December 4 marks the end of the original Pan Am, thirty years ago. Here's a story from a German point of view:

https://www.dw.com/en/pan-am-around-the ... a-59944962

or

http://www.dw.com/en/pan-am-around-the- ... a-59944962

How time flies, no pun intended. I do miss the big blue meatball.

Apols if this has been posted elsewhere, I searched and did not see it.

Thanks for posting this. Somewhat ironic that Pan Am ceased to exist 30 years ago this month and TWA's end came 20 years ago this month. They were once icons of intercontinental travel and while they had different brands and focus, there is something to be said for what they stood for, even if years of mismanagement and the evolution of the industry that ultimately rendered them unable to compete post-deregulation, specifically in Pan Am's case, they're outsized impact and legacies remain as strong as ever. Pan Am was a pioneer and it is well documented. TWA was an airline with many firsts as well.

At least AA found enough value in TWA to acquire them. By late 1991, what was left of Pan Am was a 'picked carcass' that nobody wanted to acquire. Delta got what they wanted with the former PA European routes. What was left only lasted a short time before shutting down.

mga707 wrote:

At least AA found enough value in TWA to acquire them. By late 1991, what was left of Pan Am was a 'picked carcass' that nobody wanted to acquire. Delta got what they wanted with the former PA European routes. What was left only lasted a short time before shutting down.

AA acquired TWA to knock out a competitor and find a solution to delays and congestion at ORD. It wanted a third mid-continent hub to shuffle traffic and saw that opportunity in STL, along with TWA's large fleet of MD80s. AA had little interest in the network that TWA had for the most part. It was a poorly timed, expensive mess of a deal. American paid $500 million in cash for TWA's assets. In separate arrangements, AMR was also to purchase $1.2 billion worth of assets from USAirways Group and a 49% stake in DCAir, which was designed as part of the spin off of USAirways' DC operations to meet DoJ requirements for the $11.2 UAL acquisition of USAirways announced in May 2000 that ended up not happening.

In the end, American didn't get much value out of the assets it got from TWA. 9/11 and the economic downturn that followed it resulted in AA in rather quick succession de-hubbing STL. The TATL network at JFK, or what was left of it, was of no value to AA. It already served CDG on its own metal, did not want to inherit the pricey cost of sustaining employees at TWA's station in TLV, and the market to serve CAI and RUH wasn't there following 9/11. These were TWA's sole remaining TATL routes out of JFK. The STL-LGW route was also cut within a few years post-acquisition. AA canned the majority of the TWA staff and eliminated almost any trace of the airline within weeks of TWA operating its final flight, a symbolic MCI-STL route captained by its CEO at the time, Jim Compton, on 12/01/01.

AA retains naming and branding rights, and has launched routes formerly operated by TWA from JFK (FCO, MXP, MAD, BCN) and later, TLV and ATH (2021). It closed the TWA Flight Center at JFK and consolidated everything at T8 as the construction of the new T8 was already in the plans and underway by the time the acquisition happened.

The purchase of TWA followed patterns similar to Reno Air, Air Cal, and others. AA simply wanted to remove what it perceived to be an inefficient competitor at a time when it was the industry's bell weather.

ContinentalEWR wrote:

mga707 wrote:

At least AA found enough value in TWA to acquire them. By late 1991, what was left of Pan Am was a 'picked carcass' that nobody wanted to acquire. Delta got what they wanted with the former PA European routes. What was left only lasted a short time before shutting down.

AA acquired TWA to knock out a competitor and find a solution to delays and congestion at ORD. It wanted a third mid-continent hub to shuffle traffic and saw that opportunity in STL, along with TWA's large fleet of MD80s. AA had little interest in the network that TWA had for the most part. It was a poorly timed, expensive mess of a deal. American paid $500 million in cash for TWA's assets. In separate arrangements, AMR was also to purchase $1.2 billion worth of assets from USAirways Group and a 49% stake in DCAir, which was designed as part of the spin off of USAirways' DC operations to meet DoJ requirements for the $11.2 UAL acquisition of USAirways announced in May 2000 that ended up not happening.

In the end, American didn't get much value out of the assets it got from TWA. 9/11 and the economic downturn that followed it resulted in AA in rather quick succession de-hubbing STL. The TATL network at JFK, or what was left of it, was of no value to AA. It already served CDG on its own metal, did not want to inherit the pricey cost of sustaining employees at TWA's station in TLV, and the market to serve CAI and RUH wasn't there following 9/11. These were TWA's sole remaining TATL routes out of JFK. The STL-LGW route was also cut within a few years post-acquisition. AA canned the majority of the TWA staff and eliminated almost any trace of the airline within weeks of TWA operating its final flight, a symbolic MCI-STL route captained by its CEO at the time, Jim Compton, on 12/01/01.

AA retains naming and branding rights, and has launched routes formerly operated by TWA from JFK (FCO, MXP, MAD, BCN) and later, TLV and ATH (2021). It closed the TWA Flight Center at JFK and consolidated everything at T8 as the construction of the new T8 was already in the plans and underway by the time the acquisition happened.

The purchase of TWA followed patterns similar to Reno Air, Air Cal, and others. AA simply wanted to remove what it perceived to be an inefficient competitor at a time when it was the industry's bell weather.

Correct on all counts. In retrospect, it would have been far better for AA to let TWA fail and then pick the assets they wanted, like the nearly-new MD-80s (TWA had the last batch built in 1998-99). But hindsight is always 20-20.

There are some reminders of Pan Am today. 200 Park Avenue, NYC, their HQ from 1963-1991. It was a major building and at the time of its construction and until the WTC Towers, had the largest rental commercial space of any building in the world. I worked for law firms in it from 1990-2006. I recall its ticket office on the 45th Street side on the ground floor. That I recall lasted until the late 1980's. There is a wire sculpture in the Vanderbilt St. lobby that was dedicated to Pan Am and I believe is still there. I also recall their 5th Avenue sales office. https://200parkavenue.com/#/transformation
I only had a few flights on PanAm, the longest was JFK-Nice-Rome on a 747 and several LGA-DCA shuttle flights.

