ADent wrote:

WayexTDI wrote:

What if Boeing want to offer a factory-build 737 MAX F in the future?
Mandating some variants of the 737 MAX to have the old alerting system and some to have the new one will just create dissimilarities, and in the end create an environment more prone to pilot errors.

I would imagine they can do it as a STC - like converted freighters do today. Build an empty 737-8, fly it to another location, and convert it.

Has that ever happened for an aircraft OEM to release new planes under STC?

ADent wrote:

WayexTDI wrote:

What if Boeing want to offer a factory-build 737 MAX F in the future?
Mandating some variants of the 737 MAX to have the old alerting system and some to have the new one will just create dissimilarities, and in the end create an environment more prone to pilot errors.

I would imagine they can do it as a STC - like converted freighters do today. Build an empty 737-8, fly it to another location, and convert it.

Absolutely. Boeing could even do that. A new built 738-8F is not an option, but based on the number of 737-800s and typical utilization for a standard body freighter, that’s probably not worth the investment anyways.

Avatar2go wrote:

JerseyFlyer wrote:

Does the 7MAX have the same MCAS as the re-certified 8MAX, or does it not need it?

The MCAS system is the same, although the response parameter tables may be different due to the shorter distance between the aircraft CG and stabilizer on the MAX-7.

The purpose of MCAS is to comply with the regulations for column force gradient in a manual extreme climb or maneuver. MCAS ensures the pilot experiences consistent forces on the column. It's needed because of the larger engine nacelles that generate extra lift ahead of the CG, when rotated into the airflow during a climb. The extra lift ahead of the CG must be balanced by extra lift behind, which is provided by MCAS with the stabilizer. Thus unless the nacelles were smaller on the MAX-7, it would still need MCAS.

Thank you for the concise and clear explanation.

Thinking about the -7 certification, and that it appears to be taking quite a long time for the FAA, is it possible that the delay/reluctance has a lot to do with MCAS? Of course MCAS would receive a lot of scrutiny for very obvious reasons. But, thinking about how the aerodynamic impacts vary across the MAX variants, I imagine the distance from nacelle to CG is consistent across all the variants, and the extra lift would probably have the greatest tendency to push the nose up on the shortest variant of the family? If that reasoning stands up the -7 would be the variant most dependent upon MCAS to maintain level flight.

Bird80 wrote:

Thank you for the concise and clear explanation.

Thinking about the -7 certification, and that it appears to be taking quite a long time for the FAA, is it possible that the delay/reluctance has a lot to do with MCAS? Of course MCAS would receive a lot of scrutiny for very obvious reasons. But, thinking about how the aerodynamic impacts vary across the MAX variants, I imagine the distance from nacelle to CG is consistent across all the variants, and the extra lift would probably have the greatest tendency to push the nose up on the shortest variant of the family? If that reasoning stands up the -7 would be the variant most dependent upon MCAS to maintain level flight.

That was part of the justification for using a MAX-7 for the recertification flights, together with the fact that it was already instrumented for certification. But as mentioned, MCAS itself is the same, just the flight parameter table is different.

I must admit it is amazing how the narrative on the MAX7 goes, as in next to nothing. The a/c was a test bed for certification of the larger models, but the FAA is demanding more records for a later model and appear to not be working on the 7, even to the extent to talking to congress about getting more staff to complete certification of the MAX10 before end year. To garner support for more hires you would have thought they would complete the MAX 7 and say see.....
Even the media seems to be giving the delay of the 7 a pass, we have no leaks saying there is something wrong with the 7, no leaks saying Boeing does not want to produce, no leaks saying WN or the airlines no longer want, no leaks saying the a/c is a game changer so must be delayed, so in short, what we know of the MAX7 certification effort is next to nothing.
The last FAA head flew the a/c and then flew off into the sunset and the a/c he flew to say all was well and give his stamp of approval is still sitting. In the MAX 7 case I think the FAA needs to step up and clearly state what the problem is, idle speculation even by those who are supposed to be in the know is not good.

par13del wrote:

I must admit it is amazing how the narrative on the MAX7 goes, as in next to nothing. The a/c was a test bed for certification of the larger models, but the FAA is demanding more records for a later model and appear to not be working on the 7, even to the extent to talking to congress about getting more staff to complete certification of the MAX10 before end year. To garner support for more hires you would have thought they would complete the MAX 7 and say see.....
Even the media seems to be giving the delay of the 7 a pass, we have no leaks saying there is something wrong with the 7, no leaks saying Boeing does not want to produce, no leaks saying WN or the airlines no longer want, no leaks saying the a/c is a game changer so must be delayed, so in short, what we know of the MAX7 certification effort is next to nothing.
The last FAA head flew the a/c and then flew off into the sunset and the a/c he flew to say all was well and give his stamp of approval is still sitting. In the MAX 7 case I think the FAA needs to step up and clearly state what the problem is, idle speculation even by those who are supposed to be in the know is not good.

My guess would be that there is no actual issue with the aircraft itself, just time required for the enhanced review and documentation.

One thing to understand is that if the FAA requires a lot more from Boeing, as they apparently are now, then that extra time becomes doubled on the FAA side, in also reviewing it all. There'd be no point in the extra documentation if it wasn't examined carefully..

