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Taxi645
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The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 9:33 am

The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

One thing that continuous to amaze me is the aviation industry’s perpetual ability to create unsuccessful small variants. The list is almost endless:

A318; 81 sold
A319NEO; 84 sold
A340-200; 28
A340-500; 32
A330-800; 15
A350-800; 0
A380; 251 (not a black and white failure, in terms of total seats sold its a bit more grey)
737-7; 52
777-200LR; 61
777-8; 0?

From the above list it seems that Airbus is somewhat more prone to fall into this trap. If the next largest variant has the range to serve a sufficient percentage of its flights the airline the interest will start to shift to the larger model as the additional cost is marginal compared to the extra revenue potential and flexibility.
How is it possible that an industry that is worth billions continuously gets this wrong? One could say, in terms of development cost, the smaller variant is almost free anyway so why not give it a go?

However, the flip side is that failure never looks good on any company and also launching unsuccessful models doesn’t provide financiers and customers confidence in a company’s ability to keenly read the (future) market. Furthermore, an unsuccessful small variant provides a false illusion of a family of variants which will not materialize as a result of the failure of the smallest variant. As such, when it becomes time for the board to make a choice, this “cheap but false family” proposal hinders the likely more successful, yet much more expensive to develop proposal of stretching the airframe family to keep it within a balanced payload-range window. The trick is to restrain the larger variants range just enough that a sufficient number of airlines need the smaller variant to cover the longer range missions. Alternatively one can make the smaller variant significantly lighter (see the 787-8).

How come the industry struggles so much with the balancing act between payload-range and CASM over the duration of an airframes life when the lessons from past failures in this regard are so clear?
 
Someone83
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 9:49 am

The statistics looks slighty less worse when adding the A330-200 and 787-8, 737-500. But should also add the 737-600 which again was a failure

For the 777-200LR, you could argue it creates the base for the 777F
 
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c933103
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 9:51 am

Many time the existence of such smaller variant is to attract customers who want a few aircraft of such size together with a fleet of larger sized aircraft. Having such smaller variant available, even if it itself isn't all that successful, would still help the program gain more order than just the orderbook of that variant in itself. And I think the cost of creating such a variant based on other model is comparatively lower, hence it probably isn't right to simply look at the low orderbook of the variant itself and call it failure. They fill a niche
 
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Wildlander
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 9:52 am

A variety of circumstances behind these Airbus models.
The A318 (a double shrink) was a low development cost attempt to persuade airlines that it was better to complement existing A320 Family fleets than buy a different aircraft type. The A318 probably sold at decent prices to VIP customers and certainly won additional A320 Family business that would otherwise have been lost. Mission accomplished.
The A340-200 was the base model,quickly eclipsed by the A340-300 once CFMI delivered higher thrust. Who knows how many would have been built if the SuperFan had been pursued by PW. The -300 would likely still have prevailed.
The A340-500 turned out to be a bad idea, a shrink of the relatively heavy A346 airframe/engine combination with extra fixed tankage that ate up hold volume. Launched to satisfy the ULR needs of a single customer in what was to be a very niche market. As noted the 772LR did little better, but at least its aux tanks were removeable/optional.
The jury should still be out on the A330-800 even if the prospects seem poor.
Enough has already been written about the A380!
 
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conaly
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 10:13 am

Taxi645 wrote:
From the above list it seems that Airbus is somewhat more prone to fall into this trap.


Don't forget the Boeing 747SP and the 737-600. And if you compare others: the A319, which may not be the smallest but still smaller than the base model, sold extremely well. The A330-200 did just as well, as the A330-300. So it is definitely not a perpetual failure, there are a lot of successful smaller variants.

There are also quite a lot counterexample to your "perpetual failure": With Boeing and the 757 and 767 it is the other way round, where the longest variant is by far the least successful one (757-300: 55, 767-400: 38), while the shorter versions sold incredibly well. Even the 767-200 did get more than 200 orders and deliveries. With the CRJ, the CRJ100/200 variant, which is by far the smallest, sold better than the CRJ700/900/1000 combined.

Besides, what is a failure? When the smaller version comes from the same assembly line, the costs for development and certification aren't that high. Therefore I wouldn't consider most of the mentioned variants as failure, just much less successful. If there is even a small market for a smaller aircraft, it is still a sold unit for you and not your competitor.

Wildlander wrote:
The A340-200 was the base model


Nope, it wasn't. The A340-300 is the base models and did have its maiden flights before the -200. They were just so close to each other (around half a year), that both received their certification on the same day. Side note: A330-300 is also the base model, the A330-200 came only years later, but was even much more successful in the beginning, as the first A330-300 lacked in range.
 
VSMUT
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 10:15 am

Taxi645 wrote:
The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

One thing that continuous to amaze me is the aviation industry’s perpetual ability to create unsuccessful small variants. The list is almost endless:

A318; 81 sold
A319NEO; 84 sold
A340-200; 28
A340-500; 32
A330-800; 15
A350-800; 0
A380; 251 (not a black and white failure, in terms of total seats sold its a bit more grey)
737-7; 52
777-200LR; 61
777-8; 0?

From the above list it seems that Airbus is somewhat more prone to fall into this trap.


Well maybe if you didn't cherry pick, you'd not have included the A380, and included:
737-600: 69
717: 156

The A340-500 didn't fail because it was a shrink. It was just a poor design with high operating costs, sitting in the tiny ULR niche. The stretched A340-600 was just as mediocre.
The tiny niche ULR market also explains the 777-200LR's and 777-8s poor sales. But we really shouldn't ignore that the 777F was developed on the 777-200LR frame, which puts total sales of that variant at 295.

Plenty of shrinks worked out fine. The A330-200 got almost half the total sales for the A330ceo. The A310s 255 sales was pretty decent by the standards of the time. Ditto for the 249 767-200 that were built, or the 510 777-200s or the so far 422 787-8s that have been sold.

