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IADFCO
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Sat Jan 09, 2021 7:12 am

Yes, sorry I brought it up. This feels too much like Groundhog Day. A search for my handle will bring up all the necessary information, should anybody be interested.
 
milhaus
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Sat Jan 09, 2021 4:41 pm

I agree, it is not possible to design jetliner without any system or feature which allows full authority controll in whole speed range. B737NG already has speed trim, mach trim elevator feel computer and yaw damper. The problem is MCAS was designed realy poorly with total lack of redundancy and unfortunately from my point of view redundancy is still not up to standards with other modern aircraft. Why they just not put third AOA sensor to nose , all three connect with comparator and final outcome send to FCC is still beyond my understanding
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Sat Jan 09, 2021 4:50 pm

milhaus wrote:
I agree, it is not possible to design jetliner without any system or feature which allows full authority controll in whole speed range. B737NG already has speed trim, mach trim elevator feel computer and yaw damper. The problem is MCAS was designed realy poorly with total lack of redundancy and unfortunately from my point of view redundancy is still not up to standards with other modern aircraft. Why they just not put third AOA sensor to nose , all three connect with comparator and final outcome send to FCC is still beyond my understanding

Making the 3rd sensor artificial like they will have to do for the MAX10 is probably better. In the extremely unlikely event of a flock of birds damaging all physical sensors, the artificial AoA will still be pretty accurate.
 
JayinKitsap
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Sat Jan 09, 2021 9:51 pm

On the criminal side this is over, just like SNC Lavalin in Canada. Company gets caught doing quite bad things (bribing foreign leaders not in accordance with Canadian law). Company too embedded in the society to allow for actual charges where they can't do government work.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SNC-Lavalin_affair

Boeing is too big to fail, DOD really needs them on a wide number of projects and they are a major piece of projecting the American Military Industrial Complex to the world.

If just the MAX had happened (no C19) yes this will be going on for a long, long time. Now the airline industry has been decimated, relief money has been poured in in large amounts only to swirl away down the drain. The FAA just certified return to service, new DOJ people coming in, legislative leaders hearing the economic pain of layoffs from so many airline and OEM workers, and those businesses are lobbying hard. Going further after Boeing gains very little political points at the moment, besides we are talking about an American company with American workers and these two crashes happened in far off countries. Certainly not fair but little to gain to continue the fight.

I recall hearing that most of the legal involving those that perished (RIP) has been settled, anyone have information on that? The civil cases are only for those not settled and it is a big David v Goliath & whole gang kind of fight. Boeing would rather spend $5M defending the case than settle for $2M if that sets precedent. Where do the claimants get the kind of $ to actually go after Boeing. To battle forward, the legal costs will far exceed the most generous settlement imagined above what Boeing is offering to settle. Yes, it looks like PG&E in Erin Brockovich.
 
INFINITI329
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Sun Jan 10, 2021 2:50 am

Has Boeing given any updates on the Max 10? I am expecting to see its first flight before the end of 1Q21
 
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Stitch
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Sun Jan 10, 2021 3:01 am

JayinKitsap wrote:
I recall hearing that most of the legal involving those that perished (RIP) has been settled, anyone have information on that? The civil cases are only for those not settled and it is a big David v Goliath & whole gang kind of fight. Boeing would rather spend $5M defending the case than settle for $2M if that sets precedent. Where do the claimants get the kind of $ to actually go after Boeing. To battle forward, the legal costs will far exceed the most generous settlement imagined above what Boeing is offering to settle.


I imagine most, if not all, of the current civil cases against Boeing are being paid for by the lawyers who will then be compensated by a claiming a not-insignificant percentage of the final award as their fee. As such, I would expect the lawyers to be interested in a settlement rather than a trial as it minimizes their costs and still secures them a tidy income for what work they do perform that much quicker.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Sun Jan 10, 2021 6:10 pm

Jon Ostrower provides an article on MAX:

https://theaircurrent.com/aircraft-deve ... ax-at-all/

Note: The web site is normally paywalled but this article loaded completely for me today and I am not a subscriber. It also may be paywalled in the near future. YMMV.

It puts a lot of things together in a way I've never seen before.

My takeaways:
  • The push to avoid sim training certainly came from a higher level than Chief Technical Pilot Mark Fortner. For instance:
    On May 4, 2013, (737 Max Chief Project Engineer Michael) Teal, sent an email to Boeing managers “indicating ‘concerns’ about the addition of MCAS to the flight controls system and its impact on Boeing’s ability to obtain Level B (non-simulator) pilot differences training for 737 Max pilots,” according to documents revealed by the U.S. House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee investigation that was completed in September.
  • it'd be really interesting to know where those "concerns" came from, Teal himself, or his co-workers, or his seniors...
  • Sources within Southwest indicate the much discussed $1M penalty per airplane was just a left over clause from earlier NG contracts and not a big focus for them. Their main concern was avoiding a new type rating that a switch to a clean sheet or a competitor's product would require, and a few hours in the sim would be of little significance to them, which suggests Boeing had very poor information flow from customers and their requirements into their engineering team.
  • Avoiding this sim training was the motivation for Forkner to ask FAA to keep MCAS out of the FCOM and was the key criminally fraudulent act that caused the $243M penalty plus additional $500M victim relief fund
  • The article suggests that MCAS was not needed at all, which is supported by FAA and EASA findings that the 737 is stable with MCAS off, and if Boeing asked FAA for a waiver on the stick force requirement instead of developing MCAS then FAA would have evaluated that request and if accepted the whole tragedy may have been averted.

Lots more detail in the article. I suggest you give it a look.

For instance, something that gives us a lot to talk about is the following chart:

Image

It is labeled "Boeing outlined the key program directives for the 737 Max program to Southwest Airlines in a 2013 presentation".

As above if Boeing presented this to WN, why be so absolute about the "class B" training requirement (i.e. computer based not sim), why not have a dialog? Sure, WN is going to prefer the cheaper option, but why not ask if it is negotiable? TFA suggests it really wasn't that important to WN. But, again, this chart shows the pressure to avoid sim training wasn't just something Forkner cooked up in his head, it was a project wide directive.

