Also RNP approaches can fix a lot of these issues to challenging airports but usually the operator has to pay to get it designed

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

We all look at charts, but FAA 8260-5 is the document that is the source for the charts.

https://www.faa.gov/aero_docs/acifp/NDB ... RECTED.pdf

It references Part 97 making compliance with the approach a regulation, not just a suggestion.

I’m not a local but I don’t understand why they didn’t circle to 9L, just as long, less terrain issues. The approach frequently isn’t used due to Miramar nearby, but circling wouldn’t be a problem for the tower. Here’s where experience counts, the ability to try other non-standard, but better, routes to the desired outcome. I’d bet because the prevailing wind is westerly, pilots were in a “box” thinking the visual to 27R was the only way to land.

To Revelation,

Mostly true, but Part 91 operators can, for good or evil, start the approach without the reported weather meeting the chart minimums, but ATC will inform an inbound that the weather is below mins and ask if it’s a commercial operation. If so, a clearance won’t be issued. The LOC-D is circling approach, but if a normal descent can be made the prohibited circle need not be flown and a straight in landing made. Now, in a jet the 470ft/nm means about 950 fpm, barely okay, but if visual early enough the that gradient maybe reduced by increasing the descent rate a bit earlier.

Looking at the plate, I was thinking the same thing: you could request the 17C9L and then either fly a dogleg left base to 9L or overfly and do a chicken jibe to a right base. If you can make the gradient work for the left base, that's probably the safest option in terms of visual illusions and SA. The straight-in is 3 degrees, so depending on how much track distance you add with the left base, it should be doable.

TDZE TOMTY JUGAL FAF
Alt 379 1580 2500
Dist from Thr 0 3.7 6.6
Gradient 0.1 0.1
GP 3.1 3.0

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

frmrCapCadet wrote:

A naive question/observation. For small aircraft, part of circling is to ensure there are no other aircraft on or about to land or take off. Hence the question, say a plane wants to land at Bremerton airport in less than desirable weather conditions, there are fairly decent straight in approaches, but are there any towers available to tell the pilot that no one else is using the airport at that particular time. Bremerton does not have a 'tower' so far as I know.

ATC separates known IFR traffic in controlled airspace, so, if cleared for approach into Bremerton, the flight will be the only IFR flight on the approach. If the weather is VFR in the traffic pattern and there is traffic, the IFR inbound will announce its position and have to fit in the traffic pattern. If it’s below VFR, there shouldn’t be traffic. This is very familiar going at thousands of airports.

I’ve actually, IIRC, been to Bremerton from BFI in those conditions in a Global. I’ve also been at Canadian airports located in Class G airspace where there is no ATC below about F180, just make position reports and state intentions in the blind.

I've flown into Bremerton IFR several times, both in VMC and IMC. VMC can be a zoo if several people are in the pattern, so if you're approaching opposite direction you just break off and join the downwind. If you're flying it the same direction as the VFR pattern, you announce on CTAF "10 mile final," then "5 mile final," and so forth. Usually people are nice and someone will extend downwind to let you in, but sometimes you need to break off your approach for spacing. What annoys me are the IFR pilots who just announce "over WUMOX" which many VFR pilots don't understand, versus "5 mile final."

IFR into Bremerton is pretty easy, as GF says, ATC won't let the next plane in until you're back on the missed or cancel IFR on the ground. Occasionally someone will call you up to ask about ceilings because they're noodling on going VFR, but mostly it's pretty quiet.

The "letter of the law" may have been followed (although it is hard to justify, see below), but not the "spirit", the difference being (other than the actual outcome) that if conditions were indeed VFR (1000- 3) there would have been no need to

1. Descend below the circling MDA (1440 HAA) [maybe 100' or so...], or
2. Be at 800 MSL 1sm north of RWY 17, not to mention being...
3. ... below 800 MSL as they did, as they started the maneuver.

There is much wringing of hands concerning the difference between 121 and 135/91 but the ultimate reality here was that the weather either wasn't good enough to undertake the strategy they attempted (despite the reported weather), or if it was, there was a considerable lapse in judgement in the execution, the altitude being the most suspect, but altitude aggravating the ability to judge a proper downwind/base turn. I don't see any "in between" in this case. Descending below circling mins to cancel IFR? (I don't know exactly where they cancelled, but still...) A "VFR" pattern in a Cat C/D jet at 300-400 AGL?