But it isn't just shrinks that failed. The 767-400ER sold a mere 38 examples. The 737-400 barely outsold the 737-500. The 737-900A received just 52 sales and the 737-900ERs 505 sales aren't something to celebrate either. The 757-300 landed just 55, the 747-8 153, of which only 47 were for passenger planes. The A340-600 as noted was a failure as well. I'll refrain from commenting on still running programs, since the book isn't written for those yet.
 
WkndWanderer
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 10:19 am

The exceptions to this list are often when the smallest in the family is the first/original variant. 777-200/ER, 787-8, 757-200, A350-900.
 
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Faro
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 10:28 am

Wildlander wrote:
The A318 (a double shrink) was a low development cost attempt to persuade airlines that it was better to complement existing A320 Family fleets than buy a different aircraft type. The A318 probably sold at decent prices to VIP customers and certainly won additional A320 Family business that would otherwise have been lost. Mission accomplished.
The A340-200 was the base model,quickly eclipsed by the A340-300 once CFMI delivered higher thrust. Who knows how many would have been built if the SuperFan had been pursued by PW. The -300 would likely still have prevailed.



Agreed...I would say engines have a fair bit of responsibility in poorly-selling small airliner variants...the SuperFan on the one hand and the PW6000 too...in terms of overall program cost losses, the PW6000 was spectacular...a total of only 34 engines sold as per Wiki...that must be unprecedented in the history of clean-sheet civilian jet engines...PW must have made a far greater loss on the PW6000 than Airbus on the A318...


Faro
 
AirbusA6
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 10:36 am

With the 737s and A320s, the initial shrink did well

The A319CEO was a big seller, and the 737-500 (effectively a shrink of the 737-300 back to 737-200 size) was a good seller, but the market shifted, especially as the replacement 737-600 with its larger wing was heavier and less competitive at that length
 
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Taxi645
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 10:42 am

Just to clarify guys, my intention is not to imply that every small variant is a failure. My intention is to signal the perpetual process of the airline industry getting it wrong so often. To further clarify, I'm talking about the smaller variant of the same generation of the airframe.

In that light the list shouldn't be viewed as cherry picking, but rather seen as a list of obvious examples from the "recent" past that came to mind. Also I don't have any A vs. B intention or interest, it was merely an observation when composing the list, which I think one is allowed to make.
Last edited by Taxi645 on Sat Dec 26, 2020 10:48 am, edited 3 times in total.
 
747-600X
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 10:44 am

The issue isn't so black-and-white.

The 767-200 was a hit. Notice that in that family, it's the -400 that was the ugly duckling.

Calling the -200LR the "smallest variant" is incorrect. It was larger physically (albeit not by much) than the -200 and -200ER, and quite a bit larger in terms of performance. In any regard, the 777-200 overall was a very popular airplane.

The 717 only "failed" because Boeing took an axe to it once McDonnell Douglas ceased to be.

The 747-SP was created at the specific request of specific customers, so it wasn't any more of a failure than if you were to order a custom cake from a bakery. Here, again, notice that it's the -8i model which seems to be the most "failed" variant of the family.

The 727-100 and 757-200 were (are) also very popular in their days. And yet again, with the 757, it's the -300 which sticks out as a bit of an awkward, poorly-selling add-on to the family.

As others have said, many of these "shrinks" came at low cost. Leaving a few frames out of an A319 really didn't ask much from a development standpoint. The 737-600 only existed because the -500 was a popular variant and Boeing wanted to offer something of the same size. Up against the -700, -800, and -900, there wasn't much going for it, but - again - it was developed as part of a family, with very little to lose by adding it on at the "tail" end.
 
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 10:49 am

Looking back at the A319ceo back then: After having been some exot before it really took off after Airbus added double overwing exits for 156 passenger seats for some time. (easyJet requirement)

Generally after a new aircraft family is on the market a lot of improvements trickle in. Higher rated engines, weight optimization, early customers ask for slightly higher performing variants (maybe to just meet the original promises...) These are low hanging fruits to just stretch what you got and reuse your infrastructure for something better.
 
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 12:39 pm

Taxi645 wrote:
Just to clarify guys, my intention is not to imply that every small variant is a failure. My intention is to signal the perpetual process of the airline industry getting it wrong so often.

Models are usually launched with 1-3 lauch customers and a dozen or so other airlines that have shown interest but haven't commited yet. Sometimes they end up ordering too, and the model becomes a success, or they don't, and the model 'fails'. Market conditions shift - e. g. fuel prices affect CASM and the overall economy determines RASM - or engineering over- / underperforms and the variant becomes more or less attractive than anticipated.

For example, the A340-500 was launched in the late '90s with relatively low fuel costs and a booming economy. Then came 9/11 and the highest fuel prices ever, which made the planned ULH routes unviable. Same for the 777-200LR which was nearly canceled.

The 737-600 was supposed to be a simply 1-for-1 replacement for the large 737-500 and remaining 737-200 fleets. However, the market focus had shifted from 120 seats in the '70s to 150 seats in the '80s and 180 seats in the 2000s. There were other designs in that size, e. g. the F100, the 717, the BAe Avro RJ, that also stopped selling.

The A318 suffered from suboptimal engines; the PW6000 was a complete failure, very delayed and unique to the A318 while the CFM56 variants were derived from the more powerful and older A319 & A320 and therefore were less efficient than they could've been. Of course it also sat in the same shrinking market as the 737-600.

The A319neo and 737-7 were created to keep smaller competitors like the CSeries out of airlines' fleets. Neither Airbus nor Boeing expected to make a huge profit from these but they have to offer something to keep Bombardier & Embraer from encroaching on their primary income sources A320neo & 737-8.
 
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 12:53 pm

conaly wrote:
Besides, what is a failure? When the smaller version comes from the same assembly line, the costs for development and certification aren't that high.


That is a really important point. Financial types wouldn't regard sales volume as the (single) measure of success: it's more likely to be Return On Investment. Low incremental cost can make ROI high even if sales volumes are modest.

