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kalvado
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Fri Nov 12, 2021 3:07 pm

Revelation wrote:
Noshow wrote:
Boeing needs their investors to agree on investing first.
If they only would move ahead now they could beat their competitors. They almost waited for too long. Now they face low deliveries/income and must invest big at the same time. Bring the NMA, bring the NSA but plan with realistic schedules and costs.

To use Harry's terminology, to be successful in commercial aviation you have to find investors who want to own a great engineering firm rather than a great business. I'm not sure this is possible in the current USA. It's strange to see some of the most successful recent companies in the US really were about inventing great things i.e. Amazon, SpaceX, and Tesla. Musk and Bezos had their visions, and they kept enough power to make sure they could keep investing in that vision till it paid off. Yet once the products mature, then the profit taking ensues. Sooner or later industrial investors acquire controlling interests, and it then becomes just like Boeing, money gets invested in keeping the stock price high rather than inventing great things. Industrial investors do not want to own a great engineering firm, they want to own a money making machine.

People keep thinking it is only about $$$ and C_Os to make a difference. At the same time they downplay Chinese money - talk about consistent point of view.

Here is the most frightening quote from Gates' article:
One FAA safety engineer, who cannot be identified because he spoke without FAA approval, said that in one certification specialty more than 20 such Boeing engineers left in a single month.

“I go to meetings now and don’t know the names,” he wrote in a text. “Brain drain!”

Baby boomers generation was in a sense unprecedented. They came into after two world wars cleaned up the scene, and stayed longer than any other generation. And they didn't do a good job in training replacement as there was little opportunity for professional growth for younger generations. Yes, they may come back as consultants... But they will be irreversibly expiring soon.
I said it before, I am saying it again - Boeing problems are not in C-suit, they are on engineering floors.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Fri Nov 12, 2021 3:44 pm

kalvado wrote:
Baby boomers generation was in a sense unprecedented. They came into after two world wars cleaned up the scene, and stayed longer than any other generation. And they didn't do a good job in training replacement as there was little opportunity for professional growth for younger generations. Yes, they may come back as consultants... But they will be irreversibly expiring soon.
I said it before, I am saying it again - Boeing problems are not in C-suit, they are on engineering floors.

Organizations take on the character of their leaders. That starts at the C-Suite. The fish rots from the head. There really is nothing the engineering floor can do to fix itself, that has to come from getting schedules/budgets that allow some room for older engineers to maintain/grow their skill sets and mentor younger engineers. Guess what, that just is not happening, due to bean counter mentality. Older engineers are fully scheduled. Younger engineers are quite frequently being hired offshore, no real opportunity for mentorship there. Quality drops, no one cares.

As a tail-end baby boomer, one thing I see in younger engineers is they don't stand up when they get pushed to do half assed work, they say you get what you get and turn in half assed work. They say it's not my job to worry about anything not on my desk, even if I can see how fubar'd other things are. This was not the mentality when I entered the industry. There was a team spirit, and if someone was letting the team down, they heard about it. Now, they say "it is what it is" and go home at 5PM.

It wouldn't surprise me if that isn't how we got the MCAS foobar. Test pilots knew some weird stuff happened, but not my job to make sure engineering knew/understood the concern, that would just take time we don't have to sort out. MCAS given more authority and active at the low speed regime, let's not tell FAA, that package is already signed off.
 
FLYBY72
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Fri Nov 12, 2021 4:18 pm

Revelation wrote:
kalvado wrote:
It wouldn't surprise me if that isn't how we got the MCAS foobar. Test pilots knew some weird stuff happened, but not my job to make sure engineering knew/understood the concern, that would just take time we don't have to sort out. MCAS given more authority and active at the low speed regime, let's not tell FAA, that package is already signed off.


Wrong again. The Boeing Test pilots did tell the FAA test pilots about the changes to MCAS. It is confirmed in the DOJ report. The FAA test pilots just never told the AEG.

Here, I will post it for a 5th time from the DOJ report

others in Boeing disclosed MCAS’s expanded operational scope to different FAA personnel who were responsible for determining whether the 737 MAX met U.S. federal airworthiness standards
Last edited by FLYBY72 on Fri Nov 12, 2021 4:42 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
kalvado
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Fri Nov 12, 2021 4:24 pm

FLYBY72 wrote:
others in Boeing disclosed MCAS’s expanded operational scope to different FAA personnel who were responsible for determining whether the 737 MAX met U.S. federal airworthiness standards

That's part of a bigger problem. Such information should not be spread as word of mouth.
And it is ESPECIALLY bad that it was pilots who relayed the engineering information.

Of course, a possible legal standard is "one person knew - entire organization knew". That doesn't negate the fact that those who had to know were not informed.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Fri Nov 12, 2021 4:34 pm

kalvado wrote:
FLYBY72 wrote:
others in Boeing disclosed MCAS’s expanded operational scope to different FAA personnel who were responsible for determining whether the 737 MAX met U.S. federal airworthiness standards

That's part of a bigger problem. Such information should not be spread as word of mouth.
And it is ESPECIALLY bad that it was pilots who relayed the engineering information.

Yes, that's the point I was trying to make, but did so poorly. A lot of the communication was done informally which left the opportunity for it to be misunderstood, forgotten or ignored.
 
djpearman
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Sat Nov 13, 2021 12:38 pm

Revelation wrote:
As a tail-end baby boomer, one thing I see in younger engineers is they don't stand up when they get pushed to do half assed work, they say you get what you get and turn in half assed work. They say it's not my job to worry about anything not on my desk, even if I can see how fubar'd other things are. This was not the mentality when I entered the industry. There was a team spirit, and if someone was letting the team down, they heard about it. Now, they say "it is what it is" and go home at 5PM.

As a younger engineer, my experience developing aircraft electronics is that the only aspects that (usually older) managers cared about were time and money, never quality. It didn't matter how well the design performed, so long as it cost less than it's sold for and was completed on time. Since I don't like compromising on quality, I was coerced into leaving.

Is it then surprising that the next generation eventually succumbs to that sort of pressure?
 
