Pythagoras wrote:

Exactly.

It is important to understand that both Boeing and the FAA are bureaucratic stovepipe organizations where information and responsibility is retained within disciplines. Finding compliance to a particular paragraph in the FARs is parsed out to individual UM/ARs who put together and approve the certification documents. These myriad of certification documents, where I remind you has MCAS interspersed, had been drafted and mostly completed at the time the MCAS Rev D revision. At the the time of the Rev D revision, the task before the UM/ARs would have been whether the change in functionality to include the low speed flight envelope necessitated changing these certification documents. When the erroneous activation of MCAS is judged as “Hazardous” which the FAA permits Boeing to make without outside oversight, it ensures the FAA does not gain visibility of the system and for its functionality to not be mentioned in the certification documents.

Mark Forkner in his role as Chief Technical pilot represents the services business of Boeing and not the design and manufacturing business of Boeing. It may be that the 737Max Flight Control engineers who developed and approved the Rev D revision considered whether the change in functionality required changing pilot training. It one sees the MCAS failure as equivalent to a runaway stabilizer trim one could conclude that there would be no impact to the training curriculum. That conclusion though is not Boeing’s to make exclusively of the FAA which is why Forkner and Boeing is found criminally negligent.

Let’s not forget that when Boeing concedes that additional simulator training is required for the 737Max for return to service that this training recommendation applies to all 737 models. The actions by both flight crews indicates an incomplete understanding of elevator, horizontal stabilizer and its systems.

The biggest problem with the argument you present is that common sense does not apply.

I asked some people who work in development of code in various industries what happens, and every single one of them says you write some code and counter check at every stage whether it meets requirement for the task it seeks to accomplish. After all of this is done, you look to stress test it to ensure that when it gets to market, that the software will not run into issues.

Some established checks include the people writing code (maker) not being the same people counter checking (checker) and analyzing that code on the next step in quality analysis. You might more layers before the product is validated, and all of these exist to catch problems between code development all the way to code deployment and the behavior of that software in real world conditions. In aviation, this is during certification.

JATR and the Committee on Transport reports show just how people did not either care about their jobs at the FAA and Boeing and how the latter simply wasn't bothered in getting things done the right way. People signing off on things they do not understand, people raising questions not being heard, proper controls not being in place at either organization, and overall, people not understanding how small mistakes, lapses in judgment and/or a lack of testing all compound into huge mistakes. If people were checking, they would have caught the fact that some testing had not been done, from testing, they would have realized that there was the potential for catastrophic loss of life in the real world and that their assumptions were incorrect.

We talk about MCAS and fixate on it, but as previously stated, it was not the only thing that could have led to the plane crashing, it was simply the first thing that led to two hull losses with no survivors. The more regulators checked, the more problems they found, and even after clearing the jet, they still found issues that needed to be corrected.

If the issues were isolated to this one product, one might be fine with it and state that it was an isolated incident. However, we have pickle fork issues on the NG which are likely to translate to the MAX because they share the same platform. You have issues with the Dreamliner, some issues may apply to the global fleet (how that gets handled is another issue altogether), Boeing having had data and just never bothered to check. You have issues with on the military and space side of things too while the 777X has run into regulatory issues.

MCAS being interspersed, Boeing not correctly classifying MCAS, all of these are domestic issues at Boeing.

CanukinUSA wrote:

I am certain that Boeing Management was happy with that media confusion because it distracted everyone from the fact that the simulator is based on the Flight Model that is created from Flight Test Data that comes from the manufacturer (i.e. Boeing). I suspect that Captain Forkner was evaluating the simulator for training purposes which is quite different from Simulator Certification which involves data matching from aircraft flight test data on the simulator. I will have to look back at the timeline from when he did that evaluating as what it shows is that the Boeing Simulator Engineering support team obviously knew enough about the changed MCAS operation to put it in the Simulator Flight Model. If he noted that the data did not match like you stated for certification, he would want to get the simulator fixed so that the data matched or else it would not get certified by the regulator (FAA) when they check the graphs for matching during simulator certification. Control Forces are required to be simulated quite accurately to get the simulator certified. I spent several years doing final manufacturer testing on Flight Simulators at the world's largest simulator manufacturer up in Canada and having spent time in both Aircraft Flight Test and Simulator evaluation trust me it is harder to get a Flight Simulator certified then the real aircraft itself. Unfortunately, many line pilots who do not have a technical background think it will be a nice fun time for a few weeks flying around accepting a flight simulator. It can be a very frustrating experience after a while, and you really must dig back into how the simulator has been built and into the flight model from the manufacturer to get a certified and usable simulator. On the 737 Classic simulators when I worked there, we found out that the flight test aircraft used for obtaining data had the aileron deflection angle one degree in error and had to get Boeing to go back and look at the original flight test data because we could not get the data plots required to match to certify the simulators. After that we had to put a letter from Boeing in all the 737 Classic simulators that used that flight model stating that the deflection was one degree off during flight test before we could get the simulator accepted from the FAA or any other regulator to explain why the data did not match and was one degree out.
What this really demonstrates is the fact that there must have been quite a few groups in Boeing Engineering and Management who were aware of the changes done to the MCAS system low speed operation at the time when the flight simulator model was modified.

Reports were that MCAS was not implemented in MAX sims until after crashes. Talking about certifying all that...

The simulator has to be accepted (certified) during an aircraft certification program so that the FAA AEG group can use it to determine the pilot training requirements for pilots who will be flying that aircraft. I witnessed aircraft certification programs (at other manufacturers besides Boeing) being delayed because the simulator was not ready for the FAA AEG group to determine pilot training requirements. If the simulator was not certified to match the aircraft then that puts all of the training requirements determined in that simulator in question. That was one of the major issues that delayed the ungrounding of the 737 MAX.
One has to wonder if the DOJ checked any of the documentation that would be used for simulator acceptance (certification) at the FAA National Simulator Program offices in Atlanta, the simulator manufacturer up in Canada, at the simulator support groups at Boeing and at the Boeing Training Center in Florida where the simulator was likely located. From Captain Forkners comments in his IMs and emails it sounds like the low speed functionality of MCAS was added to the simulator he was evaluating probably to get the simulator accepted in preparation for the FAA AEG pilot training requirements evaluation. He likely encountered that while checking the approach to stall capability of the simulator before the FAA AEG evaluation which he would have been involved with. Since the simulator was likely already accepted (Certified) by the FAA National Simulator Program Office that brings up the question of what was not reported by him to the FAA at that point in time? Since he had not been informed about the changes to the low speed capability of MCAS he would not have anything certain to report about MCAS other then that the simulator was acting differently from what was expected.

