tphuang wrote:sxf24 wrote:tphuang wrote:
That's quite naiive point to make. If they are not in a partnership, AA would have no incentive to lease B6 that many slots. Maybe 20 slot pairs combined. Certainly not the 40 at LGA + however many it ends up in JFK they will end up doing
What do you mean B6 could have built a more diverse network from day 1? Have you taken a look at its network out of JFK with 170 flights? It has a huge network for the # of slots it has serving basically every market that makes sense from JFK. The fact is you cannot compete for NYC corporate contracts with just JFK slots. You need LGA network also. AA lacked enough JFK slots and B6 had almost no LGA slots. That's why the 2 of them need to have a partnership to offer # of flights necessary to be competitive with DL.
Do you think B6 offering 15 flights a day on JFK-ORD can compete against a rival carrier offering 15 flights a day on LGA-ORD?
This is about providing real competition in NYC to DL and UA rather than having 2 airlines with clear holes in their network.
On top of that, this is not just about the slots for B6. It's about access to AA customers and AA's network.
Your complaints seem to be about the development and competitiveness of B6’s network, not the benefit to consumers. The DOJ’s argument is that more competitors = lower prices and the data backs that up. While increasing B6’s network breadth also helps - acknowledged by the DOJ in their discussion of the “JetBlue effect” - the cooperation between AA and B6 could raise prices since they are less motivated to compete on city pairs from NYC and BOS.
I think the two perspectives are consumers benefit from more airlines competing or consumers should be grateful to fly B6 at a higher price.
Not really, you made the accusation that B6 didn't chose to build a more diverse network at JFK, when the reality is that it a has very diverse network. As diverse as you can get from JFK for 170 slots. Now, you are changing the argument.
Also, you have to actually show this merger is producing fewer competitors. Again, they were only competitors to each on LGA-BOS, JFK-LAX/SFO/PHX/AUS/LAS pre-COVID. Even if you go by the argument that those routes are seeing 1 fewer competitor (which is a hard one to make given lack of coordination on pricing on these routes). And if you take a look at JFK-LAX, they don't codeshare all their flights, since they have a lot of duplicating times n their flight. Even if you accept that premise, the 2 airlines have now added LGA-DEN/CHS/IAH/MCI/MSY/JAX/SAV/SRQ/PWM and JFK-DEL/TLV/SCL/MDE/CLO/MCI/MKE/PVR/YVR + about 8 or 9 EWR routes that neither served pre-COVID. On top of that, B6 has added service to AA's MIA hub and LHR as further competition that goes against this theory "virtual merger". The J prices on JFK-LHR market has already seen dramatic downward affect.
The benefits of all these new markets far outweights from additional competition far outweighs the few routes that might see 1 less competition. Again, we haven't seen any abnormal capacity reduction on those JFK transcon markets from either airline.
If you want to make the argument that NEA is leading to less competition, you have to prove it. It's hard to prove because we are actually seeing far more competition.
I think you’re confusing my position with the DOJ’s argument. As I’ve pointed out before, this shouldn’t be personal.
I would strenuously disagree that B6 is unable to diversify its JFK or BOS network. They’ve choose depth, not breadth. They also carry more domestic passengers than any other airline at those airports, which makes it hard to argue they’re in a disadvantaged position.
It’s also intellectually false to only look at nonstop markets. AA operates competing connecting hubs and the DOJ argues the NEA diminishes motivation to offer lower fares on itineraries connecting in PHL, CLT, etc.