Noshow
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Sat Nov 13, 2021 2:11 pm

I am not convinced that young engineers are less accurate and bow to pressure in any different way from older colleagues.
Just get rid of too much pressure. Like magic timelines or budgets too tight. That's top level decisions.
 
frmrCapCadet
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Sat Nov 13, 2021 2:42 pm

An armchair ceo comment. Had Boeing only half way screwed up the 787 mess, and only half of the MAX fubar, and let's say the 777X would have faced tighter regulatory certification because Boeing, congress, and the agencies agreed the prior balance was wrong. Manufacturing and deliveries would never have been stopped more more than weeks as opposed to months and years. There would easily have been enough money to build the MOM, which most on line here thought would be a great success with airlines, and possibly not much of a profit maker. Boeing would be sitting on top of the heap, or at least close. Had any of the frequent posters been on the board and stuck with this plan, psycho CEOs would have got rid of them and stuck with their plans for personal enrichment. After all, it did work for all of them.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Sat Nov 13, 2021 3:18 pm

djpearman wrote:
Revelation wrote:
As a tail-end baby boomer, one thing I see in younger engineers is they don't stand up when they get pushed to do half assed work, they say you get what you get and turn in half assed work. They say it's not my job to worry about anything not on my desk, even if I can see how fubar'd other things are. This was not the mentality when I entered the industry. There was a team spirit, and if someone was letting the team down, they heard about it. Now, they say "it is what it is" and go home at 5PM.

As a younger engineer, my experience developing aircraft electronics is that the only aspects that (usually older) managers cared about were time and money, never quality. It didn't matter how well the design performed, so long as it cost less than it's sold for and was completed on time. Since I don't like compromising on quality, I was coerced into leaving.

Is it then surprising that the next generation eventually succumbs to that sort of pressure?

That's really unfortunate. I know for a fact that my immediate supervisors took a lot of heat for those of us in the trenches. They realized that if we were totally stressed out we'd get nothing done. Sadly that seems to be lost in many environments, they just pass on the heat, and if anything, multiply it. Hopefully you've found a better environment to work in.
 
Vicenza
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Re: Yet Another Dreary Boeing Scolding

Sat Nov 13, 2021 7:55 pm

BawliBooch wrote:
Opus99 wrote:
Does the US government run anything engineering successfully?


But even the notoriously inefficient US government would be an improvement over the incompetent bunch of buffoons running Boeing right now. This level of incompetence is almost criminal! Their Planes are falling out of the sky and Boeing execs are running around like a bunch of mad bulls in a China shop!

Boeing is a National Institution and the US Government should be doing something to save it!


What do you propose.....and not conveniently forgetting that Boeing is a private company?
 
djpearman
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Sat Nov 13, 2021 10:49 pm

Revelation wrote:
djpearman wrote:
Revelation wrote:
As a tail-end baby boomer, one thing I see in younger engineers is they don't stand up when they get pushed to do half assed work, they say you get what you get and turn in half assed work. They say it's not my job to worry about anything not on my desk, even if I can see how fubar'd other things are. This was not the mentality when I entered the industry. There was a team spirit, and if someone was letting the team down, they heard about it. Now, they say "it is what it is" and go home at 5PM.

As a younger engineer, my experience developing aircraft electronics is that the only aspects that (usually older) managers cared about were time and money, never quality. It didn't matter how well the design performed, so long as it cost less than it's sold for and was completed on time. Since I don't like compromising on quality, I was coerced into leaving.

Is it then surprising that the next generation eventually succumbs to that sort of pressure?

That's really unfortunate. I know for a fact that my immediate supervisors took a lot of heat for those of us in the trenches. They realized that if we were totally stressed out we'd get nothing done. Sadly that seems to be lost in many environments, they just pass on the heat, and if anything, multiply it. Hopefully you've found a better environment to work in.

I would very much like to have such supervisors and one of my former supervisors did attempt to shield us from much of the extreme micro-management. I very much enjoyed working for and with him and the team he created. However, the reporting tools introduced removed / bypassed much of the skill associated with successful project management, reducing complex progress assessment to frequently questionable single numbers (key performance indicators) and limiting supervisors to administrative tasks.

I am now in a situation vastly preferable for myself :)
 
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Pythagoras
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Sun Nov 14, 2021 1:18 am

Revelation wrote:
kalvado wrote:
FLYBY72 wrote:
[b]

That's part of a bigger problem. Such information should not be spread as word of mouth.
And it is ESPECIALLY bad that it was pilots who relayed the engineering information.

Yes, that's the point I was trying to make, but did so poorly. A lot of the communication was done informally which left the opportunity for it to be misunderstood, forgotten or ignored.


Here is how CPE Michael Teal described the communication process in his deposition to Congress:

Q So whose job would it have been, if there were going to be a change in MCAS, to inform the chief technical pilot or the other technical pilots about the change that was being made?

A The team would have to create a coordination sheet defining the changes that were being done and share it throughout the team. I'm assuming it went through the pilot organization, and the pilot organization would ensure that it got to the appropriate people.


Q So --

A I don't know exactly how that process works. I'm not --


Q But is it your expectation that a change like the change that was done to MCAS would have been information that would have been shared with the technical pilots? It wouldn't have been held secret from them, would it?

A It wouldn't. It would not have been held from them, no.


Q Okay.

A It should have been shared.


Q Do you know whose job it would be at Boeing to inform the FAA about a change like that to MCAS?

A Certainly. As part of the team that came forth with the change and the recommendation, they brought forth to me a communication plan to the FAA where we would go and share with the FAA technical specialists the changes that we're doing. As well as, I certainly know that pilots at the FAA would get involved, because the pilots would end up having to fly the enhanced -- or not enhanced. That's the wrong word -- expanded MCAS functionality. They would have to fly it for certification purposes. So the pilots would know and the technical experts would know and the certification plans would have to be updated and ultimately the certification deliverable. So the engineering team would do that.


What I would note here it that the focus of the communication is on the certification deliverables. As far as I can know, the coordination sheet which communicated the change to MCAS functionality which occurred during flight test in March 2016 has not been released into the public record. The distribution list on the coordination sheet would answer a lot of questions.
 
