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hivue
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 4:22 am

I have payed zero attention to the MAX saga for a few months now. Upon returning to it I see that the "MCAS is a stall prevention system" myth persists, to the point where the Lion Air and Ethiopian accidents are now being attributed to MCAS failing to prevent stalls. From Tuesday's Dallas Morning News in an article on AA's plans for MAX pilot training by its "aviation writer":

The process has focused on the antistall system on the 737 Max known as MCAS, which created a difficult-to-control stall that was blamed for the two crashes.
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Chemist
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 5:32 am

hivue wrote:
I have payed zero attention to the MAX saga for a few months now. Upon returning to it I see that the "MCAS is a stall prevention system" myth persists, to the point where the Lion Air and Ethiopian accidents are now being attributed to MCAS failing to prevent stalls. From Tuesday's Dallas Morning News in an article on AA's plans for MAX pilot training by its "aviation writer":

The process has focused on the antistall system on the 737 Max known as MCAS, which created a difficult-to-control stall that was blamed for the two crashes.


Perhaps one of the posters from this forum should apply for that writer's job.
 
kyu
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 9:52 am

I'm surprised this hasn't been brought up so far:
(Seattle Times) FAA engineers demand more changes to the flight crew alerting system and want regulatory waivers to be rescinded.

I'm curious if FAA management manages to ignore them yet again.
 
Opus99
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 11:39 am

kyu wrote:
I'm surprised this hasn't been brought up so far:
(Seattle Times) FAA engineers demand more changes to the flight crew alerting system and want regulatory waivers to be rescinded.

I'm curious if FAA management manages to ignore them yet again.

They probably will. Especially if it's just not the FAA that's fine with the aircraft. If Transport Canada and the EASA give the aircraft the okay. they are throwing all that commentary in the bin. The FAA isn't the only putting their a** on the line here. Unfortunately. Apparently the changes will be lengthy and costly. The FAA seems to want the aircraft to be safe. could it be safer? sure everything potentially could but safe seems fine with the FAA
 
kyu
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 12:12 pm

Opus99 wrote:
kyu wrote:
I'm surprised this hasn't been brought up so far:
(Seattle Times) FAA engineers demand more changes to the flight crew alerting system and want regulatory waivers to be rescinded.

I'm curious if FAA management manages to ignore them yet again.

They probably will. Especially if it's just not the FAA that's fine with the aircraft. If Transport Canada and the EASA give the aircraft the okay. they are throwing all that commentary in the bin. The FAA isn't the only putting their a** on the line here. Unfortunately. Apparently the changes will be lengthy and costly. The FAA seems to want the aircraft to be safe. could it be safer? sure everything potentially could but safe seems fine with the FAA

It will be very interesting to see if TC and EASA will side with FAA management or the FAA union of engineers. Also, Congress politicians will probably have a word if FAA management just intend to scrap the appeals, because it would look bad on them after their high-profile grandstanding.
 
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keesje
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 12:56 pm

kyu wrote:
Opus99 wrote:
kyu wrote:
I'm surprised this hasn't been brought up so far:
(Seattle Times) FAA engineers demand more changes to the flight crew alerting system and want regulatory waivers to be rescinded.

I'm curious if FAA management manages to ignore them yet again.

They probably will. Especially if it's just not the FAA that's fine with the aircraft. If Transport Canada and the EASA give the aircraft the okay. they are throwing all that commentary in the bin. The FAA isn't the only putting their a** on the line here. Unfortunately. Apparently the changes will be lengthy and costly. The FAA seems to want the aircraft to be safe. could it be safer? sure everything potentially could but safe seems fine with the FAA

It will be very interesting to see if TC and EASA will side with FAA management or the FAA union of engineers. Also, Congress politicians will probably have a word if FAA management just intend to scrap the appeals, because it would look bad on them after their high-profile grandstanding.


The crew alert system has been a discussion point way before the Max. It played a prominent role in previous 737 crashes. Boeing managed to avoid an expensive, time consuming modification again during 737 MAX certification. The international 737 MAX JATR experts committee addressed this issue in their okt 2019 report.

We now have better insight in the Boeing - FAA relationship and allowing exemptions during the 737 MAX certification. It's a bit sad that only the FAA engineers union dares to bring this up. No individuals dare to raise their hand? Was Boeing again keeping quiet, getting away with the dated, confusing crew alert system not meeting 2017 requirements? That would be bad for regaining credibility.

https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2019/oct/03/boeing-pushed-faa-to-relax-737-max-certification-r/
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morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 1:25 pm

keesje wrote:
kyu wrote:
Opus99 wrote:
They probably will. Especially if it's just not the FAA that's fine with the aircraft. If Transport Canada and the EASA give the aircraft the okay. they are throwing all that commentary in the bin. The FAA isn't the only putting their a** on the line here. Unfortunately. Apparently the changes will be lengthy and costly. The FAA seems to want the aircraft to be safe. could it be safer? sure everything potentially could but safe seems fine with the FAA

It will be very interesting to see if TC and EASA will side with FAA management or the FAA union of engineers. Also, Congress politicians will probably have a word if FAA management just intend to scrap the appeals, because it would look bad on them after their high-profile grandstanding.


The crew alert system has been a discussion point way before the Max. It played a prominent role in previous 737 crashes. Boeing managed to avoid an expensive, time consuming modification again during 737 MAX certification. The international 737 MAX JATR experts committee addressed this issue in their okt 2019 report.

We now have better insight in the Boeing - FAA relationship and allowing exemptions during the 737 MAX certification. It's a bit sad that only the FAA engineers union dares to bring this up. No individuals dare to raise their hand? Was Boeing again keeping quiet, getting away with the dated, confusing crew alert system not meeting 2017 requirements? That would be bad for regaining credibility.

https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2019/oct/03/boeing-pushed-faa-to-relax-737-max-certification-r/


EICAS doesn't have a perfect record either if the implementation is botched.

The NG seems to do fine without it with an accident rate not significantly different than its main competitor which has EICAS.

Maybe if Pilots focused on actually flying the aircraft and not relying upon what the computers are telling them we would get a better overall rate. Computer systems aren't perfect but unfortunately as they get closer to perfection and more complex, necessary skills are lost as training is focused on learning the more complex systems and Pilots rely on Computers to tell them what to do vs just flying the airplane.

We may really be getting close to the point where we may have a safer system by taking the pilots out of the loop of normal flight other than just being the ultimate manual flying backup and focus training on that - stick and rudder skills. Let the computers do the normal flying and if anything goes wrong the Pilot hits the big red button and takes over.
 
Noshow
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 1:26 pm

Isn't this entire public remarks phase scheduled a little too late? Modifications have been designed, installed, flight tested and such. Any new major change would put the program on another years's hold now? Back to square one? After all the work and waiting. I am not supporting rushing things for sure but practically remarks were needed before the changes not after?
 
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keesje
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 2:08 pm

Two Senate members try to force Boeing and FAA to play open book this time.

“Robust transparency is needed to ensure that independent experts and the public can review whether this aircraft is truly safe before it takes to the skies again,” the senators wrote. Boeing declined to comment. The FAA said it would respond directly to the senators.

The senators cited reports that suggested the FAA had often yielded to Boeing. “The FAA has demonstrated a disturbing pattern of deferral to Boeing in the past, and we feel strongly that the agency must fully disclose of all information related to its determinations moving forward,” the senators wrote.

Separately, major pilots unions said the FAA should require new cockpit procedures for the 737 MAX to help pilots disable an erroneous stall alert that could be a serious distraction during midflight emergencies.


https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boei ... SKCN26D1ZB

People (FAA union, British pilots) seem to fear half baked solutions are pushed through again.

The crew alert system & trim wheel issue should be solved, Boeing had 18 months, if they spent them the right way.
Last edited by keesje on Wed Sep 23, 2020 2:12 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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kyu
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 2:08 pm

keesje wrote:
kyu wrote:
Opus99 wrote:
They probably will. Especially if it's just not the FAA that's fine with the aircraft. If Transport Canada and the EASA give the aircraft the okay. they are throwing all that commentary in the bin. The FAA isn't the only putting their a** on the line here. Unfortunately. Apparently the changes will be lengthy and costly. The FAA seems to want the aircraft to be safe. could it be safer? sure everything potentially could but safe seems fine with the FAA

It will be very interesting to see if TC and EASA will side with FAA management or the FAA union of engineers. Also, Congress politicians will probably have a word if FAA management just intend to scrap the appeals, because it would look bad on them after their high-profile grandstanding.


The crew alert system has been a discussion point way before the Max. It played a prominent role in previous 737 crashes. Boeing managed to avoid an expensive, time consuming modification again during 737 MAX certification. The international 737 MAX JATR experts committee addressed this issue in their okt 2019 report.

We now have better insight in the Boeing - FAA relationship and allowing exemptions during the 737 MAX certification. It's a bit sad that only the FAA engineers union dares to bring this up. No individuals dare to raise their hand? Was Boeing again keeping quiet, getting away with the dated, confusing crew alert system not meeting 2017 requirements? That would be bad for regaining credibility.

https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2019/oct/03/boeing-pushed-faa-to-relax-737-max-certification-r/

Well, it is at least also Curtis Ewbank, BALPA, and TC. There could be more amongst the 200 submissions.
 
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flyingturtle
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 2:52 pm

morrisond wrote:
The NG seems to do fine without it with an accident rate not significantly different than its main competitor which has EICAS.

Maybe if Pilots focused on actually flying the aircraft and not relying upon what the computers are telling them we would get a better overall rate.


I'm wondering how a plane would look like if you designed one. Maybe one without an airspeed indication, because pilots should trust their senses...

While the effect is small in terms of crashed airliners, the effect is huge when you think of a crew that is facing a big workload. There's a reason things like EICAS are mandatory in newer aircraft.