I know, the train has left the station, but still...
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Stitch
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Sun Jan 10, 2021 6:34 pm

Revelation wrote:
Sources within Southwest indicate the much discussed $1M penalty per airplane was just a left over clause from earlier NG contracts and not a big focus for them. Their main concern was avoiding a new type rating that a switch to a clean sheet or a competitor's product would require, and a few hours in the sim would be of little significance to them, which suggests Boeing had very poor information flow from customers and their requirements into their engineering team.


Considering Boeing's focus on maintaining "customer lock-in" by minimizing the differences between the 737 Next Generation and the 737 MAX, even if the "no training" clause from Southwest's 737-700 contract had not been carried-over due to the MAX contract using that as the basis, Boeing still probably would have followed a similar path with MCAS.


Revelation wrote:
The article suggests that MCAS was not needed at all, which is supported by FAA and EASA findings that the 737 is stable with MCAS off, and if Boeing asked FAA for a waiver on the stick force requirement instead of developing MCAS then FAA would have evaluated that request...


I mentioned as much up-thread in response to the claim that MCAS was needed because the MAX is "unstable" without it. That being said, there would have had to been some actual "difference training" to account how the MAX reacted differently to a high AoA stall envelope than the NG did.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Sun Jan 10, 2021 7:35 pm

Stitch wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Sources within Southwest indicate the much discussed $1M penalty per airplane was just a left over clause from earlier NG contracts and not a big focus for them. Their main concern was avoiding a new type rating that a switch to a clean sheet or a competitor's product would require, and a few hours in the sim would be of little significance to them, which suggests Boeing had very poor information flow from customers and their requirements into their engineering team.


Considering Boeing's focus on maintaining "customer lock-in" by minimizing the differences between the 737 Next Generation and the 737 MAX, even if the "no training" clause from Southwest's 737-700 contract had not been carried-over due to the MAX contract using that as the basis, Boeing still probably would have followed a similar path with MCAS.


Revelation wrote:
The article suggests that MCAS was not needed at all, which is supported by FAA and EASA findings that the 737 is stable with MCAS off, and if Boeing asked FAA for a waiver on the stick force requirement instead of developing MCAS then FAA would have evaluated that request...


I mentioned as much up-thread in response to the claim that MCAS was needed because the MAX is "unstable" without it. That being said, there would have had to been some actual "difference training" to account how the MAX reacted differently to a high AoA stall envelope than the NG did.

I'm not sure if that "difference training" could be contained to a computer assisted session or not, given how the situation is being described:

Those who have flown the Max in engineering tests tell TAC that much of the differences in handling qualities with MCAS present and not are marginally perceptible “once you know what to look for” and produces a “slightly softer feel” in the aircraft’s control for stall recovery.

The article uses the analogy that many airlines keep 757 and 767 pilots current on both types, and all LearJets are still on one type certificate.

I'm just saying that Boeing seems to have painted itself into some corners by taking these black/white stances back in 2013. With a little more customer interaction, and a little more finesse, and the compliant FAA of that era, the stick force thing could very well have been just one more waiver in the long list of waivers Boeing and other manufacturers routinely get, and if sim training was needed it could be much less time than we're now seeing with MCAS in the loop. It'd be more along the lines of "here's what the entry to stall feels like" instead of "here's how to deal with the new active/standby flight control computers, here's the new check lists, here's the amended check lists" etc.

It seems they did choose the path of deception rather than negotiation and it bit them hard, along with their customers and the crash victims.
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Sun Jan 10, 2021 8:04 pm

Revelation wrote:
[*] The article suggests that MCAS was not needed at all, which is supported by FAA and EASA findings that the 737 is stable with MCAS off, and if Boeing asked FAA for a waiver on the stick force requirement instead of developing MCAS then FAA would have evaluated that request and if accepted the whole tragedy may have been averted.[/list]

Is it a coincidence that this comes up after Boeing has agreed a settlement with the DOJ?
If this was front and center during all Hill testimony and other speculation, would it have increased the calls for the FAA to shoulder more blame for the accidents?
 
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Stitch
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Sun Jan 10, 2021 8:16 pm

Revelation wrote:
[*] The article suggests that MCAS was not needed at all, which is supported by FAA and EASA findings that the 737 is stable with MCAS off, and if Boeing asked FAA for a waiver on the stick force requirement instead of developing MCAS then FAA would have evaluated that request and if accepted the whole tragedy may have been averted.[/list]

par13del wrote:
Is it a coincidence that this comes up after Boeing has agreed a settlement with the DOJ? If this was front and center during all Hill testimony and other speculation, would it have increased the calls for the FAA to shoulder more blame for the accidents?


With respect, why would it unless the belief was the FAA would both waive the FAR and not require any additional training to recognize when the MAX was entering a stall in that situation, instead hoping that the pilots would somehow "know what to look for" and instinctively intuit it.

I am hazarding a guess this might be why Boeing did not seek such an exception - even if they received it, they may have worried that they would have to do some training and since it sounds like the difference is more "by feel", I would think actual simulator training would be required or at least encouraged to help pilots recognize that "feeling" and Boeing was dead-set against any simulator training for the MAX for NG pilots.
 
CanukinUSA
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Sun Jan 10, 2021 8:31 pm

Remember that deferred prosecution is dependent on nothing new appearing from Boeing in the next three years. What are the chances of that given Boeing management and Engineering's actions the last few years? As far as I can tell the train has not left the station. The deferred prosecution clearly states that individuals may be prosecuted in the future. Boeing lawyers as expected have thrown quite a few people under the bus (rightly or wrongly depending on your viewpoint) in an attempt to clear the company. If this was not made available to the DOJ during it's investigation or seizure of documents then this may cause trouble for Boeing and/or some individuals who were involved and affect the deferred prosecution agreement. The DOJ is not going to make public any investigations it has going on because that may cause them to be thrown out of court. If I were any Boeing personnel involved with this I would be consulting with my own legal team by now. I recall junior managers telling us how no Boeing personnel were going to be in trouble in meetings before I retired. How naïve they were and I wonder what they think now? Fortunately I was not involved with the 737 MAX during it's certification process. Thank goodness.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Sun Jan 10, 2021 8:53 pm

Stitch wrote:
With respect, why would it unless the belief was the FAA would both waive the FAR and not require any additional training to recognize when the MAX was entering a stall in that situation, instead hoping that the pilots would somehow "know what to look for" and instinctively intuit it.

