sxf24 wrote:

How could Forkner be a fall guy when the government investigated Boeing extensively? This would require prosecutors to be stupid or Boeing to withhold evidence.

Or if the actual prosecution goal being creating as much appearance of a due process as possible while minimizing the actual damage to the major defense contractor and exporter.

rbavfan wrote:

Canuck600 wrote:

FLYBY72 wrote:

News Flash!!! Nothing was hidden from the FAA. The FAA knows this. Boeing handed over all documents, the FAA did not. The FAA has also refused to make certain employees açaí me for questioning, and those that were some refused to talk. It is all in the a congressional report

It is the FAA that needs to be held accountable.

How do you know they handed over all the documents? Purely speculation, but you do have to wonder if some stuff "accidentally" fell into a shredder that just happened to be running at the time.

He noted it was in the congressional record. So that would be how he knows.

Unless some were hidden or made to disappear. That's the point I was trying to make, how do we truly know all the relevant documents have been found

Scotron12 wrote:

sxf24 wrote:

How could Forkner be a fall guy when the government investigated Boeing extensively? This would require prosecutors to be stupid or Boeing to withhold evidence.

Well, Forkner certainly did not do anything for personal gain. If you read the charges, he is accused of fraud. The only benefactor, if true, was Boeing.

Seperately, Boeing has a DPA currently in effect. The whole thing stinks IMO. The Justice Department lawyer on the DPA, is now with Kirkland & Ellis, longtime Boeing counsel.

Law firms have fire walls for conflict of interest so you shouldn’t read much into that. There aren’t that many large corporate law firms.

Well...maybe so. The details, which I hope will show, who actually was the driver in this sorry saga. With $Billions at stake, it's in Boeings best interest to deflect away from the company.

Which raises the question of who is funding Forkners legal team. They are not cheap!

sxf24 wrote:

How could Forkner be a fall guy when the government investigated Boeing extensively? This would require prosecutors to be stupid or Boeing to withhold evidence.

Or both. Seriously. Technical minutia is dreary. Finding drunken texts of employees slagging off their bosses is fun. Boeing has been heavily regulated for pretty much its entire existence so I can imagine its excels at burying troublesome data and its people know to keep certain conversations in verbal form to avoid future scrutiny. I've seen enough of that in the industries I've worked in, and none of them have been heavily regulated.

It seems to me quite obvious the Senate investigators didn't try to dig very hard on the engineering side. They just interviewed the chief project engineer who said astounding things like he didn't know about mcas multiple activation till he heard about it from the media, and left it at that without following up. There's no evidence they talked to anyone who actually made the decision to not put mcas into the catastrophic category to find out how much pressure they were under to save time and money by doing so.

It's very sad. I get it, lawyers are not engineers, but all you really needed to do was read the reporting by Seattle Times, NYT and WaPo and follow the cookie crumbs. None of those reporters are engineers either.

Scotron12 wrote:

Seperately, Boeing has a DPA currently in effect. The whole thing stinks IMO. The Justice Department lawyer on the DPA, is now with Kirkland & Ellis, longtime Boeing counsel.

Indeed it reeks. The government keeps calling it a $2.5B fine yet (from memory) $1.8B was money Boeing already agreed to pay in compensation.

My memory wasn't too bad:

he DOJ said the charge was being filed as part of a deferred prosecution agreement that will also see Boeing pay more than $2.5 billion in fines.

The charge of “conspiracy to defraud the United States” specifically stemmed from allegations that employees concealed details from Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulators in its investigation of two crashes between October 2018 and March 2019 that killed 346 people.
...
Boeing’s fine consists of a $243 million criminal penalty, $500 million to people who lost relatives in the crash and $1.77 billion to global airlines affected by subsequent groundings of the aircrafts.

Ref: https://thehill.com/policy/transportati ... ax-crashes

The government actually fined Boeing $243M, yet we keep reading about it as a $2.5B fine, even in the title of the article. I know the agreement to pay airlines $1.8B was already in place at the time, it was already written off their books. I believe the $500M for victims families was "new" but still something Boeing was likely going to pay anyway. The only additional fine Boeing was hit with was $243M, at best a wrist slap and good value for money for Boeing since they could now say things like

Boeing President and CEO David Calhoun said the deferred prosecution agreement was the “right thing to do” and acknowledged that his firm’s wrongdoing.

“I firmly believe that entering into this resolution is the right thing for us to do—a step that appropriately acknowledges how we fell short of our values and expectations,” he said in a statement. “This resolution is a serious reminder to all of us of how critical our obligation of transparency to regulators is, and the consequences that our company can face if any one of us falls short of those expectations.”

Ref: Ibid.

Amazingly small fine for conspiring to defraud the government, inflated to look better in the media, yet at the same time reinforces the idea the only thing Boeing did wrong was not update the training material (as opposed to all the flaws in mcas itself) and they still get to reinforce the narrative that the only "one of us" that did something wrong was Forkner.

Scotron12 wrote:

Which raises the question of who is funding Forkners legal team. They are not cheap!

According to one excerpt I read from Peter Robison's book "Flying Blind", he says Boeing is actually paying for Forkner's legal team. I guess they want to feel he wasn't totally defenseless as they set him up for the fall.

It will be interesting to see if this lawsuit filed by the 737 Crash Victims families mentioned in today's New York Times blows apart the Boeing/DOJ agreement over the MAX mess given that the proper process appears to not have been followed by the previous US administration in it's last days by not consulting the victums families. Maybe some of the lawyers on this site can comment on this. I believe there were clauses in the agreement if anything significant came out that the agreement would not be in effect. For details go to:
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/16/busi ... Position=2

CanukinUSA wrote:

It will be interesting to see if this lawsuit filed by the 737 Crash Victims families mentioned in today's New York Times blows apart the Boeing/DOJ agreement over the MAX mess given that the proper process appears to not have been followed by the previous US administration in it's last days by not consulting the victums families. Maybe some of the lawyers on this site can comment on this. I believe there were clauses in the agreement if anything significant came out that the agreement would not be in effect. For details go to:
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/16/busi ... Position=2

The DPA said that if information about Boeing came out the DPA could terminate, not disputes between the government and other stakeholders.

