 pm

Wallsendmag wrote:
Strange I was under the impression that every aviation authority around the World grounded it not the OEM


Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk Pro


Boeing didn't ground the plane before the 2nd crash. In Nov 2018 shortly after the 1st crash, in a meeting with American Airlines Pilots Union pilots, Boeing refused to ground the plane, yet they knew there was a problem:

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/busi ... crash.html
Last edited by sgrow787 on Mon Jul 13, 2020 10:13 pm, edited 2 times in total.
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.
 
StTim
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Mon Jul 13, 2020 10:05 pm

Boeing were instructed to ground the plane. At the time it felt like they were intent on keeping it flying.

Anyhow I am not sure what raking over these old coals adds to the debate. Surely we have been around these Groundhog Day loops more than enough times.
 
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moo
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Mon Jul 13, 2020 10:11 pm

sgrow787 wrote:
Wallsendmag wrote:
Strange I was under the impression that every aviation authority around the World grounded it not the OEM


Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk Pro


Boeing didn't ground the plane before the 2nd crash.


This is technically correct - the best type of correct.

Boeing didn't ground the plane *after* the 2nd crash either - China was the first country whose regulator issued a grounding order, on March 11th. It wasn't until March 13th that the FAA grounded the MAX after Trump made a public announcement saying he was ordering the FAA to do so.

But at no point did Boeing instruct airlines to ground the aircraft - so both Wallsendmag and sgrow787 are technically correct.
 
sgrow787
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Mon Jul 13, 2020 10:29 pm

moo wrote:
sgrow787 wrote:
Wallsendmag wrote:
Strange I was under the impression that every aviation authority around the World grounded it not the OEM


Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk Pro


Boeing didn't ground the plane before the 2nd crash.


This is technically correct - the best type of correct.

Boeing didn't ground the plane *after* the 2nd crash either - China was the first country whose regulator issued a grounding order, on March 11th. It wasn't until March 13th that the FAA grounded the MAX after Trump made a public announcement saying he was ordering the FAA to do so.

But at no point did Boeing instruct airlines to ground the aircraft - so both Wallsendmag and sgrow787 are technically correct.

Yet Wallsendmag's point on who grounds commercial aircraft - OEM or certification authority - has little relevance to the topic at hand (in response to Revelation's post): whether Boeing knew they needed dual-sensor redundancy for MCAS, or whether they simply failed to consider it altogether.

According to the NYT article above, Boeing could have effectively grounded the plane by issuing an EAD for the MCAS software update that was needed:

Michael Michaelis, an American pilot, argued that Boeing should push the F.A.A. to issue what is known as an emergency airworthiness directive.

The F.A.A. had already issued one directive after the Lion Air crash, instructing airlines to revise their flight manuals to include information on how to respond to a malfunction of the anti-stall system known as MCAS. But Mr. Michaelis pushed Boeing to consider calling for an additional one to update the software.

Such a procedure would have required Boeing and airlines in the United States to take immediate action to ensure the safety of the Max, and would have likely taken the jet out of service temporarily.


So, effectively, the OEM - Boeing - had the power to cause the grounding of the Max anytime they wanted.
Last edited by sgrow787 on Mon Jul 13, 2020 10:42 pm, edited 2 times in total.
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.
 
Wallsendmag
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Mon Jul 13, 2020 10:31 pm

On the other hand you could say that Boeing’s reluctance to ground the Max says everything about their mindset


Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk Pro
 
Noshow
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Tue Jul 14, 2020 10:08 am

Whatever people blame the pilots for the aviation authorities grounded all MAXes and required changes including changes of MCAS for a reason. This is where we are at now. Going back to square one is good for nothing. Lessons were learned and progress made - hopefully.
Last edited by Noshow on Tue Jul 14, 2020 10:24 am, edited 1 time in total.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Tue Jul 14, 2020 12:27 pm

Noshow wrote:
Whatever people blame the pilots for the aviation authorities grounded all MAXes and required changes including changes of MCAS for a reason. This is where we are at now. Going back to square one is good for nothing. Lessons were learned and progress made - hopefully.

We are pointing out that lessons are not being learned.

The FAA IG report was supposed to report on the mistakes so we could learn from them, and it did not. In this situation we are discussing, Boeing knew it had a problem after the first crash and was working on a fix yet the FAA did not take any steps towards grounding the plane then, and even after the second crash was reluctant to intercede till their hand was forced by China and Trump.

Boeing knew there was a problem after the first crash. We know this because they were working on a fix. Either they didn't understand the root cause and were working on a superficial fix, or they did understand the root cause and were deliberately avoiding the expense of a full fix by going forward with a superficial fix. One path suggests incompetence, the other path suggests sacrificing safety for profits. Either way there are some lessons to be learned here, yet the FAA IG report is silent on all of this.

