ElroyJetson wrote:

JonesNL wrote:

ElroyJetson wrote:

Airbus are their Regulator are trying to make it look like nothing more than a paint issue. Both are spinning like mad, and neither is fully telling the truth imo.

The statement that the ESA is spinning this issue to favor Airbus is accusation that sets a problematic presedence for the whole industry. I would refrain from such accusations without undisputed proof from multiple sources.

The industry has already a big challenges ahead to regain trust. So, lets stop spreading unbased rumours and speculations that would further damage its reputation…

Funny, but you did not extend the same courtesy and respect to the Qatari Regulator. I wonder why?

Imho the EASA is in far too cosy a relationship with Airbus. That is not a rumor, it is merely an opinion. Many have made the same statement about the Qatari Regulator.

Each seems to be doing a stand up job in defending their respective home town entity. But again, I am expressing an opinion, nothing more.

We've seen the EASA statement; but what about the one from the Qatari Regulator? Where is it? What does it say? It'd be nice to know so we can make a judgement.

At the time, the Qatari CAA is the only one to have grounded some A350s, and done so in an obscure manner; no other CAA has gone to the same length and the EASA has reaffirmed there are no reason to do so.
So, again, who do you believe more? The sole authority that does something without full disclosure, or the remaining ones?

Duke91 wrote:

I trust a European entity more than a Qatari. That's merely an opinion

I trust QR more than Ryan Air. But does that say much?

bt

WayexTDI wrote:

ElroyJetson wrote:

JonesNL wrote:

The statement that the ESA is spinning this issue to favor Airbus is accusation that sets a problematic presedence for the whole industry. I would refrain from such accusations without undisputed proof from multiple sources.

The industry has already a big challenges ahead to regain trust. So, lets stop spreading unbased rumours and speculations that would further damage its reputation…

Funny, but you did not extend the same courtesy and respect to the Qatari Regulator. I wonder why?

Imho the EASA is in far too cosy a relationship with Airbus. That is not a rumor, it is merely an opinion. Many have made the same statement about the Qatari Regulator.

Each seems to be doing a stand up job in defending their respective home town entity. But again, I am expressing an opinion, nothing more.

We've seen the EASA statement; but what about the one from the Qatari Regulator? Where is it? What does it say? It'd be nice to know so we can make a judgement.

At the time, the Qatari CAA is the only one to have grounded some A350s, and done so in an obscure manner; no other CAA has gone to the same length and the EASA has reaffirmed there are no reason to do so.
So, again, who do you believe more? The sole authority that does something without full disclosure, or the remaining ones?

A totally fair point.

ElroyJetson wrote:

I have no idea if the EASA or the Qatari regulator is correct. But if one is subject to scrutiny, so should the other.

Isn't EASA's track record worth anything? Has it certified dud aircraft that are not safe in the past two or three decades?

flee wrote:

ElroyJetson wrote:

I have no idea if the EASA or the Qatari regulator is correct. But if one is subject to scrutiny, so should the other.

Isn't EASA's track record worth anything? Has it certified dud aircraft that are not safe in the past two or three decades?

Any knowledge that the Qatari regulator is unethical? Personally, I have never questioned the EASA, but their recent characterization of the A350 as having "paint problems" seems like a bit of a stretch to me, but whatever. They do seem to have more credibility than the Qatari regulator if only because no other agencies have grounded the A350. But again, at this point I am not sure what to believe. My opinion is the situation with the A350 is more than a "paint problem," but I also do not believe it is an immediate safety concern and have said so from the beginning. My guess is the truth lies somewhere between what the two regulatory agencies have indicated.

For those who say the Qatari regulators are doing the bidding of QR, lets step back and ask, why would QR want these frames grounded? As a bargaining chip to get better pricing for the next buy? To get Airbus to pay for the re-paint and the ongoing maintenance there of?

I would think that QR would be smart enough to predict the impact of the grounding . . . The head ache of bringing back uneconomical A380s, leasing 777s and so on.

They probably would have preferred to take the lumps and have these birds flying even with the paint maintenance issue and try to work the cost part later, as part of the next buy negotiation.

The grounding is that "nuclear option" that I would surmise that QR is too smart to knowingly force it to themselves.

bt

bikerthai wrote:

For those who say the Qatari regulators are doing the bidding of QR, lets step back and ask, why would QR want these frames grounded? As a bargaining chip to get better pricing for the next buy? To get Airbus to pay for the re-paint and the ongoing maintenance there of?

I would think that QR would be smart enough to predict the impact of the grounding . . . The head ache of bringing back uneconomical A380s, leasing 777s and so on.

They probably would have preferred to take the lumps and have these birds flying even with the paint maintenance issue and try to work the cost part later, as part of the next buy negotiation.

The grounding is that "nuclear option" that I would surmise that QR is too smart to knowingly force it to themselves.

bt

International travel is at a low so hitting Qatar quite a bit, and Airlines that have 737 max get quite a bit of their income these days from Boeing compensation.

Could be the reason why they are finding issues with the A350 that other airlines do not find that big of a deal.

ElroyJetson wrote:

JonesNL wrote:

ElroyJetson wrote:

Airbus are their Regulator are trying to make it look like nothing more than a paint issue. Both are spinning like mad, and neither is fully telling the truth imo.

The statement that the ESA is spinning this issue to favor Airbus is accusation that sets a problematic presedence for the whole industry. I would refrain from such accusations without undisputed proof from multiple sources.

The industry has already a big challenges ahead to regain trust. So, lets stop spreading unbased rumours and speculations that would further damage its reputation…

Funny, but you did not extend the same courtesy and respect to the Qatari Regulator. I wonder why?

Imho the EASA is in far too cosy a relationship with Airbus. That is not a rumor, it is merely an opinion. Many have made the same statement about the Qatari Regulator.

Each seems to be doing a stand up job in defending their respective home town entity. But again, I am expressing an opinion, nothing more.

I'd take a bit of convincing of that, this close to the MAX fiasco. I don't see now as a particularly clever timing to be playing fast and loose with the regulatory environment.
On the contrary, I'd expect the MAX fiasco to have most regulators examining their navel.

It's interesting to note that the Qatari regulator has grounded the plane, but the Qataris say the don't know whether its a safety issue or not.
Which pretty strongly suggests that the Qatari move is more commercially motivated than safety.
But that's just an opinion too

Rgds

Duke91 wrote:

International travel is at a low so hitting Qatar quite a bit, and Airlines that have 737 max get quite a bit of their income these days from Boeing compensation.

Could be the reason why they are finding issues with the A350 that other airlines do not find that big of a deal.

This line of reasoning would make more sense if they brought back smaller aircrafts like the A330. But bringing back the less efficient A380 and 777 means they need the capacity, or at least the range, and their competitors will clean their clocks with the 787 and A350.

bt

bikerthai wrote:

For those who say the Qatari regulators are doing the bidding of QR, lets step back and ask, why would QR want these frames grounded? As a bargaining chip to get better pricing for the next buy? To get Airbus to pay for the re-paint and the ongoing maintenance there of?

I would think that QR would be smart enough to predict the impact of the grounding . . . The head ache of bringing back uneconomical A380s, leasing 777s and so on.

They probably would have preferred to take the lumps and have these birds flying even with the paint maintenance issue and try to work the cost part later, as part of the next buy negotiation.

The grounding is that "nuclear option" that I would surmise that QR is too smart to knowingly force it to themselves.

bt

There is a couple of points your addressing. The Qatar CAA has international obligations under ICAO when it come to airworthiness monitoring of aircraft it has issued certificate of airworthiness to. If it has identified an issue which requires the grounding aircraft, it is required to report that to the state of design, the state of design then promulgates the information worldwide to other regulators. As far as we know this has not happened.

