DeltaMD90 wrote:

sierrakilo44 wrote:

The whole idea of apportioning a risk rating to individual airlines is a bit silly in 2022.

If you think of the last 10 years. What fatal incidents have there been on carriers in which the majority of posters on this forum would class as relatively "safe"?

2013
Asiana 214

2014
Transasia 222
Malaysian 370 and 17
Airasia 8501

2015
Transasia 235
Germanwings 9525
Metrojet 9268

2016
Egyptair 802

2017
Westwind 282

2018
Southwest 1380
Lion Max

2019
Ethiopian 302
Aeroflot 1492

The rest I'd probably skip. And I'm drawing a long bow on calling some of those "safe". In the last 10 years there's been 315 million scheduled flight departures for total of 14 fatal incidents on carriers most would consider to be reputable enough to not be crashing. How can we then calculate the absolute risk of dying per carrier? There's just not enough crashes out there to make a sample. And fatal incidents in of themselves are the be all and end all of safety, I'd rather board a Southwest or Germanwings(now EuroWings) flight over a lot of other carriers that have remained accident free in the last then years.

Fatal accidents are just a fraction of the equation. Major incidents (such as this EK incident) I'd argue are just as bad or 95% as bad from a safety prospective. Thankfully no one died, but it was so, so close. That definitely "counts"

But beyond that, minor incidents and routine maintenance violations contribute greatly. If you have a culture of shoddy maintenance or poor CRM, that's where danger creeps in.

That all is hard to quantify. Luckily, most airlines in this age recognize these threats and are constantly working to combat them.

Without the company internals and taking a whole lot of time for nuanced research, you can't really get a good outlook or resort to lazy metrics like "fatal accidents." That's why I often take these ratings and awards with a grain of salt

An interesting question is how much further safety can reasonably pushed and what needs to be done. While some accidents are coming from unpredictable scenarios, where hindsight seems to be the best available option, there seem to be another pattern when a well-predicted scenario is at play. Deviation from established and checked situation, failure to perform a time-critical action, failure to follow up on a previous incident.
So maybe some adjustments are there to expect?

kalvado wrote:

DeltaMD90 wrote:

sierrakilo44 wrote:

The whole idea of apportioning a risk rating to individual airlines is a bit silly in 2022.

If you think of the last 10 years. What fatal incidents have there been on carriers in which the majority of posters on this forum would class as relatively "safe"?

2013
Asiana 214

2014
Transasia 222
Malaysian 370 and 17
Airasia 8501

2015
Transasia 235
Germanwings 9525
Metrojet 9268

2016
Egyptair 802

2017
Westwind 282

2018
Southwest 1380
Lion Max

2019
Ethiopian 302
Aeroflot 1492

The rest I'd probably skip. And I'm drawing a long bow on calling some of those "safe". In the last 10 years there's been 315 million scheduled flight departures for total of 14 fatal incidents on carriers most would consider to be reputable enough to not be crashing. How can we then calculate the absolute risk of dying per carrier? There's just not enough crashes out there to make a sample. And fatal incidents in of themselves are the be all and end all of safety, I'd rather board a Southwest or Germanwings(now EuroWings) flight over a lot of other carriers that have remained accident free in the last then years.

Fatal accidents are just a fraction of the equation. Major incidents (such as this EK incident) I'd argue are just as bad or 95% as bad from a safety prospective. Thankfully no one died, but it was so, so close. That definitely "counts"

But beyond that, minor incidents and routine maintenance violations contribute greatly. If you have a culture of shoddy maintenance or poor CRM, that's where danger creeps in.

That all is hard to quantify. Luckily, most airlines in this age recognize these threats and are constantly working to combat them.

Without the company internals and taking a whole lot of time for nuanced research, you can't really get a good outlook or resort to lazy metrics like "fatal accidents." That's why I often take these ratings and awards with a grain of salt

An interesting question is how much further safety can reasonably pushed and what needs to be done. While some accidents are coming from unpredictable scenarios, where hindsight seems to be the best available option, there seem to be another pattern when a well-predicted scenario is at play. Deviation from established and checked situation, failure to perform a time-critical action, failure to follow up on a previous incident.
So maybe some adjustments are there to expect?

Well, just to name some that are central to this thread: over-reliance on automation and the degradation of handflying skills is something most airlines have acknowledged and have been working on (contrary to what some posters here acknowledge). Also, procedures and training... or the lack of....

The former is somewhat of a newer problem and an unfortunate byproduct of automation (which don't get me wrong, is overall very helpful).

The latter can manifest itself no matter how good technology is. It can even be solved but come back. A lot of it is just the corporate culture.

Maintenance is along the same lines. Sure, there are improvements in maintenance over the years, but it can all be negated through an airline's poor management etc.

As a pilot over the years, I've seen a lot of things emphasized... Sometimes it's due to blood, unfortunately. Sometimes it's from a close call. But often, it is a result of being proactive... Potential problems have been identified and are being addressed before people die.

Not to keep rambling but to tie it once again to EK and its culture, a lot of these proactive lessons I've seen over the years originate from flight crews making mistakes but not being scared to speak up, or from a company that collects data in non-punishing ways.

A company that's overly harsh and quick to fire shuts pilots up. Shut-up pilots cover things up and mistakes aren't shared. These mistakes aren't known about and other pilots don't learn from them. Those pilots make the same mistakes. The airline as a whole makes more mistakes than average, and eventually one of those mistakes proves fatal.

There is another ranking on CNN today.....

https://us.cnn.com/travel/article/world ... index.html

NZ at No. 1 and EK at No. 20.

fraT wrote:

There is another ranking on CNN today.....

https://us.cnn.com/travel/article/world ... index.html

NZ at No. 1 and EK at No. 20.