OldB747Driver wrote:

The "letter of the law" may have been followed (although it is hard to justify, see below), but not the "spirit", the difference being (other than the actual outcome) that if conditions were indeed VFR (1000- 3) there would have been no need to

1. Descend below the circling MDA (1440 HAA) [maybe 100' or so...], or
2. Be at 800 MSL 1sm north of RWY 17, not to mention being...
3. ... below 800 MSL as they did, as they started the maneuver.

There is much wringing of hands concerning the difference between 121 and 135/91 but the ultimate reality here was that the weather either wasn't good enough to undertake the strategy they attempted (despite the reported weather), or if it was, there was a considerable lapse in judgement in the execution, the altitude being the most suspect, but altitude aggravating the ability to judge a proper downwind/base turn. I don't see any "in between" in this case. Descending below circling mins to cancel IFR? (I don't know exactly where they cancelled, but still...) A "VFR" pattern in a Cat C/D jet at 300-400 AGL?

Absolutely, the ceiling and visibility at circling MDA, for better yet at a VFR traffic pattern altitude, were either not there or the crew didn’t level off at that altitude and started the pattern. Descending down to the altitudes reported in the ADS data are wildly inappropriate and dangerous. Not the first time I’ve seen the actual weather at great variance with the reported weather.

OldB747Driver wrote:

The "letter of the law" may have been followed (although it is hard to justify, see below), but not the "spirit", the difference being (other than the actual outcome) that if conditions were indeed VFR (1000- 3) there would have been no need to

1. Descend below the circling MDA (1440 HAA) [maybe 100' or so...], or
2. Be at 800 MSL 1sm north of RWY 17, not to mention being...
3. ... below 800 MSL as they did as they started the maneuver.

There is much wringing of hands concerning the difference between 121 and 135/91 but the ultimate reality here was that the weather either wasn't good enough to undertake the strategy they attempted (despite the reported weather), or if it was, there was a considerable lapse in judgement in the execution, the altitude being the most suspect, but altitude aggravating the ability to judge a proper downwind/base turn. I don't see any "in between" in this case. Descending below circling mins to cancel IFR? (I don't know exactly where they cancelled, but still...) A "VFR" pattern in a Cat C/D jet at 300-400 AGL?

As a VFR only pilot, I know that the weather station is only reporting what is in it’s immediate vicinity, in marginal weather. The cloud may very well be 1,200 over the station, but 400 feet over the approach end, a half a mile away. It could be “Legal”, but is it wise?(ADM) That is why judgement is such a big part of flying.

As I noted before, I see a normalization of deviance, a long-time killer of sometimes even the best pilots.
They had successfully done the maneuver before, why not this time? “It is only a “little” worse than the last, we can do it.” We see the result.

I’ve flown a few PARs to minimums (200-1/2) in reported VFR or 800-2-isn weather. The PARs standout because they’re rare even in the military. The last real missed approach I can remember was supposed to easy VMC in North Carolina. I was in the right seat and both of us were mildly surprised when I said, “Minimums, Go around, nothing in sight”.

“A little worse”! They were a 1,000’ below pattern altitude. I suspect the pilot’s exclamation on the radio was when he realized just how low he was. The FO didn’t back him up, either, another example of failing CRM and inexperience.

wxkaiser wrote:

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

Do we know who was actually flying it?

Julian Jorge Bugaj was the first officer (FO) and pilot flying (PF) . He was very likely the pilot with the least experiece on the Learjet.

That's interesting. We had the ground tracks of previous flights, but we don't know if the (experienced) owner was flying all or any of them.

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

To Revelation,

Mostly true, but Part 91 operators can, for good or evil, start the approach without the reported weather meeting the chart minimums, but ATC will inform an inbound that the weather is below mins and ask if it’s a commercial operation. If so, a clearance won’t be issued. The LOC-D is circling approach, but if a normal descent can be made the prohibited circle need not be flown and a straight in landing made. Now, in a jet the 470ft/nm means about 950 fpm, barely okay, but if visual early enough the that gradient maybe reduced by increasing the descent rate a bit earlier.

Thanks for these clarifications and others, in particular that the publications of minimums for circling approaches doesn't mean you can't do a straight in landing "if they have the active runway in sight and have sufficient time to make a normal approach for landing".