CanukinUSA wrote:

The simulator has to be accepted (certified) during an aircraft certification program so that the FAA AEG group can use it to determine the pilot training requirements for pilots who will be flying that aircraft. I witnessed aircraft certification programs (at other manufacturers besides Boeing) being delayed because the simulator was not ready for the FAA AEG group to determine pilot training requirements. If the simulator was not certified to match the aircraft then that puts all of the training requirements determined in that simulator in question. That was one of the major issues that delayed the ungrounding of the 737 MAX.
One has to wonder if the DOJ checked any of the documentation that would be used for simulator acceptance (certification) at the FAA National Simulator Program offices in Atlanta, the simulator manufacturer up in Canada, at the simulator support groups at Boeing and at the Boeing Training Center in Florida where the simulator was likely located. From Captain Forkners comments in his IMs and emails it sounds like the low speed functionality of MCAS was added to the simulator he was evaluating probably to get the simulator accepted in preparation for the FAA AEG pilot training requirements evaluation. He likely encountered that while checking the approach to stall capability of the simulator before the FAA AEG evaluation which he would have been involved with. Since the simulator was likely already accepted (Certified) by the FAA National Simulator Program Office that brings up the question of what was not reported by him to the FAA at that point in time? Since he had not been informed about the changes to the low speed capability of MCAS he would not have anything certain to report about MCAS other then that the simulator was acting differently from what was expected.

Again, reports at the time were that MAX simulators sold were actually NG sims updated with MAX cockpit layout with no change of underlying logic.
Forkner was using an internal engineering sim, not a commercial sim shipped to airlines, whatever that means.

The 737 MAX simulator was not designed to replicate the MCAS system problems, it added.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethi ... SKCN1R20WD

The internal engineering simulators are located in Seattle not in Florida. I have used them for testing before I retired from Boeing Flight Test. The simulator in Florida would have been first 737 MAX Full Flight Training Simulator at the training center in Florida. The FAA has to use a Properly FAA Certified Full Flight Training Simulator for the Pilot Training Evaluation not a engineering cab. Engineering cabs only have limited simulation capability and are not Certified for training. They also do not have the motion and visual systems that the FAA would require for simulator certification.

Even if the simulators were sold as NGs they would not be legal to use for 737 MAX training until the regulator approved them after 737 MAX flight model simulator acceptance. This again raises questions about the Flight Model that was being sent to the simulator manufacturers and airlines from Boeing. If Boeing was sending out Simulator Flight Models that did not match Flight Test Data for the 737 MAX and/or data temporary collected in the engineering cabs and claiming that it was acceptable they have some explaining to do. It also brings up questions about configuration control in the engineering cabs as they are not checked by anyone except Boeing.
The aircraft manufacturer can temporarily use data collected from the engineering cabs until Flight Test Data on the aircraft has been obtained but the aircraft flight test data has to be used once it is obtained so that may be what is being referred to by the media. Aviation so called experts in the media sadly do not know much.

CanukinUSA wrote:

The internal engineering simulators are located in Seattle not in Florida. I have used them for testing before I retired from Boeing Flight Test. The simulator in Florida would have been first 737 MAX Full Flight Training Simulator at the training center in Florida. The FAA has to use a Properly FAA Certified Full Flight Training Simulator for the Pilot Training Evaluation not a engineering cab. Engineering cabs only have limited simulation capability and are not Certified for training. They also do not have the motion and visual systems that the FAA would require for simulator certification.

Point is, no simulators other than engineering ones had MCAS implemented at the time of MAX grounding.
As it was mentioned, the full commonality between NG and MAX was a big selling point; differences training was 30 minutes iPad course - and I assume that is enough to tell about the new display layout only. As there were no handling differences between MAX and NG, as Boeing claimed, there was no reason to update sims beyond screen layout.
With that commonality being the selling point, it is pretty expected that information about actual differences didn't spread too much.

We don’t know that without knowing the details on the particular flight model installed on the simulator. Like I stated in a previous post it sounded to me that the MCAS including the low speed feature quite likely could have been in the flight model installed on the first full flight training simulator to get it certified.
The models provided to the airlines and simulator manufacturers for airline use are provided after the flight test, aircraft certification, first simulator acceptance and pilot training evaluations have been done. The simulator manufacturer for the first training 737 MAX full flight simulator would have been given the first available 737 MAX flight model with updates provided from flight test as they happened so that simulator could be certified to the best available data to determine the pilot training requirements so that the aircraft certification could happen. If that is not done the aircraft certification itself would be held up. No aircraft certification then no aircraft production and no airline use of the aircraft. After that the simulator flight model would start to be forwarded to the airlines and simulator manufacturers so that the airline training simulators could be accepted and start training pilots. The airline full flight simulator models are always slightly behind what is going on with the aircraft during initial aircraft development.

CanukinUSA wrote:

We don’t know that without knowing the details on the particular flight model installed on the simulator. Like I stated in a previous post it sounded to me that the MCAS including the low speed feature quite likely could have been in the flight model installed on the first full flight training simulator to get it certified.
The models provided to the airlines and simulator manufacturers for airline use are provided after the flight test, aircraft certification, first simulator acceptance and pilot training evaluations have been done. The simulator manufacturer for the first training 737 MAX full flight simulator would have been given the first available 737 MAX flight model with updates provided from flight test as they happened so that simulator could be certified to the best available data to determine the pilot training requirements so that the aircraft certification could happen. If that is not done the aircraft certification itself would be held up. No aircraft certification then no aircraft production and no airline use of the aircraft. After that the simulator flight model would start to be forwarded to the airlines and simulator manufacturers so that the airline training simulators could be accepted and start training pilots. The airline full flight simulator models are always slightly behind what is going on with the aircraft during initial aircraft development.

That was fairly well published back in 2019, hard to find today.
https://phys.org/news/2019-05-boeing-ac ... lator.html

According to Boeing, the flight simulator software was incapable of reproducing certain flight conditions similar to those at the time of the Ethiopian Airlines crash in March or the Lion Air crash in October.

Article proceeds to discuss how trim wheel force wasn't simulated. Which is a very questionable statement as there was a well published video from MentourPilot showing recreation of Ethiopian flight in NG sim, where pilots struggled both with trim wheel and yoke.

What they are referring to is the higher control forces on the manual trim wheel at high speeds which does not surprise me as I do not remember there being any manual pitch trim forces standards required to be simulated on simulators which to me is a serious oversight at least for the 737 and similar aircraft. They are not saying much about the MCAS simulation itself when I read it so we don’t know whether it was properly simulated or not from that article.
Boeing marketing and management badly wanted to avoid simulator training for the MAX to compete with Airbus but they do not certify aircraft and accept flight simulators. We can now all see where Boeing ended up with the MAX as a result. The questions now are what was done in an attempt to accomplish that goal and how legal were they and who was involved.

