lightsaber wrote:I merged the playing chicken with production with the prior thread (same link).
Sorry, I didn't realize we already had a 'chicken' topic going.

Moderators: jsumali2, richierich, ua900, PanAm_DC10, hOMSaR
lightsaber wrote:I merged the playing chicken with production with the prior thread (same link).
Waterbomber2 wrote:Flash forward to 2027.
Virus long gone, record traffic numbers.
Backlogs in the thousands but limited output means years to fulfill orders.
Airbus and Boeing challenged by new manufacturers offering new, disruptive technologies into the 2030's.
A & B: "back during Covid, we had government backing, if only we had invested and kept building them, we would have sold them all by now and would have had cash to invest in the next big thing."
JayinKitsap wrote:...
I agree that balance between production and demand needs to occur, but do we know that balance yet. Six months from now the OEM's will have some better information to adjust production.
...
There is probably 5 years worth of excess planes on the market right now, it will be years before the civil market has its next good year.
Sokes wrote:This may be a good time to introduce tax on aviation fuel.
Each government gives it's airlines money equivalent of the last three years fuel bill. That money is non-refundable, a subsidy. In exchange 80% fuel tax is imposed.
I believe even green parties would agree.
It's also not arbitrary or unfair to competition if countries could agree on it.
Future finance in innovation will increase.
par13del wrote:Sokes wrote:This may be a good time to introduce tax on aviation fuel.
Each government gives it's airlines money equivalent of the last three years fuel bill. That money is non-refundable, a subsidy. In exchange 80% fuel tax is imposed.
I believe even green parties would agree.
It's also not arbitrary or unfair to competition if countries could agree on it.
Future finance in innovation will increase.
So to be clear, just like the current employee retention schemes in place, you want to continue to pay thousands of workers to stay home doing nothing?
Money is money, but the optics would be better if the airlines furloughed the workers and let the state take care of them using the tax money they already collected for that purpose over the last decades, why is a new tax need to pay obligation that a previous tax was put in place to pay such obligations?
No country is allowing aviation in any numbers since pax are not travelling, so if the experts are correct that pax levels are years off from returning to any decent numbers, how much money will this tax collect?
Is this just another way of introducing the EU tax scheme which failed a couple years ago?
2175301 wrote:lightsaber wrote:Excluding the 747, CRJ, and A380, we are on track to probably see another 2 or 3 commercial aircraft lines halt production.Lightsaber
Overall great post above from which I extracted the quoted statement: You left the 767 off of your list. Its production line is humming along at pre-covid levels and will continue. I believe that the 767 and 747 lines are an advantage for Boeing at this time.
Have a great day,
lightsaber wrote:....it will get really interesting in about 18 months. I pick that time frame is that is how long I believe it will take to bring the leasing companies to the point they do not want to finance new aircraft as new deliveries will be bringing down the price of their portfolio too much. We have an aircraft production and finance system built on low interest rates with low risk. What happens when risk (in this case too many early lease returns) are realized on a big scale.
smartplane wrote:lightsaber wrote:....it will get really interesting in about 18 months. I pick that time frame is that is how long I believe it will take to bring the leasing companies to the point they do not want to finance new aircraft as new deliveries will be bringing down the price of their portfolio too much. We have an aircraft production and finance system built on low interest rates with low risk. What happens when risk (in this case too many early lease returns) are realized on a big scale.
Leasing companies have already reached those conclusions. They are still working on strategies and implementation.
Watch the OEM's cast the big lease players aside, bringing finance completely in-house. They might as well do so, as they often package buybacks for lessors to manage new and used values.
Boeing has the larger direct exposure now through BCC, but Airbus won't be far behind with buybacks and strategic alliances.
par13del wrote:Is this just another way of introducing the EU tax scheme which failed a couple years ago?
Sokes wrote:JayinKitsap wrote:...
I agree that balance between production and demand needs to occur, but do we know that balance yet. Six months from now the OEM's will have some better information to adjust production.
...
There is probably 5 years worth of excess planes on the market right now, it will be years before the civil market has its next good year.
I believe your two statements contradict each other?
After half year virus restrictions there is five years excess?
lightsaber wrote:An 80% fuel tax is a great way to ensure there is no recovery in aviation.
...
Fuel is always a high expense. I can guarantee quite a few countries would not impose this tax, putting those countries that do in a poor position to compete.
...
This tax creates an issue that airlines would have no money to buy aircraft, therefore, the airframers and engine makers would have no money to develop.
...
How about we learn to grow our fuel or something else less drastic that guarantees every plane in production has a 5+ year period of zero demand. That proposal would be worse than Smoot-Hawley (the act of Congress that made a recession the Great Depression when combined with certain other silly policies).
Lightsaber
lightsaber wrote:An 80% fuel tax is a great way to ensure there is no recovery in aviation.
Fuel is always a high expense. I can guarantee quite a few countries would not impose this tax, putting those countries that do in a poor position to compete.
There are other threads complaining the new generation of aircraft have too many problems. As fuel is a high expense of aviation, there isn't a bunch of off the shelf technology ready to implement. There are a bunch of ideas ready to implement in the future
Short term "ready technology". This can be put into new engines for a few hundred million dollars, or as part of a more extensive PiP for older engines.
