MDC862 wrote:

Wall Street Journal reporting this morning that all the "white tail" MAX have been delivered and only about 10 remain.

That didn't take long.

What does this mean from an accounting perspective? Am I correct in that most of the costs involved with the delay have already been accounted for in last year's numbers, making these potentially remarkably profitable now?

NameOmitted wrote:

What does this mean from an accounting perspective? Am I correct in that most of the costs involved with the delay have already been accounted for in last year's numbers, making these potentially remarkably profitable now?

"Remarkably" profitable? Probably not.

But it is booked revenue.

FiscAutTecGarte wrote:

I read the articles. We are seeing a rebound on deliveries and sales for MAX as the post-Covid / post-MCAS recoveries happen a bit quicker than some pundits would have suggested earlier (at least for domestic travel in large mature markets). However, my impression is that might lead Mr Calhoun in to thinking that all is good between 150-230pax for Boeing. He might see this recovery as a long term trend, when in fact it might be a surge related to pent up demand and a motivated seller (look how quick they cleared out those white tails..wow). I hope we don't find ourselves in 2024 still wondering what Boeing's response to the 150-250 pax market will be as competitors continues to improve their product in that market.

Boeing appears really confident in the MAX10. We'll have to see just how good this plane is throughout the flight test campaign. I get that MAX needs to be given time to bring in cash for Boeing. So, we'll have to wait and see if there are other large blue-chip customers ready to purchase in good quantites beyond the usual suspects. Perhaps customers will be content with the combination of capability, commonality and compelling prices that the MAX family delivers. I may be wrong in my anxiousness to see Boeing move on to a new program quickly.

We'll watch and see some more.... I guess.... They've certainly had allot of time to evaluate and analyze all manner of material and production advances.... at some point all of these bags of tricks need to materialize in a product. But for now... It's a 3 plane company... MAX,787,777 with nothing newer in revenue service or perhaps even flight tests before 2030. Good thing us enthusiast have fun stuff like the Tecnam P2012 Traveller (electrification of that will be exciting) and Textron Cessna 408 Skycourier to keep us occupied.

Some but certainly not all of us thought the NMA time line was shaping up to be an announcement at the 2019 Paris Air Show ( ref: https://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/new ... -jets.html ) with potential EIS 2025-6. Seems the current time line would be no announcement before 2023 and depending on how the "pre-programs" go, later than that. It seems the 2030 or later time line is definitely in play.

It's really hard to call their next move. Clearly they want to maximize (lol) the MAX for as much juice as they can squeeze out of it. Doing a 757-300 first gives MAX more longevity but plays to Airbus's strengths. Doing a MAX family replacement devalues the customer investment in MAX so they can't rush into that. I guess we all need to stand down till 2023 or later to see their next big move.

NameOmitted wrote:

MDC862 wrote:

Wall Street Journal reporting this morning that all the "white tail" MAX have been delivered and only about 10 remain.

That didn't take long.

What does this mean from an accounting perspective? Am I correct in that most of the costs involved with the delay have already been accounted for in last year's numbers, making these potentially remarkably profitable now?

I don't think anyone expects remarkable profits from these aircraft. Leeham suggested it will be costly for Boeing to reconfigure the aircraft to the new customer's specifications (galley, lavs, seating, etc). I guess Boeing should be glad they only have one engine partner, switching engines would add even more cost.

NameOmitted wrote:

MDC862 wrote:

Wall Street Journal reporting this morning that all the "white tail" MAX have been delivered and only about 10 remain.

That didn't take long.

What does this mean from an accounting perspective? Am I correct in that most of the costs involved with the delay have already been accounted for in last year's numbers, making these potentially remarkably profitable now?

Define "remarkably profitable".

Stitch wrote:

NameOmitted wrote:

What does this mean from an accounting perspective? Am I correct in that most of the costs involved with the delay have already been accounted for in last year's numbers, making these potentially remarkably profitable now?

"Remarkably" profitable? Probably not.

But it is booked revenue.

"Remarkable" could mean any profit, depending on your expectations.

Revelation wrote:

We can’t just talk about an incremental or marginal improvement. It has to be fundamental. So you have to prove that your modeling capability can do the next airplane and the manufacturing techniques can be used at scale and are repeatable. You have seen the developmental composites on an airplane, and you see many things; 3D printing is finding its way into many of our applications. We have to call those things out as mature before I give our team license to call out the point design on that airplane.

This comment only indicates how difficult it must be for Boeing to close the business case on this airplane. If one considers the total cost of the airplane--flight deck, landing gear, systems, interiors, engines, APU--the cost of assembly should not be the reason one waits two to three more years to launch a new airplane. Give me a break, cost savings associated with 3D printing is in the noise considering overall program costs.

In my view, Calhoun has two problems that he is dancing round. The first is that he needs time to figure out the engine strategy. The market may not be big enough for two suppliers, which probably is Boeing's preference and the airline's preference as well. The engine manufacturer's probably also don't know how to put together the business case either and how much technology to incorporate. Engine manufacturer's currently rely upon maintenance and spares for their profits and price engines accordingly. Some 737s though are going through entire service life without the engine leaving the wing. So suppose an airline purchases a bunch of 797s, 20% are used on heavy long range flights where engine life is consumed and mid-life maintenance is required. The other 80% are de-rated and used for regional routes. Those engines may never need maintenance. And don't forget that the engine manufacturers aren't in the best financial shape either right now. And those de-rated 797s have to be priced low enough to compete head-to-head with whatever Airbus puts out there.

I also think that there is concern that a 797 with substantial range on the order of 5000nm is going to take market share away from 787-8, which seems like the only airplane available to handle some of these routes. Who really knows what the financial situation is with the 787 anyway? With the pandemic, they may be counting on these sales to pull the program out of the hole that was dug.

GE/Safran and Pratt have well running new families ready for years of harvesting profits. Why should they fund competing programs at this time? And is Rolls financially ready to Royce in the upper mid size market?

It wasn't stated at the time because the 737Max news was all encompassing. But one can see departure of Kevin McAllister as Boeing Commercial CEO as related to failure to get the job done on the business model and engine sourcing for NMA/797. It seems to me that this was the job that he was specifically hired to do based upon his years at GE Aviation.

Pythagoras wrote:

Some 737s though are going through entire service life without the engine leaving the wing.

Really? I mean, on a low-utilization aircraft like a BBJ, I think that would be plausible. But a 737 in airline service?