In any distress, you simply do not have the time for reasoning whether you or the computer is smarter. "Actually flying the plane" is only part of the answer.
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Francoflier
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 3:14 pm

flyingturtle wrote:
morrisond wrote:
The NG seems to do fine without it with an accident rate not significantly different than its main competitor which has EICAS.

Maybe if Pilots focused on actually flying the aircraft and not relying upon what the computers are telling them we would get a better overall rate.


I'm wondering how a plane would look like if you designed one. Maybe one without an airspeed indication, because pilots should trust their senses...

While the effect is small in terms of crashed airliners, the effect is huge when you think of a crew that is facing a big workload. There's a reason things like EICAS are mandatory in newer aircraft.

In any distress, you simply do not have the time for reasoning whether you or the computer is smarter. "Actually flying the plane" is only part of the answer.


Morrisond has been trying to shift the blame on pilots since the start of the MAX crisis.

Yet, for the last year and a half, the airplane has been grounded on technical ground while no further pilot training has been required from authorities (other than the additional MCAS related training that will be required for MAX pilots only).

He is not a pilot nor has any knowledge of how to operate an airliner, yet seems to know more than all of the industry experts combined...
We're either in tinfoil hat territory, raging fanboyism or downright corporate propaganda. Either way, it's hopeless.
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morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 3:15 pm

flyingturtle wrote:
morrisond wrote:
The NG seems to do fine without it with an accident rate not significantly different than its main competitor which has EICAS.

Maybe if Pilots focused on actually flying the aircraft and not relying upon what the computers are telling them we would get a better overall rate.


I'm wondering how a plane would look like if you designed one. Maybe one without an airspeed indication, because pilots should trust their senses...

While the effect is small in terms of crashed airliners, the effect is huge when you think of a crew that is facing a big workload. There's a reason things like EICAS are mandatory in newer aircraft.

In any distress, you simply do not have the time for reasoning whether you or the computer is smarter. "Actually flying the plane" is only part of the answer.


You don't really have time to read EICAS either before you usually need to take control if you are in distress. Take manual control and stabilize things and then work the problem.

No in my world Pilots would actually use the back-up instruments they already have that aren't dependent on Computers and rely on those back-up systems when things are outside the ordinary.

That is the problem though - the big workload - which these days just seems to be managing the Auto-pilot. I would suggest Computers are better off at managing those systems in regular flight than trying to make them understandable for pilots to hit the right button.

Things would probably be safer if Ground control computers issued direct navigation instructions to the Airplanes Computers and took the pilot out of the loop. They would just monitor and take over if necessary.

What is safer - fix the MAX with its existing systems and alerting system that 10,000's of thousands of pilots are familiar with on an airframe that has about the same safety record as its EICAS competitor - or throw it all out - put an entirely new alerting system in the aircraft and retrain all those pilots? Adding new systems that weren't necessarily needed didn't work out so well last time.
 
frmrCapCadet
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 3:22 pm

I am trying to understand what just 'actually flying the aircraft' versus 'what the computer is telling them' means. The two seem to me to be substantially intertwined. Airbus, if I understand correctly, has at least a few levels of computer assists. One of which is about as close as Airbus allows a pilot to 'just fly the aircraft', but even there computers have a role. Perhaps someone could offer a non-technical description of what the computers do at their various levels of assist/control. They are well integrated as I understand. The MAX's are not.

Anecdotal and perhaps explaining what bothers me. My poorly integrated safety features on a RAV4 never quite tell me what the car and its sensors want to do, yet I can't just actually drive it if I don't know what it isn't telling me. Kid's Tesla with its integrated features and its 15 inch screen does a better but not perfect job.
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keesje
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 3:30 pm

On the crew alert system, it was involved in confused crews / crashes on the NG (e.g. TK 1953, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/20/busi ... dents.html ). Boeing managed to convince FAA it were mostly crew failures & did minor improvements. When the MAX came up, it argued all those cases were solved, closed, so they could not be included in the crew alert system track record. That crew alert system track record instantly looked good again. And if it works, why change it?

https://time.com/5687473/boeing-737-alarm-system/

Upgrading to e.g. 1994 ~777 standards, meeting newer requirements would be "impractical" . Impractical meaning costing a lot of money and time, which would hurt 737 MAX competitiveness and the US aircraft industry. So Boeing was exempted. Congress, Boeing and FAA were al strongly involved in this process, so it's now foreign entities making sure the crew alerting system doesn't get "lost" or exempted from proper certification.
"Never mistake motion for action." Ernest Hemingway
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 3:34 pm

Upon reflection, the Leeham article I posted yesterday ( https://leehamnews.com/2020/09/14/why-i ... nt-before/ ) seems to be the most direct in saying the real issue was MCAS's unacceptably bad implementation.

It points out the plane really is stable by saying it still needs to be flyable when MCAS is off so it HAS to be stable or it never would have been certified in the first place.

In short, Fehrm is suggesting without directly saying that MAX would have been fine if they could have gotten the MCAS-only fix deployed before the second crash.

I'm disappointed that Congress and FAA's own internal reviews haven't focused on how both Boeing and FAA reacted to the first crash.

Everyone seems to want to give them a pass on it, even though they had more than enough evidence that their worst case scenario was playing out in the field so they really needed to revisit their assumptions.
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Opus99
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 3:57 pm

Noshow wrote:
Isn't this entire public remarks phase scheduled a little too late? Modifications have been designed, installed, flight tested and such. Any new major change would put the program on another years's hold now? Back to square one? After all the work and waiting. I am not supporting rushing things for sure but practically remarks were needed before the changes not after?

Which is exactly why I feel like it’s a complete PR stunt. FAA will say they’re reviewing them took them on. Maybe they’ll be implemented on the MAX 10 and then spread across when the Boeing has designed it. Who knows
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 4:01 pm

Opus99 wrote:
Noshow wrote:
Isn't this entire public remarks phase scheduled a little too late? Modifications have been designed, installed, flight tested and such. Any new major change would put the program on another years's hold now? Back to square one? After all the work and waiting. I am not supporting rushing things for sure but practically remarks were needed before the changes not after?

Which is exactly why I feel like it’s a complete PR stunt. FAA will say they’re reviewing them took them on. Maybe they’ll be implemented on the MAX 10 and then spread across when the Boeing has designed it. Who knows

That's pretty much what happened with the earlier FAA reports, they said thank you for your comments, we'll keep them under advisement, and we're going to do what we planned to do all along. EU or CN didn't raise a fit then, not sure why we'd expect them to now.
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Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
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kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 4:14 pm

Revelation wrote:
In short, Fehrm is suggesting without directly saying that MAX would have been fine if they could have gotten the MCAS-only fix deployed before the second crash.

Honestly speaking, that is most likely the truth. Moreover, looks like that is what 2 year grounding boils down to - MCAS fix and some feel-good moves. we may be talking about reducing total MCAS related crashes over MAX lifetime from 2.05 expected if MCAS was fixed before ET crash to 2.001 with all the changes.
I just hope that all the other MAX changes got some level of attention.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 4:27 pm

keesje wrote:
On the crew alert system, it was involved in confused crews / crashes on the NG (e.g. TK 1953, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/20/busi ... dents.html ). Boeing managed to convince FAA it were mostly crew failures & did minor improvements. When the MAX came up, it argued all those cases were solved, closed, so they could not be included in the crew alert system track record. That crew alert system track record instantly looked good again. And if it works, why change it?

https://time.com/5687473/boeing-737-alarm-system/

Upgrading to e.g. 1994 ~777 standards, meeting newer requirements would be "impractical" . Impractical meaning costing a lot of money and time, which would hurt 737 MAX competitiveness and the US aircraft industry. So Boeing was exempted. Congress, Boeing and FAA were al strongly involved in this process, so it's now foreign entities making sure the crew alerting system doesn't get "lost" or exempted from proper certification.


Do you mean TK 1951?

That sure reads like poor Piloting technique to me - not keeping your hand on the thrust levers and not noticing that power had rolled back for 100 seconds and not constantly scanning your airspeed. That is one of the benefits of the 737's ancient back driven thrust levers - you know immediately if the computer is doing something it shouldn't.

From Wiki "While on final approach for landing, the aircraft was about 2,000 ft (610 m) above ground, when the left-hand (captain's) radio altimeter suddenly changed from 1,950 feet (590 m) to read −8 feet (−2.4 m) height, although the right-hand (co-pilot's) radio altimeter functioned correctly.[10] The voice recording showed that the crew was given an audible warning signal ("TOO LOW!, GEAR!") that indicated that the aircraft's landing gear should be down, as the aircraft was, according to the radio altimeter, flying too low.[10] Later, the safety board's preliminary report modified this analysis, indicating that the flight data recorder history of the captain's radio altimeter showed 8191 feet (the maximum possible recorded) until the aircraft descended through 1950, then suddenly showed negative 8 feet.[40]

The throttles were pulled back to idle thrust to slow the aircraft to descend and acquire the glideslope, but the autothrottle unexpectedly reverted to "retard" mode, which is designed to automatically decrease thrust shortly before touching down on the runway at 27 feet (8.2 m) above runway height.[41] At 144 kt, the pilots manually increased thrust to sustain that speed,[40] but the autothrottle immediately returned the thrust lever to idle power because the first officer did not hold the throttle lever in position. The throttles remained at idle for about 100 seconds while the aircraft slowed to 83 knots (154 km/h), 40 knots (74 km/h) below reference speed as the aircraft descended below the required height to stay on the glideslope.[42] The stick-shaker activated at about 150 metres (490 ft) above the ground, indicating an imminent stall, the autothrottle advanced, and the captain attempted to apply full power.[42] The engines responded, but there was not enough altitude or forward airspeed to recover, and the aircraft hit the ground tail-first at 95 knots (176 km/h).[42

Not monitoring your airspeed and thrust on approach is a big no no and is so basic a piloting skill. Or are we excusing crews from these blunders as well and blaming it on lack of EICAS?