My thought is the compliant FAA of the era could be given an application for a waiver saying the “slightly softer feel” felt somewhere along the way to reaching a stall and only noticeable once pilots were clued in to expect it may violate the letter of the law but was not a concern in the real world. In short there was nothing to look for or train for because it was only a “slightly softer feel”. FAA Chief Dickson said FAA certainly would have reviewed such an application but never received one.
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CanukinUSA
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Sun Jan 10, 2021 9:12 pm

The applicant (in this case) the manufacturer (i.e. Boeing) has to apply for an exemption from the regulations. Boeing has done that in the past on almost all of their aircraft so have other manufacturers. They have to prove an equivalent level of safety to the FAA to obtain the exemption. They obviously decided that the risk in being forced to increase the training required as stated in their objectives was not worth the time and money to do this and would likely affect the training requirements and chose to try and hide it it appears. One of the issues that they may have considered was that the simulation in the flight simulators was not exactly like the aircraft and as a result they may have opened up a whole can of worms for doing approach to stall training as was done in the past in training flight simulators. The simulators only have a generic stall model and it does not necessarily reflect the actual stall characteristics nor the approach to stall characteristics of a particular aircraft. Unfortunately with 20/20 hindsight that does not apeear to have been a very smart decision by Boeing and some of it's personnel.
 
DenverTed
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Sun Jan 10, 2021 11:13 pm

' if the FAA would have accepted a stick force waiver '
Seems like a pretty big if.
How come the FAA and EASA were not suggesting this (get rid of MCAS) 21 months ago?
 
CanukinUSA
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Sun Jan 10, 2021 11:37 pm

Why would the regulator(s) suggest how to certify an aircraft? If they did that they would be accused of showing favoritism to particular manufacturers and everyone else would be crying foul. There are many meeting between the regulator and the manufacturer about the particular program throughout the program to figure what regulations it has to meet and how that will be done and demonstrated and any exemptions that may be considered and how they will be met. It would be interesting to see what was discussed in these meetings and whether the changes to MCAS were discussed after they were made during the Flight Test Program as issues were found. It does not sound like they were. I assume that the FAA would have records of these meetings and what was discussed.
It is the applicants responsibility to present to the regulator what they are proposing and to see what the regulator's position will be. If they don't apply for it to the regulator the regulator for an exemption the regulator will have no reason to even look into it.
Another issue that has not been mentioned is that I believe the 737 MAX Chief Technical Pilot at the time had worked at the FAA for a period of time before he came to work for Boeing. He was obviously hired for his knowledge at getting issues through the FAA. Talk about a conflict of interest between Boeing and the FAA.
 
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Polot
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Sun Jan 10, 2021 11:49 pm

DenverTed wrote:
' if the FAA would have accepted a stick force waiver '
Seems like a pretty big if.
How come the FAA and EASA were not suggesting this (get rid of MCAS) 21 months ago?

As CanickinUSA mentioned it is not the FAA and EASA place to tell Boeing what approach to take. The aircraft was certified with MCAS. After the grounding it becomes a question for Boeing on what is faster/cheaper- fixing MCAS or scrapping it and possibly having to redo some of the certification flight testing. At the time they viewed fixing MCAS as the better option (and even now 21 months later that may still be true).
 
CanukinUSA
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Mon Jan 11, 2021 12:04 am

I think that the big question going forward about this whole 737 MAX mess now is how much this cost Boeing and what affect it will have on the financing of future programs at Boeing like the MOM and NSA aircraft? Without future programs like the MOM and NSA Boeing will have a hard time remaining in anywhere near the position it has in the World Commercial Aircraft market. It sounds like they are able to get financing but at what cost? I assume that the risk of loaning to Boeing for new aircraft programs has gone up enormously because of the MAX and the financiers will demand their premium. But that is another issue for another Forum.
 
CanukinUSA
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Mon Jan 11, 2021 4:47 am

My guess is that the 737 MAX Technical pilots are only the tip of the ice berg. To get a lighter sentence they will have no choice but to point out other individuals who have been involved with these decisions. I assume Boeing was backed into a corner and had no choice but to agree to it. It will be interesting to see how far this goes into the 737 MAX engineering, ODA and management ranks. It will also be interesting whether further issues that are required by the agreement can be maintained by Boeing for 3 years to avoid future prosecution for The Boeing Company.
 
INFINITI329
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Mon Jan 11, 2021 7:20 am

Revelation wrote:
Sources within Southwest indicate the much discussed $1M penalty per airplane was just a left over clause from earlier NG contracts and not a big focus for them. Their main concern was avoiding a new type rating that a switch to a clean sheet or a competitor's product would require, and a few hours in the sim would be of little significance to them, which suggests Boeing had very poor information flow from customers and their requirements into their engineering team.


Smells like bullshit to me. I don't believe this for a second. I am conviced the $1M penalty had to do with the Max.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Mon Jan 11, 2021 2:11 pm

DenverTed wrote:
' if the FAA would have accepted a stick force waiver '
Seems like a pretty big if.
How come the FAA and EASA were not suggesting this (get rid of MCAS) 21 months ago?

I'm trying to consider the decision process in 2013 when the FAA was relatively complacent, not 2019 when FAA was learning about Boeing's behavior that has now been deemed to be criminally fraudulent. From what we hear 777x is learning about how a regulator acts after you've tried to pull the wool over their eyes.

