You claimed severe icing exceeded the limits of the aircraft. Nothing in the final accident report or anywhere else indicated any such thing.
The report is addressed to an audience that is educated in the field (like a patent), it does not need to specify everything to the minute detail as those who work in the field understand the art. There is a difference between "Nothing in the final accident report" and not understanding what is included in the report. For example where they state cumulonimbus clusters, that means the presence of moderate or severe turbulence and icing. That is stated on every SIGWX chart.
The report says
"There were powerful cumulonimbus clusters on the route of AF 447. Some of them could have been the centre of some notable turbulence.
An additional meteorological analysis showed the presence of strong condensation towards AF 447’s flight level, probably associated with convection phenomena."
Per the A330 TCDS, the A330-200 certification basis is JAR 25 Change 13 effective on October 5, 1989 and JAR 25.1419 Flight in icing condition. It was certified before CS 25.1420 came into effect in 2014 (for that matter the accident also occurred in 2009 before that came into effect). What that means is the known icing certification is not the same for every aircraft. it depends on when it was certified.
Per AC No: 91-74B "How Certification Relates to Operating Rules. Operation of an aircraft in known icing is based upon when an aircraft was built and how that aircraft was certified during manufacture. Manufacturers specify how the installed equipment in that aircraft is to be operated in the POH and AFM within certain conditions of limitation."
Per AC No: 91-74B "Severe Icing. The rate of ice accumulation is such that ice protection systems fail to remove the accumulation of ice and ice accumulates in locations not normally prone to icing, such as areas aft of protected surfaces and any other areas identified by the manufacturer. A representative accretion rate for reference purposes is more than 3 inches (7.5 cm) per hour on the unprotected part of the outer wing. By regulation, immediate exit is required.
What are the protected systems in ATA 30 (Ice and Rain Protection) listed in the A330 FCOM ?
I will give you one last hint, did the report state ANY system that was unable to "remove the accumulation of ice" ?
If yes, that by definition is severe icing ("The rate of ice accumulation is such that ice protection systems fail to remove the accumulation of ice").
Also, documents provided indicated other aircraft flew at roughly the same flight path and heading and did not experience severe icing.
The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. This is that the BEA reported regarding other aircraft
"Flight IB6024 (Airbus A340) passed at the level of the ORARO waypoint at FL370 approximately twelve minutes after AF447."
"These conditions were particularly severe 70 NM to 30 NM before the TASIL waypoint. They moved away from the route by about 30 NM to the east to avoid cumulonimbus formations with a significant vertical development, and then returned to the airway in clear skies close to the TASIL waypoint."
"Flight AF459 (Airbus A330-203) passed at the level of the ORARO waypoint approximately 37 minutes after AF447."
"After flying through a turbulent zone in the head of a cumulus congestus formation at the level of NATAL, without having detected this zone on the radar, the captain selected gain in MAX mode. At about 2 h 00, he observed a first echo that differed significantly depending on whether the radar’s gain was in CAL or MAX mode. The TILT was set between -1° and 1.5°. He decided to take evasive action to the west, which resulted in a deviation of 20 NM to the left of the route. During this evasive action, a vast squall line with an estimated length of 150 NM appeared on the screen, which was set to a scale of 160 NM. The echoes were yellow and red when the radar was set with gain on the MAX position and green and yellow when the gain was on the CAL position"
"Flight LH507 (B747-400) preceded flight AF447 by about twenty minutes at FL350.
The crew reported that it flew at the upper limit of the cloud layer and then in the clouds in the region of ORARO. In this zone they saw green echoes on the radar on their path, which they avoided by changing their route by about ten nautical miles to the west. While flying through this zone, which took about fifteen minutes, they felt moderate turbulence and did not observe any lightning. They lowered their speed to the speed recommended in turbulent zones. They saw bright St Elmo’s fire on the windshield on the left-hand side."
None of the other aircraft flew the same track, same level, at the same time, a conclusion based on the observation of other crew near the time of the accident is not evidence of what happened to AF447 at the time of the accident.
If you can point to where in the final accident report it indicated severe icing of the entire aircraft exceeded the limits of the aircraft and broght it down I will cede the point.
I have given you enough hints above to find it, if you are unable to understand where that is located in the report please make a statement to that effect. Like I said above there is a significant difference between not in the report, and not understanding what the report is saying.
Also I guess by that sentence you think severe icing only means significant ice accumulation where the weight of the ice is so significate it exceeds the amount of lift being produced, that is not the definition of severe icing, hence I provided it above from AC No: 91-74B.
The final BEA report is really immaterial for any court proceedings, anything the BEA publishes cannot be used in a criminal court. The court will hear its own evidence, it will have its own expert witnesses, the court will make their own independent decision.
This sort of statement appears in the front of any accident report
"The BEA is the French Civil Aviation Safety Investigation Authority. Its investigations are conducted with the sole objective of improving aviation safety and are not intended to apportion blame or liability.
BEA investigations are independent, separate and conducted without prejudice to any judicial or administrative action that may be taken to determine blame or liability."
“Don't be a show-off. Never be too proud to turn back. There are old pilots and bold pilots, but no old, bold pilots.” E. Hamilton Lee, 1949