Airbus said in the statement “The attempt by this customer to misrepresent this specific topic as an airworthiness issue represents a threat to the international protocols on safety matters.” From https://www.airbus.com/en/newsroom/pres ... esponse-to

Secondly this is all happening under the umbrella of an aircraft purchase contract for which there is completed A350 aircraft awaiting delivery, delivery is not being accepted with the excuse that A350 aircraft are being grounded by the CAA. This is the “force majeure” concept in international commercial contracts, where non-performance by a party is excused if that party proves that the non-performance was due to an impediment beyond its control and that it could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or overcome it or its consequences.

By grounding 21 aircraft, they could be trying to invoke the hardship concept in international commercial contracts. In case of hardship the disadvantaged party is entitled to request renegotiations. The request shall be made without undue delay and shall indicate the grounds on which it is based. The request for renegotiation does not in itself entitle the disadvantaged party to withhold performance, ie they are still required to accept deliveries.

I posted earlier on this thread the leasing of the 4 77Ws at todays rates would probably be similar to the lease rates QR is paying on one A350, that in addition to the non payment of the final payment due on delivery is a substantial sum being withheld. Not accepting the aircraft that are ready for delivery and non payment of the final sum would be considered as non performance under international commercial contracts, the acceptance of the new aircraft has nothing to do with the rectification of the older aircraft.

With international commercial contracts, the interference concept is states a party may not rely on the non-performance of the other party to the extent that such non-performance was caused by the first party’s act or omission or by another event for which the first party bears the risk.Airbus has stated they have offered to fix the aircraft, however this offer was refused without justification.

In their statement they said “Airbus has worked actively with its customers in order to minimise the impact and any inconvenience caused by this in-service surface degradation on the aircraft. These solutions have all been dismissed by the above-mentioned customer without legitimate justification.”

The example used in international commercial contracts is an invalid claim non performance of a builder if the owner has locked the builder out of the site preventing the builder from building. Qatar would be liable for damages for non payment and non collection of aircraft ready for delivery, not allowing Airbus to repair the aircraft and hence extend the grounding is not a reasonable excuse to complete the deliveries.

ElroyJetson wrote:

DartHerald wrote:

Aerospace is not the only regulated industry. I have some experience in the pharmaceutical industry and whilst it is quite possible to build a working rapport with the agency inspectors the good ones will maintain their distance - but they can do that because they are not conflicted by working for the same body! The real thrust of recent posts seems to be more along the lines of "who regulates the regulators?" and the answer of course is that the process has to end somewhere, and the regulatory authority is the one generally regarded as having the ultimate say. I think it has to be recognised and accepted, though that some of these bodies are narrower in both interests and experience than others.

I have been licensed in several fields. The industry policing agencies vary widely in quality and objectivity in my experience. Some are very good, some are not. Some are far too cosy with the industries they are regulating.

Aviation regulatory bodies sole agenda is public safety. Period. In the 737 MAX debacle the FAA came under intense scrutiny. Was it justified? Were they doing an excellent job protecting public safety? I will defer to others to make that judgement.

Many have questioned the motives and objectivity of the Qatari regulatory in this thread. Is that fair? Should the EASA have the same scrutiny?

I have no idea if the EASA or the Qatari regulator is correct. But if one is subject to scrutiny, so should the other.

My designs get submitted to a whole number of Building Departments for both commercial and residential projects, with huge variability between the strictest and the most lax. I swear that the same plans in one jurisdiction will come back with over 100 comments that need to be responded to, approved without comment in another. It's nice that there are Building Inspectors but I cannot expect them to catch any errors I have, the majority of the time they never have the structural plans with them on the inspection. A decade ago I pulled up to a project where I required my own inspection. From my car I could tell there were problems as one end of the form the rebar cage was way up in the air, the other was deep in the mud, the building inspector had signed it off an hour before I got there.

On NAVFAC and Corps projects there is a similar variability from thorough review on one project, barely enough on some, maddeningly picky on others. They require the actual RISA 3D FEM files and do open them up and look through the model graphics but it is to determine if it is a good model or a piece of junk. Rarely, very rarely, do I get more than a couple of comments but no back check that the model matches the drawings if not visually obvious from a distance. In terms of field inspection it is totally turned over to the Contractor's QC staff, the government inspectors just watch the QC inspectors and will quickly flag anything the QC missed. In the current world where Indefinite Quantity contracts basically allow the government to select the 5 bidders for the job, if your quality doesn't measure up you won't make it onto the next IQ contract RFP.

I fully concur with Elroy on the regulators, what is important is whether the system is working to provide consistent safety at the desired probability levels. Interestingly, often the best quality is the lightly applied QC system, the workmen self police themselves, in the inspectors everywhere mode it seems like it is someone else's responsibility.


fmr Cap Cadet's post

Somehow this seems to be an issue of how much it costs to maintain the plane. In this case the paint system. Analogies in housing/high-rise condos are windows and siding. No longer is a window just a window, it is a system, as have been be sidings. I have some experiences with the later, both have done house and apartment/condo inspections, and currently living in a somewhat high rise condo with complicated and sometimes failing systems. The stakes can be high. The 350 paint issue will eventually be resolved as a long term maintenance issue.

Roofing and Exterior wall systems have the highest claim experience in buildings, the industry is full of such horror stories. The Dryvit (fake stucco over foam) system failures caused many a high rise to totally redo the exterior walls and windows before it was 10 years old due to moisture, mold, and similar failures. Several dozen high rises in Seattle have had replacement that exceeded the original project cost. Talk about high stakes.

It's interesting that the old time lap siding over asphalt paper over the framing still is one of the best exteriors with 100+ years of experience, basically the rain screen approach of the best window wall systems.

Back to the A350 skin breakouts, the full range of the exposure conditions and cycles are causing localized failures. These failures do not affect structural, but do affect lightning protection, drag, and expected life. It's a problem that will take a lot of design time and testing to resolve. A different issue has stopped delivery of the 787, its due to the tolerances and fit up of the barrels. Structurally fine, but not acceptable until the correction is certified. This will get resolved.

zeke wrote:

By grounding 21 aircraft, they could be trying to invoke the hardship concept in international commercial contracts. In case of hardship the disadvantaged party is entitled to request renegotiations

This is the kind of high stake poker game that I can not wrap my head around.

Seems too complex to be with pursuing.

bt

zeke wrote:

bikerthai wrote:

For those who say the Qatari regulators are doing the bidding of QR, lets step back and ask, why would QR want these frames grounded? As a bargaining chip to get better pricing for the next buy? To get Airbus to pay for the re-paint and the ongoing maintenance there of?

I would think that QR would be smart enough to predict the impact of the grounding . . . The head ache of bringing back uneconomical A380s, leasing 777s and so on.

They probably would have preferred to take the lumps and have these birds flying even with the paint maintenance issue and try to work the cost part later, as part of the next buy negotiation.

The grounding is that "nuclear option" that I would surmise that QR is too smart to knowingly force it to themselves.

bt

There is a couple of points your addressing. The Qatar CAA has international obligations under ICAO when it come to airworthiness monitoring of aircraft it has issued certificate of airworthiness to. If it has identified an issue which requires the grounding aircraft, it is required to report that to the state of design, the state of design then promulgates the information worldwide to other regulators. As far as we know this has not happened.

Airbus said in the statement “The attempt by this customer to misrepresent this specific topic as an airworthiness issue represents a threat to the international protocols on safety matters.” From https://www.airbus.com/en/newsroom/pres ... esponse-to

Secondly this is all happening under the umbrella of an aircraft purchase contract for which there is completed A350 aircraft awaiting delivery, delivery is not being accepted with the excuse that A350 aircraft are being grounded by the CAA. This is the “force majeure” concept in international commercial contracts, where non-performance by a party is excused if that party proves that the non-performance was due to an impediment beyond its control and that it could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or overcome it or its consequences.

By grounding 21 aircraft, they could be trying to invoke the hardship concept in international commercial contracts. In case of hardship the disadvantaged party is entitled to request renegotiations. The request shall be made without undue delay and shall indicate the grounds on which it is based. The request for renegotiation does not in itself entitle the disadvantaged party to withhold performance, ie they are still required to accept deliveries.

