WayexTDI wrote:

afgeneral wrote:

WayexTDI wrote:

As of right now, from what I can find, aircraft manufacturers are only banned from owning an airline, not an engine manufacturer. So, legally, Boeing could buy GE.

antitrust is different from "legal"

antitrust authorities don't want airframe manufacturers owning engine makers; they don't want a situation where Boeing owns GE and GE does not want to supply engines to Airbus or gets priority of some kind

apart from that Boing could be manufacturing everything

There are 4 main engine manufacturers (GE, PW, RR & CFM); should Airbus snatch one and Boeing another, there would still be 2 left to supply both. Meaning, each airframer could have access to 3 engine manufacturers at least; not sure where the antitrust issue is.

4-to-3 deals are routinely challenged by antitrust authorities, and that setup would be especially likely to be challenged because that structure would be highly likely to reduce innovation and raise prices to any non-B/A competitor, such as RJ manufacturers or anyone looking to break into the mainline market besides B or A. Additionally, the second of those deals - whichever of A or B bought an engine manufacturer second - would not be a 4 to 3 from the agency's perspective. It'd be a 3 to 2 in terms of independent suppliers, and functionally less: CFM is a JV and GE is one of its parents. And that is a virtual guarantee of them suing to block your deal in an industry like this.

I don't even understand why any authority would care how many engine manufacturers would be available to B or A: they'd literally have an in-house engine division. And by "I don't understand why," I mean "you are viewing this all wrong; that's not how antitrust regulators view vertical foreclosure deals." Of freaking course the buyer in the merger has sufficient options post-transaction: that's why it's doing the deal!

WayexTDI wrote:

There are 4 main engine manufacturers (GE, PW, RR & CFM); should Airbus snatch one and Boeing another, there would still be 2 left to supply both. Meaning, each airframer could have access to 3 engine manufacturers at least; not sure where the antitrust issue is.

When we work on mergers that result in four-to-three major players, the agencies (the DoJ and the FTC) tend to play a very hard ball and it takes a lot of work by teams of lawyers and economists to justify such integrations. The newly released vertical merger guidelines are on the chopping block by the FTC. Vertical foreclosure is a very big deal and things are not simple at all.

BEG2IAH wrote:

WayexTDI wrote:

There are 4 main engine manufacturers (GE, PW, RR & CFM); should Airbus snatch one and Boeing another, there would still be 2 left to supply both. Meaning, each airframer could have access to 3 engine manufacturers at least; not sure where the antitrust issue is.

When we work on mergers that result in four-to-three major players, the agencies (the DoJ and the FTC) tend to play a very hard ball and it takes a lot of work by teams of lawyers and economists to justify such integrations. The newly released vertical merger guidelines are on the chopping block by the FTC. Vertical foreclosure is a very big deal and things are not simple at all.

Sounds like you and I likely know some of the same people. Good to see someone else from this not-very-big world on here.

IADCA wrote:

Sounds like you and I likely know some of the same people. Good to see someone else from this not-very-big world on here.

I thought the same when I read your words of wisdom.

Revelation wrote:

Scotron12 wrote:

https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/news/boeings-delivery-of-new-787-dreamliners-may-not-be-delivered-till-late-oct-wsj/ar-AAO7Xra?ocid=BingNewsSearch

Targeting late October. FAA rejected Boeing proposal of 3 aircraft represntative of all 787s parked.

Interesting, but I'm not seeing where your linked article details Boeing's proposals in the way you are suggesting.

What it does say is troubling, though:

In August, Boeing met with the FAA and requested the agency approve an inspection method that would speed deliveries with targeted checks rather than nose-to-tail teardowns.

However, the regulators flagged internal company disagreements over the aircraft sample size and repeated that Boeing's employee group, which acts as an in-house regulator, needs to concur with the company's proposals.

So it seems Boeing's designated representatives (i.e. "Boeing employee group") do not concur with the company's proposals (presumably management driven).

It seems brazen for the management side to go ahead and submit a proposal without concurrence of the in-house group.

I have to admit Boeing is not covering itself in glory these days.

I see this as a good sign, because the Boeing Employee Group might represent a change within the company. Looking at this from the outside, it can be hard to tell where the problem really lies, but it seems to me whoever approved this proposal to FAA are the problem.