Besides, availability of a smaller variant can help build volume of the main/larger type, too: if A319s had not existed, carriers may have been less willing to acquire A320s, as an example.
 
Some1Somewhere
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 1:12 pm

A few others that I haven't seen mentioned:
B787-3; 0, similar story to A350-800.
B737-100; 30.
 
Cubsrule
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 1:39 pm

MIflyer12 wrote:
conaly wrote:
Besides, what is a failure? When the smaller version comes from the same assembly line, the costs for development and certification aren't that high.


That is a really important point. Financial types wouldn't regard sales volume as the (single) measure of success: it's more likely to be Return On Investment. Low incremental cost can make ROI high even if sales volumes are modest.

Besides, availability of a smaller variant can help build volume of the main/larger type, too: if A319s had not existed, carriers may have been less willing to acquire A320s, as an example.


It’s also important to remember that a number of these aircraft - the 77L, the SP, even arguably the 332 - filled valuable range or performance niches at the time of their introduction. The fact that subsequent airframe and/or engine made those niches obsolete does not make the aircraft failures.
 
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 2:36 pm

I think it is a good question. I think the big deciding factor on whether the small version will be popular is looking at OEW/MTOW and Performance. Simple shrinks where the OEW is virtually the same are almost always failures. The economics of the small version are hard to justify unless it is based on runway performance and range. Today’s planes have overall very good performance so it is a small set of circumstances where an airline will choose the smaller plane and forgo the lower CASM of larger plane.

One factor A.net often misses is sales price. Airplane sales price is usually based on the potential profit the plane can make for the airline. It isn’t as closely linked to production costs as it is in other industries. It costs about the same to built the smaller and bigger versions since the labor and high cost components (engines, systems components, flight deck etc) are the same. The revenue potential of the bigger plane is higher since it has more seats and lower CASM. The lower CASM and increased revenue from more seats makes the airplane more profitable for airlines. This revenue potential justifies that the manufacturer can charge more than the marginal difference in production costs. That means the stretch is more profitable for Airbus and Boeing. It’s just like going to a bar and deciding between a 12 ounce beer for $6 or a 20 ounce beer for $8. The 20 ounce beer is a better deal for everyone. Both manufacturers are always trying to upgauge airlines to bigger variants to earn more money. Airbus and Boeing do this even after the order is sold since almost all contracts include pricing and terms if the airline wants to upgauge all or part of the order.

Taxi645 wrote:
Just to clarify guys, my intention is not to imply that every small variant is a failure. My intention is to signal the perpetual process of the airline industry getting it wrong so often. To further clarify, I'm talking about the smaller variant of the same generation of the airframe.

In that light the list shouldn't be viewed as cherry picking, but rather seen as a list of obvious examples from the "recent" past that came to mind. Also I don't have any A vs. B intention or interest, it was merely an observation when composing the list, which I think one is allowed to make.



I think the 787-8 and 787-9 is a good case study where the larger airplane isn’t a simple stretch. The difference in OEW between the 787-8 and 787-9 is 20,000lbs. Originally there was quite a bit of customization on the 787-8 that made the airplane lighter than the 787-9 beyond the fuselage length differences. The goal was that the CASM differences would be smaller between the 787-8 and 787-9 which would justify airlines ordering either plane based on their network. That plan worked out well with the initial orders until production costs ended up being much higher than projected. At that point, Boeing steered airlines to the higher priced 787-9/10 so that they could cover all the deferred production costs. Ultimately that led to Boeing simplifying the 787-8 to be more common to 787-9 to lower production costs.

For comparisons sake the A330-800 only weighs about 10,000 lbs less than the A330-900. The result is the CASM difference between the planes is higher and there isn’t much of a point buying the smaller version unless extreme range is needed.
 
docmtl
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 2:54 pm

Should we add the Embraer E2-175 to the list ? Zero sales so far (even where the US scope clause is not an issue)...
 
frmrCapCadet
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 3:05 pm

A wing and a tube that can safely carry the most common sized humans, with very expensive jet engines which may or may not be optimized for particular models, complicated by the wide swings in the price of oil, sudden swings in the economy (not to speak of plagues), the not entirely understood gap between one and two aisles. Building a plane is betting on the future of all these variables.

One fairly OK solution which has been hammered out on this site by some of our best minds. And this is on topic to this discussion: The smallest plane that can do the distance is often better than a larger plane of the same trip costs per person. My phrase for this, although it is a somewhat different metric, has been, 'smaller planes get bigger, bigger planes get fewer'.

Also on many routes, but not all, frequency counts. An equally cost per available seat mile (or close) flying often is the winner over a larger plane flying less often. When it comes to range is the more capable plane close enough in costs to a shorter range plane that is only a little more efficient? Then the often discussed 'build twice as many planes a year and the costs to produce comes down 10%. Add the variables, hub versus P2P versus, 1Stop. Some airlines want only one type in their fleet, others seem to thrive by have multiple fleets each optimized for particular routes.

Generalizations of all this are not possible.
 
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Boeing757100
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 3:21 pm

I have a contradiction here...

757-300 (55 Units)
767-400ER (38 units)
787-10 (sold less units than the -8 and 9)



Those are all the largest variants of their respective families. While they might have been unsuccessful for different reasons than the planes mentioned earlier in the thread, I thought this should be addressed as well.
 
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PatrickZ80
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 3:36 pm

conaly wrote:
With Boeing and the 757 and 767 it is the other way round, where the longest variant is by far the least successful one (757-300: 55, 767-400: 38), while the shorter versions sold incredibly well.


Not really a fair competition since the longer variants were introduced much later. The 757-200 entered service in 1983 whereas the 757-300 entered service in 1999. Both types stayed in production until 2005. This means the 757-200 has been in production for 22 years while the 757-300 has only been in production for 6 years.

Doing a quick calculation, Boeing delivered 914 757-200s which is 41.5 planes per year on average. They delivered 55 757-300s which is 9.1 planes per year on average. And if you factor in that most 757-200s had already been produced before the 757-300 was introduced, the 757-300 wasn't actually doing that bad.