CanukinUSA wrote:
My guess is that the 737 MAX Technical pilots are only the tip of the ice berg. To get a lighter sentence they will have no choice but to point out other individuals who have been involved with these decisions. I assume Boeing was backed into a corner and had no choice but to agree to it. It will be interesting to see how far this goes into the 737 MAX engineering, ODA and management ranks. It will also be interesting whether further issues that are required by the agreement can be maintained by Boeing for 3 years to avoid future prosecution for The Boeing Company.

I agree that the agreement left the door open to future actions, but also when reading the press release I got the feeling DoJ was signaling this was the conclusion of their investigation. I also feel Calhoun's statements are a part of a Boeing PR campaign to make Forkner and Gustafsson the fall guys and contain the damage to them. I think that will be the status quo unless some evidence that is impossible to ignore pops up in the future. We know DoJ/FBI have had subpoena power and have brought in other Boeing employees such as Teal and have trawled through tons of Boeing documentation, emails and texts and so far it seems the only one they got the goods on was Forkner and Gustafsson. I think we would have heard by now if there is another shoe to fall since there are so many players in the loop and a lot of them gossip. We also know how much corporate influence there is in the US government, and like it or not Boeing still plays a huge role in the US's economy and defense, I think this is limiting DoJ's willingness to prosecute.

Compare this situation to the VW diesel scandal which ended with a VW executive in jail whereas in this situation all we see is cash changing hands. I think DoJ sent a carefully calibrated signal. A significant financial penalty but still on the low end of the scale of what it could have been. Individuals named and castigated, but not put in jail. No convictions so no criminal records. Three years of monitoring so they know Big Brother is watching, but corporations go through compliance exercises all the time and have teams trained to do such work. It's rich man's justice, which suits both parties well. Boeing is getting off lightly, which in the end may be a mistake for both Boeing and the US Government since it still seems Boeing may have a lot more to learn from this episode.
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morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Mon Jan 11, 2021 2:29 pm

DenverTed wrote:
' if the FAA would have accepted a stick force waiver '
Seems like a pretty big if.
How come the FAA and EASA were not suggesting this (get rid of MCAS) 21 months ago?


It didn't say would - it said "might". The transport Canada employee suggested this.

Plus this Canadian has been saying it forever. I don't know how many attacks I suffered because of this.

Good article - It's still up.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Mon Jan 11, 2021 2:34 pm

CanukinUSA wrote:
I think that the big question going forward about this whole 737 MAX mess now is how much this cost Boeing and what affect it will have on the financing of future programs at Boeing like the MOM and NSA aircraft? Without future programs like the MOM and NSA Boeing will have a hard time remaining in anywhere near the position it has in the World Commercial Aircraft market. It sounds like they are able to get financing but at what cost? I assume that the risk of loaning to Boeing for new aircraft programs has gone up enormously because of the MAX and the financiers will demand their premium. But that is another issue for another Forum.



Boeing is paying very low interest rates on its debt right now so if it needed to borrow to fund new development the cost would not be onerous. Plus the CFO at an investor conference put out the possibility of a big stock sale ($30Bish is the speculation) to retire debt and fund new models. They can do that whenever they want.

Plus you have earnings from Boeing Military side and they have just radically reduced costs across Commercial so should be cash flow positive going forward with resumption of MAX deliveries.

They will have no issue funding new models if they choose to proceed.
 
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Stitch
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Mon Jan 11, 2021 5:12 pm

INFINITI329 wrote:
Smells like bullshit to me. I don't believe this for a second. I am conviced the $1M penalty had to do with the Max.


Per the article, the penalty was in an earlier 737-700 Purchase Agreement and Boeing Sales used that PA as the template for the MAX PA and failed to remove it so it carried over to the MAX contract, as well.


Engineering should have pushed back to Sales and asked for the PA to be amended to remove the clause or reduce the penalty due to the minimal training needed, but by then Engineering felt compelled to not have any differences in how the NG and MAX flew so they instead went forward with developing MCAS.
 
mzlin
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Tue Jan 12, 2021 3:02 am

Stitch wrote:
Revelation wrote:
The article suggests that MCAS was not needed at all, which is supported by FAA and EASA findings that the 737 is stable with MCAS off, and if Boeing asked FAA for a waiver on the stick force requirement instead of developing MCAS then FAA would have evaluated that request...


I mentioned as much up-thread in response to the claim that MCAS was needed because the MAX is "unstable" without it. That being said, there would have had to been some actual "difference training" to account how the MAX reacted differently to a high AoA stall envelope than the NG did.


Yes that's the only logical reason for why Boeing wanted to include MCAS: to avoid the need for difference training in the sim. Of course because MCAS was designed sloppily, this ended up being a tragically bad decision (for the air crash victims and their family). The irony is that Boeing wasn't able to avoid the sim training in the end.

So that raises two questions: why not remove MCAS in the re-certification phase and go for a new certificate that does require sim training? I suppose it's only to avoid also looking like technical idiots (having already looked like greedy businessmen) that Boeing didn't do this.

And second, if MCAS had been designed the way it is now (only activating once per high-AOA event and not changing trim settings beyond what can be countered by the yoke), then the aircraft may not have crashed but the crews would have just reported some unexpected pitch-down movements at the same time as a one-sided stick shaker alert. Then perhaps having already agreed to no-sim training, the FDA would have likely allowed that policy to continue even after the subsequent discovery of the hidden MCAS feature. So if Boeing had been more competent in designing MCAS, Mark Forkner's Jedi mind tricks would have not just worked to get it removed from the manual but also achieved Boeing's strategic goal of selling 737 MAX as not requiring new sim training.
 
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Stitch
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Tue Jan 12, 2021 4:23 am

mzlin wrote:
And second, if MCAS had been designed the way it is now (only activating once per high-AOA event and not changing trim settings beyond what can be countered by the yoke), then the aircraft may not have crashed but the crews would have just reported some unexpected pitch-down movements at the same time as a one-sided stick shaker alert. Then perhaps having already agreed to no-sim training, the FDA would have likely allowed that policy to continue even after the subsequent discovery of the hidden MCAS feature. So if Boeing had been more competent in designing MCAS, Mark Forkner's Jedi mind tricks would have not just worked to get it removed from the manual but also achieved Boeing's strategic goal of selling 737 MAX as not requiring new sim training.


