tautliner wrote:

AVHerald , Simon has updated his views on the cabin video.

At first I was not aware of any other version of that passenger video thinking there was only one (my) version around that was clearly fake, therefore profoundly apologize for inadvertently including that credible video in my fake rating.

Martin320NM wrote:

seb76 wrote:

I don't understand all this discussion/fight about the video, fake or not ...
...the information that can be extracted from this snuff movie is likely of little use ...

The movie shows that up until about five seconds before the crash:
1. There was no structural failure nor engine outage with the aircraft;
2. There was no terrorist action in the cabin;
3. There were flaps extended (from the footage an expert can determine whether that was full flaps or partial);
4. The aircraft was turning very late to make that 90 degree turn onto the new airport runway. Had they initiated the turn earlier they would likely have made it with no issue;
5. But we don't know what why the pilots didn't turn earlier and why they were going so slow. We don't know what they were saying or doing at the time.

enzo011 wrote:

Martin320NM wrote:

seb76 wrote:

I don't understand all this discussion/fight about the video, fake or not ...
Did we not get most of that information already from the video from someone on the ground?

mzlin wrote:

If I understand the non-spoken implications of having to make a slow hard turn later than they should have, with functioning engines, as described above, this is looking to be similar to the C17 and B-52 low speed stalls on banking:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Alas ... C-17_crash
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1994_Fair ... B-52_crash

Avatar2go wrote:

aeromoe wrote:

Sound logic yet people still think/insist the earth is flat and endlessly discuss it. Human nature to insist they state their own opinion for the record.

Insistence by either side, this early in the investigation, is the root of the controversy. There is still a great deal we don't know, so it's wise to allow for the possibility of more information coming to light, as it surely will.

Eventually we will have an explanation that accounts for all the evidence, both confirming and non-confirming. That is how certainty is established. It's not established by insistence.

CLESpotter95 wrote:

747megatop wrote:

mzlin wrote:

And if you've ever been to Asia, you'd know their LTE coverage is much better than in the US.

But this is a tiresome topic, really, and a major distraction

Born and raised in an Asian country, lived in and visited other parts of the world. Nice try. Have some solid scientific fact based reasoning other than trying to judge where I have been or not been? (and ah, btw, I will extend the courtesy of not judging where you have been or where you haven't....appreciate if you could extend others the same courtesy).

BTW here is an article to back up my claim and disagree with your reasoning about low enough for LTE - https://kathmandupost.com/money/2019/12 ... l-way-down

Let it go. The video has been verified as authentic by multiple reputable sources. Unless you personally have detailed knowledge of Nepal's cell phone network and coverage in this specific area your argument is a non starter. Every other factor points to it being legitimate.

I have forgotten to put my phone into airplane mode before and had cell service on approach. Given the plane was very low and traveling at low speed it's not unimaginable he could have had a connection. Unless you have actual evidence there wouldn't be service there and not just conjecture based on your anecdotal experiences, I don't see a reason to believe otherwise.

mzlin wrote:

At least one commentator has raised the possibility that the pilots may have gotten confused about where they should be landing:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c-wcFTQCEmI

An intention to land at old Pokhara Airport (VPNK) would explain why the flight path was straight inline with that runway, and also low, slow, and nose-up (as the commentator noted, see 2:13 in the video).

Hard to believe both pilots would make that mistake, although could have been one was distracted and didn't notice the other's mistake until quite late. If that's the case, then a sudden intention to bank left to change course for the new airport, when starting at a low speed, may have initiated a banking stall, where the left wing would have lost lift first.

Clearly the CVR will be informative.

BoeingVista wrote:

the incident aircraft followed the same track to VNPR until we lose it about 5km from the threshold, at what point in the approach were they advised to use Runway 12? \.

F9Animal wrote:

I have done a live Facebook video in the air before, and it definitely got choppy and stopped for a few seconds here and there. I noticed I could go live in certain areas below 3,000 feet, and in more populated areas. I'm gonna stick with it being legit.