CanukinUSA wrote:

It will be interesting to see if this lawsuit filed by the 737 Crash Victims families mentioned in today's New York Times blows apart the Boeing/DOJ agreement over the MAX mess given that the proper process appears to not have been followed by the previous US administration in it's last days by not consulting the victums families. Maybe some of the lawyers on this site can comment on this. I believe there were clauses in the agreement if anything significant came out that the agreement would not be in effect. For details go to:
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/16/busi ... Position=2

Victims families (and their lawyers, first and foremost) want money. Not truth (whatever that means and whatever they say), not blood (apparently, Boeing is too big to find a single person. They may get a scapegoat, though). I expect a settlement.
So no, until US government wants to dig to the bottom of it - but I don't think there will be a real push to air that dirty laundry. Now with US government changed twice since MCAS was configured, current admin is busy with other issues, facing covid crisis and aftermath... I wouldn't bet on full and thorough investigation.

Revelation wrote:

It seems to me quite obvious the Senate investigators didn't try to dig very hard on the engineering side. They just interviewed the chief project engineer who said astounding things like he didn't know about mcas multiple activation till he heard about it from the media, and left it at that without following up. There's no evidence they talked to anyone who actually made the decision to not put mcas into the catastrophic category to find out how much pressure they were under to save time and money by doing so.

I suppose it is still possible that there is evidence for undue pressure on the technical staff. But there has not even been a hint of that to date. I have tried to explain that the actual decision making would have occurred within the specific discipline rather than involving any of the Program executives. Simply put, the Flight Controls organization was responsible for solving this problem and would have made all decisions internally without involving other disciplines. And where it may be entirely obvious to you that MCAS should be considered catastrophic, the language of the Advisory Circular and its reliance upon a qualitative assessment gives sufficient latitude for the certification approach that was followed.

The following is taken from the Advisory Circular AC No: 25.1309-1A SYSTEM DESIGN AND ANALYSIS

The definitions of "Severe Major" and "Catastrophic" are as follows:

(2) Major: Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of the airplane or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be, for example, --
(i} A significant reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, a significant increase in crew workload or in conditions impairing crew efficiency, or some discomfort to occupants; or
(ii) In more severe cases, a large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, higher workload or physical distress such that the crew could not be relied on to perform its tasks accurately or completely, or adverse effects on occupants.

(3) Catastrophic: Failure conditions which would prevent continued safe flight and landing.

Within AC 25.1309-1A, a qualitative assessment is acceptable when taking credit for flight crew action. Here is the section on flightcrew action. It would not take exceptional pilot skill or strength to toggle the electric trim switch to bring the airplane back into a trimmed state before hitting the cutout switches.

11. a. Flightcrew Action. When assessing the ability of the flightcrew to cope with a failure condition, the warning information and the complexity of the required action should be considered (reference Paragraph 8g(5)). If the evaluation indicates that a potential failure condition can be alleviated or overcome during the time available without jeopardizing other safety-related flightcrew tasks and without requiring exceptional pilot skill or strength, credit may be taken for correct and appropriate corrective action, for both qualitative and quantitative assessments. Similarly, credit may be taken for correct flightcrew performance of CCRs if overall flightcrew workload during the time available to perform them is not excessive and if they do not require exceptional pilot skill or strength. Unless flightcrew actions are accepted as normal airmanship, they should be described in the FAA-approved AFM or AFM revision or supplement.

Revelation wrote:

Amazingly small fine for conspiring to defraud the government, inflated to look better in the media, yet at the same time reinforces the idea the only thing Boeing did wrong was not update the training material (as opposed to all the flaws in mcas itself) and they still get to reinforce the narrative that the only "one of us" that did something wrong was Forkner.

From a legal perspective, which I have explained before, Boeing followed the FAA regulatory guidance and provided certification deliverables, except in the instance of communicating the change in functionality back to the AEG. The JTAR report which conducted a technical review found that. Thus Boeing cannot be held criminal except for that one specific oversight. You have no evidence except your imagination as to whether their was a conspiracy.

Pythagoras wrote:

Revelation wrote:

It seems to me quite obvious the Senate investigators didn't try to dig very hard on the engineering side. They just interviewed the chief project engineer who said astounding things like he didn't know about mcas multiple activation till he heard about it from the media, and left it at that without following up. There's no evidence they talked to anyone who actually made the decision to not put mcas into the catastrophic category to find out how much pressure they were under to save time and money by doing so.

I suppose it is still possible that there is evidence for undue pressure on the technical staff. But there has not even been a hint of that to date. I have tried to explain that the actual decision making would have occurred within the specific discipline rather than involving any of the Program executives. Simply put, the Flight Controls organization was responsible for solving this problem and would have made all decisions internally without involving other disciplines. And where it may be entirely obvious to you that MCAS should be considered catastrophic, the language of the Advisory Circular and its reliance upon a qualitative assessment gives sufficient latitude for the certification approach that was followed.

The following is taken from the Advisory Circular AC No: 25.1309-1A SYSTEM DESIGN AND ANALYSIS

The definitions of "Severe Major" and "Catastrophic" are as follows:

(2) Major: Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of the airplane or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be, for example, --
(i} A significant reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, a significant increase in crew workload or in conditions impairing crew efficiency, or some discomfort to occupants; or
(ii) In more severe cases, a large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, higher workload or physical distress such that the crew could not be relied on to perform its tasks accurately or completely, or adverse effects on occupants.

(3) Catastrophic: Failure conditions which would prevent continued safe flight and landing.

Within AC 25.1309-1A, a qualitative assessment is acceptable when taking credit for flight crew action. Here is the section on flightcrew action. It would not take exceptional pilot skill or strength to toggle the electric trim switch to bring the airplane back into a trimmed state before hitting the cutout switches.

11. a. Flightcrew Action. When assessing the ability of the flightcrew to cope with a failure condition, the warning information and the complexity of the required action should be considered (reference Paragraph 8g(5)). If the evaluation indicates that a potential failure condition can be alleviated or overcome during the time available without jeopardizing other safety-related flightcrew tasks and without requiring exceptional pilot skill or strength, credit may be taken for correct and appropriate corrective action, for both qualitative and quantitative assessments. Similarly, credit may be taken for correct flightcrew performance of CCRs if overall flightcrew workload during the time available to perform them is not excessive and if they do not require exceptional pilot skill or strength. Unless flightcrew actions are accepted as normal airmanship, they should be described in the FAA-approved AFM or AFM revision or supplement.