As I understand it, in it's original implementation, MCAS was supposed to only activate once and with only a narrow stabilizer deflection.

However, as the design progressed, it was granted the ability to activate as many times as it wished and with a significantly greater stabilizer deflection.

So now it's been switched back to how it was originally expected to operate.
 
Aviator34ID
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Tue Jan 12, 2021 12:40 pm

Do we know yet when Canada and Europe are due to catch up with the ungrounding?
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Tue Jan 12, 2021 12:43 pm

Stitch wrote:
mzlin wrote:
And second, if MCAS had been designed the way it is now (only activating once per high-AOA event and not changing trim settings beyond what can be countered by the yoke), then the aircraft may not have crashed but the crews would have just reported some unexpected pitch-down movements at the same time as a one-sided stick shaker alert. Then perhaps having already agreed to no-sim training, the FDA would have likely allowed that policy to continue even after the subsequent discovery of the hidden MCAS feature. So if Boeing had been more competent in designing MCAS, Mark Forkner's Jedi mind tricks would have not just worked to get it removed from the manual but also achieved Boeing's strategic goal of selling 737 MAX as not requiring new sim training.


As I understand it, in it's original implementation, MCAS was supposed to only activate once and with only a narrow stabilizer deflection.

However, as the design progressed, it was granted the ability to activate as many times as it wished and with a significantly greater stabilizer deflection.

So now it's been switched back to how it was originally expected to operate.


Not sure about the single vs. multiple activations but the additional stabilizer movement was because they extended MCAS to low speed scenarios and more authority was needed for the required increase in sick force. The authority limits should have been speed dependent from the beginning but they apparently weren't.
 
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Polot
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Tue Jan 12, 2021 1:07 pm

Aviator34ID wrote:
Do we know yet when Canada and Europe are due to catch up with the ungrounding?

I believe Europe’s comment period on the proposed AD ends sometime this week. Ungrounding will probably be by end of month.

No clue with Canada.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Tue Jan 12, 2021 3:08 pm

Stitch wrote:
mzlin wrote:
And second, if MCAS had been designed the way it is now (only activating once per high-AOA event and not changing trim settings beyond what can be countered by the yoke), then the aircraft may not have crashed but the crews would have just reported some unexpected pitch-down movements at the same time as a one-sided stick shaker alert. Then perhaps having already agreed to no-sim training, the FDA would have likely allowed that policy to continue even after the subsequent discovery of the hidden MCAS feature. So if Boeing had been more competent in designing MCAS, Mark Forkner's Jedi mind tricks would have not just worked to get it removed from the manual but also achieved Boeing's strategic goal of selling 737 MAX as not requiring new sim training.


As I understand it, in it's original implementation, MCAS was supposed to only activate once and with only a narrow stabilizer deflection.

However, as the design progressed, it was granted the ability to activate as many times as it wished and with a significantly greater stabilizer deflection.

So now it's been switched back to how it was originally expected to operate.

I'm pretty sure the increased authority comes from the decision to have it operate in the slow speed regime as reported above.

I thought multiple activations was not planned for, and only arose because of bad data from bad AoA sensors incorrectly convincing MCAS to activate.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
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MIflyer12
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Tue Jan 12, 2021 3:32 pm

morrisond wrote:
CanukinUSA wrote:
It sounds like they are able to get financing but at what cost?



Boeing is paying very low interest rates on its debt right now so if it needed to borrow to fund new development the cost would not be onerous. Plus the CFO at an investor conference put out the possibility of a big stock sale ($30Bish is the speculation) to retire debt and fund new models. They can do that whenever they want.

Plus you have earnings from Boeing Military side and they have just radically reduced costs across Commercial so should be cash flow positive going forward with resumption of MAX deliveries.

They will have no issue funding new models if they choose to proceed.


Boeing doesn't have the free cash flow of the ~five years pre-MAX, pre-COVID, but its fairly recent (end of October) market financing show that it can still borrow cheaply. Its financing costs are notably less than even the best of the U.S. carriers, WN, DL and AS.

The idea that Boeing couldn't find $20 Billion over the next seven years to fund a 737 replacement is just bonkers. See the function and scale of U.S. capital markets and the borrowing capacities of big, established firms like those (as Boeing) in the Dow Jones Industrial composite.
 
iamlucky13
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Tue Jan 12, 2021 11:06 pm

Revelation wrote:
I'm just saying that Boeing seems to have painted itself into some corners by taking these black/white stances back in 2013. With a little more customer interaction, and a little more finesse, and the compliant FAA of that era, the stick force thing could very well have been just one more waiver in the long list of waivers Boeing and other manufacturers routinely get, and if sim training was needed it could be much less time than we're now seeing with MCAS in the loop. It'd be more along the lines of "here's what the entry to stall feels like" instead of "here's how to deal with the new active/standby flight control computers, here's the new check lists, here's the amended check lists" etc.

It seems they did choose the path of deception rather than negotiation and it bit them hard, along with their customers and the crash victims.


They didn't paint themselves into a corner with no way out. They painted themselves into a corner where there were 2 doors to exit by (3 actually, counting a clean sheet design): Pursue waivers or make the handling characteristics similar in a fully compliant manner. They took the latter option, but messed up, walked into the ladder, and dumped the pain can over.

One of the important questions in any further prosecution is figuring out whose decision it was to be deceptive, and whether any of the pressure from above that led to that was inappropriate.

CanukinUSA wrote:
I think that the big question going forward about this whole 737 MAX mess now is how much this cost Boeing and what affect it will have on the financing of future programs at Boeing like the MOM and NSA aircraft? Without future programs like the MOM and NSA Boeing will have a hard time remaining in anywhere near the position it has in the World Commercial Aircraft market. It sounds like they are able to get financing but at what cost? I assume that the risk of loaning to Boeing for new aircraft programs has gone up enormously because of the MAX and the financiers will demand their premium. But that is another issue for another Forum.