Pythagoras wrote:

This comment only indicates how difficult it must be for Boeing to close the business case on this airplane. If one considers the total cost of the airplane--flight deck, landing gear, systems, interiors, engines, APU--the cost of assembly should not be the reason one waits two to three more years to launch a new airplane. Give me a break, cost savings associated with 3D printing is in the noise considering overall program costs.

In my view, Calhoun has two problems that he is dancing round. The first is that he needs time to figure out the engine strategy. The market may not be big enough for two suppliers, which probably is Boeing's preference and the airline's preference as well. The engine manufacturer's probably also don't know how to put together the business case either and how much technology to incorporate. Engine manufacturer's currently rely upon maintenance and spares for their profits and price engines accordingly. Some 737s though are going through entire service life without the engine leaving the wing. So suppose an airline purchases a bunch of 797s, 20% are used on heavy long range flights where engine life is consumed and mid-life maintenance is required. The other 80% are de-rated and used for regional routes. Those engines may never need maintenance. And don't forget that the engine manufacturers aren't in the best financial shape either right now. And those de-rated 797s have to be priced low enough to compete head-to-head with whatever Airbus puts out there.

I also think that there is concern that a 797 with substantial range on the order of 5000nm is going to take market share away from 787-8, which seems like the only airplane available to handle some of these routes. Who really knows what the financial situation is with the 787 anyway? With the pandemic, they may be counting on these sales to pull the program out of the hole that was dug.

I'm going to modify this sentence to be more general but makes the same point.

"Those engines will need substantially less maintenance deferred out in time, which will affect the engine manufacturer's rate of return and overall business case."

What's stopping Boeing from XLR'ing the MAX 10? By that I mean installing a larger integrated center tank.

With regards to commonality, it's already different from the other types because of the trailing link MLG.

JetBuddy wrote:

What's stopping Boeing from XLR'ing the MAX 10? By that I mean installing a larger integrated center tank.

There may or may not be the space available to add an "Aft Center Tank" like on the A321XLR and even if there is, without an increase in the Gross Operating Weights (like MTOW) any additional fuel weight would come at the expense of existing payload weight (which would have to be reduced) and I am not sure how if there is much more growth in TOW available with the existing undercarriage and tires.

The 320/737 are extraordinarily successful planes. Whatever is going to replace the upper capacity of those is going to have to be an tremendously great plane.

Revelation wrote:

We can’t just talk about an incremental or marginal improvement. It has to be fundamental. So you have to prove that your modeling capability can do the next airplane and the manufacturing techniques can be used at scale and are repeatable. You have seen the developmental composites on an airplane, and you see many things; 3D printing is finding its way into many of our applications. We have to call those things out as mature before I give our team license to call out the point design on that airplane.

Could this not mean that they could digitize the MAX first?

Not mentioned is the design of the new cockpit, completely different architecture that satisfies the latest regulatory requirements, until that is matured it is tough to do other things. Predictive maintenance, full digital design /mfg that is just now being tested on the T-7, ie will production articles really do a wing join in 30 minutes, will all that drilling on the assembly line go away, etc.

This hyper precision to fit up parts really implies that the design models will be in house to allow for control, part fabs might be by subs but no subbing out the design AKA 787 which eventually doubled the development costs in a true fiasco.

It must be a lesson learned not to save at the wrong ends. Like having to set up some super complex production system because of not enough initial internal funding for a program. On a positive note it is now a perfect time to develop everything with time to get it right and then go full speed whenever engines become available.

AirlineBob wrote:

Pythagoras wrote:

Some 737s though are going through entire service life without the engine leaving the wing.

Really? I mean, on a low-utilization aircraft like a BBJ, I think that would be plausible. But a 737 in airline service?

Nah, apart maybe from a BBJ, no aircraft, and certainly no high cycle short haul, is ever going through a normal service life without multiple engine overhauls.

JayinKitsap wrote:

Not mentioned is the design of the new cockpit, completely different architecture that satisfies the latest regulatory requirements, until that is matured it is tough to do other things. Predictive maintenance, full digital design /mfg that is just now being tested on the T-7, ie will production articles really do a wing join in 30 minutes, will all that drilling on the assembly line go away, etc.

This hyper precision to fit up parts really implies that the design models will be in house to allow for control, part fabs might be by subs but no subbing out the design AKA 787 which eventually doubled the development costs in a true fiasco.

The techniques used on T-7 only work because the airplane is small and stiff. As one increases the size of the fastener pattern it becomes more difficult to hold the tolerances. Furthermore, there is quite a bit of uncertainty as to whether fatigue performance is detrimentally affected. If the detail parts are long and flimsy then one needs to be concerned about the tooling being adequate. And remember if one needs tooling then the cost benefit is reduced dramatically.

And by the way, those techniques were pioneered by Boeing Commercial before being applied to the T-7.

Pythagoras wrote:

JayinKitsap wrote:

Not mentioned is the design of the new cockpit, completely different architecture that satisfies the latest regulatory requirements, until that is matured it is tough to do other things. Predictive maintenance, full digital design /mfg that is just now being tested on the T-7, ie will production articles really do a wing join in 30 minutes, will all that drilling on the assembly line go away, etc.

This hyper precision to fit up parts really implies that the design models will be in house to allow for control, part fabs might be by subs but no subbing out the design AKA 787 which eventually doubled the development costs in a true fiasco.

The techniques used on T-7 only work because the airplane is small and stiff. As one increases the size of the fastener pattern it becomes more difficult to hold the tolerances. Furthermore, there is quite a bit of uncertainty as to whether fatigue performance is detrimentally affected. If the detail parts are long and flimsy then one needs to be concerned about the tooling being adequate. And remember if one needs tooling then the cost benefit is reduced dramatically.

And by the way, those techniques were pioneered by Boeing Commercial before being applied to the T-7.

I recall on the 777 in the last few years was trying to pre drill fastener holes just prior to final assembly, after a good period of fighting it they reverted to drilling at assembly. If a fastener hole is drilled only .005" larger than the fastener, then the whole pattern at assembly temperature needs to hold that .005" tolerance - quite tough as the distances exceed 50", much less 500".

A better approach would be to have the outer ply predrilled, then a robot uses that as the template to finish the mated part drilling and fastener install. Minimizes the tooling you noted in that approach.

JayinKitsap wrote:

A better approach would be to have the outer ply predrilled, then a robot uses that as the template to finish the mated part drilling and fastener install. Minimizes the tooling you noted in that approach.

But that really doesn't provide the step-change in cost reduction the Calhoun says he needs because one is still having to dedicate factory flow space and allow time in the factory flow for drilling and assembly and re-work should it be required.

43 pages on What Calhoun said about the next plane.... We've had 2 additional interviews with him since.