Revelation wrote:

Amazingly small fine for conspiring to defraud the government, inflated to look better in the media, yet at the same time reinforces the idea the only thing Boeing did wrong was not update the training material (as opposed to all the flaws in mcas itself) and they still get to reinforce the narrative that the only "one of us" that did something wrong was Forkner.

From a legal perspective, which I have explained before, Boeing followed the FAA regulatory guidance and provided certification deliverables, except in the instance of communicating the change in functionality back to the AEG. The JTAR report which conducted a technical review found that. Thus Boeing cannot be held criminal except for that one specific oversight. You have no evidence except your imagination as to whether their was a conspiracy.

Not sure why we waste our time trying to explain this. No one committed a crime. It was an engineering decision, that was not malicious, or wrong. It resulted in a plane crash and was corrected. That is not criminal. What is criminal is people forgetting that the pilots and Lion Air maintenance were also found causal in the mishap. Causal means that their actions led to the crash. So Boeing is not the only cause. But the only one people want to talk about.

There re a lot of other things that are being kept out of the media. I welcome the day they are finally “entertaining” enough for the media to repot.

Boeing did not without information from the AEG. They told the AOG. The AOG knew everything. Not Boeing’s fault they don’t talk to each other.

Pythagoras wrote:

Revelation wrote:

It seems to me quite obvious the Senate investigators didn't try to dig very hard on the engineering side. They just interviewed the chief project engineer who said astounding things like he didn't know about mcas multiple activation till he heard about it from the media, and left it at that without following up. There's no evidence they talked to anyone who actually made the decision to not put mcas into the catastrophic category to find out how much pressure they were under to save time and money by doing so.

I suppose it is still possible that there is evidence for undue pressure on the technical staff. But there has not even been a hint of that to date.

There are plenty of hints.

The weekend after the second crash, a Seattle Times front-page story — citing proprietary Boeing information submitted to the FAA — laid bare how the federal regulator was not fully informed as Boeing expanded the powers of its MCAS flight control system, the automated software whose malfunctioning killed 346 people.

The follow-up stories, using numerous internal Boeing and FAA documents obtained by our reporters, showed how the flawed design was approved by a flawed regulatory process as the FAA increasingly delegated responsibility for safety assessments to the manufacturer, and how management at both organizations pressed for shortcuts and money-saving solutions against the recommendations of both low-level FAA officials and Boeing safety experts.

Ref: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... -coverage/

Lots of links to follow up there, along with similar ones at NYT, WaPo, Bloomberg, etc.

I have tried to explain that the actual decision making would have occurred within the specific discipline rather than involving any of the Program executives. Simply put, the Flight Controls organization was responsible for solving this problem and would have made all decisions internally without involving other disciplines.

Yet none of these people were interviewed with regard to pressure being applied to find shortcuts and money-saving solutions.

And where it may be entirely obvious to you that MCAS should be considered catastrophic, the language of the Advisory Circular and its reliance upon a qualitative assessment gives sufficient latitude for the certification approach that was followed.

What is still not obvious to me is what pressure the person(s) who made the decision were under. They had the "latitude" to make pretty much any call they wanted to make. Why did they decide multiple activations would be recognized as runaway stab trim and be handled within four seconds? Didn't they want any actual testing to make sure this was the case? Or was that deemed too costly or too time consuming?

FLYBY72 wrote:

Not sure why we waste our time trying to explain this. No one committed a crime. It was an engineering decision, that was not malicious, or wrong. It resulted in a plane crash and was corrected. That is not criminal. What is criminal is people forgetting that the pilots and Lion Air maintenance were also found causal in the mishap. Causal means that their actions led to the crash. So Boeing is not the only cause. But the only one people want to talk about.

Lion Air maintenance was not up to safety standards. Then after that crash, Boeing, with all it's collective knowledge, they made the decision to keep flying the MAX. They knew all the nitty gritty on MCAS and a AOA failure, and instead of shutting things down and doing a little research into whether their assumptions were good, they just kept going. The design was a failure. Checking the design by Boeing and the FAA was a failure. When warning signs presented themselves, maintenance failed to hit the brakes, and then Boeing failed to hit the brakes.

Revelation wrote:

Why did they decide multiple activations would be recognized as runaway stab trim and be handled within four seconds? Didn't they want any actual testing to make sure this was the case? Or was that deemed too costly or too time consuming?

Why did they need multiple activations to pass the stick force requirements in the tests, if it is only one activation in the fix? What's the story there? Is A, the one activation fix not really up to the requirements, or B, why the multiple activations to begin with, was that just an irrationally exuberant idea that slipped in?

Just came across a copy of the victums lawsuit filed yesterday against Boeing in the North Texas Court. The case is the United States vs Boeing. For details go to:

https://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/ ... motion.pdf

If I were a engineer and/or an executive involved with this at Boeing I think I would be starting to get a little nervous right now. The DPA could be affected by this. While I agree that Boeing is not the only one who messed up in this, they may have left themselves wide open in the US courts if the DPA is terminated.

DenverTed wrote:

Revelation wrote:

Why did they decide multiple activations would be recognized as runaway stab trim and be handled within four seconds? Didn't they want any actual testing to make sure this was the case? Or was that deemed too costly or too time consuming?

Why did they need multiple activations to pass the stick force requirements in the tests, if it is only one activation in the fix? What's the story there? Is A, the one activation fix not really up to the requirements, or B, why the multiple activations to begin with, was that just an irrationally exuberant idea that slipped in?

The system needs to reset should the airplane recover from the imminent stall and then subsequently enter a second stall. The logic for the reset function was very poorly implemented. The code reset once the pilot removed pressure from the toggle switch whether the airplane was trimmed or not. This was a key factor in both Lion Air and Ethiopia Airlines accidents as the horizontal stabilizer was not returned to a trimmed state when MCAS fired a second time. It is this particular feature where I assert the most significant error in the system was made. It was the second firing of MCAS which made the airplane uncontrollable.