The other problem with simulating high manual pitch trim forces at high speeds is that someone would have to go out in flight test and obtain data on the manual pitch trim force's. This would likely be a very high risk test condition. The forces if they are even simulated (which I do not recall being simulated in the 737 Classic simulators that I tested when testing the manual trim system) would likely only be an estimation of the forces on the wheel not based on actual data.

CanukinUSA wrote:

What they are referring to is the higher control forces on the manual trim wheel at high speeds which does not surprise me as I do not remember there being any manual pitch trim forces standards required to be simulated on simulators which to me is a serious oversight at least for the 737 and similar aircraft. They are not saying much about the MCAS simulation itself when I read it so we don’t know whether it was properly simulated or not from that article.
Boeing marketing and management badly wanted to avoid simulator training for the MAX to compete with Airbus but they do not certify aircraft and accept flight simulators. We can now all see where Boeing ended up with the MAX as a result. The questions now are what was done in an attempt to accomplish that goal and how legal were they and who was involved.

Which is exactly opposite to what I am saying.
Trim wheel force IS simulated
https://youtu.be/aoNOVlxJmow?t=758
MCAS was not. Again, hard to find today. My best find so far:
https://www.straitstimes.com/world/afri ... of-dangers

Mr von Hoesslin called attention to the airline's flight simulator program. The simulators were based on Boeing's earlier 737 "Next Generation", or NG, family of jets, and did not replicate the MCAS, he said.

I noted in that article that there was only one simulator at Boeing that was approved for the MAX. That was probably the simulator used by Captain Forkner when he was making his comments in the IMs and emails. The airline simulators had not been given the flight model for the MAX as a result probably after the FAA did it’s Pilot Training Evaluation on it and accepted the no simulator training requirement request for pilot training. It does not sound like a very through Pilot Training Evaluation was done by the FAA AEG and that is reflected in the rewrite of the Flight Standards training report before the 737 MAX was allowed back into service.

CanukinUSA wrote:

I noted in that article that there was only one simulator at Boeing that was approved for the MAX. That was probably the simulator used by Captain Forkner when he was making his comments in the IMs and emails. The airline simulators had not been given the flight model for the MAX as a result probably after the FAA did it’s Pilot Training Evaluation on it and accepted the no simulator training requirement request for pilot training. It does not sound like a very through Pilot Training Evaluation was done by the FAA AEG and that is reflected in the rewrite of the Flight Standards training report before the 737 MAX was allowed back into service.

No, again you're wrong
https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/28/africa/e ... index.html
Sim at Ethiopian Airlines was specifically branded as MAX simulator. But it omitted significant MAX-specific features.
Talking about "just a human mistake", would this fact alone qualify as criminal deception?

I agree with you that the simulator should not have been branded as a 737 MAX simulator as it is not until it is accepted as such with the proper flight model. That is obviously a marketing gimmick by the simulator manufacturer to sell simulators. Many of the simulators can be loaded with different flight models to train on different versions of the same aircraft and there is no standards as to what salesman can call their simulators. Legally the simulator is only allowed to train pilots if required on aircraft that have had the simulator accepted for by their regulator and proper configuration control has to be done to ensure the correct flight model is loaded on the simulator and that the proper cockpit panels are installed for that aircraft version.

CanukinUSA wrote:

I agree with you that the simulator should not have been branded as a 737 MAX simulator as it is not until it is accepted as such with the proper flight model. That is obviously a marketing gimmick by the simulator manufacturer to sell simulators. Many of the simulators can be loaded with different flight models to train on different versions of the same aircraft and there is no standards as to what salesman can call their simulators. Legally the simulator is only allowed to train pilots if required on aircraft that have had the simulator accepted for by their regulator and proper configuration control has to be done to ensure the correct flight model is loaded on the simulator and that the proper cockpit panels are installed for that aircraft version.

Whatever this simulator legal status is, Boeing point was that handling is identical, so sim model can be identical. Pilots were supposed to fly revenue flights with NG training + iPad differences course. That is the sequence approved by FAA, the only path for pilots to flying MAX at the time of grounding.
There were no other simulators available to airlines, and even these MAX-branded version was installed only in few places, many airlines were flying MAX having only NG sims available to pilots.

kalvado wrote:

CanukinUSA wrote:

I noted in that article that there was only one simulator at Boeing that was approved for the MAX. That was probably the simulator used by Captain Forkner when he was making his comments in the IMs and emails. The airline simulators had not been given the flight model for the MAX as a result probably after the FAA did it’s Pilot Training Evaluation on it and accepted the no simulator training requirement request for pilot training. It does not sound like a very through Pilot Training Evaluation was done by the FAA AEG and that is reflected in the rewrite of the Flight Standards training report before the 737 MAX was allowed back into service.

No, again you're wrong
https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/28/africa/e ... index.html
Sim at Ethiopian Airlines was specifically branded as MAX simulator. But it omitted significant MAX-specific features.
Talking about "just a human mistake", would this fact alone qualify as criminal deception?

I think you’re confusing features with conditions. Any MAX simulator was certified by regulator(s) and had all MAX features. However, that does not mean the specific conditions encountered by either flight could be replicated in the SIM. This all comes down to the questions of whether these conditions should have been known prior to certification.

sxf24 wrote:

kalvado wrote:

CanukinUSA wrote:

I noted in that article that there was only one simulator at Boeing that was approved for the MAX. That was probably the simulator used by Captain Forkner when he was making his comments in the IMs and emails. The airline simulators had not been given the flight model for the MAX as a result probably after the FAA did it’s Pilot Training Evaluation on it and accepted the no simulator training requirement request for pilot training. It does not sound like a very through Pilot Training Evaluation was done by the FAA AEG and that is reflected in the rewrite of the Flight Standards training report before the 737 MAX was allowed back into service.

No, again you're wrong
https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/28/africa/e ... index.html
Sim at Ethiopian Airlines was specifically branded as MAX simulator. But it omitted significant MAX-specific features.
Talking about "just a human mistake", would this fact alone qualify as criminal deception?

I think you’re confusing features with conditions. Any MAX simulator was certified by regulator(s) and had all MAX features. However, that does not mean the specific conditions encountered by either flight could be replicated in the SIM. This all comes down to the questions of whether these conditions should have been known prior to certification.

Wrong. The only model of MAX simulator available at the time of grounding didn't include MCAS logic. See links above.

kalvado wrote:

sxf24 wrote:

kalvado wrote:

No, again you're wrong
https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/28/africa/e ... index.html
Sim at Ethiopian Airlines was specifically branded as MAX simulator. But it omitted significant MAX-specific features.
Talking about "just a human mistake", would this fact alone qualify as criminal deception?

I think you’re confusing features with conditions. Any MAX simulator was certified by regulator(s) and had all MAX features. However, that does not mean the specific conditions encountered by either flight could be replicated in the SIM. This all comes down to the questions of whether these conditions should have been known prior to certification.