Even that list is a bit nonsensical. They take random criteria from “experts” (Airline Ratings is run by a journalist with very little experience in aviation employment beyond journalism) and throw them about to get a list. I guess society these days loves to list and rate things, but practically your safety on Air NZ will be no different to Qantas, Lufthansa or KLM.

I’d seriously question having QR and EY at 2 and 3. Feedback from pilots at those carriers shows they suffer from the similar high workload, fatigue, lack of rest and punitive management issues as EK. Having a younger fleet is no good if you’re pilots are tired, a slightly older fleet that’s well maintained with more alert pilots is preferable, as there’s been more hull losses due pilot fatigue lately than problems arising from older aircraft.

Whatever happened here, I liked Juan Browne's takeaway: sometimes you just need to turn the magenta bars off and fly the damn airplane. It just boggles the mind you can have four trained individuals in the flight deck and nobody notices things are not setup properly. Yeah it sucks to be leaving at 0300, but they're used to that out there...

Aaron747 wrote:

Whatever happened here, I liked Juan Browne's takeaway: sometimes you just need to turn the magenta bars off and fly the damn airplane. It just boggles the mind you can have four trained individuals in the flight deck and nobody notices things are not setup properly. Yeah it sucks to be leaving at 0300, but they're used to that out there...

I totally agree with you, just fly the plane. It seems like there was a huge lack of situational awareness. Four guys didn't pick up on the lack of a V1 callout as they were speeding along at 216 knots and out of runway?

He is referring to:

According to Mode-S data transmitted by the aircraft's transponder the aircraft remained on the ground until accelerating through at least 216 knots over ground about 4400 meters/14400 feet past the runway threshold and about 90 meters short of the localizer antennas, was airborne at 75 feet AGL at 234 knots over ground already over the first residential houses past the runway (5640 meters/18500 feet past the runway threshold), then climbed out to safety.

Ref: https://avherald.com/h?article=4f24b2d7

What I found interesting was how perplexed Juan was that the plane was in that configuration, yet the media coverage of EK's memo about not setting the altitude to 0000 was so matter-of-fact. To my totally non-expert eyes, it seemed to me Juan was implying many steps were skipped setting up the cockpit for that flight.

Ref: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bsSKt5mN3a4

Revelation wrote:

Aaron747 wrote:

Whatever happened here, I liked Juan Browne's takeaway: sometimes you just need to turn the magenta bars off and fly the damn airplane. It just boggles the mind you can have four trained individuals in the flight deck and nobody notices things are not setup properly. Yeah it sucks to be leaving at 0300, but they're used to that out there...

I totally agree with you, just fly the plane. It seems like there was a huge lack of situational awareness. Four guys didn't pick up on the lack of a V1 callout as they were speeding along at 216 knots and out of runway?

He is referring to:

According to Mode-S data transmitted by the aircraft's transponder the aircraft remained on the ground until accelerating through at least 216 knots over ground about 4400 meters/14400 feet past the runway threshold and about 90 meters short of the localizer antennas, was airborne at 75 feet AGL at 234 knots over ground already over the first residential houses past the runway (5640 meters/18500 feet past the runway threshold), then climbed out to safety.

Ref: https://avherald.com/h?article=4f24b2d7

What I found interesting was how perplexed Juan was that the plane was in that configuration, yet the media coverage of EK's memo about not setting the altitude to 0000 was so matter-of-fact. To my totally non-expert eyes, it seemed to me Juan was implying many steps were skipped setting up the cockpit for that flight.

Ref: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bsSKt5mN3a4

It makes one wonder how much non-sterile conversation was involved throughout the departure.

Delta at 18.

Quick question. Hope someone will answer before our ever-vigilant admins delete (queue GASP!) criticism of Boeing.

What kind of an engineer would design a flight director that allows setting take-off power with altitude on zero? No dings? No warnings? Seriously? Again some invisible abbreviation indicator in the corner of the screen like the Asiana 214? Or is it the "third world pilots" situation again? Did they use the same FAA official to certify it that they used for MCAS?

BREECH wrote:

Quick question. Hope someone will answer before our ever-vigilant admins delete (queue GASP!) criticism of Boeing.

What kind of an engineer would design a flight director that allows setting take-off power with altitude on zero? No dings? No warnings? Seriously? Again some invisible abbreviation indicator in the corner of the screen like the Asiana 214? Or is it the "third world pilots" situation again? Did they use the same FAA official to certify it that they used for MCAS?

Exactly, what kind of an engineer at Honewell would design and develop avionics with such a flaw?

Spetsnaz55 wrote:

BREECH wrote:

Quick question. Hope someone will answer before our ever-vigilant admins delete (queue GASP!) criticism of Boeing.

What kind of an engineer would design a flight director that allows setting take-off power with altitude on zero? No dings? No warnings? Seriously? Again some invisible abbreviation indicator in the corner of the screen like the Asiana 214? Or is it the "third world pilots" situation again? Did they use the same FAA official to certify it that they used for MCAS?

Exactly, what kind of an engineer at Honewell would design and develop avionics with such a flaw?

Flight directors are not needed for takeoff, it is not s flaw.

BREECH wrote:

Quick question. Hope someone will answer before our ever-vigilant admins delete (queue GASP!) criticism of Boeing.

What kind of an engineer would design a flight director that allows setting take-off power with altitude on zero? No dings? No warnings? Seriously? Again some invisible abbreviation indicator in the corner of the screen like the Asiana 214? Or is it the "third world pilots" situation again? Did they use the same FAA official to certify it that they used for MCAS?

It should not be a safety of flight issue - takeoff is a critical phase where all crew need to pay attention to multiple cues, ready to act by the moment. The ALT and FD settings should be immaterial to execution of a proper takeoff. I think most instructors would say all that matters is proper speed reference, flight control settings, attention to engine performance, the runway centerline, and executing a clean rotation then establishing positive climb. This is true whether flying a B777 or C172 and is basic airmanship.

