dtw2hyd wrote:

brindabella wrote:

Also a significant additive to successful software production:

1. You write Program "A", and I test it.
2. I write Program "B", and you test it.

Early-on after the ET accident I was appalled when a member here described the MCAS software getting major changes in parameters very late in testing.
One would like to think that a separate programmer doing the testing would have rapidly come to a "what the f... is this!!" stop point before throwing the junk back
to the originating programmer.

cheers

You seem to have very high expectations. Modern day software design, development and testing methodology is sketchy at best. Not in just aviation.

The problem is not the software design nor where in the world it was written. What is the problem is that most probably non aviation programmers were hired (what is legit) and they do not care if something activated repeatetly if not stated it should not. The dealbreaker is that the engineers that wrote the spevifications or the people reviewing were just not up to the job.

25 years ago friends in consulting mentioned the problem of vast projects taking so much time that by the time they were finished they could not run well and take advantage of newer chips and changes in software. I think that problem has been solved, but if someone could state it better in a paragraph or two it would be useful for many of us. The 737 is stuck with a lesser capacity computer/software that is somehow wedded to the whole plane and apparatus. The 777, 787, and I am assuming also Airbus needs fundamentally new thinking, hardware, and software. I am assuming that a fully modern cockpit would have the capability of adding the newest greatest computer chips which would allow new software, regular updates, all while being able to fly the plane. It would present visuals of all the traditional data as to flight status, navigation along with the ability to accurately and concisely describe any crisis and display those memory items.

If your angle of attacks went out of order, imagine, it would just say it was broke or had broke off, rather than impose imaginative acrobatics. In a fascinating interview of Musk, Sandy Munro suggested road lane markers were often confusing and would mislead the auto driving system, and they were needed for safer FSD. Musk's answer was informative - the car must be able in any situation to avoid accidents with other cars, objects, or pedestrians. They did not discuss how many 9s of safety were required, but both would say a lot. I think major aviation companies around the world need a very small committee of the brightest and most able to define just what the modern cockpit should be like and how it should be built. The design needs to be open to all users.

Strato2 wrote:

You are making the mistake and believing the competition will be the A321XLR when in reality it will be A321NWO and A322NWO (New Wing Option).

Then the need even more so is to make NMA-6X and NMA-7X the best they can be. And that won't happen if they are compromised stretches of NMA-5X. So launch NMA-6X first followed by NMA-7X and make them the best they can. Boeing does not want to be in a position like they are with the 787-10 vis-a-vis the A350-900 where it competes on size, but cannot compete on payload-range because it is maxed out on operating weights due to constraints inherited from the 787-8.

If Airbus then launches an A321-200nwo and A321-300nwo, Boeing is already in a solid position to compete thanks to being on a new platform and NMA-5X is scrapped because there will be no market for it. But if Airbus does not launch an A321-200/A321-300nwo, then launch NMA-5X if there is sufficient market demand to compete (where it can) with the A321-200XLR.

brindabella wrote:

I may have the wrong impression, but I understood him to say that the first (and entirely new) task would be to define the new cockpit in the light of Human Factors. And if the FAA/EASA haven't quite got it clear yet, that might take some time.

Well it stands to reason NMA would have a cockpit based on the 787 design paradigm. If EASA wants to force the rest of the commercial aviation world to adopt Airbus' standards for cockpit and flight-control design, they should petition the ICAO to make it international standards imposed at some future date. Yes, Boeing (and the FAA) need to be held to higher standards than they have in the past because of MAX (at least), but too much fiddling that delays Boeing programs EIS significantly could be seen as being as much about protecting Airbus from foreign competition (and not just from the US, but from Russia, China, Japan, Brazil and others) as it is about safety.

brindabella wrote:

PS - I wonder if delaying the MAX10 and 777X might also be a concession to the very large workload ahead on most of the programs:

In certain areas - like supplier management - I could see this being an issue since NMA would leverage those resources and they are currently tasked with supporting MAX and 777X. There would also be a Facilities aspect - if Boeing intends to use Everett to build NMA, they would need to wait for the 787 and/or 747 programs to wind down and then start the reconfiguration of those spaces for NMA. And if Boeing intends to build outside of Everett, then they would have to secure space and build a FAL.

All that being said, again presuming Boeing was ready for ATO, one expects they had contingency plans for that in place and those plans would have taken into account MAX and 777X at much higher production rates than currently planned and with the intent of at least the 787 FAL likely staying at Everett (which would imply the NMA would have used the two 747-8 buildings as that program would have been done in time for NMA to inherit the space).

seahawk wrote:

Revelation wrote:

seahawk wrote:

Imho none of the problems at Boeing are a problem of technology.

IMO taking data unsanitized from an AoA sensor is a problem of technology. That's 1st or 2nd year college level stuff. Repeated activation and unchecked authority is 4th year college level stuff. No culture involved, just dreadful engineering.

And that is for me a 100% company culture problem. It is not as if they did not have the knowledge or the means to make something better. If such a system goes through review and nobody raises a red flag, your company culture is unsuitable for an engineering company.

Something did get through their development process. To me blaming it on the nebulous concept of "culture" is a cop out. If the process was wrong, call that out. If the people implementing the process were incompetent or lazy, call that out. If managers did not provide sufficient time or other resources to get the work done, call that out.

Culture is an intangible. You can't write a spec to define culture, you can't create procedures to check if your culture is good or bad or even present. You can have the look and feel of what most people would think of as a good or great culture but still have things slip through the gaps because humans are fallible.

IMO, culture is just the current feel good buzz word. This gives us culture committees and thousands of hours of meetings but still it comes down to people doing professional quality work in design, implementation, review and test.

Revelation wrote:

seahawk wrote:

Revelation wrote:

IMO taking data unsanitized from an AoA sensor is a problem of technology. That's 1st or 2nd year college level stuff. Repeated activation and unchecked authority is 4th year college level stuff. No culture involved, just dreadful engineering.

And that is for me a 100% company culture problem. It is not as if they did not have the knowledge or the means to make something better. If such a system goes through review and nobody raises a red flag, your company culture is unsuitable for an engineering company.

Something did get through their development process. To me blaming it on the nebulous concept of "culture" is a cop out. If the process was wrong, call that out. If the people implementing the process were incompetent or lazy, call that out. If managers did not provide sufficient time or other resources to get the work done, call that out.

Culture is an intangible. You can't write a spec to define culture, you can't create procedures to check if your culture is good or bad or even present. You can have the look and feel of what most people would think of as a good or great culture but still have things slip through the gaps because humans are fallible.

IMO, culture is just the current feel good buzz word. This gives us culture committees and thousands of hours of meetings but still it comes down to people doing professional quality work in design, implementation, review and test.

I really mean no disrespect to you, as I value your input and person as much as one can value another internet personality.

But culture in the sense that large organizations are affected from is far from a buzz word, far from a current phenomenon and far from simply adding up the individual qualities of the workforce.

Cultural aspects of organizations are regularly pointed out as contributing factors for incidents, they go into bow tie analyses for risk measurement, they are the core result of factors a unique organization is comprised of. And culture is more than the individual parts.

You can very much write a spec describing what safety culture is, for example. Evidence would be the statements of accountable managers of airlines in the OMM. Culture is the inherent behaviour of an organization, not the puzzle pieces of "people doing professional work". Most people at Boeing designing the MAX would have thought, and told themselves, they were acting professionally, as within their cultural environment, the delivered quality was acceptable.