In an ideal world there would be a simpler decision matrix, but the world is not a simple place. The rules want to accommodate the desire for safe and efficient landings whenever practicable. As you wrote, the key element is the skill to recognize what is and is not acceptable visibility and the discipline to move on to Plan B when you don't get what you want.

Totally by coincidence I was watching a YT video from Matt Guthmiller last night ( https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VkIu6LQQM3c&t=1455s ) that shows a straight in night landing to KSEE in his Bonanza. I queued it up to the landing sequence. Obviously not much in common with the accident flight, but does give some idea about surrounding terrain.

32andBelow wrote:

using an ifr procedure to get to VFR conditions is hardly a loophole tho. It’s a totally valid maneuver. If they are unable to reach VFR they would either land as the approach says or they would execute the missed approach. All a circling approach does it get you to the airport environment.

you don’t file an Intended landing runway in a flight plan. You don’t even write an intended approach. You can sometimes figure out what approach they want if they filed the IAF and the IAF only goes to one approach.

All that being said what was done could have been bad judgement but the procedures used are typical and are used around the system.

Thanks to you and to others for setting the context for those of us less familiar or just not familiar with these procedures.

It wasn’t the operator’s owner flying, an employee pilot crew. There’s two times, as the captain you don’t let the FO, especially an inexperienced one, fly—when the situation is nearly over their head or nearly over your’s. The FO won’t learn anything by being put into a situation that over saturates them and you’re adding to his task saturation by commanding actions, see KTEB Lear accident. Or, if you’re approaching your limits, it’s clearly over the FO’s ability. Never voluntarily accept situations that are that tasking.

Really detailed video from AOPA Air Safety Institute on this incident:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h1KDG7iLwcI

I don't think there anything "new" in terms of information, but the visualizations really help me picture what happened.

Revelation wrote:

Really detailed video from AOPA Air Safety Institute on this incident:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h1KDG7iLwcI

I don't think there anything "new" in terms of information, but the visualizations really help me picture what happened.

I think you got the wrong link - this is a VASAviation video.

I think https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S71maBUL5wM is the one you wanted.

zuckie13 wrote:

Revelation wrote:

Really detailed video from AOPA Air Safety Institute on this incident:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h1KDG7iLwcI

I don't think there anything "new" in terms of information, but the visualizations really help me picture what happened.

I think you got the wrong link - this is a VASAviation video.

I think https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S71maBUL5wM is the one you wanted.

OOPS, thanks for the correction. Too late to edit, unfortunately.

That FX 767 slipping off the taxiway was something of local interest.

Thanks for the link @Revelation/@zuckie13 - I know that when analyzing these types of events, we (I?) tend to focus on what we see/hear but given that this accident was almost certainly a stall/spin, and given that we heard the final moments as transmitted by the inadvertently-keyed mike, it is perplexing no stall warning/shaker is heard...

zuckie13 wrote:

Revelation wrote:

Really detailed video from AOPA Air Safety Institute on this incident:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h1KDG7iLwcI

I don't think there anything "new" in terms of information, but the visualizations really help me picture what happened.

I think you got the wrong link - this is a VASAviation video.

I think https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S71maBUL5wM is the one you wanted.

Naive question, they approached from the north and west, would it have been easier to have approached from the south and east?

A comments on that Youtube video echos my belief:

"Excellent overview. Having flown this approach many times, my hunch is, in part, that they rolled out onto Base/Final and saw the mountain and cranked in an unintentional impulse hard over. You raised a few very key points that aren't available elsewhere, 1) Vref speeds in line for a stabilized 17 approach and landing and 2) airspeed/configuration questions related to stall speed (as well as the lack of horns). Outstanding report. RIP to all involved."

"so they circumvented the prohibited circle -to-land by going vfr, in other words, they cheesed it in order to overcome what they saw as an annoying technicality. At barely more than 1.3x their stall speed."

One thing that still bugs me is what he was doing when he was stalled, due to how short the time between the first expletive and the crash was (which is entirely based on a gut feeling because its hard to correctly sync audio and video to find out, and I might be completely barking up the wrong tree).

Remember that he keyed in his mic and was about to talk to ATC (and did not seem that panicked), and then shouted an "surprised" expletive as if he came across a new problem. If he had already stalled, he would have surely noticed the plane was stalling before it started nosediving?, but that did not seem apparent from the timings.