Revelation wrote:

Seems to me that there has not been a "come to Jesus" moment within Boeing, and they're still focusing more on finding shortcuts rather than doing the work. They don't seem to have internalized that the "four second rule" shortcut that led them to avoid doing a full Safety Analysis is likely the reason that the MCAS snafu got out the doors. Instead they seem to be looking for even more shortcuts such as only sampling a small number of 787s to declare the rest of them safe.

It appears that Management is still clearly focused on results (delivering planes ASAP) and not process (delivering planes correctly).

Revelation wrote:

JetBuddy wrote:

I see this as a good sign, because the Boeing Employee Group might represent a change within the company. Looking at this from the outside, it can be hard to tell where the problem really lies, but it seems to me whoever approved this proposal to FAA are the problem.

Personally, I would have thought the change would have happened a long time ago, yet we still see evidence that employees have to fight management to get them to do the right thing.

Remember this from less than a month ago?

The Federal Aviation Administration is investigating whether Boeing employees who are supposed to flag safety problems with aircraft are being pressured by the company not to raise concerns, according to a letter the agency sent to the aircraft maker.
The FAA depends on Boeing (BA) employees to carry out the agency's safety oversight functions during the design and construction of aircraft, a process known as "delegated authority."
The letter from the FAA to Boeing said the employees designated with those oversight responsibilities must have "sufficient authority to perform the authorized functions" without inference from the company. But it said a survey the agency conducted with some of those Boeing employees found "35% of people voicing concerns and sharing experiences that indicate the environment does not support independence."
"Boeing's company culture appears to hamper members of the [safety oversight] unit from communicating openly with the FAA," said the letter from the agency. The letter was first reported by the Wall Street Journal on Tuesday.

Ref: https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/24/business ... index.html

Seems to me that there has not been a "come to Jesus" moment within Boeing, and they're still focusing more on finding shortcuts rather than doing the work. They don't seem to have internalized that the "four second rule" shortcut that led them to avoid doing a full Safety Analysis is likely the reason that the MCAS snafu got out the doors. Instead they seem to be looking for even more shortcuts such as only sampling a small number of 787s to declare the rest of them safe.

Good catch on the last couple of articles. Quite a concerning revelation, pun intended. What I really don’t understand is that they are not internally aligned towards a outside party. It’s business one o one to at least tell a consistent story to the outside world, especially when its a regulator. I just can’t imagine a management team that is so glib that they don’t understand this concept…

Revelation wrote:

2175301 wrote:

Boeing is going through a culture change right now. Those take time.

I wish I was more convinced that a change was happening. Here we have the suggestion that Boeing management pushed for a solution not supported by its employees, presumably the FAA designated representatives. We had similar suggestions on 777X where Boeing was pushing to start 777X flight testing knowing it had not delivered key documents to FAA that were needed to do a readiness review. It seems Boeing can't/won't figure out how to do things the right way, even after the MCAS debacle should have made it clear what the cost of not getting things the right way was. It seems they expect to be given the benefit of the doubt, when it's clear they haven't earned such a benefit. They should be prepared for their work to be heavily scrutinized, yet it seems they are not and instead just hope to wear FAA down. So far it isn't working.

The toughest part of any culture change is always getting all levels of Management on board. Employees tend to quickly follow once Management is aligned properly. It seems Management is having a hard time coming to grips with this. They will get there.

Unfortunately, the FAA does not seem to have the power - or the boldness - as what the Nuclear Regulatory Agency (NRC) has and does. Here is a story I was told by a person who worked at a US Nuclear Plant that had a really major issue in the past (decades ago); to the point that the NRC shut the plant down (like the FAA grounding an Airplane Model). I will note that I have seen the early stages of this process play out many times.

Nuclear Power Plant is shut down over major issue involving nuclear safety and as the extent of the issue is discovered and the causes. 1st the Plant Manager resigns; to be replaced by someone who says that they will not make the same mistake. The NRC says: Not Enough as the problem goes higher. The Company Chief Nuclear Officer resigns... The NRC Says: Not Enough as the problem goes higher. The CEO of the Power Company resigns. The NRC says: Not Enough as the problem goes higher. The entire Board of Directors resigns as the Company will go bankrupt without being able to operate that Nuclear Power Plant (will hold positions until replaced). NRC says we want to meet with the new Board and CEO before authorizing restart.