I posted earlier on this thread the leasing of the 4 77Ws at todays rates would probably be similar to the lease rates QR is paying on one A350, that in addition to the non payment of the final payment due on delivery is a substantial sum being withheld. Not accepting the aircraft that are ready for delivery and non payment of the final sum would be considered as non performance under international commercial contracts, the acceptance of the new aircraft has nothing to do with the rectification of the older aircraft.

With international commercial contracts, the interference concept is states a party may not rely on the non-performance of the other party to the extent that such non-performance was caused by the first party’s act or omission or by another event for which the first party bears the risk.Airbus has stated they have offered to fix the aircraft, however this offer was refused without justification.

In their statement they said “Airbus has worked actively with its customers in order to minimise the impact and any inconvenience caused by this in-service surface degradation on the aircraft. These solutions have all been dismissed by the above-mentioned customer without legitimate justification.”

The example used in international commercial contracts is an invalid claim non performance of a builder if the owner has locked the builder out of the site preventing the builder from building. Qatar would be liable for damages for non payment and non collection of aircraft ready for delivery, not allowing Airbus to repair the aircraft and hence extend the grounding is not a reasonable excuse to complete the deliveries.

Are you a lawyer or have other relevant experience in contract law?

Force majeure would be defined in the purchase agreement and is almost certainly limited to “acts of God.” Manufacturing failures is not a force majeure, otherwise Boeing would have called this for the MAX (hint: they didn’t).

There is no hardship or interference concepts that are meaningful here. There may be hardship or interference clauses in the purchase agreement. If there’s not, you can’t take action based on concepts.

While a purchase agreement would specify remedies if an airline fails to take delivery of an aircraft that is properly tendered, Airbus has no right to access or repair airplanes in Qatar’s possession.

bikerthai wrote:

zeke wrote:

By grounding 21 aircraft, they could be trying to invoke the hardship concept in international commercial contracts. In case of hardship the disadvantaged party is entitled to request renegotiations

This is the kind of high stake poker game that I can not wrap my head around.

Seems too complex to be with pursuing.

bt

I agree. Zeke could very well be correct, but if so it seems like a high stakes poker game which could end up costing either side billions.

ElroyJetson wrote:

... it seems like a high stakes poker game which could end up costing either side billions.

If as suggested QR doesn't consider A350F because of this situation it already has, if one considers the life cycle profit on 25 or so A350Fs that won't be built. Then if one considers QR's order potentially may be what lets Boeing launch the 77XF, it gets even costlier if that is how things play out. Lots of money on the line.

sxf24 wrote:

Force majeure would be defined in the purchase agreement and is almost certainly limited to “acts of God.” Manufacturing failures is not a force majeure, otherwise Boeing would have called this for the MAX (hint: they didn’t).

There is no hardship or interference concepts that are meaningful here. There may be hardship or interference clauses in the purchase agreement. If there’s not, you can’t take action based on concepts.

I posted earlier a link to an A350 purchase agreement where "Any dispute arising out of or in connection with this Agreement shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce by three (3) arbitrators appointed in accordance with such rules."

The ICC rules for force majeure is exactly as I posted, feel free to read the ICC force majeure and hardship clause https://iccwbo.org/content/uploads/site ... Clause.pdf

sxf24 wrote:

While a purchase agreement would specify remedies if an airline fails to take delivery of an aircraft that is properly tendered, Airbus has no right to access or repair airplanes in Qatar’s possession.

Typical wording in an A350 contract


"12.1.7.3 Seller’s Rights

The Seller shall have the right to require the return of any Warranted Part, or any part removed therefrom, which is claimed to be defective if, in the judgment of the Seller, the nature of the claimed defect requires technical investigation. Such return shall be subject to the provisions of Clause 12.1.6.2. Furthermore, the Seller shall have the right to have a Seller Representative present during the disassembly, inspection and testing of any Warranted Part claimed to be defective, subject to such presence being practical and not unduly delaying the repair."

The below quote in the Airbus statements means what, they think QR and their regulator are one and the same, they are ignoring that the regulator grounded the a/c or they believe the regulator is just doing the bidding of QR?
"The attempt by this customer to misrepresent this specific topic as an airworthiness issue represents a threat to the international protocols on safety matters. "

par13del wrote:

The below quote in the Airbus statements means what, they think QR and their regulator are one and the same,

Wow, they may be right but very hard to prove I would suspect.

bt

flee wrote:

ElroyJetson wrote:

I have no idea if the EASA or the Qatari regulator is correct. But if one is subject to scrutiny, so should the other.

Isn't EASA's track record worth anything? Has it certified dud aircraft that are not safe in the past two or three decades?

They certified the MAX.

zeke wrote:

sxf24 wrote:

Force majeure would be defined in the purchase agreement and is almost certainly limited to “acts of God.” Manufacturing failures is not a force majeure, otherwise Boeing would have called this for the MAX (hint: they didn’t).

There is no hardship or interference concepts that are meaningful here. There may be hardship or interference clauses in the purchase agreement. If there’s not, you can’t take action based on concepts.

I posted earlier a link to an A350 purchase agreement where "Any dispute arising out of or in connection with this Agreement shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce by three (3) arbitrators appointed in accordance with such rules."

The ICC rules for force majeure is exactly as I posted, feel free to read the ICC force majeure and hardship clause https://iccwbo.org/content/uploads/site ... Clause.pdf

While reviewing another parties purchase agreement is insightful, it is dangerous to assume that another agreement would have similar language. Further, a cursory review of the ICC publication would show that it is providing recommendation on how to negotiate force majeure or hardship clauses negotiated in a contract. The inclusion of a dispute resolution process under Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce does not mean that the ICC’s recommendations on force majeure and hardship clauses apply to that contract.

IF Airbus and QR agreed to force majeure and/or hardship clauses and IF any such clauses are consistent with ICC, you can start to play out potential legal outcomes. This seems to be an exercise in mental gymnastics that serves no purpose other than an attempt to bolster pre-held positions that one party is bad/wrong and the other is good/right.

zeke wrote:

Typical wording in an A350 contract


"12.1.7.3 Seller’s Rights

The Seller shall have the right to require the return of any Warranted Part, or any part removed therefrom, which is claimed to be defective if, in the judgment of the Seller, the nature of the claimed defect requires technical investigation. Such return shall be subject to the provisions of Clause 12.1.6.2. Furthermore, the Seller shall have the right to have a Seller Representative present during the disassembly, inspection and testing of any Warranted Part claimed to be defective, subject to such presence being practical and not unduly delaying the repair."

First, airplane is not a Warranted Part. IF a part is removed and IF a warranty claim is approved, the part needs to be returned. This is an industry standard process.

This Youtube video recaps well for those not really following this, first time I have seen any of Coby Explanes clips so no idea if he is a "Simple Flying" that knows little or is a Leeham that has decades of aviation experience.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bnu9eZ5JRWM

Wouldn't anything to do with the lightning mesh require a good bit of testing. What concerns me is the mesh wires look quite small, looking at 20 ga copper wire with a diameter of 0.081" can only ground 20 amps in building circuits. However lightning can be millions of volts and thousands of amps. Lightning rod conductors are usually on standoffs and are in the #2/0 size capable of grounding 1,000 amps or more. These are held off the building because in the strike the wire will be red hot. What happens to the surrounding material when the copper is about to melt. There is a lot of literature about fasteners causing sparks within the tanks, well all of this depends on the continuity. I would think any change around this would require extensive testing.

Yes the original mesh system has gone thru design and certification and I assume it passed as it is certified. Changing the type of insulation on wires requires certifying this change, certainly changing the insulation / conduction bed requires testing. It may be the Faraday cage wires heating up in lightning events, expanding the wire at the same time heating the skin to an elevated temperature, but not the underlying structure. I would expect pretty high debonding stresses in such a situation, at the same time resins do not like getting cooked, they tend to go brittle causing cracking. Once cracked things go south quick.