EDIT; what if he was trying to do a "simple" stall recovery but something went wrong? That would explain a longer nosedive (or the coffee can't help me anymore and I need to get to sleep).

frmrCapCadet wrote:

zuckie13 wrote:

Revelation wrote:

Really detailed video from AOPA Air Safety Institute on this incident:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h1KDG7iLwcI

I don't think there anything "new" in terms of information, but the visualizations really help me picture what happened.

I think you got the wrong link - this is a VASAviation video.

I think https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S71maBUL5wM is the one you wanted.

Naive question, they approached from the north and west, would it have been easier to have approached from the south and east?

They were arriving from the north, easy transition to the GPS 17 approach course and they were going to circle anyway. No, looking at it from 10 minutes prior to impact, this routing makes a certain sense. Reported weather certainly sounded favorable. How they let themselves get down to the reported ADS-B altitudes is a mystery other than breakdown in crew coordination.

Reported weather and the actual view from the cockpit can be two very different things. This is a evolution that many less experienced, but luckier, pilots have survived by their wits. On the ground, they said to each other, “let’s not do that again”. Less skilled ones get their names in the paper.

TokyoImperialPa wrote:

One thing that still bugs me is what he was doing when he was stalled, due to how short the time between the first expletive and the crash was (which is entirely based on a gut feeling because its hard to correctly sync audio and video to find out, and I might be completely barking up the wrong tree).

Remember that he keyed in his mic and was about to talk to ATC (and did not seem that panicked), and then shouted an "surprised" expletive as if he came across a new problem. If he had already stalled, he would have surely noticed the plane was stalling before it started nosediving?, but that did not seem apparent from the timings.

EDIT; what if he was trying to do a "simple" stall recovery but something went wrong? That would explain a longer nosedive (or the coffee can't help me anymore and I need to get to sleep).

Stall a jet, any jet, and the rate of descent builds very quickly. If they were, in fact, at 400’ AGL, and ROD gets over 2,000 to 3,000 fpm, impact is in moments. Stalled the plane is brick.

TokyoImperialPa wrote:

A comments on that Youtube video echos my belief:

"Excellent overview. Having flown this approach many times, my hunch is, in part, that they rolled out onto Base/Final and saw the mountain and cranked in an unintentional impulse hard over. You raised a few very key points that aren't available elsewhere, 1) Vref speeds in line for a stabilized 17 approach and landing and 2) airspeed/configuration questions related to stall speed (as well as the lack of horns). Outstanding report. RIP to all involved."

"so they circumvented the prohibited circle -to-land by going vfr, in other words, they cheesed it in order to overcome what they saw as an annoying technicality. At barely more than 1.3x their stall speed."

One point the video made even clearer and these comments support is once they canceled IFR they were committed to land VFR since the escape to the IFR missed approach pattern was no longer available since they canceled IFR. I guess this is something those whose plans include circumventing the prohibited circle need to keep in mind. Better really evaluate the minimums and your capabilities when you decide to cancel IFR since you're now committing to VFR.

Revelation wrote:

TokyoImperialPa wrote:

A comments on that Youtube video echos my belief:

"Excellent overview. Having flown this approach many times, my hunch is, in part, that they rolled out onto Base/Final and saw the mountain and cranked in an unintentional impulse hard over. You raised a few very key points that aren't available elsewhere, 1) Vref speeds in line for a stabilized 17 approach and landing and 2) airspeed/configuration questions related to stall speed (as well as the lack of horns). Outstanding report. RIP to all involved."

"so they circumvented the prohibited circle -to-land by going vfr, in other words, they cheesed it in order to overcome what they saw as an annoying technicality. At barely more than 1.3x their stall speed."

One point the video made even clearer and these comments support is once they canceled IFR they were committed to land VFR since the escape to the IFR missed approach pattern was no longer available since they canceled IFR. I guess this is something those whose plans include circumventing the prohibited circle need to keep in mind. Better really evaluate the minimums and your capabilities when you decide to cancel IFR since you're now committing to VFR.

Not necessarily true, if possible remain VFR and get a pop-up clearance. If not possible, and illegal,declare an emergency, climb, confess and get a clearance. In bygone days, nothing would be said. Today, in busy airspace, probably answer to the FSDO, outcome dependent on facts and legal eagle. Better than dying. I’ve had to do it several times, not in this specific event sequence. We’d get pop-up clearances quite often flying checks.

Also, true, older and more thoughtful, I wouldn’t get myself in this situation.