DenverTed wrote:

Revelation wrote:

Why did they decide multiple activations would be recognized as runaway stab trim and be handled within four seconds? Didn't they want any actual testing to make sure this was the case? Or was that deemed too costly or too time consuming?

Why did they need multiple activations to pass the stick force requirements in the tests, if it is only one activation in the fix? What's the story there? Is A, the one activation fix not really up to the requirements, or B, why the multiple activations to begin with, was that just an irrationally exuberant idea that slipped in?

You are giving Boeing too much benefit of doubt. Was there an understanding that there may be multiple ones?
I suspect it was "proper activation - MCAS fires - airplane returns to normal flight - full stop" vs "improper activation - MCAS fired - pilot kills trim motor - full stop" and nothing considered beyond that.

An explanation of the lawsuit filed under the Crime Victoms Act by the filer (Law Professor, ex-Federal Judge, Lawyer) against.the Boeing Company over the 737 Max. For details go to:
https://reason.com/volokh/2021/12/17/a- ... agreement/

Some new documents have been released as a result of Senator Maria Cantwell's whistleblower letter on December 13, 2021 requesting FAA investigation of safety lapses.

I issued an Aviation Safety Whistleblower Report on December 13, 2021, detailing accounts from Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) and industry whistleblowers related to oversight of aviation manufacturers. I write to request that the FAA review the concerns raised by these whistleblowers and implement necessary changes to improve safety in the aviation industry.

https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2021/12/commerce-committee-releases-aviation-safety-whistleblower-report

One of the documents released by Cantwell is the letter from former FAA employee Joe Jacobsen to the Stumo family. Jacobsen refers to himself as one of the more experienced Flight Controls engineers at the FAA. He reports that the FAA organization structure which relied upon the BASOO for both certification of 737MAX and evaluation of the Airworthiness Directive after the Lion Air accident was insufficient to provide proper technical oversight.

Here is Jacobsen's synopsis of what the mistakes were:

Mistake #1: The MCAS design flaw was the result of allowing the horizontal stabilizer to move at too high a rate (degrees/second) and with too much authority (degrees per activation), given the unreliability of the input. I think it’s possible that the original design did not envision such a high rate or high authority, but subsequent increases were implemented. As the rate and authority increased, the system redundancy and reliability should also have increased (but it did not).

Mistake #2: FAA delegated too much of the design approval to the Boeing ODA, and then schedule pressure probably increased the delegation even more. Direct FAA scrutiny of the design (failure aspects) was missing. If FAA engineers were briefed on the design, I’m confident that 6 to 8 (my estimate, as noted previously) of our experienced engineers would have identified the design flaw.

Mistake #3: After the Lion Air crash, the emergency AD pilot procedures were inadequate and unverified. AD 2018-23-51 does not mention the possibility of an autothrottle malfunction due to an erroneous AOA input. Page 89 of the ET-302 accident report, describing the malfunctioning autothrottle behavior, states “the thrust reduction altitude was reached around 5 h 39 min 28 (computed from the RH baro corrected altitude). However the FMC used the LH baro corrected altitude values, which were lower than the true ones. The FMC did not detect the thrust reduction altitude when it was sending valid engine commands.” In addition to the autothrottle omission, the use of the electric stabilizer trim was characterized as optional. As the new Runaway Stabilizer procedure shows, that step is required to ensure manageable control column forces.

https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/files/72283867-0DC7-40A9-82D6-D32C5ACD3C06

Jacobsen's assessment of what might have happened corroborates what I have postulated in this thread that the certification process permitted insufficient technical oversight by the FAA, especially when it comes to the late change in functionality which occurs in flight test. It furthermore raises the issue that both Boeing and the FAA had lost institutional knowledge or failed to effectively use that knowledge which permitted a poor design to proceed.

One thing that is coming out of these whistleblower complaints is that both Boeing and GE have a problem with their internal safety/ethics processes. These complaints suggest that they are entirely ineffective in resolving what are essentially management decisions to understaff and underfund regulatory proscribed corrective action processes. It doesn't matter if you have a Safety Management System in-place if management fails to staff it and fails to take action on its findings.

And while Boeing and GE rightfully deserve blame, I'd also place a lot of blame on DOT Administrator Elaine Chao and her predecessors who put in place industry lobbyists in management positions to oversee the regulatory process. There are too many reports coming out of the FAA of managers who were willing to work with the applicants rather than enforcing regulations.

Pythagoras wrote:

Jacobsen's assessment of what might have happened corroborates what I have postulated in this thread that the certification process permitted insufficient technical oversight by the FAA, especially when it comes to the late change in functionality which occurs in flight test. It furthermore raises the issue that both Boeing and the FAA had lost institutional knowledge or failed to effectively use that knowledge which permitted a poor design to proceed.

Legal systems exist to try to achieve certain behaviors, but when those behaviors make themselves evident even after the legal system fails to deter them it's still the bad actor that is at fault, not the legal system.

I think there may be a criminal act (negligence?) In Italy for sure, though in the U.S.A. probably not.

The original MCAS was a crappy design, but probably adequate for its limited circumstances (wind up turn with g and AOA sensors).

Later they had a low speed problem and somebody decided to fix it with a tweaked MCAS. This was the deadly decision - single sensor (no g sensor), still had multiple activations, still had pull back on yoke trim cut outs removed, and no one redid the safety analysis or did a really bad job. Throw in no AOA display on some planes. And no mention of the system during training.

ADent wrote:

I think there may be a criminal act (negligence?) In Italy for sure, though in the U.S.A. probably not.

The original MCAS was a crappy design, but probably adequate for its limited circumstances (wind up turn with g and AOA sensors).

Later they had a low speed problem and somebody decided to fix it with a tweaked MCAS. This was the deadly decision - single sensor (no g sensor), still had multiple activations, still had pull back on yoke trim cut outs removed, and no one redid the safety analysis or did a really bad job. Throw in no AOA display on some planes. And no mention of the system during training.

The role of multiple activations seems to be understated. No one can explain why it was there. It was one of the first things the fix addressed. The Chief Engineer didn't even know it was there till he read about it in the media. Presumably, it was never intended to be there, just no one bothered to analyze what would happen with a stuck AoA vane so they never realized it was there.

