GalaxyFlyer wrote:

No, unless they engaged the autopilot on the take-off roll, if that can be done might. Pull back, the houses get smaller.

That's what I would think. but lately software seems to be more buggy....
There will be no CVR transcript, but there is probably some telemetry anyway. Did they pull at all?

The recorders are available, esp the QAR for EK’s FDM program. Downloading the CVR is up to the regulator and EK.

Flight control software isn’t “buggy”; thoroughly tested.

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

The recorders are available, esp the QAR for EK’s FDM program. Downloading the CVR is up to the regulator and EK.

Flight control software isn’t “buggy”; thoroughly tested.

Lately, I came across a pilot saying that at their company flight data (not legal black box, but same data via routine logging) is downloaded via cellular connection upon landing, and is available for pilot's review on company-issued tablet within 5 minutes after arrival. Not sure how typical that is, but technology must be there (and hopefully to be used productively, not punitively - but that is a different story). So company could definitely have some idea about the situation by the time the crew was back. Not saying that Emirates would do a fair review and treat pilots accordingly, just that the data should be there for those who need it.
As for software testing, looks like the bar was lowered so much that it is actually a tripping hazard these days. Boeing (second iteration?) fix for MAX that was submitted to FAA and failed to boot comes to mind.

Yes, the flight data, just about everywhere now, is downloaded and sent for processing as part of the FOQA programs. It can be via device download or, increasingly, via cellular or Wi-Fi transmission. Our corporate jet program provider says raw data in 7 minutes after receipt by the processor. Event reports are subject to validation, but, yes, pilots can debrief the basics of their flight quickly. It’s an phone app, by phase of flight, so they can see taxi speed, take-off distance, rotate speed, rate of rotation, climb out, etc.

a320fan wrote:

The 777 is a tough bird. QR had an incident in MIA a few years ago where they overran the runway on departure, collected a few antennas, nearly took out cars in the carpark, and ended up with a big gaping gash torn into the underside of the fuselage. Flew all the way to DOH with no indication that anything abnormal was going on.

No joke. OZ sent one cartwheeling down the runway grass in SFO, and everyone who had a seatbelt on survived. Incredible, really.

Weatherwatcher1 wrote:

TokyoImperialPa wrote:

ikolkyo wrote:

Something doesn’t add up, wouldn’t the plane still be in manual control this early into the flight? Not familiar with the 777 flight systems.

Some pilots engage the automation as soon as the wheels are up, but not sure on specific planes and their differences. There was a famous quip about Asiana several years ago that the autopilot would do virtually everything on the plane.

I don’t believe you can engage the autopilot at below 400 feet

200' IIRC.

The Altitude Selector would have been set and cross-checked when the "Airways Clearance" was received before engine start.
The "Take off Clearance" will often/usually also give an initial departure Altitude Restriction which should also have been set and cross-checked..

Don't know if the Autopilot can be engaged on the ground in the 777.

Saw it in a Simulator with a more-primitive jet airliner.

Terrifying!

cheers

Would be nice to receive some technical feedback from a 777 qualified pilot.

I still don't get why the AP would be engaged so early in the climb-out phase.

par13del wrote:

So foreign pilots are willing to sacrifice their "liberties" for the few extra dollars they will make working in that toxic environment, are they being "encouraged" by their respective governments for "political" reasons, and I mean those from the EU in particular and possibly Americans, pilots from other nations may already be used to such environments.

Yes

DL757NYC wrote:

par13del wrote:

So foreign pilots are willing to sacrifice their "liberties" for the few extra dollars they will make working in that toxic environment, are they being "encouraged" by their respective governments for "political" reasons, and I mean those from the EU in particular and possibly Americans, pilots from other nations may already be used to such environments.

Yes

That's how all employment works, all that varies is amount of $ (or local equivalent) and what you give up, at a minimum your time at a maximum.....

I don’t get it. That fast that low… don’t you just have to pull back on the yoke and up you go?

kalvado wrote:

Is it possible that, besides human factors, some obscure automation factor prevented them from rotating?

It could be possible the takeoff speeds were wrong , eg setup for a lighter aircraft and as a result didn’t have the automated V speeds callouts for the correct runway/weight/altitude/temperature

Flying Belgian wrote:

Would be nice to receive some technical feedback from a 777 qualified pilot.