NRC meets with new Board of Directors, CEO, Chief Nuclear Officer, and Plant Manager and tells them what their expectations are... and that it likely that the Company will cease to exist if their are any more major issues like what happened. Note that as per the regulations the Primary Purpose of the Management and Staff of a Nuclear Facility is: "To Protect The Health And Safety Of The Public." It's nice if you can make a profit while doing so; but the NRC will never accept that generating electricity, producing products, and profit is a reason to not protect the health and safety of the public.

The ex employee of that Nuclear Power plant told me that you would not believe how fast the Corporate Culture changed, especially after the Board of Directors was changed. and how a really good Safety Culture was at that plant.

I've personally seen 3 Plant Managers, 1 Site Vice President, and 1 Chief Nuclear Officer resign due to much less serious issues than what that plant had. It comes with those jobs that your out the door if there is a significant issue involving Nuclear or Plant Safety.

I'm not sure why the FAA does not have similar authority. So many of the base structure and regulations are actually the same between the FAA and NRC (its like they copy each other).

Have a great day,

Stitch wrote:

Revelation wrote:

Seems to me that there has not been a "come to Jesus" moment within Boeing, and they're still focusing more on finding shortcuts rather than doing the work. They don't seem to have internalized that the "four second rule" shortcut that led them to avoid doing a full Safety Analysis is likely the reason that the MCAS snafu got out the doors. Instead they seem to be looking for even more shortcuts such as only sampling a small number of 787s to declare the rest of them safe.

It appears that Management is still clearly focused on results (delivering planes ASAP) and not process (delivering planes correctly).

Could start by using customers that undertake meticulous pre-delivery checks, to set the bar, with financial penalties for every defect 'discovered' by customers, and rewards for Boeing QA staff identifying issues.

In contrast, some customers have contributed to the malaise by accepting new aircraft based on what the paperwork states, rather than physical and flight inspections.

Could QR be contracted to run Boeing QA? Or EK-style, who do a great job of on line QA, reducing (but not eliminating) the need for QR style ready for delivery inspections?

2175301 wrote:

Revelation wrote:

2175301 wrote:

Boeing is going through a culture change right now. Those take time.

I wish I was more convinced that a change was happening. Here we have the suggestion that Boeing management pushed for a solution not supported by its employees, presumably the FAA designated representatives. We had similar suggestions on 777X where Boeing was pushing to start 777X flight testing knowing it had not delivered key documents to FAA that were needed to do a readiness review. It seems Boeing can't/won't figure out how to do things the right way, even after the MCAS debacle should have made it clear what the cost of not getting things the right way was. It seems they expect to be given the benefit of the doubt, when it's clear they haven't earned such a benefit. They should be prepared for their work to be heavily scrutinized, yet it seems they are not and instead just hope to wear FAA down. So far it isn't working.

The toughest part of any culture change is always getting all levels of Management on board. Employees tend to quickly follow once Management is aligned properly. It seems Management is having a hard time coming to grips with this. They will get there.

Unfortunately, the FAA does not seem to have the power - or the boldness - as what the Nuclear Regulatory Agency (NRC) has and does. Here is a story I was told by a person who worked at a US Nuclear Plant that had a really major issue in the past (decades ago); to the point that the NRC shut the plant down (like the FAA grounding an Airplane Model). I will note that I have seen the early stages of this process play out many times.

Nuclear Power Plant is shut down over major issue involving nuclear safety and as the extent of the issue is discovered and the causes. 1st the Plant Manager resigns; to be replaced by someone who says that they will not make the same mistake. The NRC says: Not Enough as the problem goes higher. The Company Chief Nuclear Officer resigns... The NRC Says: Not Enough as the problem goes higher. The CEO of the Power Company resigns. The NRC says: Not Enough as the problem goes higher. The entire Board of Directors resigns as the Company will go bankrupt without being able to operate that Nuclear Power Plant (will hold positions until replaced). NRC says we want to meet with the new Board and CEO before authorizing restart.