1. Pratt's variable fan nozzle, improves takeoff and climb thrust with a small cruise fuel efficiency gain.
2. GE's variable turbine inlet guide vane cooling. On LEAP and GE9X, it could be retrofitted to the GEnX
3. Pratt 3.5:1 gearbox. Ready for when Pratt gets onto a widebody.
4. Both Boeing and Airbus can do some underside laminar flow (I believe this is why the 777x has folding wingtips as far higher aspect ratio wings are an enabling feature for this technology).
5. CFRP wings (some have it, most don't). The cold cure MS-21 wings will dramatically bring down the costs of CFRP wings.
6. More electrical subsystems. Saves a little fuel, saves a lot of maintenance.
7. unstable center of gravity (the 777 has been flying with meta stable, UAS systems have proven the unstable). However, this would probably be a stretch of the 1st version of a new aircraft.
8. More titanium. 3D printing has turned the aerospace world upside down to make some parts now cheaper to make out of titanium than out of aluminum.
Technology coming out in the GE9x (777x engine): These are not cheap technologies to develop
1. CMC turbine inlet guide vanes (CMCs are not ready for rotating blades until the strength is improved which is actually achieving a higher density).
2. More advanced cooling, for example, a 2nd high turbine, turbine clearance control valve.
3. Faster high spool (Mach # is the important criteria). This improves high turbine and high compressor efficiency, it requires developing seals with much higher seal velocities (a problem in the PW1100G), bearings, and being much more precise on shaft dynamics.
4. The GE9x is the first full electrical subsystem engine (far more than the GEnX). More work to do on the airframe.
5. Folding wingtips. This allows a greater wingspan with the minor improvement in efficiency that provides on its own. I look at that wing and I see a partial underside laminar flow wing. That will save a nice amount of fuel burn.
6. 3D printed engine parts.
https://3dprintingindustry.com/news/boe ... ht-167793/
Future technology we're waiting for:
1. CMC turbine blades (by this, I mean the rotating turbine blades). The 2nd stage of the high turbine might be possible in 5 years, it might not. The first stage of the high turbine is at least 15 years in the future.
2. Variable pitch fan blades. This was part of a RR demonstrator, but Pratt has tried in the past too. This is tough to work out all the failure modes.
3. Blended Wing Body. (BWB). I believe the evacuation issue has been solved. However, this is one heck of a risk and could bankrupt either Boeing or Airbus, so the risk will keep this technology on the shelf. The vertical stabilizer is literally a drag.
4. GFRP. A stronger fiber than CFRP. More work needs to be done to determine all the failure modes (great stuff on satellites and military where more risk is acceptable).
5. Properly aggressive folding wingtips. Real estate is expensive, in particular at established airports. To get the next generation wings with up to a 7% reduction in fuel burn thanks to underside laminar flow, a huge wingspan is required.
6. Organic structures (mostly airframe). This can save a lot of weight, but costs a huge amount in engineering design hours and planning repairs, I expect this technology is 20+ years away.
This tax creates an issue that airlines would have no money to buy aircraft, therefore, the airframers and engine makers would have no money to develop. Since aviation is such a low fraction of carbon, it would do far more to tax large TVs to cut carbon (I'm serious). However, there is a proven tech for low carbon power generation only France embraced...
Considering a BWB with the latest engines might save 20% in fuel at extreme risk of failure to the innovating companies, an 80% fuel tax would be a non-starter. Long haul air travel tends to have 40% of cost the fuel (or more).
How about we learn to grow our fuel or something else less drastic that guarantees every plane in production has a 5+ year period of zero demand. That proposal would be worse than Smoot-Hawley (the act of Congress that made a recession the Great Depression when combined with certain other silly policies).
Lightsaber
Lightsaber
JayinKitsap wrote:There have been many examples where increasing taxes slows or kills the industry, reducing taxes can help industries recover faster. Reduced production volumes has increased total cost, so giving tax breaks of say 5% of costs changes the break even point on many flights, starting recovery. Adding 5% would cause a contraction.
Aviation is only a part of the whole economy, changing tax rates in the system can mean the difference between decline and recover. We need recovery right now.
___
Impressive list of improvements, say 5 years out during a recovery the NMA-B could return to the scene, picking up all of the new cockpit changes for a new generation, really long wings hinged to still fit C for narrow bodies and D for widebodies. So far, on the 779 the outer wingtip has no control surfaces nor fuel, moving the hinge inboard may require control surfaces making things more complicated.
COVID has drastically changed the market, a new clean sheet in the part of the market without competition may be better than building planes where there is a glut. It seems that this glut is the worst in the largest widebodies.lightsaber wrote:An 80% fuel tax is a great way to ensure there is no recovery in aviation.
Fuel is always a high expense. I can guarantee quite a few countries would not impose this tax, putting those countries that do in a poor position to compete.
There are other threads complaining the new generation of aircraft have too many problems. As fuel is a high expense of aviation, there isn't a bunch of off the shelf technology ready to implement. There are a bunch of ideas ready to implement in the future
Short term "ready technology". This can be put into new engines for a few hundred million dollars, or as part of a more extensive PiP for older engines.