What can we now conclude? Boeing doesn't know what it's making next. It doesn't know when it will make them. Read the interviews. Pre-Projects (translation engineering studies / busy work to keep your engineering staff sharp and engaged). Everything here is our speculation... I'm foremost in speculating, I will own that.

Boeing's next planes are the 5 that need a combination of more studying, fixing, testing, flying, certifying... 7MAX, 10MAX, 779, 778F, 778....

FiscAutTecGarte wrote:

43 pages on What Calhoun said about the next plane.... We've had 2 additional interviews with him since.

What can we now conclude? Boeing doesn't know what it's making next. It doesn't know when it will make them. Read the interviews. Pre-Projects (translation engineering studies / busy work to keep your engineering staff sharp and engaged). Everything here is our speculation... I'm foremost in speculating, I will own that.

Boeing's next planes are the 5 that need a combination of more studying, fixing, testing, flying, certifying... 7MAX, 10MAX, 779, 778F, 778....

Yeah, I was already thinking we would not have a new plane launched till 2023 at the earliest, and the recent comments about pre-projects make me think it'll be even later than I thought.

Oh well, at least we have some evidence that at least one of those things is moving forward: Boeing MAX-10 First Flight Thread

I’d love to see Boeing put the engineers back in charge. Maybe the accountants have been running the show for too long. There seems to be absolutely no vision at the company that I can see. I’ve flown Boeing’s best products for years and this era makes me pretty sad.

surfdog75 wrote:

I’d love to see Boeing put the engineers back in charge. Maybe the accountants have been running the show for too long. There seems to be absolutely no vision at the company that I can see. I’ve flown Boeing’s best products for years and this era makes me pretty sad.

I think Dennis Mulinberg showed us engineers in charge does not mean automatically mean success in engineering prowess. They just suffer from poor leadership that doesn’t put power in the right place. Tom Enders was not an engineer by any stretch. Under him Airbus launches the 320NEO and successfully sold, and brought into service (relatively smoothly) the 350. So I mean it’s going to take a while for them to get back there but they have to clear these mini battles first. The gospel truth it launching a new jet is not going to fix that problem, the business case still has to work.

Boeing just needs to invest in its business generally from QC to R&D. They need to relax on extracting money out of it.

Do I think they’ll launch something? Yeah eventually. Do they know what that is? Nope. I think Calhoun is taking the right path to look for stability first. Get your programs out the door first. MAX 7 and 10 and 777X. At that point you can look at what the market needs.

surfdog75 wrote:

I’d love to see Boeing put the engineers back in charge. Maybe the accountants have been running the show for too long. There seems to be absolutely no vision at the company that I can see. I’ve flown Boeing’s best products for years and this era makes me pretty sad.

Engineers building what engineers want to build without a good understanding of the market could easily sink the company.

I'm an engineer. I do not make, nor do I want to make strategic decisions for my employer. I want to make technical decisions. That's what my education and experience is in.

But I do want the strategic people to ask what is technically possible, and give me time to figure it out, before they make their strategic decision. It appears to me that is what Boeing is doing right now.

surfdog75 wrote:

I’d love to see Boeing put the engineers back in charge. Maybe the accountants have been running the show for too long. There seems to be absolutely no vision at the company that I can see. I’ve flown Boeing’s best products for years and this era makes me pretty sad.

Put Engineers in charge and you'll soon have no company.
I'm an engineer, (well, Manufacturing Engineer really) and currently fighting like hell to hold off specification creep being driven by Engineers on a new product, that has the potential to kill our ability to hit the cost and schedule targets our market dictates.

Engineers like to engineer for the hell of it.
That's why they do what they do.
But any of that Engineering HAS to add value to both the business and the customer.
That's a commercial and marketing aspect of running a commercial business that is fundamental to its success.

The reality is that, despite our "accountant" vs "Engineer" rhetoric, you actually need all of those parts of the business, including quality, product assurance, project management etc to be working in harmony to deliver a safe quality product at schedules and costs that drive a market advantage.

Getting out of balance either way risks the viability of the business.
And that's what I believe happened to Boeing - money at virtually any cost..

iamlucky13 wrote:

Engineers building what engineers want to build without a good understanding of the market could easily sink the company.

I'm an engineer. I do not make, nor do I want to make strategic decisions for my employer. I want to make technical decisions. That's what my education and experience is in.

But I do want the strategic people to ask what is technically possible, and give me time to figure it out, before they make their strategic decision. It appears to me that is what Boeing is doing right now.

Agreed


Rgds

The problems we have seen were strategic decisions not a matter of "engineers" vs. "management" or similar. If you insist on a group to blame it was possibly the investors level above the company picking some new top management that went in the wrong direction leaving Boeing without some future new programs for some time and wasting budgets on overruns, repairs and such.

The strategic decision was never hard. If Boeing is not outright lying, the 737-8 is competitive and making them money. The 787 is dominating the A330. So the outlook is that they should be okay in any tender up to 737-8 size. Suffering with the 737-9 and 737-10 and winning with the 787. Doing a new design that fixes the weakness of the 737-9/10 without hurting the 737-8 or the 787 is practically impossible. If you have come to the conclusion that the 737-8 will need a replacement in the early 2030ies anyway and that the 787 will get a new engine in the same time frame, it becomes obvious that any plane put in the middle of the 2 and having an EiS in 2027/28 would have a very limited window of opportunity.

astuteman wrote:

surfdog75 wrote:

I’d love to see Boeing put the engineers back in charge. Maybe the accountants have been running the show for too long. There seems to be absolutely no vision at the company that I can see. I’ve flown Boeing’s best products for years and this era makes me pretty sad.

Put Engineers in charge and you'll soon have no company.
I'm an engineer, (well, Manufacturing Engineer really) and currently fighting like hell to hold off specification creep being driven by Engineers on a new product, that has the potential to kill our ability to hit the cost and schedule targets our market dictates.

Engineers like to engineer for the hell of it.
That's why they do what they do.
But any of that Engineering HAS to add value to both the business and the customer.
That's a commercial and marketing aspect of running a commercial business that is fundamental to its success.

The reality is that, despite our "accountant" vs "Engineer" rhetoric, you actually need all of those parts of the business, including quality, product assurance, project management etc to be working in harmony to deliver a safe quality product at schedules and costs that drive a market advantage.

Getting out of balance either way risks the viability of the business.
And that's what I believe happened to Boeing - money at virtually any cost..

iamlucky13 wrote:

Engineers building what engineers want to build without a good understanding of the market could easily sink the company.