I for one am excited to see where the 5X program goes. It gives Boeing a completely fresh sheet of paper to play with and a load of information for us to follow. The engine market will scramble to meet the need. GE has already stated it would not take part in a 3 engine optioned program. If they stick to their guns then that means a potential 5X has at most 2 engine manufacturers.

Does Boeing go sole source ala the 737? Only time will tell.

Revelation wrote:

seahawk wrote:

Revelation wrote:

IMO taking data unsanitized from an AoA sensor is a problem of technology. That's 1st or 2nd year college level stuff. Repeated activation and unchecked authority is 4th year college level stuff. No culture involved, just dreadful engineering.

And that is for me a 100% company culture problem. It is not as if they did not have the knowledge or the means to make something better. If such a system goes through review and nobody raises a red flag, your company culture is unsuitable for an engineering company.

Something did get through their development process. To me blaming it on the nebulous concept of "culture" is a cop out. If the process was wrong, call that out. If the people implementing the process were incompetent or lazy, call that out. If managers did not provide sufficient time or other resources to get the work done, call that out.

Culture is an intangible. You can't write a spec to define culture, you can't create procedures to check if your culture is good or bad or even present. You can have the look and feel of what most people would think of as a good or great culture but still have things slip through the gaps because humans are fallible.

IMO, culture is just the current feel good buzz word. This gives us culture committees and thousands of hours of meetings but still it comes down to people doing professional quality work in design, implementation, review and test.

Imho culture is more than a buzzword. Culture is the thing that decides if voicing concerns or objections to a plan is good or bad for your career. Culture is the thing that decides if people responsible for safety are free to concentrate on that or if they have to bow to the pressure of others. And most of all culture is the thing that defines how you deal with mistakes, do you learn from them, do you use them to improve or do you look for scapegoats. You can have the most perfect safety process, if raising a concern still gets you an appointment with the next 3 management levels, all pressuring you to withdraw your concern, your process is fine, your culture is not.

CX747 wrote:

GE has already stated it would not take part in a 3 engine optioned program. If they stick to their guns then that means a potential 5X has at most 2 engine manufacturers.

Does Boeing go sole source ala the 737? Only time will tell.

Another example of spoiled brat behavior. GE can opt out for all I care, and good riddance. Sole sourcing is almost always a bad idea.

seahawk wrote:

Revelation wrote:

seahawk wrote:

And that is for me a 100% company culture problem. It is not as if they did not have the knowledge or the means to make something better. If such a system goes through review and nobody raises a red flag, your company culture is unsuitable for an engineering company.

Something did get through their development process. To me blaming it on the nebulous concept of "culture" is a cop out. If the process was wrong, call that out. If the people implementing the process were incompetent or lazy, call that out. If managers did not provide sufficient time or other resources to get the work done, call that out.

Culture is an intangible. You can't write a spec to define culture, you can't create procedures to check if your culture is good or bad or even present. You can have the look and feel of what most people would think of as a good or great culture but still have things slip through the gaps because humans are fallible.

IMO, culture is just the current feel good buzz word. This gives us culture committees and thousands of hours of meetings but still it comes down to people doing professional quality work in design, implementation, review and test.

Imho culture is more than a buzzword. Culture is the thing that decides if voicing concerns or objections to a plan is good or bad for your career. Culture is the thing that decides if people responsible for safety are free to concentrate on that or if they have to bow to the pressure of others. And most of all culture is the thing that defines how you deal with mistakes, do you learn from them, do you use them to improve or do you look for scapegoats. You can have the most perfect safety process, if raising a concern still gets you an appointment with the next 3 management levels, all pressuring you to withdraw your concern, your process is fine, your culture is not.

Reminds of an IT project with an Indian company; they had the best governance, development and QA certificates, yet they always delivered software that failed miserably. I learned there and then culture makes a huge difference...

JonesNL wrote:

seahawk wrote:

Revelation wrote:

Something did get through their development process. To me blaming it on the nebulous concept of "culture" is a cop out. If the process was wrong, call that out. If the people implementing the process were incompetent or lazy, call that out. If managers did not provide sufficient time or other resources to get the work done, call that out.

Culture is an intangible. You can't write a spec to define culture, you can't create procedures to check if your culture is good or bad or even present. You can have the look and feel of what most people would think of as a good or great culture but still have things slip through the gaps because humans are fallible.

IMO, culture is just the current feel good buzz word. This gives us culture committees and thousands of hours of meetings but still it comes down to people doing professional quality work in design, implementation, review and test.

Imho culture is more than a buzzword. Culture is the thing that decides if voicing concerns or objections to a plan is good or bad for your career. Culture is the thing that decides if people responsible for safety are free to concentrate on that or if they have to bow to the pressure of others. And most of all culture is the thing that defines how you deal with mistakes, do you learn from them, do you use them to improve or do you look for scapegoats. You can have the most perfect safety process, if raising a concern still gets you an appointment with the next 3 management levels, all pressuring you to withdraw your concern, your process is fine, your culture is not.

Reminds of an IT project with an Indian company; they had the best governance, development and QA certificates, yet they always delivered software that failed miserably. I learned there and then culture makes a huge difference...

Sorry Jones, you really don’t understand in what concept we talk about culture here. It is not cultures as nations and religions and traditions would depict, but corporate culture.

frmrCapCadet wrote:

25 years ago friends in consulting mentioned the problem of vast projects taking so much time that by the time they were finished they could not run well and take advantage of newer chips and changes in software. I think that problem has been solved, but if someone could state it better in a paragraph or two it would be useful for many of us. The 737 is stuck with a lesser capacity computer/software that is somehow wedded to the whole plane and apparatus. The 777, 787, and I am assuming also Airbus needs fundamentally new thinking, hardware, and software. I am assuming that a fully modern cockpit would have the capability of adding the newest greatest computer chips which would allow new software, regular updates, all while being able to fly the plane. It would present visuals of all the traditional data as to flight status, navigation along with the ability to accurately and concisely describe any crisis and display those memory items.

I am not 100% sure about civil aviation, but I suspect like mil or space they also use radiation hardened chips to reduce the effects of high altitude radiation. Since these require a different substrate and/or package, these are custom production runs, often based on chip designs which have become obsolete.

Apart from radiation requirements the latest and greatest is more defect prone than the products which have been in manufacturing for a couple of years. Perfect for a new gadget, not so much if your life depends on it. Probably there are newer chips available than the 737 uses today, but you cannot simply put the latest generation of chips in device which is so safety critical.

CRJockey wrote:

I really mean no disrespect to you, as I value your input and person as much as one can value another internet personality.

But culture in the sense that large organizations are affected from is far from a buzz word, far from a current phenomenon and far from simply adding up the individual qualities of the workforce.

Cultural aspects of organizations are regularly pointed out as contributing factors for incidents, they go into bow tie analyses for risk measurement, they are the core result of factors a unique organization is comprised of. And culture is more than the individual parts.

You can very much write a spec describing what safety culture is, for example. Evidence would be the statements of accountable managers of airlines in the OMM. Culture is the inherent behaviour of an organization, not the puzzle pieces of "people doing professional work". Most people at Boeing designing the MAX would have thought, and told themselves, they were acting professionally, as within their cultural environment, the delivered quality was acceptable.

Thank you for the kind words. Too bad we aren't in agreement, however I do respect your opinion.