Perhaps you could say the 757-300 came too late. Had it been introduced in 1983 or shortly after, together with the 757-200, we would have seen whole other numbers. But basically when it was introduced it was already outdated. It was a stretch of a 16 year old design, not exactly the best concept for success.
 
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Taxi645
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 5:00 pm

I think a lot is about range management.

Below are three hypothetical graphs of three scenario's. At the bottom of the graphs is range. The height of the bars represents the trade-off between the amount of missions a plane could do vs it's CASM at each brochure range (again this is hypothetical and very simplified, perhaps not even the correct, but let's run with it).

The two browns bars are two variants of the same plane at the same MTOW. The one on the left with high capacity and lower range, the one on the right with lower capacity and higher range.

Image

So let's start with scenario 1 where a plane is just launched. The larger variant is very limited in range and far removed from the optimum. It's lower CASM and higher revenue potential can compensate somewhat, but sales won't sky rocket (A330-300 or 787-10 at launch for instance).

Then the airframe gets new engines and other efficiency updates as well as MTOW growth. The brown bars move to the right. The larger variant moves closer to the optimal range and because of it's better CASM and revenue potential it start to overtake the smaller model with each incremental improvement, but sales are still nicely distributed between the two models (similar to the A330 later in it's run).

Now we go to scenario three. The airframe has gotten another major update (A330NEO). Again we see the brown bars move to the right. However the larger plane now has enough range to do the majority of missions. Since it also has the better CASM and revenue potential, there is little reason to still go for the smaller version.

In order to avoid the latter scenario the airframe could've been stretched to reduce the range of the models again and to keep the situation balanced as with scenario two, but it is obviously more expensive than just keeping the length as is a pray there will be any takers for the smaller version.
 
WayexTDI
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 5:09 pm

Taxi645 wrote:
The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

One thing that continuous to amaze me is the aviation industry’s perpetual ability to create unsuccessful small variants. The list is almost endless:

A318; 81 sold
A319NEO; 84 sold
A340-200; 28
A340-500; 32
A330-800; 15
A350-800; 0
A380; 251 (not a black and white failure, in terms of total seats sold its a bit more grey)
737-7; 52
777-200LR; 61
777-8; 0?

From the above list it seems that Airbus is somewhat more prone to fall into this trap. If the next largest variant has the range to serve a sufficient percentage of its flights the airline the interest will start to shift to the larger model as the additional cost is marginal compared to the extra revenue potential and flexibility.
How is it possible that an industry that is worth billions continuously gets this wrong? One could say, in terms of development cost, the smaller variant is almost free anyway so why not give it a go?

However, the flip side is that failure never looks good on any company and also launching unsuccessful models doesn’t provide financiers and customers confidence in a company’s ability to keenly read the (future) market. Furthermore, an unsuccessful small variant provides a false illusion of a family of variants which will not materialize as a result of the failure of the smallest variant. As such, when it becomes time for the board to make a choice, this “cheap but false family” proposal hinders the likely more successful, yet much more expensive to develop proposal of stretching the airframe family to keep it within a balanced payload-range window. The trick is to restrain the larger variants range just enough that a sufficient number of airlines need the smaller variant to cover the longer range missions. Alternatively one can make the smaller variant significantly lighter (see the 787-8).

How come the industry struggles so much with the balancing act between payload-range and CASM over the duration of an airframes life when the lessons from past failures in this regard are so clear?

It's already been mentioned, but to recap what you decided to leave behind:
717-200: 156 planes;
737-100: 30 planes;
737-600: 69 planes;
747SP: 45 planes.
787-3: 0 planes.
Of course, if you decide to remove those from your Airbus-biased list, it removes most of Boeing duds and leaves only the Airbus ones...

The 777-200LR is a specific variant of the 777-200 sized planes, which sold a total number of 805 copies (88 -200s, 422 -200ERs, 61 -200LRs and 234 Fs).
 
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aemoreira1981
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 5:14 pm

The B77L doesn't really count as the smallest variant, as it's the same fuselage length as the B772, which sold 510 examples (88 -200, 422 - 200ER). As others have mentioned, the Boeing 777-200LR only sold 61 examples, but it formed the basis for the Boeing 777 freighter, which has sold 234 examples, for a total of 305...without the passenger version, there's no freighter version, meaning the initial fuselage example sold 815 examples.

Now, as for the E-Jet, what is weirdest is that the smallest and largest variants sold the worst (191 E170s, 172 E195s). The E175 was the best seller, selling 798 examples, although with a heavy USA concentration, followed by the E190, which sold 568 examples. However, bad selling doesn't necessarily mean short-lasting...an example being the Boeing 737-900ER. Except for Lion Air, airlines that bought that model, primarily in the USA plus El Al, intend to operate the model for 25-30 years.

The argument works much better for narrow-bodies, not wide-bodies, as the smaller version is typically made available first (especially for Boeing, and sometimes for Airbus). The A319 sold well because it could work for hot and high airports, especially for Chinese airlines and Avianca, while the A318 was just too heavy and small. However, the A20N has all of its capabilities with greater capacity, meaning one doesn't need the A19N, which has sold extremely poorly. If someone orders a 35,000-lb thrust version of the A21N, that could eat into A20N sales as well (currently, it's about an 8:7 split between A20N and A21N orders). The MAX 7 could be an interesting case, as that model has so few orders that I would be surprised if anyone ordering it doesn't convert to the MAX 8...thus far, only Southwest Airlines and WestJet have MAX 7 orders (that basically being a small shrink of the MAX 9). What I find interesting though is how poorly the MAX 9 is selling, even though Southwest could order a bunch and go to 198 passengers, still keeping 4 flight attendants.

If one wants to go way back...what about the MD-87 in the Super 80 range? That shrink accounted for only 75 of the 1191 MD-80 series planes sold (the most popular was the MD-82/88). Also, from what the MD-80 succeeded, the DC-9's most successful version was the -30, which accounted for 621 of the 976 sold---the -10/20 was the initial version there, and the -40 and -50 sold poorly because it was higher capacity but extremely short range).