The main lesson learned seems to be how to sweep things under the rug and cut your losses. Blame some unnamed engineer for following some industry standard four second rule that is not even a part of the Federal Aviation Rules. Release some drunken text messages between co-workers to draw the focus onto common human foibles rather than engineering mistakes or business priorities that were a big part of the reason they were drinking in the first place. Put your CEO in front of Congress knowing they won't resist the temptation to score points by ripping him on his pay package rather than asking nerdy questions about how his engineering department produced such a flawed plane or how it didn't take steps to ground the plane themselves. Fill the room with victim's families so they can vent at Boeing's CEO and take attention away from how Congress had ceded most regulatory authority to industry and wanted to cede it all.

All this talk of more openness going forward seems temporary at best because the lessons weren't learned. Even after losing billions of dollars Boeing's losses are still less than if they were found guilty of product liability. Their main goal all along was to find a scapegoat to pin it on and they seem to have done that. Calhoun says he's personally talked to the "four second guy" and that's good enough for everyone so far. Apparently we'll never know why he didn't insist on doing some real world experiments to see if actual pilots could deal with runaway MCAS, whether he was facing corporate pressure, etc. Calhoun says he feels bad about it, good enough. Sure they are paying out billions in compensation, that was going to be the case all along. At least they avoided Dieselgate V2 with executives in jail and wholesale buy backs of their products. They and future generations of business and law students will consider this to be a net win. Unless things change in a material way, that's the lesson that will be learned.
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StTim
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Tue Jul 14, 2020 12:41 pm

Good summary. Learning the wrong lessons indeed.
 
frmrCapCadet
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Tue Jul 14, 2020 1:12 pm

Public hearings are not where the real work is done. Member of congress are not experts, and rely on staff members or other persons to do the investigations in private committee sessions. The final reports did call for returning more authority to FAA and particularly its non-political workers. But isn't the Justice Department still investigating?

ps - Revelation, good post.
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TaromA380
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Tue Jul 14, 2020 2:10 pm

We should not forget that the FAA is a state agency.
While a corrupted private company can be thrown to the lion’s den, the state has its own way of dealing with such blows. It will not openly go into all the drama nor admit too much but will solve the problems in a discreet manner.
I’m fairly sure that after the FAA crashed (that day when the rest of the world grounded their child, the whole world but them) it was a historic shock and changes were made starting a new era.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Tue Jul 14, 2020 2:45 pm

SamYeager2016 wrote:
morrisond wrote:
Or you just do what any Pilot should be capable of - push the control column forward.

Don't tell me we're back to the refrain of "It was all the fault of those foreign pilots! Nothing wrong with the plane at all!" :sarcastic:


Nice Partial Quote.

The post I was replying to was implying that the only way out of a high angle attack going forward was repeated MCAS activations - I simply pointed out that the pilots would not have to sit there passively and wait for the plane to correct itself. If it was severe enough there would be multiple other indications (stick shaker, stall horn/voice) that something was amiss and they would have the option of using the big control like thingy in front of them versus waiting for the plane to correct itself.

You know - actually fly the plane. And no this is not a comment on the crashes - we are talking about MCAS 2.0 and going forward.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Tue Jul 14, 2020 2:56 pm

TaromA380 wrote:
We should not forget that the FAA is a state agency.
While a corrupted private company can be thrown to the lion’s den, the state has its own way of dealing with such blows. It will not openly go into all the drama nor admit too much but will solve the problems in a discreet manner.
I’m fairly sure that after the FAA crashed (that day when the rest of the world grounded their child, the whole world but them) it was a historic shock and changes were made starting a new era.

I wish I was as optimistic. I'm sure the short term caused a great amount of embarrassment and thus shook things up. I think longer term the corporate priority of less FAA regulation will continue to be pursued, and since it is the corporations that finance federal elections, they will eventually get what they want.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
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kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Tue Jul 14, 2020 3:32 pm

morrisond wrote:
SamYeager2016 wrote:
morrisond wrote:
Or you just do what any Pilot should be capable of - push the control column forward.

Don't tell me we're back to the refrain of "It was all the fault of those foreign pilots! Nothing wrong with the plane at all!" :sarcastic:


Nice Partial Quote.

The post I was replying to was implying that the only way out of a high angle attack going forward was repeated MCAS activations - I simply pointed out that the pilots would not have to sit there passively and wait for the plane to correct itself. If it was severe enough there would be multiple other indications (stick shaker, stall horn/voice) that something was amiss and they would have the option of using the big control like thingy in front of them versus waiting for the plane to correct itself.