Scotron12
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Sun Nov 14, 2021 7:50 am

It will be interesting to learn what Forkner says during his trial. Will the DPA that Boeing has with the DOJ still stand if he provides incriminating evidence of higher up direction?

As mentioned previously, his lawyer, David Gerger, is no dummy. Some of his past cases are complete exoneration of the BP engineer tried for pollution and MANSLAUGHTER in the Deepwater Horizon blowout. (BP total bill for that disaster over $$65Billion)
 
FLYBY72
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Sun Nov 14, 2021 6:06 pm

Pythagoras wrote:

What I would note here it that the focus of the communication is on the certification deliverables. As far as I can know, the coordination sheet which communicated the change to MCAS functionality which occurred during flight test in March 2016 has not been released into the public record. The distribution list on the coordination sheet would answer a lot of questions.


Yes, that sheet would answer a lot of questions indeed. Why has the FAA not provided it to congress or anyone else? Maybe they don’t want anyone knowing they retained certification for MCAS and it was not delegated like we have been told.
 
CanukinUSA
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Mon Nov 15, 2021 5:03 am

Coordination sheets are a Boeing Internal document. I think that the question should be whether the coordination sheet was obtained by government agencies such as the Department of Justice, FBI and Inspector General of the Department of Transportation when they obtained documents after the Ethiopian accident when they searched Boeing facilities. If the sheet was not obtained then why has is not been demanded by the authorities from Boeing.
There should have been quite a number of documents related to the simulator in question that the comments were made from as a result of the simulator certification by the National Simulator Program office of the FAA which likely was involved with the approval of the simulator shortly before the training requirements were being considered. An approved simulator has to be used to determine the training requirements.
It does not sound to me that a very professional investigation was done by the DOJ, FBI and FAA in this case.
 
Scotron12
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Mon Nov 15, 2021 6:03 am

Could be true and that Boeing figured to cut a deal with the DOJ, hence the DPA. Throw enough money to squash any deep scruitiny on the B737MAX.
 
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Tue Nov 16, 2021 8:09 pm

Long extract from a new book coming out on the MCAS topic:

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features ... -737-crash

Titled: Flying Blind: The 737 Max Tragedy and the Fall of Boeing, by Peter Robison, to be published on Nov. 30 by Doubleday.

One interesting quote, from the meeting with Boeing VP Mike Sinnett and AA's pilot union officials, after the JT crash but before the ET one:

If there’s a runaway stabilizer, Sinnett asked them, why does the reason matter? Can’t a pilot in such a situation just run the checklist? The American Airlines flyers knew instinctively that a malfunction like the one on the Lion Air jet would take time to diagnose. “This particular one is masked by so many other distractions,” union spokesman Dennis Tajer answered. “Exactly,” Michaelis agreed.

The plane was still new to the pilots, and few had flown it much or done little more than cursory training on an iPad. Michaelis fumed that, from the accounts he’d read, the software had kept whacking the nose of the plane down: “You’re touching my stick, you know?” Boeing “would’ve had a real shitstorm,” he continued, if the same failure had happened on a Max flight out of Miami and American had dropped a plane into Biscayne Bay. “Somebody at the corporate level made the decision that this isn’t important to brief our pilots on,” he said.

The pilots kept raising scenarios for Sinnett, and they ended up almost talking among themselves. One pilot wondered why he got only 40 minutes of training on the Max when the display was so different from its predecessor’s. Another pointed out that American still didn’t have a Max simulator.

Sinnett finally summoned words to match their intensity. “You’ve got to understand that our commitment to safety is as great as yours,” he said. “It really is. And the worst thing that can ever happen is a tragedy like this. And the even worse thing would be another one. So we have to do all the things we can to make sure that this never happens again.” He said Boeing was working hard on an MCAS update to tame the system. “Not a year, but a couple—maybe six weeks-ish,” he said.

This was the conversation that was taped "discretely" by the AA union guy. I don't know if the transcript has already been released, but it's very interesting to me. The AA pilots responded instantly about how/why relying on the four second rule was a total non-starter. It seems so dubious the way Boeing talked themselves into just going with it! The Boeing VP says they are working on a fix to be released in six weeks. Didn't anyone within Boeing do a serious analysis on the risk of not getting that fix out before another crash? Apparently FAA did, but allegedly its math was done incorrectly and unfortunatly, too optimistically.

Overall the piece talks about a kind of "omerta", or code of silence, amongst Boeing engineers about safety issues. Allegedly, bad consequences befell engineers who wrote in email that the infamous 737 rudder failover situation was a problem for the company, so they as a tribe responded by saying as little as possible about safety issues, especially in written form.
 
StTim
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Tue Nov 16, 2021 8:23 pm

Revelation wrote:

Overall the piece talks about a kind of "omerta", or code of silence, amongst Boeing engineers about safety issues. Allegedly, bad consequences befell engineers who wrote in email that the infamous 737 rudder failover situation was a problem for the company, so they as a tribe responded by saying as little as possible about safety issues, especially in written form.


The fact that the only fall guy for the MCAS fiasco is a mid layer guy who used instant messaging (probably not knowing they were stored) shows how effective, for Boeing, that silence has been.
 
CanukinUSA
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Tue Nov 16, 2021 10:27 pm

Interesting Town Hall Seattle Event to be livestreamed on Friday 11/19/2021 at 07:30 PM PST (Seattle) time on "Flying Blind:The 737 MAX Tragedy and the Fall of Boeing" with Dominic Gates (Seattle Times) and Peter Robison (Bloombeerg).
https://townhallseattle.org/event/peter ... nic-gates/
I think you have to register with the Town Hall Seattle to get the livestream.
 
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Pythagoras
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Wed Nov 17, 2021 8:18 am

Revelation wrote:
Long extract from a new book coming out on the MCAS topic:

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features ... -737-crash

Titled: Flying Blind: The 737 Max Tragedy and the Fall of Boeing, by Peter Robison, to be published on Nov. 30 by Doubleday.