Aaron747 wrote:

It should not be a safety of flight issue - takeoff is a critical phase where all crew need to pay attention to multiple cues, ready to act by the moment. The ALT and FD settings should be immaterial to execution of a proper takeoff. I think most instructors would say all that matters is proper speed reference, flight control settings, attention to engine performance, the runway centerline, and executing a clean rotation then establishing positive climb. This is true whether flying a B777 or C172 and is basic airmanship.

Demagoguery at its best. If you have a computer onboard, why not make it... ya know... safer? What can be a simpler algorhythm? Take-off power + altitude 0 = ding, check FD settings. Following your logic, autopilot is not necessary, it's basic airmanship skill to fly a plane. As for not a safety of flight issue, would you still say the same if they actually crashed into houses and killed everyone both on the ground and onboard?

And as for Honeywell being the supplier, I take it Boeing just grabs what they like from the shelf, install it and never bother to test how it works? Come to think about it, doesn't look like a joke anymore.

BREECH wrote:

Quick question. Hope someone will answer before our ever-vigilant admins delete (queue GASP!) criticism of Boeing.

What kind of an engineer would design a flight director that allows setting take-off power with altitude on zero? No dings? No warnings? Seriously? Again some invisible abbreviation indicator in the corner of the screen like the Asiana 214? Or is it the "third world pilots" situation again? Did they use the same FAA official to certify it that they used for MCAS?

You know you can do the same on the Airbus as well right, You can doing on the A220 (CSeries), You can do it on the CRJs, you can also do that on the E-series. Are those airplanes unsafe as well? No.

This close call is solely on the crew and could have been avoided with some verification of the altitudes set in the MCP and PFDs and making sure the proper flight modes are active and armed on the FMAs (TOGA/TOGA active modes and LNAV (or HDG SeL)/VNAV as the armed modes. (Boeing specific).

BREECH wrote:

Aaron747 wrote:

It should not be a safety of flight issue - takeoff is a critical phase where all crew need to pay attention to multiple cues, ready to act by the moment. The ALT and FD settings should be immaterial to execution of a proper takeoff. I think most instructors would say all that matters is proper speed reference, flight control settings, attention to engine performance, the runway centerline, and executing a clean rotation then establishing positive climb. This is true whether flying a B777 or C172 and is basic airmanship.

Demagoguery at its best. If you have a computer onboard, why not make it... ya know... safer? What can be a simpler algorhythm? Take-off power + altitude 0 = ding, check FD settings. Following your logic, autopilot is not necessary, it's basic airmanship skill to fly a plane. As for not a safety of flight issue, would you still say the same if they actually crashed into houses and killed everyone both on the ground and onboard?

And as for Honeywell being the supplier, I take it Boeing just grabs what they like from the shelf, install it and never bother to test how it works? Come to think about it, doesn't look like a joke anymore.

Stop the Boeing bashing, like I said earlier, you can set Takeoff power in most jets without the proper flight modes. At the end of the day, you are manually flying a airplane until at least 200 feet (earliest a A/P can can be commanded on). It isn’t difficult to start a 3 degree per second rotation to 15 degrees of pitch (11 degrees for the 747-8F/77W) after hearing the rotate call out even when the proper modes aren’t set.

There other more pertinent warnings that will kick on (improper trim setting, speed brakes/spoilers deployed, takeoff flaps not set) for the proper takeoff configurations are not set.

All of these posts with folks wanting to rely on automation is hurting my head… A lot of folks literally want to take Autoplilot and Chill to a new level until it kills you…

BREECH wrote:

Aaron747 wrote:

It should not be a safety of flight issue - takeoff is a critical phase where all crew need to pay attention to multiple cues, ready to act by the moment. The ALT and FD settings should be immaterial to execution of a proper takeoff. I think most instructors would say all that matters is proper speed reference, flight control settings, attention to engine performance, the runway centerline, and executing a clean rotation then establishing positive climb. This is true whether flying a B777 or C172 and is basic airmanship.

Demagoguery at its best. If you have a computer onboard, why not make it... ya know... safer? What can be a simpler algorhythm? Take-off power + altitude 0 = ding, check FD settings. Following your logic, autopilot is not necessary, it's basic airmanship skill to fly a plane. As for not a safety of flight issue, would you still say the same if they actually crashed into houses and killed everyone both on the ground and onboard?

And as for Honeywell being the supplier, I take it Boeing just grabs what they like from the shelf, install it and never bother to test how it works? Come to think about it, doesn't look like a joke anymore.

Well you didn't read my post carefully enough, obviously. Autopilot is a very useful tool - but it is not at all necessary to execute a takeoff, whether flying a B777 or C172. That's why I said takeoff requires basic airmanship.

One would hope that on the next iteration of airplanes that they might design in some features to make this harder to do even if no was meant to, as it did happen.

Exeiowa wrote:

One would hope that on the next iteration of airplanes that they might design in some features to make this harder to do even if no was meant to, as it did happen.

Why? Can’t automate you way out of everything. At some point pilots have to just trust and verify and fly the airplane….. It’s not rocket science.

bigb wrote:

Exeiowa wrote:

One would hope that on the next iteration of airplanes that they might design in some features to make this harder to do even if no was meant to, as it did happen.

Why? Can’t automate you way out of everything. At some point pilots have to just trust and verify and fly the airplane….. It’s not rocket science.

I agree. Pilots need to be pilots, and not flying a proper takeoff is unacceptable regardless of what the flight directors are commanding.