You know - actually fly the plane. And no this is not a comment on the crashes - we are talking about MCAS 2.0 and going forward.

You keep forgetting that the very root cause is aerodynamic instability of the airframe. And since MCAS activation itself is a sign that there is an emergency going on - we're talking about handling emergency on top of emergency - and basically be akin of juggler skill, as those professionally deal with instabilities.
Sure, anything can be trained. A day in a sim on a weekly basis should provide ample familiraity with the situation, but I suspect airlines would be reluctant to do the right thing..
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Tue Jul 14, 2020 3:36 pm

Revelation wrote:
Noshow wrote:
Whatever people blame the pilots for the aviation authorities grounded all MAXes and required changes including changes of MCAS for a reason. This is where we are at now. Going back to square one is good for nothing. Lessons were learned and progress made - hopefully.

We are pointing out that lessons are not being learned.

The FAA IG report was supposed to report on the mistakes so we could learn from them, and it did not. In this situation we are discussing, Boeing knew it had a problem after the first crash and was working on a fix yet the FAA did not take any steps towards grounding the plane then, and even after the second crash was reluctant to intercede till their hand was forced by China and Trump.

Boeing knew there was a problem after the first crash. We know this because they were working on a fix. Either they didn't understand the root cause and were working on a superficial fix, or they did understand the root cause and were deliberately avoiding the expense of a full fix by going forward with a superficial fix. One path suggests incompetence, the other path suggests sacrificing safety for profits. Either way there are some lessons to be learned here, yet the FAA IG report is silent on all of this.

The main lesson learned seems to be how to sweep things under the rug and cut your losses. Blame some unnamed engineer for following some industry standard four second rule that is not even a part of the Federal Aviation Rules. Release some drunken text messages between co-workers to draw the focus onto common human foibles rather than engineering mistakes or business priorities that were a big part of the reason they were drinking in the first place. Put your CEO in front of Congress knowing they won't resist the temptation to score points by ripping him on his pay package rather than asking nerdy questions about how his engineering department produced such a flawed plane or how it didn't take steps to ground the plane themselves. Fill the room with victim's families so they can vent at Boeing's CEO and take attention away from how Congress had ceded most regulatory authority to industry and wanted to cede it all.

All this talk of more openness going forward seems temporary at best because the lessons weren't learned. Even after losing billions of dollars Boeing's losses are still less than if they were found guilty of product liability. Their main goal all along was to find a scapegoat to pin it on and they seem to have done that. Calhoun says he's personally talked to the "four second guy" and that's good enough for everyone so far. Apparently we'll never know why he didn't insist on doing some real world experiments to see if actual pilots could deal with runaway MCAS, whether he was facing corporate pressure, etc. Calhoun says he feels bad about it, good enough. Sure they are paying out billions in compensation, that was going to be the case all along. At least they avoided Dieselgate V2 with executives in jail and wholesale buy backs of their products. They and future generations of business and law students will consider this to be a net win. Unless things change in a material way, that's the lesson that will be learned.

A great overview - but basically focused on a high level / management perspective. WHich is a big - but not the only aspect of situation.
I would love to see a similar analysis from the design department engineer perspective. My feeling so far that Boeing is willing to throw technical folks under the bus - it happened to be "technical pilot" this time. This is a great way to attract talent and maintain good working environment - in management dreams..
 
dagKentWA
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Tue Jul 14, 2020 4:27 pm

kalvado wrote:
morrisond wrote:
SamYeager2016 wrote:
Don't tell me we're back to the refrain of "It was all the fault of those foreign pilots! Nothing wrong with the plane at all!" :sarcastic:


Nice Partial Quote.

The post I was replying to was implying that the only way out of a high angle attack going forward was repeated MCAS activations - I simply pointed out that the pilots would not have to sit there passively and wait for the plane to correct itself. If it was severe enough there would be multiple other indications (stick shaker, stall horn/voice) that something was amiss and they would have the option of using the big control like thingy in front of them versus waiting for the plane to correct itself.

You know - actually fly the plane. And no this is not a comment on the crashes - we are talking about MCAS 2.0 and going forward.

You keep forgetting that the very root cause is aerodynamic instability of the airframe. And since MCAS activation itself is a sign that there is an emergency going on - we're talking about handling emergency on top of emergency - and basically be akin of juggler skill, as those professionally deal with instabilities.
Sure, anything can be trained. A day in a sim on a weekly basis should provide ample familiraity with the situation, but I suspect airlines would be reluctant to do the right thing..


