Pythagoras wrote:All of this is just hearsay and speculation.
It is a fact that the ADS-B data was available in public forums two hours after the 2nd crash. I think it's safe speculation that someone within Boeing saw it soon thereafter.
Pythagoras wrote:Muilenburg certainly knew much more than what he decided to tell Trump.
You seem to be suggesting he lied to Trump when he said he knew the plane was safe, because if he 'knew more', it was that it was highly likely that MCAS had activated multiple times in the 2nd crash. As the NYT article said his staff was working on a response the day before he spoke to Trump. If they didn't have that info then they really were not trying to understand what actually happened, since even us a.netters understood by then that the ET crash had huge similarities to the JT crash.
Pythagoras wrote:Remember this behavior is all highly unusual. Why is a CEO calling the President of the United States during an on-going accident investigation when the FAA is the responsible government entity to be communicating with and to be making any public statement?
Remember as well that both Boeing and the FAA are bureaucratic organizations and decisions must be reviewed and vetted by appropriate layers of management. It isn't quite as easy as you believe for the engineering team reach a conclusion and then have the organizations instantaneously act upon that recommendation.
Like it or not, that's how the previously elected chief executive operated. Boeing is a rich corporation, their CEO's pay alone was $millions a year, it's his job and his corporation's job to be able to operate in the environment as it exists, not how it used to exist in 1969.
Gremlinzzzz wrote:The last two paragraphs though capture how this was so similar to what happened 40 years earlier.
Didn't read since it's behind a paywall...
Maybe I should adjust my reference above to 1979?
To be honest it does feel like Boeing was acting the way it would have acted 40 or 50 years earlier. Just put out the word that the airplane is safe without doing the work to check if the airplane doesn't have a huge flaw like the ADS-B data should have suggested to Boeing Engineering. Assume the public accepts the occasional catastrophic plane crash as a price to pay for air travel like they might have in 1969 or 1979. Don't be proactive and ground the plane yourself even though you have two different crashes with similar circumstances, let the FAA be the heavy and make you do it, far less law suits that way. Keep making the story about how FAA wasn't strict enough even though you continuously lobby the FAA to be more lenient and in the end it's a Boeing plane that crashes regardless of FAA regulations.
I also made the argument that there are risks in air travel shortly after both crashes, and argued to wait till more facts were in, but of course Boeing had facts pretty quickly and seems to have spent their time trying to figure out how to deal with the bad news, and in a way, still are.
My reaction may have been tempered because I have seen risks involving air travel. People working in the same facility as me were on SR-111 in 1998. People in my church knew some pilots and crew that were lost on 9/11. So there is risk every time you get in an airplane, just like when you get into a car.
The difference here is that the 2nd MCAS crash was avoidable, just like the 2nd DC-10 crash was. In both cases it's apparent that a big corporation wasn't willing to accept it could and did make mistakes. Its default posture was to be in denial till it could no longer could plausibly remain in denial, and even then try to limit the damage to one or two individuals making human errors rather than admitting its system did not detect designs with serious problems.