1. Pratt's variable fan nozzle, improves takeoff and climb thrust with a small cruise fuel efficiency gain.
2. GE's variable turbine inlet guide vane cooling. On LEAP and GE9X, it could be retrofitted to the GEnX
3. Pratt 3.5:1 gearbox. Ready for when Pratt gets onto a widebody.
4. Both Boeing and Airbus can do some underside laminar flow (I believe this is why the 777x has folding wingtips as far higher aspect ratio wings are an enabling feature for this technology).
5. CFRP wings (some have it, most don't). The cold cure MS-21 wings will dramatically bring down the costs of CFRP wings.
6. More electrical subsystems. Saves a little fuel, saves a lot of maintenance.
7. unstable center of gravity (the 777 has been flying with meta stable, UAS systems have proven the unstable). However, this would probably be a stretch of the 1st version of a new aircraft.
8. More titanium. 3D printing has turned the aerospace world upside down to make some parts now cheaper to make out of titanium than out of aluminum.
Technology coming out in the GE9x (777x engine): These are not cheap technologies to develop
1. CMC turbine inlet guide vanes (CMCs are not ready for rotating blades until the strength is improved which is actually achieving a higher density).
2. More advanced cooling, for example, a 2nd high turbine, turbine clearance control valve.
3. Faster high spool (Mach # is the important criteria). This improves high turbine and high compressor efficiency, it requires developing seals with much higher seal velocities (a problem in the PW1100G), bearings, and being much more precise on shaft dynamics.
4. The GE9x is the first full electrical subsystem engine (far more than the GEnX). More work to do on the airframe.
5. Folding wingtips. This allows a greater wingspan with the minor improvement in efficiency that provides on its own. I look at that wing and I see a partial underside laminar flow wing. That will save a nice amount of fuel burn.
6. 3D printed engine parts.
https://3dprintingindustry.com/news/boe ... ht-167793/
Future technology we're waiting for:
1. CMC turbine blades (by this, I mean the rotating turbine blades). The 2nd stage of the high turbine might be possible in 5 years, it might not. The first stage of the high turbine is at least 15 years in the future.
2. Variable pitch fan blades. This was part of a RR demonstrator, but Pratt has tried in the past too. This is tough to work out all the failure modes.
3. Blended Wing Body. (BWB). I believe the evacuation issue has been solved. However, this is one heck of a risk and could bankrupt either Boeing or Airbus, so the risk will keep this technology on the shelf. The vertical stabilizer is literally a drag.
4. GFRP. A stronger fiber than CFRP. More work needs to be done to determine all the failure modes (great stuff on satellites and military where more risk is acceptable).
5. Properly aggressive folding wingtips. Real estate is expensive, in particular at established airports. To get the next generation wings with up to a 7% reduction in fuel burn thanks to underside laminar flow, a huge wingspan is required.
6. Organic structures (mostly airframe). This can save a lot of weight, but costs a huge amount in engineering design hours and planning repairs, I expect this technology is 20+ years away.
This tax creates an issue that airlines would have no money to buy aircraft, therefore, the airframers and engine makers would have no money to develop. Since aviation is such a low fraction of carbon, it would do far more to tax large TVs to cut carbon (I'm serious). However, there is a proven tech for low carbon power generation only France embraced...
Considering a BWB with the latest engines might save 20% in fuel at extreme risk of failure to the innovating companies, an 80% fuel tax would be a non-starter. Long haul air travel tends to have 40% of cost the fuel (or more).
How about we learn to grow our fuel or something else less drastic that guarantees every plane in production has a 5+ year period of zero demand. That proposal would be worse than Smoot-Hawley (the act of Congress that made a recession the Great Depression when combined with certain other silly policies).
Lightsaber
Lightsaber
lightsaber wrote:............................. Neither Boeing nor Airbus have the cash to cast the big lease companies assidde. They are running into cash flow issues which hampers their ability to finance aircraft for customers. This will be a very interesting financial situation.
Either way, Airbus and Boeing will have to cut production (ok, Boeing mostly not ramping up MAX as much and ramping down 787, Airbus has to rationalize their production, both narrowbody and widebody production is far too high).
I still think at least 3 production lines will have to stop in addition to the 3 lines we know are stopping (747, CRJ, and A380).
Lightsaber
Jetport wrote:lightsaber wrote:............................. Neither Boeing nor Airbus have the cash to cast the big lease companies assidde. They are running into cash flow issues which hampers their ability to finance aircraft for customers. This will be a very interesting financial situation.
Either way, Airbus and Boeing will have to cut production (ok, Boeing mostly not ramping up MAX as much and ramping down 787, Airbus has to rationalize their production, both narrowbody and widebody production is far too high).
I still think at least 3 production lines will have to stop in addition to the 3 lines we know are stopping (747, CRJ, and A380).
Lightsaber
What 3 production lines? I assume you are talking just Boeing and Airbus and permanent closure of the lines?
The only obvious one is the A330? I can't imagine either Boeing or Airbus closing any other lines. The 777 and A220 programs both have challenges, but most of the money has already been spent and the long term prospects of both lines are very good.
lightsaber wrote:I'm not betting against factory freighters (767, 777). I'm not betting against the A320 or MAX (too strategic) or A350 or 787 (too much backlog, future potential. That leaves 9 products competing for scraps of sales vs. the huge used availability and sales from the six lines I'm not betting against.