NRC meets with new Board of Directors, CEO, Chief Nuclear Officer, and Plant Manager and tells them what their expectations are... and that it likely that the Company will cease to exist if their are any more major issues like what happened. Note that as per the regulations the Primary Purpose of the Management and Staff of a Nuclear Facility is: "To Protect The Health And Safety Of The Public." It's nice if you can make a profit while doing so; but the NRC will never accept that generating electricity, producing products, and profit is a reason to not protect the health and safety of the public.

The ex employee of that Nuclear Power plant told me that you would not believe how fast the Corporate Culture changed, especially after the Board of Directors was changed. and how a really good Safety Culture was at that plant.

I've personally seen 3 Plant Managers, 1 Site Vice President, and 1 Chief Nuclear Officer resign due to much less serious issues than what that plant had. It comes with those jobs that your out the door if there is a significant issue involving Nuclear or Plant Safety.

I'm not sure why the FAA does not have similar authority. So many of the base structure and regulations are actually the same between the FAA and NRC (its like they copy each other).

Have a great day,

Ironically, the change of entire management structure would have probably prevented the dragging discussions with the 787 and 777x…

I don't have a subscription but the Seattle Times headline said deliveries are delayed until "late October".

smartplane wrote:

Stitch wrote:

Revelation wrote:

Seems to me that there has not been a "come to Jesus" moment within Boeing, and they're still focusing more on finding shortcuts rather than doing the work. They don't seem to have internalized that the "four second rule" shortcut that led them to avoid doing a full Safety Analysis is likely the reason that the MCAS snafu got out the doors. Instead they seem to be looking for even more shortcuts such as only sampling a small number of 787s to declare the rest of them safe.

It appears that Management is still clearly focused on results (delivering planes ASAP) and not process (delivering planes correctly).

Could start by using customers that undertake meticulous pre-delivery checks, to set the bar, with financial penalties for every defect 'discovered' by customers, and rewards for Boeing QA staff identifying issues.

In contrast, some customers have contributed to the malaise by accepting new aircraft based on what the paperwork states, rather than physical and flight inspections.

Could QR be contracted to run Boeing QA? Or EK-style, who do a great job of on line QA, reducing (but not eliminating) the need for QR style ready for delivery inspections?

You don't really want to give customers authority to go into bullshit mode for a hefty reward.
Personal and corporate integrity is part of the deal in such situations. There needs to be a balance between strong authority being able and willing to take drastic measures and same authority understanding of important things vs bullshit.
FAA may have tons of authority, but little common sense in using that. At least that was demonstrated over years. QR will be willing to find microscratches in paint and carpet discoloration. None of them seem to be capable of analyzing engineering, and more so - doing so honestly and without bias or prejudice.

At a meeting on August 2, between QA at Boeing and the FAA, Boeing told the FAA that 3 787s of the 106 undelivered, were REPRESENTATIVE of how the entire batch were produced.

https://www.marketwatch.com/story/deliv ... 1630884959

Scotron12 wrote:

At a meeting on August 2, between QA at Boeing and the FAA, Boeing told the FAA that 3 787s of the 106 undelivered, were REPRESENTATIVE of how the entire batch were produced.

https://www.marketwatch.com/story/deliv ... 1630884959

And then there's the Boeing employee, who has called BS on that statement, as one can read in the linked story.

Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk

oschkosch wrote:

Scotron12 wrote:

At a meeting on August 2, between QA at Boeing and the FAA, Boeing told the FAA that 3 787s of the 106 undelivered, were REPRESENTATIVE of how the entire batch were produced.

https://www.marketwatch.com/story/deliv ... 1630884959

And then there's the Boeing employee, who has called BS on that statement, as one can read in the linked story.

Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk

Never heard of him/her... BACs management needs a fundamental change (the BOD might need 1*100 too...)
Maybe our whole system has a need for that...

Francoflier wrote:

I'd note that the current troubles with the 787 do not stem from outsourcing or subcontracting this time, but from assembly... The one thing that Boeing actually does itself.

To me, the root of all this mess is the SC plant and its ostensible goal to cut costs, corners and bypass unions. It has been a source of trouble from the very beginning, as illustrated by multiple quality complaints from customers since the early days.