The idea of an EICAS/ECAM caution or advisory is not a bad idea though on future airframes or software updates. It should be pretty straightforward to set up a few conditions to trigger an alert. Weight on wheels, reference airport loaded on the FMS INIT page, and altitude window set less than 1000’ above or any altitude below airport elevation:
*DING* VERIFY MCP ALT

Plenty of other situations that still require pilots to be pilots however. Similar to this situation, a low altitude climb restriction after takeoff where the FD / AP commands a level off but the autothrust is still in the takeoff setting. That’s a situation that a pilot would have to intervene on any manufacturer I’ve flown.

I know you are very well familiar with all of this bigb. I’m just sharing examples for our non-pilot friends

bigb wrote:

Exeiowa wrote:

One would hope that on the next iteration of airplanes that they might design in some features to make this harder to do even if no was meant to, as it did happen.

Why? Can’t automate you way out of everything. At some point pilots have to just trust and verify and fly the airplane….. It’s not rocket science.

We do not expect the technical operators to open the wrong valve in my chemical plant, but we still put interlocks in place to prevent it from happening. Every time we have come across a dangerous occurrence we make changes to our DCS to try to prevent it from occurring next time. We do PHA where we ask what would happen if questions and then design in solutions to prevent these from happening. The hierarchy goes do something different, engineering controls, training and then PPE. I am sure airplane design has something similar, why would anyone object to making things better? This seems like one of things that could be fairly simply improved. If we use near misses to improve human performance it should also be used for the engineering portion. People make mistakes sometimes you can preempt them. It is not going to solve everything but it can make things better. it is a yes and approach.

Exeiowa wrote:

bigb wrote:

Exeiowa wrote:

One would hope that on the next iteration of airplanes that they might design in some features to make this harder to do even if no was meant to, as it did happen.

Why? Can’t automate you way out of everything. At some point pilots have to just trust and verify and fly the airplane….. It’s not rocket science.

We do not expect the technical operators to open the wrong valve in my chemical plant, but we still put interlocks in place to prevent it from happening. Every time we have come across a dangerous occurrence we make changes to our DCS to try to prevent it from occurring next time. We do PHA where we ask what would happen if questions and then design in solutions to prevent these from happening. The hierarchy goes do something different, engineering controls, training and then PPE. I am sure airplane design has something similar, why would anyone object to making things better? This seems like one of things that could be fairly simply improved. If we use near misses to improve human performance it should also be used for the engineering portion. People make mistakes sometimes you can preempt them. It is not going to solve everything but it can make things better. it is a yes and approach.

Most airlines respectful airlines have procedures in place that have multiple verification processes for initial A/P modes, take off settings, and take performance data entry from Pre-departure crew briefing all the way to a pre-takeoff briefing where situations like this can be avoided… I’ve heard rumblings of EK removing the pre-takeoff briefing but I will have to confirm with my EK buddy who is a former EK pilot himself. If that is a case, that I one of the threat and error traps that have been removed.

I am not oppose to putting additional safety measures in place however, at the end of the day. You can only do so much, at some point pilots have to be pilots.

Gremlinzzzz wrote:

I am not a pilot.

Thank God your are not a pilot. Would hate to share a flight deck with you...

Exeiowa wrote:

bigb wrote:

Exeiowa wrote:

One would hope that on the next iteration of airplanes that they might design in some features to make this harder to do even if no was meant to, as it did happen.

Why? Can’t automate you way out of everything. At some point pilots have to just trust and verify and fly the airplane….. It’s not rocket science.

We do not expect the technical operators to open the wrong valve in my chemical plant, but we still put interlocks in place to prevent it from happening. Every time we have come across a dangerous occurrence we make changes to our DCS to try to prevent it from occurring next time. We do PHA where we ask what would happen if questions and then design in solutions to prevent these from happening. The hierarchy goes do something different, engineering controls, training and then PPE. I am sure airplane design has something similar, why would anyone object to making things better? This seems like one of things that could be fairly simply improved. If we use near misses to improve human performance it should also be used for the engineering portion. People make mistakes sometimes you can preempt them. It is not going to solve everything but it can make things better. it is a yes and approach.

People make mistakes, yes, but with proper procedures, CRM, and airmanship, there shouldn’t ever be mistakes in critical phases of flight like takeoff. It’s literally one of the first things student pilots practice.

Spetsnaz55 wrote:

BREECH wrote:

Quick question. Hope someone will answer before our ever-vigilant admins delete (queue GASP!) criticism of Boeing.

What kind of an engineer would design a flight director that allows setting take-off power with altitude on zero? No dings? No warnings? Seriously? Again some invisible abbreviation indicator in the corner of the screen like the Asiana 214? Or is it the "third world pilots" situation again? Did they use the same FAA official to certify it that they used for MCAS?

Exactly, what kind of an engineer at Honewell would design and develop avionics with such a flaw?

From what I know, Boeing and Airbus design their own autopilot and flight director control laws and logics. Honeywell and others just supply the computers and displays.

Weatherwatcher1 wrote:

TokyoImperialPa wrote:

ikolkyo wrote:

Something doesn’t add up, wouldn’t the plane still be in manual control this early into the flight? Not familiar with the 777 flight systems.

Some pilots engage the automation as soon as the wheels are up, but not sure on specific planes and their differences. There was a famous quip about Asiana several years ago that the autopilot would do virtually everything on the plane.

I don’t believe you can engage the autopilot at below 400 feet

Actually it’s 200 feet on most Boeing models, including the 777. But yeah, Autopilot engagement is inhibited below 200 feet after takeoff.

I don’t have all the details yet. As I understand it, the pitch mode ended up in ALT (altitude hold) instead of TO/GA. So after lift off, the flight director commanded a pitch down. This has happened a few other times and the Pilot-Flying was smart enough to not put the airplane in a descent at like 200 feet. The issue is being investigated. Speaking from my personal opinion, I expect it will be fixed.

It’s not necessarily an airplane design flaw. It apprars to be crew error, but the intent is to make the design such that these kinds of crew errors don’t have major consequences.