I honestly don't know. There just isn't enough money to keep 15 airframes in production on 19 production lines.
Lightsaber
flipdewaf wrote:I agree, something has to give but it feels like the chaff has been cut already from the big boys.
“I owe it to you to be transparent: it’s unlikely that voluntary departures will be enough,” Faury wrote in the letter distributed on Friday evening.
...
“Unfortunately, the recovery in airline traffic over the summer period has not been at the level the industry was counting on,” Faury wrote.
“We must now prepare for a crisis that will probably be even deeper and longer than the previous scenarios suggested”.
lightsaber wrote:Now I advocate an A320 further production cut and a small ramp up in MAX production
iamlucky13 wrote:lightsaber wrote:Now I advocate an A320 further production cut and a small ramp up in MAX production
Let's use the articles you posted to try to quantify these and the other models a little better.
The 2nd Aviation Week article you linked to forecasts a little over 1300 deliveries for 2021, mixed at 71% narrowbodies, 16% widebodies, 7% regional jets, and 6% turboprops.
Here's roughly how I see that breaking down. The first line for each bullet is the model numbers I'm
assuming fit in the Aviation Week forecast category, and roughly what rate Aviation Week has forecast deliveries for 2021 on average (we should assume the year will be back-loaded). The second line is what I know or estimate of the planned or recent production rates, followed by the percent of Aviation Week's forecast for the segment.
- 737 + A320 + CSeries (C919 and MC-21, neither of which are certified yet): 77 per month
- Planned: 31 + 40 + 6? = 77 per month - 100%- 787 + 777/777X + 767 + 747 + A350 +A330NEO + A380: 17 per month
- Planned: 6 + 2.5 + 3 + 0.5 + 6 + 2 + 0.5 = 20.5 - 120%- ERJ + MRJ + AJR21 + SSJ: 8 per month
- Planned: 5? + 0 + 1 + 1? = 7 - 88%- ATR72 + ?: 7 per month
- Planned: ? - ? %
A few specific comments, which parallel yours:
737 and A320 - I think they'll continue to build and park. Maybe they'll end up parking 5-10 or so a month next year, but then keep the production rates low even as demand rises again in order to clear that backlog.
787 and A350 - We've talked already about widebody pain, it looks like they will need to continue the discussions of a further rate cut, or more parked frames. I suspect they will park frames
777 - At the targeted rates, they have 2 years of production for the legacy version, mostly freighters. Combined with a low rate of 777X's to accumulate and park until certification, I don't think there will be any new surprises here:
747 and A380 - the former are freighters and will get delivered. The remaining A380's are a small enough part of the picture that if any of them get cancelled, it doesn't change the big picture much.
Regionals and turboprops - This segment looks like it will consist of Embraer and ATR, for all intents and purposes. I will watch hopefully to see who else survives.
My overall take:
The key strategy right now is not trying to cut production as low as the demand. That would kill the supply chain and eviscerate their skilled workforces. They'll park planes because they have the cash to keep their suppliers alive and their workforces diminished but intact, and building up excess near term inventory is the most sensible way to utilize that money. They may continue to park planes through much of 2021.
2022 and a couple additional years will be used to deliver those backlogs. Passenger volumes might not yet be at 2019 levels, but hopefully close enough that airlines are retiring old frames at a pace roughly matching deliveries.
JayinKitsap wrote:There have been many examples where increasing taxes slows or kills the industry, reducing taxes can help industries recover faster. Reduced production volumes has increased total cost, so giving tax breaks of say 5% of costs changes the break even point on many flights, starting recovery. Adding 5% would cause a contraction.
Aviation is only a part of the whole economy, changing tax rates in the system can mean the difference between decline and recover. We need recovery right now.
Sokes wrote:JayinKitsap wrote:There have been many examples where increasing taxes slows or kills the industry, reducing taxes can help industries recover faster. Reduced production volumes has increased total cost, so giving tax breaks of say 5% of costs changes the break even point on many flights, starting recovery. Adding 5% would cause a contraction.
Aviation is only a part of the whole economy, changing tax rates in the system can mean the difference between decline and recover. We need recovery right now.
How do you know that adding 5% cost would cause a contraction? You don't, you assume.
Trump did strong cuts in tax for companies. As a consequence, are manufacturers rushing back to the US to open new factories?
Airlines need cash now. My proposal gives them lots of cash now in a way even aviation critics can agree. It will make sure less efficient models get retired. Higher proportion of cost for fuel means willingness to spend more on equipment. My intent is to help the value chain, not to destroy it.
My argument is only wrong if the demand curve is quite elastic, which I doubt.
It may also be that 40% fuel tax is a good idea, while 80% fuel tax is a bad idea.
"... for some products, the customer's desire could drop sharply even with a little price increase, and for other products, it could stay almost the same even with a big price increase. Economists use the term elasticity to denote this sensitivity to price increases. More precisely, price elasticity gives the percentage change in quantity demanded when there is a one percent increase in price, holding everything else constant."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Price_ela ... _of_demand
Anybody has evidence how price elastic the demand curve for flights is?
lightsaber wrote:iamlucky13 wrote:lightsaber wrote:Now I advocate an A320 further production cut and a small ramp up in MAX production
Let's use the articles you posted to try to quantify these and the other models a little better.