Avatar2go wrote:

par13del wrote:

I must admit it is amazing how the narrative on the MAX7 goes, as in next to nothing. The a/c was a test bed for certification of the larger models, but the FAA is demanding more records for a later model and appear to not be working on the 7, even to the extent to talking to congress about getting more staff to complete certification of the MAX10 before end year. To garner support for more hires you would have thought they would complete the MAX 7 and say see.....
Even the media seems to be giving the delay of the 7 a pass, we have no leaks saying there is something wrong with the 7, no leaks saying Boeing does not want to produce, no leaks saying WN or the airlines no longer want, no leaks saying the a/c is a game changer so must be delayed, so in short, what we know of the MAX7 certification effort is next to nothing.
The last FAA head flew the a/c and then flew off into the sunset and the a/c he flew to say all was well and give his stamp of approval is still sitting. In the MAX 7 case I think the FAA needs to step up and clearly state what the problem is, idle speculation even by those who are supposed to be in the know is not good.

My guess would be that there is no actual issue with the aircraft itself, just time required for the enhanced review and documentation.

One thing to understand is that if the FAA requires a lot more from Boeing, as they apparently are now, then that extra time becomes doubled on the FAA side, in also reviewing it all. There'd be no point in the extra documentation if it wasn't examined carefully..

Meh, there's no problem until there is. Once I learned that the MAX-7 was indeed the uncertified bird that got the 8 and 9 recertified and yet can't get itself certified... after flying... I don't know.... forever..... It's just really, really weird. Something is up. It was like this on the 777-x program where we heard absolutely nothing... and bam... years of delay. Something is up with the 7 and that has to be hurting the 10 as well... what I mean to say is there is very different criteria than the 8 and 9 and I suspect it's not going smoothly... Someone is unhappy with something.... If there was good news to share... Boeing would have mentioned it rather than remain silent while it's stock price fell sharply.

To add, within a few weeks of Boeing submitting documentation for the MAX10 the FAA was out announcing that items were missing, but they still have not completed reviewing the MAX7 documents to say what's missing? The things that make you go hhhmmmm....I guess they are ensuring the MAX7 is safer than the MAX8 / 9.

These are speculative comments, but there is no supporting fact. If FAA has not mentioned the MAX-7 and Boeing has said certification is expected imminently, there is no reason to believe otherwise. We also know that the FAA is taking longer and has asked for more documentation in general. So that too jives 100% with the reality we see. And of course we know that the MAX-7 was used to recertify the entire MAX family.

If the FAA states otherwise, I'd be willing to reconsider this view. But not without reason.

FiscAutTecGarte wrote:

I'm shocked... The system was verified on an uncertified lighter and shorter airframe (Max-7) and then just rubber stamped for the two other members of the family (Max-8 and Max-9) without having to specifically test them on those aircraft.

I have always understood that shorter frame is more sensitive to MCAS inputs than longer frames. If you balance a short stick at its mid-point on your finger it takes very little force to knock it off by pushing one of the sides down. The longer stick would be more 'stable' for the equivalent amount of force and wouldn't get knocked off balance.

Maybe I really need to see a shrink, but I kept watching test flights on FlightAware and all those insane maneuvers and tight turns they pulled off. The whole testing campaign was done on a -7 which was equipped with all the required sensors. I don't see anything rubber-stamped, but it bugs me that a frame that was beaten to death during tests is still not certified. Does a certification really need a million pages?

BEG2IAH wrote:

Maybe I really need to see a shrink, but I kept watching test flights on FlightAware and all those insane maneuvers and tight turns they pulled off. The whole testing campaign was done on a -7 which was equipped with all the required sensors. I don't see anything rubber-stamped, but it bugs me that a frame that was beaten to death during tests is still not certified. Does a certification really need a million pages?

The extreme wind-up turns were required to activate and test MCAS, as it isn't needed for normal flight. I think the present certification requirements are just the new reality, which the FAA feels it must do to assure safety, satisfy Congress, and re-establish respect and standing as enforcing a high standard.

The advantage in this for Boeing is that it will help them extend certification to other regulators around the world, if the FAA work is bulletproof. Last thing either of them needs is to certify in the US and then have that questioned elsewhere.

WayexTDI wrote:

Has that ever happened for an aircraft OEM to release new planes under STC?

The original Aviation Partners Boeing Blended Winglets for 737 were an add on (STC). Then an option. Then installed before delivery. Then integrated into production.

ADent wrote:

WayexTDI wrote:

Has that ever happened for an aircraft OEM to release new planes under STC?

The original Aviation Partners Boeing Blended Winglets for 737 were an add on (STC). Then an option. Then installed before delivery. Then integrated into production.

But were they installed on the production line using the STC, or was there an amendment to the TC?

BEG2IAH wrote:

FiscAutTecGarte wrote:

I'm shocked... The system was verified on an uncertified lighter and shorter airframe (Max-7) and then just rubber stamped for the two other members of the family (Max-8 and Max-9) without having to specifically test them on those aircraft.

I have always understood that shorter frame is more sensitive to MCAS inputs than longer frames. If you balance a short stick at its mid-point on your finger it takes very little force to knock it off by pushing one of the sides down. The longer stick would be more 'stable' for the equivalent amount of force and wouldn't get knocked off balance.

Maybe I really need to see a shrink, but I kept watching test flights on FlightAware and all those insane maneuvers and tight turns they pulled off. The whole testing campaign was done on a -7 which was equipped with all the required sensors. I don't see anything rubber-stamped, but it bugs me that a frame that was beaten to death during tests is still not certified. Does a certification really need a million pages?

A shorter aircraft would be less sensitive to equivalent control inputs due to the shorter moment arm, which is why the A318 and 737-600 have bigger vertical stabilizers. I’m sure the engineers tailor the MCAS response to the aircraft it is on so that MCAS activation feels roughly the same whether you’re flying a -7,-8, or-9.
The current certification delay is purely politics in my opinion.

orlandocfi wrote:

The current certification delay is purely politics in my opinion.

may very well be. if so, it isn't doing MAX 7 and MAX 10 customers any favors.

orlandocfi wrote:

BEG2IAH wrote:

FiscAutTecGarte wrote:

I'm shocked... The system was verified on an uncertified lighter and shorter airframe (Max-7) and then just rubber stamped for the two other members of the family (Max-8 and Max-9) without having to specifically test them on those aircraft.