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

Not necessarily true, if possible remain VFR and get a pop-up clearance. If not possible, and illegal,declare an emergency, climb, confess and get a clearance. In bygone days, nothing would be said. Today, in busy airspace, probably answer to the FSDO, outcome dependent on facts and legal eagle. Better than dying. I’ve had to do it several times, not in this specific event sequence. We’d get pop-up clearances quite often flying checks.

Also, true, older and more thoughtful, I wouldn’t get myself in this situation.

Yes, when I wrote "committed" I meant in the legal sense, not the life or death sense. Definitely better to deal with the legal and professional fallout than being too dead to do so.

Revelation wrote:

TokyoImperialPa wrote:

A comments on that Youtube video echos my belief:

"Excellent overview. Having flown this approach many times, my hunch is, in part, that they rolled out onto Base/Final and saw the mountain and cranked in an unintentional impulse hard over. You raised a few very key points that aren't available elsewhere, 1) Vref speeds in line for a stabilized 17 approach and landing and 2) airspeed/configuration questions related to stall speed (as well as the lack of horns). Outstanding report. RIP to all involved."

"so they circumvented the prohibited circle -to-land by going vfr, in other words, they cheesed it in order to overcome what they saw as an annoying technicality. At barely more than 1.3x their stall speed."

One point the video made even clearer and these comments support is once they canceled IFR they were committed to land VFR since the escape to the IFR missed approach pattern was no longer available since they canceled IFR. I guess this is something those whose plans include circumventing the prohibited circle need to keep in mind. Better really evaluate the minimums and your capabilities when you decide to cancel IFR since you're now committing to VFR.

Anything is available to you in an emergency

Here’s the preliminary NTSB report. Yes, they struck a power line prior to ground impact. What were thinking flying this low, other than “I’ve got to get in”.

https://interactive.cbs8.com/pdfs/Repor ... _21_PM.pdf

Thank you for sharing the link.

It is not clear to me whether the wording of the report is intended to convey that striking the power lines was the immediate cause of the crash, or whether striking power lines was merely part of the sequence of the cash:

NTSB Preliminary Report wrote:

Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane struck a set of power lines and subsequently impacted the yard of a residential home about 1.43 nautical miles east of the approach end of runway 27R.

The report states they overflew the field at 775 feet barometric altitude MSL / 407 AGL. Then they climbed to 950 MSL. The final ADS-B data point was at 875 MSL. The report states ground level at the crash site is 595 feet. Nearby hills are about 750 and 680 feet in height, but aide from those hills being below the aircraft, the aircraft appears to have flown between these hills, so if they did strike a power line, it should have been 180' feet high. That seems unlikely in the residential neighborhood they were over.

When they report barometric pressure, do they literally mean the ADS-B altitude data came from the pressure altimeter, not GPS or a radar altimeter? How much error is typical, or how much drift might occur if they referenced the pressure altimeter at takeoff 200 miles away?

Also thanks, @GalaxyFlyer, for the link/update.
It is interesting phraseology in the preliminary report, @iamlucky13... mentioning the power line seems to potentially imply it was a precursor to the loss of control rather than the result of the loss of the control, but the 'altitude math' seems to contradict that conclusion.

iamlucky13 wrote:

Thank you for sharing the link.

It is not clear to me whether the wording of the report is intended to convey that striking the power lines was the immediate cause of the crash, or whether striking power lines was merely part of the sequence of the cash:

NTSB Preliminary Report wrote:

Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane struck a set of power lines and subsequently impacted the yard of a residential home about 1.43 nautical miles east of the approach end of runway 27R.

The report states they overflew the field at 775 feet barometric altitude MSL / 407 AGL. Then they climbed to 950 MSL. The final ADS-B data point was at 875 MSL. The report states ground level at the crash site is 595 feet. Nearby hills are about 750 and 680 feet in height, but aide from those hills being below the aircraft, the aircraft appears to have flown between these hills, so if they did strike a power line, it should have been 180' feet high. That seems unlikely in the residential neighborhood they were over.

When they report barometric pressure, do they literally mean the ADS-B altitude data came from the pressure altimeter, not GPS or a radar altimeter? How much error is typical, or how much drift might occur if they referenced the pressure altimeter at takeoff 200 miles away?

I would presume the IIC is stating the FDR data, not ADS-B. The crew should and it’s verified have used the local QNH, not the setting from KSNA departure.

