JonesNL wrote:Revelation wrote:SteelChair wrote:It is so unfortunate that Boeing has chosen to let Southwest dictate their 737 decisions, they should have put a 787 style cockpit in the MAX imho.
I don't think that was ever on the table. Putting 787's tech onto 737 would have been an all new airplane from a certification point of view. None of the systems are FBW capable, they all would have needed to be replaced. C-Series cause Airbus to do NEO and in turn Boeing to do MAX. They weren't ever going to take on a 787 cockpit and the systems upgrades it would require in the time frame they were working with.
On the other hand, I have read via Peter Lemme's posts to Twitter that putting the 757 cockpit into the 737 NG was on the table. It made sense from Boeing's point of view. The 757 was still in production so it would have brought economy of scale and cockpit similarity across 737-757-767. 757 was not FBW so the engineering effort was reasonable. The ex-McDD bean counters were not in charge, Boeing was still an engineering firm. Sadly, it got shot down by Southwest due to training costs. One of the great "what if" moments in airliner history, IMO.planecane wrote:Which is essentially the reason that Boeing went with the MAX instead of a clean sheet. The technology didn't exist to make the small improvement over the MAX/NEO worth the enormous investment. In hindsight, it would have been worth it to avoid the MCAS fiasco .
You can't know that a clean sheet would not have been extremely fouled up knowing there was time pressure from the market and cost pressure from Boeing management and FAA management willing to accommodate Boeing's schedule demands and not support their own people. Calhoun seems to be much more realistic about what can be accomplished in a given amount of time and very cognizant of the current regulatory environment. IMO a clean sheet 737 replacement would never have happened under the previous regime so the point is moot.
I do not understand the shouting for clean sheet everything. It is totally unrealistic. Financial suicide, see recent case in point Bombardier.
What this industry need is an radical revolution in development costs a la SpaceX and not more me too clean sheets.It is just to costly to do new designs so we rarely see new designs. A and B should try to scoop as many engineers from SpaceX just to learn about how they can improve the development cycle. If that happens the rate of innovation would be grow exponentially…
There is a level of risk that is acceptable in space travel which is not remotely acceptable in commercial air travel. For launch, they clear the flight path below a rocket in case it explodes. There is a not-insignificant chance that something catastrophic happens on every flight. Heck, with the horrendous safety record of the Space Shuttle, they still flew 22 missions after the second hull loss and complete loss of crew. Does anybody think there weren't some other undiscovered design issues that could have popped up afterwards?
SpaceX has regular crashes and explosions occur during their development cycle. Can you imagine if a few 777Xs crashed in test flights and the CEO announced how much they learned from it?