I've been a part of a large number of organizations (six major organizations over three plus decades of work, many of them household names and leaders in their industry), and I have to say I feel the "inherent behaviour of an organization" is a fiction. Sure there may be traits or tendencies but nothing I would say would be a behavior that could be counted on to hold in even the majority of cases, never mind in all cases. There are too many individuals involved. They may be having different things going on in their lives at the time, good or bad, and in my experience these things govern their behavior far more than any inherent organizational set of traits. As noted large corporations often outsource work so even if the corporation itself had such traits it seems likely that they don't pass through organizational borders. I've seen higher level management try to project that there was a corporate wide culture, but down in the trenches it still was individuals with their own strengths and weaknesses, brilliances and foibles that were in control of events.

CRJockey wrote:

JonesNL wrote:

seahawk wrote:

Imho culture is more than a buzzword. Culture is the thing that decides if voicing concerns or objections to a plan is good or bad for your career. Culture is the thing that decides if people responsible for safety are free to concentrate on that or if they have to bow to the pressure of others. And most of all culture is the thing that defines how you deal with mistakes, do you learn from them, do you use them to improve or do you look for scapegoats. You can have the most perfect safety process, if raising a concern still gets you an appointment with the next 3 management levels, all pressuring you to withdraw your concern, your process is fine, your culture is not.

Reminds of an IT project with an Indian company; they had the best governance, development and QA certificates, yet they always delivered software that failed miserably. I learned there and then culture makes a huge difference...

Sorry Jones, you really don’t understand in what concept we talk about culture here. It is not cultures as nations and religions and traditions would depict, but corporate culture.

You've actually missed the mark. Jones was spot on in describing a version of "culture". A nation, can have a culture that has the same positives and negatives, just like a corporate culture. Take for instance Japanese culture and how they view seniority and younger personnel speaking to senior personnel. That "culture" is different than American "culture" or German "culture". Kind of like the viewpoint of America being a "Cowboy" culture. Right, wrong, indifferent it is there.

CX747 wrote:

GE has already stated it would not take part in a 3 engine optioned program. If they stick to their guns then that means a potential 5X has at most 2 engine manufacturers. Does Boeing go sole source ala the 737? Only time will tell.

744SPX wrote:

Another example of spoiled brat behavior. GE can opt out for all I care, and good riddance. Sole sourcing is almost always a bad idea.

More like "once burned, twice shy" considering GE invested a fortune on the GE90 for the 777 and lost their shirts. One of the reasons they were willing to kick in development funds for the Longer Range 777 program in exchange for exclusivity was to try and salvage that spend. Lucky for them, the 777-300ER proved to be massively popular and they made a mint on the GE90-115B.

But really, we're never going to see more than two engine OEMs on any commercial airline program that is not expected to sell in the five figures because the risk-reward is not there for so many. Rolls-Royce tends to be more liberal about sharing because the UK helps underwrite their programs via Repayable Launch Investment, but I doubt even they would be willing to go three-ways with GE and PW on a program that would only be expected to sell 1000-1500 frames over it's life.

Revelation wrote:

CRJockey wrote:

I really mean no disrespect to you, as I value your input and person as much as one can value another internet personality.

But culture in the sense that large organizations are affected from is far from a buzz word, far from a current phenomenon and far from simply adding up the individual qualities of the workforce.

Cultural aspects of organizations are regularly pointed out as contributing factors for incidents, they go into bow tie analyses for risk measurement, they are the core result of factors a unique organization is comprised of. And culture is more than the individual parts.

You can very much write a spec describing what safety culture is, for example. Evidence would be the statements of accountable managers of airlines in the OMM. Culture is the inherent behaviour of an organization, not the puzzle pieces of "people doing professional work". Most people at Boeing designing the MAX would have thought, and told themselves, they were acting professionally, as within their cultural environment, the delivered quality was acceptable.

Thank you for the kind words. Too bad we aren't in agreement, however I do respect your opinion.

I've been a part of a large number of organizations (six major organizations over three plus decades of work, many of them household names and leaders in their industry), and I have to say I feel the "inherent behaviour of an organization" is a fiction. Sure there may be traits or tendencies but nothing I would say would be a behavior that could be counted on to hold in even the majority of cases, never mind in all cases. There are too many individuals involved. They may be having different things going on in their lives at the time, good or bad, and in my experience these things govern their behavior far more than any inherent organizational set of traits. As noted large corporations often outsource work so even if the corporation itself had such traits it seems likely that they don't pass through organizational borders. I've seen higher level management try to project that there was a corporate wide culture, but down in the trenches it still was individuals with their own strengths and weaknesses, brilliances and foibles that were in control of events.

Everybody knows that some superiors are better than others and even the same person will have different moods depending on what is going on in their lives, but that still does not negate company culture as an important factor. But how the hierarchy reacts to problems is still a cultural problem and something that needs the example of the highest levels of leadership to work. If the CEO does not want to hear about problems, he sends a message down the line and this message forms the company´s culture. I have made a switch with a whole organisation from one leadership to another and even though both had the same basic principals of the larger company, the different leadership styles gave totally different meanings to the same basic rules.

It was completely different when the guys from manufacturing started questioning your designs. One boss would feel attacked and try everything to silence those questions, the other would welcome them and invite them to take a look at the possible problem together and either convince them there is no problem or find a better solution together. It was still the same process on paper, the same forms filled out, the same checkboxes checked, but a completely different working environment. The second boss did miss a few deadlines due to this, the first boss never missed a deadline but had to go after a really big screw-up which did cost a lot more than a missed deadline.

CX747 wrote:

CRJockey wrote:

JonesNL wrote:

Reminds of an IT project with an Indian company; they had the best governance, development and QA certificates, yet they always delivered software that failed miserably. I learned there and then culture makes a huge difference...

Sorry Jones, you really don’t understand in what concept we talk about culture here. It is not cultures as nations and religions and traditions would depict, but corporate culture.

You've actually missed the mark. Jones was spot on in describing a version of "culture". A nation, can have a culture that has the same positives and negatives, just like a corporate culture. Take for instance Japanese culture and how they view seniority and younger personnel speaking to senior personnel. That "culture" is different than American "culture" or German "culture". Kind of like the viewpoint of America being a "Cowboy" culture. Right, wrong, indifferent it is there.

Corporate culture is usually defined/effected by its location as well. Boeing HQ went from its engineering cultured location, to its Wall Street cultured location in Chicago..

There is nothing wrong with wanting to appeal the financial market. Airplane development and production need financing and investors.
But they must be careful to not milk the company too much to please the market. Like buying their own stock instead of financing expensive new programs. For some time you can delay it but then the investments will be needed without delay. We are coming closer to this point. Not sure the MDD way is the way to go.
I hope they begin their next programs soon.

Stitch wrote:

brindabella wrote:

I may have the wrong impression, but I understood him to say that the first (and entirely new) task would be to define the new cockpit in the light of Human Factors. And if the FAA/EASA haven't quite got it clear yet, that might take some time.