No. The root cause is that Boeing's customers wanted a plane that flew like the NG, so that they would not have to do additional training. To make the plane fly like an NG, MCAS was required, because yes, the plane flew differently as a result of the larger engines and the required change in CoG and the resulting tendency of the plane to pitch up while climbing & accelerating. But no one has ever proven that the plane was inherently unstable, only that it flew differently than the NG. And if a pilot knows how to fly, they can learn how to handle the aerodynamic characteristics of a particular model of plane.
 
StTim
Posts: 3754
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Tue Jul 14, 2020 4:55 pm

dagKentWA wrote:
kalvado wrote:
morrisond wrote:

Nice Partial Quote.

The post I was replying to was implying that the only way out of a high angle attack going forward was repeated MCAS activations - I simply pointed out that the pilots would not have to sit there passively and wait for the plane to correct itself. If it was severe enough there would be multiple other indications (stick shaker, stall horn/voice) that something was amiss and they would have the option of using the big control like thingy in front of them versus waiting for the plane to correct itself.

You know - actually fly the plane. And no this is not a comment on the crashes - we are talking about MCAS 2.0 and going forward.

You keep forgetting that the very root cause is aerodynamic instability of the airframe. And since MCAS activation itself is a sign that there is an emergency going on - we're talking about handling emergency on top of emergency - and basically be akin of juggler skill, as those professionally deal with instabilities.
Sure, anything can be trained. A day in a sim on a weekly basis should provide ample familiraity with the situation, but I suspect airlines would be reluctant to do the right thing..


No. The root cause is that Boeing's customers wanted a plane that flew like the NG, so that they would not have to do additional training. To make the plane fly like an NG, MCAS was required, because yes, the plane flew differently as a result of the larger engines and the required change in CoG and the resulting tendency of the plane to pitch up while climbing & accelerating. But no one has ever proven that the plane was inherently unstable, only that it flew differently than the NG. And if a pilot knows how to fly, they can learn how to handle the aerodynamic characteristics of a particular model of plane.


No - MCAS is required to meet the standard FAR regulations on control feel.
 
kalvado
Posts: 2932
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Tue Jul 14, 2020 5:00 pm

dagKentWA wrote:
kalvado wrote:
morrisond wrote:

Nice Partial Quote.

The post I was replying to was implying that the only way out of a high angle attack going forward was repeated MCAS activations - I simply pointed out that the pilots would not have to sit there passively and wait for the plane to correct itself. If it was severe enough there would be multiple other indications (stick shaker, stall horn/voice) that something was amiss and they would have the option of using the big control like thingy in front of them versus waiting for the plane to correct itself.

You know - actually fly the plane. And no this is not a comment on the crashes - we are talking about MCAS 2.0 and going forward.

You keep forgetting that the very root cause is aerodynamic instability of the airframe. And since MCAS activation itself is a sign that there is an emergency going on - we're talking about handling emergency on top of emergency - and basically be akin of juggler skill, as those professionally deal with instabilities.
Sure, anything can be trained. A day in a sim on a weekly basis should provide ample familiraity with the situation, but I suspect airlines would be reluctant to do the right thing..


No. The root cause is that Boeing's customers wanted a plane that flew like the NG, so that they would not have to do additional training. To make the plane fly like an NG, MCAS was required, because yes, the plane flew differently as a result of the larger engines and the required change in CoG and the resulting tendency of the plane to pitch up while climbing & accelerating. But no one has ever proven that the plane was inherently unstable, only that it flew differently than the NG. And if a pilot knows how to fly, they can learn how to handle the aerodynamic characteristics of a particular model of plane.

Wrong. Stick force reversal was acknowledged by Boeing - "although it is just a little bit". There is a specific FAR explicitly prohibiting that, period. And there is a pretty good reason why. MAX is not certifiable without MCAS, training or not. Full stop. "Just a little bit" excuse is like saying there was no rape as he only went a quater inch deep.

What made the story worse is not disclosing MCAS to pilots - which was indeed for commonality reasons so that NG pilots don't have to be trained to deal with a new safety system.
 
sgrow787
Posts: 450
Joined: Fri May 16, 2014 8:12 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Tue Jul 14, 2020 5:05 pm

dagKentWA wrote:
kalvado wrote:
morrisond wrote:

Nice Partial Quote.

The post I was replying to was implying that the only way out of a high angle attack going forward was repeated MCAS activations - I simply pointed out that the pilots would not have to sit there passively and wait for the plane to correct itself. If it was severe enough there would be multiple other indications (stick shaker, stall horn/voice) that something was amiss and they would have the option of using the big control like thingy in front of them versus waiting for the plane to correct itself.