BREECH wrote:

And as for Honeywell being the supplier, I take it Boeing just grabs what they like from the shelf, install it and never bother to test how it works? Come to think about it, doesn't look like a joke anymore.

Completely false in every aspect. Not sure where you get this misinformation. I’ll withhold a few things I’d like to say to avoid getting in trouble. Suffice it to say you don’t understand the issue at hand, the system, or Boeing’s rigorous testing.

Jungleneer wrote:

Spetsnaz55 wrote:

BREECH wrote:

Quick question. Hope someone will answer before our ever-vigilant admins delete (queue GASP!) criticism of Boeing.

What kind of an engineer would design a flight director that allows setting take-off power with altitude on zero? No dings? No warnings? Seriously? Again some invisible abbreviation indicator in the corner of the screen like the Asiana 214? Or is it the "third world pilots" situation again? Did they use the same FAA official to certify it that they used for MCAS?

Exactly, what kind of an engineer at Honewell would design and develop avionics with such a flaw?

From what I know, Boeing and Airbus design their own autopilot and flight director control laws and logics. Honeywell and others just supply the computers and displays.

That’s correct. And the previous poster is again making wildly inaccurate claims without understanding even the basics. Asiana 214 was blatant crew error and lack of basic flying skills. However, Boeing did make a design change to the 747, 777, and 787 Autothrottle systems to better protect the crew in the event of such errors.

There was no invisible abbreviation in the corner of the screen on Asiana 214. The flight modes and Airspeed were clearly show in the middle of the pilot’s forward field of view, which a competent pilot should be monitoring. Not sure how this assertion was fabricated.

To put my 3$ worth into the discussion - I tried to replicate the issue by setting MCP to 0000 on the ground in B787 with TOGA armed (or arming TOGA when MCP was set to 0000) and the mode didn't go to ALT - so it seems Boeing has improved the MCP logic on the 787.

My car allows me to drive at 60mph/100km/h and turn the wheel hard to the side. I could roll this thing. I wonder why the automation in the car doesn't prevent this?

Chemist wrote:

My car allows me to drive at 60mph/100km/h and turn the wheel hard to the side. I could roll this thing. I wonder why the automation in the car doesn't prevent this?

Are you sure? I think your tires wouldn't provide the necessary grip. And you might not spin like crazy either because you have electronics that prevent that... So...

(Notwithstanding this is a false equivalent. Just wanted to point out it's bad)

xl0hr wrote:

Chemist wrote:

My car allows me to drive at 60mph/100km/h and turn the wheel hard to the side. I could roll this thing. I wonder why the automation in the car doesn't prevent this?

Are you sure? I think your tires wouldn't provide the necessary grip. And you might not spin like crazy either because you have electronics that prevent that... So...

(Notwithstanding this is a false equivalent. Just wanted to point out it's bad)

I think his point is that at some point pilots have to br competent pilots. Maybe if your Flight Director is commanding nose down at 200 above ground, you know maybe a 777 pilot should have enough pilot skill to know not to follow it.

I don’t know all the details of this event yet, but take the Turkish Air and Asiana accidents for example. There were different root causes in each case. First was a system malfunction, second was the crew selecting an inappropriate automation mode, which put the automation in an incorrect state so it wasn’t holding their speed for them. But in each case, the crews just sit there while the airplane falls out of the sky without even showing basic piloting skills.

Having said that, Boeing does try to make the airplane systems as error tolerant as possible, especially in the current post-Max world, past mistakes notwithstanding. There is now a HUGH emphasis on Human Factors and catching potential crew errors.

BoeingGuy wrote:

First was a system malfunction, second was the crew selecting an inappropriate automation mode, which put the automation in an incorrect state so it wasn’t holding their speed for them.

Precipitated from the first event was an autothrottle alert like found on the FBW Airbus autothrust. This however was not extended from the 737 to other models the 777.

If lessons learned from the first event had been implemented across other types the second event in my view would not have happened.

xl0hr wrote:

Chemist wrote:

My car allows me to drive at 60mph/100km/h and turn the wheel hard to the side. I could roll this thing. I wonder why the automation in the car doesn't prevent this?

Are you sure? I think your tires wouldn't provide the necessary grip. And you might not spin like crazy either because you have electronics that prevent that... So...

(Notwithstanding this is a false equivalent. Just wanted to point out it's bad)

None of that changes the inescapable point here: automation is *not* necessary to execute a proper and safe takeoff.

xl0hr wrote:

Chemist wrote:

My car allows me to drive at 60mph/100km/h and turn the wheel hard to the side. I could roll this thing. I wonder why the automation in the car doesn't prevent this?

Are you sure? I think your tires wouldn't provide the necessary grip. And you might not spin like crazy either because you have electronics that prevent that... So...

(Notwithstanding this is a false equivalent. Just wanted to point out it's bad)

I know somebody who rolled a high-end SUV in an abrupt traffic avoidance maneuver.

Chemist wrote:

xl0hr wrote:

Chemist wrote:

My car allows me to drive at 60mph/100km/h and turn the wheel hard to the side. I could roll this thing. I wonder why the automation in the car doesn't prevent this?

Are you sure? I think your tires wouldn't provide the necessary grip. And you might not spin like crazy either because you have electronics that prevent that... So...

(Notwithstanding this is a false equivalent. Just wanted to point out it's bad)

I know somebody who rolled a high-end SUV in an abrupt traffic avoidance maneuver.

Okay. I was thinking sedan (what used to be normal cars when I was growing up in Europe).

BoeingGuy wrote:

I think his point is that at some point pilots have to br competent pilots. Maybe if your Flight Director is commanding nose down at 200 above ground, you know maybe a 777 pilot should have enough pilot skill to know not to follow it.

Still false equivalence. Blindly following a GPS command to "turn left" where there's no street or trusting Tesla's auto pilot when merging feel like a better parable.