9Patch wrote:

flee wrote:

ElroyJetson wrote:

I have no idea if the EASA or the Qatari regulator is correct. But if one is subject to scrutiny, so should the other.

Isn't EASA's track record worth anything? Has it certified dud aircraft that are not safe in the past two or three decades?

They certified the MAX.

In effect they followed standard procedure and took (for the most part) the certification done by the FAA. That standard is under pressure but most in the industry want to see it continue as to not do so will certainly drive costs up and time scales right.

In the past they have requested changes based on the documentation flowing from the lead agency. If that lead agency did not have the documents on MCAS they can't possibly have been known to EASA.

sxf24 wrote:

zeke wrote:

Typical wording in an A350 contract


"12.1.7.3 Seller’s Rights

The Seller shall have the right to require the return of any Warranted Part, or any part removed therefrom, which is claimed to be defective if, in the judgment of the Seller, the nature of the claimed defect requires technical investigation. Such return shall be subject to the provisions of Clause 12.1.6.2. Furthermore, the Seller shall have the right to have a Seller Representative present during the disassembly, inspection and testing of any Warranted Part claimed to be defective, subject to such presence being practical and not unduly delaying the repair."

First, airplane is not a Warranted Part. IF a part is removed and IF a warranty claim is approved, the part needs to be returned. This is an industry standard process.

Nope. Many OEMs do not necessarily require the return of a part (usually a small one) to approve warranty, especially if you know that part has a short life and/or a tendency to fail.
Source: I handled warranty for many years for an OEM on Airbus aircraft, and handled MROs and airlines in-house repair claims.

Having been following this whole discussion for several pages, I am quite surprised that there hasn't been more focus on the 'context' to this debacle between the two parties. My understanding is that there is a significant previous 'history' between AAB and Airbus and it is surprising, at least to me, that this latest spat has not been viewed through that lens. When there were the original issues about 'quality' with the A350 deliveries, including refusals to accept aircraft, Airbus appeared to become increasingly frustrated, ultimately leading to an attempt to 'run around' AAB by essentially going over his head to his superiors (ie 'the nuclear option'). That was touched upon by reports at the time. However, little emerged about the outcome of that tactic, other than that, ultimately, deliveries recommenced. One has to wonder whether that could, conceivably, be a factor in this latest spat. As it's hard to imagine AAB being particularly happy by that tactical move by Airbus, especially as he's known to be a formidable personality. Has he been waiting to settle an old score? Who knows. However, I also thought that he was fairly recently also in a serious spat with RR over engine maintenance/servicing/support for the Trent engines on the fleet? With RR refusing his requests? That was also fleetingly reported, I believe? But, again, seemed to be buried almost immediately. As I said, within this context (with previous significant spats with both Airbus and RR), does that hold a mirror up to AAB's current actions? Personally, I would guess it must be a possibility? For me, if it was any other personality, at any other airline, in any other jurisdiction then I would have a far higher surety of the issue. I am not denying there is one, but the opaqueness surrounding it, including the facts of the alleged Qatar regulatory position, plus the historical context, does raise questions about its seriousness/validity in my mind.

gads.. I've learned that when non lawyers start quoting contracts, law, etc., while they do it with the purest of intent, they are usually wrong when the issue is adjudicated or goes to arbitration. We all think we can read contracts, law, and fine print, but it is never that simple ,if it were we wouldn't need scores of lawyers.
There are really only a couple solid facts here: 1) 21 aircraft are grounded with deteriorating surfaces between the copper mesh and the final paint. 2)Airbus says that's normal, QR and several others say it's not. 3) Whatever the contracts say, the repair is not easy or cheap and may require a complete remanufacture of some or all of the composite structures. 4) Airbus wants arbitration to decide if it has to pay, if it doesn't 21 aircraft are headed to the scrappers since the tooling and repair processes are currently outside an airlines capability. 5) there are appearances of a Boeing/FAA coziness between Airbus and EASA and QR and their regulatory.

Everything else is just barroom noise.

kanban wrote:

gads.. I've learned that when non lawyers start quoting contracts, law, etc., while they do it with the purest of intent, they are usually wrong when the issue is adjudicated or goes to arbitration. We all think we can read contracts, law, and fine print, but it is never that simple ,if it were we wouldn't need scores of lawyers.
There are really only a couple solid facts here: 1) 21 aircraft are grounded with deteriorating surfaces between the copper mesh and the final paint. 2)Airbus says that's normal, QR and several others say it's not. 3) Whatever the contracts say, the repair is not easy or cheap and may require a complete remanufacture of some or all of the composite structures. 4) Airbus wants arbitration to decide if it has to pay, if it doesn't 21 aircraft are headed to the scrappers since the tooling and repair processes are currently outside an airlines capability. 5) there are appearances of a Boeing/FAA coziness between Airbus and EASA and QR and their regulatory.

Everything else is just barroom noise.

1) "grounded" by only one CAA worldwide, and said CAA might be too cozy with the airline.
2) EASA says it's not an airworthiness issue.
4) how do you know "tooling and repair processes are currently outside an airlines capability"?
5) if there was coziness between Airbus and EASA, why hasn't CAAs (such as the FAA) grounded the A350?

Sorry, but you're trying to shoot down assumptions by making even bigger assumptions.

WayexTDI wrote:

kanban wrote:

gads.. I've learned that when non lawyers start quoting contracts, law, etc., while they do it with the purest of intent, they are usually wrong when the issue is adjudicated or goes to arbitration. We all think we can read contracts, law, and fine print, but it is never that simple ,if it were we wouldn't need scores of lawyers.
There are really only a couple solid facts here: 1) 21 aircraft are grounded with deteriorating surfaces between the copper mesh and the final paint. 2)Airbus says that's normal, QR and several others say it's not. 3) Whatever the contracts say, the repair is not easy or cheap and may require a complete remanufacture of some or all of the composite structures. 4) Airbus wants arbitration to decide if it has to pay, if it doesn't 21 aircraft are headed to the scrappers since the tooling and repair processes are currently outside an airlines capability. 5) there are appearances of a Boeing/FAA coziness between Airbus and EASA and QR and their regulatory.

Everything else is just barroom noise.

1) "grounded" by only one CAA worldwide, and said CAA might be too cozy with the airline.
2) EASA says it's not an airworthiness issue.
4) how do you know "tooling and repair processes are currently outside an airlines capability"?
5) if there was coziness between Airbus and EASA, why hasn't CAAs (such as the FAA) grounded the A350?

Sorry, but you're trying to shoot down assumptions by making even bigger assumptions.

The Qatari CAA grounded specific aircraft, not the fleet. I suspect the aircraft are grounded until a repair is complete, which is not an unreasonable position. It remains fully within QR’s discretion if/when it is prepared to make a repair, be it temporary or permanent.

I also think other CAAs would also ground airplanes that did not have necessary repairs.

sxf24 wrote:

WayexTDI wrote:

kanban wrote:

gads.. I've learned that when non lawyers start quoting contracts, law, etc., while they do it with the purest of intent, they are usually wrong when the issue is adjudicated or goes to arbitration. We all think we can read contracts, law, and fine print, but it is never that simple ,if it were we wouldn't need scores of lawyers.
There are really only a couple solid facts here: 1) 21 aircraft are grounded with deteriorating surfaces between the copper mesh and the final paint. 2)Airbus says that's normal, QR and several others say it's not. 3) Whatever the contracts say, the repair is not easy or cheap and may require a complete remanufacture of some or all of the composite structures. 4) Airbus wants arbitration to decide if it has to pay, if it doesn't 21 aircraft are headed to the scrappers since the tooling and repair processes are currently outside an airlines capability. 5) there are appearances of a Boeing/FAA coziness between Airbus and EASA and QR and their regulatory.

Everything else is just barroom noise.

1) "grounded" by only one CAA worldwide, and said CAA might be too cozy with the airline.
2) EASA says it's not an airworthiness issue.
4) how do you know "tooling and repair processes are currently outside an airlines capability"?
5) if there was coziness between Airbus and EASA, why hasn't CAAs (such as the FAA) grounded the A350?