Plenty of problems with 737, 767 tanker, and Starliner CST-100. Endemic through the company, not just a S.C. problem.

2175301 wrote:

Revelation wrote:

2175301 wrote:

Boeing is going through a culture change right now. Those take time.

I wish I was more convinced that a change was happening. Here we have the suggestion that Boeing management pushed for a solution not supported by its employees, presumably the FAA designated representatives. We had similar suggestions on 777X where Boeing was pushing to start 777X flight testing knowing it had not delivered key documents to FAA that were needed to do a readiness review. It seems Boeing can't/won't figure out how to do things the right way, even after the MCAS debacle should have made it clear what the cost of not getting things the right way was. It seems they expect to be given the benefit of the doubt, when it's clear they haven't earned such a benefit. They should be prepared for their work to be heavily scrutinized, yet it seems they are not and instead just hope to wear FAA down. So far it isn't working.

The toughest part of any culture change is always getting all levels of Management on board. Employees tend to quickly follow once Management is aligned properly. It seems Management is having a hard time coming to grips with this. They will get there.

The funny thing is that, when Management decide of a culture change, lower-level Employees have no choice but to agree to those changes; now, try to make Management change, that's another story since a lot believe they cannot be wrong.

2175301 wrote:

I'm not sure why the FAA does not have similar authority. So many of the base structure and regulations are actually the same between the FAA and NRC (its like they copy each other).

Because the FAA has two objectives: the first is safety and the second is promoting US commercial aviation.

The NRC is only focused on safety. If they were equally focused on promoting the construction of US nuclear powerplants worldwide, they might not be so stringent on how those plants are operated.

WayexTDI wrote:

The funny thing is that, when Management decide of a culture change, lower-level Employees have no choice but to agree to those changes; now, try to make Management change, that's another story since a lot believe they cannot be wrong.

The major stockholders (investment firms) are the ones who impose change on management and as long as that management is making them money, they have a(n in)vested interest in keeping the culture and the people promoting said culture in place.

I just remember times when NTSB (whose job is directly and solely related to the safety of transportation) chafing at times to what they saw as FAA resistance to recommendations they generated during their safety investigations.

Anyway, it does seem clear that with two family groundings the FAA had to reactively enforce (787 and 737 MAX), the FAA does seem to - at least with Boeing Commercial - taking a closer and impartial look at their operations and holding them to a higher standard than they appear to have done in the past.

Discussing proposals with FAA does not equal pushing shortcuts. There’s constant dialogue with OEMs and their regulators, rather than a scenario where final proposals are submitted for review. It benefits the entire industry to have give and take during the certification process with the regulator having the final say.

sxf24 wrote:

Discussing proposals with FAA does not equal pushing shortcuts. There’s constant dialogue with OEMs and their regulators, rather than a scenario where final proposals are submitted for review. It benefits the entire industry to have give and take during the certification process with the regulator having the final say.

The narrative that seems to be forming here, however, is that constant dialogue is not having a material effect on how BCA management is approaching dealing with these issues in a more proactive way. It still seems their policy towards non-critical issues remains "we'll fix it in post".

Stitch wrote:

sxf24 wrote:

Discussing proposals with FAA does not equal pushing shortcuts. There’s constant dialogue with OEMs and their regulators, rather than a scenario where final proposals are submitted for review. It benefits the entire industry to have give and take during the certification process with the regulator having the final say.

The narrative that seems to be forming here, however, is that constant dialogue is not having a material effect on how BCA management is approaching dealing with these issues in a more proactive way. It still seems their policy towards non-critical issues remains "we'll fix it in post".

Correction of non-critical deficiencies is deferred today. Why would a different standard be applied?

sxf24 wrote:

Correction of non-critical deficiencies is deferred today. Why would a different standard be applied?

I guess the issue now is the duration of that deferment. Boeing appears to (continue to) want a longer period than the FAA feels is appropriate and acceptable.

Revelation said, "According to the ST piece Boeing said it wants it's employees to speak their minds so it's all good, yet 100 787s still sit undelivered."

How many would be foolish enough to actually DO so? Been there, done that, suffered the consequences.