I have always understood that shorter frame is more sensitive to MCAS inputs than longer frames. If you balance a short stick at its mid-point on your finger it takes very little force to knock it off by pushing one of the sides down. The longer stick would be more 'stable' for the equivalent amount of force and wouldn't get knocked off balance.

Maybe I really need to see a shrink, but I kept watching test flights on FlightAware and all those insane maneuvers and tight turns they pulled off. The whole testing campaign was done on a -7 which was equipped with all the required sensors. I don't see anything rubber-stamped, but it bugs me that a frame that was beaten to death during tests is still not certified. Does a certification really need a million pages?

A shorter aircraft would be less sensitive to equivalent control inputs due to the shorter moment arm, which is why the A318 and 737-600 have bigger vertical stabilizers. I’m sure the engineers tailor the MCAS response to the aircraft it is on so that MCAS activation feels roughly the same whether you’re flying a -7,-8, or-9.
The current certification delay is purely politics in my opinion.

Being sure that the right thing will be done is not a recognised quality process.

I’m not sure if this was brought up before. But Dominic Gates tells us previous MAX’s were exempted from what is currently required for “crew alerting systems”. The MAX 10 may not be exempted and any enhancement to the current system would take time and cost Boeing money.

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... ng-system/

MrBretz wrote:

I’m not sure if this was brought up before. But Dominic Gates tells us previous MAX’s were exempted from what is currently required for “crew alerting systems”. The MAX 10 may not be exempted and any enhancement to the current system would take time and cost Boeing money.

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... ng-system/

The MAX 10 if certified by December 31, 2022 it won’t have to have a new modern alerting system. Under current law if it’s later than that, they’ll have to meet the new requirements or beg congress for a change in the law.

Congress ought to extend the deadline for the 737-10 and 737-7. Everyone knows will be the last 737 derivative models. They are the same generation as the 737-8 and 737-9. I really don't see the problem. Both models were in the works before the horrible 737-8 crashes in in 2018 and 2019. There won't be any future new Boeing models after the 737-10 and the 737-7 that won't meet the new cockpit interface requirements. The is an arbitrary deadline and surely COVID-19 and the Ukraine war created havoc with all sorts of schedules. In December of 2020 there hopes that the the new mRNA vaccines by Pfizer and Moderna would quickly end the COVID-19 pandemic. Sadly they have not.

The “Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act” was part of the budget act in 2020 as part of a "lame duck session" after the 2020 elections but before the new congress was sworn in. Anyone familiar with how budget acts are passed in the US will understand that the details don't get the individual attention they deserve. At the time it was passed none of the 737 Max models were recertified and back in service. Now half of them are. I don't see how a failure by Congress to extend the deadline could not become an issue in the congressional elections this year. I know the "Civil Aviation Forum" is not the place to discuss politics, but I don't really see how politics can be disentangled from the law that created the deadline which apparently will be missed. Boeing is the largest exporting company in the US economy. The 737 is it's biggest selling product. Certification of the -10 and -7 would be adding two more models of the same generation of 737 which have the same type rating and were in the works prior the crashes that prompted the legislation.

https://www.avweb.com/aviation-news/con ... ility-act/

flyingclrs727 wrote:

Congress ought to extend the deadline for the 737-10 and 737-7. Everyone knows will be the last 737 derivative models. They are the same generation as the 737-8 and 737-9. I really don't see the problem. Both models were in the works before the horrible 737-8 crashes in in 2018 and 2019. There won't be any future new Boeing models after the 737-10 and the 737-7 that won't meet the new cockpit interface requirements. The is an arbitrary deadline and surely COVID-19 and the Ukraine war created havoc with all sorts of schedules. In December of 2020 there hopes that the the new mRNA vaccines by Pfizer and Moderna would quickly end the COVID-19 pandemic. Sadly they have not.

The “Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act” was part of the budget act in 2020 as part of a "lame duck session" after the 2020 elections but before the new congress was sworn in. Anyone familiar with how budget acts are passed in the US will understand that the details don't get the individual attention they deserve. At the time it was passed none of the 737 Max models were recertified and back in service. Now half of them are. I don't see how a failure by Congress to extend the deadline could not become an issue in the congressional elections this year. I know the "Civil Aviation Forum" is not the place to discuss politics, but I don't really see how politics can be disentangled from the law that created the deadline which apparently will be missed. Boeing is the largest exporting company in the US economy. The 737 is it's biggest selling product. Certification of the -10 and -7 would be adding two more models of the same generation of 737 which have the same type rating and were in the works prior the crashes that prompted the legislation.

https://www.avweb.com/aviation-news/con ... ility-act/

Why should boeing get bailed out of the mess they created?

dstblj52 wrote:

flyingclrs727 wrote:

Congress ought to extend the deadline for the 737-10 and 737-7. Everyone knows will be the last 737 derivative models. They are the same generation as the 737-8 and 737-9. I really don't see the problem. Both models were in the works before the horrible 737-8 crashes in in 2018 and 2019. There won't be any future new Boeing models after the 737-10 and the 737-7 that won't meet the new cockpit interface requirements. The is an arbitrary deadline and surely COVID-19 and the Ukraine war created havoc with all sorts of schedules. In December of 2020 there hopes that the the new mRNA vaccines by Pfizer and Moderna would quickly end the COVID-19 pandemic. Sadly they have not.