The 2nd Aviation Week article you linked to forecasts a little over 1300 deliveries for 2021, mixed at 71% narrowbodies, 16% widebodies, 7% regional jets, and 6% turboprops.
Here's roughly how I see that breaking down. The first line for each bullet is the model numbers I'm assuming fit in the Aviation Week forecast category, and roughly what rate Aviation Week has forecast deliveries for 2021 on average (we should assume the year will be back-loaded). The second line is what I know or estimate of the planned or recent production rates, followed by the percent of Aviation Week's forecast for the segment.
- 737 + A320 + CSeries (C919 and MC-21, neither of which are certified yet): 77 per month
- Planned: 31 + 40 + 6? = 77 per month - 100%- 787 + 777/777X + 767 + 747 + A350 +A330NEO + A380: 17 per month
- Planned: 6 + 2.5 + 3 + 0.5 + 6 + 2 + 0.5 = 20.5 - 120%- ERJ + MRJ + AJR21 + SSJ: 8 per month
- Planned: 5? + 0 + 1 + 1? = 7 - 88%- ATR72 + ?: 7 per month
- Planned: ? - ? %
A few specific comments, which parallel yours:
737 and A320 - I think they'll continue to build and park. Maybe they'll end up parking 5-10 or so a month next year, but then keep the production rates low even as demand rises again in order to clear that backlog.
787 and A350 - We've talked already about widebody pain, it looks like they will need to continue the discussions of a further rate cut, or more parked frames. I suspect they will park frames
777 - At the targeted rates, they have 2 years of production for the legacy version, mostly freighters. Combined with a low rate of 777X's to accumulate and park until certification, I don't think there will be any new surprises here:
747 and A380 - the former are freighters and will get delivered. The remaining A380's are a small enough part of the picture that if any of them get cancelled, it doesn't change the big picture much.
Regionals and turboprops - This segment looks like it will consist of Embraer and ATR, for all intents and purposes. I will watch hopefully to see who else survives.
My overall take:
The key strategy right now is not trying to cut production as low as the demand. That would kill the supply chain and eviscerate their skilled workforces. They'll park planes because they have the cash to keep their suppliers alive and their workforces diminished but intact, and building up excess near term inventory is the most sensible way to utilize that money. They may continue to park planes through much of 2021.
2022 and a couple additional years will be used to deliver those backlogs. Passenger volumes might not yet be at 2019 levels, but hopefully close enough that airlines are retiring old frames at a pace roughly matching deliveries.
You missed that links projection:
. "He predicts that A320neo rates will shrink to 24 aircraft per month in 2021, while A220 output will go from four per month in 2019 to two, new-build A350 aircraft will be down to three, and A330neo production will drop to two. "
lightsaber wrote:I believe you neglected to include the MAX overhang and huge surplus of other aircraft produced in 2020. That chart has a need for 900 aircraft in 2020. We will have 500+ A320NEO, 500+ MAX, a few dozen A220, 30+ A330NEO, 70+ A350, 28 or so 777, about 80 787, plus all the others.
If that analysis is correct, That is over production of 300 to 400 this year that weighs down next year. You are asking Boeing and Airbus to float 20 to 40 billion euro/dollars. That assumes the already delivered and then returned to service MAX were included.
lightsaber wrote:Also, note the cut in production in 2023 per the chart. That should be avoided.
lightsaber wrote:I'm afraid the article's estimate seems about right. Airbus is overproducing and so is Boeing.
Airbus by about 20 per month.
lightsaber wrote:ps, I missed Revalation's link
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-airb ... SKBN26522J
Airbus is doing forced layoffs.
lightsaber wrote:Aviation is, in normal times, an elastic market.
"Significant demand response to airfare changes":
https://www.iata.org/en/iata-repository ... tervistas/
the consensus among most aviation economists has been
that demand for airline services is generally both price and income elastic.
The supply chain is about to be decimated. Unfortunately, there is no avoiding that. There is no R&D money for what you propose.
Lightsaber
lightsaber wrote:Another link on US airlines elastic demand:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/benbaldanz ... stead/amp/
Profit dropped over 70% due to a 25% increase in fuel prices and a mere 3% drop in fares. Capacity discipline needs to return. That means bad news for Boeing, Airbus, other airframers, and their sub-vendors.
If fuel prices increase, that means more capacity discipline.
Lightsaber
Sokes wrote:lightsaber wrote:Aviation is, in normal times, an elastic market.
"Significant demand response to airfare changes":
https://www.iata.org/en/iata-repository ... tervistas/
the consensus among most aviation economists has been
that demand for airline services is generally both price and income elastic.
The supply chain is about to be decimated. Unfortunately, there is no avoiding that. There is no R&D money for what you propose.
Lightsaber
Thank you for the IATA link. It confirms what I thought.
p.vi:
"This report has revealed that there are different price elasticities associated with different uses.
When consumers are choosing between airlines on a route, or even between destinations for
holidays, conference locations, etc., there is a degree of price elasticity for airline seats. However,
if all competitors on a route, or if a wide range of routes all experience the same proportionate price
increase, the demand for airline services becomes less elastic. As a price increase is extended to
ever larger groups of competing airlines or competing destinations, then the overall demand for air
travel is revealed to be somewhat inelastic.