Well it stands to reason NMA would have a cockpit based on the 787 design paradigm. If EASA wants to force the rest of the commercial aviation world to adopt Airbus' standards for cockpit and flight-control design, they should petition the ICAO to make it international standards imposed at some future date. Yes, Boeing (and the FAA) need to be held to higher standards than they have in the past because of MAX (at least), but too much fiddling that delays Boeing programs EIS significantly could be seen as being as much about protecting Airbus from foreign competition (and not just from the US, but from Russia, China, Japan, Brazil and others) as it is about safety.

brindabella wrote:

PS - I wonder if delaying the MAX10 and 777X might also be a concession to the very large workload ahead on most of the programs:

In certain areas - like supplier management - I could see this being an issue since NMA would leverage those resources and they are currently tasked with supporting MAX and 777X. There would also be a Facilities aspect - if Boeing intends to use Everett to build NMA, they would need to wait for the 787 and/or 747 programs to wind down and then start the reconfiguration of those spaces for NMA. And if Boeing intends to build outside of Everett, then they would have to secure space and build a FAL.

All that being said, again presuming Boeing was ready for ATO, one expects they had contingency plans for that in place and those plans would have taken into account MAX and 777X at much higher production rates than currently planned and with the intent of at least the 787 FAL likely staying at Everett (which would imply the NMA would have used the two 747-8 buildings as that program would have been done in time for NMA to inherit the space).

I second that.

I was extremely concerned during the MAX grounding that a determined push seemed to be underway to turn the 737 into an A320 in terms of Avionics at least.

1) this was fundamentally impossible - in design terms the 737 was a product of the 707 era (even today the Flight Deck looks pretty pre-historic, especially the overhead panels). The A320, the first real "computer" airliner, was designed in the 1980s. Massively different technology. Utterly different design philosophies.
2) it was also unwise in that the two families have closely-comparable safety records (both very safe). The greater the changes forced onto the 737, the greater the risk of further (possibly fatal) unforeseen complications. Just a bad idea to keep on pushing for more and more changes to an extremely successful and well-proven design.
3) this seemed to come to a head with the demand that the 737 needed a 3rd AoA source.

It really had very unsavoury implications which seemingly had little to do with safety and lots to do with securing commercial advantage over the MAX.

So I was greatly relieved when BA stood their ground, common-sense prevailed and the third source will now be "synthetic".



cheers

Noshow wrote:

There is nothing wrong with wanting to appeal the financial market. Airplane development and production need financing and investors.
But they must be careful to not milk the company too much to please the market. Like buying their own stock instead of financing expensive new programs. For some time you can delay it but then the investments will be needed without delay. We are coming closer to this point. Not sure the MDD way is the way to go.
I hope they begin their next programs soon.

By my reckoning, BCA have twice come to the point in the last 25 years whereby it might well secure dominance of the airliner market.
The first was the 787 development, which could and should have then ushered-in the Y1/Y3 products.
The 787 was and is that good.
However this was turned into a spectacular "own goal" by BCA Management trying to be just too cute with Financial Management.
The Management apparently understood little or nothing about the elevated skill-sets required to build a modern airliner, and that BCA itself actually had a large portion of these relatively rare skills in-house.
The Management let gigantic Technical risk in through the back door while attempting to mitigate Financial risk.

The second was the great momentum developing through the mid-to late 2010s.
The Free Cash flow was skyrocketing year-by-year.
By 2018 BCA was looking-at a Nett Profit well above $10Billion and say $18billion Free Cash.
The NMA could easily have been financed by cash-in-hand.

I was always a fan of developing remuneration for Management whereby the individuals explicitly profited by the success of the Company.

But the sight of this rolling river of Free Cash basically frittered-away, being used to jive the Share-price via Share Buy-backs ...


NAH.



There has to be a better way.

cheers

CX747 wrote:

CRJockey wrote:

JonesNL wrote:

Reminds of an IT project with an Indian company; they had the best governance, development and QA certificates, yet they always delivered software that failed miserably. I learned there and then culture makes a huge difference...

Sorry Jones, you really don’t understand in what concept we talk about culture here. It is not cultures as nations and religions and traditions would depict, but corporate culture.

You've actually missed the mark. Jones was spot on in describing a version of "culture". A nation, can have a culture that has the same positives and negatives, just like a corporate culture. Take for instance Japanese culture and how they view seniority and younger personnel speaking to senior personnel. That "culture" is different than American "culture" or German "culture". Kind of like the viewpoint of America being a "Cowboy" culture. Right, wrong, indifferent it is there.

Agree, he was describing a (randomly chosen) version of culture. The data point the discussion about cultures started, however, was the interesting discussion whether or not there is a (corporate) culture defining the way work is done and, specifically, if that is one of the major factors that led Boeing to start producing a half-arsed product. Not about German or American, Japanese or Indian culture as in traditions.

Saying it again just to clarify: data point was Boeing and corporate. Not the whole world and ethics and tradition.

Revelation wrote:

CRJockey wrote:

I really mean no disrespect to you, as I value your input and person as much as one can value another internet personality.

But culture in the sense that large organizations are affected from is far from a buzz word, far from a current phenomenon and far from simply adding up the individual qualities of the workforce.

Cultural aspects of organizations are regularly pointed out as contributing factors for incidents, they go into bow tie analyses for risk measurement, they are the core result of factors a unique organization is comprised of. And culture is more than the individual parts.

You can very much write a spec describing what safety culture is, for example. Evidence would be the statements of accountable managers of airlines in the OMM. Culture is the inherent behaviour of an organization, not the puzzle pieces of "people doing professional work". Most people at Boeing designing the MAX would have thought, and told themselves, they were acting professionally, as within their cultural environment, the delivered quality was acceptable.

Thank you for the kind words. Too bad we aren't in agreement, however I do respect your opinion.

I've been a part of a large number of organizations (six major organizations over three plus decades of work, many of them household names and leaders in their industry), and I have to say I feel the "inherent behaviour of an organization" is a fiction. Sure there may be traits or tendencies but nothing I would say would be a behavior that could be counted on to hold in even the majority of cases, never mind in all cases. There are too many individuals involved. They may be having different things going on in their lives at the time, good or bad, and in my experience these things govern their behavior far more than any inherent organizational set of traits. As noted large corporations often outsource work so even if the corporation itself had such traits it seems likely that they don't pass through organizational borders. I've seen higher level management try to project that there was a corporate wide culture, but down in the trenches it still was individuals with their own strengths and weaknesses, brilliances and foibles that were in control of events.

Thanks as well for sharing your past 30+ years, very interesting different perspective. Maybe we have simply made different experiences and mine is, I admit, a little shorter and less diversified (two major organizations and 12 years) as yours.

I just felt, that even within different positions and aspects of the businesses (mostly non-flying jobs in engineering, but also in the cockpit after career switch), a certain and relevant subordination under what I would see as "corporate culture" was always given. The culture was distinctly different between the successful large heavy industry global player and the successful large airline global player, but consistent within the companies. Individuals, I feel, have been extraordinary wilful to submit to the subconciously agreed set of norms, values and, yes, corporate culture, the company (by means of its employees) has been creating over the decades.

I agree with you that the corporate culture high(er) level management wants to inflict on the company, due to what they or modern work psychology perceive as ideal, is hardly ever a joyful venture. And more often than not the attempt slowly fades into non-existance after being wildly unsuccessful as the guys and gals in the trenches simply don't accept a new culture by force.