The “Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act” was part of the budget act in 2020 as part of a "lame duck session" after the 2020 elections but before the new congress was sworn in. Anyone familiar with how budget acts are passed in the US will understand that the details don't get the individual attention they deserve. At the time it was passed none of the 737 Max models were recertified and back in service. Now half of them are. I don't see how a failure by Congress to extend the deadline could not become an issue in the congressional elections this year. I know the "Civil Aviation Forum" is not the place to discuss politics, but I don't really see how politics can be disentangled from the law that created the deadline which apparently will be missed. Boeing is the largest exporting company in the US economy. The 737 is it's biggest selling product. Certification of the -10 and -7 would be adding two more models of the same generation of 737 which have the same type rating and were in the works prior the crashes that prompted the legislation.

https://www.avweb.com/aviation-news/con ... ility-act/

Why should boeing get bailed out of the mess they created?

Congress also created this mess. They have underfunded and understaffed the FAA. They imposed an artificial deadline for getting the 737 Max 7 and 10 certified with the same cockpit as the the Max 8 and 9. There is a really good chance that the chair of the committee that passed the bill and opposes any changes will not be the chair in 2023. Perhaps other members will want to reconsider the deadline.

flyingclrs727 wrote:

Congress also created this mess. They have underfunded and understaffed the FAA. They imposed an artificial deadline for getting the 737 Max 7 and 10 certified with the same cockpit as the the Max 8 and 9. There is a really good chance that the chair of the committee that passed the bill and opposes any changes will not be the chair in 2023. Perhaps other members will want to reconsider the deadline.

Arguably the changes congress wanted are not new they have been around for a long time, the idea of this bill was to put a line in the sand.

The changes required may have stopped the max crashes, and if a subsequent crash happens it will not good got the government.

There really is no excuse for this to not have been address on all MAX aircraft, the requirement has been around for a long time.

zeke wrote:

flyingclrs727 wrote:

Congress also created this mess. They have underfunded and understaffed the FAA. They imposed an artificial deadline for getting the 737 Max 7 and 10 certified with the same cockpit as the the Max 8 and 9. There is a really good chance that the chair of the committee that passed the bill and opposes any changes will not be the chair in 2023. Perhaps other members will want to reconsider the deadline.

Arguably the changes congress wanted are not new they have been around for a long time, the idea of this bill was to put a line in the sand.

The changes required may have stopped the max crashes, and if a subsequent crash happens it will not good got the government.

There really is no excuse for this to not have been address on all MAX aircraft, the requirement has been around for a long time.

This law wasn’t even being talked about when the MAX was launched back in 2011, the NG didn’t have it and has not needed it so why would Boeing spend a large amount of money to add it to the MAX and lose commonality? Makes no sense.

flyingclrs727 wrote:

dstblj52 wrote:

flyingclrs727 wrote:

Congress ought to extend the deadline for the 737-10 and 737-7. Everyone knows will be the last 737 derivative models. They are the same generation as the 737-8 and 737-9. I really don't see the problem. Both models were in the works before the horrible 737-8 crashes in in 2018 and 2019. There won't be any future new Boeing models after the 737-10 and the 737-7 that won't meet the new cockpit interface requirements. The is an arbitrary deadline and surely COVID-19 and the Ukraine war created havoc with all sorts of schedules. In December of 2020 there hopes that the the new mRNA vaccines by Pfizer and Moderna would quickly end the COVID-19 pandemic. Sadly they have not.

The “Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act” was part of the budget act in 2020 as part of a "lame duck session" after the 2020 elections but before the new congress was sworn in. Anyone familiar with how budget acts are passed in the US will understand that the details don't get the individual attention they deserve. At the time it was passed none of the 737 Max models were recertified and back in service. Now half of them are. I don't see how a failure by Congress to extend the deadline could not become an issue in the congressional elections this year. I know the "Civil Aviation Forum" is not the place to discuss politics, but I don't really see how politics can be disentangled from the law that created the deadline which apparently will be missed. Boeing is the largest exporting company in the US economy. The 737 is it's biggest selling product. Certification of the -10 and -7 would be adding two more models of the same generation of 737 which have the same type rating and were in the works prior the crashes that prompted the legislation.

https://www.avweb.com/aviation-news/con ... ility-act/

Why should boeing get bailed out of the mess they created?

Congress also created this mess. They have underfunded and understaffed the FAA. They imposed an artificial deadline for getting the 737 Max 7 and 10 certified with the same cockpit as the the Max 8 and 9. There is a really good chance that the chair of the committee that passed the bill and opposes any changes will not be the chair in 2023. Perhaps other members will want to reconsider the deadline.

Deadlines by definition are artificial.

ikolkyo wrote:

This law wasn’t even being talked about when the MAX was launched back in 2011, the NG didn’t have it and has not needed it so why would Boeing spend a large amount of money to add it to the MAX and lose commonality? Makes no sense.

Isn’t is a standard safety feature required under the FARs for a long time, maybe 20 years ?

zeke wrote:

ikolkyo wrote:

This law wasn’t even being talked about when the MAX was launched back in 2011, the NG didn’t have it and has not needed it so why would Boeing spend a large amount of money to add it to the MAX and lose commonality? Makes no sense.

Isn’t is a standard safety feature required under the FARs for a long time, maybe 20 years ?

Gonna assume you’re speaking about EICAS and I’m honestly not sure about that. All I know is Boeing should have added it to the 737NG back in the 90s, that’s where they truly screwed up. They would have been better off going clean sheet than adding it to the MAX.

flyingclrs727 wrote:

Congress also created this mess. They have underfunded and understaffed the FAA. They imposed an artificial deadline for getting the 737 Max 7 and 10 certified with the same cockpit as the the Max 8 and 9. There is a really good chance that the chair of the committee that passed the bill and opposes any changes will not be the chair in 2023. Perhaps other members will want to reconsider the deadline.