I'm an engineer. I do not make, nor do I want to make strategic decisions for my employer. I want to make technical decisions. That's what my education and experience is in.

But I do want the strategic people to ask what is technically possible, and give me time to figure it out, before they make their strategic decision. It appears to me that is what Boeing is doing right now.

Agreed


Rgds

I'm an engineer educational-wise, even got a Ph.D. (to be correct Dr.-Ing. because I'm German). I’m working for a research institute and currently coordination a large proposal regarding the hybrid-electrical drive-train for aircraft application’s.

A posterchild example what you get if you let – mostly – only engineers design is the A380. It was built for a -1000 stretch fare of the 80 m length box and with insane growth-capabilities build in from the very beginning. It was always an engineer’s dream of an airplane as a flying statement “bigger & better” than anything around not considering much around that.

We all know how that went south …

However if you’ve got only the bean-counters run your company and your company isn’t exactly building toothbrushes but large civil airplanes things will went south too. Posterchild examples include MD until they got taken over from Boeing and what Boeing did with the enormous money-mountain at hand pre-Max grounding. One word: “stock pay back”. INSANE

So the truth is, you need god and balanced leadership now matter if engineer or not and a MIXED team directly below with equal saying in strategic decisions.

I think that is just wrong. The accountants also drooled about the idea of an A380-1000, which would allow you to fly the same number of pax as 4 747s with only 2 A380s. Half the crews, half the flights, and probably less than half the fuel consumption - what is not to like about it? They failed when it came to asking the flying customer. Sure the customer liked the idea of flying in a highly comfortable giant jet, with a bar and sports area, but in reality the customer saved some bucks and lots of time by flying from the local airport directly and sitting in tight seat. But that was still the time when airlines thought comfort would win them customers.

That is the lesson that must not be forgotten. You can do whatever you want, but if your new plane does not allow you to sell the ticket for 99,99 instread of 100,99, you do not need that plane.

Stitch wrote:

JetBuddy wrote:

What's stopping Boeing from XLR'ing the MAX 10? By that I mean installing a larger integrated center tank.

There may or may not be the space available to add an "Aft Center Tank" like on the A321XLR and even if there is, without an increase in the Gross Operating Weights (like MTOW) any additional fuel weight would come at the expense of existing payload weight (which would have to be reduced) and I am not sure how if there is much more growth in TOW available with the existing undercarriage and tires.

I have been wondering about the same thing. How much can Boeing increase the Take-off weight? I realize that the engine thrust needs to be beefed up. Is it possible to get 35000 lbf thrust and 101 tonnes might? I might require a look at the gear as you say. But the gear has been modified for the -10MAX and maybe Boeing did think about increasing the MTOW for the 737 Max10. The engine might not be as optimized as on the A321XLR, but the wing should not be worse than for the A321XLR.

I know Lightsaber has suggested the 737-9MAX ER/LR with a Max10 landing gear and fuel tanks. It will be interesting to see what Boeing is offering. I believe that the -9MAX has been floated in media together with a -8MAXERX.

iamlucky13 wrote:

Engineers building what engineers want to build without a good understanding of the market could easily sink the company.

Yes, I spent the 1990s watching that happen close up at a once-great company. The engineers had so much clout that they brow-beat marketing to the point where the good ones left and the bad ones stayed. It was a recipe for failure. The company was going broke during the biggest boom in industry history (the Internet Era) and ended up being sold to a competitor.

dare100em wrote:

I'm an engineer educational-wise, even got a Ph.D. (to be correct Dr.-Ing. because I'm German). I’m working for a research institute and currently coordination a large proposal regarding the hybrid-electrical drive-train for aircraft application’s.

A posterchild example what you get if you let – mostly – only engineers design is the A380. It was built for a -1000 stretch fare of the 80 m length box and with insane growth-capabilities build in from the very beginning. It was always an engineer’s dream of an airplane as a flying statement “bigger & better” than anything around not considering much around that.

We all know how that went south …

Yes, we have had the word of the "father of the A380" in recent threads here and he said they had not left enough capability for expansion in the A340 and they were not going to make that mistake again. Ok, so they made a different mistake instead...

dare100em wrote:

However if you’ve got only the bean-counters run your company and your company isn’t exactly building toothbrushes but large civil airplanes things will went south too. Posterchild examples include MD until they got taken over from Boeing and what Boeing did with the enormous money-mountain at hand pre-Max grounding. One word: “stock pay back”. INSANE

So the truth is, you need god and balanced leadership now matter if engineer or not and a MIXED team directly below with equal saying in strategic decisions.

As you and astuteman say, there needs to be a balance, and it's pretty clear Boeing did not achieve that balance. Unfortunately we never got a clear reading of exactly what went on in the trenches of the MAX program. Boeing successfully found fall guys in Forkner and Gustaffson and the guy who used the made-up four second rule, and Congress used their opportunity to get to the bottom of things to press the CEO on his pay package rather than try to figure out what went on in the trenches.

astuteman wrote:

[
Put Engineers in charge and you'll soon have no company.
I'm an engineer, (well, Manufacturing Engineer really) and currently fighting like hell to hold off specification creep being driven by Engineers on a new product, that has the potential to kill our ability to hit the cost and schedule targets our market dictates.

Engineers like to engineer for the hell of it.
That's why they do what they do.
But any of that Engineering HAS to add value to both the business and the customer.
That's a commercial and marketing aspect of running a commercial business that is fundamental to its success.

The reality is that, despite our "accountant" vs "Engineer" rhetoric, you actually need all of those parts of the business, including quality, product assurance, project management etc to be working in harmony to deliver a safe quality product at schedules and costs that drive a market advantage.

Rgds

Nice post, and I agree. I have an engineering background as well. My point really was the balance between business and tech shifted far too much to one side of the ledger. Take a look at SpaceX, for example, competing against the Boeing space launch entry. How could that happen to a company with the size and experience of Boeing? I love Boeing, and I know they need to repair the balance sheet. I want to see them back leading the way in design and innovation.

surfdog75 wrote:

Nice post, and I agree. I have an engineering background as well. My point really was the balance between business and tech shifted far too much to one side of the ledger. Take a look at SpaceX, for example, competing against the Boeing space launch entry. How could that happen to a company with the size and experience of Boeing? I love Boeing, and I know they need to repair the balance sheet. I want to see them back leading the way in design and innovation.

It's a huge challenge: how can you get the best of all worlds: access to the huge assets an established corporation has, while also getting the risk taking and innovation of a start-up?

It's been a challenge going all the way back to WWII and Kelly Johnson founding the Skunk Works to avoid Lockheed's bureaucracy. Even though it was a relatively small company, it already had problems with innovation being stifled and they took a pretty interesting yet hard to reproduce approach.