Revelation wrote:

WesternDC6B wrote:

Revelation said, "According to the ST piece Boeing said it wants it's employees to speak their minds so it's all good, yet 100 787s still sit undelivered."

How many would be foolish enough to actually DO so? Been there, done that, suffered the consequences.

I agree, caution must be exercised. The legislation provides various avenues and protections, but no guarantee that they will be invoked if you get the brown end of the stick. I also got myself on the troublemakers list at one job and IMO that plus some unmistakable ageism got me on the layoff list. Didn't matter, I got a severance and moved on to a new job in a more interesting and less stressful part of the industry after a few months of what was in essence paid vacation. Yet still it sucks that management can take revenge and the impact will be there immediately whereas it's unclear how effective the protection measures will be.

One employer of mine put out "Anonymous" surveys. Turns out the pages of the surveys were encoded. Did they really think this could get past a room full of techies, geeks, and computer freaks? None of us filled it out.

Hometown Boeing fan. But maintain the rights to criticize the home team. Here is my A versus B take on this. (even though we were not suppose to do that on this thread). Airbus was created by European governments to build civil air planes to challenge US monopolies. Their first and primary goal is to build great planes (and hire the people who build them). That used to be Boeing's goal. But they moved to Chicago and sold their soul to Wall Street. How can anyone doubt that Airbus is in a better environment to build great planes? I have hopes the Boeing will recover, even willing to hold my nose and see our state spend money to help make it happen. But last time we spent the money and got kicked in the groin, fell down and another kick in the face.

So the Boeing Employee Group, do we know that these are Boeing employees who are working under the FAA guidance and not Boeing management?
If they are, and they agreed with management decision on the inspections, what would the result have been, the new culture is kicking in or the old is continuing where they are continuing to rubber stamp?
Honestly, in my opinion, at least for a few years maybe 5 is sufficient, the FAA should have gone out and hired their own inspectors to as they say "Shun the very appearance of evil", until such time as the political masters believe that the train at Boeing and all its cars are back on the right track.
How much more time must be spent having Boeing verify its "decisions", then submit them to the Employee Group, who reviews then submits them to the FAA who in all likelyhood goes over them again with a fine tooth comb because the Group is embedded with Boeing, are paid by them and their loyalty is questionable.

frmrCapCadet wrote:

Hometown Boeing fan. But maintain the rights to criticize the home team. Here is my A versus B take on this. (even though we were not suppose to do that on this thread). Airbus was created by European governments to build civil air planes to challenge US monopolies. Their first and primary goal is to build great planes (and hire the people who build them). That used to be Boeing's goal. But they moved to Chicago and sold their soul to Wall Street. How can anyone doubt that Airbus is in a better environment to build great planes? I have hopes the Boeing will recover, even willing to hold my nose and see our state spend money to help make it happen. But last time we spent the money and got kicked in the groin, fell down and another kick in the face.

How is Boeing’s structure any different than Apple for example? Same “Wall Street capitalist high stock compensation” plan as Boeing. Or replace Apple with countless other successful companies. The problem was Boeing’s commercial leadership (and some of their military).

Apple dictates to stockholders to a degree most companies would die for.

frmrCapCadet wrote:

Apple dictates to stockholders to a degree most companies would die for.

To a large degree that’s because Apple doesn’t need its stock holders’ capital. Apple has enough cash and capacity for debt that it could easily go private and continue to operate without providing a return to its owners. Boeing and other companies is capital intensive industries don’t have the same ability.

airzona11 wrote:

frmrCapCadet wrote:

Hometown Boeing fan. But maintain the rights to criticize the home team. Here is my A versus B take on this. (even though we were not suppose to do that on this thread). Airbus was created by European governments to build civil air planes to challenge US monopolies. Their first and primary goal is to build great planes (and hire the people who build them). That used to be Boeing's goal. But they moved to Chicago and sold their soul to Wall Street. How can anyone doubt that Airbus is in a better environment to build great planes? I have hopes the Boeing will recover, even willing to hold my nose and see our state spend money to help make it happen. But last time we spent the money and got kicked in the groin, fell down and another kick in the face.

How is Boeing’s structure any different than Apple for example? Same “Wall Street capitalist high stock compensation” plan as Boeing. Or replace Apple with countless other successful companies. The problem was Boeing’s commercial leadership (and some of their military).

