Very simply you are not comparing Apples to Apples.
I'm not comparing apples to apples because it is not my intention to compare apples to apples (not everything in life is). As you could have understood from my earlier post, it is a possible sequence of decisions and events that identifies a possible vulnerability in Boeing strategy related to the 787 if they not sufficiently anticipate an ultrafan A350. Again you are forcing me to take the thread further off topic.
You are talking about a PIP and increasing the MTOW on 787 which may cost $1B in total and could be delivered in less than 5 years to a $15-20B program (Engine $10B, 3 custom length frames - $5-10B) that you may not be able to deliver in numbers until after 2032 - assuming everything goes well on an Engine that has a ton of new tech.
Okay, let's put this in some context. The 777x program for instance required:
- New engines ($2+ billion)
- New wing ($2 billion)
- 2 changed length's (simple stretches) and further development and initial certification cost ($1 billion)
Total was $5 billion which, has gone up to $6.5 billion apparently with all the certification drama).
In the market it provides a 400+ seat replacement with a sales expectation of 350.
Now let's look at what I'm proposing for the A350UF:
- New engines (granted more extensive development so more expensive then the GE9X but 10 billion instead of $2+ billion does not seem realistic). Let's give it $6 billion.
- No new wing,
- 3 changed length's (2 if you exclude the 850) which are also simple stretches and further development and certification cost: $2 billion.
- Possible development of a lighter "850"; $2 billion
So a total of ~$10 billion (remember the whole A350 up till now, with all it's weights and wing variants is estimated at $15 billion). What this provides in the market:
- In my view a total capture of any new sales in the 400+ market.
- A totally revamped and future (SAF) proofing of the A350.
- Protection of the A350 against new variants of the 787
- With a possible 265T "850" an answer to the 787-9 and a long term replacement for the A330NEO.
So if you compare what the $6.5 billion brought Boeing with the 777x program and what this potential $10 billion investment could provide for the A350 than yes I think that could be a very worthwhile investment. Also consider a small part of the difference is due to inflation.
If Airbus goes to that amount of investment - which they have no real reason to do so - why do you not think Boeing would as well?
If have already explained the reasons for Airbus to do so in the very post you quoted. If you think that line of thought is not valid than please engage in what was said and provide reasoning why it is not valid.
The reason why it would be difficult for Boeing to respond in a time frame sufficiently short that would not lead to significant 787 market share erosion would be because, as again already explained, 1) they would have already committed and introduced a PIP and 2) as Lightsaber has explained you don't just develop a widebody GTF on a whim, it takes years of development. If Airbus helps RR in financing (because they have even more to gain), they would want exclusivity (or at least a significant period of exclusivity) in return, preventing Boeing to just slap on ultrafan as a quick fix.
I want to further point out that I'm not attacking Boeing, as an outsider it is not even possible to know which scenario's they are looking at and which possible product enhancements they are actually considering. As someone interested in product strategy, I'm merely identifying a possible risk in Boeing's 787 strategy if they would commit to only a PIP. What I do often experience is that overzealous enthusiasts of either A or B are so defensive about any issue addressed about their favourite brand that a meaningful discussion is very difficult to have and quickly leads to threads going way off topic as is now again the case.
On the general notion that there will be no new widebody engines before 2035:
In 2018 Airbus was acquiring engineering workforce for work on the A350NEO. In the mean time we have had COVID, which indeed drastically reduced the market, but also permanently took out quite a bit of older WB metal. Also of course we have seen narrowbodies gaining capability, compromising the low end of the WB market. That said I find it very hard to believe that, considering the above, there would be a 17 year delay between Airbus starting to hire A350NEO workforce and an eventual introduction. Especially considering that the A350NEO part of the market would not be as affected by these new more capable narrowbodies.