I know its early in the design game, bit I am curious about this widebody 2-2-2 concept. What are the benefits over a single isle 3-3 or a traditional 2-3-2/2-4-2 configuration besides what looks like better cargo capacity? I had heard that it may mean faster loading/unloading but for that to benefit wouldn't there need to be and L1 and L2 door capable of handling jetways?

seahawk wrote:

Everybody knows that some superiors are better than others and even the same person will have different moods depending on what is going on in their lives, but that still does not negate company culture as an important factor. But how the hierarchy reacts to problems is still a cultural problem and something that needs the example of the highest levels of leadership to work. If the CEO does not want to hear about problems, he sends a message down the line and this message forms the company´s culture. I have made a switch with a whole organisation from one leadership to another and even though both had the same basic principals of the larger company, the different leadership styles gave totally different meanings to the same basic rules.

It was completely different when the guys from manufacturing started questioning your designs. One boss would feel attacked and try everything to silence those questions, the other would welcome them and invite them to take a look at the possible problem together and either convince them there is no problem or find a better solution together. It was still the same process on paper, the same forms filled out, the same checkboxes checked, but a completely different working environment. The second boss did miss a few deadlines due to this, the first boss never missed a deadline but had to go after a really big screw-up which did cost a lot more than a missed deadline.

So the root cause was one manager was perceived to be close minded and fearful, another one open minded and accommodating.

How are traits such as open mindedness measurable? How is lack of open mindedness actionable? Re-education? Firing? People are complex and often two-faced. How do you detect "false positives" where the manager acts open minded and accommodating when talking to superiors and HR but close minded and fearful when dealing with subordinates? How much openness is enough? How much fearfulness is a disqualification? Isn't fearfulness a sign of prudence and caution?

How much clemency do you give the person who signed off on the work that took unsanitized data from an AoA sensor and used it to provide multiple activation and unlimited authority when he says "I wanted to do better but my boss is fearful and close minded so I signed off instead of dealing with that situation"?

Doesn't the entire system of personal responsibility enforced by signed documents fall apart when individuals can play the "bad culture" card?

I know I sound like an old man when I say this, but all this signals a move away from personal integrity and towards no-blame culture.

Something to think about: the guy whose signature was at the end of the list of signatures on the MAX is now the Chief Engineer of the 777X Program....

Revelation wrote:

seahawk wrote:

Everybody knows that some superiors are better than others and even the same person will have different moods depending on what is going on in their lives, but that still does not negate company culture as an important factor. But how the hierarchy reacts to problems is still a cultural problem and something that needs the example of the highest levels of leadership to work. If the CEO does not want to hear about problems, he sends a message down the line and this message forms the company´s culture. I have made a switch with a whole organisation from one leadership to another and even though both had the same basic principals of the larger company, the different leadership styles gave totally different meanings to the same basic rules.

It was completely different when the guys from manufacturing started questioning your designs. One boss would feel attacked and try everything to silence those questions, the other would welcome them and invite them to take a look at the possible problem together and either convince them there is no problem or find a better solution together. It was still the same process on paper, the same forms filled out, the same checkboxes checked, but a completely different working environment. The second boss did miss a few deadlines due to this, the first boss never missed a deadline but had to go after a really big screw-up which did cost a lot more than a missed deadline.

So the root cause was one manager was perceived to be close minded and fearful, another one open minded and accommodating.

How are traits such as open mindedness measurable? How is lack of open mindedness actionable? Re-education? Firing? People are complex and often two-faced. How do you detect "false positives" where the manager acts open minded and accommodating when talking to superiors and HR but close minded and fearful when dealing with subordinates? How much openness is enough? How much fearfulness is a disqualification? Isn't fearfulness a sign of prudence and caution?

How much clemency do you give the person who signed off on the work that took unsanitized data from an AoA sensor and used it to provide multiple activation and unlimited authority when he says "I wanted to do better but my boss is fearful and close minded so I signed off instead of dealing with that situation"?

Doesn't the entire system of personal responsibility enforced by signed documents fall apart when individuals can play the "bad culture" card?

I know I sound like an old man when I say this, but all this signals a move away from personal integrity and towards no-blame culture.

Something to think about: the guy whose signature was at the end of the list of signatures on the MAX is now the Chief Engineer of the 777X Program....

Is that not exactly an example that the company culture is off. The one person responsible for signing the system off is still enjoying a high leading position, while they went after the guys using unsuitable language in the E-Mails describing the problems. And when it comes to personal responsibility the fact you just described indicates that it does not seem that important at Boeing. Sure nobody should have signed off on the system, but the way Boeing worked made it increasingly likely they did. If you openly disrespect the regulator it is highly unlikely that you respect the regulations.

Apart from that once you take a management role in an organisation your first job is to help your employees to do their jobs as good as possible. From what we know doing a good job was measured mostly in monetary terms, which is again a decision by the highest levels of management. If I always demand the cheapest solution and reward those bringing the cheapest solution, it is likely that I will some day end up with a crappy solution.

Why is it such a struggle for Boeing to build a new plane?

A clean sheet is nothing but integration of the best technologies vendors can offer and build. It is not that Boeing is reinventing the flying machine.

dtw2hyd wrote:

Why is it such a struggle for Boeing to build a new plane?

A clean sheet is nothing but integration of the best technologies vendors can offer and build. It is not that Boeing is reinventing the flying machine.

It isn't, at all. The struggle is to maximise Return on Investment, both within the boundary of a potential NMA and within the scope of the company (alternate use of the money).

dtw2hyd wrote:

Why is it such a struggle for Boeing to build a new plane?

A clean sheet is nothing but integration of the best technologies vendors can offer and build. It is not that Boeing is reinventing the flying machine.

I'd say its not such a struggle to build a new plane, the big struggle is deciding which new plane to build.

Fred

AndoAv8R wrote:

I know its early in the design game, bit I am curious about this widebody 2-2-2 concept. What are the benefits over a single isle 3-3 or a traditional 2-3-2/2-4-2 configuration besides what looks like better cargo capacity? I had heard that it may mean faster loading/unloading but for that to benefit wouldn't there need to be and L1 and L2 door capable of handling jetways?

I went to Seatguru, Frontier A321 230 seats, Spirit A321 228 seats, United 753 232 seats, Delta 753 234 seats. Assuming the market is moving more towards 225 and 250 seat domestic airliners, what is the better solution, single aisle or twin aisle?
As for 2-2-2 versus 2-3-2, the advantage of 2-2-2 would be for the same capacity less frontal area, a longer aircraft needing a smaller tail. Plus no middle seat. I think around a 50m length, a 2-2-2 works well and is better proportioned than a 3-3, or 2-3-2, but that's just personal opinion.

seahawk wrote:

Is that not exactly an example that the company culture is off. The one person responsible for signing the system off is still enjoying a high leading position, while they went after the guys using unsuitable language in the E-Mails describing the problems. And when it comes to personal responsibility the fact you just described indicates that it does not seem that important at Boeing. Sure nobody should have signed off on the system, but the way Boeing worked made it increasingly likely they did. If you openly disrespect the regulator it is highly unlikely that you respect the regulations.

Apart from that once you take a management role in an organisation your first job is to help your employees to do their jobs as good as possible. From what we know doing a good job was measured mostly in monetary terms, which is again a decision by the highest levels of management. If I always demand the cheapest solution and reward those bringing the cheapest solution, it is likely that I will some day end up with a crappy solution.

I still feel you're thinking in terms of intangible and second order effects and making a lot of suppositions. There is a long list of possible reasons why a bad design was signed off. It could be company culture. It could be the person doing the signing off was going though a crisis in their personal life, a health scare, was simply bored and inattentive, was incompetent or was not given the time or the information needed to evaluate the design correctly.