You know - actually fly the plane. And no this is not a comment on the crashes - we are talking about MCAS 2.0 and going forward.

You keep forgetting that the very root cause is aerodynamic instability of the airframe. And since MCAS activation itself is a sign that there is an emergency going on - we're talking about handling emergency on top of emergency - and basically be akin of juggler skill, as those professionally deal with instabilities.
Sure, anything can be trained. A day in a sim on a weekly basis should provide ample familiraity with the situation, but I suspect airlines would be reluctant to do the right thing..


No. The root cause is that Boeing's customers wanted a plane that flew like the NG, so that they would not have to do additional training. To make the plane fly like an NG, MCAS was required, because yes, the plane flew differently as a result of the larger engines and the required change in CoG and the resulting tendency of the plane to pitch up while climbing & accelerating. But no one has ever proven that the plane was inherently unstable, only that it flew differently than the NG. And if a pilot knows how to fly, they can learn how to handle the aerodynamic characteristics of a particular model of plane.


Again, confusing root cause of Boeing's engineering failures with root cause of the fatal crashes, the latter having already been discussed at length on this forum.
Last edited by sgrow787 on Tue Jul 14, 2020 5:20 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.
 
iamlucky13
Posts: 1263
Joined: Wed Aug 08, 2007 12:35 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Tue Jul 14, 2020 6:15 pm

sgrow787 wrote:
Wallsendmag wrote:
Strange I was under the impression that every aviation authority around the World grounded it not the OEM


Boeing didn't ground the plane before the 2nd crash. In Nov 2018 shortly after the 1st crash, in a meeting with American Airlines Pilots Union pilots, Boeing refused to ground the plane, yet they knew there was a problem:

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/busi ... crash.html


That is correct, and it is old news. They knew repeated MCAS activations were a factor in the crash, but Boeing and global regulators did not appear to believe the situation was radically different from other potential upsets flight crews should be capable of recovering from, so they issued information on what MCAS system does and how to disable it. Unfortunately, even with that information, the crew of the Ethiopian flight still crashed. I'm going to stop there rather than reignite the debate on what the crew of the 2nd crash might have done differently.

From a high level perspective, it doesn't matter what the flight crew might have done differently. What matters is it once the data showed that MCAS had been involved in the Ethiopian crash as well, it was clear that the Lion Air crew's difficulty dealing with MCAS malfunctions was not unique. The assessment of low risk of continued operation with better information for crews who may face the issue had not borne out.
 
sgrow787
Posts: 450
Joined: Fri May 16, 2014 8:12 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Tue Jul 14, 2020 6:55 pm

iamlucky13 wrote:
sgrow787 wrote:
Wallsendmag wrote:
Strange I was under the impression that every aviation authority around the World grounded it not the OEM


Boeing didn't ground the plane before the 2nd crash. In Nov 2018 shortly after the 1st crash, in a meeting with American Airlines Pilots Union pilots, Boeing refused to ground the plane, yet they knew there was a problem:

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/busi ... crash.html


That is correct, and it is old news. They knew repeated MCAS activations were a factor in the crash, but Boeing and global regulators did not appear to believe the situation was radically different from other potential upsets flight crews should be capable of recovering from, so they issued information on what MCAS system does and how to disable it. Unfortunately, even with that information, the crew of the Ethiopian flight still crashed. I'm going to stop there rather than reignite the debate on what the crew of the 2nd crash might have done differently.

From a high level perspective, it doesn't matter what the flight crew might have done differently. What matters is it once the data showed that MCAS had been involved in the Ethiopian crash as well, it was clear that the Lion Air crew's difficulty dealing with MCAS malfunctions was not unique. The assessment of low risk of continued operation with better information for crews who may face the issue had not borne out.


Again, mixing words with actions. If Boeing's actions represent dominos, we have an odd coincidence of dominos lining up perfectly with Max design and certification processes, regardless of what Boeing and the FAA said after they got caught.
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.
 
ikramerica
Posts: 15100
Joined: Mon May 23, 2005 9:33 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Tue Jul 14, 2020 7:12 pm

SamYeager2016 wrote:
morrisond wrote:
Or you just do what any Pilot should be capable of - push the control column forward.

Don't tell me we're back to the refrain of "It was all the fault of those foreign pilots! Nothing wrong with the plane at all!" :sarcastic:

I don't think he said that.

He was saying that if MCAS is disabled, then the pilot would compensate for high angle of attack by pushing the stick forward meaning it's not so much a safety of flight issue to disable MCAS, but it makes the plane more manageable and less difficult to fly. Not that the pilots in the doomed flight were inept for not combatting MCAS effectively.
Of all the things to worry about... the Wookie has no pants.
 