ContinentalEWR wrote:

mga707 wrote:

At least AA found enough value in TWA to acquire them. By late 1991, what was left of Pan Am was a 'picked carcass' that nobody wanted to acquire. Delta got what they wanted with the former PA European routes. What was left only lasted a short time before shutting down.

AA acquired TWA to knock out a competitor and find a solution to delays and congestion at ORD.

TWA wasn't a big enough competitor even to worry about - it represented about 5% of national enplaned passengers in 1999, about 20% larger than America West but just 2/3 the size of #7 CO. There was no development of that mid-con hub, not in the 20 years of AA ownership. These are deficient rationalizations, to try to convince people (ex-employees, probably) there was something of value. It had been stripped and underinvested very thoroughly. TWA was heading to Chapter 7 even before 9/11.

It was almost incredible TWA lasted as long as it did since Carl Icahn stripped TWA for years, remember all those routes to London Heathrow, they were sold to AA in 1989 & 1991. ORD to London was sold to AA for $195,000,000. In 1991 LAX, BOS & JFK were sold for $445 million. AA got Miami to LHR for free since United didn't fly it as part of their Pan am Heathrow purchase. Today AA's LHR operation is huge in a JV with British Airways.

Isn't this post about Pan Am? Over half the posts are about TWA. Can the mods MAYBE try to keep things on topic?

I think I miss TWA more than Pan Am, probably because I flew more with TWA when I was a kid during the eighties. I probably only flew a handful of times with Pan Am during that time. My last two flights on Pan Am were in April 1990, JFK-FRA-JFK. Pan Am and TWA were very important airlines in the post-war aviation history of West Germany for Germans and German-American kids like myself who visited his oma (grandma) every summer. By the way, anyone who flew TWA during the eighties, do you remember how TWA loved to show Dudley Moore films?

mga707 wrote:

ContinentalEWR wrote:

mga707 wrote:

At least AA found enough value in TWA to acquire them. By late 1991, what was left of Pan Am was a 'picked carcass' that nobody wanted to acquire. Delta got what they wanted with the former PA European routes. What was left only lasted a short time before shutting down.

AA acquired TWA to knock out a competitor and find a solution to delays and congestion at ORD. It wanted a third mid-continent hub to shuffle traffic and saw that opportunity in STL, along with TWA's large fleet of MD80s. AA had little interest in the network that TWA had for the most part. It was a poorly timed, expensive mess of a deal. American paid $500 million in cash for TWA's assets. In separate arrangements, AMR was also to purchase $1.2 billion worth of assets from USAirways Group and a 49% stake in DCAir, which was designed as part of the spin off of USAirways' DC operations to meet DoJ requirements for the $11.2 UAL acquisition of USAirways announced in May 2000 that ended up not happening.

In the end, American didn't get much value out of the assets it got from TWA. 9/11 and the economic downturn that followed it resulted in AA in rather quick succession de-hubbing STL. The TATL network at JFK, or what was left of it, was of no value to AA. It already served CDG on its own metal, did not want to inherit the pricey cost of sustaining employees at TWA's station in TLV, and the market to serve CAI and RUH wasn't there following 9/11. These were TWA's sole remaining TATL routes out of JFK. The STL-LGW route was also cut within a few years post-acquisition. AA canned the majority of the TWA staff and eliminated almost any trace of the airline within weeks of TWA operating its final flight, a symbolic MCI-STL route captained by its CEO at the time, Jim Compton, on 12/01/01.

AA retains naming and branding rights, and has launched routes formerly operated by TWA from JFK (FCO, MXP, MAD, BCN) and later, TLV and ATH (2021). It closed the TWA Flight Center at JFK and consolidated everything at T8 as the construction of the new T8 was already in the plans and underway by the time the acquisition happened.

The purchase of TWA followed patterns similar to Reno Air, Air Cal, and others. AA simply wanted to remove what it perceived to be an inefficient competitor at a time when it was the industry's bell weather.

Correct on all counts. In retrospect, it would have been far better for AA to let TWA fail and then pick the assets they wanted, like the nearly-new MD-80s (TWA had the last batch built in 1998-99). But hindsight is always 20-20.

It was stated at the time that TWA’s only assets with any real value at the time were the MD-80’s, and the Kansas City Heavy Maint Base. (Namely, the mechanics, not the base itself.)

jfk777 wrote:

It was almost incredible TWA lasted as long as it did since Carl Icahn stripped TWA for years, remember all those routes to London Heathrow, they were sold to AA in 1989 & 1991. ORD to London was sold to AA for $195,000,000. In 1991 LAX, BOS & JFK were sold for $445 million. AA got Miami to LHR for free since United didn't fly it as part of their Pan am Heathrow purchase. Today AA's LHR operation is huge in a JV with British Airways.

TWA was troubled long before Icahn came along. His era was the result of what had happened before.

I think we all agree that the fall of PA (and EA&TW) was a slow controled flight into terrain that started decades before the endgame. Bottom line is that PA couldn't shrink itself and cover operating & debt servicing obligations.

Seeing the Pan Am Globe logo on a rail box car is all kinds of wrong.

Reading about Pan Am, it always felt that their destiny is exceptionally unfair. Here they were, spending inordinate amounts on CAPEX to actually establish intercontinental navigation principles, and practices. Then teaching their own military (both USN aviation and USAAF) how to fly long distances over water. Then banned from flying domestic in the US. And then having their international routes, and IP investments enabling them, declared a "shared resource", open game for any US airline (with notable exception of Heathrow, where the other side also didn't want additional entrants)

Looking at the photo in the article of the first posting- its an old photo of FRA.
It´s amazing that all the cars - especially the VW Buses (T1) in the photo- would probably me more valuable today, than the 747-100!?