I still don't get why the AP would be engaged so early in the climb-out phase.

777 minimum AP engage altitude is 200’. I’ve never seen anyone do it in real life with almost 9K on the 777.

zeke wrote:

kalvado wrote:

Is it possible that, besides human factors, some obscure automation factor prevented them from rotating?

It could be possible the takeoff speeds were wrong, eg setup for a lighter aircraft and as a result didn’t have the automated V speeds callouts for the correct runway/weight/altitude/temperature

If they set up for a lighter aircraft, my uneducated guess would be they would get early callouts and have to be on alert, possibly estimating Vr on the fly. However, they were almost driving through the houses at the end of the roll with pretty high speed. It could happen if they were programmed much heavier, but what kind of weight would require 216+ knots on a 773? MTOW + a bit of a handicap? It doesn't look like low weight setting with low thrust as they had higher than normal speed.
My gut feeling is there is something else here beyond pilots falling asleep.

There’s a bit more to this..than four crew taking off with ‘0’ on the MCP

My understanding is that the previous crew selected ‘0’ in the MCP after landing to protect the next crew from leaving 3000 in the MCP (previous MAP) instead of the usual 4000 SID altitude.

FCOM SOP on Capts MCP pre flight is left to right…if one turns on the FD the FMA Vert window automatically displays ‘ALT’ - the airport elevation 75’ is now close enough to zero to capture said mode. next the Capt pre flight moves right and in DXB usually selects 4000 - regular SID altitude

So you now have correct altitude (4000) but the FMA is not in TOGA/TOGA (LNAV/VNAV armed) - Its in ALT capture to ‘0’…in other words the FDs will pitch down. All looks reasonably normal as the color coding on FMA same, MCP altitude correct…but the FMA mode is incorrect.

EK removed the TAKE REVIEW verbal call out SOP prior to before the BEFORE TAKE OFF C/LIST - a number of years ago, to underscore ‘quiet Flt Deck’ philosophy much to the annoyance of the pilot group. The verbal ‘out loud’ Take Off review would include “TOGA/TOGA….” And if this was not heard - error trapped.

As to why these pilot did not fly it correctly…root cause FEAR. The ME3 and in particular EK have a track history of firing pilots for human error.

So now you have pilots who dont want to risk hand flying in case of error - and so become overly dependent on automation...and thus a depletion of ability to go to basic pitch / power flying.

Vicious circle. They have had four serious incidents as a result of poor flying skills - one of which resulted in a crash. The other two were A380 near CFITs in DME and JFK respectively and now this incident. FZ in Rostov is another example - same boss, so now five.

The training dept in EK has a particularly poisonous local pilot manager who over rules TRI/TRE grading on a regular basis, usually to the detriment of the trainee.

This adds to the fear.

Any buzz word that catches the said managers attention can result in his personal audit of the session. So now you may have trainers who see something they dont like in the trainee that can be improved with training - but are reluctant to point it out because they realize the severity of this managers intervention…does not fit the regular remedial training that is required.

Its like a jury conviction of accidental manslaughter -then having the judge hand down a death sentence.

The conjecture is - the jury in EK training dept know this…dont think the death sentence is appropriate and hence aquit.

And that ladies and gents is a problem.

TAC's report is not behind a paywall:

https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safe ... lose-call/

JO's tweet says:

It wasn’t set to zero, that’s one of the key facts of our independent reporting on this. It was set properly, but the autopilot mode had previously captured to the earlier 0000 entry and hadn’t been reset.

Ref: https://twitter.com/jonostrower/status/ ... 1560157187

TFA says this is a known behavior of the Boeing AP/FD and is taught in training so it is something the crew should have known and dealt with.

Avgeek21 wrote:

santi319 wrote:

VMCA787 wrote:

You obviously haven't had the "pleasure" of working for a ME3. The simple fact is if you are terminated then there is no problem. Issue solved. Forget everything you know about workers' rights.

Thiss, the ME3 are NOT regulated at all like the rest of the west, people forget that. Heck, people even completely forget about the Flydubai accident in Rostov, which was 100% the airline and the regulations over there ‘s fault. Not even a word on it.