One interesting quote, from the meeting with Boeing VP Mike Sinnett and AA's pilot union officials, after the JT crash but before the ET one:

If there’s a runaway stabilizer, Sinnett asked them, why does the reason matter? Can’t a pilot in such a situation just run the checklist? The American Airlines flyers knew instinctively that a malfunction like the one on the Lion Air jet would take time to diagnose. “This particular one is masked by so many other distractions,” union spokesman Dennis Tajer answered. “Exactly,” Michaelis agreed.

The plane was still new to the pilots, and few had flown it much or done little more than cursory training on an iPad. Michaelis fumed that, from the accounts he’d read, the software had kept whacking the nose of the plane down: “You’re touching my stick, you know?” Boeing “would’ve had a real shitstorm,” he continued, if the same failure had happened on a Max flight out of Miami and American had dropped a plane into Biscayne Bay. “Somebody at the corporate level made the decision that this isn’t important to brief our pilots on,” he said.

The pilots kept raising scenarios for Sinnett, and they ended up almost talking among themselves. One pilot wondered why he got only 40 minutes of training on the Max when the display was so different from its predecessor’s. Another pointed out that American still didn’t have a Max simulator.

Sinnett finally summoned words to match their intensity. “You’ve got to understand that our commitment to safety is as great as yours,” he said. “It really is. And the worst thing that can ever happen is a tragedy like this. And the even worse thing would be another one. So we have to do all the things we can to make sure that this never happens again.” He said Boeing was working hard on an MCAS update to tame the system. “Not a year, but a couple—maybe six weeks-ish,” he said.

This was the conversation that was taped "discretely" by the AA union guy. I don't know if the transcript has already been released, but it's very interesting to me. The AA pilots responded instantly about how/why relying on the four second rule was a total non-starter. It seems so dubious the way Boeing talked themselves into just going with it! The Boeing VP says they are working on a fix to be released in six weeks. Didn't anyone within Boeing do a serious analysis on the risk of not getting that fix out before another crash? Apparently FAA did, but allegedly its math was done incorrectly and unfortunatly, too optimistically.

Overall the piece talks about a kind of "omerta", or code of silence, amongst Boeing engineers about safety issues. Allegedly, bad consequences befell engineers who wrote in email that the infamous 737 rudder failover situation was a problem for the company, so they as a tribe responded by saying as little as possible about safety issues, especially in written form.


From the Bloomberg article:

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-11-16/are-boeing-planes-unsafe-pilots-blamed-for-corporate-errors-in-max-737-crash

Early that December, staffers in the FAA’s Aircraft Certification Service concluded there might be 15 more Max crashes without a software fix, based on a rough estimate that one in every hundred pilots might have trouble handling the rare sensor failure.


This answers the question of who was responsible for the analysis which permitted the 737Max to continue to fly after the Lion Air accident. I'm surprised by the 1-in-100 pilot number used in the risk analysis. It doesn't sound like a number where anyone put any thought into it. It seems like a number that someone used to arrive at a predetermined answer. I would have guessed 1-in-10 would have been used because Safety Engineers are usually very conservative with this type of analysis.
 
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keesje
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Wed Nov 17, 2021 8:50 am

If Boeing had grounded the MAX after Lionair it would have had severe consequences.

- share price would have taken a hit, hurting hundreds of thousands of small investors and executive bonusses.
- the Boeing competitive position against Airbus would have suffered
- Southwest would need to be compensated because training manual changes

Better wait for the official crash investigation report that will be released in 18 months and not overreact to unconfirmed rumours. Pilots performance probably played a big rol.

Pilot error or improper maintenance. Seen the Lionair track record? Pilot training. viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1407217&start=100

Arrogance was huge.
 
frmrCapCadet
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Wed Nov 17, 2021 3:28 pm

And always have plausible deniability about anything that can go wrong. Never leave a paper trail. "Did we do something criminal? You gotta prove it beyond reasonable doubt." That, more or less, got me into trouble on this site some time ago. Oh yes, I also mentioned that Boeing seemed not able to make and deliver planes. Plus words to the effect (more or less from the CEO) bragging that Boeing was no longer an engineering company. Did I claim that as a home team rooter I retained the right to be as critical as needed? Guilty!
 
CanukinUSA
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Wed Nov 17, 2021 5:20 pm

The Lion Air Official Aircraft Accident report has been released and is available on the Indonesian Aircraft Accident Investigiation site.
The Ethiopean Accident report has not been released and is a preliminary version only. When the official report will be released is not currently known given the civil war that is going on in Ethiopia right now. Your guess is as good as mine. It was remoured to be released a few months ago but that has not happened.
 
CanukinUSA
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Wed Nov 17, 2021 6:23 pm

Correction: Last sentence should be in previous post: It was rumoured to be released a few months ago but that has not happened.
 
kalvado
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Wed Nov 17, 2021 8:04 pm

CanukinUSA wrote:
The Lion Air Official Aircraft Accident report has been released and is available on the Indonesian Aircraft Accident Investigiation site.
The Ethiopean Accident report has not been released and is a preliminary version only. When the official report will be released is not currently known given the civil war that is going on in Ethiopia right now. Your guess is as good as mine. It was remoured to be released a few months ago but that has not happened.

Do we actually expect anything new from ET report?
Most of events are pretty clear, and problems are acted upon. Any responsibility assignment would be highly political, with ultimate responsibilities pretty much decided by courts.
 
CanukinUSA
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Sat Nov 20, 2021 3:10 am

It appears that the Presentation "Flying Blind:The 737 MAX Tragedy and the Fall of Boeing" may be livestreamed in about 20 minutes on youtube at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8JB65CUaQ-M
 
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Dalavia
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Sat Nov 20, 2021 11:10 am

CanukinUSA wrote:
It appears that the Presentation "Flying Blind:The 737 MAX Tragedy and the Fall of Boeing" may be livestreamed in about 20 minutes on youtube at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8JB65CUaQ-M


It was live streamed. I watched it from start to finish. Nothing really new but very interesting nonetheless, with some perceptive insights especially into Boeing’s culture shift (for the worse) over recent decades. It was, of course, designed to promote the launch of the book.