9Patch
Posts: 616
Joined: Wed Mar 13, 2019 10:38 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Tue Jul 14, 2020 7:39 pm

2175301 wrote:
Actually, on the previoius Lion Air Flight, my memory of the reports is that the PIC used manual trim multiple times to correct and maintain control. There was a 3rd pilot flying either as a passenger or in the jump-seat who knew enough about the system that had MCAS, or recognized it as runaway stablizer, to suggest turning it off... stopping the problem.

Yes, and then the Lion Air pilots continued on to their destination, instead of getting that plane on the ground ASAP!
Apparently they didn't warn the next crew of what might happen.
 
kalvado
Posts: 2932
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Tue Jul 14, 2020 8:02 pm

9Patch wrote:
2175301 wrote:
Actually, on the previoius Lion Air Flight, my memory of the reports is that the PIC used manual trim multiple times to correct and maintain control. There was a 3rd pilot flying either as a passenger or in the jump-seat who knew enough about the system that had MCAS, or recognized it as runaway stablizer, to suggest turning it off... stopping the problem.

Yes, and then the Lion Air pilots continued on to their destination, instead of getting that plane on the ground ASAP!
Apparently they didn't warn the next crew of what might happen.

Apparently, there was a maintenance write-up left by the first Lion crew and some corrective action between flights. Apparently, the first crew didn't fully understand what happened and write-up was very approximate. Pilots held in the dark about MCAS certainly didn't help.
 
9Patch
Posts: 616
Joined: Wed Mar 13, 2019 10:38 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Tue Jul 14, 2020 9:43 pm

kalvado wrote:
9Patch wrote:
2175301 wrote:
Actually, on the previoius Lion Air Flight, my memory of the reports is that the PIC used manual trim multiple times to correct and maintain control. There was a 3rd pilot flying either as a passenger or in the jump-seat who knew enough about the system that had MCAS, or recognized it as runaway stablizer, to suggest turning it off... stopping the problem.

Yes, and then the Lion Air pilots continued on to their destination, instead of getting that plane on the ground ASAP!
Apparently they didn't warn the next crew of what might happen.

Apparently, there was a maintenance write-up left by the first Lion crew and some corrective action between flights. Apparently, the first crew didn't fully understand what happened and write-up was very approximate. Pilots held in the dark about MCAS certainly didn't help.

All the holes in the Swiss cheese lined up.
 
iamlucky13
Posts: 1263
Joined: Wed Aug 08, 2007 12:35 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Tue Jul 14, 2020 10:11 pm

sgrow787 wrote:
iamlucky13 wrote:
sgrow787 wrote:

Boeing didn't ground the plane before the 2nd crash. In Nov 2018 shortly after the 1st crash, in a meeting with American Airlines Pilots Union pilots, Boeing refused to ground the plane, yet they knew there was a problem:

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/busi ... crash.html


That is correct, and it is old news. They knew repeated MCAS activations were a factor in the crash, but Boeing and global regulators did not appear to believe the situation was radically different from other potential upsets flight crews should be capable of recovering from, so they issued information on what MCAS system does and how to disable it. Unfortunately, even with that information, the crew of the Ethiopian flight still crashed. I'm going to stop there rather than reignite the debate on what the crew of the 2nd crash might have done differently.

From a high level perspective, it doesn't matter what the flight crew might have done differently. What matters is it once the data showed that MCAS had been involved in the Ethiopian crash as well, it was clear that the Lion Air crew's difficulty dealing with MCAS malfunctions was not unique. The assessment of low risk of continued operation with better information for crews who may face the issue had not borne out.


Again, mixing words with actions. If Boeing's actions represent dominos, we have an odd coincidence of dominos lining up perfectly with Max design and certification processes, regardless of what Boeing and the FAA said after they got caught.


You're not making clear what your point is. We know there was a coincidence of circumstances lining up to lead to the crashes despite multiple layers of safety. That is the case with most crashes and not in question here.

The words and the actions are consistent, but based on flawed information. After the first crash, Boeing and the regulators believed the plane could be operated safely despite the issue if crews were more explicitly aware there could be a need to follow a runaway stabilizer procedure as an interim mitigation until a permanent fix was ready. Those was their words. They allowed it to continue operating after the Lionair crash. That was their action.

The real problem is the mistakes in the risk analysis that concluded pilot actions to counter a fault were reasonable and sufficient for the conditions that would be present if a fault occurred. That led to the conclusion redundancy was not required in order to prevent a fault, rather than just assure it was rare. They also failed to re-analyze the risk as the design evolved to allow more stabilizer travel due to MCAS. Those mistakes were not resolved when the grounding questions were first asked, so the same mistaken risk analysis led to the same mistaken conclusion.