This FT article about Cisco's "spin-in" approach goes through its pros and cons along with discussing the problem in general: https://www.ft.com/content/a81c934c-cb3 ... 9e8bfe60c0

I was able to see the article after clearing browser cookies.

Revelation wrote:

surfdog75 wrote:

Nice post, and I agree. I have an engineering background as well. My point really was the balance between business and tech shifted far too much to one side of the ledger. Take a look at SpaceX, for example, competing against the Boeing space launch entry. How could that happen to a company with the size and experience of Boeing? I love Boeing, and I know they need to repair the balance sheet. I want to see them back leading the way in design and innovation.

It's a huge challenge: how can you get the best of all worlds: access to the huge assets an established corporation has, while also getting the risk taking and innovation of a start-up?

It's been a challenge going all the way back to WWII and Kelly Johnson founding the Skunk Works to avoid Lockheed's bureaucracy. Even though it was a relatively small company, it already had problems with innovation being stifled and they took a pretty interesting yet hard to reproduce approach.

This FT article about Cisco's "spin-in" approach goes through its pros and cons along with discussing the problem in general: https://www.ft.com/content/a81c934c-cb3 ... 9e8bfe60c0

I was able to see the article after clearing browser cookies.

Thanks. I'll check the article. Not sure about the inner workings of BA but I like your "skunk works" idea for civil aviation. Here's your budget and you have full autonomy. See what you can do. Seems like we"ve been stuck in the same flight envelope forever. The costs for entry are so high though, unless Tesla creates an aviation division, progress probably won't follow the technology approach of buying a startup that looks promising. Innovation at this point is probably up to the big players.

surfdog75 wrote:

astuteman wrote:

[
Put Engineers in charge and you'll soon have no company.
I'm an engineer, (well, Manufacturing Engineer really) and currently fighting like hell to hold off specification creep being driven by Engineers on a new product, that has the potential to kill our ability to hit the cost and schedule targets our market dictates.

Engineers like to engineer for the hell of it.
That's why they do what they do.
But any of that Engineering HAS to add value to both the business and the customer.
That's a commercial and marketing aspect of running a commercial business that is fundamental to its success.

The reality is that, despite our "accountant" vs "Engineer" rhetoric, you actually need all of those parts of the business, including quality, product assurance, project management etc to be working in harmony to deliver a safe quality product at schedules and costs that drive a market advantage.

Rgds

Nice post, and I agree. I have an engineering background as well. My point really was the balance between business and tech shifted far too much to one side of the ledger. Take a look at SpaceX, for example, competing against the Boeing space launch entry. How could that happen to a company with the size and experience of Boeing? I love Boeing, and I know they need to repair the balance sheet. I want to see them back leading the way in design and innovation.

Nice post right back.
From the outside it appears that Boeing lost the focus on the balance, and shifted, as you say, to the leger.
Carried away either by their own success, or the exec bonuses...

Rgds

keesje wrote:

Compared to 757 / XLR:
lighter materials, lower maintenance costs
wider fuselage to facilitate higher capacity versions
AKH options
up to 280 passengers
86+ inch GTF's, engine choice
crew rest behind cockpit
quieter
bigger wing tanks, avoiding fuselage tanks
higher cabin pressure
wider aisle, seats
higher cruising speed
better early stage cruise performance

If they design the 757 replacement as a shared project with an eventually MAX replacement I could see even more benefits:

- Designed from the start for even more efficient production compared A320 (once ramped up).
- Designed from the start for new and future human-machine interface/automation developments/insights/regulations.
- One cockpit/ fuselage cross-section could cover A220-300 till A322 competition.
- Fresh design with reduced range for the smaller variant allows low enough weight for simple, non-folding high aspect ration wing within the 36m span limit.
- Slightly more lift from the nose.

If they do a circular MC-21 style circular cross-section (same circumference as A320) and will be able to push through a new lower container (if it fails it would be non-containerized just like the 737), the lower cabin floor would even further improve cabin space in both height and width (passenger shoulders/heads better positioned in relation to the fuselages widest point). They could gain 23 cm (9'') more headspace and 27,5 cm (11'') more width at seat level than the 737. The cabin space advantage compared to the A320 would become very significant and a key benefit both for the long range variant (much much wider seats and much roomier cabin) as well is for the short range variant (very wide aisles for fast turnaround times). In fact it could be the single most important thing that could provide a NSA a commercial edge against the A320 series with 80+ production rate efficiencies. Again all within the A320's circumference/wetted area.

viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1457171&start=250#p22634373

Taxi645 wrote:

keesje wrote:

Compared to 757 / XLR:
lighter materials, lower maintenance costs
wider fuselage to facilitate higher capacity versions
AKH options
up to 280 passengers
86+ inch GTF's, engine choice
crew rest behind cockpit
quieter
bigger wing tanks, avoiding fuselage tanks
higher cabin pressure
wider aisle, seats
higher cruising speed
better early stage cruise performance

If they design the 757 replacement as a shared project with an eventually MAX replacement I could see even more benefits:

- Designed from the start for even more efficient production compared A320 (once ramped up).
- Designed from the start for new and future human-machine interface/automation developments/insights/regulations.
- One cockpit/ fuselage cross-section could cover A220-300 till A322 competition.
- Fresh design with reduced range for the smaller variant allows low enough weight for simple, non-folding high aspect ration wing within the 36m span limit.
- Slightly more lift from the nose.

If they do a circular MC-21 style circular cross-section (same circumference as A320) and will be able to push through a new lower container (if it fails it would be non-containerized just like the 737), the lower cabin floor would even further improve cabin space in both height and width (passenger shoulders/heads better positioned in relation to the fuselages widest point). They could gain 23 cm (9'') more headspace and 27,5 cm (11'') more width at seat level than the 737. The cabin space advantage compared to the A320 would become very significant and a key benefit both for the long range variant (much much wider seats and much roomier cabin) as well is for the short range variant (very wide aisles for fast turnaround times). In fact it could be the single most important thing that could provide a NSA a commercial edge against the A320 series with 80+ production rate efficiencies. Again all within the A320's circumference/wetted area.

viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1457171&start=250#p22634373

Nice work, missed the link 4 months ago. Agree a common advanced, easy to produce and flexible fuselage would make sense. Wing/ wingbox/ engines etc seems hard to optimize for both 150 seats 6 flights a day and crossing the Atlantic with a good long haul product.

keesje wrote:

Taxi645 wrote:

keesje wrote:

Compared to 757 / XLR:
lighter materials, lower maintenance costs
wider fuselage to facilitate higher capacity versions
AKH options
up to 280 passengers
86+ inch GTF's, engine choice
crew rest behind cockpit
quieter
bigger wing tanks, avoiding fuselage tanks
higher cabin pressure
wider aisle, seats
higher cruising speed
better early stage cruise performance

If they design the 757 replacement as a shared project with an eventually MAX replacement I could see even more benefits:

- Designed from the start for even more efficient production compared A320 (once ramped up).
- Designed from the start for new and future human-machine interface/automation developments/insights/regulations.
- One cockpit/ fuselage cross-section could cover A220-300 till A322 competition.
- Fresh design with reduced range for the smaller variant allows low enough weight for simple, non-folding high aspect ration wing within the 36m span limit.
- Slightly more lift from the nose.