Sorry, but you're trying to shoot down assumptions by making even bigger assumptions.

The Qatari CAA grounded specific aircraft, not the fleet. I suspect the aircraft are grounded until a repair is complete, which is not an unreasonable position. It remains fully within QR’s discretion if/when it is prepared to make a repair, be it temporary or permanent.

I also think other CAAs would also ground airplanes that did not have necessary repairs.

I'll ask for the umpteenth time (since no one has yet to respond): on what actual basis are those aircraft grounded? Does anyone has the actual text from the Qatari CAA?
Are those necessary repairs due to QR's lack of maintenance? Or to manufacturing defects? Or maybe both?

As of right now, we are going round and round based on some comments from an unreasonable person (AAB, yes I said he's not reasonable) and some photos with very little background (which airplane were involved? which area of the plane was photographed? how big is the defect), all countered by the only official word from a CAA (EASA) that contradicts all this; yet we've still managed to go 18 pages so far, with no end in sight (in the same way of the QR/Airbus dispute).

WayexTDI wrote:

kanban wrote:

gads.. I've learned that when non lawyers start quoting contracts, law, etc., while they do it with the purest of intent, they are usually wrong when the issue is adjudicated or goes to arbitration. We all think we can read contracts, law, and fine print, but it is never that simple ,if it were we wouldn't need scores of lawyers.
There are really only a couple solid facts here: 1) 21 aircraft are grounded with deteriorating surfaces between the copper mesh and the final paint. 2)Airbus says that's normal, QR and several others say it's not. 3) Whatever the contracts say, the repair is not easy or cheap and may require a complete remanufacture of some or all of the composite structures. 4) Airbus wants arbitration to decide if it has to pay, if it doesn't 21 aircraft are headed to the scrappers since the tooling and repair processes are currently outside an airlines capability. 5) there are appearances of a Boeing/FAA coziness between Airbus and EASA and QR and their regulatory.

Everything else is just barroom noise.

1) "grounded" by only one CAA worldwide, and said CAA might be too cozy with the airline.
2) EASA says it's not an airworthiness issue.
4) how do you know "tooling and repair processes are currently outside an airlines capability"?
5) if there was coziness between Airbus and EASA, why hasn't CAAs (such as the FAA) grounded the A350?

Sorry, but you're trying to shoot down assumptions by making even bigger assumptions.

Well first who gets the repair procedure certified, I believe the OEM has done basic repair procedures for ramp rash, but the big stuff has been repaired by the OEM or one of its subcontractors. This is most certainly above any airlines capability, with possible exception of the top ranked ones like LH that performs lots of maintenance.

It's a tough fix, some factors I see are:
1) How to remove the remaining coatings between the structural shell and the mesh, the fasteners were install through it all, leaving little washers of crud at every of the bazillion fasteners on the plane.
2) How to clean the back side of the copper mesh, possibly remove all oxidation and corrosion, and prime it. Does that primer affect the shell resin or fiber.
3) What to do with the solvents, cleaners, and primers that ran under all those washers of crud.
4) Where mesh is lost, how is the new piece patched in, it must have new mesh installed. But the existing is attached by said fasteners noted in #1. Somehow the mesh needs to be electrically connected but lap splices bump the surface.
5) To install the mesh the existing fasteners in the area requiring replacement need to be removed. However, many areas on the wings are over tanks, where the fastener tips can spark in lightning. Special procedures required. Even worse is the underside of the wing, as the fasteners need to also be leak tight.
6) Once the mesh is cleaned and primed it needs to be pushed down snug when applying the coating over the mesh.
7) The surface of the coating in 6 needs to be smooth with little ripples, the profiles were already improved for drag just removing the roughness of the fasteners, its got to be smooth like a car is. Between the coating application and cure, what keeps the mesh from popping back up.
8) The bad news - the mesh is 0.5 mm and when the thickness exceeds 1.0 mm using material with a specific gravity of 1.5 the OEW rises from current. Thicknesses here are my own estimate as the replaced aluminum is around 3 mm.

Kanban's summary outline of the problem seems about right. It's not much different than the RR T1000 problems, coatings on the blades were not having the expected engine life between repairs. It was a three ring circus with airlines not having their planes for months. Prior to these problems RR was landing around half of the 787 orders, after it was below 1/3. This experience may have soured the relationship between QR and Airbus, but their A350 fleet is among the largest for the model. Other airlines considering the A350 will investigate this issue and may go elsewhere if they are not satisfied. Right now the 787 sales have flatlined since the barrel join issues came to light, won't return until the issue is resolved.

JayinKitsap wrote:

WayexTDI wrote:

kanban wrote:

gads.. I've learned that when non lawyers start quoting contracts, law, etc., while they do it with the purest of intent, they are usually wrong when the issue is adjudicated or goes to arbitration. We all think we can read contracts, law, and fine print, but it is never that simple ,if it were we wouldn't need scores of lawyers.
There are really only a couple solid facts here: 1) 21 aircraft are grounded with deteriorating surfaces between the copper mesh and the final paint. 2)Airbus says that's normal, QR and several others say it's not. 3) Whatever the contracts say, the repair is not easy or cheap and may require a complete remanufacture of some or all of the composite structures. 4) Airbus wants arbitration to decide if it has to pay, if it doesn't 21 aircraft are headed to the scrappers since the tooling and repair processes are currently outside an airlines capability. 5) there are appearances of a Boeing/FAA coziness between Airbus and EASA and QR and their regulatory.

Everything else is just barroom noise.

1) "grounded" by only one CAA worldwide, and said CAA might be too cozy with the airline.
2) EASA says it's not an airworthiness issue.
4) how do you know "tooling and repair processes are currently outside an airlines capability"?
5) if there was coziness between Airbus and EASA, why hasn't CAAs (such as the FAA) grounded the A350?

Sorry, but you're trying to shoot down assumptions by making even bigger assumptions.

Well first who gets the repair procedure certified, I believe the OEM has done basic repair procedures for ramp rash, but the big stuff has been repaired by the OEM or one of its subcontractors. This is most certainly above any airlines capability, with possible exception of the top ranked ones like LH that performs lots of maintenance.

It's a tough fix, some factors I see are:
1) How to remove the remaining coatings between the structural shell and the mesh, the fasteners were install through it all, leaving little washers of crud at every of the bazillion fasteners on the plane.
2) How to clean the back side of the copper mesh, possibly remove all oxidation and corrosion, and prime it. Does that primer affect the shell resin or fiber.
3) What to do with the solvents, cleaners, and primers that ran under all those washers of crud.
4) Where mesh is lost, how is the new piece patched in, it must have new mesh installed. But the existing is attached by said fasteners noted in #1. Somehow the mesh needs to be electrically connected but lap splices bump the surface.
5) To install the mesh the existing fasteners in the area requiring replacement need to be removed. However, many areas on the wings are over tanks, where the fastener tips can spark in lightning. Special procedures required. Even worse is the underside of the wing, as the fasteners need to also be leak tight.
6) Once the mesh is cleaned and primed it needs to be pushed down snug when applying the coating over the mesh.
7) The surface of the coating in 6 needs to be smooth with little ripples, the profiles were already improved for drag just removing the roughness of the fasteners, its got to be smooth like a car is. Between the coating application and cure, what keeps the mesh from popping back up.
8) The bad news - the mesh is 0.5 mm and when the thickness exceeds 1.0 mm using material with a specific gravity of 1.5 the OEW rises from current. Thicknesses here are my own estimate as the replaced aluminum is around 3 mm.

Kanban's summary outline of the problem seems about right. It's not much different than the RR T1000 problems, coatings on the blades were not having the expected engine life between repairs. It was a three ring circus with airlines not having their planes for months. Prior to these problems RR was landing around half of the 787 orders, after it was below 1/3. This experience may have soured the relationship between QR and Airbus, but their A350 fleet is among the largest for the model. Other airlines considering the A350 will investigate this issue and may go elsewhere if they are not satisfied. Right now the 787 sales have flatlined since the barrel join issues came to light, won't return until the issue is resolved.