Thank you for the “heads up” that enabled me to tune into it.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Sat Nov 20, 2021 2:37 pm

Dalavia wrote:
It was live streamed. I watched it from start to finish. Nothing really new but very interesting nonetheless, with some perceptive insights especially into Boeing’s culture shift (for the worse) over recent decades. It was, of course, designed to promote the launch of the book.

Just reading the excerpt from Bloomberg (see my earlier post) gave me the same impression.

Here's the part I mean:

Boeing had been a giant of American aviation for a century, but a financial reinvention under Muilenburg turned it into something else—a Wall Street darling. In 2017 it had reported a 67% jump in earnings, to $8.2 billion. Boeing’s share price had almost tripled during Muilenburg’s short tenure, reaching more than $386, and his chief financial officer, Greg Smith, told colleagues in one meeting that it could top $800 or $900 if the company kept doing what had made shareholders happy: raising the dividend, buying back shares, and keeping expenses low.

That’s precisely what some people at Boeing feared, according to hundreds of hours of interviews with current and former employees for the book from which this article is adapted, Flying Blind: The 737 Max Tragedy and the Fall of Boeing. Among themselves, they complained about how a company that had once been ruled by engineers who thumbed their noses at Wall Street now celebrated managers for cost-cutting, co-opted regulators, and pressured suppliers with relentless, Walmart-style tactics to cut their prices.

I get it, there are some companies that are overly indulgent on the tech side and others that are overly focused on the bottom line, and some that manage to strike a balance between rewarding shareholders and investing in the company's future. Boeing has had this run where they are overly focused on rewarding shareholders, and of course, executives, since they pay themselves in shares. It's hard to see them making the changes they need to make under Calhoun. There's very little evidence that he'll do anything but continue the practices he helped shape as a board member during the Muilenburg era.
 
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Sat Nov 20, 2021 2:43 pm

Revelation wrote:
Dalavia wrote:
It was live streamed. I watched it from start to finish. Nothing really new but very interesting nonetheless, with some perceptive insights especially into Boeing’s culture shift (for the worse) over recent decades. It was, of course, designed to promote the launch of the book.

Just reading the excerpt from Bloomberg (see my earlier post) gave me the same impression.

Here's the part I mean:

Boeing had been a giant of American aviation for a century, but a financial reinvention under Muilenburg turned it into something else—a Wall Street darling. In 2017 it had reported a 67% jump in earnings, to $8.2 billion. Boeing’s share price had almost tripled during Muilenburg’s short tenure, reaching more than $386, and his chief financial officer, Greg Smith, told colleagues in one meeting that it could top $800 or $900 if the company kept doing what had made shareholders happy: raising the dividend, buying back shares, and keeping expenses low.

That’s precisely what some people at Boeing feared, according to hundreds of hours of interviews with current and former employees for the book from which this article is adapted, Flying Blind: The 737 Max Tragedy and the Fall of Boeing. Among themselves, they complained about how a company that had once been ruled by engineers who thumbed their noses at Wall Street now celebrated managers for cost-cutting, co-opted regulators, and pressured suppliers with relentless, Walmart-style tactics to cut their prices.

I get it, there are some companies that are overly indulgent on the tech side and others that are overly focused on the bottom line, and some that manage to strike a balance between rewarding shareholders and investing in the company's future. Boeing has had this run where they are overly focused on rewarding shareholders, and of course, executives, since they pay themselves in shares. It's hard to see them making the changes they need to make under Calhoun. There's very little evidence that he'll do anything but continue the practices he helped shape as a board member during the Muilenburg era.

Is there anyone within Boeing who could potentially be good? I don’t know where they’ll hire from externally
 
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Sat Nov 20, 2021 3:19 pm

Pythagoras wrote:
[...]

This answers the question of who was responsible for the analysis which permitted the 737Max to continue to fly after the Lion Air accident. I'm surprised by the 1-in-100 pilot number used in the risk analysis. It doesn't sound like a number where anyone put any thought into it. It seems like a number that someone used to arrive at a predetermined answer. I would have guessed 1-in-10 would have been used because Safety Engineers are usually very conservative with this type of analysis.


This is what was, and still is, mind boggling to me.

This did not start from a failure arising from some complex unusual interaction in some intricate feedback loop or some unexpected inaccuracy in the inverse dynamics of the model reference blocks. This was a trivial "fail high" failure, that an undergraduate controls student can simulate.

Take your Matlab/Simulink (or whatever they use) model, feed fail high/fail lows to all the sensors, one at a time and in combination, see what happens. You don't need a human to test all combinations, a computer can easily do it.

Take the simplest possible math model of a pilot, a gain pilot (correction proportional to departure from trim), and see what this hypothetical pilot would do after 3, 4, 5, 10, 20 seconds.

I'd bet anything that this simple due diligence would have shown massive red flags on the 4-second assumption. Not predicted what would have happened, mind you, the model is too crude (although I'm sure that Boeing has the required human factors expertise in-house), but raising massive red flags, yes.
 
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Sat Nov 20, 2021 3:58 pm

IADFCO wrote:
I'd bet anything that this simple due diligence would have shown massive red flags on the 4-second assumption. Not predicted what would have happened, mind you, the model is too crude (although I'm sure that Boeing has the required human factors expertise in-house), but raising massive red flags, yes.

A lot of what we see seems to be people working from the desired answer backwards. There's just too much of it in so many different directions. Occam's Razor kicks in. The simplest explanation that fits is the correct answer.
 
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Sat Nov 20, 2021 7:18 pm

Pythagoras wrote:

From the Bloomberg article:

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-11-16/are-boeing-planes-unsafe-pilots-blamed-for-corporate-errors-in-max-737-crash

Early that December, staffers in the FAA’s Aircraft Certification Service concluded there might be 15 more Max crashes without a software fix, based on a rough estimate that one in every hundred pilots might have trouble handling the rare sensor failure.