Wrong. The only model of MAX simulator available at the time of grounding didn't include MCAS logic. See links above.

The link says no such thing.

sxf24 wrote:

kalvado wrote:

sxf24 wrote:

I think you’re confusing features with conditions. Any MAX simulator was certified by regulator(s) and had all MAX features. However, that does not mean the specific conditions encountered by either flight could be replicated in the SIM. This all comes down to the questions of whether these conditions should have been known prior to certification.

Wrong. The only model of MAX simulator available at the time of grounding didn't include MCAS logic. See links above.

The link says no such thing.

Did you notice that I said linkS?
Another one saying that in plain English:

The sim program does not simulate the MCAS, thus using this older NG has serious drawbacks in our training when operating the Max,” Mr von Hoesslin wrote in an email. “I suggest alternate training methods.”

https://www.irishtimes.com/business/tra ... -1.3908073
And yes, Ethiopian was one of a few airlines actually having MAX-branded sim.

Ethiopian can brand their simulator to whatever the Ethiopian CAA allows them to do, and I am certain that the simulator that was approved is the one at Boeing which would have had to be approved to assist the aircraft certification. If the Ethiopian CAA approved the Ethiopian Airlines simulator for 737 MAX training, then my guess is that would be a matter for the Ethiopian courts as to whether Criminal Deception occurred. If Ethiopian airlines was doing non-approved 737 MAX training in their simulator, then it might be Criminal Deception by them again in the Ethiopian courts. If the training and/or simulator approval was done by the FAA and/or Boeing for the Ethiopian CAA and/or Ethiopian Airlines, then there might be a case in the US courts. It all depends on who was involved and what agreements there are between Countries and/or Companies. I am certain that there will be many lawyers involved from many different countries as this gets ramped up more.

kalvado wrote:

sxf24 wrote:

kalvado wrote:

Wrong. The only model of MAX simulator available at the time of grounding didn't include MCAS logic. See links above.

The link says no such thing.

Did you notice that I said linkS?
Another one saying that in plain English:

The sim program does not simulate the MCAS, thus using this older NG has serious drawbacks in our training when operating the Max,” Mr von Hoesslin wrote in an email. “I suggest alternate training methods.”

https://www.irishtimes.com/business/tra ... -1.3908073
And yes, Ethiopian was one of a few airlines actually having MAX-branded sim.

The quote you’re referencing is about a NG SIM used for MAX training, not a MAX SIM.

CanukinUSA wrote:

Ethiopian can brand their simulator to whatever the Ethiopian CAA allows them to do, and I am certain that the simulator that was approved is the one at Boeing which would have had to be approved to assist the aircraft certification. If the Ethiopian CAA approved the Ethiopian Airlines simulator for 737 MAX training, then my guess is that would be a matter for the Ethiopian courts as to whether Criminal Deception occurred. If Ethiopian airlines was doing non-approved 737 MAX training in their simulator, then it might be Criminal Deception by them again in the Ethiopian courts. If the training and/or simulator approval was done by the FAA and/or Boeing for the Ethiopian CAA and/or Ethiopian Airlines, then there might be a case in the US courts. It all depends on who was involved and what agreements there are between Countries and/or Companies. I am certain that there will be many lawyers involved from many different countries as this gets ramped up more.

Ethiopian bought the only available MAX-branded sim. Whoever made it for Boeing, apparently, had that sim endorsed by Boeing and FAA. Nothing to do with branding by Ethiopian.
But apparently FAA went easy on those stickers.

sxf24 wrote:

kalvado wrote:

sxf24 wrote:

The link says no such thing.

Did you notice that I said linkS?
Another one saying that in plain English:

The sim program does not simulate the MCAS, thus using this older NG has serious drawbacks in our training when operating the Max,” Mr von Hoesslin wrote in an email. “I suggest alternate training methods.”

https://www.irishtimes.com/business/tra ... -1.3908073
And yes, Ethiopian was one of a few airlines actually having MAX-branded sim.

The quote you’re referencing is about a NG SIM used for MAX training, not a MAX SIM.

OK, lets flip it around - anything saying in plain text that there were MAX sims which included MCAS in 2019?

Again, in plain text from US source:
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... max-flaws/

“Ethiopian Airlines is among the very few airlines in the world and the only one in Africa which has acquired and operates the B737 Max 8 full flight simulator,” Asrat’s statement adds, something no U.S. airline can say, although the major operators now have MAX flight simulators on order.

Asrat also pointed out that “However, it’s very unfortunate that the B737 Max 8 simulator was not configured to simulate the MCAS operation by the aircraft manufacturer.”

ikramerica wrote:

It’s good to know there is criminal liability for certain negligence and fraud.

To posit that the software “engineers” who wrote troubled code or the executives who asked for a common type rating are criminally liable is a bit much. If anything, it’s the project managers who are the most culpable in the design failure.

Anyone know whether Boeing had adopted the cluster-f methodology known as “Agile” while working on the MAX? In a large, old school company like Boeing, it could result in a flight critical process relying on a non-redundant input while failing to account for previous activated states.

Part of the reason we know what we do is because of the culture of openness in accident investigation and why most aviation authorities do not impose criminal liability based on accidents, because then all the facts of the case will only be pried out during legal discovery. By and large the “liability” rests with the company and not those performing their job duties for the company, unless someone violates the rules with malicious intent. You also venture into the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard when you enter the criminal realm, which is tough to prove especially in the case of a multifaceted system developed by hundreds of people who clearly don’t know what the other is doing. I suspect those who think people at Boeing should be criminally liable would not enjoy working in a world where this was the norm. And FWIW while the tragic incidents show an utter failure to understand failure modes, to say it was intentionally embedded despite huge safety risks is quite a stretch.

Revelation wrote:

Rekoff wrote:

We can all guess to the reason why Boeing only paid a fraction of Volkswagen yet the MAX disasters were a few orders of magnitude worse in their consequences.

The difference is there was incontrovertible evidence that VW intentionally cheated, whereas Boeing's human error defense is still intact.

I've written many times that Boeing has done a masterful job getting investigators to focus on the surface level stuff like Forkner's drunken texts and Muilenberg's pay while apparently not focusing on how the human errors happened. Some have suggested that this is because at the end of the day human error is not criminal behavior so going deep down that path would not be of interest to the criminal courts. I guess it's now up to the civil courts. I hope they can get to the bottom of it, but their goal is to get cash settlements for the victims and of course the lawyers too, so it's quite likely that it'll all end up with cash settlements and non-disclosure agreements with no admission of guilt by Boeing.

I'd love it if there were some "family jewels" ( ref: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Family_Je ... nce_Agency) ) locked up in a safe somewhere that eventually would see the light of day, but I have to say I doubt it very much.