Also the weak and delegated FAA oversight is the result of Boeing lobbying Congress for that, isn't that correct?

Chemist wrote:

Also the weak and delegated FAA oversight is the result of Boeing lobbying Congress for that, isn't that correct?

It's also something that keeps getting under-stated.

The tragic outcome is to a good degree a result of Boeing telling Congress it could self-regulate, but when given the chance, tragedy resulted.

From my reading of the FAA's letter about the state of the 777X, it seems to me that they still need strong regulatory oversight.

Hopefully the current FAA is up to the task.

Revelation wrote:

Pythagoras wrote:

Jacobsen's assessment of what might have happened corroborates what I have postulated in this thread that the certification process permitted insufficient technical oversight by the FAA, especially when it comes to the late change in functionality which occurs in flight test. It furthermore raises the issue that both Boeing and the FAA had lost institutional knowledge or failed to effectively use that knowledge which permitted a poor design to proceed.

Legal systems exist to try to achieve certain behaviors, but when those behaviors make themselves evident even after the legal system fails to deter them it's still the bad actor that is at fault, not the legal system.

I for one hate laws and regulations intended to apply only to those parties that will obey them. Legislators and regulators pass laws and create regulations and then pat themselves on the back and say, "OK, we made that illegal now; that'll keep 'em in line." If there are no citations handed out and fines collected, or arrests made with fines and/or jail time then either enforcement is inadequate (not the bad actor's fault) or the law or regulation isn't needed.

hivue wrote:

Revelation wrote:

Pythagoras wrote:

Jacobsen's assessment of what might have happened corroborates what I have postulated in this thread that the certification process permitted insufficient technical oversight by the FAA, especially when it comes to the late change in functionality which occurs in flight test. It furthermore raises the issue that both Boeing and the FAA had lost institutional knowledge or failed to effectively use that knowledge which permitted a poor design to proceed.

Legal systems exist to try to achieve certain behaviors, but when those behaviors make themselves evident even after the legal system fails to deter them it's still the bad actor that is at fault, not the legal system.

I for one hate laws and regulations intended to apply only to those parties that will obey them. Legislators and regulators pass laws and create regulations and then pat themselves on the back and say, "OK, we made that illegal now; that'll keep 'em in line." If there are no citations handed out and fines collected, or arrests made with fines and/or jail time then either enforcement is inadequate (not the bad actor's fault) or the law or regulation isn't needed.

If you look at the level of police work, so much happens just because the threat of larger punishments exist, whether they are used or not. Same thing is going on here. Many of the things reported in this thread are procedural things like not reporting changes to the FAA. There probably isn't a law that says if you don't report X to FAA you get fined Y, but there is a law that says if we see a pattern of misreporting we can pull Boeing's production certificate for 737 (which was done) or suspend 737's airworthiness certificate (which was done) because FAA feels it can't determine if the plane is safe or not. Violation of the smaller "illegal" things were needed to trigger the big decisions.

Also the law can't anticipate all the technological twists and turns, it'd be obsolete shortly after written, if not before. Therefore as written in this post certain things are at the discretion of the engineers, but in turn the expectation is if their discretion turns out to be used incorrectly, bigger consequences result. This is what I'm not seeing here. Boeing has managed to position Forkner as the fall guy and this has let the failures in their engineering process go pretty much unchallenged.

I'm about half way through Robison's book. So far, everything I've read matches my experience working for a major Boeing supplier in that time frame. That same cost over quality philosophy percolated well into the supplier base, and the forced negotiations with suppliers over every change order poisoned relationships that had been built up over years.

One question has arisen in my mind. Robinson cites the 787 fires which eventually led to placing them in an isolated enclosure. I recall there being some design changes to the battery as well, but I wonder if there have been any contained fires since?

Revelation wrote:

Also the law can't anticipate all the technological twists and turns, it'd be obsolete shortly after written, if not before. Therefore as written in this post certain things are at the discretion of the engineers, but in turn the expectation is if their discretion turns out to be used incorrectly, bigger consequences result. This is what I'm not seeing here. Boeing has managed to position Forkner as the fall guy and this has let the failures in their engineering process go pretty much unchallenged.

What I'm observing is that Boeing and its insurers are just doing what its bureaucratic organizations are trained and hired to do. The legal team advises the executives to not make statements that the airplane has a design flaw and would thereby be unsafe. The communication team tries to manage the message. The army of DC lobbyists are sent out to bend the ear of legislators and regulators. The insurance companies put their processes in place to obtain quick legally binding settlements with the victim's families. The actually facts of what went wrong from a regulatory perspective are hidden until the NTSB reports are released. And even then those reports won't address failures like one of organizational structure that kept key Subject Matter Experts from engaging in the design and oversight.

And so, Boeing and FAA headquarters circle the wagons and try to control the message because it would be poor optics if the public found out what really happened in that junior or unknowledgable engineers made the key decisions at Boeing, at Collins and at the FAA, and that Subject Matter Experts in these organizations would have stepped in if given the chance. And it would be poor optics to the FAA if the public found out that the in-service safety management process which the FAA has responsibility for setting up and overseeing is critically flawed, likely due to insufficient technical expertise in the organization which thereby becomes overly reliant on the manufacturer's word

FAA Headquarters is not going to tell Congress that it has lost the technical capability to regulate effectively because it woefully underpays and overworks its staff. Over my career, I worked with many of those currently at the FAA who were effectively trained at Boeing before moving over to the FAA. As a consequence, the Seattle ACO was known to be more rigorous than other ACOs. My significant other, who has expertise in this area, postulates that the MD-11 Swissair Flight 111 accident might not have happened had the STC been processed through SACO rather than the Los Angeles ACO office. That accident too was a failure in certification process.

Remember here as well that Congress shut down the FAA for 35 days in 2018-2019 while the Lion Air accident Airworthiness Directive was being developed. The FAA employees were paid for those days but the work didn't go away, it just piled on top of the other work that they had to get done that year.

Everyone should be happy to know though that the FAA is now understands it has a staff shortage and at least in the Seattle ACO is bringing in some new hires out of university to fill positions.