Returning to wide-bodies, I have to wonder if a carrier like SQ ever seriously considered the A342, before Airbus offered a higher-MTOW A343 to entice SQ to dump its MD-11 order. (The A345 though was just way too heavy, and ultimately the Boeing 787-9 Dreamliner accomplished what that tried to do, with 118t less MTOW---fly PER-LHR nonstop.)
 
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 5:32 pm

Weatherwatcher1 wrote:
I think it is a good question. I think the big deciding factor on whether the small version will be popular is looking at OEW/MTOW and Performance. Simple shrinks where the OEW is virtually the same are almost always failures. The economics of the small version are hard to justify unless it is based on runway performance and range. Today’s planes have overall very good performance so it is a small set of circumstances where an airline will choose the smaller plane and forgo the lower CASM of larger plane.

This sums it up. If the larger variant has a small increase in flight costs (not the 737-400 where shortened engine overhaul intervals kept the 733 the popular models).

Lightsaber
 
2travel2know2
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 5:36 pm

Why an airline with an all Boeing 737-700/800 fleet, obsessed with commonality choose Embraer 190 over the B737-600?, when the smallest next generation B737 had kind of the the same passenger capacity as E190 but with a range like a B737-800?
IMHO, A318 and B737-600 weren't that much of successful aircraft variants due to the fact that they were two frames for very specific routes and airports, not all airlines which order them actually needed them for that use.
 
smartplane
Posts: 1763
Joined: Fri Aug 03, 2018 9:23 pm

Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 5:56 pm

WayexTDI wrote:
Taxi645 wrote:
The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

One thing that continuous to amaze me is the aviation industry’s perpetual ability to create unsuccessful small variants. The list is almost endless:

A318; 81 sold
A319NEO; 84 sold
A340-200; 28
A340-500; 32
A330-800; 15
A350-800; 0
A380; 251 (not a black and white failure, in terms of total seats sold its a bit more grey)
737-7; 52
777-200LR; 61
777-8; 0?

From the above list it seems that Airbus is somewhat more prone to fall into this trap. If the next largest variant has the range to serve a sufficient percentage of its flights the airline the interest will start to shift to the larger model as the additional cost is marginal compared to the extra revenue potential and flexibility.
How is it possible that an industry that is worth billions continuously gets this wrong? One could say, in terms of development cost, the smaller variant is almost free anyway so why not give it a go?

However, the flip side is that failure never looks good on any company and also launching unsuccessful models doesn’t provide financiers and customers confidence in a company’s ability to keenly read the (future) market. Furthermore, an unsuccessful small variant provides a false illusion of a family of variants which will not materialize as a result of the failure of the smallest variant. As such, when it becomes time for the board to make a choice, this “cheap but false family” proposal hinders the likely more successful, yet much more expensive to develop proposal of stretching the airframe family to keep it within a balanced payload-range window. The trick is to restrain the larger variants range just enough that a sufficient number of airlines need the smaller variant to cover the longer range missions. Alternatively one can make the smaller variant significantly lighter (see the 787-8).

How come the industry struggles so much with the balancing act between payload-range and CASM over the duration of an airframes life when the lessons from past failures in this regard are so clear?

It's already been mentioned, but to recap what you decided to leave behind:
717-200: 156 planes;
737-100: 30 planes;
737-600: 69 planes;
747SP: 45 planes.
787-3: 0 planes.
Of course, if you decide to remove those from your Airbus-biased list, it removes most of Boeing duds and leaves only the Airbus ones...

The 777-200LR is a specific variant of the 777-200 sized planes, which sold a total number of 805 copies (88 -200s, 422 -200ERs, 61 -200LRs and 234 Fs).

Add 737-100.
 
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aemoreira1981
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 5:59 pm

2travel2know2 wrote:
Why an airline with an all Boeing 737-700/800 fleet, obsessed with commonality choose Embraer 190 over the B737-600?, when the smallest next generation B737 had kind of the the same passenger capacity as E190 but with a range like a B737-800?
IMHO, A318 and B737-600 weren't that much of successful aircraft variants due to the fact that they were two frames for very specific routes and airports, not all airlines which order them actually needed them for that use.


The 73G might have been a huge bust if not for WN, which wanted a model that could have the same size as the 733 (the 733 was converted to 143 seats). WN alone operates more than half of the variant in service. The 738/73H was by far the most successful, but what if Boeing had introduced the 73J much sooner? The 736 misjudged how the market was moving, but at least it wasn't as bad as the A318 and the PW6000.
 
Antarius
Posts: 3436
Joined: Thu Apr 13, 2017 1:27 pm

Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 6:04 pm

WayexTDI wrote:
Taxi645 wrote:
The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

One thing that continuous to amaze me is the aviation industry’s perpetual ability to create unsuccessful small variants. The list is almost endless:

A318; 81 sold
A319NEO; 84 sold
A340-200; 28
A340-500; 32
A330-800; 15
A350-800; 0
A380; 251 (not a black and white failure, in terms of total seats sold its a bit more grey)
737-7; 52
777-200LR; 61
777-8; 0?

From the above list it seems that Airbus is somewhat more prone to fall into this trap. If the next largest variant has the range to serve a sufficient percentage of its flights the airline the interest will start to shift to the larger model as the additional cost is marginal compared to the extra revenue potential and flexibility.
How is it possible that an industry that is worth billions continuously gets this wrong? One could say, in terms of development cost, the smaller variant is almost free anyway so why not give it a go?

However, the flip side is that failure never looks good on any company and also launching unsuccessful models doesn’t provide financiers and customers confidence in a company’s ability to keenly read the (future) market. Furthermore, an unsuccessful small variant provides a false illusion of a family of variants which will not materialize as a result of the failure of the smallest variant. As such, when it becomes time for the board to make a choice, this “cheap but false family” proposal hinders the likely more successful, yet much more expensive to develop proposal of stretching the airframe family to keep it within a balanced payload-range window. The trick is to restrain the larger variants range just enough that a sufficient number of airlines need the smaller variant to cover the longer range missions. Alternatively one can make the smaller variant significantly lighter (see the 787-8).