I was born almost 7 years after Pan Am ceased ops, but I try get to get my hands on as much 1:200 scale models I can and I make AI flightplans and repaints for my FSX (soon MSFS) to keep it flying around the world. The billboard livery looks good on an A350 and B748

The world and the aviation industry work as usual

Phosphorus wrote:

Reading about Pan Am, it always felt that their destiny is exceptionally unfair. Here they were, spending inordinate amounts on CAPEX to actually establish intercontinental navigation principles, and practices. Then teaching their own military (both USN aviation and USAAF) how to fly long distances over water. Then banned from flying domestic in the US. And then having their international routes, and IP investments enabling them, declared a "shared resource", open game for any US airline (with notable exception of Heathrow, where the other side also didn't want additional entrants)

In the end, I think it was a political game of what goes around, comes around. Juan Trippe was a brilliant innovator, but like many brilliant people, he had his quirks. From everything I understand and have read, he wasn't the easiest man to deal with. I believe a lot of what happened to Pan Am in the 1970's - on top of really poor management and deregulation - was the bills coming due for the pressure Trippe applied to politicians and industry alike.

Trippe was a ruthless businessman and a brilliant visionary, but by the time he stepped down, there were many politicians ready to sink their knives into Pan Am for the pressure he applied to politicians as he was building "The Chosen Instrument."

MIflyer12 wrote:

ContinentalEWR wrote:

mga707 wrote:

At least AA found enough value in TWA to acquire them. By late 1991, what was left of Pan Am was a 'picked carcass' that nobody wanted to acquire. Delta got what they wanted with the former PA European routes. What was left only lasted a short time before shutting down.

AA acquired TWA to knock out a competitor and find a solution to delays and congestion at ORD.

TWA wasn't a big enough competitor even to worry about - it represented about 5% of national enplaned passengers in 1999, about 20% larger than America West but just 2/3 the size of #7 CO. There was no development of that mid-con hub, not in the 20 years of AA ownership. These are deficient rationalizations, to try to convince people (ex-employees, probably) there was something of value. It had been stripped and underinvested very thoroughly. TWA was heading to Chapter 7 even before 9/11.

TWA would not have survived much longer as a stand alone carrier, that's true, and 9/11 would have likely pushed the company into liquidation, had it limbered on through the rest of 2001 (I believe it filed for Chapter 11 a fourth time as AA acquired it). TWA was, though, perceived as a nuisance, and an obstacle to pricing as far as AA was concerned, and that the principal reason for buying it. No, AA didn't develop STL into a hub. It kept the hub in place for about 1 year, then started downsizing it in phases, starting in 2003 and again in 2004.

FlyingElvii wrote:

jfk777 wrote:

It was almost incredible TWA lasted as long as it did since Carl Icahn stripped TWA for years, remember all those routes to London Heathrow, they were sold to AA in 1989 & 1991. ORD to London was sold to AA for $195,000,000. In 1991 LAX, BOS & JFK were sold for $445 million. AA got Miami to LHR for free since United didn't fly it as part of their Pan am Heathrow purchase. Today AA's LHR operation is huge in a JV with British Airways.

TWA was troubled long before Icahn came along. His era was the result of what had happened before.

Pan Am's biggest problems were the lack of a meaningful domestic route network. Much, if not all of that domestic network was concentrated around JFK and MIA, and designed to feed the 747s and A310s. The 747 was, by the time Pan Am shut down, 21+ years old, they were too large for 1/2 of the year, the same problem TWA experienced with them. They worked for routes like LHR and CDG during the slower winter season, but the rest of the network they served needed smaller frames and that was the opening for AA, UA, and DL, which all began to expand across the Atlantic (AA in 1987, UA in 1990, and DL since the 1980s). Pan Am acquired A310s in a sweet deal, because Airbus was desperate to place them (and the A300s) with a US carrier, and took a significant price cut to do it). The A310-200s were, the wrong aircraft for some routes to Europe and didn't have enough range). and the A310 overall was not a fuel efficient carrier.

The Pan Am of 1990 was essentially unchanged network wise since the sale of the TPAC network and getting smaller. The sale of the TATL network and JFK assets to Delta was the final nail in the coffin. Pan Am's MIA hub and Latin America network would very likely not survived the competition that was coming with AA's purchase of the Eastern network and Miami operation.

Without LHR, which Pan Am sold off, the TATL network had become redundant and with those 747s, even more of a financial drag.

TWA's circumstances were a bit different. It had a more robust domestic network, thanks to STL, the Ozark acquisition, but it struggled financially as well. Carl Icahn saddled the airline with more debt, under-invested in equipment, resulting in an old, inefficient fleet, crumbling terminals at JFK, and too many 747 seats to fill in the slow winter season. Selling off LHR resulted in TWA losing a boat load of corporate contracts. The Karabu deal, TWA 800, and the changed competitive landscape were pretty much assuring TWA would not survive. The leases on all those new planes that arrived (717s, 757s and the 767-300s) were also a major drag on finances, as they were all leased at very high rates, given TWA's very poor credit rating. In short, TWA lived on borrowed time for much of the second half of the 1990s. The relatively rapid draw down of the TATL network post-TWA 800 even with twin jets illustrated just how unprofitable TWA was. The advent of JetBlue at JFK and Continental's growth to Europe from Newark were also a factor in pushing TWA to the brink. What was left at JFK was a skeletal operation with about 30-40 daily flights, at most.

A great airline, from a time when the America was its heyday.

In the early Seventies, how BIG PanAm was: RTW services, PanAm Building, Intercontinental Hotels, the missile division, FalconJet, Worldport, the ground service that became PanAm World Services and some stakes in airline as AVENSA or Ariana, this in exchange for assist the company. It was impossible to think that huge company would be on their knees twenty years later.

For me, the PanAm's fall is similar of VARIG and Swissair.

In Brazil, the company - through its subsidiary Panair do Brasil, made many airports in the Northeast and North for Allies during WWII. The Panair was a great company thanks to PanAm, maybe its main subsidiary.

By the way, today is 20 years since the Transbrasil ceased the operations.