Pythagoras wrote:

What I'm observing is that Boeing and its insurers are just doing what its bureaucratic organizations are trained and hired to do. The legal team advises the executives to not make statements that the airplane has a design flaw and would thereby be unsafe. The communication team tries to manage the message. The army of DC lobbyists are sent out to bend the ear of legislators and regulators. The insurance companies put their processes in place to obtain quick legally binding settlements with the victim's families. The actually facts of what went wrong from a regulatory perspective are hidden until the NTSB reports are released. And even then those reports won't address failures like one of organizational structure that kept key Subject Matter Experts from engaging in the design and oversight.

And so, Boeing and FAA headquarters circle the wagons and try to control the message because it would be poor optics if the public found out what really happened in that junior or unknowledgable engineers made the key decisions at Boeing, at Collins and at the FAA, and that Subject Matter Experts in these organizations would have stepped in if given the chance. And it would be poor optics to the FAA if the public found out that the in-service safety management process which the FAA has responsibility for setting up and overseeing is critically flawed, likely due to insufficient technical expertise in the organization which thereby becomes overly reliant on the manufacturer's word

Some of us thought the Forkner prosecution would give DoJ more leverage to get him to turn on Boeing insiders to bring more of the insider's stories to the surface. If what "Flying Blind" reports is true and Boeing is paying Forkner's expenses for a top-shelf legal team, then it seems that strategy is being undermined if not nullified.

Instead what we are seeing is FAA insiders coming to Forkner's aid and trying to steer the focus to Boeing's engineering team, which presumably is a move to put Boeing on the hook and keep FAA off the hook.

As the old saying suggests, we live in interesting times.

Revelation wrote:

Pythagoras wrote:

What I'm observing is that Boeing and its insurers are just doing what its bureaucratic organizations are trained and hired to do. The legal team advises the executives to not make statements that the airplane has a design flaw and would thereby be unsafe. The communication team tries to manage the message. The army of DC lobbyists are sent out to bend the ear of legislators and regulators. The insurance companies put their processes in place to obtain quick legally binding settlements with the victim's families. The actually facts of what went wrong from a regulatory perspective are hidden until the NTSB reports are released. And even then those reports won't address failures like one of organizational structure that kept key Subject Matter Experts from engaging in the design and oversight.

And so, Boeing and FAA headquarters circle the wagons and try to control the message because it would be poor optics if the public found out what really happened in that junior or unknowledgable engineers made the key decisions at Boeing, at Collins and at the FAA, and that Subject Matter Experts in these organizations would have stepped in if given the chance. And it would be poor optics to the FAA if the public found out that the in-service safety management process which the FAA has responsibility for setting up and overseeing is critically flawed, likely due to insufficient technical expertise in the organization which thereby becomes overly reliant on the manufacturer's word

Some of us thought the Forkner prosecution would give DoJ more leverage to get him to turn on Boeing insiders to bring more of the insider's stories to the surface. If what "Flying Blind" reports is true and Boeing is paying Forkner's expenses for a top-shelf legal team, then it seems that strategy is being undermined if not nullified.

Instead what we are seeing is FAA insiders coming to Forkner's aid and trying to steer the focus to Boeing's engineering team, which presumably is a move to put Boeing on the hook and keep FAA off the hook.

As the old saying suggests, we live in interesting times.

You are missing the point. There is no one to so-call "turn on Boeing insiders" because decisions like the composition of engineering teams and how functional organizations communicate with each other are not ones that are subject to regulation. One doesn't know that one has lost institutional knowledge until there is an error, and that is the only way managers will find out about it.

CanukinUSA wrote:

An explanation of the lawsuit filed under the Crime Victoms Act by the filer (Law Professor, ex-Federal Judge, Lawyer) against.the Boeing Company over the 737 Max. For details go to:
https://reason.com/volokh/2021/12/17/a- ... agreement/

Wow. From the link:

mere months after the DPA was executed and filed with this Court, one of the Government's lead attorneys who approved the agreement joined the lead law firm for Boeing and specifically the very legal team that represented Boeing in this criminal case.

More abouth that here: https://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/ ... and-ellis/

What this whole chirade shows is that Boeing and the US Gov have no intention of changing the status quo.

The quagmire with the underfunding, delegation and failed oversight along with probable vested interests (Ali Bahrami, Erin Cox et al?) will remain.

It stinks and if I had lost family in those crashes, I would be bloody fuming.

Chaostheory wrote:

Wow. From the link:

mere months after the DPA was executed and filed with this Court, one of the Government's lead attorneys who approved the agreement joined the lead law firm for Boeing and specifically the very legal team that represented Boeing in this criminal case.

More abouth that here: https://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/ ... and-ellis/

What this whole chirade shows is that Boeing and the US Gov have no intention of changing the status quo.

The quagmire with the underfunding, delegation and failed oversight along with probable vested interests (Ali Bahrami, Erin Cox et al?) will remain.

It stinks and if I had lost family in those crashes, I would be bloody fuming.

You should be prepared for the "but that's not illegal" reply in the near future.

Revelation wrote:

Chaostheory wrote:

Wow. From the link:

mere months after the DPA was executed and filed with this Court, one of the Government's lead attorneys who approved the agreement joined the lead law firm for Boeing and specifically the very legal team that represented Boeing in this criminal case.

More abouth that here: https://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/ ... and-ellis/

What this whole chirade shows is that Boeing and the US Gov have no intention of changing the status quo.

The quagmire with the underfunding, delegation and failed oversight along with probable vested interests (Ali Bahrami, Erin Cox et al?) will remain.

It stinks and if I had lost family in those crashes, I would be bloody fuming.

You should be prepared for the "but that's not illegal" reply in the near future.

Indeed.

But do you remember the conversation we had recently about rebuilding trust?

Rgds

astuteman wrote:

Revelation wrote:

Chaostheory wrote:

Wow. From the link:

mere months after the DPA was executed and filed with this Court, one of the Government's lead attorneys who approved the agreement joined the lead law firm for Boeing and specifically the very legal team that represented Boeing in this criminal case.

More abouth that here: https://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/ ... and-ellis/

What this whole chirade shows is that Boeing and the US Gov have no intention of changing the status quo.

The quagmire with the underfunding, delegation and failed oversight along with probable vested interests (Ali Bahrami, Erin Cox et al?) will remain.