I totally get what you say but it's very hard to swallow. Besides Volkswagen we have BP as another data point of a foreign company excessively penalised. What comparable examples are there for US companies? The Exxon Valdez oil spill punitive damages went from $5 billion to $2.5billion to finally $500million. Contrast this to the $20.8 billion BP had to pay in punitive damages next to additional cleanup costs and charges of about $40 billion.

I seriously doubt we'd see the same "investigation" if the victims were American. I'm dead certain we'd see Airbus go bankrupt if it was them having their single sensor MCAS implimentation cause the death of 346 Americans.

I'm giving Nader's effort about 0.0001% chance of succeeding, let's say less chance of an individual AOA sensor failure.

Since we seem to want to talk simulators, I found https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... -messages/ which is a pretty complete rendering of what Forkner was doing.

1) He was not working on the 'engineering simulator' ( e-cab ) when he encountered what he thought was a MCAS activation, he was working on the pilot training simulator

At the time of the chat, Forkner was working to develop the first MAX simulator at Boeing’s facility in Miami. It was manufactured by TRU, a Canadian-American simulator maker, a subsidiary of Textron headquartered in Goose Creek, S.C.

2) Multiple sources in the article say he did NOT encounter a MCAS activation in the sim based on the contents of the text chain because he was not in a flight regime that would have triggered MCAS

3) The most likely scenario was that he was encountering bugs in the TRU simulator that he thought were MCAS activations

4) Sources also say the TRU simulator could not reproduce the full MCAS scenario because it did not provide a way to disable one AoA sensor and/or have it provide inaccurate data. Maybe this is the source of all of the reports that the sim could not simulate MCAS? The article makes it pretty clear the TRU simulator did have the changes for low speed MCAS in its code.

5) The article doesn't make it perfectly clear, but it seems at this point in time the MCAS changes for low speed flight were known to Forkner. I'll have to re-read the texts but IMO the reports don't really say Forkner discovered the low speed behavior in the sim, although he did use the term "shocker alert" in the text to Gustafsson and did complain that the test pilots didn't tell him about the change. It could be he learned about the changes through some other path and as above was confused about what he was experiencing. It's pretty clear from his texts that he was over-stressed and over-worked at that period of time.

Regarding Nader's effort, I agree it doesn't have much hope of success, but maybe he will get some help from China?

"China's civil aviation authorities always uphold three principles: First, aircraft alteration must be approved for airworthiness. Second, pilots must be fully and effectively retrained. Third, the conclusion of the investigation of the two fatal accidents must be clear and the improvement measures effective," Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian said at a press conference in mid-June.

Ref: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202108/1230693.shtml

Raising the point suggests the Chinese Foreign Ministry didn't feel that the conclusion of the investigation of the two fatal accidents was clear as of mid-June, no?

Also raising the point about the effectiveness of the improvement measures suggests they feel they were not effective as of mid-June?

Maybe Boeing will have to be more transparent to get China to allow MAX to fly again, and this may help Nader's cause?

Or is Boeing going to continue to be less than transparent because revealing more about how MCAS happened would be more costly than losing China's business?

Revelation wrote:

Since we seem to want to talk simulators, I found https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... -messages/ which is a pretty complete rendering of what Forkner was doing.

1) He was not working on the 'engineering simulator' ( e-cab ) when he encountered what he thought was a MCAS activation, he was working on the pilot training simulator

At the time of the chat, Forkner was working to develop the first MAX simulator at Boeing’s facility in Miami. It was manufactured by TRU, a Canadian-American simulator maker, a subsidiary of Textron headquartered in Goose Creek, S.C.

2) Multiple sources in the article say he did NOT encounter a MCAS activation in the sim based on the contents of the text chain because he was not in a flight regime that would have triggered MCAS

3) The most likely scenario was that he was encountering bugs in the TRU simulator that he thought were MCAS activations

4) Sources also say the TRU simulator could not reproduce the full MCAS scenario because it did not provide a way to disable one AoA sensor and/or have it provide inaccurate data. Maybe this is the source of all of the reports that the sim could not simulate MCAS? The article makes it pretty clear the TRU simulator did have the changes for low speed MCAS in its code.

5) The article doesn't make it perfectly clear, but it seems at this point in time the MCAS changes for low speed flight were known to Forkner. I'll have to re-read the texts but IMO the reports don't really say Forkner discovered the low speed behavior in the sim, although he did use the term "shocker alert" in the text to Gustafsson and did complain that the test pilots didn't tell him about the change. It could be he learned about the changes through some other path and as above was confused about what he was experiencing. It's pretty clear from his texts that he was over-stressed and over-worked at that period of time.

To make things even more messy, Ethiopian simulator is apparently a different company, CAE - not TRU.

Pythagoras wrote:

LDRA wrote:

Scotron12 wrote:

Can you imagine, of course with a bit of 20/20 hindsight, if Boeing had come clean from the outset on MCAS, and that SIM training would be required??

Notwithstanding the so called $1M per plane deal with SW, it would have cost Boeing money, yeah, a lot of money, but certainly a lot lot less than the $billions it's cost to date.

OTOH, Im sure it wasn't Forkner et al, that were solely responsible. Doesn't make sense

Forkner is one of the victims. Poor person was not even told of MCAS, had to find it out for himself in simulator. This MCAS thing is so low profile, even Boeing chief tech pilot doesn't know about it!

The released emails and IMs from Forker were certainly misread by the media. Many of the more sensational language is taken as Forkner is in the process of conducting his evaluation to certify the 737Max simulators in Miami. I don't think I read or heard anywhere in the media that the issues were ultimately resolved and the simulators were fully certified by the FAA. The media, likely unknowingly, confused the work that Forkner was doing on simulator certification with the work the Forkner was responsible for in developing the 737Max pilot training curriculum. Personally, I always appreciated working with engineers that argued and had real passion for their craft.

What we forget about the discussions concerning Forkner's comments of the "Jedi Mind Trick" is that Boeing was concerned primarily about the regulators imposing simulator training for adding two functions whose purpose was to enhance safety. The Roll Command Alerting System (RCAS) was added to both 737NG and 737Max to improve situational awareness when the airplane entered high-bank angles to prevent Loss of Control accidents. The Runway Situation Awareness Tools (RSAT) provided early indication to pilots that the airplane was set-up to conduct an overrun on landing. Contrary to the narrative that is in the media, Boeing was focussing on enhancing safety by adding these functions to the flight deck. The technical issues were insufficiently explained by the media and thus there is the appearance the Boeing was in the wrong by making this argument. However even upon the review after the two accidents, the FAA considers the RCAS and RSAT functions to only require Level B differences training when transitioning from 737NG to 737Max.

@Pythagoras

For referencce, this is the skype messaging log pertaining MCAS activation in sim.