I thought Chemist was going into envelope protection bashing. But I won't put words in anyone's posts.

I agree that when taking off one should be aware that pushing forward to sink at 200 feet is always a bad idea and one should keep flying and switch off the automation that tells you to sink. My flight experience is 20hrs of watching YouTube streams though (on an Airbus ).

Whether designing a system that will predictably produce these commands after a human erroneously set it up is still state of the art is another question. Especially since there seem easy ways to throw a warning (see experts above).

But I guess FAA and Boeing haven't agreed yet how humans and computers should interact nowadays.

xl0hr wrote:

Whether designing a system that will predictably produce these commands after a human erroneously set it up is still state of the art is another question. Especially since there seem easy ways to throw a warning (see experts above).

But I guess FAA and Boeing haven't agreed yet how humans and computers should interact nowadays.

There is a lot of false information and non-experts chiming in in a lot of these posts. This is despite the fact that the issue is under investigation and not fully understood what occurred yet. But a lot of Youtube video experts think they know the design is at fault. BTW, I do this stuff for a living.

There is an alert. The EGPWS “DON’T SINK” aural caution alert will annunciate if you descend after take off. The FMA clearly show what Flight Director and/or Autopilot modes are engaged, on the primary flight display (not in the corner as some other “expert “ bizarrely posted).

zeke wrote:

BoeingGuy wrote:

First was a system malfunction, second was the crew selecting an inappropriate automation mode, which put the automation in an incorrect state so it wasn’t holding their speed for them.

Precipitated from the first event was an autothrottle alert like found on the FBW Airbus autothrust. This however was not extended from the 737 to other models the 777.

If lessons learned from the first event had been implemented across other types the second event in my view would not have happened.

I don’t agree. The 777 Autothrottle has the auto-reengage function. The 737 does not. It’s just that the Asiana crew screwed up the mode selection so badly that Auto-reengage didn’t function. I’m sure you are aware the Autothrottle was changed to better protect against such crew errors. The 777 also has the AIRSPEED LOW caution. The Asiana crew was so asleep at the switch that they weren’t even monitoring their Airspeed. It wouldn’t surprise me if the PF didn’t have his hands on the Thrust Levels (like the EK 521 captain didn’t have his hands on the thrust levers during a balked landing).

At what point do you have to design an airplane to account for someone who doesn’t show basic flying skills?

Exeiowa wrote:

One would hope that on the next iteration of airplanes that they might design in some features to make this harder to do even if no was meant to, as it did happen.

Engineeringing today is a race between s
engineers striving to build bigger and better idiot-proof designs, and the Universe trying to produce bigger and better idiots. So far, the Universe is winning

I like Juan Browne.

BoeingGuy wrote:

At what point do you have to design an airplane to account for someone who doesn’t show basic flying skills?

Despite the positive changes you describe at Boeing, it seems they need to embrace the idea that this point is really, really low and not likely to improve. Airlines are already having problems finding qualified pilots and will likely be doing so for many years to come since parents have figured out spending six figures to get your kid a minimum wage job is not a great idea and the military is no longer providing a fat pipeline of experienced candidates with "the right stuff".

To continue the Tesla analogy, they are putting cameras focused on driver's eyeballs just to make sure they are still awake. Be prepared to see that in airliner cockpits some day.

kalvado wrote:

Exeiowa wrote:

One would hope that on the next iteration of airplanes that they might design in some features to make this harder to do even if no was meant to, as it did happen.

Engineering today is a race between engineers striving to build bigger and better idiot-proof designs, and the Universe trying to produce bigger and better idiots. So far, the Universe is winning

My version of this: When Man invents something that is idiot proof, God invents a better idiot!

seat1a wrote:

I like Juan Browne.

I didn't like some of his earlier stuff, but he's getting better especially with regard to crediting others and he's growing on me to the point I really appreciate his work.

BoeingGuy wrote:

zeke wrote:

BoeingGuy wrote:

First was a system malfunction, second was the crew selecting an inappropriate automation mode, which put the automation in an incorrect state so it wasn’t holding their speed for them.

Precipitated from the first event was an autothrottle alert like found on the FBW Airbus autothrust. This however was not extended from the 737 to other models the 777.

If lessons learned from the first event had been implemented across other types the second event in my view would not have happened.

I don’t agree. The 777 Autothrottle has the auto-reengage function. The 737 does not. It’s just that the Asiana crew screwed up the mode selection so badly that Auto-reengage didn’t function. I’m sure you are aware the Autothrottle was changed to better protect against such crew errors. The 777 also has the AIRSPEED LOW caution. The Asiana crew was so asleep at the switch that they weren’t even monitoring their Airspeed. It wouldn’t surprise me if the PF didn’t have his hands on the Thrust Levels (like the EK 521 captain didn’t have his hands on the thrust levers during a balked landing).

At what point do you have to design an airplane to account for someone who doesn’t show basic flying skills?

Surely Boeing has a duty to ensure more consistency between MAX, 777 and 787, especially where common / 'quick change' ratings are offered / promoted? When buying from Boeing, there is a disconnect between the 'owners' of the various model families, which from your comments, extends even deeper to design, development and standards.

smartplane wrote:

BoeingGuy wrote:

zeke wrote:

Precipitated from the first event was an autothrottle alert like found on the FBW Airbus autothrust. This however was not extended from the 737 to other models the 777.

If lessons learned from the first event had been implemented across other types the second event in my view would not have happened.

I don’t agree. The 777 Autothrottle has the auto-reengage function. The 737 does not. It’s just that the Asiana crew screwed up the mode selection so badly that Auto-reengage didn’t function. I’m sure you are aware the Autothrottle was changed to better protect against such crew errors. The 777 also has the AIRSPEED LOW caution. The Asiana crew was so asleep at the switch that they weren’t even monitoring their Airspeed. It wouldn’t surprise me if the PF didn’t have his hands on the Thrust Levels (like the EK 521 captain didn’t have his hands on the thrust levers during a balked landing).