This answers the question of who was responsible for the analysis which permitted the 737Max to continue to fly after the Lion Air accident. I'm surprised by the 1-in-100 pilot number used in the risk analysis. It doesn't sound like a number where anyone put any thought into it. It seems like a number that someone used to arrive at a predetermined answer. I would have guessed 1-in-10 would have been used because Safety Engineers are usually very conservative with this type of analysis.


So if the risk assessment had used one in every ten pilots might have trouble handling the rare sensor failure, the projections would have been 150 more Max crashes without the software fix. Congress members and victims families were incredulous that the 737Max was continued to fly with the prospects of 15 more accidents. The should be even more incredulous that the FAA erred in its assessment on the unsafe side of the equation by presuming an optimistic 1-in-100 incorrect pilot action.
 
CanukinUSA
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Mon Nov 29, 2021 7:44 pm

It appears that some member of the US Congress are asking for more details on the Boeing 737 Max oversight by the FAA. We will see if this amounts to anything or not.
For details go to
https://www.reuters.com/business/aerosp ... 021-11-29/
 
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eeightning
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Fresh Air interview: decline of Boeing as an Engineering leader

Fri Dec 03, 2021 3:58 am

https://www.npr.org/2021/11/29/10597844 ... he-737-max

The Author is Bloomberg Biz week reporter Peter Robison, and the book "Flying Blind: The 737 MAX Tragedy And The Fall Of Boeing."

Nothing new, but he does a nice job explaining how Boeing morphed from an Engineering drivin' company who rarely made such terrible engineering decisions (and when they did they accepted responsibility) to a financial engineering company that excelled at engineering shortcuts above all, and also tricking regulators into letting them get away with it, and finally shifting blame onto pilots, and token scapegoats.

It is an excellent interview and there is much more in it. Listen yourself, or read the book and share your observations.
 
trex8
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Re: Fresh Air interview: decline of Boeing as an Engineering leader

Fri Dec 03, 2021 3:45 pm

eeightning wrote:
https://www.npr.org/2021/11/29/1059784424/flying-blind-author-says-boeing-put-profit-ahead-of-safety-with-the-737-max

The Author is Bloomberg Biz week reporter Peter Robison, and the book "Flying Blind: The 737 MAX Tragedy And The Fall Of Boeing."

Nothing new, but he does a nice job explaining how Boeing morphed from an Engineering drivin' company who rarely made such terrible engineering decisions (and when they did they accepted responsibility) to a financial engineering company that excelled at engineering shortcuts above all, and also tricking regulators into letting them get away with it, and finally shifting blame onto pilots, and token scapegoats.

It is an excellent interview and there is much more in it. Listen yourself, or read the book and share your observations.

Im about a 1/3 way through the book, this is a must read for anutters. How Boeing (and Im sure many other companies) got totally messed up by the Welch GE view of providing shareholder value and not concentrating on their products will be something they teach in biz schools in the future, along with the mea culpas from the biz school profs who already are saying they got it wrong.
 
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Re: Fresh Air interview: decline of Boeing as an Engineering leader

Fri Dec 03, 2021 3:54 pm

trex8 wrote:
Im about a 1/3 way through the book, this is a must read for anutters. How Boeing (and Im sure many other companies) got totally messed up by the Welch GE view of providing shareholder value and not concentrating on their products will be something they teach in biz schools in the future, along with the mea culpas from the biz school profs who already are saying they got it wrong.

Then those same students will see how much wealth people like Jack Welsh, Harry Stonecipher, Jim McNearney, et al accumulated, and think to themselves "if I play my cards right I can be them", and soon forget what their college profs said.
 
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Fri Dec 03, 2021 4:29 pm

CanukinUSA wrote:
It appears that some member of the US Congress are asking for more details on the Boeing 737 Max oversight by the FAA. We will see if this amounts to anything or not.
For details go to
https://www.reuters.com/business/aerosp ... 021-11-29/


They will continue to stall like they have been doing. They sure don't want congress knowing the truth.
 
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Fri Dec 03, 2021 4:36 pm

FLYBY72 wrote:
CanukinUSA wrote:
It appears that some member of the US Congress are asking for more details on the Boeing 737 Max oversight by the FAA. We will see if this amounts to anything or not.
For details go to
https://www.reuters.com/business/aerosp ... 021-11-29/

They will continue to stall like they have been doing. They sure don't want congress knowing the truth.

Then Congress can stall on the next set of payments for KC-46, F-15 EX, etc.
 
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Fri Dec 03, 2021 5:02 pm

If the design team built the landing gear leg to take half the load and it failed, would they blame the FAA for not catching it?
MCAS having more speed, multiple firings, and based on one sensor should have been caught by Boeing, if they had professional pride in their design. I think they should have asked the question, what if an AOA sensor fails, which many will over the fleet in 20 years. They could have tested that with an unknowing airline crew on a test flight with some Boeing test pilots to save them. Instead, the defacto plan was to test that in the real world with a passenger flight, and then after a crash, try it again?
At some point, whoever makes a complex design, owns it at least 90%. If there is a structural engineer for a tall building in the city of Chicago or New York, the building department isn't going to catch everything. Unless the FAA puts the same amount of hours into checking Boeing's work as Boeing uses in design, which is unrealistic.
It's like using a table saw, somebody could be standing there watching you for safety, but the bottom line is you have to focus enough to decrease the risk of mistake is the core tenet.
 
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Fri Dec 03, 2021 5:17 pm

frmrCapCadet wrote:
An armchair ceo comment. Had Boeing only half way screwed up the 787 mess, and only half of the MAX fubar, and let's say the 777X would have faced tighter regulatory certification because Boeing, congress, and the agencies agreed the prior balance was wrong. Manufacturing and deliveries would never have been stopped more more than weeks as opposed to months and years. There would easily have been enough money to build the MOM, which most on line here thought would be a great success with airlines, and possibly not much of a profit maker. Boeing would be sitting on top of the heap, or at least close. Had any of the frequent posters been on the board and stuck with this plan, psycho CEOs would have got rid of them and stuck with their plans for personal enrichment. After all, it did work for all of them.