To: Forkner, Mark A[mark.a.forkner@boeing.com]; Gustavsson, Patrik H[patrik.h.gustavsson@boeing.com]
From: Forkner, Mark A
Sent: Wed 11/16/2016 2:55:56 AM (UTC)
Subject: Conversation with Forkner, Mark A
Mark Forkner 6:46 PM:
dude, log off!
\
Gustavsson, Patrik H 6:46 PM:
You too!!!
I just logged on to check my schedule. I have so much to do that I want to work from home
I just cant get stuff done in the office
Mark Forkner 6:47 PM:
nah, I'm locked in my hotel room with an ice cold grey goose, I'll probably fire off a few dozen inappropriate emails before I call
it a night
Gustavsson, Patrik H 6:47 PM:
LMAO!!!!
Mark Forkner 6:47 PM:
this job is insane
Gustavsson, Patrik H 6:47 PM:
So did you get anything done in the sim today?
Or what is the normal chaos there?
Mark Forkner 6:48 PM:
although it must be easy compared to working as a tech pilot for RYR
Gustavsson, Patrik H 6:48 PM:
Well it's different here. We are pretty busy here for sure.
Mark Forkner 6:48 PM:
actually this one is pretty stable, and I signed off some DRs, but there are still some real fundamental issues that they claim
they're aware of
Gustavsson, Patrik H 6:48 PM:
What I hated about Ryanair was the extreme pressure they put on people
Ok, that's good
Mark Forkner 6:49 PM:
so I just need to start being a dick to make you quit?
Gustavsson, Patrik H 6:49 PM:
LOL, that's it!
Mark Forkner 6:49 PM:
alright, no more mr nice guy!
actually I'd cry uncontrollably if you left
I'd ask for a job in sales where I can just get paid to drink with customers and lie about how awesome our airplanes are
Gustavsson, Patrik H 6:50 PM:
I'd cry if anyone in our group left.
Mark Forkner 6:50 PM:
Oh shocker alerT!
MCAS is now active down to M .2
It's running rampant in the sim on me
at least that's what Vince thinks is happening
Gustavsson, Patrik H 6:51 PM:
Oh great, that means we have to update the speed trim descritption in vol 2
Mark Forkner 6:51 PM:
so I basically lied to the regulators (unknowingly)
Gustavsson, Patrik H 6:51 PM:
it wasnt a lie, no one told us that was the case
Mark Forkner 6:51 PM:
I'm levelling off at like 4000 ft, 230 knots and the plane is trimming itself like craxy
I'm like, WHAT?
Gustavsson, Patrik H 6:52 PM:
that's what i saw on sim one, but on approach
I think thats wrong
Mark Forkner 6:52 PM:
granted, I suck at flying, but even this was egregious
Gustavsson, Patrik H 6:52 PM:
No, i think we need aero to confirm what its supposed to be doing
Mark Forkner 6:53 PM:
Vince is going to get me some spreadsheet table that shows when it's supposed to kick in.
why are we just now hearing about this?
Gustavsson, Patrik H 6:53 PM:
I don't know, the test pilots have kept us out of the loop
It's really only christine that is trying to work with us, but she has been too busy
Mark Forkner 6:54 PM:
they're all so damn busy, and getting pressure from the program
Gustavsson, Patrik H 6:54 PM:
That is true, I wouldnt want to be them
Ok, its time to log off
Mark Forkner 6:55 PM:
ok later man
Gustavsson, Patrik H 6:55 PM:
I'll work from home tomorrow, be online all day
later

Based on chat context, "so I basically lied to the regulators (unknowingly)" comment was likely referring to MCAS expansion to low mach speed

It was likely MCAS activation due to simulated failure scenario, as the flight parameters were not high AOA/outside normal envolope

The only 737 Simulator listed in the FlightGlobal 2021 Civil Simulator Census for the 737 in Ethiopia is at Ethiopian Airlines and is a 737NG Level-D Full Flight Simulator built by Flight Safety International.
If there is another 737 Max simulator it is not certified right now. Given that the Simulator Census is sponsored by CAE, I am certain they would want to make sure that their simulator is listed in the list if it was certified.
TRU is now owned by CAE if I recall correctly. It was a spin off by several ex-CAE employees that got bought by Textron and has now been bought by CAE from Textron.

LDRA wrote:

It was likely MCAS activation due to simulated failure scenario, as the flight parameters were not high AOA/outside normal envolope

I don't think that's the case. The flight control laws say MCAS won't activate without high AoA at the edges of the flight envelope. You'd need to be at high AoA or find a way to make the sim think there was a high AoA, and the ST article says there was no way to make that happen in the TRU sim.

To me the interesting part is:

Mark Forkner 6:50 PM:
Oh shocker alerT!
MCAS is now active down to M .2
It's running rampant in the sim on me
at least that's what Vince thinks is happening

So Forkner is not saying anything like "I just discovered MCAS", he's saying something is happening and someone else named Vince suggests that it is MCAS but as above that suggestion seems wrong.

Mark Forkner 6:53 PM:
Vince is going to get me some spreadsheet table that shows when it's supposed to kick in.
why are we just now hearing about this?
Gustavsson, Patrik H 6:53 PM:
I don't know, the test pilots have kept us out of the loop

So it is Gustavsson rather than Forkner who complains that the test pilots have kept them out of the loop, and they are finding out about MCAS via 'Vince', or at least are getting the details about it from 'Vince'.

CanukinUSA wrote:

The only 737 Simulator listed in the FlightGlobal 2021 Civil Simulator Census for the 737 in Ethiopia is at Ethiopian Airlines and is a 737NG Level-D Full Flight Simulator built by Flight Safety International.
If there is another 737 Max simulator it is not certified right now. Given that the Simulator Census is sponsored by CAE, I am certain they would want to make sure that their simulator is listed in the list if it was certified.
TRU is now owned by CAE if I recall correctly. It was a spin off by several ex-CAE employees that got bought by Textron and has now been bought by CAE from Textron.

Whatever this worth:
https://www.cae.com/news-events/press-r ... rt-canada/
It is not Ethiopian machine, but yet.

According to the FlightGlobal 2021 Civil Simulator Census there are at least 34 Boeing 737 Max Full Flight Simulators now certified worldwide at Level-C or Level-D. There are 4 additional Simulators listed in China that may be certified as their certification status is not listed. I believe that Survey is usually done by FlightGlobal in June annually, but no date is shown.