Flew PA one time in the early 70's thanks to...TWA. I was about 6 or 7 years old and Mom and I were non-revving back to the States on TWA after a trip to Spain and Portugal. The TWA 747 LIS-JFK was full so they issued us a ticket on a PA 707 which was half full. Very pleasant flight with incredible service thanks to the light load plus the nature of PA FA training at the time. We had lunch, constant snack offerings throughout the flight and a pre-arrival mini-meal before arrival. Don't remember the Worldport as we had to scurry over to T5 to catch our TWA flight to ORD, with another connection on Ozark to Peoria. My Mom worked for OZ reservations and we almost always flew TWA TATL because according to her, the PA rez agents were "stuck up" and were never very helpful when a "lesser" carrier's agents called them. Maybe that's why the TW 747 was jam packed and the PA 707 was half empty. But the PA ground staff and flight crew were top notch.

Here’s an article published today (Dec 3):

https://www.cnn.com/travel/article/pan- ... index.html

PB26 wrote:

A great airline, from a time when the America was its heyday.

In the early Seventies, how BIG PanAm was: RTW services, PanAm Building, Intercontinental Hotels, the missile division, FalconJet, Worldport, the ground service that became PanAm World Services and some stakes in airline as AVENSA or Ariana, this in exchange for assist the company. It was impossible to think that huge company would be on their knees twenty years later.

For me, the PanAm's fall is similar of VARIG and Swissair.

In Brazil, the company - through its subsidiary Panair do Brasil, made many airports in the Northeast and North for Allies during WWII. The Panair was a great company thanks to PanAm, maybe its main subsidiary.

By the way, today is 20 years since the Transbrasil ceased the operations.

Don’t forget Panagra, Pan Am Grace that became Braniff, then EA, finally AA’s South American routes on the west side of SA.

PA727 wrote:

Phosphorus wrote:

Reading about Pan Am, it always felt that their destiny is exceptionally unfair. (....)

(...)

Trippe was a ruthless businessman and a brilliant visionary, but by the time he stepped down, there were many politicians ready to sink their knives into Pan Am for the pressure he applied to politicians as he was building "The Chosen Instrument."

Very interesting comments from both of you.

Destiny was not unfair to PanAm or Juan Trippe. I have a suggested reading: A Dream of Eagles, by Ralph O'Neill. O'Neill set up NYRBA and was doing a better job than Trippe on getting long-haul air travel off the ground. But Trippe had friends in Washington and swallowed NYRBA. This book is fascinating.

Here is a news report from WABC on the day Pan Am went out of business on 12/4/91
https://youtu.be/b-KarUJQ6v0

Near the end, PanAm made a surprise appearance serving ABQ. They tagged their JFK-DFW flight onto ABQ from Dec, 1989 into Feb 1990, less than two months. Appears they were still trying to make the JFK hub work.

I miss the Pan Am 727s and A300/310s with the billboard Pan Am text and the meatball. One of the great airline liveries of all time. Under-stated class.

I RARELY comment upon Airliners.net, but I'm an engaged reader!!!

Strictly my opinion, thus "meaningless" conjecture re: "why" factors of 20-30yr old deceased airlines....BUT....[i]what do y'all believe were the #1 factor (singular) for Pan Am & TWA ceasing to exist w/ exception of a "clothing/bag brand" & a "hotel" circa 2021????

PA & TW are fascinating airlines w/ odd similarities. They're the Original Gangsta's of JFK-Europe. To remain solvent, they both sold "platinum eggs" to competitors---PA/UA Pacific & TW/AA Atlantic (more an Icahn $$$ thing than a life-sustaining need?) & then PA/DL Atlantic. They both lost a 747 due to "no-fault" towards the ultimate end (Obviously devastating for all, yet I don't believe either tragedy r in the top 10 for ultimate failure....just my opinion....another question & perhaps another thread, PA103 or TW800---which one was ultimately more debilitating??? I'd go w/ PA103). Core fleet-types were nearly identical 747/727/707...yes, TW had L1011's & DC-9s & PA had AA310's....but the core of both were Boeing.

Anyway.....

*Pan Am #1 = Acquisition @ a premium of National Airlines....1st merger post-deregulation(???). Added "dead butterfly effect" points for basically underwriting Lorenzo. PA didn't posses a strategic logic or tactical response for deregulation. I suspect the "SkyGod" culture reigned supreme as in "We are Pan American Airlines, we can do no wrong...and if we do, remember...We are Pan American Airlines and will exist forever" (i.e the strategy was a mentality of invincibility).

*TWA #1 = Karabu. Icahn can be bashed-bashed-bashed...yet logically, didn't Icahn do exactly as Icahn was hardwired to do??? Weren't TW mngmt/employees aware of Northwest's LBO & UA's "adventures in ESOP"? Ichan's reputation proceeded him...what was TW uncertain of??? No Assistant-Junior-VP suggested "Hey...maybe we should re-examine the Howard Hughes years before we....." Lastly, in order to rid themselves of Ichan....u give him a 45% discount on all fares for flights through STL for 8yrs?Karabu has a to be one of---if not THE--- most horrifically stupid "agreements" in Airline History & just as the "Interweb thingy" was gaining booking traction (LowestFare.com)

MR27122 wrote:

I RARELY comment upon Airliners.net, but I'm an engaged reader!!!

Strictly my opinion, thus "meaningless" conjecture re: "why" factors of 20-30yr old deceased airlines....BUT....[i]what do y'all believe were the #1 factor (singular) for Pan Am & TWA ceasing to exist w/ exception of a "clothing/bag brand" & a "hotel" circa 2021????

PA & TW are fascinating airlines w/ odd similarities. They're the Original Gangsta's of JFK-Europe. To remain solvent, they both sold "platinum eggs" to competitors---PA/UA Pacific & TW/AA Atlantic (more an Icahn $$$ thing than a life-sustaining need?) & then PA/DL Atlantic. They both lost a 747 due to "no-fault" towards the ultimate end (Obviously devastating for all, yet I don't believe either tragedy r in the top 10 for ultimate failure....just my opinion....another question & perhaps another thread, PA103 or TW800---which one was ultimately more debilitating??? I'd go w/ PA103). Core fleet-types were nearly identical 747/727/707...yes, TW had L1011's & DC-9s & PA had AA310's....but the core of both were Boeing.

Anyway.....