In their 3rd quarter earnings report, they estimated they currently have $9.1 billion owed to customers for concessions. $5.7 billion of that has been agreed upon, so there is $3.4 billion in the estimate that could increase or decrease.

They have also reported $5 billion in estimated abnormal production costs (low rate, and I assume retrofits, too).

Plus the $2.5 billion in criminal penalties.

I don't know where civil penalties stand, but I see one estimate repeated a few places of $3 billion.

That's right around $20 billion so far in spent or reasonably forecast costs.

This definitely does affect their ability to fund the next aircraft program, but I think it will eventually be an imperative to make an NSA. I presume this will mean a mix of re-assigning engineers currently supporting 777X, 737 return to service and MAX10, as well as working on the to-be-shutdown lines for the 787 and 747, as well as resuming hiring again. Therefore, part of the cost of the program would fit within their current targeted spending rate after the downsizing is complete, and part of it would entail a rebound in workforce, supplier contracting, etc.

Their recent bond sales have been at very low rates, so it currently does not hurt much to raise cash through debt. Future bond sales may not be so favorable, and regardless, I would think that strategically they would want to see their operations return to generating a profit before committing. In that case, they might not need debt, and would presumably instead prefer to work on both developing the new aircraft and paying down their current mountain of debt.

Overall, my view is that for the long term future of Boeing where they are right now, the most important thing the MAX needs to do (aside from fly safely) is fund its replacement.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Mon Jan 18, 2021 4:02 pm

Transport Canada has approved MAX RTS - reading the AD it does not appear anything new or significant that we don't already know.

https://wwwapps.tc.gc.ca/Saf-Sec-Sur/2/ ... ft=pdf&l=E
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Mon Jan 18, 2021 8:51 pm

morrisond wrote:
Transport Canada has approved MAX RTS - reading the AD it does not appear anything new or significant that we don't already know.

https://wwwapps.tc.gc.ca/Saf-Sec-Sur/2/ ... ft=pdf&l=E

Only real difference:

Specifically, the Canadian design changes for the Boeing 737 MAX will include an enhanced flight deck procedure that provides the option for a pilot-in-command to disable a loud and intrusive warning system (commonly called the “stick shaker”) when the system has been erroneously activated by a failure in the angle of attack sensor system. This feature will effectively reduce pilot workload given what has been learned from the two tragic accidents, and has been fully evaluated by Transport Canada’s flight test pilots.

There will also be differences in training including that associated with the enhanced flight deck procedure.

Ref: https://www.canada.ca/en/transport-cana ... 7-max.html

Good for them.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
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AirBoat
Posts: 71
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Mon Jan 18, 2021 10:30 pm

Revelation wrote:
Stitch wrote:
mzlin wrote:
And second, if MCAS had been designed the way it is now (only activating once per high-AOA event and not changing trim settings beyond what can be countered by the yoke), then the aircraft may not have crashed but the crews would have just reported some unexpected pitch-down movements at the same time as a one-sided stick shaker alert. Then perhaps having already agreed to no-sim training, the FDA would have likely allowed that policy to continue even after the subsequent discovery of the hidden MCAS feature. So if Boeing had been more competent in designing MCAS, Mark Forkner's Jedi mind tricks would have not just worked to get it removed from the manual but also achieved Boeing's strategic goal of selling 737 MAX as not requiring new sim training.


As I understand it, in it's original implementation, MCAS was supposed to only activate once and with only a narrow stabilizer deflection.

However, as the design progressed, it was granted the ability to activate as many times as it wished and with a significantly greater stabilizer deflection.

So now it's been switched back to how it was originally expected to operate.

I'm pretty sure the increased authority comes from the decision to have it operate in the slow speed regime as reported above.

I thought multiple activations was not planned for, and only arose because of bad data from bad AoA sensors incorrectly convincing MCAS to activate.


The logic seems to be lacking here. You cant go for more authority on the stabilizer and then go back to less. both cant be correct.
What is being discussed here is what is in the public domain. The thing about legal cases is that the defendant says as little as possible.
 
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Polot
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Tue Jan 19, 2021 12:08 am

AirBoat wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Stitch wrote:

As I understand it, in it's original implementation, MCAS was supposed to only activate once and with only a narrow stabilizer deflection.

However, as the design progressed, it was granted the ability to activate as many times as it wished and with a significantly greater stabilizer deflection.

So now it's been switched back to how it was originally expected to operate.

I'm pretty sure the increased authority comes from the decision to have it operate in the slow speed regime as reported above.

I thought multiple activations was not planned for, and only arose because of bad data from bad AoA sensors incorrectly convincing MCAS to activate.


The logic seems to be lacking here. You cant go for more authority on the stabilizer and then go back to less. both cant be correct.
What is being discussed here is what is in the public domain. The thing about legal cases is that the defendant says as little as possible.

It’s not going back to less authority (if the aircraft is actually in a situation where it needs MCAS the authority is appropriate) but now has safe guards to not activate multiple times or when there are AOA disagreement between the two sensors.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Tue Jan 19, 2021 1:55 am

What is the timeline for RTS in Europe?
 
Spetsnaz55
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Tue Jan 19, 2021 2:58 am

Tomorrow or Wednesday for Europe.
 
BoeingGuy
Posts: 6617
Joined: Fri Dec 10, 2010 6:01 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Tue Jan 19, 2021 3:06 am

Polot wrote:
AirBoat wrote:
Revelation wrote:
I'm pretty sure the increased authority comes from the decision to have it operate in the slow speed regime as reported above.

I thought multiple activations was not planned for, and only arose because of bad data from bad AoA sensors incorrectly convincing MCAS to activate.


The logic seems to be lacking here. You cant go for more authority on the stabilizer and then go back to less. both cant be correct.
What is being discussed here is what is in the public domain. The thing about legal cases is that the defendant says as little as possible.

It’s not going back to less authority (if the aircraft is actually in a situation where it needs MCAS the authority is appropriate) but now has safe guards to not activate multiple times or when there are AOA disagreement between the two sensors.