When the second crash happened, they limited their words for 2 days while they started the action of collecting and analyzing the data. The media, writing to an audience that doesn't even understand simple words like "literally," had no difficulty spinning the FAA's technical words that they hadn't determined "systemic performance issues" as if the FAA were declaring summarily that there was no problem. A few less official comments were actually rather dismissive, but those comments were not the basis of the FAA decisions. However, the actual text of the [url="https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/media/CAN_2019_03.pdf"]CANIC[/url] issued the day of the accident indicated they were investigating what the problem is and whether it was related to the previous crash:
External reports are drawing similarities between this accident and the Lion Air Flight 610 accident on October 29, 2018. However, this investigation has just begun and to date we have not been provided data to draw any conclusions or take any actions.


Somewhere around 2-1/2 days after the crash, before the flight data recorders had even been read, but once they had a look at the elevation data broadcast by the aircraft, and received the report from the investigators on the ground that the horizontal stabilizer jack screw was in an extreme nose down position, they concluded the evidence presented significant concern the crashes were related, and they grounded the MAX.
 
2175301
Posts: 1909
Joined: Wed May 16, 2007 11:19 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Tue Jul 14, 2020 10:33 pm

Everyone: Please understand that it is rare for an aircraft company to ground an aircraft based on an event - with with solid evidence of a problem.

Airbus did not ground the A330 after AF447, even though they had the automated maintenance system (ACARS) reports of pitot tube issues, and they already knew there was an icing problem with the pitot tubes installed on that and other A330's. My memory was they was a directive out there and everyone had "x" amount of time to replace the pitot tubes with a different design.

Airbus had another aircraft fall a substantial height due to a flight envelope software error before the pilots recovered the flight (I don't recall the exact reference or aircraft model; but was identified and discussed during the Lion Air and Ethiopian crash threads). Both EASA and Airbus felt that they could just work on a software fix to be incorporated in the future.

I am sure that you can find many similar issues with all manufactures. It is a very rare and extreem situation where the aircraft manufacturer will ground an aircraft.

Both Boeing and the FAA thought that the directive to notify people of MCAS and use of the runaway stabilizer checklist would be an adequate response to the Lion Air crash, and it is in line with other issues discovered on other aircraft over the years.

Have a great day,
 
jwjsamster
Posts: 45
Joined: Thu Jun 10, 2010 12:12 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Tue Jul 14, 2020 10:36 pm

I'm sorry if this has been answered already, but will Boeing's fix require separate certification of the MAX aircraft from the NGs?

Thank you
 
sgrow787
Posts: 450
Joined: Fri May 16, 2014 8:12 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Tue Jul 14, 2020 10:51 pm

iamlucky13 wrote:
You're not making clear what your point is. We know there was a coincidence of circumstances lining up to lead to the crashes despite multiple layers of safety. That is the case with most crashes and not in question here.

The words and the actions are consistent, but based on flawed information. After the first crash, Boeing and the regulators believed the plane could be operated safely despite the issue if crews were more explicitly aware there could be a need to follow a runaway stabilizer procedure as an interim mitigation until a permanent fix was ready. Those was their words. They allowed it to continue operating after the Lionair crash. That was their action.

The real problem is the mistakes in the risk analysis that concluded pilot actions to counter a fault were reasonable and sufficient for the conditions that would be present if a fault occurred. That led to the conclusion redundancy was not required in order to prevent a fault, rather than just assure it was rare. They also failed to re-analyze the risk as the design evolved to allow more stabilizer travel due to MCAS. Those mistakes were not resolved when the grounding questions were first asked, so the same mistaken risk analysis led to the same mistaken conclusion.

When the second crash happened, they limited their words for 2 days while they started the action of collecting and analyzing the data. The media, writing to an audience that doesn't even understand simple words like "literally," had no difficulty spinning the FAA's technical words that they hadn't determined "systemic performance issues" as if the FAA were declaring summarily that there was no problem. A few less official comments were actually rather dismissive, but those comments were not the basis of the FAA decisions. However, the actual text of the [url="https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/media/CAN_2019_03.pdf"]CANIC[/url] issued the day of the accident indicated they were investigating what the problem is and whether it was related to the previous crash:
External reports are drawing similarities between this accident and the Lion Air Flight 610 accident on October 29, 2018. However, this investigation has just begun and to date we have not been provided data to draw any conclusions or take any actions.