*Pan Am #1 = Acquisition @ a premium of National Airlines....1st merger post-deregulation(???). Added "dead butterfly effect" points for basically underwriting Lorenzo. PA didn't posses a strategic logic or tactical response for deregulation. I suspect the "SkyGod" culture reigned supreme as in "We are Pan American Airlines, we can do no wrong...and if we do, remember...We are Pan American Airlines and will exist forever" (i.e the strategy was a mentality of invincibility).

*TWA #1 = Karabu. Icahn can be bashed-bashed-bashed...yet logically, didn't Icahn do exactly as Icahn was hardwired to do??? Weren't TW mngmt/employees aware of Northwest's LBO & UA's "adventures in ESOP"? Ichan's reputation proceeded him...what was TW uncertain of??? No Assistant-Junior-VP suggested "Hey...maybe we should re-examine the Howard Hughes years before we....." Lastly, in order to rid themselves of Ichan....u give him a 45% discount on all fares for flights through STL for 8yrs?Karabu has a to be one of---if not THE--- most horrifically stupid "agreements" in Airline History & just as the "Interweb thingy" was gaining booking traction (LowestFare.com)

Wow! Is it me or is this impossible to read? So much unnecessary punctuation.

airzim wrote:

MR27122 wrote:

I RARELY comment upon Airliners.net, but I'm an engaged reader!!!

Strictly my opinion, thus "meaningless" conjecture re: "why" factors of 20-30yr old deceased airlines....BUT....[i]what do y'all believe were the #1 factor (singular) for Pan Am & TWA ceasing to exist w/ exception of a "clothing/bag brand" & a "hotel" circa 2021????

PA & TW are fascinating airlines w/ odd similarities. They're the Original Gangsta's of JFK-Europe. To remain solvent, they both sold "platinum eggs" to competitors---PA/UA Pacific & TW/AA Atlantic (more an Icahn $$$ thing than a life-sustaining need?) & then PA/DL Atlantic. They both lost a 747 due to "no-fault" towards the ultimate end (Obviously devastating for all, yet I don't believe either tragedy r in the top 10 for ultimate failure....just my opinion....another question & perhaps another thread, PA103 or TW800---which one was ultimately more debilitating??? I'd go w/ PA103). Core fleet-types were nearly identical 747/727/707...yes, TW had L1011's & DC-9s & PA had AA310's....but the core of both were Boeing.

Anyway.....

*Pan Am #1 = Acquisition @ a premium of National Airlines....1st merger post-deregulation(???). Added "dead butterfly effect" points for basically underwriting Lorenzo. PA didn't posses a strategic logic or tactical response for deregulation. I suspect the "SkyGod" culture reigned supreme as in "We are Pan American Airlines, we can do no wrong...and if we do, remember...We are Pan American Airlines and will exist forever" (i.e the strategy was a mentality of invincibility).

*TWA #1 = Karabu. Icahn can be bashed-bashed-bashed...yet logically, didn't Icahn do exactly as Icahn was hardwired to do??? Weren't TW mngmt/employees aware of Northwest's LBO & UA's "adventures in ESOP"? Ichan's reputation proceeded him...what was TW uncertain of??? No Assistant-Junior-VP suggested "Hey...maybe we should re-examine the Howard Hughes years before we....." Lastly, in order to rid themselves of Ichan....u give him a 45% discount on all fares for flights through STL for 8yrs?Karabu has a to be one of---if not THE--- most horrifically stupid "agreements" in Airline History & just as the "Interweb thingy" was gaining booking traction (LowestFare.com)

Wow! Is it me or is this impossible to read? So much unnecessary punctuation.

Get On Up!!!! Is it me, or are you a James Brown Fan??? U Gotta hit me 2 times w/ the double-post!!!! (Mods if posting re punctation is relevant to aviation, so is James Brown!!)

A lot of TWA and Pan Am discussion, for me 1991 was the loss of Pan Am and Eastern. I was lucky to fly both, many more times Eastern, but they were similar for me in that they were both predominately East Coast airlines (especially New York and Florida). I miss them both, however truth be told I could not see either Eastern or Pan Am today unless they had merged with someone else like TWA would ten years later.

Eastern would have been the perfect merger partner for Continental or NWA, labor aside.
Pan Am would have been perfect merger partner for United, in the end most of the airline's assets ended up United.

Phosphorus wrote:

Reading about Pan Am, it always felt that their destiny is exceptionally unfair. Here they were, spending inordinate amounts on CAPEX to actually establish intercontinental navigation principles, and practices. Then teaching their own military (both USN aviation and USAAF) how to fly long distances over water. Then banned from flying domestic in the US. And then having their international routes, and IP investments enabling them, declared a "shared resource", open game for any US airline (with notable exception of Heathrow, where the other side also didn't want additional entrants)

Well in the 1940's they tried to get legal recognition as the monopoly flag carrier for the US. This is the reason they had limited rights to domestic routes. They also created lots of political enemies due to their heavy handed tactics.

flyingclrs727 wrote:

Phosphorus wrote:

Reading about Pan Am, it always felt that their destiny is exceptionally unfair. Here they were, spending inordinate amounts on CAPEX to actually establish intercontinental navigation principles, and practices. Then teaching their own military (both USN aviation and USAAF) how to fly long distances over water. Then banned from flying domestic in the US. And then having their international routes, and IP investments enabling them, declared a "shared resource", open game for any US airline (with notable exception of Heathrow, where the other side also didn't want additional entrants)

Well in the 1940's they tried to get legal recognition as the monopoly flag carrier for the US. This is the reason they had limited rights to domestic routes. They also created lots of political enemies due to their heavy handed tactics.

THIS….
There was a lot of resentment toward PA management, for a long time, by both the Government and labor. Juan Trippe’s “Own-a-Senator” program was wildly successful, right up until it wasn’t.

Add to that deregulation, long-standing and sometimes very bitter labor issues in the U.S., (Labor at all levels demanding “Industry leading and Defining contracts” due to PA’s status as “The Premier Airline of the World”, even after it wasn’t. (See the 1985 Pan Am Strike). Plus, cold-war era jobs program contracts abroad. PA’s high legacy expenses in every category doomed them, with competition growing.