The other thing MCAS will now do is cut out if the pilot puts in an opposing control column input.
 
Spetsnaz55
Posts: 289
Joined: Wed Feb 20, 2019 2:38 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Tue Jan 19, 2021 1:34 pm

Spetsnaz55 wrote:
Tomorrow or Wednesday for Europe.


Patrick Ky said the airworthiness directive is coming next week actually.
 
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Revelation
Posts: 26553
Joined: Wed Feb 09, 2005 9:37 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Tue Jan 19, 2021 2:40 pm

Spetsnaz55 wrote:
Spetsnaz55 wrote:
Tomorrow or Wednesday for Europe.

Patrick Ky said the airworthiness directive is coming next week actually.

Confirmation: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boei ... SKBN29O106
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
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Revelation
Posts: 26553
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Tue Jan 19, 2021 2:44 pm

Revelation wrote:
morrisond wrote:
Transport Canada has approved MAX RTS - reading the AD it does not appear anything new or significant that we don't already know.

https://wwwapps.tc.gc.ca/Saf-Sec-Sur/2/ ... ft=pdf&l=E

Only real difference:

Specifically, the Canadian design changes for the Boeing 737 MAX will include an enhanced flight deck procedure that provides the option for a pilot-in-command to disable a loud and intrusive warning system (commonly called the “stick shaker”) when the system has been erroneously activated by a failure in the angle of attack sensor system. This feature will effectively reduce pilot workload given what has been learned from the two tragic accidents, and has been fully evaluated by Transport Canada’s flight test pilots.

There will also be differences in training including that associated with the enhanced flight deck procedure.

Ref: https://www.canada.ca/en/transport-cana ... 7-max.html

Good for them.

EU will also include the optional procedure to disable the stick shaker: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... -next-week
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
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Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
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planecane
Posts: 1713
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Wed Jan 20, 2021 3:02 am

BoeingGuy wrote:
Polot wrote:
AirBoat wrote:

The logic seems to be lacking here. You cant go for more authority on the stabilizer and then go back to less. both cant be correct.
What is being discussed here is what is in the public domain. The thing about legal cases is that the defendant says as little as possible.

It’s not going back to less authority (if the aircraft is actually in a situation where it needs MCAS the authority is appropriate) but now has safe guards to not activate multiple times or when there are AOA disagreement between the two sensors.


The other thing MCAS will now do is cut out if the pilot puts in an opposing control column input.


I don't believe that is true. MCAS, by design, trims opposite to the control column input. I'd have to research but maybe it cuts out after an opposite trim input and doesn't allow another activation.
 
BoeingGuy
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Wed Jan 20, 2021 3:05 am

planecane wrote:
BoeingGuy wrote:
Polot wrote:
It’s not going back to less authority (if the aircraft is actually in a situation where it needs MCAS the authority is appropriate) but now has safe guards to not activate multiple times or when there are AOA disagreement between the two sensors.


The other thing MCAS will now do is cut out if the pilot puts in an opposing control column input.


I don't believe that is true. MCAS, by design, trims opposite to the control column input. I'd have to research but maybe it cuts out after an opposite trim input and doesn't allow another activation.


Yeah it’s true. It’s as I stated. MCAS activation is stopped by aft column cutout.

MCAS only trims in one direction so it doesn’t trim opposite to the control column input.
 
AABusDrvr
Posts: 178
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Wed Jan 20, 2021 4:55 am

BoeingGuy wrote:
planecane wrote:
BoeingGuy wrote:

The other thing MCAS will now do is cut out if the pilot puts in an opposing control column input.


I don't believe that is true. MCAS, by design, trims opposite to the control column input. I'd have to research but maybe it cuts out after an opposite trim input and doesn't allow another activation.


Yeah it’s true. It’s as I stated. MCAS activation is stopped by aft column cutout.

MCAS only trims in one direction so it doesn’t trim opposite to the control column input.



I have completed our MAX special training, and thats not what's in the new manuals. The MCAS will trim nose down, but now will remove all the nose down trim when the triggering condition is no longer present, so it will trim both directions. It's also specifically stated that the control column cutout switches do not interrupt nose down MCAS trim commands, but will interrupt nose up MCAS trim commands.
 
BoeingGuy
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Wed Jan 20, 2021 5:19 am

AABusDrvr wrote:
BoeingGuy wrote:
planecane wrote:

I don't believe that is true. MCAS, by design, trims opposite to the control column input. I'd have to research but maybe it cuts out after an opposite trim input and doesn't allow another activation.


Yeah it’s true. It’s as I stated. MCAS activation is stopped by aft column cutout.

MCAS only trims in one direction so it doesn’t trim opposite to the control column input.



I have completed our MAX special training, and thats not what's in the new manuals. The MCAS will trim nose down, but now will remove all the nose down trim when the triggering condition is no longer present, so it will trim both directions. It's also specifically stated that the control column cutout switches do not interrupt nose down MCAS trim commands, but will interrupt nose up MCAS trim commands.


I wasn’t referring to the Stab Cutout Switches. I was referring to the the fact that if you pull back on the column, it will cut out a nose down MCAS input. This is referred to as aft column cutout. That was not true in the original design.

Are you sure the manuals state that pulling back on the column will not cut out a nose down MCAS input? This is my understanding of how it works. It’s what was explained to me. I think I’ll review the FCOM to make sure I’m not misunderstanding then.
 
brindabella
Posts: 742
Joined: Fri Apr 30, 2010 10:38 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Wed Jan 20, 2021 12:55 pm

iamlucky13 wrote:
Revelation wrote:
I'm just saying that Boeing seems to have painted itself into some corners by taking these black/white stances back in 2013. With a little more customer interaction, and a little more finesse, and the compliant FAA of that era, the stick force thing could very well have been just one more waiver in the long list of waivers Boeing and other manufacturers routinely get, and if sim training was needed it could be much less time than we're now seeing with MCAS in the loop. It'd be more along the lines of "here's what the entry to stall feels like" instead of "here's how to deal with the new active/standby flight control computers, here's the new check lists, here's the amended check lists" etc.