That area of the world is known to hide anything for their image.

Not true. A LOT has happened and changed as a result. And all for the better. Trust me.

How so Avgeek?
The rosters actually got worse after the Rostov accident. I know that for a fact. From what I hear the rostering in Flydubai is still very poor. I have seen fatiguing roster as of December of this year from friends. Please tell us what has changed in the ME and the GCAA since Rostov or EK 407? I wondering will rostering be a factor in this incident.

kalvado wrote:

If they set up for a lighter aircraft, my uneducated guess would be they would get early callouts and have to be on alert, possibly estimating Vr on the fly. However, they were almost driving through the houses at the end of the roll with pretty high speed. It could happen if they were programmed much heavier, but what kind of weight would require 216+ knots on a 773? MTOW + a bit of a handicap? It doesn't look like low weight setting with low thrust as they had higher than normal speed.
My gut feeling is there is something else here beyond pilots falling asleep.

A lighter aircraft would have lower V speeds, it would also have lower thrust. The lower thrust and higher takeoff mass would result in longer distance across the ground to accelerate.

zeke wrote:

kalvado wrote:

If they set up for a lighter aircraft, my uneducated guess would be they would get early callouts and have to be on alert, possibly estimating Vr on the fly. However, they were almost driving through the houses at the end of the roll with pretty high speed. It could happen if they were programmed much heavier, but what kind of weight would require 216+ knots on a 773? MTOW + a bit of a handicap? It doesn't look like low weight setting with low thrust as they had higher than normal speed.
My gut feeling is there is something else here beyond pilots falling asleep.

A lighter aircraft would have lower V speeds, it would also have lower thrust. The lower thrust and higher takeoff mass would result in longer distance across the ground to accelerate.

But they accelerated past tire speed limit, and likely past any possible Vr for any weight

kalvado wrote:

But they accelerated past tire speed limit, and likely past any possible Vr for any weight

Indicated speed is not what you see on FR24 data

zeke wrote:

kalvado wrote:

But they accelerated past tire speed limit, and likely past any possible Vr for any weight

Indicated speed is not what you see on FR24 data

Would you assume 40 knots tailwind for takeoff? I doubt that could be the case.

TAC article notes that 262 kts would have exceeded the flaps setting (15°? Just guessing) at takeoff. Is there no automated flight envelope protection? And just how dangerous is it to proceed on a 14 hour flight after a serious flap over speed event?

kalvado wrote:

Would you assume 40 knots tailwind for takeoff? I doubt that could be the case.

I would expect the density altitude to be above airport elevation.

The Safety Management System at most advanced (and safe) airlines is really quite simple. The premise is that if one pilot made an error, another might make the same mistake. The mistake is noted, explained, then made available to the rest of the pilot group, hopefully ensuring it doesn’t happen to others.

At old fashioned, draconian (and unsafe) airlines, the pilot who made the error is fired. By firing the pilot, it only really ensures that only he doesn’t make the mistake again. Leaving the risk of others making the same mistake in the future.

An excellent example was the takeoff calculation error by a QR 777 at MIA, dragging its tail at the far end. If one knew the MIA airport layout as well as how WAT data is printed by ACARS, you can see when all holes of Swiss Cheese align how it happened.

That Captain was fired and publicly mocked. (Unsafe SMS). Where I fly, as we fly into MIA, we were warned within 24 hours of the error by memo and the error possibility was then included in the Pilot Briefing Notes for MIA. (Safe SMS).

I’m hoping that EK understands that firing the pilot(s) does not solve the problem. Educating the rest of their ranks does.

Good thing they fired those pilots. That should really help the safety culture! (Sarcasm if you can’t tell)

I dunno, I'm of the opinion that a simple mistake shouldn't be fired. Thats not this. They made a fairly major error that should have resulted in damage to the plane. THEN they flew thousands of miles with passengers and no inspection for damage. Its that second part they should be fired for.

XT6Wagon wrote:

I dunno, I'm of the opinion that a simple mistake shouldn't be fired. Thats not this. They made a fairly major error that should have resulted in damage to the plane. THEN they flew thousands of miles with passengers and no inspection for damage. Its that second part they should be fired for.