The labor issues were very bad, and so bitter, that even after PA died, they continued…
After Carnival acquired the brand, and painted the globe on their tales, they had to fight numerous lawsuits, even from the State of New York, demanding that Ex-PA employees be given hiring rights, including payment of past and due wages, plus retiree insurance and flight benefits.

Speaking of this special day, a recent intereview done with the son of Juan Trippe’s and his thoughts on why the airline failed: https://aviationsourcenews.com/airline/ ... rd-trippe/


The author of Skygods also was in an interview recently: https://aviationsourcenews.com/airline/ ... novations/

Happy reading!

I grew up in Berlin and flew a lot on Pan Am, especially in Germany, but transatlantic and within the US as well. I wonder if the huge 747 order broke the neck of Pan Am? It had teething troubles for some time, the air transport system and market were not ready for the big aircraft and oil went up. I still remember the super elegant design of Pan Am from the sixties and I loved their old 747-100 that did a constant slight dutch roll in cruise as their early autopilots could only steer with a delay.
Pan Am went down financially for a long time and had to sell more and more parts. Not fun to watch. I consider the early 707 period as their top era and their clipper oceanic routes with flying boats before.
Pan Am will remain some iconic brand forever.

Noshow wrote:

I grew up in Berlin and flew a lot on Pan Am, especially in Germany, but transatlantic and within the US as well. I wonder if the huge 747 order broke the neck of Pan Am? It had teething troubles for some time, the air transport system and market were not ready for the big aircraft and oil went up. I still remember the super elegant design of Pan Am from the sixties and I loved their old 747-100 that did a constant slight dutch roll in cruise as their early autopilots could only steer with a delay.
Pan Am went down financially for a long time and had to sell more and more parts. Not fun to watch. I consider the early 707 period as their top era and their clipper oceanic routes with flying boats before.
Pan Am will remain some iconic brand forever.

The 747 order was a gamble, that's true, but I don't think the cost of it was a factor in Pan Am's demise. The plane itself though, was a factor, later. The 747 was a marvel and democratized air travel the world over, but it was an expensive machine to operate on a lot of routes, notably over the Atlantic, during the slower winter months. It was also an aging workhorse for Pacific operations around the time PA sold the network there to UA. By the time of the TPAC sale, the 744 was still on the drawing board, and aircraft that would render Pan Am's Asia Pacific network and hub at NRT obsolete weren't yet flying, but the cost of re-fleeting for the next decade to serve the market were likely a factor in a decision to sell off the Asia network, as well as the need to raise cash to continue operating.

Pan Am operated until the end much like it always did. It had a weak domestic network, was focused on JFK and MIA and struggled to feed the 747 and A310s for the routes they covered.

Remembering Pan Am.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cYtDhGN0O9o

My only direct experience with PA was a special memory. As a 12-ish year-old on a spotting trip to MSY in the mid-80s, I got up the courage to approach a PA gate agent on the B concourse if I could visit the plane and the flight deck. He enthusiastically called over a flight attendant who eagerly welcomed me on board and allowed me to interrupt the engineer with my questions. The plane was 72S Clipper Intrepid. All 3 were eager to help, professional, and very welcoming.

I did fly DL a few times out of JFK in the 90s, beginning in 1992. I remember the airport passenger service agents being equally eager to help. They really demonstrated that "I'm glad you're here with us." attitude. Would most of them still be PA veterans?

ContinentalEWR wrote:

Noshow wrote:

I grew up in Berlin and flew a lot on Pan Am, especially in Germany, but transatlantic and within the US as well. I wonder if the huge 747 order broke the neck of Pan Am? It had teething troubles for some time, the air transport system and market were not ready for the big aircraft and oil went up. I still remember the super elegant design of Pan Am from the sixties and I loved their old 747-100 that did a constant slight dutch roll in cruise as their early autopilots could only steer with a delay.
Pan Am went down financially for a long time and had to sell more and more parts. Not fun to watch. I consider the early 707 period as their top era and their clipper oceanic routes with flying boats before.
Pan Am will remain some iconic brand forever.

The 747 order was a gamble, that's true, but I don't think the cost of it was a factor in Pan Am's demise. The plane itself though, was a factor, later. The 747 was a marvel and democratized air travel the world over, but it was an expensive machine to operate on a lot of routes, notably over the Atlantic, during the slower winter months. It was also an aging workhorse for Pacific operations around the time PA sold the network there to UA. By the time of the TPAC sale, the 744 was still on the drawing board, and aircraft that would render Pan Am's Asia Pacific network and hub at NRT obsolete weren't yet flying, but the cost of re-fleeting for the next decade to serve the market were likely a factor in a decision to sell off the Asia network, as well as the need to raise cash to continue operating.

Pan Am operated until the end much like it always did. It had a weak domestic network, was focused on JFK and MIA and struggled to feed the 747 and A310s for the routes they covered.

The 747 was too big for many routes. It may have been fine for JFK-LHR, JFK-AMS, JFK-FRA, and JFK-CDG, but it was not suitable for lower volume routes like JFK-BCN. Also the route structure of Pan Am was heavily weighted towards flying out of IDL (JFK) Maybe that worked in the early days when there was less traffic, but it made less and less sense as international air traffic grew. Pan Am could print money when only two US airlines (Pan Am and TWA) were allowed to fly to LHR and likewise two US airlines (Pan Am and Northwest) were allowed to fly to NRT. Pan Am could make people flying from other parts of the US to fly into JFK on various US domestic airlines. Deregulation allowed passengers to fly to foreign destinations without having to fly to JFK first. Also after the early 1970's security checks started to be required to board aircraft. In the case of JFK, it meant passengers transferring from domestic flights would have to be rescreened due to having to go outside of the secure zone in the terminal where their domestic flight arrived to transfer to Pan Am's terminal. Almost 50 years after security screenings became required to board planes, JFK still does not have secure airside connections between terminals. The inconvenience of connecting at JFK certainly did not help Pan Am when deregulation allowed competitors to collect passengers from their domestic hubs and bypass JFK to Europe.