Apple does not sell safety, Boeing does

Apple does sell security, however. Somewhat analogous to safety.

LDRA wrote:

Apple does not sell safety, Boeing does

In recent years that could be arguably debatable if it increases profits.

Further delays?

Boeing Co. is dealing with a new defect on its 787 Dreamliner, the latest in a series of production slip-ups that have delayed aircraft deliveries and drawn increased U.S. government scrutiny.

The new problem involves certain titanium parts that are weaker than they should be on 787s built over the past three years, people familiar with the matter said. The discovery is among other Dreamliner snafus that have left Boeing stuck with more than $25 billion of the jets in its inventory.

https://www-wsj-com.cdn.ampproject.org/ ... 1634209201

Titanium parts are often in high loaded, high temperature places. But also landing gears, engines. Hopefully in easy to reach, replace, maybe line replace.

When will this end ?!

This company man, I just want all this bad stuff surrounding Boeing to just end already. Just when you think it's done something else comes up

According to Reuters, the issue is "The parts include fittings that help secure the floor beam in one fuselage section, as well as other fittings, spacers, brackets, and clips within other assemblies." https://finance.yahoo.com/news/boeing-d ... 40462.html

while the floor beam securing could be an issue, the other items may have no impact and are titanium merely for corrosion prevention.

Be interesting to know where the QA chain lies with these parts. While it is de rigueur to blame the final OEM for all issues, if Leonardo SpA or MPS were charged with handling the QA, then it's not really fair, IMO, to call out this as "another Boeing mistake" if they were delegating QA to a sub-tier supplier.

Stitch wrote:

Be interesting to know where the QA chain lies with these parts. While it is de rigueur to blame the final OEM for all issues, if Leonardo SpA or MPS were charged with handling the QA, then it's not really fair, IMO, to call out this as "another Boeing mistake" if they were delegating QA to a sub-tier supplier.

This is a very fair point, it's just not ideal for Boeing from all aspects no matter who is at fault. All people are going to see is more 787 issues in the headline, they don't care about who is actually at fault.

Something is very strange here. 3 years ago something in the process must have changed. If the parts before were ok, either manufacturing changed and it was deemed ok from above (Boeing) that the parts were weaker then they should without informing regulators. Or the manufacturer never informed Boeing and actually just delivered faulty parts what would be a criminal act. It still would be concerning though that it took Boeing 3 years to figure that out. Or the third option is neither the manufacturer nor Boeing realised that the parts were not up to standards what is also really concerning.
Shipping one bad batch of parts can happen and that can have a lot of reasons but three years worth of parts?

It's also the other issues that make this a headline, if production was going without any further troubles this would just have been a small story that would not have been discussed.

But yeah, Boeing obviously can't use this kind of news right now. But it's good that issue are not hidden from the public, that would be even worse.

FluidFlow wrote:

Something is very strange here. 3 years ago something in the process must have changed. If the parts before were ok, either manufacturing changed and it was deemed ok from above (Boeing) that the parts were weaker then they should without informing regulators. Or the manufacturer never informed Boeing and actually just delivered faulty parts what would be a criminal act. It still would be concerning though that it took Boeing 3 years to figure that out. Or the third option is neither the manufacturer nor Boeing realised that the parts were not up to standards what is also really concerning.

1) I would like to believe Boeing would not approve a specification change they knew would not meet criteria since that would open the company to possible civil and criminal liability if a failure led to a hull loss or a regulator later discovered the change and the intentional obfuscation thereof.

2) MPS is said to be "under scrutiny by (Italian) prosecutors" so if there is malfeasance, it could be on MPS' part and if they were the ones charged with doing QA, they could have indeed intentionally kept it hidden from Leonardo and Boeing. And if MPS did make an unapproved change three years ago and did hide that change, then it is possible this investigation by Italian prosecutors is what brought it to light and why three years worth of now suspect parts made it through the supply chain into airframes.

3) Leonardo stated MPS no longer supplies these parts so I would like to know if parts supplied by this new vendor to Leonardo are meeting specification. If they are, this further reinforces the possibility that MPS was the one who made a change and then hid it.