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

Here’s the preliminary NTSB report. Yes, they struck a power line prior to ground impact. What were thinking flying this low, other than “I’ve got to get in”.

https://interactive.cbs8.com/pdfs/Repor ... _21_PM.pdf

I'd be really interested in knowing if there was a phone call with their DO/CP prior to launching, and if there was any discussions with their passengers prior to launching about the possibility of not getting in.

I'd be really interested in the crew's actual duty day/rest.

I'd be really interested if any SMS analysis was done on this flight.

This isn't the first tail-end 91 deadhead that went south, and one reason we started to squirm when weather went down, while the pressures to get the aircraft home (and not pay the ramp fees/taxi/ferry cost) and personal desires to sleep in their own bed start making terrible ideas reasonable.

It’s one reason we prohibit night VFR operations except for recurrency training at home in good VMC, 2000-5. It’s also an IS-BAO SMS requirement to address any night VFR operations.

TokyoImperialPa wrote:

One thing that still bugs me is what he was doing when he was stalled, due to how short the time between the first expletive and the crash was (which is entirely based on a gut feeling because its hard to correctly sync audio and video to find out, and I might be completely barking up the wrong tree).

Remember that he keyed in his mic and was about to talk to ATC (and did not seem that panicked), and then shouted an "surprised" expletive as if he came across a new problem. If he had already stalled, he would have surely noticed the plane was stalling before it started nosediving?, but that did not seem apparent from the timings.

EDIT; what if he was trying to do a "simple" stall recovery but something went wrong? That would explain a longer nosedive (or the coffee can't help me anymore and I need to get to sleep).

In that tight of a turn, stall speed increases dramatically.

Most interesting to me about the NTSB Preliminary Report is the map that shows that the pilot asked for the lights to be turned up significantly-before they overflew the airport, when they were at an ADSB-reported altitude of 775 Feet MSL, the altitude they maintained while crossing the field. For some reason, I had it in my head that he asked for the lights to be turned up while they were on their upwind leg or maybe base leg, but in fact it was while they were still pretty-far from the field on the initial approach. In fact, all of the calls except the final one came geographically much further north of the airport than I expected, and I now am positive that that audio that we heard had the gaps of silence in it truncated.

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

I would presume the IIC is stating the FDR data, not ADS-B.

The NTSB does say that the wreckage was removed for investigation, but they don't explicitly reference reading out any CVR or FDR, but they do reference ADS-B, so I assumed that that's what they were using for their map and recitation. Also interesting that the wreckage came to rest at 595 feet MSL. That means that at the last ADS-B report of 900 feet, they were 305 feet AGL. Wow. That accounts for the 3-ish seconds between exclamation and impact.

I'm thinking the power line reference is merely-factual. At 305 feet AGL, they were still-above the 90-200-foot typical height of a 500kV "high tension" line tower, and I of course don't know if the area has any of those. Residential power lines, which I think they're suggesting that this was, are typically strung at 20-ish feet. NTSB will tie that observation it into a sequence of events better as the investigation continues. If nothing else, it might indicate trajectory.

wjcandee wrote:

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

I would presume the IIC is stating the FDR data, not ADS-B.

I'm thinking the power line reference is merely-factual. At 305 feet AGL, they were still-above the 90-200-foot typical height of a 500kV "high tension" line tower, and I of course don't know if the area has any of those. Residential power lines, which I think they're suggesting that this was, are typically strung at 20-ish feet. NTSB will tie that observation it into a sequence of events better as the investigation continues. If nothing else, it might indicate trajectory.

Almost certainly just factual. The El Cajon substation is at the corner of W. Main and N. Johnson and is 69kV-12kV. It was all over when the lines were struck.

dakota123 wrote:

wjcandee wrote:

I'm thinking the power line reference is merely-factual. At 305 feet AGL, they were still-above the 90-200-foot typical height of a 500kV "high tension" line tower, and I of course don't know if the area has any of those. Residential power lines, which I think they're suggesting that this was, are typically strung at 20-ish feet. NTSB will tie that observation it into a sequence of events better as the investigation continues. If nothing else, it might indicate trajectory.

Almost certainly just factual. The El Cajon substation is at the corner of W. Main and N. Johnson and is 69kV-12kV. It was all over when the lines were struck.