It is too bad that this stopped progress on the MOM. For the first time in my life, I question if Boeing has the ability to build a clean sheet. The fine tuned US aerospace machine that cranked out hundreds of designs in the 50s, 60s, and 70s, seems to be a thing of the past to say the least.
 
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Pythagoras
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Re: Fresh Air interview: decline of Boeing as an Engineering leader

Fri Dec 03, 2021 5:25 pm

trex8 wrote:
eeightning wrote:
https://www.npr.org/2021/11/29/1059784424/flying-blind-author-says-boeing-put-profit-ahead-of-safety-with-the-737-max

The Author is Bloomberg Biz week reporter Peter Robison, and the book "Flying Blind: The 737 MAX Tragedy And The Fall Of Boeing."

Nothing new, but he does a nice job explaining how Boeing morphed from an Engineering drivin' company who rarely made such terrible engineering decisions (and when they did they accepted responsibility) to a financial engineering company that excelled at engineering shortcuts above all, and also tricking regulators into letting them get away with it, and finally shifting blame onto pilots, and token scapegoats.

It is an excellent interview and there is much more in it. Listen yourself, or read the book and share your observations.

Im about a 1/3 way through the book, this is a must read for anutters. How Boeing (and Im sure many other companies) got totally messed up by the Welch GE view of providing shareholder value and not concentrating on their products will be something they teach in biz schools in the future, along with the mea culpas from the biz school profs who already are saying they got it wrong.


I was at the official program launch for both 777 down at what we called the B-52 hanger at Boeing Field and also the 777X in Everett at the Dreamlifter Flight Center. The 777 Program launch featured the University of Washington marching and former aeronautical engineer and now manager Phil Condit clumsily throwing a football out into the audience. It was a bit cheesy but everyone enjoyed it. The program manager for 777X was Scott Fancher, an executive who had spent 30 years in Boeing Defense & Space--primarily within anti-missile defense--before moving over into Commercial where he previously had managed the 787 program. At that program launch, there was none of the energy that was there at the original 777 launch. What I remember most from the 777X launch was what was not said. What was not said was how great the airplane was going to be for the passenger--the larger windows, wider seats, lower cabin altitude, new lighting and interior. Mulally, who loved telling the story about the bumping toilet seat, knew that his team of engineers and manufacturing operations would be motivated by what they were doing was going to have a measurable benefit to people. Not so Fancher. And that in my view is the synopsis of what went wrong with Boeing. Fancher was a fine executive. No complaints about how he ran his team or communicated but it just that thinking about the bigger vision he was not what he was graded on.
 
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Fri Dec 03, 2021 5:43 pm

Not making Mulally CEO was a huge mistake Boeing made. Up to that time the setup for the follow on programs was timed right.
 
FLYBY72
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Fri Dec 03, 2021 6:09 pm

Revelation wrote:
FLYBY72 wrote:
CanukinUSA wrote:
It appears that some member of the US Congress are asking for more details on the Boeing 737 Max oversight by the FAA. We will see if this amounts to anything or not.
For details go to
https://www.reuters.com/business/aerosp ... 021-11-29/

They will continue to stall like they have been doing. They sure don't want congress knowing the truth.

Then Congress can stall on the next set of payments for KC-46, F-15 EX, etc.


What does the FAA stalling Congress have to do with the KC-46, F-15EX?
 
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Fri Dec 03, 2021 6:11 pm

FLYBY72 wrote:
Revelation wrote:
FLYBY72 wrote:
They will continue to stall like they have been doing. They sure don't want congress knowing the truth.

Then Congress can stall on the next set of payments for KC-46, F-15 EX, etc.

What does the FAA stalling Congress have to do with the KC-46, F-15EX?

Good point, I had a brain fart. Congress also controls FAA's budget though. They should have plenty of leverage if they want to use it.
 
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Fri Dec 03, 2021 6:19 pm

DenverTed wrote:
If the design team built the landing gear leg to take half the load and it failed, would they blame the FAA for not catching it?
MCAS having more speed, multiple firings, and based on one sensor should have been caught by Boeing, if they had professional pride in their design. I think they should have asked the question, what if an AOA sensor fails, which many will over the fleet in 20 years. They could have tested that with an unknowing airline crew on a test flight with some Boeing test pilots to save them. Instead, the defacto plan was to test that in the real world with a passenger flight, and then after a crash, try it again?
At some point, whoever makes a complex design, owns it at least 90%. If there is a structural engineer for a tall building in the city of Chicago or New York, the building department isn't going to catch everything. Unless the FAA puts the same amount of hours into checking Boeing's work as Boeing uses in design, which is unrealistic.
It's like using a table saw, somebody could be standing there watching you for safety, but the bottom line is you have to focus enough to decrease the risk of mistake is the core tenet.



Boring did catch all of that. They also told the FAA all of that. Guess what? It met standards. MCAS is a sub mode mode of the Speed Trim System. Malfunctions of the STS were rated hazardous by THE FAA!! So sub mode rated hazardous only requires 1 sensor. The FAA knows this. They know because they, not Boeing, certified it. That is why they are stalling Congress. Boeing handed over everything. The FAA has not. The FAA is also not letting certain people talk to Congress. Why is that?
 
DenverTed
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Fri Dec 03, 2021 6:35 pm

FLYBY72 wrote:
DenverTed wrote:
If the design team built the landing gear leg to take half the load and it failed, would they blame the FAA for not catching it?
MCAS having more speed, multiple firings, and based on one sensor should have been caught by Boeing, if they had professional pride in their design. I think they should have asked the question, what if an AOA sensor fails, which many will over the fleet in 20 years. They could have tested that with an unknowing airline crew on a test flight with some Boeing test pilots to save them. Instead, the defacto plan was to test that in the real world with a passenger flight, and then after a crash, try it again?
At some point, whoever makes a complex design, owns it at least 90%. If there is a structural engineer for a tall building in the city of Chicago or New York, the building department isn't going to catch everything. Unless the FAA puts the same amount of hours into checking Boeing's work as Boeing uses in design, which is unrealistic.
It's like using a table saw, somebody could be standing there watching you for safety, but the bottom line is you have to focus enough to decrease the risk of mistake is the core tenet.