It stinks and if I had lost family in those crashes, I would be bloody fuming.

You should be prepared for the "but that's not illegal" reply in the near future.

Indeed.

But do you remember the conversation we had recently about rebuilding trust?

Rgds

Does more paperwork means more trust?
FAA certification is, by nature, a paperwork process. While it may result in finding some issues, I suspect most of those would be related to the legal meaning of the verb "is"
Even if one could create a highly professional group of engineers for certification programs, that group would degrade to group of bureaucrats pretty quick.

Revelation wrote:

Hopefully the current FAA is up to the task.

Is it really a new FAA, if we expect Boeing to clean house to "rectify" the situation, should we expect the FAA to do the same and the congress to do a mea culpa?
On the FAA side, is their current actions on the 777X / 787 an example of learning on the job, not wanting to get caught out again or actually doing what they should have been doing?
We heard about systemic problems with the working relationships between Boeing and the FAA in terms of technical expertise, other than the constant harping on what Boeing did wrong, have we seen much discussion in the congress and the FAA on what changes they will or should be making? We know Boeing has announced structural changes around their design / engineering teams and oversight, whether sincere and workable only time will tell, but I think we also need to see movement on the FAA / congressional side, as the regulator and law writers, they can make changes whenever they like, no need to wait and see how Boeing changes are working, the FAA and efficiency had issues prior to MAX.
Folks talk about additional funding, but where will the man power come from, it takes years to gain the experience and degrees in the field, we know that we do not have a ton of such talent sitting around doing nothing, so in the 3 to maybe 10 years it will take the FAA to bone up, what are the solutions, who is having that discussion?

par13del wrote:

Revelation wrote:

Hopefully the current FAA is up to the task.

Is it really a new FAA, if we expect Boeing to clean house to "rectify" the situation, should we expect the FAA to do the same and the congress to do a mea culpa?

Well, we haven't seen Boeing do one either, but you forgot to mention that

Chaostheory wrote:

CanukinUSA wrote:

An explanation of the lawsuit filed under the Crime Victoms Act by the filer (Law Professor, ex-Federal Judge, Lawyer) against.the Boeing Company over the 737 Max. For details go to:
https://reason.com/volokh/2021/12/17/a- ... agreement/

Wow. From the link:

mere months after the DPA was executed and filed with this Court, one of the Government's lead attorneys who approved the agreement joined the lead law firm for Boeing and specifically the very legal team that represented Boeing in this criminal case.

More abouth that here: https://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/ ... and-ellis/

What this whole chirade shows is that Boeing and the US Gov have no intention of changing the status quo.

The quagmire with the underfunding, delegation and failed oversight along with probable vested interests (Ali Bahrami, Erin Cox et al?) will remain.

It stinks and if I had lost family in those crashes, I would be bloody fuming.

Good post, but any serious person should be fuming whether they lost family or not.

Vicenza wrote:

par13del wrote:

Revelation wrote:

Hopefully the current FAA is up to the task.

Is it really a new FAA, if we expect Boeing to clean house to "rectify" the situation, should we expect the FAA to do the same and the congress to do a mea culpa?

Well, we haven't seen Boeing do one either, but you forgot to mention that

Boeing never said they would, nor did FAA either.

Boeing has admitted very little wrongdoing. On the engineering side they said they put too much workload on the pilots. On the training side Boeing admitted two of its employees committed fraud. Boeing enhanced safety oversight and changed the organizational structure. That's about it. IMO none of this equates to "cleaning house". It seems the covid era downsizing and the passage of time has made some of the names/faces change. I presume they along with FAA are looking at their work a bit differently these days, but again, this does not equate to "cleaning house".

More details on the changes they made:
Ref: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... x-crashes/
Ref: https://boeing.mediaroom.com/2019-09-30 ... ces-Safety

glbltrvlr wrote:

One question has arisen in my mind. Robinson cites the 787 [battery] fires which eventually led to placing them in an isolated enclosure. I recall there being some design changes to the battery as well, but I wonder if there have been any contained fires since?

And if anyone is interested, a quick Google search revealed that there has been at least one subsequent battery fire incident that was successfully contained, suggesting that the battery construction changes implemented didn't fully address the problem.

Interesting interview by Dominick Gates of Seattle Times with two of BCA's senior leaders at https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... x-crashes/

The interviews are heavily policed by Boeing's PR team. Questions about how the MAX fubar happened are strictly off limits.

The article presents a conundrum: Boeing is not admitting to any serious wrong doing in the past, yet is also saying they've made significant changes in how they do things. The later should not be necessary if the former is true.

As usual, it seems their paramount concern is avoiding liability claims rather than changing their culture.

An interesting snip from the article:

A month after the second MAX crash in March 2019, former Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg insisted that the Boeing engineers who designed MCAS “followed exactly the steps in our design and certification processes that consistently produce safe airplanes.”

But if Boeing has established where exactly the engineering scrutiny of that software faltered, it isn’t sharing the information.

Asked if any engineers had been held accountable for that tragic miss, Hyslop responded “I’m not gonna answer that question” and Boeing’s public relations staff intervened to shut down that line of inquiry.

The article points out repeatedly how Boeing has pretty much lost the narrowbody market segment to Airbus and has nothing in its near term road map that can change that situation.

It also floats the idea that maybe Boeing might spin off its profitable defense and space assets and strand Commercial with the less profitable properties. IMO this must be a real great concept in the minds of the Wall Street mavens both inside Boeing and outside. Carve off themselves a nice slice with "key man" provisions amid the resulting churn and either land on the profitable side or call it a career. We've seen this play out a lot lately with GE being the most recent example. Sprinkle it with words such as synergy and shareholder value, it'll go down sweet as sugar.

PS: The above article has a link ( https://www.seattletimes.com/pacific-nw ... d-effects/ ) with a part of "Flying Blind" that I had not yet read. Warning, it's pretty depressing stuff for those of us who dislike bean counter culture.

glbltrvlr wrote:

glbltrvlr wrote:

One question has arisen in my mind. Robinson cites the 787 [battery] fires which eventually led to placing them in an isolated enclosure. I recall there being some design changes to the battery as well, but I wonder if there have been any contained fires since?