But you don’t fire them until you’ve gone through the investigation to determine why what happened occurred. Was it something that could happen again to any other pilots or was it negligence. For sure stand them down whilst investigating but to just blindly fire without any reasons why the incident occurred how it did is not a just culture.

worldranger wrote:

There’s a bit more to this..than four crew taking off with ‘0’ on the MCP

My understanding is that the previous crew selected ‘0’ in the MCP after landing to protect the next crew from leaving 3000 in the MCP (previous MAP) instead of the usual 4000 SID altitude.

FCOM SOP on Capts MCP pre flight is left to right…if one turns on the FD the FMA Vert window automatically displays ‘ALT’ - the airport elevation 75’ is now close enough to zero to capture said mode. next the Capt pre flight moves right and in DXB usually selects 4000 - regular SID altitude

So you now have correct altitude (4000) but the FMA is not in TOGA/TOGA (LNAV/VNAV armed) - Its in ALT capture to ‘0’…in other words the FDs will pitch down. All looks reasonably normal as the color coding on FMA same, MCP altitude correct…but the FMA mode is incorrect.

EK removed the TAKE REVIEW verbal call out SOP prior to before the BEFORE TAKE OFF C/LIST - a number of years ago, to underscore ‘quiet Flt Deck’ philosophy much to the annoyance of the pilot group. The verbal ‘out loud’ Take Off review would include “TOGA/TOGA….” And if this was not heard - error trapped.

As to why these pilot did not fly it correctly…root cause FEAR. The ME3 and in particular EK have a track history of firing pilots for human error.

So now you have pilots who dont want to risk hand flying in case of error - and so become overly dependent on automation...and thus a depletion of ability to go to basic pitch / power flying.

Vicious circle. They have had four serious incidents as a result of poor flying skills - one of which resulted in a crash. The other two were A380 near CFITs in DME and JFK respectively and now this incident. FZ in Rostov is another example - same boss, so now five.

The training dept in EK has a particularly poisonous local pilot manager who over rules TRI/TRE grading on a regular basis, usually to the detriment of the trainee.

This adds to the fear.

Any buzz word that catches the said managers attention can result in his personal audit of the session. So now you may have trainers who see something they dont like in the trainee that can be improved with training - but are reluctant to point it out because they realize the severity of this managers intervention…does not fit the regular remedial training that is required.

Its like a jury conviction of accidental manslaughter -then having the judge hand down a death sentence.

The conjecture is - the jury in EK training dept know this…dont think the death sentence is appropriate and hence aquit.

And that ladies and gents is a problem.

This. That's the explanation of how the 777 FD's work. The FD's were armed whilst Zero was still set on the MCP - which put the FD's in Alt Cap mode. When they set the correct SID Altitude of 4000'in the MCP, the FD was already locked. Had they cycled the FD's at that point, no issue, no incident.
There's a couple of questions about that glitch in the 777 FD software as its a known issue. Also, there's the question of why the inbound crew set Zero in the MCP, which is not an FCOM or EK procedure..

As for employment - This is how EK works and for certain QR too. There's a Blame Culture - not a safety culture.
There's no such thing as a contract of employment in the Middle East unless it benefits the employer. There are no worker rights or comeback on any management decision. Yes, I've seen the employment contracts at EK as I was there for 9 years so I speak from experience.

These incidents will become more commonplace now - the reason is simple.
EK alone made over 2500 pilots redundant across both fleets - not just low hours, but highly experienced guys, including trainers with upto 35 years of service. That's a huge amount of experience to lose on a flight deck. Despite attempts to get them back, the majority of us won't return to that culture. EK are now struggling to find pilots at all and are mostly getting low hours people from Africa and India. EK used to set a minimum hours requirement of 4000 hours to be able to apply - now that's the minimum requirement for Command upgrade. See the difference?
The fear culture that pervades makes everything a problem. The guys at Domodevedo who nearly had a CFIT spent the entire Go Around talking about how they were going to be called into the office - no dealing with the problem they had and rebriefing the approach. Its all on the CVR.. That's where the midset of EK pilots is.