Boring did catch all of that. They also told the FAA all of that. Guess what? It met standards. MCAS is a sub mode mode of the Speed Trim System. Malfunctions of the STS were rated hazardous by THE FAA!! So sub mode rated hazardous only requires 1 sensor. The FAA knows this. They know because they, not Boeing, certified it. That is why they are stalling Congress. Boeing handed over everything. The FAA has not. The FAA is also not letting certain people talk to Congress. Why is that?

So if the speed trim is based on one AOA, there must have been ten to fifty failures over the years that the crews had to deal with. I wonder what the history of that looks like. Obviously MCAS must have been a more severe event of a speed trim failure.
My point was that a builder has 75% responsibility for building something that works, and the safety checking mechanism of the building dept. or FAA is only 25%. I don't think a structural engineer for a high rise can just design faulty product, and then when it fails, wash their hands and say the building dept. is 100% responsible for safety and catching all mistakes.
 
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Pythagoras
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Fri Dec 03, 2021 7:10 pm

DenverTed wrote:
FLYBY72 wrote:
DenverTed wrote:
If the design team built the landing gear leg to take half the load and it failed, would they blame the FAA for not catching it?
MCAS having more speed, multiple firings, and based on one sensor should have been caught by Boeing, if they had professional pride in their design. I think they should have asked the question, what if an AOA sensor fails, which many will over the fleet in 20 years. They could have tested that with an unknowing airline crew on a test flight with some Boeing test pilots to save them. Instead, the defacto plan was to test that in the real world with a passenger flight, and then after a crash, try it again?
At some point, whoever makes a complex design, owns it at least 90%. If there is a structural engineer for a tall building in the city of Chicago or New York, the building department isn't going to catch everything. Unless the FAA puts the same amount of hours into checking Boeing's work as Boeing uses in design, which is unrealistic.
It's like using a table saw, somebody could be standing there watching you for safety, but the bottom line is you have to focus enough to decrease the risk of mistake is the core tenet.



Boring did catch all of that. They also told the FAA all of that. Guess what? It met standards. MCAS is a sub mode mode of the Speed Trim System. Malfunctions of the STS were rated hazardous by THE FAA!! So sub mode rated hazardous only requires 1 sensor. The FAA knows this. They know because they, not Boeing, certified it. That is why they are stalling Congress. Boeing handed over everything. The FAA has not. The FAA is also not letting certain people talk to Congress. Why is that?

So if the speed trim is based on one AOA, there must have been ten to fifty failures over the years that the crews had to deal with. I wonder what the history of that looks like. Obviously MCAS must have been a more severe event of a speed trim failure.
My point was that a builder has 75% responsibility for building something that works, and the safety checking mechanism of the building dept. or FAA is only 25%. I don't think a structural engineer for a high rise can just design faulty product, and then when it fails, wash their hands and say the building dept. is 100% responsible for safety and catching all mistakes.


This is exactly why I see that MCAS is a failure of configuration control. In my view, there just wasn't anybody in the room when the design change was made that had any operational experience to challenge the assessment that an MCAS failure as "just like" a runaway stab trim failure. And with the lack of that type of experience in the room, the default question asked of the engineering team was "Is this change certifiable?" with the assumption that if it was certifiable than it was a safe design. That is the way the regulations are supposed to work. But the change appears to have been inadvertently hidden from the FAA human factors regulators and hidden from the technical pilots who would have been the ones to challenge the hazardous classification.
 
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Fri Dec 03, 2021 7:37 pm

Pythagoras wrote:
But the change appears to have been inadvertently hidden from the FAA human factors regulators and hidden from the technical pilots who would have been the ones to challenge the hazardous classification.

Or maybe it was not inadvertent, but we'll never know because Boeing has managed to keep the key decision makers in that loop under wraps, and Congress never followed the paper trail from 737 Chief Engineer Teal (who says he only heard about multiple activation via the media and just trusted his underlings on the flight control team without any due diligence) down to whomever made the actual decisions.
 
kalvado
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Fri Dec 03, 2021 7:49 pm

Revelation wrote:
Pythagoras wrote:
But the change appears to have been inadvertently hidden from the FAA human factors regulators and hidden from the technical pilots who would have been the ones to challenge the hazardous classification.

Or maybe it was not inadvertent, but we'll never know because Boeing has managed to keep the key decision makers in that loop under wraps, and Congress never followed the paper trail from 737 Chief Engineer Teal (who says he only heard about multiple activation via the media and just trusted his underlings on the flight control team without any due diligence) down to whomever made the key decisions.

And what would that change, after all? It is possibly possible to put someone (two, ten ones) behind the bars.
Would it resurrect those who died? Would it help MAX to be a better plane? Would it make future planes safer?
Any follow up is only as good as it would make for some better future. Putting blame on someone personally would hardly change problematic workflows, and not necessarily make people more willing to share concerns.
So maybe there is a better option than pinpointing guilty?
 
StTim
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Re: Updated: Boeing's Fatal Flaw, former Chief Technical Pilot indicted

Fri Dec 03, 2021 8:00 pm

kalvado wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Pythagoras wrote:
But the change appears to have been inadvertently hidden from the FAA human factors regulators and hidden from the technical pilots who would have been the ones to challenge the hazardous classification.

Or maybe it was not inadvertent, but we'll never know because Boeing has managed to keep the key decision makers in that loop under wraps, and Congress never followed the paper trail from 737 Chief Engineer Teal (who says he only heard about multiple activation via the media and just trusted his underlings on the flight control team without any due diligence) down to whomever made the key decisions.

And what would that change, after all? It is possibly possible to put someone (two, ten ones) behind the bars.
Would it resurrect those who died? Would it help MAX to be a better plane? Would it make future planes safer?
Any follow up is only as good as it would make for some better future. Putting blame on someone personally would hardly change problematic workflows, and not necessarily make people more willing to share concerns.
So maybe there is a better option than pinpointing guilty?

I agree but what is happening at the moment is those in leadership positions are not being held responsible for their actions. What chance they, and Boeing, have really learnt their lesson?

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