At least the previous crews got it right - WIKI Again "The data from the flight recorder also showed that the same altimeter problem had happened twice during the previous eight landings but that on both occasions the crew had taken the correct action by disengaging the auto throttle and manually increasing the thrust. Investigations are under way to determine why more action had not been taken after the altimeter problem was detected"

The previous crews hit the big red button (figuratively speaking by disengaging auto throttle) and got it right. TK 1951 was fatal due to bad piloting - not lack of EICAS.
 
Chemist
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 5:16 pm

It's a complex problem. On the one hand an autothrottle is a great thing. OTOH by using it all the time it causes complacency in scanning your instruments. Witness Asiana in SFO, or the guy sleeping in a Tesla on autopilot going 90mph. You assume the computers will keep you under control and you quit cross checking so often.
 
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keesje
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 5:37 pm

morrisond wrote:
keesje wrote:
On the crew alert system, it was involved in confused crews / crashes on the NG (e.g. TK 1953, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/20/busi ... dents.html ). Boeing managed to convince FAA it were mostly crew failures & did minor improvements. When the MAX came up, it argued all those cases were solved, closed, so they could not be included in the crew alert system track record. That crew alert system track record instantly looked good again. And if it works, why change it?

https://time.com/5687473/boeing-737-alarm-system/

Upgrading to e.g. 1994 ~777 standards, meeting newer requirements would be "impractical" . Impractical meaning costing a lot of money and time, which would hurt 737 MAX competitiveness and the US aircraft industry. So Boeing was exempted. Congress, Boeing and FAA were al strongly involved in this process, so it's now foreign entities making sure the crew alerting system doesn't get "lost" or exempted from proper certification.


Do you mean TK 1951?

That sure reads like poor Piloting technique to me - not keeping your hand on the thrust levers and not noticing that power had rolled back for 100 seconds and not constantly scanning your airspeed. That is one of the benefits of the 737's ancient back driven thrust levers - you know immediately if the computer is doing something it shouldn't.

From Wiki "While on final approach for landing, the aircraft was about 2,000 ft (610 m) above ground, when the left-hand (captain's) radio altimeter suddenly changed from 1,950 feet (590 m) to read −8 feet (−2.4 m) height, although the right-hand (co-pilot's) radio altimeter functioned correctly.[10] The voice recording showed that the crew was given an audible warning signal ("TOO LOW!, GEAR!") that indicated that the aircraft's landing gear should be down, as the aircraft was, according to the radio altimeter, flying too low.[10] Later, the safety board's preliminary report modified this analysis, indicating that the flight data recorder history of the captain's radio altimeter showed 8191 feet (the maximum possible recorded) until the aircraft descended through 1950, then suddenly showed negative 8 feet.[40]

The throttles were pulled back to idle thrust to slow the aircraft to descend and acquire the glideslope, but the autothrottle unexpectedly reverted to "retard" mode, which is designed to automatically decrease thrust shortly before touching down on the runway at 27 feet (8.2 m) above runway height.[41] At 144 kt, the pilots manually increased thrust to sustain that speed,[40] but the autothrottle immediately returned the thrust lever to idle power because the first officer did not hold the throttle lever in position. The throttles remained at idle for about 100 seconds while the aircraft slowed to 83 knots (154 km/h), 40 knots (74 km/h) below reference speed as the aircraft descended below the required height to stay on the glideslope.[42] The stick-shaker activated at about 150 metres (490 ft) above the ground, indicating an imminent stall, the autothrottle advanced, and the captain attempted to apply full power.[42] The engines responded, but there was not enough altitude or forward airspeed to recover, and the aircraft hit the ground tail-first at 95 knots (176 km/h).[42

Not monitoring your airspeed and thrust on approach is a big no no and is so basic a piloting skill. Or are we excusing crews from these blunders as well and blaming it on lack of EICAS?

At least the previous crews got it right - WIKI Again "The data from the flight recorder also showed that the same altimeter problem had happened twice during the previous eight landings but that on both occasions the crew had taken the correct action by disengaging the auto throttle and manually increasing the thrust. Investigations are under way to determine why more action had not been taken after the altimeter problem was detected"

The previous crews hit the big red button (figuratively speaking by disengaging auto throttle) and got it right. TK 1951 was fatal due to bad piloting - not lack of EICAS.


The aircraft was fighting the pilots instead of helping them while the crew alert system gave incorrect, confusing information. Similar to the MAX crashes. Boeing got away with TK1951 and the MAX Lionair crash, blaming the crew. FAA was in the pocket.

https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.nytime ... s.amp.html
"Never mistake motion for action." Ernest Hemingway
 
Antarius
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 6:13 pm

keesje wrote:
morrisond wrote:
keesje wrote:
On the crew alert system, it was involved in confused crews / crashes on the NG (e.g. TK 1953, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/20/busi ... dents.html ). Boeing managed to convince FAA it were mostly crew failures & did minor improvements. When the MAX came up, it argued all those cases were solved, closed, so they could not be included in the crew alert system track record. That crew alert system track record instantly looked good again. And if it works, why change it?

https://time.com/5687473/boeing-737-alarm-system/

Upgrading to e.g. 1994 ~777 standards, meeting newer requirements would be "impractical" . Impractical meaning costing a lot of money and time, which would hurt 737 MAX competitiveness and the US aircraft industry. So Boeing was exempted. Congress, Boeing and FAA were al strongly involved in this process, so it's now foreign entities making sure the crew alerting system doesn't get "lost" or exempted from proper certification.


Do you mean TK 1951?

That sure reads like poor Piloting technique to me - not keeping your hand on the thrust levers and not noticing that power had rolled back for 100 seconds and not constantly scanning your airspeed. That is one of the benefits of the 737's ancient back driven thrust levers - you know immediately if the computer is doing something it shouldn't.

From Wiki "While on final approach for landing, the aircraft was about 2,000 ft (610 m) above ground, when the left-hand (captain's) radio altimeter suddenly changed from 1,950 feet (590 m) to read −8 feet (−2.4 m) height, although the right-hand (co-pilot's) radio altimeter functioned correctly.[10] The voice recording showed that the crew was given an audible warning signal ("TOO LOW!, GEAR!") that indicated that the aircraft's landing gear should be down, as the aircraft was, according to the radio altimeter, flying too low.[10] Later, the safety board's preliminary report modified this analysis, indicating that the flight data recorder history of the captain's radio altimeter showed 8191 feet (the maximum possible recorded) until the aircraft descended through 1950, then suddenly showed negative 8 feet.[40]

The throttles were pulled back to idle thrust to slow the aircraft to descend and acquire the glideslope, but the autothrottle unexpectedly reverted to "retard" mode, which is designed to automatically decrease thrust shortly before touching down on the runway at 27 feet (8.2 m) above runway height.[41] At 144 kt, the pilots manually increased thrust to sustain that speed,[40] but the autothrottle immediately returned the thrust lever to idle power because the first officer did not hold the throttle lever in position. The throttles remained at idle for about 100 seconds while the aircraft slowed to 83 knots (154 km/h), 40 knots (74 km/h) below reference speed as the aircraft descended below the required height to stay on the glideslope.[42] The stick-shaker activated at about 150 metres (490 ft) above the ground, indicating an imminent stall, the autothrottle advanced, and the captain attempted to apply full power.[42] The engines responded, but there was not enough altitude or forward airspeed to recover, and the aircraft hit the ground tail-first at 95 knots (176 km/h).[42

Not monitoring your airspeed and thrust on approach is a big no no and is so basic a piloting skill. Or are we excusing crews from these blunders as well and blaming it on lack of EICAS?

At least the previous crews got it right - WIKI Again "The data from the flight recorder also showed that the same altimeter problem had happened twice during the previous eight landings but that on both occasions the crew had taken the correct action by disengaging the auto throttle and manually increasing the thrust. Investigations are under way to determine why more action had not been taken after the altimeter problem was detected"

The previous crews hit the big red button (figuratively speaking by disengaging auto throttle) and got it right. TK 1951 was fatal due to bad piloting - not lack of EICAS.


The aircraft was fighting the pilots instead of helping them while the crew alert system gave incorrect, confusing information. Similar to the MAX crashes. Boeing got away with TK1951 and the MAX Lionair crash, blaming the crew. FAA was in the pocket.

https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.nytime ... s.amp.html


Wildly different cases. Under no circumstance EVER should a pilot not be monitoring their airspeed and altitude. The Dutch Safety board concluded that the pilots should have initiated a go around. Acting like Boeing got away with TK1951 is like acting like Airbus got away with AF447 or Boeing got away with OZ214; responsibility of monitoring instruments lies with the pilots. Not wildly reacting to anything you hear or see.
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morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 6:15 pm

keesje wrote:
morrisond wrote:
keesje wrote:
On the crew alert system, it was involved in confused crews / crashes on the NG (e.g. TK 1953, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/20/busi ... dents.html ). Boeing managed to convince FAA it were mostly crew failures & did minor improvements. When the MAX came up, it argued all those cases were solved, closed, so they could not be included in the crew alert system track record. That crew alert system track record instantly looked good again. And if it works, why change it?

https://time.com/5687473/boeing-737-alarm-system/

Upgrading to e.g. 1994 ~777 standards, meeting newer requirements would be "impractical" . Impractical meaning costing a lot of money and time, which would hurt 737 MAX competitiveness and the US aircraft industry. So Boeing was exempted. Congress, Boeing and FAA were al strongly involved in this process, so it's now foreign entities making sure the crew alerting system doesn't get "lost" or exempted from proper certification.