The airlines are well acquainted with bonded repairs, which may be conducted on wing if required. The OEM's Structural Repair Manual will include instructions on materials, cure specifications, and procedures which may be followed. Typically, paint and coatings is sanded using 150-180 grit sand paper until one reaches the primer. Should the primer be suspect, sanding may be permitted down to the CFRP specifying that sanding should not create black dust. Fasteners can be removed and holes temporarily potted. Solvent cleaning is through use of MPK (or MEK overseas). Typically repairs are completed at either at 250F or 350F depending upon the cure temperature of the material. Higher temperature cures are more difficult as care must be taken around sealants and metal fittings to avoid damage. The repair will consist of a vacuum bag and a heat blanket with thermocouples used around the periphery and backside to monitor the cure. Typically an extra fiberglass ply is used on the exterior as a sanding ply to restore/maintain contour.

WayexTDI wrote:

kanban wrote:

gads.. I've learned that when non lawyers start quoting contracts, law, etc., while they do it with the purest of intent, they are usually wrong when the issue is adjudicated or goes to arbitration. We all think we can read contracts, law, and fine print, but it is never that simple ,if it were we wouldn't need scores of lawyers.
There are really only a couple solid facts here: 1) 21 aircraft are grounded with deteriorating surfaces between the copper mesh and the final paint. 2)Airbus says that's normal, QR and several others say it's not. 3) Whatever the contracts say, the repair is not easy or cheap and may require a complete remanufacture of some or all of the composite structures. 4) Airbus wants arbitration to decide if it has to pay, if it doesn't 21 aircraft are headed to the scrappers since the tooling and repair processes are currently outside an airlines capability. 5) there are appearances of a Boeing/FAA coziness between Airbus and EASA and QR and their regulatory.

Everything else is just barroom noise.

1) "grounded" by only one CAA worldwide, and said CAA might be too cozy with the airline.
2) EASA says it's not an airworthiness issue.
4) how do you know "tooling and repair processes are currently outside an airlines capability"?
5) if there was coziness between Airbus and EASA, why hasn't CAAs (such as the FAA) grounded the A350?

Sorry, but you're trying to shoot down assumptions by making even bigger assumptions.

The Structural Repair Manual may not have allowance for damage to the paint and mesh. If there is no instructions on how to handle damage, the airplane does not meet Type Design and therefore cannot be shown safe and cannot be dispatched. The airline would need to make a special telex request to the OEM describing the damage and receive approval/repair instructions before dispatch. Typically for this type of damage, the airline would be instructed to apply speed tape and be allowed a nominal number of flights/days until the airplane was returned to type design configuration.

EASA is responsible for finding initial compliance to the regulations for Type Design, but it is the responsibility of the local state agency, in this instance Qatar, to provide approval for airplanes registered and operated within its jurisdiction.

ElroyJetson wrote:

DartHerald wrote:

Aerospace is not the only regulated industry. I have some experience in the pharmaceutical industry and whilst it is quite possible to build a working rapport with the agency inspectors the good ones will maintain their distance - but they can do that because they are not conflicted by working for the same body! The real thrust of recent posts seems to be more along the lines of "who regulates the regulators?" and the answer of course is that the process has to end somewhere, and the regulatory authority is the one generally regarded as having the ultimate say. I think it has to be recognised and accepted, though that some of these bodies are narrower in both interests and experience than others.

I have been licensed in several fields. The industry policing agencies vary widely in quality and objectivity in my experience. Some are very good, some are not. Some are far too cosy with the industries they are regulating.

Aviation regulatory bodies sole agenda is public safety. Period. In the 737 MAX debacle the FAA came under intense scrutiny. Was it justified? Were they doing an excellent job protecting public safety? I will defer to others to make that judgement.

Many have questioned the motives and objectivity of the Qatari regulatory in this thread. Is that fair? Should the EASA have the same scrutiny?

I have no idea if the EASA or the Qatari regulator is correct. But if one is subject to scrutiny, so should the other.

Should be EASA and all other regulators other than the Qatari one are correct.

We will see how serious that is once international travel picks back up.

best regards
Thomas

This dispute between A and Q is about going public in a way like this. What we see is the French way to say enough is enough.

WayexTDI wrote:

sxf24 wrote:

WayexTDI wrote:

1) "grounded" by only one CAA worldwide, and said CAA might be too cozy with the airline.
2) EASA says it's not an airworthiness issue.
4) how do you know "tooling and repair processes are currently outside an airlines capability"?
5) if there was coziness between Airbus and EASA, why hasn't CAAs (such as the FAA) grounded the A350?

Sorry, but you're trying to shoot down assumptions by making even bigger assumptions.

The Qatari CAA grounded specific aircraft, not the fleet. I suspect the aircraft are grounded until a repair is complete, which is not an unreasonable position. It remains fully within QR’s discretion if/when it is prepared to make a repair, be it temporary or permanent.

I also think other CAAs would also ground airplanes that did not have necessary repairs.

I'll ask for the umpteenth time (since no one has yet to respond): on what actual basis are those aircraft grounded? Does anyone has the actual text from the Qatari CAA?
Are those necessary repairs due to QR's lack of maintenance? Or to manufacturing defects? Or maybe both?

As of right now, we are going round and round based on some comments from an unreasonable person (AAB, yes I said he's not reasonable) and some photos with very little background (which airplane were involved? which area of the plane was photographed? how big is the defect), all countered by the only official word from a CAA (EASA) that contradicts all this; yet we've still managed to go 18 pages so far, with no end in sight (in the same way of the QR/Airbus dispute).

We don’t know why the airplanes are grounded. The lack of public statements and rolling nature of the grounding would lead me to conclude it is because an issue is arising and not being corrected.

Have VN reported any similar issues with their A350's like QR ? They have some early built frames, a dark livery and operate in a hot ( OK, not Qatar hot ) climate.

TC957 wrote:

dark livery and operate in a hot ( OK, not Qatar hot ) climate.

In Vietnam, it's not the heat, it's the humidity.

Believe it or not, I hear that Vietnamese expat say it is worst in Houston Texas.

bt

sxf24 wrote:

WayexTDI wrote:

sxf24 wrote:

The Qatari CAA grounded specific aircraft, not the fleet. I suspect the aircraft are grounded until a repair is complete, which is not an unreasonable position. It remains fully within QR’s discretion if/when it is prepared to make a repair, be it temporary or permanent.

I also think other CAAs would also ground airplanes that did not have necessary repairs.

I'll ask for the umpteenth time (since no one has yet to respond): on what actual basis are those aircraft grounded? Does anyone has the actual text from the Qatari CAA?
Are those necessary repairs due to QR's lack of maintenance? Or to manufacturing defects? Or maybe both?

As of right now, we are going round and round based on some comments from an unreasonable person (AAB, yes I said he's not reasonable) and some photos with very little background (which airplane were involved? which area of the plane was photographed? how big is the defect), all countered by the only official word from a CAA (EASA) that contradicts all this; yet we've still managed to go 18 pages so far, with no end in sight (in the same way of the QR/Airbus dispute).

We don’t know why the airplanes are grounded. The lack of public statements and rolling nature of the grounding would lead me to conclude it is because an issue is arising and not being corrected.

Exactly. And that's this lack of transparency, coupled with the EASA statement and the fact that no other CAA has taken similar measures as the Qatari CAA, which is troubling and questionable.

WayexTDI wrote:

sxf24 wrote:

WayexTDI wrote:

I'll ask for the umpteenth time (since no one has yet to respond): on what actual basis are those aircraft grounded? Does anyone has the actual text from the Qatari CAA?
Are those necessary repairs due to QR's lack of maintenance? Or to manufacturing defects? Or maybe both?

As of right now, we are going round and round based on some comments from an unreasonable person (AAB, yes I said he's not reasonable) and some photos with very little background (which airplane were involved? which area of the plane was photographed? how big is the defect), all countered by the only official word from a CAA (EASA) that contradicts all this; yet we've still managed to go 18 pages so far, with no end in sight (in the same way of the QR/Airbus dispute).