It's very true about the loss of experience; I know of an EK A380 captain who was with the carrier for 15 years and he, along with hundreds of others were just kicked out en masse; they approached him to go back on a retraining course next month; he told them, very politely, to sod off. He's got another job since, but among the other factors was that he would not have retained his seniority and there were a number of other conditions that were less favourable than when he left. I don't know how many A380s they have flying now, but I think it's around a third of its overall fleet and when you think of it, that's a massive investment to have sitting in the desert.

While the 777 fleet did certainly lose quite a number of its people, it was not quite as badly affected; there's still plenty of them parked. However, from what I gather, there was a recognition (not public, of course) that they let too many go, with the result that many pilots were working up to 90h a month. I wonder if this will be a factor in the "investigation". I tend to doubt it.

XT6Wagon wrote:

I dunno, I'm of the opinion that a simple mistake shouldn't be fired. Thats not this. They made a fairly major error that should have resulted in damage to the plane. THEN they flew thousands of miles with passengers and no inspection for damage. Its that second part they should be fired for.

The continuing on part.....happens fairly regularly. Many people still defend the actions of the crew and airline on BA268

SteelChair wrote:

XT6Wagon wrote:

I

The continuing on part.....happens fairly regularly. Many people still defend the actions of the crew and airline on BA268

Which one was this? Can't recall.

I have to say that I don't have a massive amount of sympathy for the crew, in the sense that they're paid a generous salary to get an aircraft from A to B and what happened here seems very serious and very incompetent. That said, I do have a very real concern that investigations into air safety incidents should have as their primary aim improvements to safety and if (as seems to be the case in many places, not just EK and the UAE) the primary goal is face saving, not only do you not improve safety, you work actively against it, because all you do is to create an environment of fear. There should be an open channel of communication and people should be able to discuss possible threats to air safety. The punitive approach seems only guaranteed to contribute to a further cock-up down the road, which may well be fatal.

XT6Wagon wrote:

I dunno, I'm of the opinion that a simple mistake shouldn't be fired. Thats not this. They made a fairly major error that should have resulted in damage to the plane. THEN they flew thousands of miles with passengers and no inspection for damage. Its that second part they should be fired for.

Their thinking was probably that if they did a direct return they'd definitely be investigated and fired. And if they continue there's a chance no one notices and it all blows over. That's not a good safety culture but it's the reality they work under...

Why I'm not even or remotely surprised by the fact the pilots got fired... That's the way they do at the ME3, they've got a problem so people got terminated then they check what to do.

For the one who says that nobody is forced to go work for the ME3 ok we get it. Nobody forces you to do so. However, it bears repeating that most of people accept expatriating themselves at the other side of the globe out of necessity, not for vanity.
I've worked for one of the ME3 for a year and can tell you that towards the end of my assignment I was counting the hours to get away.

ME3 provide good value for the customer for sure but when it comes to behind the scenes there are two or three things we can talk...

That is insane that at 175ft it was going 262 knots. Fortunately nothing major happened. Glad everyone was ok. This could have ended much worse. Imagine the media coverage of a Boeing plane incident due to being forced down after takeoff.

kaitak wrote:

SteelChair wrote:

XT6Wagon wrote:

I

The continuing on part.....happens fairly regularly. Many people still defend the actions of the crew and airline on BA268

Which one was this? Can't recall.

That would be the British Airways Boeing 747-400 that had engine 2 surge on take-off out of LAX and proceeded to fly across the Atlantic anyway. They ended up landing in Manchester instead of London.

There has been a massive brain drain at EK. Many trainers and experienced pilots left either voluntarily or were forced out during COVID over the last 2 years. The problem started well before Covid due to deteriorating rosters and compensation. Fly them at your own risk! This kind of incident is inexcusable and shows an extreme lack of airmanship. I won’t be surprised to see them have a fatal accident soon.

Some info going around the F/O who was pilot flying was a low houred local recruit. So instead of having several thousand jet hours before joining they came straight into the right hand seat of a 777.

Now while I'm generally a big fan of good ab initio schemes the EK Cadet program is not one of them.

While hampered by nepotism and favoritism in the selection process, the problem is the recruits go straight onto Long Haul operations.

If you do graduate a low houred pilot and put them straight into the first officer's seat put them on something no larger than a 737/320. This way they can fly 2-4 sector days multiple days per week, and very quickly build up experience in airline ops and takeoffs and landings. I'd estimate doing 2-4 sectors per day they can do anywhere between 15-30 sectors per month as PF.