The implications of this are as follows:
For an airline on a given route, increasing price is likely to result in a more than proportionate
decrease in air travel. Lower fares will greatly stimulate traffic and raise revenues.
(i.e., airline specific fare changes are price elastic).
If all airlines on a given route increase fares by the same amount (e.g., due to the imposition of
passenger based airport fees that are passed on to the consumer), then the decrease in traffic
will be less than the former case.
If all airlines on a wide set of routes increase fares by roughly similar amounts (e.g., due to the
imposition of new market-wide taxes or to the working through of higher fuel or security costs)
then the decrease in traffic may be less or much less than proportional to the increase in fares.
(i.e., general increases in airline fares across a broad range of markets appear to be price
inelastic.)"
So if Lufthansa increases the price and Emirates doesn't, Lufthansa looses business. From this lobby groups conclude that fuel tax is harmful for aviation.
Also interesting p.3:
"Time period considered: elasticity tends to be greater over the long run because consumers
have more time to adjust their behaviour. For example, short-term demand for gasoline is very
inelastic (approximately -0.2)4 as consumers have little choice but to continue consuming in
order that they can travel to work, school etc., although they can cut down on some leisure or
discretionary trips or use other modes. The long-term elasticity is higher (about -0.7 – still
inelastic) as consumers can purchase smaller cars, move nearer to work and other behavioural
changes in order to reduce consumption."
That also is not surprising.
I don't dispute that on 400 km distance some people will switch to cars.
80% fuel tax may lead to 20% higher ticket prices which may lead to I guess 5-10% less demand. My argument is that retiring fuel inefficient planes will more than compensate for the decrease in ticket demand.
Higher fuel price justifies higher maintenance expenditure for fuel efficient engines, which also helps the value chain.lightsaber wrote:Another link on US airlines elastic demand:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/benbaldanz ... stead/amp/
Profit dropped over 70% due to a 25% increase in fuel prices and a mere 3% drop in fares. Capacity discipline needs to return. That means bad news for Boeing, Airbus, other airframers, and their sub-vendors.
If fuel prices increase, that means more capacity discipline.
Lightsaber
Your link doesn't work for me.
There has to be something wrong if airlines drop fares at a time when fuel prices increase.
I therefore doubt the drop in profit should be attributed to increased fuel price.
iamlucky13 wrote:My entire premise above, by the way, is partially biased against being willing to believe as many of the people I know in aerospace will be laid off as would be dictated by a 60% production rate cut.
Sokes wrote:I agree with Waterbomber. Let's just continue manufacturing. There are still inefficient models that can be replaced. B787, A350 and A320 can be produced with three months usual demand as inventory in normal times. In this situation even six months makes sense.
If people have to be sacked in a year, so be it. By that time other businesses may be able to absorb those laborers.
I understand that argument is less true for countries with trade deficit. But that's a different discussion.
"As of July 2019, 692 Boeing 737 Classic aircraft were in commercial service. This includes 297 -300s, 261 -400s, and 134 -500s.[17]"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_Classic.
Weatherwatcher1 wrote:Sokes wrote:I agree with Waterbomber. Let's just continue manufacturing. There are still inefficient models that can be replaced. B787, A350 and A320 can be produced with three months usual demand as inventory in normal times. In this situation even six months makes sense.
If people have to be sacked in a year, so be it. By that time other businesses may be able to absorb those laborers.
I understand that argument is less true for countries with trade deficit. But that's a different discussion.
"As of July 2019, 692 Boeing 737 Classic aircraft were in commercial service. This includes 297 -300s, 261 -400s, and 134 -500s.[17]"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_Classic.
I don’t think posting the number of 737 classics flying helps your case. If you look at the airfleets data for how many 737 classic airplanes Have gone into storage this year, it’s far fewer as a percentage than A320s or 737NGs since 50-75% of the 737 classics are now freighters. Similarly the number of crime 757s hasn’t dropped as a percentage as much as the A320 either since it’s a freighter. Is it time to ramp up the 737NGBCF and A321P2F lines?
lightsaber wrote:iamlucky13 wrote:My entire premise above, by the way, is partially biased against being willing to believe as many of the people I know in aerospace will be laid off as would be dictated by a 60% production rate cut.
I work in that industry. I do not want the layoffs. Boeing and Airbus are running through cash too quickly and airlines are worse off.
Airbus' profits in the good times weren't high enough to ride this magnitude of a drop without my previously quoted production drops.
Boeing's 2q report had $4.3 billion go out when March was a normal (ish) delivery month.
Production needs to drop for Airbus by 20/month.
For Boeing, by a few 787 per month and reign back on MAX production restart to the absolute minimum.
Lightsaber
Ps, for example, AirAsiaX is being sued for not paying Aircraft leases. As the primary A330NEO buyer, they will not be receiving aircraft until the leasors are happier:
https://simpleflying.com/airasia-x-sued ... -payments/
JonesNL wrote:I can't understand they do not understand that demand is dead for the next 18 months. The only reason that airliners are accepting deliveries are contractual obligations, not because they need it. Shoving your products in your customers throats when they do not want them is never a good long term strategy...