Do you mean TK 1951?

That sure reads like poor Piloting technique to me - not keeping your hand on the thrust levers and not noticing that power had rolled back for 100 seconds and not constantly scanning your airspeed. That is one of the benefits of the 737's ancient back driven thrust levers - you know immediately if the computer is doing something it shouldn't.

From Wiki "While on final approach for landing, the aircraft was about 2,000 ft (610 m) above ground, when the left-hand (captain's) radio altimeter suddenly changed from 1,950 feet (590 m) to read −8 feet (−2.4 m) height, although the right-hand (co-pilot's) radio altimeter functioned correctly.[10] The voice recording showed that the crew was given an audible warning signal ("TOO LOW!, GEAR!") that indicated that the aircraft's landing gear should be down, as the aircraft was, according to the radio altimeter, flying too low.[10] Later, the safety board's preliminary report modified this analysis, indicating that the flight data recorder history of the captain's radio altimeter showed 8191 feet (the maximum possible recorded) until the aircraft descended through 1950, then suddenly showed negative 8 feet.[40]

The throttles were pulled back to idle thrust to slow the aircraft to descend and acquire the glideslope, but the autothrottle unexpectedly reverted to "retard" mode, which is designed to automatically decrease thrust shortly before touching down on the runway at 27 feet (8.2 m) above runway height.[41] At 144 kt, the pilots manually increased thrust to sustain that speed,[40] but the autothrottle immediately returned the thrust lever to idle power because the first officer did not hold the throttle lever in position. The throttles remained at idle for about 100 seconds while the aircraft slowed to 83 knots (154 km/h), 40 knots (74 km/h) below reference speed as the aircraft descended below the required height to stay on the glideslope.[42] The stick-shaker activated at about 150 metres (490 ft) above the ground, indicating an imminent stall, the autothrottle advanced, and the captain attempted to apply full power.[42] The engines responded, but there was not enough altitude or forward airspeed to recover, and the aircraft hit the ground tail-first at 95 knots (176 km/h).[42

Not monitoring your airspeed and thrust on approach is a big no no and is so basic a piloting skill. Or are we excusing crews from these blunders as well and blaming it on lack of EICAS?

At least the previous crews got it right - WIKI Again "The data from the flight recorder also showed that the same altimeter problem had happened twice during the previous eight landings but that on both occasions the crew had taken the correct action by disengaging the auto throttle and manually increasing the thrust. Investigations are under way to determine why more action had not been taken after the altimeter problem was detected"

The previous crews hit the big red button (figuratively speaking by disengaging auto throttle) and got it right. TK 1951 was fatal due to bad piloting - not lack of EICAS.


The aircraft was fighting the pilots instead of helping them while the crew alert system gave incorrect, confusing information. Similar to the MAX crashes. Boeing got away with TK1951 and the MAX Lionair crash, blaming the crew. FAA was in the pocket.

https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.nytime ... s.amp.html


That is what the standby instruments are for - when things are confused.

If you are okay with 100 Seconds on approach when you don't scan your instruments or check the throttle position at least once then yes Boeing "Got away with it" and the pilots should not be held accountable at all.

Why do we need to train the pilots at all then if that is the standard you are okay with?
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 6:20 pm

Well known MCAS critic Peter Lemme wrote via Twitter:

The malfunction of a single RA caused the autothrottle to set idle power and TK1951 crashed back in 2009.
The incorrect mode “RETARD” was annunciated.
Throttles were at idle.
Airspeed was apparent.
I see no parallel to MCAS/MAX.

Not everything on the airplane is made fail-safe!!!
autothrottle is a single thread system.
pilot is its master.
mode is clearly annunciated.
action is consistant.
pilot is expected to disconnect the autothrottle if it malfunctions.
Monitoring airspeed is a pilot function.

Radio altimeter malfunctioned.
Autopilot controlling to glide slope.
All modes clearly annunciated.
No system countermanded pilot action.
Pilot is there for a reason.
Stick shaker activated properly.

Pilot didn’t recover the airplane from the upset also allowed speed excursion.

A single thread system is just that.
The autothrottle is not fail-safe, the pilot is its master.
Moving throttles, mode annuciation, flight instruments.
There is no mystery.
There is inattention and failure to manage airspeed.


Ref: https://twitter.com/satcom_guru/status/ ... 7938084865

Summation of TK1951 investigation conclusions reached by the investigators from The Netherlands:

... the approach was not stabilized; hence, the crew ought to have initiated a go-around. The autopilot followed the glide slope while the autothrottle reduced thrust to idle, owing to a faulty radio altimeter showing an incorrect height. This caused the airspeed to drop and the pitch attitude to increase; all this went unnoticed by the crew until the stick shaker activated. Prior to this, air traffic control caused the crew to intercept the glide slope from above; this obscured the erroneous autothrottle mode and increased the crew's workload. The subsequent approach to stall recovery procedure was not executed properly, causing the aircraft to stall and crash.[

Ref: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_A ... light_1951

Not sure why we have all this effort to link two very different scenarios together.
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keesje
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 6:29 pm

You should rely on pilots if that provides the safest solution to deal with challenges. Not to escape the cost & leadtime of the best solution.

That would be indicative for a weak safety culture. Boeing and FAA need to fight back to regain global credibility in certifying aircraft.

The flexibility, close ooperation, smartness and efficiency demonstrated by Congress, Boeing and streamlined FAA in the 2012-2019 timeframe, could be devastating for US aerospace.

I trust and believe US politics, industry and stake holders are aware. The fact the MAX is still grounded and 777x delayed jndicates so.
"Never mistake motion for action." Ernest Hemingway
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 6:34 pm

Revelation wrote:
Well known MCAS critic Peter Lemme wrote via Twitter:

The malfunction of a single RA caused the autothrottle to set idle power and TK1951 crashed back in 2009.
The incorrect mode “RETARD” was annunciated.
Throttles were at idle.
Airspeed was apparent.
I see no parallel to MCAS/MAX.

Not everything on the airplane is made fail-safe!!!
autothrottle is a single thread system.
pilot is its master.
mode is clearly annunciated.
action is consistant.
pilot is expected to disconnect the autothrottle if it malfunctions.
Monitoring airspeed is a pilot function.

Radio altimeter malfunctioned.
Autopilot controlling to glide slope.
All modes clearly annunciated.
No system countermanded pilot action.
Pilot is there for a reason.
Stick shaker activated properly.

Pilot didn’t recover the airplane from the upset also allowed speed excursion.

A single thread system is just that.
The autothrottle is not fail-safe, the pilot is its master.
Moving throttles, mode annuciation, flight instruments.
There is no mystery.
There is inattention and failure to manage airspeed.


Ref: https://twitter.com/satcom_guru/status/ ... 7938084865

Summation of TK1951 investigation conclusions reached by the investigators from The Netherlands:

... the approach was not stabilized; hence, the crew ought to have initiated a go-around. The autopilot followed the glide slope while the autothrottle reduced thrust to idle, owing to a faulty radio altimeter showing an incorrect height. This caused the airspeed to drop and the pitch attitude to increase; all this went unnoticed by the crew until the stick shaker activated. Prior to this, air traffic control caused the crew to intercept the glide slope from above; this obscured the erroneous autothrottle mode and increased the crew's workload. The subsequent approach to stall recovery procedure was not executed properly, causing the aircraft to stall and crash.[

Ref: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_A ... light_1951

Not sure why we have all this effort to link two very different scenarios together.

Because they are, well, very similar?
A single failure causing computer actively overrule pilot input?
Special recognition goes to quoting a report which is explicitly criticized as diminishing the role of airplane functionality due to the influence of a certain company - as an argument relieving certain company of responsibility.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 6:41 pm

keesje wrote:
You should rely on pilots if that provides the safest solution to deal with challenges. Not to escape the cost & leadtime of the best solution.

That would be indicative for a weak safety culture. Boeing and FAA need to fight back to regain global credibility in certifying aircraft.

The flexibility, close ooperation, smartness and efficiency demonstrated by Congress, Boeing and streamlined FAA in the 2012-2019 timeframe, could be devastating for US aerospace.

I trust and believe US politics, industry and stake holders are aware. The fact the MAX is still grounded and 777x delayed jndicates so.

It may be generational thing. Boeing thrived when The Greatest Generation and Baby Boomers were in command. Yes, humans were the most reliable piece of any system those days. That is, when making retirement plans for pilots was a questionable investment as survival was uncertain at all.
Things have changed a bit, but designs of early Boeing product apparently didn't. What's worse, generations of engineers apparently accept same mentality. Looks like lessons are not being learnt, so things will become worse before - or rather if - they become better.
 
AABusDrvr
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 6:44 pm

keesje wrote:
morrisond wrote:
keesje wrote:
On the crew alert system, it was involved in confused crews / crashes on the NG (e.g. TK 1953, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/20/busi ... dents.html ). Boeing managed to convince FAA it were mostly crew failures & did minor improvements. When the MAX came up, it argued all those cases were solved, closed, so they could not be included in the crew alert system track record. That crew alert system track record instantly looked good again. And if it works, why change it?

https://time.com/5687473/boeing-737-alarm-system/

Upgrading to e.g. 1994 ~777 standards, meeting newer requirements would be "impractical" . Impractical meaning costing a lot of money and time, which would hurt 737 MAX competitiveness and the US aircraft industry. So Boeing was exempted. Congress, Boeing and FAA were al strongly involved in this process, so it's now foreign entities making sure the crew alerting system doesn't get "lost" or exempted from proper certification.


Do you mean TK 1951?