How come the industry struggles so much with the balancing act between payload-range and CASM over the duration of an airframes life when the lessons from past failures in this regard are so clear?

It's already been mentioned, but to recap what you decided to leave behind:
717-200: 156 planes;
737-100: 30 planes;
737-600: 69 planes;
747SP: 45 planes.
787-3: 0 planes.
Of course, if you decide to remove those from your Airbus-biased list, it removes most of Boeing duds and leaves only the Airbus ones...

The 777-200LR is a specific variant of the 777-200 sized planes, which sold a total number of 805 copies (88 -200s, 422 -200ERs, 61 -200LRs and 234 Fs).


The 717 really doesn't belong on this list either. It's a rebranded MD aircraft; under the Boeing umbrella it's the only variant.

The 737-700 shouldn't be on the original list as the 736 is the shortest variant and sold appalling poorly.

The 783, a358, 778 to me don't belong either. They never were made. There are tons of drawing board variants that never make it to production.
 
WayexTDI
Posts: 2554
Joined: Fri Sep 21, 2018 4:38 pm

Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 6:07 pm

smartplane wrote:
WayexTDI wrote:
Taxi645 wrote:
The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

One thing that continuous to amaze me is the aviation industry’s perpetual ability to create unsuccessful small variants. The list is almost endless:

A318; 81 sold
A319NEO; 84 sold
A340-200; 28
A340-500; 32
A330-800; 15
A350-800; 0
A380; 251 (not a black and white failure, in terms of total seats sold its a bit more grey)
737-7; 52
777-200LR; 61
777-8; 0?

From the above list it seems that Airbus is somewhat more prone to fall into this trap. If the next largest variant has the range to serve a sufficient percentage of its flights the airline the interest will start to shift to the larger model as the additional cost is marginal compared to the extra revenue potential and flexibility.
How is it possible that an industry that is worth billions continuously gets this wrong? One could say, in terms of development cost, the smaller variant is almost free anyway so why not give it a go?

However, the flip side is that failure never looks good on any company and also launching unsuccessful models doesn’t provide financiers and customers confidence in a company’s ability to keenly read the (future) market. Furthermore, an unsuccessful small variant provides a false illusion of a family of variants which will not materialize as a result of the failure of the smallest variant. As such, when it becomes time for the board to make a choice, this “cheap but false family” proposal hinders the likely more successful, yet much more expensive to develop proposal of stretching the airframe family to keep it within a balanced payload-range window. The trick is to restrain the larger variants range just enough that a sufficient number of airlines need the smaller variant to cover the longer range missions. Alternatively one can make the smaller variant significantly lighter (see the 787-8).

How come the industry struggles so much with the balancing act between payload-range and CASM over the duration of an airframes life when the lessons from past failures in this regard are so clear?

It's already been mentioned, but to recap what you decided to leave behind:
717-200: 156 planes;
737-100: 30 planes;
737-600: 69 planes;
747SP: 45 planes.
787-3: 0 planes.
Of course, if you decide to remove those from your Airbus-biased list, it removes most of Boeing duds and leaves only the Airbus ones...

The 777-200LR is a specific variant of the 777-200 sized planes, which sold a total number of 805 copies (88 -200s, 422 -200ERs, 61 -200LRs and 234 Fs).

Add 737-100.

I did, 30 planes.
 
WayexTDI
Posts: 2554
Joined: Fri Sep 21, 2018 4:38 pm

Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 6:12 pm

Antarius wrote:
WayexTDI wrote:
Taxi645 wrote:
The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

One thing that continuous to amaze me is the aviation industry’s perpetual ability to create unsuccessful small variants. The list is almost endless:

A318; 81 sold
A319NEO; 84 sold
A340-200; 28
A340-500; 32
A330-800; 15
A350-800; 0
A380; 251 (not a black and white failure, in terms of total seats sold its a bit more grey)
737-7; 52
777-200LR; 61
777-8; 0?

From the above list it seems that Airbus is somewhat more prone to fall into this trap. If the next largest variant has the range to serve a sufficient percentage of its flights the airline the interest will start to shift to the larger model as the additional cost is marginal compared to the extra revenue potential and flexibility.
How is it possible that an industry that is worth billions continuously gets this wrong? One could say, in terms of development cost, the smaller variant is almost free anyway so why not give it a go?

However, the flip side is that failure never looks good on any company and also launching unsuccessful models doesn’t provide financiers and customers confidence in a company’s ability to keenly read the (future) market. Furthermore, an unsuccessful small variant provides a false illusion of a family of variants which will not materialize as a result of the failure of the smallest variant. As such, when it becomes time for the board to make a choice, this “cheap but false family” proposal hinders the likely more successful, yet much more expensive to develop proposal of stretching the airframe family to keep it within a balanced payload-range window. The trick is to restrain the larger variants range just enough that a sufficient number of airlines need the smaller variant to cover the longer range missions. Alternatively one can make the smaller variant significantly lighter (see the 787-8).

How come the industry struggles so much with the balancing act between payload-range and CASM over the duration of an airframes life when the lessons from past failures in this regard are so clear?

It's already been mentioned, but to recap what you decided to leave behind:
717-200: 156 planes;
737-100: 30 planes;
737-600: 69 planes;
747SP: 45 planes.
787-3: 0 planes.
Of course, if you decide to remove those from your Airbus-biased list, it removes most of Boeing duds and leaves only the Airbus ones...

The 777-200LR is a specific variant of the 777-200 sized planes, which sold a total number of 805 copies (88 -200s, 422 -200ERs, 61 -200LRs and 234 Fs).


The 717 really doesn't belong on this list either. It's a rebranded MD aircraft; under the Boeing umbrella it's the only variant.

The 737-700 shouldn't be on the original list as the 736 is the shortest variant and sold appalling poorly.