I don’t want to dive too deeply into politics here, but congress cutting the FAA’s budget and limiting its ability for oversight was almost certainly done at Boeings request or at the very least to help them get an aircraft quickly and cheaply certified. This is very much Boeings mess, and they should be made to clean it up.

They should have to either get the Max10 certified by the of the year or bring it up to modern standards, and by modern I mean to at least the same standard as the 40 year old CAS system fitted to the 757! That’s what’s crazy here, the systems which are required to bring the Max into compliance have been fitted by Boeing themselves to other aircraft for over 4 decades.

If congress and the FAA want to show to the public that they now serious about putting safety before profits, they need to ensure Boeing comply with the law as its written. It clearly states in the report that the absence of a CAS played a role in both of the Max incidents and as I stated above Boeing have had the ability to implement such a system for 40 years, but chose not too to save a buck.

Daysleeper wrote:

flyingclrs727 wrote:

Congress also created this mess. They have underfunded and understaffed the FAA. They imposed an artificial deadline for getting the 737 Max 7 and 10 certified with the same cockpit as the the Max 8 and 9. There is a really good chance that the chair of the committee that passed the bill and opposes any changes will not be the chair in 2023. Perhaps other members will want to reconsider the deadline.

I don’t want to dive too deeply into politics here, but congress cutting the FAA’s budget and limiting its ability for oversight was almost certainly done at Boeings request or at the very least to help them get an aircraft quickly and cheaply certified. This is very much Boeings mess, and they should be made to clean it up.

Limiting oversight- definitely.

Cutting budget? Eh. The reality is before the Max put the spotlight on the FAA it was a political easy area to cut budget to fund other things. Most people don’t care that much about the FAA as it typically has little effect on their day to day lives. With US airlines (and Boeing up to the Max) having a good safety track record that further made people take the FAA for granted. I doubt Boeing was behind any major push to cut their budget.

IMO Boeing just should have added EICAS to the MAX & they knew. IMO Boeing just should have added EICAS to the NG & they knew.
But they had enough cloud, power, work around safety track records to have FAA exempt / allow it.

After the MAX crashes it became clear the 737 Crew Alert system again worked against the crew instead of helping it during emergency situations. Now again avoiding decent, modern EICAS by hiding behind flawed safety track records/ abusing changed product rule (it was the pilots), trying to blame FAA, congress, anyone is another indication of a safety culture unfit for duty.

keesje wrote:

IMO Boeing just should have added EICAS to the MAX & they knew. IMO Boeing just should have added EICAS to the NG & they knew.
But they had enough cloud, power, work around safety track records to have FAA exempt / allow it.

After the MAX crashes it became clear the 737 Crew Alert system again worked against the crew instead of helping it during emergency situations. Now again avoiding decent, modern EICAS by hiding behind flawed safety track records/ abusing changed product rule (it was the pilots), trying to blame FAA, congress, anyone is another indication of a safety culture unfit for duty.

They could have added it at additional expense and loss of commonality, which is contrary to what the airlines wanted (as far as I have read). And to be fair, prior to the MAX, 737s were not falling out of the sky due to the lack of EICAS. Just my view on it. I also think the MAX fiasco was more about poor execution and implantation of MCAS than anything else. Sure they were chasing the all mighty dollar, which probably lead to them being blinded to the trap that MCAS caused.

Polot wrote:

Limiting oversight- definitely.

Cutting budget? Eh. The reality is before the Max put the spotlight on the FAA it was a political easy area to cut budget to fund other things. Most people don’t care that much about the FAA as it typically has little effect on their day to day lives. With US airlines (and Boeing up to the Max) having a good safety track record that further made people take the FAA for granted. I doubt Boeing was behind any major push to cut their budget.

Fair point, I doubt Boeing actually lobbied for congress to cut the FAA budget – but cutting the budget of an agency seems to be the method favoured by politicians to make it infective, thereby allowing them to make changes to how it operates.

We have seen various administrations use this method to attack to other agencies such as the IRS; resulting in them being unable to perform complex audits and enforce the law. I have no doubt that a similar technique was used upon the FAA and once it became clear that they no longer had the resources to oversee a certification, Boeing were only too happy to do the work for them.

I stand by what I said initially. This is very much a Boeing created shit show, and they should be forced to clean it up.

Daysleeper wrote:

Polot wrote:

Limiting oversight- definitely.

Cutting budget? Eh. The reality is before the Max put the spotlight on the FAA it was a political easy area to cut budget to fund other things. Most people don’t care that much about the FAA as it typically has little effect on their day to day lives. With US airlines (and Boeing up to the Max) having a good safety track record that further made people take the FAA for granted. I doubt Boeing was behind any major push to cut their budget.

Fair point, I doubt Boeing actually lobbied for congress to cut the FAA budget – but cutting the budget of an agency seems to be the method favoured by politicians to make it infective, thereby allowing them to make changes to how it operates.

We have seen various administrations use this method to attack to other agencies such as the IRS; resulting in them being unable to perform complex audits and enforce the law. I have no doubt that a similar technique was used upon the FAA and once it became clear that they no longer had the resources to oversee a certification, Boeing were only too happy to do the work for them.

I stand by what I said initially. This is very much a Boeing created shit show, and they should be forced to clean it up.

How much more punishment does Boeing and its employees deserve before you’ve feel they’ve paid for the mistakes on the MAX?