Put them into a 777 as a Long Haul pilot? Maybe 2-3 per month as PF?, and then EK use a lot of augmented crew ops so that further cuts down sectors as PF from 1 every 2 to one every 4. Some EK F/O's may have gotten into and passed the cadet training through nepotism rather than skill, and then only be doing 1 sector per month as PF, especially in recent times. On a 777 in which they probably fly on autopilot from 200ft after take off to 200ft before landing. That's barely enough to build up operational experience and manual flight "feel".

KAUSpilot wrote:

There has been a massive brain drain at EK. Many trainers and experienced pilots left either voluntarily or were forced out during COVID over the last 2 years. The problem started well before Covid due to deteriorating rosters and compensation. Fly them at your own risk! This kind of incident is inexcusable and shows an extreme lack of airmanship. I won’t be surprised to see them have a fatal accident soon.

They technically have, EK 521.

With this incident, Moscow, New York, Melbourne we're seeing so many incidents of just downright horrible flying from what should be some of the world's best pilots. They should not be having this many incidents at this rate. I fear with a quick return to the existing level of flying and the loss of so many pilots who won't be returning will force EK to employ even lesser skilled pilots and work them harder with no tolerance for error or erring on the side of safety.

I think EK should be off a potential flyer's list for a while, no matter how good their cabin service is or how good their PR is.

Not sure the relevance of FD as you don’t use it on the ground. Rotate is always done using a mk. 1 eyeball, FD materialises on the PFD once airborne

sierrakilo44 wrote:

Some info going around the F/O who was pilot flying was a low houred local recruit. So instead of having several thousand jet hours before joining they came straight into the right hand seat of a 777.

If so wtf was the captain doing when the FO didn’t rotate or rotate enough at the presumably made rotate call.

To me in part this incident and others like in the past suggests poor a CRM culture at EK, perhaps at other ME3 and related airlines. There should have been cross-checks done, if an error someone should speak up, unafraid of facing discipline or firing, the correction made.

sierrakilo44 wrote:

Some info going around the F/O who was pilot flying was a low houred local recruit. So instead of having several thousand jet hours before joining they came straight into the right hand seat of a 777.

Now while I'm generally a big fan of good ab initio schemes the EK Cadet program is not one of them.

While hampered by nepotism and favoritism in the selection process, the problem is the recruits go straight onto Long Haul operations.

If you do graduate a low houred pilot and put them straight into the first officer's seat put them on something no larger than a 737/320. This way they can fly 2-4 sector days multiple days per week, and very quickly build up experience in airline ops and takeoffs and landings. I'd estimate doing 2-4 sectors per day they can do anywhere between 15-30 sectors per month as PF.

Put them into a 777 as a Long Haul pilot? Maybe 2-3 per month as PF?, and then EK use a lot of augmented crew ops so that further cuts down sectors as PF from 1 every 2 to one every 4. Some EK F/O's may have gotten into and passed the cadet training through nepotism rather than skill, and then only be doing 1 sector per month as PF, especially in recent times. On a 777 in which they probably fly on autopilot from 200ft after take off to 200ft before landing. That's barely enough to build up operational experience and manual flight "feel".

Some of this just reads like excuses. You do your pre-flight checks, you counter check that everything is fine, and then pay attention to see that everything is going according to plan during the take off roll. Some of these things should be imprinted on the mind.

Gremlinzzzz wrote:

sierrakilo44 wrote:

Some info going around the F/O who was pilot flying was a low houred local recruit. So instead of having several thousand jet hours before joining they came straight into the right hand seat of a 777.

Now while I'm generally a big fan of good ab initio schemes the EK Cadet program is not one of them.

While hampered by nepotism and favoritism in the selection process, the problem is the recruits go straight onto Long Haul operations.

If you do graduate a low houred pilot and put them straight into the first officer's seat put them on something no larger than a 737/320. This way they can fly 2-4 sector days multiple days per week, and very quickly build up experience in airline ops and takeoffs and landings. I'd estimate doing 2-4 sectors per day they can do anywhere between 15-30 sectors per month as PF.