It seems they did choose the path of deception rather than negotiation and it bit them hard, along with their customers and the crash victims.


They didn't paint themselves into a corner with no way out. They painted themselves into a corner where there were 2 doors to exit by (3 actually, counting a clean sheet design): Pursue waivers or make the handling characteristics similar in a fully compliant manner. They took the latter option, but messed up, walked into the ladder, and dumped the pain can over.

One of the important questions in any further prosecution is figuring out whose decision it was to be deceptive, and whether any of the pressure from above that led to that was inappropriate.

CanukinUSA wrote:
I think that the big question going forward about this whole 737 MAX mess now is how much this cost Boeing and what affect it will have on the financing of future programs at Boeing like the MOM and NSA aircraft? Without future programs like the MOM and NSA Boeing will have a hard time remaining in anywhere near the position it has in the World Commercial Aircraft market. It sounds like they are able to get financing but at what cost? I assume that the risk of loaning to Boeing for new aircraft programs has gone up enormously because of the MAX and the financiers will demand their premium. But that is another issue for another Forum.


In their 3rd quarter earnings report, they estimated they currently have $9.1 billion owed to customers for concessions. $5.7 billion of that has been agreed upon, so there is $3.4 billion in the estimate that could increase or decrease.

They have also reported $5 billion in estimated abnormal production costs (low rate, and I assume retrofits, too).

Plus the $2.5 billion in criminal penalties.

I don't know where civil penalties stand, but I see one estimate repeated a few places of $3 billion.

That's right around $20 billion so far in spent or reasonably forecast costs.

This definitely does affect their ability to fund the next aircraft program, but I think it will eventually be an imperative to make an NSA. I presume this will mean a mix of re-assigning engineers currently supporting 777X, 737 return to service and MAX10, as well as working on the to-be-shutdown lines for the 787 and 747, as well as resuming hiring again. Therefore, part of the cost of the program would fit within their current targeted spending rate after the downsizing is complete, and part of it would entail a rebound in workforce, supplier contracting, etc.

Their recent bond sales have been at very low rates, so it currently does not hurt much to raise cash through debt. Future bond sales may not be so favorable, and regardless, I would think that strategically they would want to see their operations return to generating a profit before committing. In that case, they might not need debt, and would presumably instead prefer to work on both developing the new aircraft and paying down their current mountain of debt.

Overall, my view is that for the long term future of Boeing where they are right now, the most important thing the MAX needs to do (aside from fly safely) is fund its replacement.


:checkmark:

Nice.

Many thanks,
Billy

PS - "teeth-grinding -time".
For all those years of rapidly increasing free cash - Muilenberg dithered and dithered and dithered.
BA could have done the NMA from CASH!
:mad:
Billy
 
AABusDrvr
Posts: 178
Joined: Sat Dec 03, 2016 6:48 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, Q1 2021

Wed Jan 20, 2021 1:47 pm

BoeingGuy wrote:
AABusDrvr wrote:
BoeingGuy wrote:

Yeah it’s true. It’s as I stated. MCAS activation is stopped by aft column cutout.

MCAS only trims in one direction so it doesn’t trim opposite to the control column input.



I have completed our MAX special training, and thats not what's in the new manuals. The MCAS will trim nose down, but now will remove all the nose down trim when the triggering condition is no longer present, so it will trim both directions. It's also specifically stated that the control column cutout switches do not interrupt nose down MCAS trim commands, but will interrupt nose up MCAS trim commands.


I wasn’t referring to the Stab Cutout Switches. I was referring to the the fact that if you pull back on the column, it will cut out a nose down MCAS input. This is referred to as aft column cutout. That was not true in the original design.

Are you sure the manuals state that pulling back on the column will not cut out a nose down MCAS input? This is my understanding of how it works. It’s what was explained to me. I think I’ll review the FCOM to make sure I’m not misunderstanding then.



This is what it says,

"Control column actuated stabilizer trim cutout switches interrupts operation of
main electric stabilizer trim, autopilot trim and the Speed Trim function when the
control column movement opposes trim direction. Aft control column movement
does not interrupt Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS)
nose down trim commands. Forward control column movement interrupts MCAS
nose up trim commands."
 
Avgeek21
Posts: 297
Joined: Mon Mar 04, 2019 5:44 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding News and Reference Thread [Ungrounded by FAA 18NOV2020]

Sat Jan 23, 2021 9:26 am

yyztpa2 wrote:
northstardc4m wrote:
WJA115 YYC-YVR first MAX return to service in Canada

C-FHCM

https://www.flightradar24.com/WJA115/26a1071c

https://www.flightradar24.com/data/flig ... 5#26a1071c

Westjet is going to have a couple weeks on Air Canada, who aren't flying them in service until Feb 1

Whoops on misstart.
https://canadianaviationnews.wordpress. ... ationnews/


Could have been on any 737 varient. Not related to MCAS or flight controls/navigation. 'Health monitoring' seems to be Packs or temp control related. Non issue, it happens.
 
Whiteguy
Posts: 1670
Joined: Sat Nov 29, 2003 6:11 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding News and Reference Thread [Ungrounded by FAA 18NOV2020]

Sat Jan 23, 2021 4:17 pm

Avgeek21 wrote:
yyztpa2 wrote:
northstardc4m wrote:
WJA115 YYC-YVR first MAX return to service in Canada

C-FHCM

https://www.flightradar24.com/WJA115/26a1071c

https://www.flightradar24.com/data/flig ... 5#26a1071c

Westjet is going to have a couple weeks on Air Canada, who aren't flying them in service until Feb 1

Whoops on misstart.
https://canadianaviationnews.wordpress. ... ationnews/


Could have been on any 737 varient. Not related to MCAS or flight controls/navigation. 'Health monitoring' seems to be Packs or temp control related. Non issue, it happens.


Could’ve been anything in the after start flow, that’s why it’s done....

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