That sure reads like poor Piloting technique to me - not keeping your hand on the thrust levers and not noticing that power had rolled back for 100 seconds and not constantly scanning your airspeed. That is one of the benefits of the 737's ancient back driven thrust levers - you know immediately if the computer is doing something it shouldn't.

From Wiki "While on final approach for landing, the aircraft was about 2,000 ft (610 m) above ground, when the left-hand (captain's) radio altimeter suddenly changed from 1,950 feet (590 m) to read −8 feet (−2.4 m) height, although the right-hand (co-pilot's) radio altimeter functioned correctly.[10] The voice recording showed that the crew was given an audible warning signal ("TOO LOW!, GEAR!") that indicated that the aircraft's landing gear should be down, as the aircraft was, according to the radio altimeter, flying too low.[10] Later, the safety board's preliminary report modified this analysis, indicating that the flight data recorder history of the captain's radio altimeter showed 8191 feet (the maximum possible recorded) until the aircraft descended through 1950, then suddenly showed negative 8 feet.[40]

The throttles were pulled back to idle thrust to slow the aircraft to descend and acquire the glideslope, but the autothrottle unexpectedly reverted to "retard" mode, which is designed to automatically decrease thrust shortly before touching down on the runway at 27 feet (8.2 m) above runway height.[41] At 144 kt, the pilots manually increased thrust to sustain that speed,[40] but the autothrottle immediately returned the thrust lever to idle power because the first officer did not hold the throttle lever in position. The throttles remained at idle for about 100 seconds while the aircraft slowed to 83 knots (154 km/h), 40 knots (74 km/h) below reference speed as the aircraft descended below the required height to stay on the glideslope.[42] The stick-shaker activated at about 150 metres (490 ft) above the ground, indicating an imminent stall, the autothrottle advanced, and the captain attempted to apply full power.[42] The engines responded, but there was not enough altitude or forward airspeed to recover, and the aircraft hit the ground tail-first at 95 knots (176 km/h).[42

Not monitoring your airspeed and thrust on approach is a big no no and is so basic a piloting skill. Or are we excusing crews from these blunders as well and blaming it on lack of EICAS?

At least the previous crews got it right - WIKI Again "The data from the flight recorder also showed that the same altimeter problem had happened twice during the previous eight landings but that on both occasions the crew had taken the correct action by disengaging the auto throttle and manually increasing the thrust. Investigations are under way to determine why more action had not been taken after the altimeter problem was detected"

The previous crews hit the big red button (figuratively speaking by disengaging auto throttle) and got it right. TK 1951 was fatal due to bad piloting - not lack of EICAS.


The aircraft was fighting the pilots instead of helping them while the crew alert system gave incorrect, confusing information. Similar to the MAX crashes. Boeing got away with TK1951 and the MAX Lionair crash, blaming the crew. FAA was in the pocket.

https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.nytime ... s.amp.html


The aircraft was not "fighting" the pilots, the automation didn't perform as expected due to erroneous information from one (of two installed) radio altimeters. They failed to notice the airspeed decay or notice the airspeed trend vectors indicating the airspeed decay. All while pressing an unstable approach, that by their own procedures should have resulted in a go around.

Automation can be a wonderful tool to manage workload, or it can become a terrible crutch that can lead you down the path to disaster in a hurry. There is a reason some airlines require the pilot flying to "follow through" on the controls below a certain altitude, even when the automation is flying the airplane. It's a trust but verify relationship, and you need to be ready to step up, or down the automation level as required to manage the situation.

The airplane flies just fine without both the radio altimeter or auto throttles, and neither is required for dispatch (with restrictions). If it's not doing what you expect it to, just turn it off and drive on.

As stated above, it's like the Tesla driver who uses the autopilot while watching a movie, or using a PED, and then wonders why they hit a bridge abutment, or stopped car on the shoulder.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 6:46 pm

kalvado wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Not sure why we have all this effort to link two very different scenarios together.

Because they are, well, very similar?
A single failure causing computer actively overrule pilot input?

I'm not seeing the similarity. MCAS was not explained to pilots and Boeing relied too much (by its own admission) that pilots would recognize it as stab runaway. RA failure scenario is fully documented and known to pilots. Auto-throttle annunciated the mode switch audibly and by moving the throttles. Lemme wrote "No system countermanded pilot action" so he disagrees on your claim. Pilots were behind the plane doing an unstable approach before the RA failure so they were task saturated because of their own actions. These are not "very similar" situations.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
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Antarius
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 6:51 pm

Revelation wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Not sure why we have all this effort to link two very different scenarios together.

Because they are, well, very similar?
A single failure causing computer actively overrule pilot input?

I'm not seeing the similarity. MCAS was not explained to pilots and Boeing relied too much (by its own admission) that pilots would recognize it as stab runaway. RA failure scenario is fully documented and known to pilots. Auto-throttle annunciated the mode switch audibly and by moving the throttles. Lemme wrote "No system countermanded pilot action" so he disagrees on your claim. Pilots were behind the plane doing an unstable approach before the RA failure so they were task saturated because of their own actions. These are not "very similar" situations.


The bolded part is key. In the TK case, it isn't like the pilots pushed the throttles forward and instead the 738 idled. It was similar to any other instrument failure - incorrect data was provided and the pilots failed to do basic flying.

MCAS is unique in this regard.
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kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 6:54 pm

AABusDrvr wrote:
keesje wrote:
morrisond wrote:

Do you mean TK 1951?

That sure reads like poor Piloting technique to me - not keeping your hand on the thrust levers and not noticing that power had rolled back for 100 seconds and not constantly scanning your airspeed. That is one of the benefits of the 737's ancient back driven thrust levers - you know immediately if the computer is doing something it shouldn't.

From Wiki "While on final approach for landing, the aircraft was about 2,000 ft (610 m) above ground, when the left-hand (captain's) radio altimeter suddenly changed from 1,950 feet (590 m) to read −8 feet (−2.4 m) height, although the right-hand (co-pilot's) radio altimeter functioned correctly.[10] The voice recording showed that the crew was given an audible warning signal ("TOO LOW!, GEAR!") that indicated that the aircraft's landing gear should be down, as the aircraft was, according to the radio altimeter, flying too low.[10] Later, the safety board's preliminary report modified this analysis, indicating that the flight data recorder history of the captain's radio altimeter showed 8191 feet (the maximum possible recorded) until the aircraft descended through 1950, then suddenly showed negative 8 feet.[40]

The throttles were pulled back to idle thrust to slow the aircraft to descend and acquire the glideslope, but the autothrottle unexpectedly reverted to "retard" mode, which is designed to automatically decrease thrust shortly before touching down on the runway at 27 feet (8.2 m) above runway height.[41] At 144 kt, the pilots manually increased thrust to sustain that speed,[40] but the autothrottle immediately returned the thrust lever to idle power because the first officer did not hold the throttle lever in position. The throttles remained at idle for about 100 seconds while the aircraft slowed to 83 knots (154 km/h), 40 knots (74 km/h) below reference speed as the aircraft descended below the required height to stay on the glideslope.[42] The stick-shaker activated at about 150 metres (490 ft) above the ground, indicating an imminent stall, the autothrottle advanced, and the captain attempted to apply full power.[42] The engines responded, but there was not enough altitude or forward airspeed to recover, and the aircraft hit the ground tail-first at 95 knots (176 km/h).[42

Not monitoring your airspeed and thrust on approach is a big no no and is so basic a piloting skill. Or are we excusing crews from these blunders as well and blaming it on lack of EICAS?

At least the previous crews got it right - WIKI Again "The data from the flight recorder also showed that the same altimeter problem had happened twice during the previous eight landings but that on both occasions the crew had taken the correct action by disengaging the auto throttle and manually increasing the thrust. Investigations are under way to determine why more action had not been taken after the altimeter problem was detected"

The previous crews hit the big red button (figuratively speaking by disengaging auto throttle) and got it right. TK 1951 was fatal due to bad piloting - not lack of EICAS.


The aircraft was fighting the pilots instead of helping them while the crew alert system gave incorrect, confusing information. Similar to the MAX crashes. Boeing got away with TK1951 and the MAX Lionair crash, blaming the crew. FAA was in the pocket.

https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.nytime ... s.amp.html


The aircraft was not "fighting" the pilots, the automation didn't perform as expected due to erroneous information from one (of two installed) radio altimeters. They failed to notice the airspeed decay or notice the airspeed trend vectors indicating the airspeed decay. All while pressing an unstable approach, that by their own procedures should have resulted in a go around.

Automation can be a wonderful tool to manage workload, or it can become a terrible crutch that can lead you down the path to disaster in a hurry. There is a reason some airlines require the pilot flying to "follow through" on the controls below a certain altitude, even when the automation is flying the airplane. It's a trust but verify relationship, and you need to be ready to step up, or down the automation level as required to manage the situation.

The airplane flies just fine without both the radio altimeter or auto throttles, and neither is required for dispatch (with restrictions). If it's not doing what you expect it to, just turn it off and drive on.

As stated above, it's like the Tesla driver who uses the autopilot while watching a movie, or using a PED, and then wonders why they hit a bridge abutment, or stopped car on the shoulder.

Automation performed as expected DUE TO POOR DESIGN.
Again, design choices of WWII equipment - simple relay logic - is all what could be done back then. For 2020... some companies are way behind times. I am at the point when I would consider designing NG as a fundamental mistake. Hydraulic computers, relay logic.... In there any wood in the primary structure?
Same problem - people are unable to keep up with external circumstances. Human nature. Wise people learn from other's mistakes, smart people learn on their own mistakes, Boeing doesn't learn on it's own ones...
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 7:12 pm

kalvado wrote:
AABusDrvr wrote:
keesje wrote:

The aircraft was fighting the pilots instead of helping them while the crew alert system gave incorrect, confusing information. Similar to the MAX crashes. Boeing got away with TK1951 and the MAX Lionair crash, blaming the crew. FAA was in the pocket.

https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.nytime ... s.amp.html


The aircraft was not "fighting" the pilots, the automation didn't perform as expected due to erroneous information from one (of two installed) radio altimeters. They failed to notice the airspeed decay or notice the airspeed trend vectors indicating the airspeed decay. All while pressing an unstable approach, that by their own procedures should have resulted in a go around.