Boeing spent billions making changes the FAA, EASA and other regulators required to return the MAX to service, including changes to crew alerting. Presumably these changes meant the aircraft met the regulator’s standards for safe operations.

Congress made a political decision to require a specific feature on aircraft certified after a certain date. I think it’s important for the FAA to opine on whether EICAS would make the MAX 10 safer, or if introducing significant differences to the 737 family would be counterproductive.

Boeing was clear that adding EICAS is not simple and would require a $10 billion investment. Boeing doesn’t have that money and I think maintaining a politically-imposed deadline without any confirmation it improves safety would lead to the cancellation of the MAX 10 program (and MAX 7 if the FAA hasn’t certified by that date) and probably push Boeing out of the narrowbody market altogether. While that might make some people feel good that, Boeing paid or was forced to clean up the situation, it would be counterproductive and bit overkill for not adjusting a deadline by a few months.

Vicenza wrote:

bpatus297 wrote:

They could have added it at additional expense and loss of commonality, which is contrary to what the airlines wanted (as far as I have read)

.

Only one airline in particular, and a scenario in which no manufacturer (of anything) should have allowed itself to be dictated to by one customer.

I can almost guarantee you that *every* customer worldwide with a sizable NG fleet was demanding cockpit commonality with the MAX. It is practically the only remaining selling point of this dinosaur aircraft. It just so happens that WN was quite vocal about it, and I’m sure they may come to regret that.

Vicenza wrote:

bpatus297 wrote:

They could have added it at additional expense and loss of commonality, which is contrary to what the airlines wanted (as far as I have read)

.

Only one airline in particular, and a scenario in which no manufacturer (of anything) should have allowed itself to be dictated to by one customer.

I get that WN had a huge say in the Max, but I would wager a bet that other airlines were queried and weighed in too.

Vicenza wrote:

sxf24 wrote:

How much more punishment does Boeing and its employees deserve before you’ve feel they’ve paid for the mistakes on the MAX?

As much as it takes for them to demonstrate that they have changed their culture of greed and money first, and for which 345 innocent people paid with their lives, and for which they still try every way to deny responsibility for (because that would cost them money!). Pushing things under the carpet, and make excuses, is no way to deal with fundamental problems.

What does that demonstration look like?

Boeing accepted broad responsibility for the ET accident (https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/10/busi ... iopia.html). I know this wasn’t enough for Dominic Gates and Samaya Stumo’s family, but I’m not sure what else Boeing is supposed to say or do to make them satisfied except cancelling the MAX, which removes the livelihood for the hundreds of thousands of non-executive employees and suppliers.

sxf24 wrote:

Vicenza wrote:

sxf24 wrote:

How much more punishment does Boeing and its employees deserve before you’ve feel they’ve paid for the mistakes on the MAX?

As much as it takes for them to demonstrate that they have changed their culture of greed and money first, and for which 345 innocent people paid with their lives, and for which they still try every way to deny responsibility for (because that would cost them money!). Pushing things under the carpet, and make excuses, is no way to deal with fundamental problems.

What does that demonstration look like?

Boeing accepted broad responsibility for the ET accident (https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/10/busi ... iopia.html). I know this wasn’t enough for Dominic Gates and Samaya Stumo’s family, but I’m not sure what else Boeing is supposed to say or do to make them satisfied except cancelling the MAX, which removes the livelihood for the hundreds of thousands of non-executive employees and suppliers.

Get a decent IECAS on the 737, like on the 757. Instead of desperately looking for weasel reasons not to. Like hundreds of experts have told them for decades.
https://simpleflying.com/boeing-737-max ... ign-urged/

keesje wrote:

sxf24 wrote:

Vicenza wrote:

As much as it takes for them to demonstrate that they have changed their culture of greed and money first, and for which 345 innocent people paid with their lives, and for which they still try every way to deny responsibility for (because that would cost them money!). Pushing things under the carpet, and make excuses, is no way to deal with fundamental problems.

What does that demonstration look like?

Boeing accepted broad responsibility for the ET accident (https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/10/busi ... iopia.html). I know this wasn’t enough for Dominic Gates and Samaya Stumo’s family, but I’m not sure what else Boeing is supposed to say or do to make them satisfied except cancelling the MAX, which removes the livelihood for the hundreds of thousands of non-executive employees and suppliers.

Get a decent IECAS on the 737, like on the 757. Instead of desperately looking for weasel reasons not to. Like hundreds of experts have told them for decades.
https://simpleflying.com/boeing-737-max ... ign-urged/

It’s easy to drop provocative statements and headlines into a thread. It’s a lot harder to explain to how introduce substantial differences mid-program without impacting other airplane systems and creating additional risks, particularly when the FAA and EASA found the crew alerting changes to the MAX 8 and 9 were appropriate.

Boeing should not be given another get out of jail free card for the MAX disaster. They made poor choices using a 1960's airplane with minimal safety features on it. IF they are unable to meet the deadline let the plane either not be produced or have a separate pilot group for it. When the goal posts keep moving it is crazy.

sxf24 wrote:

How much more punishment does Boeing and its employees deserve before you’ve feel they’ve paid for the mistakes on the MAX?

Boeing spent billions making changes the FAA, EASA and other regulators required to return the MAX to service, including changes to crew alerting. Presumably these changes meant the aircraft met the regulator’s standards for safe operations.

I don’t see any of this as punishment for a mistake. I see it having to deal with the consequences of corporate greed, putting short term financial gains over long term viability and ultimately safety, and human life.

The 737 should have been replaced a long time ago, and Boeing knew this, but the dumpster fire which was (and still is, to some extent) the 787 program put an end to the yellow stone project and any hope of seeing the Boeing return to what they were known and loved for; engineering excellence and innovation.