Somewhere around 2-1/2 days after the crash, before the flight data recorders had even been read, but once they had a look at the elevation data broadcast by the aircraft, and received the report from the investigators on the ground that the horizontal stabilizer jack screw was in an extreme nose down position, they concluded the evidence presented significant concern the crashes were related, and they grounded the MAX.


Words and actions with respect to the Max design and certification. You keep wanting to talk about the crashes and the root cause of them. How much clearer do I need to be??
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.
 
User avatar
Stitch
Posts: 27306
Joined: Wed Jul 06, 2005 4:26 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Tue Jul 14, 2020 11:49 pm

2175301 wrote:
Airbus had another aircraft fall a substantial height due to a flight envelope software error before the pilots recovered the flight (I don't recall the exact reference or aircraft model; but was identified and discussed during the Lion Air and Ethiopian crash threads). Both EASA and Airbus felt that they could just work on a software fix to be incorporated in the future.


Qantas Flight 72 on 7 October 2008.
 
9Patch
Posts: 616
Joined: Wed Mar 13, 2019 10:38 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Jul 15, 2020 1:17 am

Stitch wrote:
2175301 wrote:
Airbus had another aircraft fall a substantial height due to a flight envelope software error before the pilots recovered the flight (I don't recall the exact reference or aircraft model; but was identified and discussed during the Lion Air and Ethiopian crash threads). Both EASA and Airbus felt that they could just work on a software fix to be incorporated in the future.


Qantas Flight 72 on 7 October 2008.

Which according to Wiki was a Airbus A330-303.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qantas_Flight_72
 
asdf
Posts: 705
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Jul 15, 2020 6:42 am

2175301 wrote:
Airbus did not ground the A330 after AF447, even though they had the automated maintenance system (ACARS) reports of pitot tube issues, and they already knew there was an icing problem with the pitot tubes installed on that and other A330's. My memory was they was a directive out there and everyone had "x" amount of time to replace the pitot tubes with a different design.

you are right
only air france busses had that faulty french pitot tubes and air france for months didnt follow the directive to change them to the standard ones (not from france manufacturing)

2175301 wrote:
Airbus had another aircraft fall a substantial height due to a flight envelope software error before the pilots recovered the flight (I don't recall the exact reference or aircraft model; but was identified and discussed during the Lion Air and Ethiopian crash threads). Both EASA and Airbus felt that they could just work on a software fix to be incorporated in the future.

the big difference is that the busses and all transport cetegory aircrafts beside the boeing 737MAX are aerodynamical perfectly flyable planes. the boeing 737MAX isnt.
engines to far in front and to high on the wing mountet
to reach economic goals

the MAX dont fly well without augmentation

the other boeings and the busses fly perfectly well without augmentation

thats the difference
 
ACATROYAL
Posts: 67
Joined: Mon Aug 20, 2007 11:25 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Jul 15, 2020 9:50 am

There have been lots of great debates and arguments in this thread throughout the last year however one very important point will soon come to light and that is... will passengers fly in the MAX? I took an unofficial poll with roughly 40 people in the last few weeks to see if they knew they were going to fly in a MAX would they actually get in the plane. The results were not to surprising.... 34 out of 40 said No they wouldn't! These people I asked were regular folks unlike the aviation geeks that we are. Over one year in the news has given the MAX a very negative image that may take a long time to shake. Personally I doubt I'll get in one anytime soon as well...
 
Noshow
Posts: 1781
Joined: Wed Jun 15, 2016 3:20 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Jul 15, 2020 9:56 am

I wouldn't mind to fly if the mods get greenlighted by FAA, EASA and Canada and the crews trained.
 
Opus99
Posts: 1152
Joined: Thu May 30, 2019 10:51 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Jul 15, 2020 9:57 am

ACATROYAL wrote:
There have been lots of great debates and arguments in this thread throughout the last year however one very important point will soon come to light and that is... will passengers fly in the MAX? I took an unofficial poll with roughly 40 people in the last few weeks to see if they knew they were going to fly in a MAX would they actually get in the plane. The results were not to surprising.... 34 out of 40 said No they wouldn't! These people I asked were regular folks unlike the aviation geeks that we are. Over one year in the news has given the MAX a very negative image that may take a long time to shake. Personally I doubt I'll get in one anytime soon as well...

The general public will initially avoid the MAX no doubt, I think until they see about a year or so of people getting on it and not falling from the sky then they may begin to have a change of heart. Eventually people will get on a MAX no doubt. I always use American Airlines as an example of an airline that has had so many incidents and accidents so much that I just couldn't see myself ever flying them but I eventually did...I don't know if that applies but yes but personally, the day it gets the green light I would go on it, simply because we've been informed of how scrutinised its been over the past year

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