The 783, a358, 778 to me don't belong either. They never were made. There are tons of drawing board variants that never make it to production.

The 787-3 and A350-800 were cancelled before being manufactured; the 777-8 is still believed to be manufactured, might be too premature to say it'll never make it to production.
I agree the 787-3 and A350-800 should not be on the list; but OP included the A350-800, so by all logic the 787-3 should be too.

As far as the 717, not sure if it should be on the list or not; not sure the A380 should be either, both planes ended up being the single variant of an originally planed family.
 
Antarius
Posts: 3436
Joined: Thu Apr 13, 2017 1:27 pm

Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 6:41 pm

WayexTDI wrote:
Antarius wrote:
WayexTDI wrote:
It's already been mentioned, but to recap what you decided to leave behind:
717-200: 156 planes;
737-100: 30 planes;
737-600: 69 planes;
747SP: 45 planes.
787-3: 0 planes.
Of course, if you decide to remove those from your Airbus-biased list, it removes most of Boeing duds and leaves only the Airbus ones...

The 777-200LR is a specific variant of the 777-200 sized planes, which sold a total number of 805 copies (88 -200s, 422 -200ERs, 61 -200LRs and 234 Fs).


The 717 really doesn't belong on this list either. It's a rebranded MD aircraft; under the Boeing umbrella it's the only variant.

The 737-700 shouldn't be on the original list as the 736 is the shortest variant and sold appalling poorly.

The 783, a358, 778 to me don't belong either. They never were made. There are tons of drawing board variants that never make it to production.

The 787-3 and A350-800 were cancelled before being manufactured; the 777-8 is still believed to be manufactured, might be too premature to say it'll never make it to production.
I agree the 787-3 and A350-800 should not be on the list; but OP included the A350-800, so by all logic the 787-3 should be too.

As far as the 717, not sure if it should be on the list or not; not sure the A380 should be either, both planes ended up being the single variant of an originally planed family.


Fair enough. I agree that the a358 shouldn't be on the list either as well as the a380 and 717 as they are single variants. We can include the MD-95 under the MD-80/90 series though as it has comparable models.

For now, I'd leave the 778 off as it hasn't been officially produced. I doubt it will as the sales prospects look atrocious, but you never know!

Another one to add is the a320-100 with 21 produced. Although, it can be argued that the a320-200 is basically the same thing with minor tweaks and can be rolled in together.
 
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Taxi645
Topic Author
Posts: 529
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 6:41 pm

Don't get hung up about the list. It's just the most recent models that came to mind. I'm sure I missed a few and some might be debatable. The list is not at the center of the opening post, but rather the phenomenon as described.
 
Someone83
Posts: 5451
Joined: Sun Sep 17, 2006 5:47 pm

Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 6:43 pm

Noshow wrote:
Looking back at the A319ceo back then: After having been some exot before it really took off after Airbus added double overwing exits for 156 passenger seats for some time. (easyJet requirement)


I don’t believe this is correct. Yes, the double overving exit helped boost the program by the important easyJet order, but looking at the A319 by itself it also sold decent with one exit, landing good volume orders with multiple important carriers. Like UA, AC, BA, IB, LH, US, AF, NW, etc
 
Northwest1988
Posts: 386
Joined: Mon Mar 25, 2013 6:10 pm

Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 6:59 pm

I think Boeing would have been better off to put more emphasis on the 717 and possibly a 717-300 than the 737-600. Hindsight 2020...
 
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DocLightning
Posts: 22270
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 7:04 pm

Someone83 wrote:
For the 777-200LR, you could argue it creates the base for the 777F


The LR has no parts that aren't also used on the 772, 77F, or 77W. It was never going to be a big seller, but at almost no additional cost to develop, the break-even number was miniscule.
 
Weatherwatcher1
Posts: 969
Joined: Sun Mar 03, 2019 5:14 pm

Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 7:06 pm

Taxi645 wrote:
Don't get hung up about the list. It's just the most recent models that came to mind. I'm sure I missed a few and some might be debatable. The list is not at the center of the opening post, but rather the phenomenon as described.


I agree that it isn’t worth getting hung up on the list and trying to debate what planes are failures. The trend of smaller derivatives struggling (especially later in the models life) compared to stretches is true for both Airbus and Boeing. I believe it is the same market forces of CASM vs revenue potential vs acquisition price vs airplane performance. The equation changes with each example, but the same factors influence order decisions
 
Antarius
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Joined: Thu Apr 13, 2017 1:27 pm

Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 7:27 pm

Taxi645 wrote:
Don't get hung up about the list. It's just the most recent models that came to mind. I'm sure I missed a few and some might be debatable. The list is not at the center of the opening post, but rather the phenomenon as described.


To have a solid conclusion, IMO, we need solid underlying data.
 
WayexTDI
Posts: 2554
Joined: Fri Sep 21, 2018 4:38 pm

Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 10:23 pm

Taxi645 wrote:
Don't get hung up about the list. It's just the most recent models that came to mind. I'm sure I missed a few and some might be debatable. The list is not at the center of the opening post, but rather the phenomenon as described.

It actually is important when one of your comments is
From the above list it seems that Airbus is somewhat more prone to fall into this trap
.
Your list included some Airbus models (like the A350-800, which was offered for sale but never built) while ignoring a Boeing model with the same story (the 787-3).
Last edited by WayexTDI on Sat Dec 26, 2020 10:29 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
WayexTDI
Posts: 2554
Joined: Fri Sep 21, 2018 4:38 pm

Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 10:27 pm

Antarius wrote:
WayexTDI wrote:
Antarius wrote:

The 717 really doesn't belong on this list either. It's a rebranded MD aircraft; under the Boeing umbrella it's the only variant.

The 737-700 shouldn't be on the original list as the 736 is the shortest variant and sold appalling poorly.

The 783, a358, 778 to me don't belong either. They never were made. There are tons of drawing board variants that never make it to production.