Automation can be a wonderful tool to manage workload, or it can become a terrible crutch that can lead you down the path to disaster in a hurry. There is a reason some airlines require the pilot flying to "follow through" on the controls below a certain altitude, even when the automation is flying the airplane. It's a trust but verify relationship, and you need to be ready to step up, or down the automation level as required to manage the situation.

The airplane flies just fine without both the radio altimeter or auto throttles, and neither is required for dispatch (with restrictions). If it's not doing what you expect it to, just turn it off and drive on.

As stated above, it's like the Tesla driver who uses the autopilot while watching a movie, or using a PED, and then wonders why they hit a bridge abutment, or stopped car on the shoulder.

Automation performed as expected DUE TO POOR DESIGN.
Again, design choices of WWII equipment - simple relay logic - is all what could be done back then. For 2020... some companies are way behind times. I am at the point when I would consider designing NG as a fundamental mistake. Hydraulic computers, relay logic.... In there any wood in the primary structure?
Same problem - people are unable to keep up with external circumstances. Human nature. Wise people learn from other's mistakes, smart people learn on their own mistakes, Boeing doesn't learn on it's own ones...


If a pilot can't look at an airspeed indicator once in 100 seconds on approach and maintain airspeed they don't belong in an cockpit. Even the most perfectly designed systems can fail due to manufacturing errors or simply failing due to use and time. You have to ready to take over if you rely upon those systems.

Unless you can guarantee that you can design the perfect system that will never fail or have a mechanical failure you need Pilots to do basic pilot things. This is a basic pilot thing.

Listen to AABusDrvr, he is a pilot and knows what he is talking about.
 
Virtual737
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 7:27 pm

kalvado wrote:
Wise people learn from other's mistakes, smart people learn on their own mistakes, Boeing doesn't learn on it's own ones...


I hope that entities other than Boeing take time out to learn from this.

Just last year during on this very forum during the initial "should the MAX be grounded" threads, industry insiders were stating that you don't ground an airliner when you don't know exactly what is broken. The statements implied that, even when it is becoming clear that something is tremendously wrong, we don't take action until we know exactly what it is. About as far from safety first as you can get.

Since then, the plight of the many thousands of Boeing workers and those working for sub-contractors has been put forward as the strongest driver for minimising the length of the grounding. I have every sympathy with their plight, but again it shouldn't trump being 100% sure that the fixes are right and proper. The time to take into consideration those livelihoods was first and foremost during the design, testing and certification of the MAX.
 
AABusDrvr
Posts: 157
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 7:37 pm

kalvado wrote:
AABusDrvr wrote:
keesje wrote:

The aircraft was fighting the pilots instead of helping them while the crew alert system gave incorrect, confusing information. Similar to the MAX crashes. Boeing got away with TK1951 and the MAX Lionair crash, blaming the crew. FAA was in the pocket.

https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.nytime ... s.amp.html


The aircraft was not "fighting" the pilots, the automation didn't perform as expected due to erroneous information from one (of two installed) radio altimeters. They failed to notice the airspeed decay or notice the airspeed trend vectors indicating the airspeed decay. All while pressing an unstable approach, that by their own procedures should have resulted in a go around.

Automation can be a wonderful tool to manage workload, or it can become a terrible crutch that can lead you down the path to disaster in a hurry. There is a reason some airlines require the pilot flying to "follow through" on the controls below a certain altitude, even when the automation is flying the airplane. It's a trust but verify relationship, and you need to be ready to step up, or down the automation level as required to manage the situation.

The airplane flies just fine without both the radio altimeter or auto throttles, and neither is required for dispatch (with restrictions). If it's not doing what you expect it to, just turn it off and drive on.

As stated above, it's like the Tesla driver who uses the autopilot while watching a movie, or using a PED, and then wonders why they hit a bridge abutment, or stopped car on the shoulder.

Automation performed as expected DUE TO POOR DESIGN.
Again, design choices of WWII equipment - simple relay logic - is all what could be done back then. For 2020... some companies are way behind times. I am at the point when I would consider designing NG as a fundamental mistake. Hydraulic computers, relay logic.... In there any wood in the primary structure?
Same problem - people are unable to keep up with external circumstances. Human nature. Wise people learn from other's mistakes, smart people learn on their own mistakes, Boeing doesn't learn on it's own ones...


Fair enough. From an engineering/design standpoint, the system performed as expected, with the data it was receiving. From a flight crew perspective, and at 1,000' or less above the ground on final, thats all that really matters at that time, the automation was not performing as expected. At that point, the crew is expected to intervene, and actually do some "pilot stuff" to prevent an undesired outcome. That is after all, why they are sitting there.

Even the mighty airbus isn't immune to automation issues, and requires human intervention from time to time.

At some point, I'm sure everything that provides us transportation will be automated, but I wager I'll be long departed before that happens.
 
Antarius
Posts: 2543
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 7:39 pm

kalvado wrote:
AABusDrvr wrote:
keesje wrote:

The aircraft was fighting the pilots instead of helping them while the crew alert system gave incorrect, confusing information. Similar to the MAX crashes. Boeing got away with TK1951 and the MAX Lionair crash, blaming the crew. FAA was in the pocket.

https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.nytime ... s.amp.html


The aircraft was not "fighting" the pilots, the automation didn't perform as expected due to erroneous information from one (of two installed) radio altimeters. They failed to notice the airspeed decay or notice the airspeed trend vectors indicating the airspeed decay. All while pressing an unstable approach, that by their own procedures should have resulted in a go around.

Automation can be a wonderful tool to manage workload, or it can become a terrible crutch that can lead you down the path to disaster in a hurry. There is a reason some airlines require the pilot flying to "follow through" on the controls below a certain altitude, even when the automation is flying the airplane. It's a trust but verify relationship, and you need to be ready to step up, or down the automation level as required to manage the situation.

The airplane flies just fine without both the radio altimeter or auto throttles, and neither is required for dispatch (with restrictions). If it's not doing what you expect it to, just turn it off and drive on.

As stated above, it's like the Tesla driver who uses the autopilot while watching a movie, or using a PED, and then wonders why they hit a bridge abutment, or stopped car on the shoulder.

Automation performed as expected DUE TO POOR DESIGN.
Again, design choices of WWII equipment - simple relay logic - is all what could be done back then. For 2020... some companies are way behind times. I am at the point when I would consider designing NG as a fundamental mistake. Hydraulic computers, relay logic.... In there any wood in the primary structure?
Same problem - people are unable to keep up with external circumstances. Human nature. Wise people learn from other's mistakes, smart people learn on their own mistakes, Boeing doesn't learn on it's own ones...


You had a more modern FBW aircraft in AF 447 and OZ 214. In both cases, pilots failed to react their instruments, the former by incorrectly yanking the stick back and the latter not monitoring airspeed and the glideslope.

Technology, even with better designs, has holes when something fails. And that's why we pay 2 trained people to manage it. TK 1951 was an extremely avoidable incident just like AF 447 and OZ 214.
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Opus99
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 7:48 pm

Honestly, my thing is why put a public comment period NOW? after 18 months of work then they're telling you to go back and add even MORE changes that will probably push this thing back a year. why not gather all this at the start, reach out to all these pilot unions etc and gather the info and then go ahead.

which leads to my question is the MAX as safe as the NG with these fixes? if it is that quite frankly seems good enough for me... the reality is you can always do more and at that point we will be sitting here for another 5 years.

You have BALPA saying that the fixes don't deal with the "inherent aerodynamic issues" of the MAX. I mean I thought we were past that like what kind of comment is that?

I wonder what we will find if we opened up the NG or other aircraft programs like this.

My conclusion is if the FAA, EASA and Transport Canada can individually come out say look guys this aircraft is safe then that is good enough for me, what anybody else has to say is irrelevant. but IF they can't say that then okay.....yikes
 
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Stitch
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 8:05 pm

Opus99 wrote:
Honestly, my thing is why put a public comment period NOW?


It is probably procedure. And it's probably why the FAA ignores it, since the input they received during the previous 18 months from the various actual stakeholders (OEMs, Certification and Safety Agencies, Customers, Pilot and Engineering Unions and Groups, etc.) was what was actually acted upon to come up with the final recommendations that are then opened to the public.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 9:05 pm

AABusDrvr wrote:
kalvado wrote:
AABusDrvr wrote:

The aircraft was not "fighting" the pilots, the automation didn't perform as expected due to erroneous information from one (of two installed) radio altimeters. They failed to notice the airspeed decay or notice the airspeed trend vectors indicating the airspeed decay. All while pressing an unstable approach, that by their own procedures should have resulted in a go around.

Automation can be a wonderful tool to manage workload, or it can become a terrible crutch that can lead you down the path to disaster in a hurry. There is a reason some airlines require the pilot flying to "follow through" on the controls below a certain altitude, even when the automation is flying the airplane. It's a trust but verify relationship, and you need to be ready to step up, or down the automation level as required to manage the situation.

The airplane flies just fine without both the radio altimeter or auto throttles, and neither is required for dispatch (with restrictions). If it's not doing what you expect it to, just turn it off and drive on.

As stated above, it's like the Tesla driver who uses the autopilot while watching a movie, or using a PED, and then wonders why they hit a bridge abutment, or stopped car on the shoulder.