Thanks for the knowledgeable answer!

wjcandee wrote:

Most interesting to me about the NTSB Preliminary Report is the map that shows that the pilot asked for the lights to be turned up significantly-before they overflew the airport, when they were at an ADSB-reported altitude of 775 Feet MSL, the altitude they maintained while crossing the field. For some reason, I had it in my head that he asked for the lights to be turned up while they were on their upwind leg or maybe base leg, but in fact it was while they were still pretty-far from the field on the initial approach. In fact, all of the calls except the final one came geographically much further north of the airport than I expected, and I now am positive that that audio that we heard had the gaps of silence in it truncated.

The audio shared in the first post has definitely been cut significantly. It's around a minute, but the NTSB timestamps indicate about 2 minutes for the events recorded in the audio. The request to turn up the lights is a 1 minute, 38 seconds before the last ADS-B data point.

I assumed it had recorders, but looking at 91 and 135 rules, I think it’s too old and too small to be required.

Looking at the map of the timeline of events and comparing previous flight patterns of the same approach the pilots obviously flew this approach this time to close in which left no room for any errors and could not safely make the turn from base leg to final. The crew obviously knew the area and all of the landmarks so it makes me wonder why they didn't climb and break off the approach when they realized they turned downwind to close in even if it meant busting the rules to get back IFR or knowing the area why they just didn't find some way to widen there pattern a bit taking into consideration the obstacles etc. I've never been out that way when I visited San Diego but that airport certainly looks challenging even in VFR conditions. Now I want to post a link to a circling approach I just observed a Lear 60 make to Runway 17 here at Fort Worth Meacham from Alliance Town Center as it made me think of this accident as I was watching these pilots. Our weather here is cloudy so I could see this very well. Let me say the approach this crew made into Fort Worth a bit ago with a Lear 60 was a thing of beauty. These pilots made very flat wide turns with minimum bank angles.

https://flightaware.com/live/flight/HER ... /KPBI/KFTW

freakyrat wrote:

Looking at the map of the timeline of events and comparing previous flight patterns of the same approach the pilots obviously flew this approach this time to close in which left no room for any errors and could not safely make the turn from base leg to final. The crew obviously knew the area and all of the landmarks so it makes me wonder why they didn't climb and break off the approach when they realized they turned downwind to close in even if it meant busting the rules to get back IFR or knowing the area why they just didn't find some way to widen there pattern a bit taking into consideration the obstacles etc. I've never been out that way when I visited San Diego but that airport certainly looks challenging even in VFR conditions. Now I want to post a link to a circling approach I just observed a Lear 60 make to Runway 17 here at Fort Worth Meacham from Alliance Town Center as it made me think of this accident as I was watching these pilots. Our weather here is cloudy so I could see this very well. Let me say the approach this crew made into Fort Worth a bit ago with a Lear 60 was a thing of beauty. These pilots made very flat wide turns with minimum bank angles.

https://flightaware.com/live/flight/HER ... /KPBI/KFTW

Flying a traffic pattern != circling approach.

The Learjet you posted a link to entered on the downwind and flew a normal traffic pattern, it did not shoot a circling approach procedure.

SoCalPilot wrote:

freakyrat wrote:

Looking at the map of the timeline of events and comparing previous flight patterns of the same approach the pilots obviously flew this approach this time to close in which left no room for any errors and could not safely make the turn from base leg to final. The crew obviously knew the area and all of the landmarks so it makes me wonder why they didn't climb and break off the approach when they realized they turned downwind to close in even if it meant busting the rules to get back IFR or knowing the area why they just didn't find some way to widen there pattern a bit taking into consideration the obstacles etc. I've never been out that way when I visited San Diego but that airport certainly looks challenging even in VFR conditions. Now I want to post a link to a circling approach I just observed a Lear 60 make to Runway 17 here at Fort Worth Meacham from Alliance Town Center as it made me think of this accident as I was watching these pilots. Our weather here is cloudy so I could see this very well. Let me say the approach this crew made into Fort Worth a bit ago with a Lear 60 was a thing of beauty. These pilots made very flat wide turns with minimum bank angles.

https://flightaware.com/live/flight/HER ... /KPBI/KFTW

Flying a traffic pattern != circling approach.

The Learjet you posted a link to entered on the downwind and flew a normal traffic pattern, it did not shoot a circling approach procedure.

The reason I brought it up is to show a stabilized approach vs unstabilized. The Lear in my example could have easily came in from the west and circled over the field to make the same stabilized approach. It was just fun to watch. Here you have an airport Brown Field with a whole bunch of terrain obstacles where IFR circling approaches are not allowed and even VFR ones are difficult. It makes it difficult making the approach in a high performance jet at low altitude and challenging terrain at night with little margain for error.