We don’t know why the airplanes are grounded. The lack of public statements and rolling nature of the grounding would lead me to conclude it is because an issue is arising and not being corrected.

Exactly. And that's this lack of transparency, coupled with the EASA statement and the fact that no other CAA has taken similar measures as the Qatari CAA, which is troubling and questionable.

I would not say it’s troubling: the Qatari CAA’s job is to make sure Qatar registered airplanes are airworthy. It would make sense that A350s without repairs are not airworthy. The discrepancy is whether or not repairs are acceptable to the CAA and/or QR.

The more I read, I’m convinced this is not black and white, but quite nuanced with both sides posturing publicly behind half truths.

sxf24 wrote:

WayexTDI wrote:

sxf24 wrote:

We don’t know why the airplanes are grounded. The lack of public statements and rolling nature of the grounding would lead me to conclude it is because an issue is arising and not being corrected.

Exactly. And that's this lack of transparency, coupled with the EASA statement and the fact that no other CAA has taken similar measures as the Qatari CAA, which is troubling and questionable.

I would not say it’s troubling: the Qatari CAA’s job is to make sure Qatar registered airplanes are airworthy. It would make sense that A350s without repairs are not airworthy. The discrepancy is whether or not repairs are acceptable to the CAA and/or QR.

The more I read, I’m convinced this is not black and white, but quite nuanced with both sides posturing publicly behind half truths.

I agree it's their job to make sure the planes are airworthy; but, in this case, why not make public the text grounding those planes? Do they have anything to hide? If not, then show the proof.

WayexTDI wrote:

sxf24 wrote:

WayexTDI wrote:

Exactly. And that's this lack of transparency, coupled with the EASA statement and the fact that no other CAA has taken similar measures as the Qatari CAA, which is troubling and questionable.

I would not say it’s troubling: the Qatari CAA’s job is to make sure Qatar registered airplanes are airworthy. It would make sense that A350s without repairs are not airworthy. The discrepancy is whether or not repairs are acceptable to the CAA and/or QR.

The more I read, I’m convinced this is not black and white, but quite nuanced with both sides posturing publicly behind half truths.

I agree it's their job to make sure the planes are airworthy; but, in this case, why not make public the text grounding those planes? Do they have anything to hide? If not, then show the proof.

There is a significant amount of engagement between regulator and operators on a daily basis that is not publicized. Failing to receive the desired transparency does not mean a valid issue does not exist.

kanban wrote:

Everything else is just barroom noise.

You say that as if it is a bad thing!

sxf24 wrote:

The Qatari CAA grounded specific aircraft, not the fleet. I suspect the aircraft are grounded until a repair is complete, which is not an unreasonable position. It remains fully within QR’s discretion if/when it is prepared to make a repair, be it temporary or permanent.

I also think other CAAs would also ground airplanes that did not have necessary repairs.

As I've said before, there are many different reasons a regulator can ground a plane, and as you point out they did not ground the fleet therefore the presumption that they are saying the problem impacts all A350s is false. There is a lot of posturing going on.

WayexTDI wrote:

I'll ask for the umpteenth time (since no one has yet to respond): on what actual basis are those aircraft grounded? Does anyone has the actual text from the Qatari CAA?

Suppose the planes were actually grounded due to unpaid registration fees, would you expect Qatari CAA to post that to their web site? Point being you are making a presumption that they have to publish why they are doing what they are doing, which they probably don't. Of course it'd be helpful to know, but that's different than suggesting they must say.

JayinKitsap wrote:

Kanban's summary outline of the problem seems about right. It's not much different than the RR T1000 problems, coatings on the blades were not having the expected engine life between repairs. It was a three ring circus with airlines not having their planes for months. Prior to these problems RR was landing around half of the 787 orders, after it was below 1/3. This experience may have soured the relationship between QR and Airbus, but their A350 fleet is among the largest for the model. Other airlines considering the A350 will investigate this issue and may go elsewhere if they are not satisfied. Right now the 787 sales have flatlined since the barrel join issues came to light, won't return until the issue is resolved.

I'm not sure this becomes like T1000 or not. With T1000 there was no question the blades were failing before they should, there was no question about if the airplanes should be grounded, there was no maintenance steps the operators could take to preserve the life of the blades. This situation is different in that one can infer Airbus feels the "surface degradation" can be solved by routine maintenance and the airplanes never should have been grounded.

I'm not concerned about the 787 barrel issue, it's an issue of engineers specifying tolerances that can't be met in the factory and a very sensitive FAA is making Boeing dot the i's and cross the t's. I think it will be settled over time.

Airbus is sensitive to the reputational damage aspects of this, which is a double edge sword. QR may be using the regulator's grounding to suggest that this as a safety issue, but Airbus may be putting too much of the problem onto QR which IMO could generate concerns from current and future operators. Other operators may be silently observing the process, glad to let QR be the one to drive Airbus into providing a solution.

Revelation wrote:

WayexTDI wrote:

I'll ask for the umpteenth time (since no one has yet to respond): on what actual basis are those aircraft grounded? Does anyone has the actual text from the Qatari CAA?

Suppose the planes were actually grounded due to unpaid registration fees, would you expect Qatari CAA to post that to their web site? Point being you are making a presumption that they have to publish why they are doing what they are doing, which they probably don't. Of course it'd be helpful to know, but that's different than suggesting they must say.

When a CAA is ordering an airline to ground airplanes due to airworthiness questions, then yes, said CAA is expected to publish it for full transparency.
Given the turn this story is taking, it would be for the full benefit of the Qatari CAA and Qatar Airways to publish said order; if you keep it under wraps, and knowing Qatar Airways blaming history, it's easy to consider this as being suspicious.

sxf24 wrote:

WayexTDI wrote:

sxf24 wrote:

I would not say it’s troubling: the Qatari CAA’s job is to make sure Qatar registered airplanes are airworthy. It would make sense that A350s without repairs are not airworthy. The discrepancy is whether or not repairs are acceptable to the CAA and/or QR.

The more I read, I’m convinced this is not black and white, but quite nuanced with both sides posturing publicly behind half truths.

I agree it's their job to make sure the planes are airworthy; but, in this case, why not make public the text grounding those planes? Do they have anything to hide? If not, then show the proof.

There is a significant amount of engagement between regulator and operators on a daily basis that is not publicized. Failing to receive the desired transparency does not mean a valid issue does not exist.

Since the "issue" has been considered as not being worth of grounding the planes by the regulator that first approved the design, then yes I'll consider this issue not to be valid.

WayexTDI wrote:

Revelation wrote:

WayexTDI wrote:

I'll ask for the umpteenth time (since no one has yet to respond): on what actual basis are those aircraft grounded? Does anyone has the actual text from the Qatari CAA?

Suppose the planes were actually grounded due to unpaid registration fees, would you expect Qatari CAA to post that to their web site? Point being you are making a presumption that they have to publish why they are doing what they are doing, which they probably don't. Of course it'd be helpful to know, but that's different than suggesting they must say.

When a CAA is ordering an airline to ground airplanes due to airworthiness questions, then yes, said CAA is expected to publish it for full transparency.
Given the turn this story is taking, it would be for the full benefit of the Qatari CAA and Qatar Airways to publish said order; if you keep it under wraps, and knowing Qatar Airways blaming history, it's easy to consider this as being suspicious.

I think it's more nuanced than that. As far as I know, QCAA has said exactly nothing, and AAB has said QR is grounding the airplanes at the request of the regulator but nothing more than that. There is no statement where QCAA says they are grounding the airplanes due to airworthiness concerns. AAB says he doesn't know if the planes are safe or unsafe because he says the root cause of the problem has not been found, but that's him speaking not QCAA. All of this walks up to a certain line but doesn't cross it, IMO.

Revelation wrote:

kanban wrote:

Everything else is just barroom noise.