Automation performed as expected DUE TO POOR DESIGN.
Again, design choices of WWII equipment - simple relay logic - is all what could be done back then. For 2020... some companies are way behind times. I am at the point when I would consider designing NG as a fundamental mistake. Hydraulic computers, relay logic.... In there any wood in the primary structure?
Same problem - people are unable to keep up with external circumstances. Human nature. Wise people learn from other's mistakes, smart people learn on their own mistakes, Boeing doesn't learn on it's own ones...


Fair enough. From an engineering/design standpoint, the system performed as expected, with the data it was receiving. From a flight crew perspective, and at 1,000' or less above the ground on final, thats all that really matters at that time, the automation was not performing as expected. At that point, the crew is expected to intervene, and actually do some "pilot stuff" to prevent an undesired outcome. That is after all, why they are sitting there.

Even the mighty airbus isn't immune to automation issues, and requires human intervention from time to time.

At some point, I'm sure everything that provides us transportation will be automated, but I wager I'll be long departed before that happens.

It is even not about automation. It is about - if things are not performing to some reasonable expectation, then it is things - not expectations - which need to be adjusted. Now "reasonable" is a very vague word if you want to send someone to a drawing board... And modern systems can have more complicated internal logic to adjust to expectations compared to pre-Apollo design of 737 (Apollo is basically the start of what can be called "modern approach" IMHO). Which may be a very complex thing to do, though.
 
Elkadad313
Posts: 48
Joined: Thu Aug 20, 2020 12:55 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 9:27 pm

kyu wrote:
I'm surprised this hasn't been brought up so far:
(Seattle Times) FAA engineers demand more changes to the flight crew alerting system and want regulatory waivers to be rescinded.

I'm curious if FAA management manages to ignore them yet again.

I ran across this yesterday: FAA May Soon Have Power to Hire or Fire Boeing Employees
https://www.airlinepilotcentral.com/art ... oyees.html

Whoever conceived MCAS had no idea of the can of worms it would create.
 
Elkadad313
Posts: 48
Joined: Thu Aug 20, 2020 12:55 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 9:43 pm

I just ran across a possibly sensationalized article article tltled 'FAA May Soon Have Power to Hire or Fire Boeing Employees'

Regardless, whoever conceived MCAS had no idea it would put Boeing in such peril. The possibility of a regulatory body making personnel decisions is almost beyond belief. Of course, the thought of the MAX being grounded for 1.5 years was beyond belief until it happened.
 
Vicenza
Posts: 153
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 10:11 pm

Elkadad313 wrote:
I just ran across a possibly sensationalized article article tltled 'FAA May Soon Have Power to Hire or Fire Boeing Employees'

Regardless, whoever conceived MCAS had no idea it would put Boeing in such peril. The possibility of a regulatory body making personnel decisions is almost beyond belief. Of course, the thought of the MAX being grounded for 1.5 years was beyond belief until it happened.


I don't think that the conception of MCAS, much less the person who conceived it, was the problem. That problem stemmed from how it was implemented, not correctly tested and the adverse effects deliberately covered up by Boeing solely for financial gains.
 
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FiscAutTecGarte
Posts: 143
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 10:40 pm

keesje wrote:
morrisond wrote:
keesje wrote:
On the crew alert system, it was involved in confused crews / crashes on the NG (e.g. TK 1953, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/20/busi ... dents.html ). Boeing managed to convince FAA it were mostly crew failures & did minor improvements. When the MAX came up, it argued all those cases were solved, closed, so they could not be included in the crew alert system track record. That crew alert system track record instantly looked good again. And if it works, why change it?

https://time.com/5687473/boeing-737-alarm-system/

Upgrading to e.g. 1994 ~777 standards, meeting newer requirements would be "impractical" . Impractical meaning costing a lot of money and time, which would hurt 737 MAX competitiveness and the US aircraft industry. So Boeing was exempted. Congress, Boeing and FAA were al strongly involved in this process, so it's now foreign entities making sure the crew alerting system doesn't get "lost" or exempted from proper certification.


Do you mean TK 1951?

That sure reads like poor Piloting technique to me - not keeping your hand on the thrust levers and not noticing that power had rolled back for 100 seconds and not constantly scanning your airspeed. That is one of the benefits of the 737's ancient back driven thrust levers - you know immediately if the computer is doing something it shouldn't.

From Wiki "While on final approach for landing, the aircraft was about 2,000 ft (610 m) above ground, when the left-hand (captain's) radio altimeter suddenly changed from 1,950 feet (590 m) to read −8 feet (−2.4 m) height, although the right-hand (co-pilot's) radio altimeter functioned correctly.[10] The voice recording showed that the crew was given an audible warning signal ("TOO LOW!, GEAR!") that indicated that the aircraft's landing gear should be down, as the aircraft was, according to the radio altimeter, flying too low.[10] Later, the safety board's preliminary report modified this analysis, indicating that the flight data recorder history of the captain's radio altimeter showed 8191 feet (the maximum possible recorded) until the aircraft descended through 1950, then suddenly showed negative 8 feet.[40]

The throttles were pulled back to idle thrust to slow the aircraft to descend and acquire the glideslope, but the autothrottle unexpectedly reverted to "retard" mode, which is designed to automatically decrease thrust shortly before touching down on the runway at 27 feet (8.2 m) above runway height.[41] At 144 kt, the pilots manually increased thrust to sustain that speed,[40] but the autothrottle immediately returned the thrust lever to idle power because the first officer did not hold the throttle lever in position. The throttles remained at idle for about 100 seconds while the aircraft slowed to 83 knots (154 km/h), 40 knots (74 km/h) below reference speed as the aircraft descended below the required height to stay on the glideslope.[42] The stick-shaker activated at about 150 metres (490 ft) above the ground, indicating an imminent stall, the autothrottle advanced, and the captain attempted to apply full power.[42] The engines responded, but there was not enough altitude or forward airspeed to recover, and the aircraft hit the ground tail-first at 95 knots (176 km/h).[42

Not monitoring your airspeed and thrust on approach is a big no no and is so basic a piloting skill. Or are we excusing crews from these blunders as well and blaming it on lack of EICAS?

At least the previous crews got it right - WIKI Again "The data from the flight recorder also showed that the same altimeter problem had happened twice during the previous eight landings but that on both occasions the crew had taken the correct action by disengaging the auto throttle and manually increasing the thrust. Investigations are under way to determine why more action had not been taken after the altimeter problem was detected"

The previous crews hit the big red button (figuratively speaking by disengaging auto throttle) and got it right. TK 1951 was fatal due to bad piloting - not lack of EICAS.


The aircraft was fighting the pilots instead of helping them while the crew alert system gave incorrect, confusing information. Similar to the MAX crashes. Boeing got away with TK1951 and the MAX Lionair crash, blaming the crew. FAA was in the pocket.

https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.nytime ... s.amp.html


EASA certified NG and MAX as well.DId they conduct a faulty exam, did they rubberstamp, or were they in someone's back pocket. Or does TC and EASA get a mulligan by citing reciprocity? Not being argumentative, but there were two other esteemed authoritative bodies that could have weighed in, challenged the implementation and helped to prevent disasters.

My position is everyone was lax. everyone's program needs to be looked at. i hope that EASA stays firm regarding the third AOA sensor.. or will the acquiese and just accept the FAA ruling/standards again?
.
learning never stops...

FischAutoTechGarten is the full handle and it reflects my interest. It's abbreviated to fit A.net short usernames.
 
Antarius
Posts: 2543
Joined: Thu Apr 13, 2017 1:27 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 11:32 pm

kalvado wrote:
AABusDrvr wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Automation performed as expected DUE TO POOR DESIGN.
Again, design choices of WWII equipment - simple relay logic - is all what could be done back then. For 2020... some companies are way behind times. I am at the point when I would consider designing NG as a fundamental mistake. Hydraulic computers, relay logic.... In there any wood in the primary structure?
Same problem - people are unable to keep up with external circumstances. Human nature. Wise people learn from other's mistakes, smart people learn on their own mistakes, Boeing doesn't learn on it's own ones...


Fair enough. From an engineering/design standpoint, the system performed as expected, with the data it was receiving. From a flight crew perspective, and at 1,000' or less above the ground on final, thats all that really matters at that time, the automation was not performing as expected. At that point, the crew is expected to intervene, and actually do some "pilot stuff" to prevent an undesired outcome. That is after all, why they are sitting there.

Even the mighty airbus isn't immune to automation issues, and requires human intervention from time to time.

At some point, I'm sure everything that provides us transportation will be automated, but I wager I'll be long departed before that happens.

It is even not about automation. It is about - if things are not performing to some reasonable expectation, then it is things - not expectations - which need to be adjusted. Now "reasonable" is a very vague word if you want to send someone to a drawing board... And modern systems can have more complicated internal logic to adjust to expectations compared to pre-Apollo design of 737 (Apollo is basically the start of what can be called "modern approach" IMHO). Which may be a very complex thing to do, though.


Again, we've seen similar issues on far newer aircraft including FBW ones from both major manufacturers. Bad data in = bad data out, no matter when the system was built.

The age of the 737's design had nothing to do with the TK incident.
2020: SFO DFW IAH HOU CLT MEX BIS MIA GUA ORD DTW LGA BOS LHR DUB BFS BHD STN OAK PHL ISP JFK SJC DEN SJU LAS TXL GDL
 
kalvado
Posts: 2898
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Wed Sep 23, 2020 11:40 pm

Antarius wrote:
kalvado wrote:
AABusDrvr wrote:

Fair enough. From an engineering/design standpoint, the system performed as expected, with the data it was receiving. From a flight crew perspective, and at 1,000' or less above the ground on final, thats all that really matters at that time, the automation was not performing as expected. At that point, the crew is expected to intervene, and actually do some "pilot stuff" to prevent an undesired outcome. That is after all, why they are sitting there.