If they do a circular MC-21 style circular cross-section (same circumference as A320) and will be able to push through a new lower container (if it fails it would be non-containerized just like the 737), the lower cabin floor would even further improve cabin space in both height and width (passenger shoulders/heads better positioned in relation to the fuselages widest point). They could gain 23 cm (9'') more headspace and 27,5 cm (11'') more width at seat level than the 737. The cabin space advantage compared to the A320 would become very significant and a key benefit both for the long range variant (much much wider seats and much roomier cabin) as well is for the short range variant (very wide aisles for fast turnaround times). In fact it could be the single most important thing that could provide a NSA a commercial edge against the A320 series with 80+ production rate efficiencies. Again all within the A320's circumference/wetted area.

viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1457171&start=250#p22634373

Nice work, missed the link 4 months ago. Agree a common advanced, easy to produce and flexible fuselage would make sense. Wing/ wingbox/ engines etc seems hard to optimize for both 150 seats 6 flights a day and crossing the Atlantic with a good long haul product.

How beneficial is it to use the same fuselage? Especially when everything else needs to be different: wing, wing box, gears, tail section and engines. Maybe I missed something, but it doesn’t really sounds like an silver bullit when you need to change so much…

JonesNL wrote:

keesje wrote:

Taxi645 wrote:

If they design the 757 replacement as a shared project with an eventually MAX replacement I could see even more benefits:

- Designed from the start for even more efficient production compared A320 (once ramped up).
- Designed from the start for new and future human-machine interface/automation developments/insights/regulations.
- One cockpit/ fuselage cross-section could cover A220-300 till A322 competition.
- Fresh design with reduced range for the smaller variant allows low enough weight for simple, non-folding high aspect ration wing within the 36m span limit.
- Slightly more lift from the nose.

If they do a circular MC-21 style circular cross-section (same circumference as A320) and will be able to push through a new lower container (if it fails it would be non-containerized just like the 737), the lower cabin floor would even further improve cabin space in both height and width (passenger shoulders/heads better positioned in relation to the fuselages widest point). They could gain 23 cm (9'') more headspace and 27,5 cm (11'') more width at seat level than the 737. The cabin space advantage compared to the A320 would become very significant and a key benefit both for the long range variant (much much wider seats and much roomier cabin) as well is for the short range variant (very wide aisles for fast turnaround times). In fact it could be the single most important thing that could provide a NSA a commercial edge against the A320 series with 80+ production rate efficiencies. Again all within the A320's circumference/wetted area.

viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1457171&start=250#p22634373

Nice work, missed the link 4 months ago. Agree a common advanced, easy to produce and flexible fuselage would make sense. Wing/ wingbox/ engines etc seems hard to optimize for both 150 seats 6 flights a day and crossing the Atlantic with a good long haul product.

How beneficial is it to use the same fuselage? Especially when everything else needs to be different: wing, wing box, gears, tail section and engines. Maybe I missed something, but it doesn’t really sounds like an silver bullit when you need to change so much…

Economies of scale and customer catalogs. You can manufacture, pre stuff at larger scale, reducing costs. The cockpit, tail, systems, galleys, cargo systems, lavatories, pilots and the total cabin catalog can be standardized. Instead of having all that and its supply chains doubled.

Building aircraft is relative low rate production (1 a day is high), higher volumes make feasible more automation, efficiencies.


https://airinsight.com/luise-and-renate ... at-airbus/

For Boeing knowing they will use a NB / NSA fuselage for an NMA, would enormous reduce costs, strengthen the NMA business case.

You do not need the same fuselage diameter for that either. If planed for a robotic line can do varsious fuselage diameters without extra costs.

Exactly, you can have the same pilot training for different cross sections. Same with standardizing cargo systems and lavatory systems. Even seating system can be Standardized for different cross sections.

JonesNL wrote:

How beneficial is it to use the same fuselage? Especially when everything else needs to be different: wing, wing box, gears, tail section and engines. Maybe I missed something, but it doesn’t really sounds like an silver bullit when you need to change so much…

I would view it this way: Everything from MAX8 length up till around A322 length is most efficient 6-abreast anyway. The model below MAX8 length at around 170 max capacity it's probably a wash between 5-abreast and 6-abreast. You already have commonality with all the models above so 6-abreast would be fine. Again the A319NEO is not struggling because of it being stubby but because the frame has become so capable with efficiency improvements you can choose the next model up with little penalty. This one would get a range reset so the smallest model have a meaningful range advantage.

So basically while the advantages of a common fuselage may not be overwhelming, the disadvantages are practically non-existent. So it's a no-brainer. Perhaps a manufacturing expert could expand on how much manufacturing flexibility a single fuselage would provide. Being able to switch between the medium and short range variant based on market demand with limited added cost could be a significant advantage.

keesje wrote:

Taxi645 wrote:

keesje wrote:

Compared to 757 / XLR:
lighter materials, lower maintenance costs
wider fuselage to facilitate higher capacity versions
AKH options
up to 280 passengers
86+ inch GTF's, engine choice
crew rest behind cockpit
quieter
bigger wing tanks, avoiding fuselage tanks
higher cabin pressure
wider aisle, seats
higher cruising speed
better early stage cruise performance

If they design the 757 replacement as a shared project with an eventually MAX replacement I could see even more benefits:

- Designed from the start for even more efficient production compared A320 (once ramped up).
- Designed from the start for new and future human-machine interface/automation developments/insights/regulations.
- One cockpit/ fuselage cross-section could cover A220-300 till A322 competition.
- Fresh design with reduced range for the smaller variant allows low enough weight for simple, non-folding high aspect ration wing within the 36m span limit.
- Slightly more lift from the nose.