Pan Am along with TWA, and BOAC (later BA) also benefitted from the Bermuda I and II Agreements that prohibited any airline from flying between Atlanta, Houston, or Dallas and Heathrow. Quite frankly I think that prohibition was a violation of the US Constitution. The 747 unlike the 707 had plenty of range for IAH-LHR or DFW-LHR. Braniff started flying DFW-LGW, and British Caledonian started flying LGW-IAH. That allowed nonstop travel from Texas to London, but it didn't do much for connections at LHR. It wasn't til 2008 that the Bermuda II restrictions were eliminated. That allowed any US airline to fly from any US airport to LHR.

The 747 was simply too big for the Atlantic. Pan Am 103 was a LHR-JFK flight on the Wed before xmas and only had 59% load factor. TWA 800 was a JFK-CDG-FCO flight on a Wed in the middle of summer. It only had a 48% load factor even with some passengers reaccommodated from a canceled FCO flight.

Best job I ever had! Best work family ever! I still miss the Clipper!

flyingclrs727 wrote:

ContinentalEWR wrote:

Noshow wrote:

I grew up in Berlin and flew a lot on Pan Am, especially in Germany, but transatlantic and within the US as well. I wonder if the huge 747 order broke the neck of Pan Am? It had teething troubles for some time, the air transport system and market were not ready for the big aircraft and oil went up. I still remember the super elegant design of Pan Am from the sixties and I loved their old 747-100 that did a constant slight dutch roll in cruise as their early autopilots could only steer with a delay.
Pan Am went down financially for a long time and had to sell more and more parts. Not fun to watch. I consider the early 707 period as their top era and their clipper oceanic routes with flying boats before.
Pan Am will remain some iconic brand forever.

The 747 order was a gamble, that's true, but I don't think the cost of it was a factor in Pan Am's demise. The plane itself though, was a factor, later. The 747 was a marvel and democratized air travel the world over, but it was an expensive machine to operate on a lot of routes, notably over the Atlantic, during the slower winter months. It was also an aging workhorse for Pacific operations around the time PA sold the network there to UA. By the time of the TPAC sale, the 744 was still on the drawing board, and aircraft that would render Pan Am's Asia Pacific network and hub at NRT obsolete weren't yet flying, but the cost of re-fleeting for the next decade to serve the market were likely a factor in a decision to sell off the Asia network, as well as the need to raise cash to continue operating.

Pan Am operated until the end much like it always did. It had a weak domestic network, was focused on JFK and MIA and struggled to feed the 747 and A310s for the routes they covered.

The 747 was too big for many routes. It may have been fine for JFK-LHR, JFK-AMS, JFK-FRA, and JFK-CDG, but it was not suitable for lower volume routes like JFK-BCN. Also the route structure of Pan Am was heavily weighted towards flying out of IDL (JFK) Maybe that worked in the early days when there was less traffic, but it made less and less sense as international air traffic grew. Pan Am could print money when only two US airlines (Pan Am and TWA) were allowed to fly to LHR and likewise two US airlines (Pan Am and Northwest) were allowed to fly to NRT. Pan Am could make people flying from other parts of the US to fly into JFK on various US domestic airlines. Deregulation allowed passengers to fly to foreign destinations without having to fly to JFK first. Also after the early 1970's security checks started to be required to board aircraft. In the case of JFK, it meant passengers transferring from domestic flights would have to be rescreened due to having to go outside of the secure zone in the terminal where their domestic flight arrived to transfer to Pan Am's terminal. Almost 50 years after security screenings became required to board planes, JFK still does not have secure airside connections between terminals. The inconvenience of connecting at JFK certainly did not help Pan Am when deregulation allowed competitors to collect passengers from their domestic hubs and bypass JFK to Europe.

Pan Am along with TWA, and BOAC (later BA) also benefitted from the Bermuda I and II Agreements that prohibited any airline from flying between Atlanta, Houston, or Dallas and Heathrow. Quite frankly I think that prohibition was a violation of the US Constitution. The 747 unlike the 707 had plenty of range for IAH-LHR or DFW-LHR. Braniff started flying DFW-LGW, and British Caledonian started flying LGW-IAH. That allowed nonstop travel from Texas to London, but it didn't do much for connections at LHR. It wasn't til 2008 that the Bermuda II restrictions were eliminated. That allowed any US airline to fly from any US airport to LHR.

Oh please. What amendment of the US Constitution exactly would that violate?? Specifically??

william wrote:

Seeing the Pan Am Globe logo on a rail box car is all kinds of wrong.

I used to think the same thing, but after seeing various airline names being brought back to life in some bastardized version of their previous self, I have grown to like the fact that the Pan Am name and the blue globe are in a safe place now. I would also say the same for TWA.

That was a tough time for aviation because the Eastern Airlines shutdown was around the same time. Delta benefited greatly by gaining access to European routes from JFK.

flyingclrs727 wrote:

ContinentalEWR wrote:

Noshow wrote:

I grew up in Berlin and flew a lot on Pan Am, especially in Germany, but transatlantic and within the US as well. I wonder if the huge 747 order broke the neck of Pan Am? It had teething troubles for some time, the air transport system and market were not ready for the big aircraft and oil went up. I still remember the super elegant design of Pan Am from the sixties and I loved their old 747-100 that did a constant slight dutch roll in cruise as their early autopilots could only steer with a delay.
Pan Am went down financially for a long time and had to sell more and more parts. Not fun to watch. I consider the early 707 period as their top era and their clipper oceanic routes with flying boats before.
Pan Am will remain some iconic brand forever.

The 747 order was a gamble, that's true, but I don't think the cost of it was a factor in Pan Am's demise. The plane itself though, was a factor, later. The 747 was a marvel and democratized air travel the world over, but it was an expensive machine to operate on a lot of routes, notably over the Atlantic, during the slower winter months. It was also an aging workhorse for Pacific operations around the time PA sold the network there to UA. By the time of the TPAC sale, the 744 was still on the drawing board, and aircraft that would render Pan Am's Asia Pacific network and hub at NRT obsolete weren't yet flying, but the cost of re-fleeting for the next decade to serve the market were likely a factor in a decision to sell off the Asia network, as well as the need to raise cash to continue operating.