As you write, Boeing has done a good job making Forkner the fall guy, and our Congress chose to take that bait and also stick it to Muilenberg about his pay package rather than figure out what actually went on. The system counted on people who signed documents taking personal responsibility that the work was done correctly. We've heard a bit about Teal being interviewed by Congress about why he signed off on the MAX, and he said something along the lines of "I just trusted the people beneath me". Ok, fine, interview the one who signed off on the flight control system, keep drilling down through the layers till you really know what went on. Sadly we did not get that outcome, yet the system STILL relies on people signing documents taking personal responsibility that the work is done right and standing their ground if they can't do that with a clear conscious.

Revelation wrote:

seahawk wrote:

Is that not exactly an example that the company culture is off. The one person responsible for signing the system off is still enjoying a high leading position, while they went after the guys using unsuitable language in the E-Mails describing the problems. And when it comes to personal responsibility the fact you just described indicates that it does not seem that important at Boeing. Sure nobody should have signed off on the system, but the way Boeing worked made it increasingly likely they did. If you openly disrespect the regulator it is highly unlikely that you respect the regulations.

Apart from that once you take a management role in an organisation your first job is to help your employees to do their jobs as good as possible. From what we know doing a good job was measured mostly in monetary terms, which is again a decision by the highest levels of management. If I always demand the cheapest solution and reward those bringing the cheapest solution, it is likely that I will some day end up with a crappy solution.

I still feel you're thinking in terms of intangible and second order effects and making a lot of suppositions. There is a long list of possible reasons why a bad design was signed off. It could be company culture. It could be the person doing the signing off was going though a crisis in their personal life, a health scare, was simply bored and inattentive, was incompetent or was not given the time or the information needed to evaluate the design correctly.

As you write, Boeing has done a good job making Forkner the fall guy, and our Congress chose to take that bait and also stick it to Muilenberg about his pay package rather than figure out what actually went on. The system counted on people who signed documents taking personal responsibility that the work was done correctly. We've heard a bit about Teal being interviewed by Congress about why he signed off on the MAX, and he said something along the lines of "I just trusted the people beneath me". Ok, fine, interview the one who signed off on the flight control system, keep drilling down through the layers till you really know what went on. Sadly we did not get that outcome, yet the system STILL relies on people signing documents taking personal responsibility that the work is done right and standing their ground if they can't do that with a clear conscious.

The closest things I can think of to MCAS, are the Florida pedestrian bridge failure, and the sinking Sales Force tower in SF. I can understand how one person can get tunnel vision and miss the obvious. If there is a thorough review, and several people feel like their reputation is vested in the ideas, these should have been avoidable.

Revelation wrote:

seahawk wrote:

Is that not exactly an example that the company culture is off. The one person responsible for signing the system off is still enjoying a high leading position, while they went after the guys using unsuitable language in the E-Mails describing the problems. And when it comes to personal responsibility the fact you just described indicates that it does not seem that important at Boeing. Sure nobody should have signed off on the system, but the way Boeing worked made it increasingly likely they did. If you openly disrespect the regulator it is highly unlikely that you respect the regulations.

Apart from that once you take a management role in an organisation your first job is to help your employees to do their jobs as good as possible. From what we know doing a good job was measured mostly in monetary terms, which is again a decision by the highest levels of management. If I always demand the cheapest solution and reward those bringing the cheapest solution, it is likely that I will some day end up with a crappy solution.

I still feel you're thinking in terms of intangible and second order effects and making a lot of suppositions. There is a long list of possible reasons why a bad design was signed off. It could be company culture. It could be the person doing the signing off was going though a crisis in their personal life, a health scare, was simply bored and inattentive, was incompetent or was not given the time or the information needed to evaluate the design correctly.

As you write, Boeing has done a good job making Forkner the fall guy, and our Congress chose to take that bait and also stick it to Muilenberg about his pay package rather than figure out what actually went on. The system counted on people who signed documents taking personal responsibility that the work was done correctly. We've heard a bit about Teal being interviewed by Congress about why he signed off on the MAX, and he said something along the lines of "I just trusted the people beneath me". Ok, fine, interview the one who signed off on the flight control system, keep drilling down through the layers till you really know what went on. Sadly we did not get that outcome, yet the system STILL relies on people signing documents taking personal responsibility that the work is done right and standing their ground if they can't do that with a clear conscious.

I thought exactly like you a few years ago, but imho this is ignoring the fact that humans are social animals and most try to fit in with the group. If you are an experienced and skilled engineer you might really have the guts to stand up to organisational pressure, but the company politics can easily aim to convince such types to look for a new challenge. I also thought that you can not really mismanage an engineering teams because we have rules, regulations, standards are responsibility until I learned that you can and that is without changing any of the things I just mentioned. You just need to use "soft" factors and hire new people that are more in line with your thinking. For example if somebody voices a concern about your project, you can have him write a report about his concerns and demand it finished and refined to a very high level within an impossible to achieve time frame. Then you call him into the office and instead of talking about the concern you start talking about the missing quality of the report, the missed timeline and spelling errors you found, but you avoid talking about the actual concern. Make it a really unpleasant conversation for the employee. Also use this as a negative in the performance review. If the employee insists have another 2 rounds of unpleasant conversations with the next 2 management levels, preferably one with finance or marketing pointing out the importance of a flawless execution and that any delay will be the employee´s responsibility only. On the other hand laud everyone who does not disagree with the plan or finds a solution to cut corners. If you keep doing this and the whole management structure ticks the same, I bet that within 3 years less than 10% of the employees will voice a concern if not 100% certain. Less than 50% will voice a concern even if 100% certain. Psychological pressure does work on nearly everyone.

And anything we heard out of Boeing is imho a strong indication of a very toxic company culture that worked exactly like that. Sure it does not remove personal responsibility from the individual (ok at Boeing in did) but it is not the way such a company should (or imho can) be run.

Simple: If the -5X is set to be the biggest member of the future 737 follow on family make it single aisle. If it is set to be the smallest of the NMA family: Twin aisle. The latter would be my decision. Just another XLR is too expensive from scratch. Better get into uncharted terrain.

seahawk wrote:

I thought exactly like you a few years ago, but imho this is ignoring the fact that humans are social animals and most try to fit in with the group. If you are an experienced and skilled engineer you might really have the guts to stand up to organisational pressure, but the company politics can easily aim to convince such types to look for a new challenge. I also thought that you can not really mismanage an engineering teams because we have rules, regulations, standards are responsibility until I learned that you can and that is without changing any of the things I just mentioned. You just need to use "soft" factors and hire new people that are more in line with your thinking. For example if somebody voices a concern about your project, you can have him write a report about his concerns and demand it finished and refined to a very high level within an impossible to achieve time frame. Then you call him into the office and instead of talking about the concern you start talking about the missing quality of the report, the missed timeline and spelling errors you found, but you avoid talking about the actual concern. Make it a really unpleasant conversation for the employee. Also use this as a negative in the performance review. If the employee insists have another 2 rounds of unpleasant conversations with the next 2 management levels, preferably one with finance or marketing pointing out the importance of a flawless execution and that any delay will be the employee´s responsibility only. On the other hand laud everyone who does not disagree with the plan or finds a solution to cut corners. If you keep doing this and the whole management structure ticks the same, I bet that within 3 years less than 10% of the employees will voice a concern if not 100% certain. Less than 50% will voice a concern even if 100% certain. Psychological pressure does work on nearly everyone.