If they do a circular MC-21 style circular cross-section (same circumference as A320) and will be able to push through a new lower container (if it fails it would be non-containerized just like the 737), the lower cabin floor would even further improve cabin space in both height and width (passenger shoulders/heads better positioned in relation to the fuselages widest point). They could gain 23 cm (9'') more headspace and 27,5 cm (11'') more width at seat level than the 737. The cabin space advantage compared to the A320 would become very significant and a key benefit both for the long range variant (much much wider seats and much roomier cabin) as well is for the short range variant (very wide aisles for fast turnaround times). In fact it could be the single most important thing that could provide a NSA a commercial edge against the A320 series with 80+ production rate efficiencies. Again all within the A320's circumference/wetted area.

viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1457171&start=250#p22634373

Nice work, missed the link 4 months ago. Agree a common advanced, easy to produce and flexible fuselage would make sense. Wing/ wingbox/ engines etc seems hard to optimize for both 150 seats 6 flights a day and crossing the Atlantic with a good long haul product.

I wonder if Boeing could risk it by for a new lower container standard and going slightly narrower than the 154'' (391cm) cabin width you propose. If we list the cabin width's:

737: 353cm
A320: 370cm
MC-21: 381cm
Keesje: 391cm

By going for a new lower container and thus lowering the cabin floor on a circular MC-21 sized fuselage (A320 circumference), the cabin experience in both height and width (especially at head height) would come close to the 391cm you propose without the associated weight and wetted area. As such it would be better able to fulfil the role of both the 757 replacement as well an eventual MAX replacement/ A220-500 competitor. Making it too large would probably make it start to struggle in the smaller sizes.

viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1457171&p=22653969#p22653691

Actually, thinking a bit more on it, a new container could be a key to success for a new Boeing 3x3 cross section. If Boeing would be able to enforce a new container, they might be able to do quite the coop. Their chances of succeeding at such would be an order of magnitude bigger with a single 3x3 cross section compared to having different fuselage cross sections for NMA and NSA. If they were able to launch a lower and wider container than the LD3-43, that would open up a whole avenue of opportunity for them against the A320 (and less important the MC-21 as well). Possibly enough advantage to be able to survive through the ramp up face against a 60+/month A320 rate.

If they would be able to enforce a lower and wider container, combined with a circular MC-21 sized 3x3 cross section, they would be able to lower the floor and thus hugely increase the available headspace. That could mean that, based on the 4.06 m MC-21 diameter (again identical circumference/wetted area as the A320) the width of the cabin at head height could be about 13 cm / 5'' wider than the A320 with practically the same wetted area. That means that you can do 74 cm / 29” aisle with 737/787 seat width (at seat height it would even be about 15 cm / 6’’ wider). On top of that one would make better use of the cargo part of the cross section with less dead space.

Taxi645 wrote:

keesje wrote:

Taxi645 wrote:

If they design the 757 replacement as a shared project with an eventually MAX replacement I could see even more benefits:

- Designed from the start for even more efficient production compared A320 (once ramped up).
- Designed from the start for new and future human-machine interface/automation developments/insights/regulations.
- One cockpit/ fuselage cross-section could cover A220-300 till A322 competition.
- Fresh design with reduced range for the smaller variant allows low enough weight for simple, non-folding high aspect ration wing within the 36m span limit.
- Slightly more lift from the nose.

If they do a circular MC-21 style circular cross-section (same circumference as A320) and will be able to push through a new lower container (if it fails it would be non-containerized just like the 737), the lower cabin floor would even further improve cabin space in both height and width (passenger shoulders/heads better positioned in relation to the fuselages widest point). They could gain 23 cm (9'') more headspace and 27,5 cm (11'') more width at seat level than the 737. The cabin space advantage compared to the A320 would become very significant and a key benefit both for the long range variant (much much wider seats and much roomier cabin) as well is for the short range variant (very wide aisles for fast turnaround times). In fact it could be the single most important thing that could provide a NSA a commercial edge against the A320 series with 80+ production rate efficiencies. Again all within the A320's circumference/wetted area.

viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1457171&start=250#p22634373

Nice work, missed the link 4 months ago. Agree a common advanced, easy to produce and flexible fuselage would make sense. Wing/ wingbox/ engines etc seems hard to optimize for both 150 seats 6 flights a day and crossing the Atlantic with a good long haul product.

I wonder if Boeing could risk it by for a new lower container standard and going slightly narrower than the 154'' (391cm) cabin width you propose. If we list the cabin width's:

737: 353cm
A320: 370cm
MC-21: 381cm
Keesje: 391cm

By going for a new lower container and thus lowering the cabin floor on a circular MC-21 sized fuselage (A320 circumference), the cabin experience in both height and width (especially at head height) would come close to the 391cm you propose without the associated weight and wetted area. As such it would be better able to fulfil the role of both the 757 replacement as well an eventual MAX replacement/ A220-500 competitor. Making it too large would probably make it start to struggle in the smaller sizes.

viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1457171&p=22653969#p22653691

Actually, thinking a bit more on it, a new container could be a key to success for a new Boeing 3x3 cross section. If Boeing would be able to enforce a new container, they might be able to do quite the coop. Their chances of succeeding at such would be an order of magnitude bigger with a single 3x3 cross section compared to having different fuselage cross sections for NMA and NSA. If they were able to launch a lower and wider container than the LD3-43, that would open up a whole avenue of opportunity for them against the A320 (and less important the MC-21 as well). Possibly enough advantage to be able to survive through the ramp up face against a 60+/month A320 rate.

If they would be able to enforce a lower and wider container, combined with a circular MC-21 sized 3x3 cross section, they would be able to lower the floor and thus hugely increase the available headspace. That could mean that, based on the 4.06 m MC-21 diameter (again identical circumference/wetted area as the A320) the width of the cabin at head height could be about 13 cm / 5'' wider than the A320 with practically the same wetted area. That means that you can do 74 cm / 29” aisle with 737/787 seat width (at seat height it would even be about 15 cm / 6’’ wider). On top of that one would make better use of the cargo part of the cross section with less dead space.

I think going for an entirely new slightly bigger container, fitting a new fuselage would face a lot of resistance. The industry adopted the LD3-45 / AKH as industry standard long ago. The MC-21 and C919 have them.

Theoretically for bigger aircraft a simple robust convertible container could be used.


keesje

keesje wrote:

Taxi645 wrote:

keesje wrote:

Nice work, missed the link 4 months ago. Agree a common advanced, easy to produce and flexible fuselage would make sense. Wing/ wingbox/ engines etc seems hard to optimize for both 150 seats 6 flights a day and crossing the Atlantic with a good long haul product.