Even the mighty airbus isn't immune to automation issues, and requires human intervention from time to time.

At some point, I'm sure everything that provides us transportation will be automated, but I wager I'll be long departed before that happens.

It is even not about automation. It is about - if things are not performing to some reasonable expectation, then it is things - not expectations - which need to be adjusted. Now "reasonable" is a very vague word if you want to send someone to a drawing board... And modern systems can have more complicated internal logic to adjust to expectations compared to pre-Apollo design of 737 (Apollo is basically the start of what can be called "modern approach" IMHO). Which may be a very complex thing to do, though.


Again, we've seen similar issues on far newer aircraft including FBW ones from both major manufacturers. Bad data in = bad data out, no matter when the system was built.

The age of the 737's design had nothing to do with the TK incident.

Of course, conceptually ancient design is a direct factor. Space age - and nuclear arm race - brought forward concepts of reliability, protection from the fake signal. Apparently, Boeing missed the memo.
And sloppy design practices are fairly obvious. Just think about it - there is a concept of active side, there is retard function which always operate on one side, and there is MCAS which randomly(!!!) selects which side to operate on. Do you smell 420? I think this looks more like heroine...
 
Antarius
Posts: 2543
Joined: Thu Apr 13, 2017 1:27 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Thu Sep 24, 2020 12:08 am

kalvado wrote:
Antarius wrote:
kalvado wrote:
It is even not about automation. It is about - if things are not performing to some reasonable expectation, then it is things - not expectations - which need to be adjusted. Now "reasonable" is a very vague word if you want to send someone to a drawing board... And modern systems can have more complicated internal logic to adjust to expectations compared to pre-Apollo design of 737 (Apollo is basically the start of what can be called "modern approach" IMHO). Which may be a very complex thing to do, though.


Again, we've seen similar issues on far newer aircraft including FBW ones from both major manufacturers. Bad data in = bad data out, no matter when the system was built.

The age of the 737's design had nothing to do with the TK incident.

Of course, conceptually ancient design is a direct factor. Space age - and nuclear arm race - brought forward concepts of reliability, protection from the fake signal. Apparently, Boeing missed the memo.
And sloppy design practices are fairly obvious. Just think about it - there is a concept of active side, there is retard function which always operate on one side, and there is MCAS which randomly(!!!) selects which side to operate on. Do you smell 420? I think this looks more like heroine...


Of course protection from an incorrect signal is ideal. But that doesn't mean it's the cause of an incident. If your check engine light comes on, you don't crash your car into the wall - the onus of driving is still on you.

Same thing in the TK incident. Errant warnings do not absolve the pilots from actively flying the plane. The same was on AF 447, an errant overspeed warning isn't carte blanche to pull back on the stick without thinking. How do you justify that one? Not Boeing, not pre-apollo program. Same outcome.

Every year, countless errant warnings are diagnosed and either acted on or ignored. Across Boeing, Airbus,Embraer, Bombardier etc. Most don't end in disaster as the pilots are there to diagnose.

And I'm leaving MCAS out of the above, as it was a truly unique screw up.
2020: SFO DFW IAH HOU CLT MEX BIS MIA GUA ORD DTW LGA BOS LHR DUB BFS BHD STN OAK PHL ISP JFK SJC DEN SJU LAS TXL GDL
 
kalvado
Posts: 2898
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Thu Sep 24, 2020 12:26 am

Antarius wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Antarius wrote:

Again, we've seen similar issues on far newer aircraft including FBW ones from both major manufacturers. Bad data in = bad data out, no matter when the system was built.

The age of the 737's design had nothing to do with the TK incident.

Of course, conceptually ancient design is a direct factor. Space age - and nuclear arm race - brought forward concepts of reliability, protection from the fake signal. Apparently, Boeing missed the memo.
And sloppy design practices are fairly obvious. Just think about it - there is a concept of active side, there is retard function which always operate on one side, and there is MCAS which randomly(!!!) selects which side to operate on. Do you smell 420? I think this looks more like heroine...


Of course protection from an incorrect signal is ideal. But that doesn't mean it's the cause of an incident. If your check engine light comes on, you don't crash your car into the wall - the onus of driving is still on you.

Same thing in the TK incident. Errant warnings do not absolve the pilots from actively flying the plane. The same was on AF 447, an errant overspeed warning isn't carte blanche to pull back on the stick without thinking. How do you justify that one? Not Boeing, not pre-apollo program. Same outcome.

Every year, countless errant warnings are diagnosed and either acted on or ignored. Across Boeing, Airbus,Embraer, Bombardier etc. Most don't end in disaster as the pilots are there to diagnose.

And I'm leaving MCAS out of the above, as it was a truly unique screw up.

Humans are prone to errors. If hundreds of complex errors occurs and single-digit of them lead to crashes - what would happen if those complex errors are reduced by a factor of 10?
That is what should motivate design, not lewid dreams about 10" airmanship..
 
Antarius
Posts: 2543
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Thu Sep 24, 2020 12:28 am

kalvado wrote:
Antarius wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Of course, conceptually ancient design is a direct factor. Space age - and nuclear arm race - brought forward concepts of reliability, protection from the fake signal. Apparently, Boeing missed the memo.
And sloppy design practices are fairly obvious. Just think about it - there is a concept of active side, there is retard function which always operate on one side, and there is MCAS which randomly(!!!) selects which side to operate on. Do you smell 420? I think this looks more like heroine...


Of course protection from an incorrect signal is ideal. But that doesn't mean it's the cause of an incident. If your check engine light comes on, you don't crash your car into the wall - the onus of driving is still on you.

Same thing in the TK incident. Errant warnings do not absolve the pilots from actively flying the plane. The same was on AF 447, an errant overspeed warning isn't carte blanche to pull back on the stick without thinking. How do you justify that one? Not Boeing, not pre-apollo program. Same outcome.

Every year, countless errant warnings are diagnosed and either acted on or ignored. Across Boeing, Airbus,Embraer, Bombardier etc. Most don't end in disaster as the pilots are there to diagnose.

And I'm leaving MCAS out of the above, as it was a truly unique screw up.

Humans are prone to errors. If hundreds of complex errors occurs and single-digit of them lead to crashes - what would happen if those complex errors are reduced by a factor of 10?
That is what should motivate design, not lewid dreams about 10" airmanship..


No one is debating that point.

That doesn't mean an aircraft type is not safe because of an errant warning. There are plenty of other indicators to tell you to do so. (Again, not including MCAS and it's issue in this)
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kalvado
Posts: 2898
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Thu Sep 24, 2020 12:36 am

Antarius wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Antarius wrote:

Of course protection from an incorrect signal is ideal. But that doesn't mean it's the cause of an incident. If your check engine light comes on, you don't crash your car into the wall - the onus of driving is still on you.

Same thing in the TK incident. Errant warnings do not absolve the pilots from actively flying the plane. The same was on AF 447, an errant overspeed warning isn't carte blanche to pull back on the stick without thinking. How do you justify that one? Not Boeing, not pre-apollo program. Same outcome.

Every year, countless errant warnings are diagnosed and either acted on or ignored. Across Boeing, Airbus,Embraer, Bombardier etc. Most don't end in disaster as the pilots are there to diagnose.

And I'm leaving MCAS out of the above, as it was a truly unique screw up.

Humans are prone to errors. If hundreds of complex errors occurs and single-digit of them lead to crashes - what would happen if those complex errors are reduced by a factor of 10?
That is what should motivate design, not lewid dreams about 10" airmanship..


No one is debating that point.

That doesn't mean an aircraft type is not safe because of an errant warning. There are plenty of other indicators to tell you to do so. (Again, not including MCAS and it's issue in this)

Think about it in such a way: if people became confused by automation, automation is at least a contributing factor. Believe it or not - see exhibit 1: crashed plane on the ground.
That is the proof, not some "doesn't mean". It IS less safe because it crashed. And while we're at this... Sky IS blue. Milk IS white. Earth IS round.
 
Antarius
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q3 2020

Thu Sep 24, 2020 12:38 am

kalvado wrote:
Antarius wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Humans are prone to errors. If hundreds of complex errors occurs and single-digit of them lead to crashes - what would happen if those complex errors are reduced by a factor of 10?
That is what should motivate design, not lewid dreams about 10" airmanship..


No one is debating that point.

That doesn't mean an aircraft type is not safe because of an errant warning. There are plenty of other indicators to tell you to do so. (Again, not including MCAS and it's issue in this)

Think about it in such a way: if people became confused by automation, automation is at least a contributing factor. Believe it or not - see exhibit 1: crashed plane on the ground.
That is the proof, not some "doesn't mean". It IS less safe because it crashed. And while we're at this... Sky IS blue. Milk IS white. Earth IS round.


Pretty much every single aircraft type on earth fits in this category.
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Military Aircraft Every type from fighters to helicopters from air forces around the globe

Classic Airliners Props and jets from the good old days

Flight Decks Views from inside the cockpit

Aircraft Cabins Passenger cabin shots showing seat arrangements as well as cargo aircraft interior

Cargo Aircraft Pictures of great freighter aircraft

Government Aircraft Aircraft flying government officials

Helicopters Our large helicopter section. Both military and civil versions

Blimps / Airships Everything from the Goodyear blimp to the Zeppelin

Night Photos Beautiful shots taken while the sun is below the horizon

Accidents Accident, incident and crash related photos

Air to Air Photos taken by airborne photographers of airborne aircraft

Special Paint Schemes Aircraft painted in beautiful and original liveries

Airport Overviews Airport overviews from the air or ground

Tails and Winglets Tail and Winglet closeups with beautiful airline logos