Put them into a 777 as a Long Haul pilot? Maybe 2-3 per month as PF?, and then EK use a lot of augmented crew ops so that further cuts down sectors as PF from 1 every 2 to one every 4. Some EK F/O's may have gotten into and passed the cadet training through nepotism rather than skill, and then only be doing 1 sector per month as PF, especially in recent times. On a 777 in which they probably fly on autopilot from 200ft after take off to 200ft before landing. That's barely enough to build up operational experience and manual flight "feel".

Some of this just reads like excuses. You do your pre-flight checks, you counter check that everything is fine, and then pay attention to see that everything is going according to plan during the take off roll. Some of these things should be imprinted on the mind.

I think the point was that if the pilot was as inexperienced as suggested that "imprinting" did not have time to occur

Exeiowa wrote:

Gremlinzzzz wrote:

sierrakilo44 wrote:

Some info going around the F/O who was pilot flying was a low houred local recruit. So instead of having several thousand jet hours before joining they came straight into the right hand seat of a 777.

Now while I'm generally a big fan of good ab initio schemes the EK Cadet program is not one of them.

While hampered by nepotism and favoritism in the selection process, the problem is the recruits go straight onto Long Haul operations.

If you do graduate a low houred pilot and put them straight into the first officer's seat put them on something no larger than a 737/320. This way they can fly 2-4 sector days multiple days per week, and very quickly build up experience in airline ops and takeoffs and landings. I'd estimate doing 2-4 sectors per day they can do anywhere between 15-30 sectors per month as PF.

Put them into a 777 as a Long Haul pilot? Maybe 2-3 per month as PF?, and then EK use a lot of augmented crew ops so that further cuts down sectors as PF from 1 every 2 to one every 4. Some EK F/O's may have gotten into and passed the cadet training through nepotism rather than skill, and then only be doing 1 sector per month as PF, especially in recent times. On a 777 in which they probably fly on autopilot from 200ft after take off to 200ft before landing. That's barely enough to build up operational experience and manual flight "feel".

Some of this just reads like excuses. You do your pre-flight checks, you counter check that everything is fine, and then pay attention to see that everything is going according to plan during the take off roll. Some of these things should be imprinted on the mind.

I think the point was that if the pilot was as inexperienced as suggested that "imprinting" did not have time to occur

It is like when someone works in a laboratory. First thing you learn is to clean your workplace and when you are done, clean it again. Next day, even if no one else accessed the lab, clean it again.It is just something that you do when in college such that when you get a job, it is something that you continue doing. No assumptions.

People get into issues when they start assuming stuff and not doing what they should have done in the first place. That is what seems to have happened here and somehow that is now the airline's problem.

Be accountable, damn it.

Gremlinzzzz wrote:

Exeiowa wrote:

Gremlinzzzz wrote:

Some of this just reads like excuses. You do your pre-flight checks, you counter check that everything is fine, and then pay attention to see that everything is going according to plan during the take off roll. Some of these things should be imprinted on the mind.

I think the point was that if the pilot was as inexperienced as suggested that "imprinting" did not have time to occur

It is like when someone works in a laboratory. First thing you learn is to clean your workplace and when you are done, clean it again. Next day, even if no one else accessed the lab, clean it again.It is just something that you do when in college such that when you get a job, it is something that you continue doing. No assumptions.

People get into issues when they start assuming stuff and not doing what they should have done in the first place. That is what seems to have happened here and somehow that is now the airline's problem.

Be accountable, damn it.

Exactly the only thing you should assume is that the person who was before you at your work did not do his job right so you need to check everything.

FluidFlow wrote:

Gremlinzzzz wrote:

Exeiowa wrote:

I think the point was that if the pilot was as inexperienced as suggested that "imprinting" did not have time to occur

It is like when someone works in a laboratory. First thing you learn is to clean your workplace and when you are done, clean it again. Next day, even if no one else accessed the lab, clean it again.It is just something that you do when in college such that when you get a job, it is something that you continue doing. No assumptions.

People get into issues when they start assuming stuff and not doing what they should have done in the first place. That is what seems to have happened here and somehow that is now the airline's problem.

Be accountable, damn it.

Exactly the only thing you should assume is that the person who was before you at your work did not do his job right so you need to check everything.