All of Boeings current problems are entirely of their own making and most likely linked to their efforts to cut costs no matter the consequences.

sxf24 wrote:

Congress made a political decision to require a specific feature on aircraft certified after a certain date. I think it’s important for the FAA to opine on whether EICAS would make the MAX 10 safer, or if introducing significant differences to the 737 family would be counterproductive.

Boeing was clear that adding EICAS is not simple and would require a $10 billion investment. Boeing doesn’t have that money and I think maintaining a politically-imposed deadline without any confirmation it improves safety would lead to the cancellation of the MAX 10 program (and MAX 7 if the FAA hasn’t certified by that date) and probably push Boeing out of the narrowbody market altogether. While that might make some people feel good that, Boeing paid or was forced to clean up the situation, it would be counterproductive and bit overkill for not adjusting a deadline by a few months.

The political aspect of the decision congress made was to help Boeing by allowing them time to get all versions of the Max certified before it came into effect. EICAS improves safety, which is why every other commercial aircraft in production has such a system. In fact, the report referenced in the Seattle Times article states that the lack of such a system played a role in both of the Max’s accidents, so I’m not sure how you can come to the conclusion that adding it to the Max10 will make it more dangerous.

Polot wrote:

Daysleeper wrote:

flyingclrs727 wrote:

Congress also created this mess. They have underfunded and understaffed the FAA. They imposed an artificial deadline for getting the 737 Max 7 and 10 certified with the same cockpit as the the Max 8 and 9. There is a really good chance that the chair of the committee that passed the bill and opposes any changes will not be the chair in 2023. Perhaps other members will want to reconsider the deadline.

I don’t want to dive too deeply into politics here, but congress cutting the FAA’s budget and limiting its ability for oversight was almost certainly done at Boeings request or at the very least to help them get an aircraft quickly and cheaply certified. This is very much Boeings mess, and they should be made to clean it up.

Limiting oversight- definitely.

Cutting budget? Eh. The reality is before the Max put the spotlight on the FAA it was a political easy area to cut budget to fund other things. Most people don’t care that much about the FAA as it typically has little effect on their day to day lives. With US airlines (and Boeing up to the Max) having a good safety track record that further made people take the FAA for granted. I doubt Boeing was behind any major push to cut their budget.

The FAA budget for certification should be paid for out of user fees from manufacturers rather than general revenues.

bpatus297 wrote:

keesje wrote:

IMO Boeing just should have added EICAS to the MAX & they knew. IMO Boeing just should have added EICAS to the NG & they knew.
But they had enough cloud, power, work around safety track records to have FAA exempt / allow it.

After the MAX crashes it became clear the 737 Crew Alert system again worked against the crew instead of helping it during emergency situations. Now again avoiding decent, modern EICAS by hiding behind flawed safety track records/ abusing changed product rule (it was the pilots), trying to blame FAA, congress, anyone is another indication of a safety culture unfit for duty.

They could have added it at additional expense and loss of commonality, which is contrary to what the airlines wanted (as far as I have read). And to be fair, prior to the MAX, 737s were not falling out of the sky due to the lack of EICAS. Just my view on it. I also think the MAX fiasco was more about poor execution and implantation of MCAS than anything else. Sure they were chasing the all mighty dollar, which probably lead to them being blinded to the trap that MCAS caused.

Wasnt the MCAS fiasco caused by Boeing not asking for a Waiver as they did for the 757/767 ?

Etheereal wrote:

bpatus297 wrote:

keesje wrote:

IMO Boeing just should have added EICAS to the MAX & they knew. IMO Boeing just should have added EICAS to the NG & they knew.
But they had enough cloud, power, work around safety track records to have FAA exempt / allow it.

After the MAX crashes it became clear the 737 Crew Alert system again worked against the crew instead of helping it during emergency situations. Now again avoiding decent, modern EICAS by hiding behind flawed safety track records/ abusing changed product rule (it was the pilots), trying to blame FAA, congress, anyone is another indication of a safety culture unfit for duty.

They could have added it at additional expense and loss of commonality, which is contrary to what the airlines wanted (as far as I have read). And to be fair, prior to the MAX, 737s were not falling out of the sky due to the lack of EICAS. Just my view on it. I also think the MAX fiasco was more about poor execution and implantation of MCAS than anything else. Sure they were chasing the all mighty dollar, which probably lead to them being blinded to the trap that MCAS caused.

Wasnt the MCAS fiasco caused by Boeing not asking for a Waiver as they did for the 757/767 ?

As I understand, it was to make the Max "behave" or "feel" like and NG for certification and training purposes, i.e. commonalty.

NLINK wrote:

Boeing should not be given another get out of jail free card for the MAX disaster. They made poor choices using a 1960's airplane with minimal safety features on it. IF they are unable to meet the deadline let the plane either not be produced or have a separate pilot group for it. When the goal posts keep moving it is crazy.

The FAA, EASA and other regulators found the safety features on the MAX 8 and 9 to be sufficient and allowed the airplanes to return to service. Why would this configuration suddenly become unsafe on January 1, 2023?

Daysleeper wrote:

sxf24 wrote:

How much more punishment does Boeing and its employees deserve before you’ve feel they’ve paid for the mistakes on the MAX?

Boeing spent billions making changes the FAA, EASA and other regulators required to return the MAX to service, including changes to crew alerting. Presumably these changes meant the aircraft met the regulator’s standards for safe operations.

I don’t see any of this as punishment for a mistake. I see it having to deal with the consequences of corporate greed, putting short term financial gains over long term viability and ultimately safety, and human life.