Huge difference between a visual pattern on a VMC day over flat terrain and a night circling approach with terrain. A circling pattern requires 25-30 degree banked turns at low level. He could NOT have flown a circle with a pattern like you observed—would have either sight of runway or struck terrain.

Well under 1000' AGL in a Lear, maneuvering in marginal VFR at night is basically scud running a circling pattern in a jet. Seems like a recipe for what happened.

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

Huge difference between a visual pattern on a VMC day over flat terrain and a night circling approach with terrain. A circling pattern requires 25-30 degree banked turns at low level. He could NOT have flown a circle with a pattern like you observed—would have either sight of runway or struck terrain.

Yes that's why I brought it. What I observed with my Lear 60 were a set of nice shallow banked turns. They were definitely like and art form. The way the Lear at Gillespie made his downwind turn closer in as opposed to previous flights (Previous flights he flew a downwind further south) that he made the same approach with left him little room for error and ended up getting him in the coffin corner with the accident being the result. The airport there in San Diego (Gillespie) is just a challenge due to its location and the surrounding terrain.

Julian Jorge Bugaj was the first officer (FO) and pilot flying (PF) .

This is highly significant. Flying a left pattern from the right seat, in marginal VFR, at night is a recipe for disaster. He would have been attempting to fly a VFR pattern without being able to see the airport.

When MDW is landing on the 13's, the ILS to 4R, with a circle to 13C is flown. It is almost always done from right seat, for very good reason.

barney captain wrote:

Julian Jorge Bugaj was the first officer (FO) and pilot flying (PF) .

This is highly significant. Flying a left pattern from the right seat, in marginal VFR, at night is a recipe for disaster. He would have been attempting to fly a VFR pattern without being able to see the airport.

When MDW is landing on the 13's, the ILS to 4R, with a circle to 13C is flown. It is almost always done from right seat, for very good reason.

Probably the reason the downwind was too close in compared to previous ones.

barney captain wrote:

Julian Jorge Bugaj was the first officer (FO) and pilot flying (PF) .

This is highly significant. Flying a left pattern from the right seat, in marginal VFR, at night is a recipe for disaster. He would have been attempting to fly a VFR pattern without being able to see the airport.

When MDW is landing on the 13's, the ILS to 4R, with a circle to 13C is flown. It is almost always done from right seat, for very good reason.

You’re assuming he was in the right seat, likely, if the PF, he was in the left seat. Most 91/135 crews swap seats and are always in the left as PF. Probably not appropriate in this case, but that’s on the captain and company policy. At lots of operations, both pilots are highly experienced, fully type rated, and treated/paid as captains.

freakyrat wrote:

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

Huge difference between a visual pattern on a VMC day over flat terrain and a night circling approach with terrain. A circling pattern requires 25-30 degree banked turns at low level. He could NOT have flown a circle with a pattern like you observed—would have either sight of runway or struck terrain.

Yes that's why I brought it. What I observed with my Lear 60 were a set of nice shallow banked turns. They were definitely like and art form. The way the Lear at Gillespie made his downwind turn closer in as opposed to previous flights (Previous flights he flew a downwind further south) that he made the same approach with left him little room for error and ended up getting him in the coffin corner with the accident being the result. The airport there in San Diego (Gillespie) is just a challenge due to its location and the surrounding terrain.

What we don’t know is the weather, ceiling and visibility, on those earlier flights. If it was more like 1500-3-5SM, flying the wider pattern shown in the earlier ADS-B plots is correct and the cockpit view would be normal.. On the accident flight, we now can confirm they were far lower than circling minimums which creates an illusion—because if you at 500’ vs, 1,000’, the runway/airfield will appear higher in the windows, this illusion causes the pilot to try to put the view correct by flying closer to the runway. Plus, the limited visibility creates the desire to be close so not to lose sight of the field. These illusions add up to the track flown.

They weren’t in a coffin corner, they stalled. Coffin corner refers to high altitude flight where low speed buffet and Mach buffet become nearly the same IAS.

Looking at this YT video, the presenter has the weather on those earlier flights—VMC or at worst above circling minimums. Very different situation.
.

https://youtu.be/_FipwHxRcBI

What I meant is they were making a steep turn at low altitude at to slow of an airspeed and stalled.