Any updates on the CVR? I think it was being flown to France? Any updates from the airline?

zeke wrote:

BoeingVista wrote:

the incident aircraft followed the same track to VNPR until we lose it about 5km from the threshold, at what point in the approach were they advised to use Runway 12? \.

That is a pretty much a text book reversal to an opposite end approach, at 1500 ft (3nm/5lm); turn right 45 degrees intercept the downwind track and flying visually to the opposite end,

zeke wrote:

F9Animal wrote:

I have done a live Facebook video in the air before, and it definitely got choppy and stopped for a few seconds here and there. I noticed I could go live in certain areas below 3,000 feet, and in more populated areas. I'm gonna stick with it being legit.

Any updates on the CVR? I think it was being flown to France? Any updates from the airline?

I assume this was done in the US where the aircraft had WIFI and the aircraft had a purpose built stable link to the ground, not a direct connection between your phone to cell towers on the ground. Been told cell networks dont like phone moving in and out of the cell tower footprint through a network of towers at the speed aircraft fly.

As the crash happened near the old airport, and near a hospital, I would assume the cell tower density in the area was higher.

I would assume both FDR that have been recovered will be sent to France, however they could easily end up in Singapore or Australia which have the technical capability tp read them out. Whoever reads them out would make a report back t the local authority, and it up to them what information gets released.

usxguy wrote:

based on the posts about cell service & proof - i'm wondering if my post with a map showing the cell tower with 4G LTE service was deleted? But there's decent 4G LTE coverage in Pokhara.

F9Animal wrote:

zeke wrote:

F9Animal wrote:

Any updates on the CVR? I think it was being flown to France? Any updates from the airline?

...

I would assume both FDR that have been recovered will be sent to France, however they could easily end up in Singapore or Australia which have the technical capability tp read them out. Whoever reads them out would make a report back t the local authority, and it up to them what information gets released.

The FDR was sent to France, the the CVR will be reviewed locally. I finally found an article on how that will happen. I was actually in a less populated area when doing the helicopter trip.

AngMoh wrote:

This article states both the FDR and CVR will be sent to Singapore this Friday. There was an MOU signed in 2020 relating to support for aircraft incident and accident investigations.

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapo ... al-3233576

zeke wrote:

AngMoh wrote:

This article states both the FDR and CVR will be sent to Singapore this Friday. There was an MOU signed in 2020 relating to support for aircraft incident and accident investigations.

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapo ... al-3233576

Singapore is a very primitive colony (if you dare to challenge the leader you were sent to prison), I did mention that the articles may be sent to Australia or Singapore for retrieval as they possess the technical capability, however I am of the belief that CAAS lack the ability to actually think through the data and to understand the reasons.

I have Singaporean PR, I have no issue with the day to day Singaporean person, just the local political machine that can manufacture any result.

Caleo wrote:

Nepalese investigators have released preliminary findings that both engines were feathered on approach to Pokhara.

https://twitter.com/aviationsafety/stat ... VRYNNJW9Ew

pugman211 wrote:

You could hear some sort of metal gear crunching in the videos. I wonder if the aircraft auto feathered the faulty engine ( am I right in thinking that happens on this type?) and cockpit crew mistakenly feathered the other engine.

Couple that with slow speed, high pitch and in a turn, things went south very quickly.

D L X wrote:

pugman211 wrote:

You could hear some sort of metal gear crunching in the videos. I wonder if the aircraft auto feathered the faulty engine ( am I right in thinking that happens on this type?) and cockpit crew mistakenly feathered the other engine.

Couple that with slow speed, high pitch and in a turn, things went south very quickly.

So, isn't that almost exactly what happened in the Taiwanese crash?

pugman211 wrote:

You could hear some sort of metal gear crunching in the videos. I wonder if the aircraft auto feathered the faulty engine ( am I right in thinking that happens on this type?) and cockpit crew mistakenly feathered the other engine.

Couple that with slow speed, high pitch and in a turn, things went south very quickly.