You say that as if it is a bad thing!

JayinKitsap wrote:

Kanban's summary outline of the problem seems about right. It's not much different than the RR T1000 problems, coatings on the blades were not having the expected engine life between repairs. It was a three ring circus with airlines not having their planes for months. Prior to these problems RR was landing around half of the 787 orders, after it was below 1/3. This experience may have soured the relationship between QR and Airbus, but their A350 fleet is among the largest for the model. Other airlines considering the A350 will investigate this issue and may go elsewhere if they are not satisfied. Right now the 787 sales have flatlined since the barrel join issues came to light, won't return until the issue is resolved.

I'm not sure this becomes like T1000 or not. With T1000 there was no question the blades were failing before they should, there was no question about if the airplanes should be grounded, there was no maintenance steps the operators could take to preserve the life of the blades. This situation is different in that one can infer Airbus feels the "surface degradation" can be solved by routine maintenance and the airplanes never should have been grounded.

I'm not concerned about the 787 barrel issue, it's an issue of engineers specifying tolerances that can't be met in the factory and a very sensitive FAA is making Boeing dot the i's and cross the t's. I think it will be settled over time.

Airbus is sensitive to the reputational damage aspects of this, which is a double edge sword. QR may be using the regulator's grounding to suggest that this as a safety issue, but Airbus may be putting too much of the problem onto QR which IMO could generate concerns from current and future operators. Other operators may be silently observing the process, glad to let QR be the one to drive Airbus into providing a solution.

I fully agree that immediate airworthiness is not in question like with the T1000, but I was looking at those cases with engines where the time on wing is X hours when the engines were purchased, but once the aircraft is in service the engine manufacturer comes back indicating that replacement of parts is now X/2, doubling the frequency of the maintenance. Should the airline pay for this added maintenance not in the original proposal?

I too do not feel there are any real issues with the 787 barrels, I don't think the FAA does either as there has not been a grounding, only closure of the line & no deliveries. I believe that Boeing has the fix, has the supporting calculations and basis, and is in the testing and certification phase. It takes months and months to get certifications done.

If this issue did not affect the lightning mesh or how it is adhered to the hull I would concur that it is basically painting type of maintenance that Airbus could stick to the airlines even though it will be a more extensive repainting and much closer intervals. Customers wouldn't be happy to spend more in this area than if it was another model.

Keeping the lightning protection in operation is integral to safe operation, the airlines already have to repair lightning damage where strikes had burn thru, but replacing whole square meters where it debonded seems to be far more than anticipated when purchasing, or their prior experience with other models.

Revelation wrote:

WayexTDI wrote:

Revelation wrote:

Suppose the planes were actually grounded due to unpaid registration fees, would you expect Qatari CAA to post that to their web site? Point being you are making a presumption that they have to publish why they are doing what they are doing, which they probably don't. Of course it'd be helpful to know, but that's different than suggesting they must say.

When a CAA is ordering an airline to ground airplanes due to airworthiness questions, then yes, said CAA is expected to publish it for full transparency.
Given the turn this story is taking, it would be for the full benefit of the Qatari CAA and Qatar Airways to publish said order; if you keep it under wraps, and knowing Qatar Airways blaming history, it's easy to consider this as being suspicious.

I think it's more nuanced than that. As far as I know, QCAA has said exactly nothing, and AAB has said QR is grounding the airplanes at the request of the regulator but nothing more than that. There is no statement where QCAA says they are grounding the airplanes due to airworthiness concerns. AAB says he doesn't know if the planes are safe or unsafe because he says the root cause of the problem has not been found, but that's him speaking not QCAA. All of this walks up to a certain line but doesn't cross it, IMO.

Hold the bus: since the beginning of this thread, the whole premise was that QR grounded the planes because QCCA asked them to due to airworthiness concerns.
NOW we're being more nuanced?

Come one, let's not fool ourselves here: there is no airworthiness concerns and AAB, trying to play the stronger man, has been caught with his pants down and is trying to find a way out while keeping face.

WayexTDI wrote:

Revelation wrote:

WayexTDI wrote:

When a CAA is ordering an airline to ground airplanes due to airworthiness questions, then yes, said CAA is expected to publish it for full transparency.
Given the turn this story is taking, it would be for the full benefit of the Qatari CAA and Qatar Airways to publish said order; if you keep it under wraps, and knowing Qatar Airways blaming history, it's easy to consider this as being suspicious.

I think it's more nuanced than that. As far as I know, QCAA has said exactly nothing, and AAB has said QR is grounding the airplanes at the request of the regulator but nothing more than that. There is no statement where QCAA says they are grounding the airplanes due to airworthiness concerns. AAB says he doesn't know if the planes are safe or unsafe because he says the root cause of the problem has not been found, but that's him speaking not QCAA. All of this walks up to a certain line but doesn't cross it, IMO.

Hold the bus: since the beginning of this thread, the whole premise was that QR grounded the planes because QCCA asked them to due to airworthiness concerns.
NOW we're being more nuanced?

Come one, let's not fool ourselves here: there is no airworthiness concerns and AAB, trying to play the stronger man, has been caught with his pants down and is trying to find a way out while keeping face.

There’s always been an opportunity for nuance, but a lack of interest to seek it.

JayinKitsap wrote:

If this issue did not affect the lightning mesh or how it is adhered to the hull I would concur that it is basically painting type of maintenance that Airbus could stick to the airlines even though it will be a more extensive repainting and much closer intervals. Customers wouldn't be happy to spend more in this area than if it was another model.

Keeping the lightning protection in operation is integral to safe operation, the airlines already have to repair lightning damage where strikes had burn thru, but replacing whole square meters where it debonded seems to be far more than anticipated when purchasing, or their prior experience with other models.

Airbus's argument seems to be a mesh exposure isn't a problem since the lightening protection is extensive and exposure doesn't make it stop working. It's a hard argument to make, IMO, yet we have seen Boeing just drop protection from parts of the 787 saying the fleet data shows various areas of the airplane are not at risk.

WayexTDI wrote:

Hold the bus: since the beginning of this thread, the whole premise was that QR grounded the planes because QCCA asked them to due to airworthiness concerns.
NOW we're being more nuanced?

Actually not, the whole thread started because of an issue found repainting one A350 and from that point on Airbus has been framing this as a paint issue whereas QR has been saying it's not clear what the issue is because the root cause is not understood.

If you do some googling, Airbus seems to be winning that battle of words. It is most often described as a paint issue and not an airworthiness issue.

WayexTDI wrote:

Come one, let's not fool ourselves here: there is no airworthiness concerns and AAB, trying to play the stronger man, has been caught with his pants down and is trying to find a way out while keeping face.

IMO it's about cold hard cash rather than saving face. Both sides are trying to get themselves into the most advantageous position they can for the next round of the battle, presumably arbitration.

The most plausible explanation to me is that the grounded aircraft have not been repaired so the Qatari regulator feels that in an unrepaired state they are not airworthy.

Of course, Airbus claims offers have been made to repair the aircraft in question but QR has turned them down. I happen to believe Airbus.

AAB says essentially says he wants to know " the root cause" of the problem before a final solution is put forth and the aircraft are fixed.

So, we have a classic standoff.

To my mind everyone is telling their own truth. The EASA thinks in general the skin degradation problem is not cause to ground the A350 fleet. From what I know they are correct. AAB wants to understand "the root cause," and Airbus to come up with a long term fix, and also pay for the fix.

Airbus probably feels AAB is being unreasonable, and the operators will have to eat the maintenance costs going forward, with probably some technical and financial support from Arbus throw in.

Nobody is outright lying, everyone is telling partial truths in an attempt to win the public relations battle and either extract money from the other party, or prevent the bleeding of money. It will be fascinating to see how it all turns out.

Do the complaints about Qatar pilots flight and duty hours in other threads not point towards a conflict of interest between the operator and the regulator? In this example, do Qatar pilots fly to the same FDP limitations as their European colleagues. If not why not? I know this is not a FDP discussion.