Pan Am operated until the end much like it always did. It had a weak domestic network, was focused on JFK and MIA and struggled to feed the 747 and A310s for the routes they covered.

The 747 was too big for many routes. It may have been fine for JFK-LHR, JFK-AMS, JFK-FRA, and JFK-CDG, but it was not suitable for lower volume routes like JFK-BCN. Also the route structure of Pan Am was heavily weighted towards flying out of IDL (JFK) Maybe that worked in the early days when there was less traffic, but it made less and less sense as international air traffic grew. Pan Am could print money when only two US airlines (Pan Am and TWA) were allowed to fly to LHR and likewise two US airlines (Pan Am and Northwest) were allowed to fly to NRT. Pan Am could make people flying from other parts of the US to fly into JFK on various US domestic airlines. Deregulation allowed passengers to fly to foreign destinations without having to fly to JFK first. Also after the early 1970's security checks started to be required to board aircraft. In the case of JFK, it meant passengers transferring from domestic flights would have to be rescreened due to having to go outside of the secure zone in the terminal where their domestic flight arrived to transfer to Pan Am's terminal. Almost 50 years after security screenings became required to board planes, JFK still does not have secure airside connections between terminals. The inconvenience of connecting at JFK certainly did not help Pan Am when deregulation allowed competitors to collect passengers from their domestic hubs and bypass JFK to Europe.

Pan Am along with TWA, and BOAC (later BA) also benefitted from the Bermuda I and II Agreements that prohibited any airline from flying between Atlanta, Houston, or Dallas and Heathrow. Quite frankly I think that prohibition was a violation of the US Constitution. The 747 unlike the 707 had plenty of range for IAH-LHR or DFW-LHR. Braniff started flying DFW-LGW, and British Caledonian started flying LGW-IAH. That allowed nonstop travel from Texas to London, but it didn't do much for connections at LHR. It wasn't til 2008 that the Bermuda II restrictions were eliminated. That allowed any US airline to fly from any US airport to LHR.

Bermuda II was lifted in 2008 but it didn't exactly mean any US airline could fly from any US city or open skies for UK based carriers. They each needed to secure a slot first at LHR. Bermuda II didn't remediate that. As to violating the US Constitution, oh please.....on what basis? What nonsense.

Atlwarrior wrote:

That was a tough time for aviation because the Eastern Airlines shutdown was around the same time. Delta benefited greatly by gaining access to European routes from JFK.

Eventually yes, DL did, but not at the start. In fact, within 3 years of acquiring and launching PA's network from JFK to Europe, it cut many routes and developed code-shares with many airlines rather than fly them on its own metal, thanks to alliances at the time and individual arrangements (Sabena, Swissair, Virign, TAP, Aer Lingus, and more).

I had my first two flights on Pan Am so I have a lot of sentiment to the airline. There was a lot of mismanagement, old planes and finally Lockerbie gave it a final kick into bankruptcy. A true icon in air travel.

Josh76040 wrote:

flyingclrs727 wrote:

ContinentalEWR wrote:

The 747 order was a gamble, that's true, but I don't think the cost of it was a factor in Pan Am's demise. The plane itself though, was a factor, later. The 747 was a marvel and democratized air travel the world over, but it was an expensive machine to operate on a lot of routes, notably over the Atlantic, during the slower winter months. It was also an aging workhorse for Pacific operations around the time PA sold the network there to UA. By the time of the TPAC sale, the 744 was still on the drawing board, and aircraft that would render Pan Am's Asia Pacific network and hub at NRT obsolete weren't yet flying, but the cost of re-fleeting for the next decade to serve the market were likely a factor in a decision to sell off the Asia network, as well as the need to raise cash to continue operating.

Pan Am operated until the end much like it always did. It had a weak domestic network, was focused on JFK and MIA and struggled to feed the 747 and A310s for the routes they covered.

The 747 was too big for many routes. It may have been fine for JFK-LHR, JFK-AMS, JFK-FRA, and JFK-CDG, but it was not suitable for lower volume routes like JFK-BCN. Also the route structure of Pan Am was heavily weighted towards flying out of IDL (JFK) Maybe that worked in the early days when there was less traffic, but it made less and less sense as international air traffic grew. Pan Am could print money when only two US airlines (Pan Am and TWA) were allowed to fly to LHR and likewise two US airlines (Pan Am and Northwest) were allowed to fly to NRT. Pan Am could make people flying from other parts of the US to fly into JFK on various US domestic airlines. Deregulation allowed passengers to fly to foreign destinations without having to fly to JFK first. Also after the early 1970's security checks started to be required to board aircraft. In the case of JFK, it meant passengers transferring from domestic flights would have to be rescreened due to having to go outside of the secure zone in the terminal where their domestic flight arrived to transfer to Pan Am's terminal. Almost 50 years after security screenings became required to board planes, JFK still does not have secure airside connections between terminals. The inconvenience of connecting at JFK certainly did not help Pan Am when deregulation allowed competitors to collect passengers from their domestic hubs and bypass JFK to Europe.

Pan Am along with TWA, and BOAC (later BA) also benefitted from the Bermuda I and II Agreements that prohibited any airline from flying between Atlanta, Houston, or Dallas and Heathrow. Quite frankly I think that prohibition was a violation of the US Constitution. The 747 unlike the 707 had plenty of range for IAH-LHR or DFW-LHR. Braniff started flying DFW-LGW, and British Caledonian started flying LGW-IAH. That allowed nonstop travel from Texas to London, but it didn't do much for connections at LHR. It wasn't til 2008 that the Bermuda II restrictions were eliminated. That allowed any US airline to fly from any US airport to LHR.

Oh please. What amendment of the US Constitution exactly would that violate?? Specifically??

Easy!

ARTICLE I, SECTION 9, CLAUSE 6
No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another; nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.