I wonder if Boeing could risk it by for a new lower container standard and going slightly narrower than the 154'' (391cm) cabin width you propose. If we list the cabin width's:

737: 353cm
A320: 370cm
MC-21: 381cm
Keesje: 391cm

By going for a new lower container and thus lowering the cabin floor on a circular MC-21 sized fuselage (A320 circumference), the cabin experience in both height and width (especially at head height) would come close to the 391cm you propose without the associated weight and wetted area. As such it would be better able to fulfil the role of both the 757 replacement as well an eventual MAX replacement/ A220-500 competitor. Making it too large would probably make it start to struggle in the smaller sizes.

viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1457171&p=22653969#p22653691

Actually, thinking a bit more on it, a new container could be a key to success for a new Boeing 3x3 cross section. If Boeing would be able to enforce a new container, they might be able to do quite the coop. Their chances of succeeding at such would be an order of magnitude bigger with a single 3x3 cross section compared to having different fuselage cross sections for NMA and NSA. If they were able to launch a lower and wider container than the LD3-43, that would open up a whole avenue of opportunity for them against the A320 (and less important the MC-21 as well). Possibly enough advantage to be able to survive through the ramp up face against a 60+/month A320 rate.

If they would be able to enforce a lower and wider container, combined with a circular MC-21 sized 3x3 cross section, they would be able to lower the floor and thus hugely increase the available headspace. That could mean that, based on the 4.06 m MC-21 diameter (again identical circumference/wetted area as the A320) the width of the cabin at head height could be about 13 cm / 5'' wider than the A320 with practically the same wetted area. That means that you can do 74 cm / 29” aisle with 737/787 seat width (at seat height it would even be about 15 cm / 6’’ wider). On top of that one would make better use of the cargo part of the cross section with less dead space.

I think going for an entirely new slightly bigger container, fitting a new fuselage would face a lot of resistance. The industry adopted the LD3-45 / AKH as industry standard long ago. The MC-21 and C919 have them.

Yes, indeed it would face a lot of resistance, but enough resistance to not reap the benefits of the lower container on cabin dimensions in a circular fuselage? Giving them a key advantage in both medium haul cabin space experience/seat width as well as short haul turn around times through the wide aisle. The LD3-45 was designed for the A320 and Airbus was much smaller then than Boeing is now. If they don't succeed at pushing through this lower container format, there is always the option of bulk-loading like the thousands of 737 in operation. It could be worth the gamble, especially if it would be one of the few key benefits a NBA could have over an A320 with very low R&D overhead and pumping out 80+ a month. Is just a more efficient use of available space on a 6-abreast, perhaps the next Airbus 6-abreast would follow suit.

Jon Ostrower: There's always an aviation angle to every story.
A.net: There's always a container angle to every aviation story.

Whatever Boeing does next may be impacted by a 'brain drain', according to an article on Bloomberg:

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features ... zon-spacex

Title: Boeing’s Turnaround After 737 Max Crisis Threatened by Talent Exodus
Sub-title: After calamity and years of restrained ambition under cost-obsessed executives, the company that was once a factory of dreams is losing workers to SpaceX and Amazon.

Loaded for free for me after clearing out cookies, your results may vary.

The article suggests talent is going to SpaceX for the adventure / glory and to Amazon for the cash.

Also suggests that many are double-dipping i.e. taking Boeing's severance offer then signing on with their new employer.

As for "Boeing CEO's Comments" we have:

Still, Calhoun has said Boeing didn’t skimp on the projects that are most vital to its future. “We know we’re getting more efficient, and we think we can sustain all the important investments that I think investors are counting on from the Boeing Company,” he said last month.

This is the same person who just said he'd do 779 all over again given the chance (ref: our 777x sales thread) so I don't know how much I'd value what he has to say. Basically he too is someone who is there because he got a better offer.

The talent exodus suggests to me that whatever they do next will be more expensive. They've done the classic corporate US move of dumping staff during lean times with no plan to deal with what happens upon recovery. Unlike earlier economic dips, big competitors such as Amazon and SpaceX have plenty of money and they are spending it on talent as it becomes available, the talent isn't just waiting around for Boeing's next big project. Whenever Boeing tries to staff up its next big project they will start at higher wage levels and be less able to lure back experienced former workers as contractors. IMO it makes scenarios like MCAS more likely, where someone writes code with absolutely no consideration of basics such as sanitizing the inputs or considers multiple activation due to nonsensical inputs and no one catches the error while making sure they have someone else to blame if/when the spam hits the fan.

Revelation wrote:

Whatever Boeing does next may be impacted by a 'brain drain', according to an article on Bloomberg:

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features ... zon-spacex

Title: Boeing’s Turnaround After 737 Max Crisis Threatened by Talent Exodus
Sub-title: After calamity and years of restrained ambition under cost-obsessed executives, the company that was once a factory of dreams is losing workers to SpaceX and Amazon.

Loaded for free for me after clearing out cookies, your results may vary.

The article suggests talent is going to SpaceX for the adventure / glory and to Amazon for the cash.

Also suggests that many are double-dipping i.e. taking Boeing's severance offer then signing on with their new employer.

As for "Boeing CEO's Comments" we have:

Still, Calhoun has said Boeing didn’t skimp on the projects that are most vital to its future. “We know we’re getting more efficient, and we think we can sustain all the important investments that I think investors are counting on from the Boeing Company,” he said last month.

This is the same person who just said he'd do 779 all over again given the chance (ref: our 777x sales thread) so I don't know how much I'd value what he has to say. Basically he too is someone who is there because he got a better offer.

The talent exodus suggests to me that whatever they do next will be more expensive. They've done the classic corporate US move of dumping staff during lean times with no plan to deal with what happens upon recovery. Unlike earlier economic dips, big competitors such as Amazon and SpaceX have plenty of money and they are spending it on talent as it becomes available, the talent isn't just waiting around for Boeing's next big project. Whenever Boeing tries to staff up its next big project they will start at higher wage levels and be less able to lure back experienced former workers as contractors. IMO it makes scenarios like MCAS more likely, where someone writes code with absolutely no consideration of basics such as sanitizing the inputs or considers multiple activation due to nonsensical inputs and no one catches the error while making sure they have someone else to blame if/when the spam hits the fan.

Thanks for the link and info, but not sure this is news as Bloomberg tries to bring it. Old tech losing staff to new tech is an trend of the last 15 years, and the double whammy crisis just accelerated it. It will be also much harder to lure talent as Boeing is not the engineering excellence brand it used to be. The war on talent with neighbours is fierce...

Why doesn't Boeing launch a 767X?