The 787-3 and A350-800 were cancelled before being manufactured; the 777-8 is still believed to be manufactured, might be too premature to say it'll never make it to production.
I agree the 787-3 and A350-800 should not be on the list; but OP included the A350-800, so by all logic the 787-3 should be too.

As far as the 717, not sure if it should be on the list or not; not sure the A380 should be either, both planes ended up being the single variant of an originally planed family.


Fair enough. I agree that the a358 shouldn't be on the list either as well as the a380 and 717 as they are single variants. We can include the MD-95 under the MD-80/90 series though as it has comparable models.

For now, I'd leave the 778 off as it hasn't been officially produced. I doubt it will as the sales prospects look atrocious, but you never know!

Another one to add is the a320-100 with 21 produced. Although, it can be argued that the a320-200 is basically the same thing with minor tweaks and can be rolled in together.

The A320-100 is just the first A320s built; the A320-200 is basically an improved A320-100, same size and all. OP was talking about smaller variants: the smaller variants of the A320 are the A319, and the A318.
Following your logic, the 747-300 should be included then; but it was basically there to bridge the gap between the 747-200 (3-man cockpit, older aerodynamics) and the 747-400 (2-man cockpit, better aerodynamics, stretched upper deck). And it was built at only 81 units.
 
phatfarmlines
Posts: 2034
Joined: Thu Sep 27, 2001 12:06 pm

Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 10:42 pm

The success (or failure) of the smallest variant depends on where it sat on the product life cycle. The 767-200 had decent sales in the early 1980s until 767-300 came along in the mid-1980s.

The same could be argued for the 757-200. If the 757-300 came out first, followed up by a theoretical 757-200 "shrink", would the 757-300 outperformed the 757-200? There were arilines operating the stretch DC-8s in the time the 757-200 came out which could have benefitted.

Good topic - I don't think this topic has been discussed in this forum.
 
Aircellist
Posts: 1682
Joined: Fri Oct 08, 2004 8:43 am

Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 10:56 pm

:old: For the record, the 757-100 never made it to the flight line either
 
93Sierra
Posts: 398
Joined: Sat Apr 17, 2010 11:01 pm

Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 10:57 pm

What about the ejet or the crj family?
 
airbazar
Posts: 10529
Joined: Wed Sep 10, 2003 11:12 pm

Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sat Dec 26, 2020 11:02 pm

I think it's unfair to call it a perpetual failure. The smallest variant exists for a reason and it plays an important role.
For starters, airliner sizes increase over time. But often times the lack of adequate technology makes the larger variant unattractive. For example, the A332 and B772 sold a lot of frames earlier on because the A333 and 773 were not all that capable. While the A318 was too much of a niche frame, to this day the A319 still flies missions that neither the A320 or A321 can fly but at some point the A320 will be the smallest type in Airbus' A320 family.
Another important factor is that at the time of launch, the so called smallest variant is still a significant increase in size and capability so it provides customers with the ability to adopt a smaller increase. For example, in Boeing's portfolio the 788 was a replacement for the B763 yet it was significantly larger. It was a lot easier for airlines to jump from the 763 to the 788 and then the 789 than to make the giant leap from 763 to 789. Once the world became comfortable with the size of the 789 that intermediate step was no longer necessary.
 
User avatar
ADent
Posts: 1222
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sun Dec 27, 2020 12:07 am

Wildlander wrote:
The A318 (a double shrink) was a low development cost attempt to persuade airlines that it was better to complement existing A320 Family fleets than buy a different aircraft type. The A318 probably sold at decent prices to VIP customers and certainly won additional A320 Family business that would otherwise have been lost. Mission accomplished.

Don't forget that the A318 was originally offered only with PW6000 engines. With 3 year delay the CFM was offered- an engine rated for 32,000 lb and de-rated to at 21,600 or 23,300 lbs for the A318.

So a double shrink with engines 1.5x too big.
 
Sokes
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sun Dec 27, 2020 4:33 am

Taxi645 wrote:
...
Below are three hypothetical graphs of three scenario's. At the bottom of the graphs is range. The height of the bars represents the trade-off between the amount of missions a plane could do vs it's CASM at each brochure range (again this is hypothetical and very simplified, perhaps not even the correct, but let's run with it).

The two browns bars are two variants of the same plane at the same MTOW. The one on the left with high capacity and lower range, the one on the right with lower capacity and higher range.

Image

...

Shouldn't there be two bars for each distance, one for the smaller, one for the bigger variant?
How to know which particular varient was chosen at what range?
 
dstblj52
Posts: 744
Joined: Tue Nov 19, 2019 8:38 pm

Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sun Dec 27, 2020 4:47 am

93Sierra wrote:
What about the ejet or the crj family?

the fact that most of them fly under scope restricting traditional market rules buy differentiating labor rates
 
FlyingElvii
Posts: 1802
Joined: Wed Dec 27, 2017 10:53 pm

Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sun Dec 27, 2020 7:01 am

Northwest1988 wrote:
I think Boeing would have been better off to put more emphasis on the 717 and possibly a 717-300 than the 737-600. Hindsight 2020...

Operators LOVED the 717, maint costs and dispatch reliability were astounding, but it got caught in between competition and the 2001 recession. The 717, 737-600, and the Fokker 100 were all competing in the same segment, with Bombardier just below it, and Dornier marketing to the same customers. The 200/700/900 family just offered more flexibility, and could be operated by subsidiaries outside of SCOPE. Add in the Long Beach follies, and it isn’t hard to see why Boeing chose how they did, even despite the potential.
 
FlyingElvii
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Joined: Wed Dec 27, 2017 10:53 pm

Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sun Dec 27, 2020 7:05 am

WkndWanderer wrote:
The exceptions to this list are often when the smallest in the family is the first/original variant. 777-200/ER, 787-8, 757-200, A350-900.

Add the CRJ-1000 to that list, or the Saab 2000.
 
inkjet7
Posts: 265
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Re: The perpetual failure of the smallest variant.

Sun Dec 27, 2020 7:58 am

How about the F70 versus the F100? The first 70 was quite literally a shrink of the larger model.

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