JonesNL wrote:I can't understand they do not understand that demand is dead for the next 18 months. The only reason that airliners are accepting deliveries are contractual obligations, not because they need it. Shoving your products in your customers throats when they do not want them is never a good long term strategy...
JonesNL wrote:lightsaber wrote:iamlucky13 wrote:My entire premise above, by the way, is partially biased against being willing to believe as many of the people I know in aerospace will be laid off as would be dictated by a 60% production rate cut.
I work in that industry. I do not want the layoffs. Boeing and Airbus are running through cash too quickly and airlines are worse off.
Airbus' profits in the good times weren't high enough to ride this magnitude of a drop without my previously quoted production drops.
Boeing's 2q report had $4.3 billion go out when March was a normal (ish) delivery month.
Production needs to drop for Airbus by 20/month.
For Boeing, by a few 787 per month and reign back on MAX production restart to the absolute minimum.
Lightsaber
Ps, for example, AirAsiaX is being sued for not paying Aircraft leases. As the primary A330NEO buyer, they will not be receiving aircraft until the leasors are happier:
https://simpleflying.com/airasia-x-sued ... -payments/
As the title suggests, parties are playing chicken and are/were in denial about the lack of demand. Airbus should go to survival mode asap; kill the A330, convert all orders to A350s or an "in the pipeline" A322 (entering development after the XLR is finished or not depending on demand) and lower the production volume even more: 50-60%. Less cash spent now, is more cash in the future to invest.
I can't understand they do not understand that demand is dead for the next 18 months. The only reason that airliners are accepting deliveries are contractual obligations, not because they need it. Shoving your products in your customers throats when they do not want them is never a good long term strategy...
JonesNL wrote:
I can't understand they do not understand that demand is dead for the next 18 months. The only reason that airliners are accepting deliveries are contractual obligations, not because they need it. Shoving your products in your customers throats when they do not want them is never a good long term strategy...
oldJoe wrote:JonesNL wrote:
I can't understand they do not understand that demand is dead for the next 18 months. The only reason that airliners are accepting deliveries are contractual obligations, not because they need it. Shoving your products in your customers throats when they do not want them is never a good long term strategy...
If demand is dead for the next 18 months, I wonder myself, why Boeing builds MAX planes at all ? There are already ~500 ( ? ) parked ! No OEM can send the workforce on a 18 months holiday.
MIflyer12 wrote:JonesNL wrote:I can't understand they do not understand that demand is dead for the next 18 months. The only reason that airliners are accepting deliveries are contractual obligations, not because they need it. Shoving your products in your customers throats when they do not want them is never a good long term strategy...
It's not as if they can terminate the assembly workers (French & German labor contracts) and kill all the elements of the supply chain by taking production to zero.
lightsaber wrote:JonesNL wrote:I can't understand they do not understand that demand is dead for the next 18 months. The only reason that airliners are accepting deliveries are contractual obligations, not because they need it. Shoving your products in your customers throats when they do not want them is never a good long term strategy...
This is an astute observation. Airbus is really hurting their customer base producing aircraft that cannot be needed before 2022.
60% of aircraft are normally built for industry growth and with so many parked, there is no replacement demand.
The prior chart shown was for a readership that produces aircraft. No magazine catering to that audience will have subscribers if they publish to worst case scenario too early. Unfortunately, global lockdown has hit, for the aerospace industry, a worse scenario than my April worst case scenario.
Boeing and Airbus must conserve cash to develop those future products. They need to spend more on automation (e.g., I would make the A350 landing gear linkages out of monolithic printed titanium saving cost and weight as the current fastened together assembly is not the normal elegant Airbus design). Only recently was that tech developed for such large and stressed parts.
Until an aircraft comes out that adds a large new cost advantage, airlines do not need new aircraft (e.g., A321xLR).
Waterbomber2 wrote:lightsaber wrote:JonesNL wrote:I can't understand they do not understand that demand is dead for the next 18 months. The only reason that airliners are accepting deliveries are contractual obligations, not because they need it. Shoving your products in your customers throats when they do not want them is never a good long term strategy...
This is an astute observation. Airbus is really hurting their customer base producing aircraft that cannot be needed before 2022.
60% of aircraft are normally built for industry growth and with so many parked, there is no replacement demand.
The prior chart shown was for a readership that produces aircraft. No magazine catering to that audience will have subscribers if they publish to worst case scenario too early. Unfortunately, global lockdown has hit, for the aerospace industry, a worse scenario than my April worst case scenario.
Boeing and Airbus must conserve cash to develop those future products. They need to spend more on automation (e.g., I would make the A350 landing gear linkages out of monolithic printed titanium saving cost and weight as the current fastened together assembly is not the normal elegant Airbus design). Only recently was that tech developed for such large and stressed parts.
Until an aircraft comes out that adds a large new cost advantage, airlines do not need new aircraft (e.g., A321xLR).
As I said earlier, as an OEM you have two choices.
Shut production down and book the fixed costs as losses, or keep production running and convert the fixed costs and variable cost into inventory, resulting in zero losses. The latter strategy comes at the expense of a larger negative cash flow, but with liquidity secured from the government, this is the smartest thing to do.
Sure those aircraft are going to be parked for a while, but inventory is inventory, they'll be able to sell them in a few years, resulting in a double positive cash flow.