Then you come in and you see even people who say that they are pilots having an issue with an airline. It is honestly some of the dumbest stuff I have read.

Who on Earth needs to be reminded to do everything from scratch? And then check again if what they have is the right result? If you cannot do that, you have no business being in a cockpit............and it has absolutely nothing to do with talent but everything to do with care.

Many years ago I was the station safety manager at a ground handling company. They had a solid safety management system, which took care of ensuring incidents were handled correctly, corrective actions implemented and communicated across the company on a global scale. So far, so good.

Then there was a change of CEO, who was of a rather jurassic mindset - very much akin to the mindset seen at ME3 and other similarly inclined carriers. He didn’t really care what had happened, why it had happened and what would be done to prevent a reoccourance. All he wanted to know was who got fired.

Station managers around the world soon cottoned on, and the monthly incident meetings became an exercise in “John Doe drove a tractor into the aircraft, we fired John” and on to the next incident. Not even a hint of getting to the bottom of what caused John to drive the tractor into the aircraft.

The message to staff was clear, albeit unintended: If you’re the cause of an incident and own up to it, you’ll be fired. But if you keep your mouth shut, there’s at least a chance the company won’t figure out it was you, and your job is safe.

It was a that exact moment in time I handed in my resignation. Without, I hasten to add, having a new job lined up. Best decision I ever made; my professional integrity is not, and will never be, for sale.

The information from inside the airline is that the Captain was flying - not the FO.

She was supposedly competent having gone through quite a stringent Command Upgrade - they don't give away the 4th strip at Emirates just because its your turn. The success rate for Command upgrades is around 65%. Then you have to keep hold of that 4th strip and that's not easy or guaranteed either.

Regarding the FD, the culture in EK is that the automation should be used to its maximum capacity. Yes, the FD would show after rotation which is, of course, a visual manouevre. However, due to the already engaged ALT mode of the FD's, it commanded a pitch down which was duly followed.

Airmanship, experience and any free thinking are in short supply in Emirates right now and the situation certainly won't improve anytime soon.
Expect a large smoking hole in the future. We can only hope it happens outside of Dubai where the malaise and degrading management culture can be brought fully into the open and a Gulf Air style structure enforced upon them.

It’s simple as this…. FLY the PLANE.

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I have had ALL AUTOMATION go dumb as the plane approached rotation speed when we hit a bump at LGA at night in the weather. (temporary took the electrical system out) So I just pulled back and we flew. Stayed low until I verified the standby horizon and airspeed was good and then climbed into the clouds over the water. Reset the system and flew to JFK and changed planes. I fly the plane and use automation to help. Any other formula will kill you and others. Had a lightning strike do the same thing. It hit the cockpit right above a circuit breaker panel. Dark and standby instruments. Landed in Dayton on stby instruments . The ceiling was above 2000 fr so it was a simple VFR landing. All the 150+ passengers knew was a ball of electricity rolled down the isle. All we did was fly the plane.

To many companies are using rout training techniques . Dumb. There Is a 330 on the bottom of the ocean, a 777 in SFO and numerous other airbus and Boeing products were flown into the ground using automation or not flying the plane. It isn’t hard…..fly the plane.

Are people forgetting how to fly or never taught in the first place….that is the question of the day.

I have worked in the ME and seen at first hand just how the culture is. I've seen people leave a switch in the wrong position thus embarraasing the next pilot when something hasn't worked etc. They've been immediately terminated and sent home that night. The term was 'runwayed' Its all about face.

reltney wrote:

It’s simple as this…. FLY the PLANE.

Are people forgetting how to fly or never taught in the first place….that is the question of the day.

It's not so much pilots forgetting to fly. It's pilots not being allowed to. First off in EK long haul they only get a few sectors per month as PF.

And then you have a punitive culture which not only demands automation but pretty much wants to eradicate any "flying out of the box" ie on LNAV/VNAV as much as possible, no track shortening, no creativity. Just do what the FMC and ATC tell you to do.

Any attempt at thinking out of the box and the slightest mistake and you are immediately dismissed without investigation. It's a 12th century justice system in a 2021 global carrier.

Wouldn't surprise me to think the crew on the Flight Deck decided to continue to IAD rather than return to DXB lest they draw attention to their mistake. It's a culture of fear and cover ups.