CanukinUSA wrote:

According to the FlightGlobal 2021 Civil Simulator Census there are at least 34 Boeing 737 Max Full Flight Simulators now certified worldwide at Level-C or Level-D. There are 4 additional Simulators listed in China that may be certified as their certification status is not listed. I believe that Survey is usually done by FlightGlobal in June annually, but no date is shown.

https://leehamnews.com/2020/02/10/cae-r ... roduction/
Maybe something with branding?

kalvado wrote:

sxf24 wrote:

kalvado wrote:

Did you notice that I said linkS?
Another one saying that in plain English:

https://www.irishtimes.com/business/tra ... -1.3908073
And yes, Ethiopian was one of a few airlines actually having MAX-branded sim.

The quote you’re referencing is about a NG SIM used for MAX training, not a MAX SIM.

OK, lets flip it around - anything saying in plain text that there were MAX sims which included MCAS in 2019?

There’s a difference between including MCAS and simulating the conditions of the LionAir and ET incidents.

Failing to recognize the distinction means you’re only here to troll.

sxf24 wrote:

kalvado wrote:

sxf24 wrote:

The quote you’re referencing is about a NG SIM used for MAX training, not a MAX SIM.

OK, lets flip it around - anything saying in plain text that there were MAX sims which included MCAS in 2019?

There’s a difference between including MCAS and simulating the conditions of the LionAir and ET incidents.

Failing to recognize the distinction means you’re only here to troll.

Links please. So far, there is no single direct mention that MCAS was actually implemented - vs upfront statements of "no MCAS"

kalvado wrote:

sxf24 wrote:

kalvado wrote:

OK, lets flip it around - anything saying in plain text that there were MAX sims which included MCAS in 2019?

There’s a difference between including MCAS and simulating the conditions of the LionAir and ET incidents.

Failing to recognize the distinction means you’re only here to troll.

Links please. So far, there is no single direct mention that MCAS was actually implemented - vs upfront statements of "no MCAS"

Classic gaslighting. You make multiple claims, without supporting data, yet when challenged say the other party needs to provide a link.

Every year the regulatory agencies must perform some of the original simulator checks to keep the simulator approved (certified) for training when they visit a simulator training center for every simulator to ensure that they match flight test data. The Flight Test Data has way more information on these systems then you will ever understand it sounds like. If you think that the regulatory agencies worldwide do not check the MCAS system simulation right now given what's happened with the MCAS on the 737 MAX to ensure it is being simulated properly you are very naive. Your so called upfront statements are quotes from the media who have little knowledge of the aviation industry and even less knowledge of Flight Simulators.

CanukinUSA wrote:

Every year the regulatory agencies must perform some of the original simulator checks to keep the simulator approved (certified) for training when they visit a simulator training center for every simulator to ensure that they match flight test data. The Flight Test Data has way more information on these systems then you will ever understand it sounds like. If you think that the regulatory agencies worldwide do not check the MCAS system simulation right now given what's happened with the MCAS on the 737 MAX to ensure it is being simulated properly you are very naive. Your so called upfront statements are quotes from the media who have little knowledge of the aviation industry and even less knowledge of Flight Simulators.

Question is not about the present state of affairs - and I would be surprized if sims didn't get a full implementation of MCAS by the day MAX was ungrounded; question is about what happened before grounding.
At that point, there were no simulators which could adequately reproduce actual in-flight behavior.
As for media having no clue... We're talking about direct quoted from airline officials. If you have overriding data, such as links and quotes from sim certification paperwork, you're more than welcome to share those. Generic statements about due diligence from agencies don't count.

kalvado wrote:

CanukinUSA wrote:

Every year the regulatory agencies must perform some of the original simulator checks to keep the simulator approved (certified) for training when they visit a simulator training center for every simulator to ensure that they match flight test data. The Flight Test Data has way more information on these systems then you will ever understand it sounds like. If you think that the regulatory agencies worldwide do not check the MCAS system simulation right now given what's happened with the MCAS on the 737 MAX to ensure it is being simulated properly you are very naive. Your so called upfront statements are quotes from the media who have little knowledge of the aviation industry and even less knowledge of Flight Simulators.

Question is not about the present state of affairs - and I would be surprized if sims didn't get a full implementation of MCAS by the day MAX was ungrounded; question is about what happened before grounding.
At that point, there were no simulators which could adequately reproduce actual in-flight behavior.
As for media having no clue... We're talking about direct quoted from airline officials. If you have overriding data, such as links and quotes from sim certification paperwork, you're more than welcome to share those. Generic statements about due diligence from agencies don't count.

I have pondered this question as well. How important is it to have MCAS functionality incorporated in the 737Max simulator?

My perception is that it would have made no meaningful difference whether it was incorporated or not. Should a pilot in the simulator take a 737Max into a stall the only difference would be that the stabilizer trim wheel would have activated whereas in a 737NG it would not have activated. Pilot action is the same and airplane response is the same, as well. It does not appear to me to be a significant difference. The trim wheel is constantly in motion as part of the Speed Trim System, and the pilots are accustomed with that behavior already. In fact, are the deep stalls where MCAS would activate actually part of the pilot training curriculum? I'd like to hear from a 737 pilot on that question.

It seems like those commenting herein are assuming that MCAS functionality should have been incorporated into the training when there was erroneous angle-of-attack data. Here again, I'd like to know whether this type of training was even done in the simulator. My assumption is that there is training for erroneous airspeed which would have also covered erroneous angle-of-attack data, i.e. the non-normal procedures are similar. Here again, it does not seem like adding MCAS functionality was really required. I'd like to hear from a 737 pilot on this question as well.

Pythagoras wrote:

I have pondered this question as well. How important is it to have MCAS functionality incorporated in the 737Max simulator?

implementing something this complex is not on/off situation but there are tens of questions whether each particular aspect of MCAS was implemented. I believe the simulators do not run the actual SW that real 737s run but a separate company implements the simulator SW based on requirement spec that is a simplified version of what the people writing the real 737 SW got as their requirement spec.

If the requirement spec does not include specific detailed requirement for multiple activations the simulator version of MCAS SW does not perform multiple activations that real 737 SW did before the groundings. This kind of simplified and more ideal kind of performing MCAS is of little help for solving any problems that come from implementation problems of real 737 SW which have problems that are not replicated into the simulator.

I guess simulator sessions are supposed to simulate different rare but difficult problem situations but I would be surprised if this specific problem of AoA sensor issues were ever part of simulator training program anywhere. Who would have specified such a simulator session to be run?

I also have no idea whether the commercial 737 simulators have enough horsepower in their trim wheel to resist pilot action to rotate this trim wheel to simulate an important aspect of why this problem to become a big problem.

So even if the simulators would be said to include MCAS it would probably be of no help for anything as these critical details of MCAS would probably not be part of the MCAS support that is advertised.

Ertro wrote:

implementing something this complex is not on/off situation but there are tens of questions whether each particular aspect of MCAS was implemented. I believe the simulators do not run the actual SW that real 737s run but a separate company implements the simulator SW based on requirement spec that is a simplified version of what the people writing the real 737 SW got as their requirement spec.