At what point do you have to design an airplane to account for someone who doesn’t show basic flying skills?

Surely Boeing has a duty to ensure more consistency between MAX, 777 and 787, especially where common / 'quick change' ratings are offered / promoted? When buying from Boeing, there is a disconnect between the 'owners' of the various model families, which from your comments, extends even deeper to design, development and standards.

Again. More arm chair quarterback. The 737 Max does in fact have an Airspeed Low alert and a host of other enhancements. It’s the customers who balk at making the 737 Max into a 787 for commonality reasons.

The newer models do have a lot of commonality. From an avionics and flight controls perspective, the 777-9 is very similar to a 787. The 787 is getting some never upgrades developed for the 777-9. But you can’t just go back and make a 737 or 767 and turn it into a 787.

My

Revelation wrote:

BoeingGuy wrote:

At what point do you have to design an airplane to account for someone who doesn’t show basic flying skills?

Despite the positive changes you describe at Boeing, it seems they need to embrace the idea that this point is really, really low and not likely to improve. Airlines are already having problems finding qualified pilots and will likely be doing so for many years to come since parents have figured out spending six figures to get your kid a minimum wage job is not a great idea and the military is no longer providing a fat pipeline of experienced candidates with "the right

This is well embraced. The change in pilot demographics is discussed all the time when evaluating new and existing designs. Boeing has hired numerous Human Factors doctorates and experts to ensure this is properly addressed moving forward.

Also, many Boeing airplanes do have a “Crew Alertness Monitor”. It was developed over 20 years ago long before Tesla thought about cameras.

As you well know, I’ve been incredibly critical of the incompetent and self-serving corrupt way Boeing has been managed for so many years.

But I will call a spade a spade. Some of the Armchair or YouTube “expert” criticisms here are unfair and inaccurate. There is a lot of good occurring on the engineering side.

kalvado wrote:

Exeiowa wrote:

One would hope that on the next iteration of airplanes that they might design in some features to make this harder to do even if no was meant to, as it did happen.

Engineeringing today is a race between s
engineers striving to build bigger and better idiot-proof designs, and the Universe trying to produce bigger and better idiots. So far, the Universe is winning

I’ve corrected people at work for saying that pilots are becoming less capable. The average IQ of incoming pilots is declining or anything. It’s the experience and quality of training that is declining.

One of Boeing past Chief Pilots coined the term “reserve aeronautical knowledge”. That just the seat of the pants experience a pilot developed over many years of flying experience.

Many pilots today don’t have that military, Cessna or other flying experience to draw on. The ab initio pilot who gets in the the right seat of a QR 787 is probably a highly capable individual, but lacks that reserve aeronautical knowledge like Captains Haynes and Sullenberger had, for example.

BoeingGuy wrote:

My

Revelation wrote:

BoeingGuy wrote:

At what point do you have to design an airplane to account for someone who doesn’t show basic flying skills?

Despite the positive changes you describe at Boeing, it seems they need to embrace the idea that this point is really, really low and not likely to improve. Airlines are already having problems finding qualified pilots and will likely be doing so for many years to come since parents have figured out spending six figures to get your kid a minimum wage job is not a great idea and the military is no longer providing a fat pipeline of experienced candidates with "the right

This is well embraced. The change in pilot demographics is discussed all the time when evaluating new and existing designs. Boeing has hired numerous Human Factors doctorates and experts to ensure this is properly addressed moving forward.

Also, many Boeing airplanes do have a “Crew Alertness Monitor”. It was developed over 20 years ago long before Tesla thought about cameras.

As you well know, I’ve been incredibly critical of the incompetent and self-serving corrupt way Boeing has been managed for so many years.

But I will call a spade a spade. Some of the Armchair or YouTube “expert” criticisms here are unfair and inaccurate. There is a lot of good occurring on the engineering side.

DO I understand it correctly, that from the start of takeoff roll to certain altitude is the only part of flight where all the control should be manual only?
I am afraid that is the part people are missing - the degree of crew responsibility over those 90 seconds of flight.

BoeingGuy wrote:

My

Revelation wrote:

BoeingGuy wrote:

At what point do you have to design an airplane to account for someone who doesn’t show basic flying skills?

Despite the positive changes you describe at Boeing, it seems they need to embrace the idea that this point is really, really low and not likely to improve. Airlines are already having problems finding qualified pilots and will likely be doing so for many years to come since parents have figured out spending six figures to get your kid a minimum wage job is not a great idea and the military is no longer providing a fat pipeline of experienced candidates with "the right

This is well embraced. The change in pilot demographics is discussed all the time when evaluating new and existing designs. Boeing has hired numerous Human Factors doctorates and experts to ensure this is properly addressed moving forward.

Also, many Boeing airplanes do have a “Crew Alertness Monitor”. It was developed over 20 years ago long before Tesla thought about cameras.

As you well know, I’ve been incredibly critical of the incompetent and self-serving corrupt way Boeing has been managed for so many years.

But I will call a spade a spade. Some of the Armchair or YouTube “expert” criticisms here are unfair and inaccurate. There is a lot of good occurring on the engineering side.

"... ensure this is properly addressed moving forward."

"There is a lot of good occurring on the engineering side."

"The 787 is getting some newer upgrades developed for the 777-9".

Great to see changes are occurring, and being led by engineering, setting the bar higher. But this shouldn't be newsworthy. It should be integral to the DNA of the company. And flow in every direction. Yes, even the MAX team can come up with original ideas and solutions for the big boys, not just the reverse.