And if anyone is interested, a quick Google search revealed that there has been at least one subsequent battery fire incident that was successfully contained, suggesting that the battery construction changes implemented didn't fully address the problem.

There have been zero fires since. The one you were talking about was an overheat. One incident in almost 10 years. Yes, the problem was addressed.

Revelation wrote:

Interesting interview by Dominick Gates of Seattle Times with two of BCA's senior leaders at https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... x-crashes/
The article points out repeatedly how Boeing has pretty much lost the narrowbody market segment to Airbus and has nothing in its near term road map that can change that situation.

Well, when the only place you get your "information" is this moron at the Seattle Times, I see how you could think that.

I bet Boeing has a few things up their sleeve...

These article you love to reference are written for clicks. Entertainment produces clicks. They are light on facts because facts are boring.

FLYBY72 wrote:

Revelation wrote:

Interesting interview by Dominick Gates of Seattle Times with two of BCA's senior leaders at https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... x-crashes/
The article points out repeatedly how Boeing has pretty much lost the narrowbody market segment to Airbus and has nothing in its near term road map that can change that situation.

Well, when the only place you get your "information" is this moron at the Seattle Times, I see how you could think that.

I bet Boeing has a few things up their sleeve...

These article you love to reference are written for clicks. Entertainment produces clicks. They are light on facts because facts are boring.

Good assessment. I find it interesting that a Dominic Gates interview with Boeing leaders dedicates more space to critical quotes from others with zero fact checking. It is drivel written for clicks and explains why it was the first Boeing interview he got in 2 years.

FLYBY72 wrote:

Revelation wrote:

Interesting interview by Dominick Gates of Seattle Times with two of BCA's senior leaders at https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... x-crashes/
The article points out repeatedly how Boeing has pretty much lost the narrowbody market segment to Airbus and has nothing in its near term road map that can change that situation.

Well, when the only place you get your "information" is this moron at the Seattle Times, I see how you could think that.

I bet Boeing has a few things up their sleeve...

These article you love to reference are written for clicks. Entertainment produces clicks. They are light on facts because facts are boring.

Great, you trash a guy who has a well established track record for journalism including a Pulitzer Prize and expect others to lean into the "bet" of an anonymous Internet poster instead. Feel free to give us some information to back up your "bet", if you actually have any.

Revelation wrote:

PS: The above article has a link ( https://www.seattletimes.com/pacific-nw ... d-effects/ ) with a part of "Flying Blind" that I had not yet read. Warning, it's pretty depressing stuff for those of us who dislike bean counter culture.

Hey Rev. I have to say I enjoy reading your posts. I don’t know your background, but you are very well informed.

I admit that I’m not comfortable flying on the Max. That may be stupidity on my part, but I still don’t trust the thing.

Do you think the Max is now as safe as any other commercial plane? You’ve studied this a lot more than many of us. Has Boeing really learned a lesson or should we be worried Boeing could pull something like this again in the future?

[quote="Revelation"]
Boeing never said they would, nor did FAA either.

Boeing has admitted very little wrongdoing. On the engineering side they said they put too much workload on the pilots. On the training side Boeing admitted two of its employees committed fraud. Boeing enhanced safety oversight and changed the organizational structure. That's about it. IMO none of this equates to "cleaning house". It seems the covid era downsizing and the passage of time has made some of the names/faces change. I presume they along with FAA are looking at their work a bit differently these days, but again, this does not equate to "cleaning house".

I agree with you entirely. My comment was more directed though at the normal line from the member, and in the role normally played.

sxf24 wrote:

Good assessment. I find it interesting that a Dominic Gates interview with Boeing leaders dedicates more space to critical quotes from others with zero fact checking. It is drivel written for clicks and explains why it was the first Boeing interview he got in 2 years.

Feel free to provide some fair-use quotes of what you think is "drivel", otherwise you're just willy-waiving.

Revelation wrote:

sxf24 wrote:

Good assessment. I find it interesting that a Dominic Gates interview with Boeing leaders dedicates more space to critical quotes from others with zero fact checking. It is drivel written for clicks and explains why it was the first Boeing interview he got in 2 years.

Feel free to provide some fair-use quotes of what you think is "drivel", otherwise you're just willy-waiving.

I don’t need to justify my opinion. You’re free to disagree.

Dominic Gates has become a hack, dependent on gossip from Richard Auboulafia, Adam Pilarski, and Scott Hamilton. He has no real sources at Boeing left.

DDR wrote:

Do you think the Max is now as safe as any other commercial plane? You’ve studied this a lot more than many of us. Has Boeing really learned a lesson or should we be worried Boeing could pull something like this again in the future?

I won't say my reading or posting is authoritative in any way. The main thing I've keyed off to form my opinion is that EASA has said they have done a full review of the MAX's control system and instrumentation and have found no showstoppers. They are pushing for an improved AoA system for MAX-10 but are still OK with the current setup as being within regulations. Also China's aviation regulator has said they found the current set of fixes are satisfactory, permission for return to service now has to come from the economics ministry. I think these agencies are pretty far removed from any undo influence from Boeing. Again, this is just my opinion, but I don't feel any additional concern getting onto a MAX vs any other airliner. The fixes are in place and the training is clearly far better than before, which was no training at all. We should now be tracking the historical safety curve of the 737 family, which is quite good.

On the other hand, I now think MAX is in a really bad place commercially. They just lost both QF and KL as 737 customers, two blue-chip operations. Personally I now feel that at some level 737's dated tech played its role in this. Sure, it works and shown to be safe, but investing in it now means you're comfortable for running it for the next 20 years or so, and at some level the recent scrutiny MAX has gotten has got to make decision makers less comfortable that it's the right way to go. One impact of Airbus's 60/40 split is that one gets more confidence that it will have more staying power later in its life cycle, so it's a safer investment.

sxf24 wrote:

I don’t need to justify my opinion. You’re free to disagree.

Dominic Gates has become a hack, dependent on gossip from Richard Auboulafia, Adam Pilarski, and Scott Hamilton. He has no real sources at Boeing left.

Indeed it is just your opinion, one you haven't substantiated in any way. Clearly you have no way of knowing what sources he does or does not have within Boeing.