If the requirement spec does not include specific detailed requirement for multiple activations the simulator version of MCAS SW does not perform multiple activations that real 737 SW did before the groundings. This kind of simplified and more ideal kind of performing MCAS is of little help for solving any problems that come from implementation problems of real 737 SW which have problems that are not replicated into the simulator.

I guess simulator sessions are supposed to simulate different rare but difficult problem situations but I would be surprised if this specific problem of AoA sensor issues were ever part of simulator training program anywhere. Who would have specified such a simulator session to be run?

I also have no idea whether the commercial 737 simulators have enough horsepower in their trim wheel to resist pilot action to rotate this trim wheel to simulate an important aspect of why this problem to become a big problem.

So even if the simulators would be said to include MCAS it would probably be of no help for anything as these critical details of MCAS would probably not be part of the MCAS support that is advertised.

The Seattle Times link I recently posted implies the training sim uses different software than the actual aircraft, yet it uses the data from flight test to check that it behaves the same as the real plane.

It's pretty clear from the ST article that the CAE sim had an implementation of the MCAS algorithm/feature and it's also clear that it had no way to simulate the accident scenario where bad AoA data cause multiple MCAS activations.

It's also clear from the Mentor Pilot video mentioned earlier that training sims can/do put strong loads on the trim wheel to simulate out of trim conditions.

Revelation wrote:

Ertro wrote:

implementing something this complex is not on/off situation but there are tens of questions whether each particular aspect of MCAS was implemented. I believe the simulators do not run the actual SW that real 737s run but a separate company implements the simulator SW based on requirement spec that is a simplified version of what the people writing the real 737 SW got as their requirement spec.

If the requirement spec does not include specific detailed requirement for multiple activations the simulator version of MCAS SW does not perform multiple activations that real 737 SW did before the groundings. This kind of simplified and more ideal kind of performing MCAS is of little help for solving any problems that come from implementation problems of real 737 SW which have problems that are not replicated into the simulator.

I guess simulator sessions are supposed to simulate different rare but difficult problem situations but I would be surprised if this specific problem of AoA sensor issues were ever part of simulator training program anywhere. Who would have specified such a simulator session to be run?

I also have no idea whether the commercial 737 simulators have enough horsepower in their trim wheel to resist pilot action to rotate this trim wheel to simulate an important aspect of why this problem to become a big problem.

So even if the simulators would be said to include MCAS it would probably be of no help for anything as these critical details of MCAS would probably not be part of the MCAS support that is advertised.

The Seattle Times link I recently posted implies the training sim uses different software than the actual aircraft, yet it uses the data from flight test to check that it behaves the same as the real plane.

It's pretty clear from the ST article that the CAE sim had an implementation of the MCAS algorithm/feature and it's also clear that it had no way to simulate the accident scenario where bad AoA data cause multiple MCAS activations.

It's also clear from the Mentor Pilot video mentioned earlier that training sims can/do put strong loads on the trim wheel to simulate out of trim conditions.

My bet that trim wheel load is a leftover from roller coaster recovery being a standard trained procedure.
And overall, a fun situation - simplified model is OK for routine training, but was unable to handle out of ordinary situation. And that became The Problem.
Looks like Boeing is very reliant on sims (if I remember correctly, original MCAS was introduced based on sim flying before first flight) - so lack of ability to run Air Lion crash in the sim resulted in underestimating the situation, to the point that gravity of the situation was not realized even after the second crash.
So, apparent lack of engineering skills coupled with incomplete sim capability, and because of the nail the kingdom falls.

Corrections to comments on previous posts:
1) When the 737 Max simulator was manufactured the Company was not CAE it was TRU. It was only recently bought up by CAE and is now part of CAE.
2) Where and by whom the software was written would depend on whether the system was simulated with software and/or if actual use of the Avionics systems boxes occurred in the simulator. It could be the simulator manufacturer, someone they contracted out to and even the Avionics supplier if actual Avionics were used in that situation. It it is the Avionics supplier it would likely be the same software as the aircraft with special software added for the simulator's unique features like repositioning, flight freezes for training if available.
3) The Airline/Training Center is almost always the buyer of the Flight Simulator and as a result decides which available options and malfunctions it wants on its simulators. Certain extra features may be simulated and requested by the buyer (usually at extra cost) and would only be on that customers simulator. If the simulator manufacturer is allowed to it may offer the special feature to be sold and installed on other simulators for other customers. If it is wise the buyer will consult with its regulator and the aircraft manufacturer. In rare cases the airline will have another company buy the simulator.
4) The Aircraft Flight Model is produced typically by the aircraft manufacturer during its flight test program. In some cases, particularly with smaller aircraft manufacturers a special flight test program will have to be setup to obtain data to produce the simulator (this costs money) at the desired approval level. The buyer of the flight simulator will purchase it and provide it to the simulator manufacturer to install on its simulator with restrictions on its use.
5) The aircraft manufacturer usually provides documentation to describe its systems so that the simulator software can be developed. All this documentation is proprietary, so it is only provided to those who need it to produce the simulator after they sign non-disclosure agreements.
6) The simulator manufacturer provides proprietary documentation to describe the simulator, its features, malfunctions installed and details so that it can be maintained in service.
7) The simulator manufacturer will provide a list of the malfunctions that it can simulate to the buyer when the buyer purchases the simulator and then the buyer picks the malfunctions it wants to install on its simulator. How many they have on their simulator depends on the agreement between the simulator manufacturer and the buyer. It likely costs extra to get more malfunctions installed but that will be in the agreement between the manufacturer and buyer. Again if they are wise they will consult with their regulator, the aircraft manufacturer, etc..
8) The customer usually does the final customer accepting of the simulator at the simulator manufacturing facility. In some cases they may hire someone to consult/assist if they are not familiar with flight simulators. They will usually do another acceptance once the simulator is moved to their location before the regulator tests the simulator.
9) The regulator is responsible for certifying the simulator for use for airlines and crews in its country and typically does testing at the simulators final location to accept the simulator. If the simulator is moved it usually has to be recertified. In some cases they may have another countries regulator (typically the FAA and/or EASA) accept the simulator if they lack the expertise/manpower to do it. If the simulator is used to train airlines and/or crews from another country another regulator may have to certify/accept the simulator before it can be used by them. Some airlines contract out their simulators to earn revenue when they are not using them.
10) The simulator manufacturer will agree with the buyer on what regulatory standards will be meet as a minimum for acceptance/training by the buyer and regulator (i.e. Flight Training Device, FAA, ICAO, EASA Levels of approval, etc.).
11) A manual (Acceptance Type Guide (ATG), Qualification Test Guide (QTG), etc.) is produced for the regulators which has all of the data and testing details for that particular simulator acceptance/certification when the simulator is approved/certified.