Not so many years ago, each model family had their 'own' sale / purchase contract variations. That still seems to linger to some extent with NB v WB today.

kalvado wrote:

DO I understand it correctly, that from the start of takeoff roll to certain altitude is the only part of flight where all the control should be manual only?
I am afraid that is the part people are missing - the degree of crew responsibility over those 90 seconds of flight.

People might want to watch the Blancolirio video linked earlier. He's an experienced 777 pilot and talks to his state of mind during takeoff. The plane is at its slowest and its heaviest. A lot can go wrong. If you're treating it like another day in the office, you're doing it wrong.

BoeingGuy wrote:

kalvado wrote:

Exeiowa wrote:

One would hope that on the next iteration of airplanes that they might design in some features to make this harder to do even if no was meant to, as it did happen.

Engineeringing today is a race between s
engineers striving to build bigger and better idiot-proof designs, and the Universe trying to produce bigger and better idiots. So far, the Universe is winning

I’ve corrected people at work for saying that pilots are becoming less capable. The average IQ of incoming pilots is declining or anything. It’s the experience and quality of training that is declining.

One of Boeing past Chief Pilots coined the term “reserve aeronautical knowledge”. That just the seat of the pants experience a pilot developed over many years of flying experience.

Many pilots today don’t have that military, Cessna or other flying experience to draw on. The ab initio pilot who gets in the the right seat of a QR 787 is probably a highly capable individual, but lacks that reserve aeronautical knowledge like Captains Haynes and Sullenberger had, for example.

We can go into a long discussion over what kind of job a pilot is. Is it something that should be taught in a trade school, require a PhD, or a well-drilled chimpanzee should be able to do everything except for ATC comms?
My - maybe uneducated - opinion is that modern airplanes should require qualified flight operators. And the main objective - I believe you were the one bringing it in stall training context anyway - should be preventing the system from falling into an improper state. That means, for the context of this accident, pulling yoke at Vrotate. What I hear is that problem is not limited to flight ops. Someone from a large non-av US high tech manufacturer complained, that new hires cannot handle complex instructions. Complex meaning "push yellow button, wait 10 seconds, push green button". I don't see going any lower than that...

The only situation I can see Boeing being responsible is if FDR data shows yoke pulled and elevator not moving. So far no evidence that was the case.

kalvado wrote:

BoeingGuy wrote:

My

Revelation wrote:

Despite the positive changes you describe at Boeing, it seems they need to embrace the idea that this point is really, really low and not likely to improve. Airlines are already having problems finding qualified pilots and will likely be doing so for many years to come since parents have figured out spending six figures to get your kid a minimum wage job is not a great idea and the military is no longer providing a fat pipeline of experienced candidates with "the right

This is well embraced. The change in pilot demographics is discussed all the time when evaluating new and existing designs. Boeing has hired numerous Human Factors doctorates and experts to ensure this is properly addressed moving forward.

Also, many Boeing airplanes do have a “Crew Alertness Monitor”. It was developed over 20 years ago long before Tesla thought about cameras.

As you well know, I’ve been incredibly critical of the incompetent and self-serving corrupt way Boeing has been managed for so many years.

But I will call a spade a spade. Some of the Armchair or YouTube “expert” criticisms here are unfair and inaccurate. There is a lot of good occurring on the engineering side.

DO I understand it correctly, that from the start of takeoff roll to certain altitude is the only part of flight where all the control should be manual only?
I am afraid that is the part people are missing - the degree of crew responsibility over those 90 seconds of flight.

That’s correct. Autopilot engagement is inhibited below 200 feet on takeoff. It’s not commonly engaged that low anyway.

The Flight Director gives visual cues. It’s parked at 8 degrees pitch prior to liftoff. Then it transitions to 15 degrees after ground/air transition. Then transitions to giving speed through elevator guidance (unless there is a windshear).

In this case the Flight Director was apparently in the wrong mode and giving guidance commands to descend back to runway altitude.

The issue is being investigated. I believe it’s happened at least once before. That pilot was smart enough not to follow an erroneous descent Flight Director command at such a low altitude.

It’s like the guy who drove his car into a river because by Gawd that’s what his GPS Nav system told him to do. People don’t have any common sense anymore.

This is a precursor, Singapore Airlines levelled off a 777 and flew around Shanghai at 480 feet for a considerable period of time after takeoff. Incredibly lucky not to hit anything. And shockingly bad flying skills.

https://avherald.com/h?article=4dc3882a

BoeingGuy wrote:

I don’t agree. The 777 Autothrottle has the auto-reengage function. The 737 does not. It’s just that the Asiana crew screwed up the mode selection so badly that Auto-reengage didn’t function. I’m sure you are aware the Autothrottle was changed to better protect against such crew errors. The 777 also has the AIRSPEED LOW caution. The Asiana crew was so asleep at the switch that they weren’t even monitoring their Airspeed. It wouldn’t surprise me if the PF didn’t have his hands on the Thrust Levels (like the EK 521 captain didn’t have his hands on the thrust levers during a balked landing).

At what point do you have to design an airplane to account for someone who doesn’t show basic flying skills?

I will just let the facts speak for themselves

"Boeing also has a "caution tone" for low airspeed on the 777, along with versions of the 747, according to an FAA panel studying the issue. But other planes have a verbal warning such as "airspeed low." Clifford said the 777 tone "has proven to not capture the pilot's attention in these low airspeed circumstances.""

"Airbus has a warning that says "speed speed speed" every five seconds between 2,000 and 100 feet when an aircraft goes too slow. The equipment is on the A320 family since 1995 and on all A330, 340, 350 and 380 aircraft.

Boeing puts a warning that says "airspeed low, airspeed low" on 737-600, -700, -800 and -900 planes, according to an FAA panel studying the issue. Boeing began putting the warning on 737s after a Turkish Airlines crash Feb. 25, 2009, near Amsterdam that killed nine and injured 117."

from https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nat ... 4/2508863/