The 737 should have been replaced a long time ago, and Boeing knew this, but the dumpster fire which was (and still is, to some extent) the 787 program put an end to the yellow stone project and any hope of seeing the Boeing return to what they were known and loved for; engineering excellence and innovation.

All of Boeings current problems are entirely of their own making and most likely linked to their efforts to cut costs no matter the consequences.

What do you think is an appropriate punishment, and what is the basis for instituting an extrajudicial punishment on a company?

Daysleeper wrote:

sxf24 wrote:

Congress made a political decision to require a specific feature on aircraft certified after a certain date. I think it’s important for the FAA to opine on whether EICAS would make the MAX 10 safer, or if introducing significant differences to the 737 family would be counterproductive.

Boeing was clear that adding EICAS is not simple and would require a $10 billion investment. Boeing doesn’t have that money and I think maintaining a politically-imposed deadline without any confirmation it improves safety would lead to the cancellation of the MAX 10 program (and MAX 7 if the FAA hasn’t certified by that date) and probably push Boeing out of the narrowbody market altogether. While that might make some people feel good that, Boeing paid or was forced to clean up the situation, it would be counterproductive and bit overkill for not adjusting a deadline by a few months.

The political aspect of the decision congress made was to help Boeing by allowing them time to get all versions of the Max certified before it came into effect. EICAS improves safety, which is why every other commercial aircraft in production has such a system. In fact, the report referenced in the Seattle Times article states that the lack of such a system played a role in both of the Max’s accidents, so I’m not sure how you can come to the conclusion that adding it to the Max10 will make it more dangerous.

The question is whether changing the MAX 10, and potentially other models, to incorporate EICAS results in other changes that could impact safety. An airplane is a system and as we saw during the MAX grounding, making a small change in one area can have an unintended ripple effect. I think the intent of congress for the MAX to retain the existing configuration

I think the FAA needs to provide feedback on whether it makes sense, from a practical and safety standpoint, to require changes to the MAX, I think that is justified.

Avatar2go wrote:

BEG2IAH wrote:

Maybe I really need to see a shrink, but I kept watching test flights on FlightAware and all those insane maneuvers and tight turns they pulled off. The whole testing campaign was done on a -7 which was equipped with all the required sensors. I don't see anything rubber-stamped, but it bugs me that a frame that was beaten to death during tests is still not certified. Does a certification really need a million pages?

The extreme wind-up turns were required to activate and test MCAS, as it isn't needed for normal flight. I think the present certification requirements are just the new reality, which the FAA feels it must do to assure safety, satisfy Congress, and re-establish respect and standing as enforcing a high standard.

The advantage in this for Boeing is that it will help them extend certification to other regulators around the world, if the FAA work is bulletproof. Last thing either of them needs is to certify in the US and then have that questioned elsewhere.

Other regulators are seeing documentation, and commenting right now, under the 'no surprises' agreement between the FAA and JATR representatives.

bpatus297 wrote:

Etheereal wrote:

bpatus297 wrote:

They could have added it at additional expense and loss of commonality, which is contrary to what the airlines wanted (as far as I have read). And to be fair, prior to the MAX, 737s were not falling out of the sky due to the lack of EICAS. Just my view on it. I also think the MAX fiasco was more about poor execution and implantation of MCAS than anything else. Sure they were chasing the all mighty dollar, which probably lead to them being blinded to the trap that MCAS caused.

Wasnt the MCAS fiasco caused by Boeing not asking for a Waiver as they did for the 757/767 ?

As I understand, it was to make the Max "behave" or "feel" like and NG for certification and training purposes, i.e. commonalty.

I believe it was to meet a FAR requirement that the control pressure required must increase in wind up turns.

NLINK wrote:

Boeing should not be given another get out of jail free card for the MAX disaster. They made poor choices using a 1960's airplane with minimal safety features on it. IF they are unable to meet the deadline let the plane either not be produced or have a separate pilot group for it. When the goal posts keep moving it is crazy.

Ironically it was a safety feature that Boeing added to the MAX that caused the crashes. Without MCAS those crashes never happen and all Boeing needed was to train pilots to remain aware of their attitude during takeoff.

sxf24 wrote:

NLINK wrote:

Boeing should not be given another get out of jail free card for the MAX disaster. They made poor choices using a 1960's airplane with minimal safety features on it. IF they are unable to meet the deadline let the plane either not be produced or have a separate pilot group for it. When the goal posts keep moving it is crazy.

It's a new variant of the airplane that is longer, heavier and has a different landing gear than the MAX8 and 9. There has to be an end somewhere to force Boeing to design a modern airplane or exit the business. This is the reason Boeing is in the mess now because this and WN. To many variants have been allowed under the original type certification.

flyingclrs727 wrote:

Polot wrote:

Daysleeper wrote:

I don’t want to dive too deeply into politics here, but congress cutting the FAA’s budget and limiting its ability for oversight was almost certainly done at Boeings request or at the very least to help them get an aircraft quickly and cheaply certified. This is very much Boeings mess, and they should be made to clean it up.

Limiting oversight- definitely.

Cutting budget? Eh. The reality is before the Max put the spotlight on the FAA it was a political easy area to cut budget to fund other things. Most people don’t care that much about the FAA as it typically has little effect on their day to day lives. With US airlines (and Boeing up to the Max) having a good safety track record that further made people take the FAA for granted. I doubt Boeing was behind any major push to cut their budget.

The FAA budget for certification should be paid for out of user fees from manufacturers rather than general revenues.

I am not sure that would mitigate corruption. If your department, and you and your friends pay and pension, is funded by Boeing then you start to favor Boeing.