And anything we heard out of Boeing is imho a strong indication of a very toxic company culture that worked exactly like that. Sure it does not remove personal responsibility from the individual (ok at Boeing in did) but it is not the way such a company should (or imho can) be run.

Interestingly enough I too had a transformation in my thinking but in an opposite direction. Earlier in my career I thought senior management with a well thought out message could create a corporate culture that would diffuse through the layers and motivate people to "do the right thing". I drank the kool aid. As time went on I ran into more careerists, back stabbers and two faced turds who showed it really only takes one bad apple to ruin the barrel. Once you learn how to recognize a bad apple you then realize how many of them there are and how resilient they are.

There is an entire spectrum of people with their own personalities. I think it's naive to assume that it was noble engineers trying to do the right thing fighting back against money grubbing managers. Sure there was a bunch of that, but there were probably very good managers trying to deal with engineers cutting corners and every different permutation of goodness, evil, competence, incompetence, eagerness, laziness, etc. It's pretty clear that the media shows us the most sensationalistic view they can find. No "culture" can homogenize that, IMO. Thus we have processes with measureables and responsible people signing documents to affirm their personal responsibility. As the saying goes, grab them by the (naughty bits) and their hearts and minds will follow. This stuff is too critical to allow "get out of jail free" cards like "bad culture made me do it", yet it seems we are heading in that direction, much to our detriment.

DenverTed wrote:

AndoAv8R wrote:

I know its early in the design game, bit I am curious about this widebody 2-2-2 concept. What are the benefits over a single isle 3-3 or a traditional 2-3-2/2-4-2 configuration besides what looks like better cargo capacity? I had heard that it may mean faster loading/unloading but for that to benefit wouldn't there need to be and L1 and L2 door capable of handling jetways?

I went to Seatguru, Frontier A321 230 seats, Spirit A321 228 seats, United 753 232 seats, Delta 753 234 seats. Assuming the market is moving more towards 225 and 250 seat domestic airliners, what is the better solution, single aisle or twin aisle?
As for 2-2-2 versus 2-3-2, the advantage of 2-2-2 would be for the same capacity less frontal area, a longer aircraft needing a smaller tail. Plus no middle seat. I think around a 50m length, a 2-2-2 works well and is better proportioned than a 3-3, or 2-3-2, but that's just personal opinion.

Plus faster egress than 2-3-2.
I'm certainly hoping for 2-2-2 if this gets built as a widebody. Then you could have fuselage commonality with NSA as well. It may be that 2-2-2's day has finally arrived.

Revelation wrote:

seahawk wrote:

I thought exactly like you a few years ago, but imho this is ignoring the fact that humans are social animals and most try to fit in with the group. If you are an experienced and skilled engineer you might really have the guts to stand up to organisational pressure, but the company politics can easily aim to convince such types to look for a new challenge. I also thought that you can not really mismanage an engineering teams because we have rules, regulations, standards are responsibility until I learned that you can and that is without changing any of the things I just mentioned. You just need to use "soft" factors and hire new people that are more in line with your thinking. For example if somebody voices a concern about your project, you can have him write a report about his concerns and demand it finished and refined to a very high level within an impossible to achieve time frame. Then you call him into the office and instead of talking about the concern you start talking about the missing quality of the report, the missed timeline and spelling errors you found, but you avoid talking about the actual concern. Make it a really unpleasant conversation for the employee. Also use this as a negative in the performance review. If the employee insists have another 2 rounds of unpleasant conversations with the next 2 management levels, preferably one with finance or marketing pointing out the importance of a flawless execution and that any delay will be the employee´s responsibility only. On the other hand laud everyone who does not disagree with the plan or finds a solution to cut corners. If you keep doing this and the whole management structure ticks the same, I bet that within 3 years less than 10% of the employees will voice a concern if not 100% certain. Less than 50% will voice a concern even if 100% certain. Psychological pressure does work on nearly everyone.

And anything we heard out of Boeing is imho a strong indication of a very toxic company culture that worked exactly like that. Sure it does not remove personal responsibility from the individual (ok at Boeing in did) but it is not the way such a company should (or imho can) be run.

Interestingly enough I too had a transformation in my thinking but in an opposite direction. Earlier in my career I thought senior management with a well thought out message could create a corporate culture that would diffuse through the layers and motivate people to "do the right thing". I drank the kool aid. As time went on I ran into more careerists, back stabbers and two faced turds who showed it really only takes one bad apple to ruin the barrel. Once you learn how to recognize a bad apple you then realize how many of them there are and how resilient they are.

There is an entire spectrum of people with their own personalities. I think it's naive to assume that it was noble engineers trying to do the right thing fighting back against money grubbing managers. Sure there was a bunch of that, but there were probably very good managers trying to deal with engineers cutting corners and every different permutation of goodness, evil, competence, incompetence, eagerness, laziness, etc. It's pretty clear that the media shows us the most sensationalistic view they can find. No "culture" can homogenize that, IMO. Thus we have processes with measureables and responsible people signing documents to affirm their personal responsibility. As the saying goes, grab them by the (naughty bits) and their hearts and minds will follow. This stuff is too critical to allow "get out of jail free" cards like "bad culture made me do it", yet it seems we are heading in that direction, much to our detriment.

I agree, management can not install a good or new company culture, but I am certain it can destroy an existing good company culture. In the end company culture depends on the management leading by example, hiring and promoting people that are naturaly compatible with the desired system and this only does evolve very slowly and over a long time. As an old mentor said: "Fear is easier to install than trust. And it takes many positive experiences to negate one negative."
And imho a bad company culture is no reason to escape personal responsibility, it is however an important thing to understand how organisations fail. Even if you would find the one person that signed the system off and could put the final blame on that person, there would still be questions like:

Why did the person not notice the mistake?
If the person did notice them, why did the person sign it off anyway?

And to be honest it does not look like Boeing went to find the root cause.

Revelation wrote:

seahawk wrote:

Everybody knows that some superiors are better than others and even the same person will have different moods depending on what is going on in their lives, but that still does not negate company culture as an important factor. But how the hierarchy reacts to problems is still a cultural problem and something that needs the example of the highest levels of leadership to work. If the CEO does not want to hear about problems, he sends a message down the line and this message forms the company´s culture. I have made a switch with a whole organisation from one leadership to another and even though both had the same basic principals of the larger company, the different leadership styles gave totally different meanings to the same basic rules.

It was completely different when the guys from manufacturing started questioning your designs. One boss would feel attacked and try everything to silence those questions, the other would welcome them and invite them to take a look at the possible problem together and either convince them there is no problem or find a better solution together. It was still the same process on paper, the same forms filled out, the same checkboxes checked, but a completely different working environment. The second boss did miss a few deadlines due to this, the first boss never missed a deadline but had to go after a really big screw-up which did cost a lot more than a missed deadline.

So the root cause was one manager was perceived to be close minded and fearful, another one open minded and accommodating.

How are traits such as open mindedness measurable? How is lack of open mindedness actionable? Re-education? Firing? People are complex and often two-faced. How do you detect "false positives" where the manager acts open minded and accommodating when talking to superiors and HR but close minded and fearful when dealing with subordinates? How much openness is enough? How much fearfulness is a disqualification? Isn't fearfulness a sign of prudence and caution? Or is the "culture" difference really that SpaceX has great leadership and Boeing has poor leadership?