If you are building a product that has higher demand than the production capacity, and the demand is wiped out because of macro-issues that are very temporary, the most stupid thing is to stop or reduce the production rate.
JonesNL wrote:Waterbomber2 wrote:lightsaber wrote:This is an astute observation. Airbus is really hurting their customer base producing aircraft that cannot be needed before 2022.
60% of aircraft are normally built for industry growth and with so many parked, there is no replacement demand.
The prior chart shown was for a readership that produces aircraft. No magazine catering to that audience will have subscribers if they publish to worst case scenario too early. Unfortunately, global lockdown has hit, for the aerospace industry, a worse scenario than my April worst case scenario.
Boeing and Airbus must conserve cash to develop those future products. They need to spend more on automation (e.g., I would make the A350 landing gear linkages out of monolithic printed titanium saving cost and weight as the current fastened together assembly is not the normal elegant Airbus design). Only recently was that tech developed for such large and stressed parts.
Until an aircraft comes out that adds a large new cost advantage, airlines do not need new aircraft (e.g., A321xLR).
As I said earlier, as an OEM you have two choices.
Shut production down and book the fixed costs as losses, or keep production running and convert the fixed costs and variable cost into inventory, resulting in zero losses. The latter strategy comes at the expense of a larger negative cash flow, but with liquidity secured from the government, this is the smartest thing to do.
Sure those aircraft are going to be parked for a while, but inventory is inventory, they'll be able to sell them in a few years, resulting in a double positive cash flow.
If you are building a product that has higher demand than the production capacity, and the demand is wiped out because of macro-issues that are very temporary, the most stupid thing is to stop or reduce the production rate.
Cash is King and losses are expected in crisis. (Negative) cash flow is the most important parameter at the moment. Why do you think all CEO's focus on cash burn rate and not on losses...
Waterbomber2 wrote:JonesNL wrote:Waterbomber2 wrote:
As I said earlier, as an OEM you have two choices.
Shut production down and book the fixed costs as losses, or keep production running and convert the fixed costs and variable cost into inventory, resulting in zero losses. The latter strategy comes at the expense of a larger negative cash flow, but with liquidity secured from the government, this is the smartest thing to do.
Sure those aircraft are going to be parked for a while, but inventory is inventory, they'll be able to sell them in a few years, resulting in a double positive cash flow.
If you are building a product that has higher demand than the production capacity, and the demand is wiped out because of macro-issues that are very temporary, the most stupid thing is to stop or reduce the production rate.
Cash is King and losses are expected in crisis. (Negative) cash flow is the most important parameter at the moment. Why do you think all CEO's focus on cash burn rate and not on losses...
Except when you are industrial champions called Airbus and Boeing and your government is going to give you all the cash you need.
Polot wrote:Waterbomber2 wrote:JonesNL wrote:
Cash is King and losses are expected in crisis. (Negative) cash flow is the most important parameter at the moment. Why do you think all CEO's focus on cash burn rate and not on losses...
Except when you are industrial champions called Airbus and Boeing and your government is going to give you all the cash you need.
No strings attached cash is not limitless.
Waterbomber2 wrote:Polot wrote:Waterbomber2 wrote:
Except when you are industrial champions called Airbus and Boeing and your government is going to give you all the cash you need.
No strings attached cash is not limitless.
Not for the airlines, but the OEM's are practically pseudo-governmental companies.
jeffrey0032j wrote:oldJoe wrote:JonesNL wrote:
I can't understand they do not understand that demand is dead for the next 18 months. The only reason that airliners are accepting deliveries are contractual obligations, not because they need it. Shoving your products in your customers throats when they do not want them is never a good long term strategy...
If demand is dead for the next 18 months, I wonder myself, why Boeing builds MAX planes at all ? There are already ~500 ( ? ) parked ! No OEM can send the workforce on a 18 months holiday.
The good thing for Boeing now is that the Max is on low rate production, easier for them if they need to stop production.
A similar situation for Airbus will hit Airbus worse than Boeing as Airbus is still not cutting production rates to match demand, I reckon that in a few months time, Airbus may have more planes sitting around than Boeing.
oldJoe wrote:jeffrey0032j wrote:oldJoe wrote:
If demand is dead for the next 18 months, I wonder myself, why Boeing builds MAX planes at all ? There are already ~500 ( ? ) parked ! No OEM can send the workforce on a 18 months holiday.
The good thing for Boeing now is that the Max is on low rate production, easier for them if they need to stop production.
A similar situation for Airbus will hit Airbus worse than Boeing as Airbus is still not cutting production rates to match demand, I reckon that in a few months time, Airbus may have more planes sitting around than Boeing.
what ?
Airbus builds 40 A32x family aircraft per month and delivers ~35 per month. How on earth will they match 500 in a few months ?
JonesNL wrote:MIflyer12 wrote:JonesNL wrote:I can't understand they do not understand that demand is dead for the next 18 months. The only reason that airliners are accepting deliveries are contractual obligations, not because they need it. Shoving your products in your customers throats when they do not want them is never a good long term strategy...
It's not as if they can terminate the assembly workers (French & German labor contracts) and kill all the elements of the supply chain by taking production to zero.
It will be painfull, but sometimes you need to amputate the leg to make sure the patient survives...