How much clemency do you give the person who signed off on the work that took unsanitized data from an AoA sensor and used it to provide multiple activation and unlimited authority when he says "I wanted to do better but my boss is fearful and close minded so I signed off instead of dealing with that situation"?

Doesn't the entire system of personal responsibility enforced by signed documents fall apart when individuals can play the "bad culture" card?

I know I sound like an old man when I say this, but all this signals a move away from personal integrity and towards no-blame culture.

Something to think about: the guy whose signature was at the end of the list of signatures on the MAX is now the Chief Engineer of the 777X Program....

I kind of agree with a lot of this, but then you also have to ask yourself questions like:
1 - How does Boeing happen to screw up the 767 tanker, the 737 MAX, the Starliner CST-100 test flight, and the SLS Green Run? This is a myriad of different programs that all had embarassing problems due to software issues, insufficient testing, and botched implementations. It sure seems systemic and that's more than just a few individuals.
2 - Yet a young upstart company, SpaceX, got way less money and is about to launch their third crewed mission to the space station in a couple of months. That same company is flying early prototype Mars rockets in Boca Chica Texas, and also lands expendable first stages - one of them eight times for the same first stage booster. Is their boldness, innovation, and success just due to people doing their job better than Boeing? Or is it a "culture" that is different?

CRJockey wrote:

alyusuph wrote:

Boeing should resurrect the 757 with more composites and a new engine

Absolutely agree with you. Wonder why nobody thought about it before you? You think they still have the tooling? I suggest it will sell a thousand copies.

Even if they don't have the tooling, they should just redevelop it. The 757 is an aircraft which they already have experience developing. It will really help them to lower a lot of development costs. Imagine if they get an engine which is say, 30% more efficient even without composites its a development which can build a good business case, if you add to composites and other new aerodynamic technologies etc it may lead to a very compelling product., and this time the tooling should be in alignment to churning out aircraft with more composites. Thinking about it, even if they end up with a new narrow-body, the best narrowbody will be one which stands high on its landing gear, something which the 757 already has. If they have grandfathered the 737 for fifty years, they can do the same with the 757, isn't it.

If I was in their board I would propose to discontinue the 739, replace it with a 757 neo, and only maintain the production of the 738 Max, and maybe, maybe the 737 Max...(also for the BBJs etc). So the production lines will be, one line 737-700 Max and 737-800 Max; and the second line the 757Neos.

Revelation wrote:

alyusuph wrote:

Boeing should resurrect the 757 with more composites and a new engine

Not possible.

JonesNL wrote:

Revelation wrote:

Getting Airbus to react is part of the plan. It's a better idea than letting them invest nothing and dominate the market.

Historical data shows, that NB eats WB routes when range is there. An NB NMA would make more sense as it would probably is easier to transfer components and lessons learned to NSA. Also, if an WB NMA is introduced there will be less differentiation compared to the 787, which might be pushed to the 5500nm+ niche.

I agree that Boeing should do something, but can the WB NMA compete with the A322 on CASM?

Yes, it can be competitive, and must be or it won't get launched.

dtw2hyd wrote:

Revelation wrote:

There was something wrong with 777, it would not compete with A350 with the old wing.

Imagination is just that, imagination.

So 777X (the fix) will be able to outsell A350?

Compete != outsell in both the real and imaginary domains.

Feel free to choose your own words, but please don't choose mine.

Boeing WB NMA will never be able to compete with the A321LR/XLR That's why they need to respond with the 757 NEO; tTe 788 is already covering them pretty at a capacity level above the narrow bodies. I recall Emirates or Qatar once advised Boeing to develop a 788 "light". Boeing does not need to look further beyond the 788 for the WB NMA because they already have the 788 to start with. They should just shed more weight on the aircraft, get rid of those sturdy landing gears and other "strong" parts of the airframe, fuel tanks and wing etc and come up with the 788 Light.
Watch the space, ten years from now, when COVID is behind us and air travel is booming again, the 788 will sell even more to cover capacity gaps of the narrow bodies. Just like the 757, the airlines are yet to discover what the 788 can do on high capacity -high density configuration routes..

seahawk wrote:

I agree, management can not install a good or new company culture, but I am certain it can destroy an existing good company culture. In the end company culture depends on the management leading by example, hiring and promoting people that are naturally compatible with the desired system and this only does evolve very slowly and over a long time. As an old mentor said: "Fear is easier to install than trust. And it takes many positive experiences to negate one negative."
And imho a bad company culture is no reason to escape personal responsibility, it is however an important thing to understand how organisations fail. Even if you would find the one person that signed the system off and could put the final blame on that person, there would still be questions like:
And to be honest it does not look like Boeing went to find the root cause.

Agree with most of this. There absolutely IS such a thing as corporate culture, and it DOES affect collective behaviour.
I don't agree though that leadership can't install a "good" culture.
They absolutely can.
I have just watched the leadership in my business catch a cultural and behavioural slide that has happened over the past two decades, and turn it around.

And one of the key things that they have instilled is rewarding taking personal responsibility, and managing "blame" culture.
That, and realising the product actually matters, and it's not just a case of loading the business with "project managers".
And some of it has been painful (although I have loved the "back to basics" feel of what we're doing.

Boeing Commercial were pretty much on record as "going after Airbus" in a commercial sense.
The pressure on the WTO...
The intense pressure on the cost structure on the 787, and its suppliers.....
The avoidance of $1m per MAX to sharpen the MAX's competitive position.
The tariff cases.......

All of the external body language points to commercial pressure taking precedence over engineering integrity in the "reward" behaviour process.

Yes, individuals are responsible somewhere. But there's a reason the buck stops with leadership.

Rgds

There definately is corporete culture in issues like whether it is a good career move to raise up uncomfortable issues or whether yes-men seem to be rising to the top.
If anybody doesn't think there was a massive culture problem in Enron and anybody who was not not cool with what was going on was fired and people being screened before hiring to be accepting to that sort of thing, I don't know what to say.

Interesting article on Boeing corporate culture at the top during 737 Max Crisis brought out by shareholder lawsuit against Boeing in today’s Wall Street Journal behind firewall at:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-boa ... _lead_pos4
It will be interesting to see what affect this has on DOJ agreement with Boeing and Boeing Culture at the top for future aircraft programs.

astuteman wrote:

seahawk wrote:

I agree, management can not install a good or new company culture, but I am certain it can destroy an existing good company culture. In the end company culture depends on the management leading by example, hiring and promoting people that are naturally compatible with the desired system and this only does evolve very slowly and over a long time. As an old mentor said: "Fear is easier to install than trust. And it takes many positive experiences to negate one negative."
And imho a bad company culture is no reason to escape personal responsibility, it is however an important thing to understand how organisations fail. Even if you would find the one person that signed the system off and could put the final blame on that person, there would still be questions like:
And to be honest it does not look like Boeing went to find the root cause.

Agree with most of this. There absolutely IS such a thing as corporate culture, and it DOES affect collective behaviour.
I don't agree though that leadership can't install a "good" culture.
They absolutely can.
I have just watched the leadership in my business catch a cultural and behavioural slide that has happened over the past two decades, and turn it around.

I agree with you, I just pointed out that you can not install a new culture like adding a new regulation. If the culture is not honoured by the upper management and not lived by them every day, it does not work. If they do, you can turn things around, but I still believe, that it is harder to improve a cooperate culture than to destroy a good one.