TWA302 wrote:

D L X wrote:

pugman211 wrote:

You could hear some sort of metal gear crunching in the videos. I wonder if the aircraft auto feathered the faulty engine ( am I right in thinking that happens on this type?) and cockpit crew mistakenly feathered the other engine.

Couple that with slow speed, high pitch and in a turn, things went south very quickly.

So, isn't that almost exactly what happened in the Taiwanese crash?

TransAsia 235 had an engine issue and the flight crew shut down the operating engine by accident. This sounds very similar. Documentary on it. https://www.facebook.com/aircrashinvestigationsmayday/videos/caught-on-tape-transasia-airways-flight-235/3941911492541170/

AirlineCritic wrote:

Wow. Unbelievable…

On 15 January 2023, an ATR 72-212A was operating scheduled flights between Kathmandu (VNKT) and Pokhara International Airport (VNPR). The same flight crew operated two sectors between VNKT to VNPR and VNPR to VNKT earlier in the morning. The accident occurred during a visual approach for runway 12 at VNPR. This was the third flight by the crew members on that day. The flight was operated by two Captains, one Captain was in the process of obtaining aerodrome familarization for operating into Pokhara and the other Captain being the instructor pilot. The Captain being familarized, who was occupying the left hand seat, was the Pilot Flying (PF) and the instructor pilot, occupying the right hand seat, was the Pilot Monitoring (PM).

The take-off, climb, cruise and descent to Pokhara was normal. During the first contact with Pokhara tower the Air Traffic Controller (ATC) assigned the runway 30 to land. But during the later phases of flight crew requested and received clearance from ATC to land on Runway 12.

At 10:51:36, the aircraft descended (from 6,500 feet at five miles away from VNPR and joined the downwind track for Runway 12 to the north of the runway. The aircraft was visually identified by ATC during the approach. At 10:56:12, the pilots extended the flaps to the 15 degrees position and selected the landing gears lever to the down position. The take-off (TO) setting was selected on power management panel.

At 10:56:27, the PF disengaged the Autopilot System (AP) at an altitude of 721 feet Above Ground Level (AGL). The PF then called for “FLAPS 30” at 10:56:32, and the PM replied, “Flaps 30 and descending”. The flight data recorder (FDR) data did not record any flap surface movement at that time. Instead, the propeller rotation speed (Np) of both engines decreased simultaneously to less than 25%1 and the torque (Tq) started decreasing to 0%, which is consistent with both propellers going into the feathered condition. On the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) area microphone recording, a single Master Caution chime was recorded at 10:56:36. The flight crew then carried out the “Before Landing Checklist” before starting the left turn onto the base leg. During that time, the power lever angle increased from 41% to 44%. At the point, Np of both propellers were recorded as Non-Computed Data (NCD) in the FDR and the torque (Tq) of both engines were at 0%. When propellers are in feather, they are not producing thrust.

When both propellers were feathered, the investigation team observed that both engines of 9N-ANC were running flight idle condition during the event flight to prevent over torque. As per the FDR data, all the recorded parameters related to engines did not show any anomaly. At 10:56:50 when the radio altitude callout for five hundred feet3 was annunciated, another “click” sound was heard. The aircraft reached a maximum bank angle of 30 degrees at this altitude. The recorded Np and Tq data remained invalid. The yaw damper disconnected four seconds later. The PF consulted the PM on whether to continue the left turn and the PM replied to continue the turn. Subsequently, the PF asked the PM on whether to continue descend and the PM responded it was not necessary and instructed to apply a little power. At 10:56:54, another click was heard, followed by the flaps surface movement to the 30 degrees position.

When ATC gave the clearance for landing at 10:57:07, the PF mentioned twice that there was no power coming from the engines. At 10:57:11, the power levers were advanced first to 62 degrees then to the maximum power position. It was followed by a “click” sound at 10:57:16. One second after the “click” sound, the aircraft was at the initiation of its last turn at 368 feet AGL, the highpressure turbine speed (Nh) of both engines increased from 73% to 77%.

It is noted that the PF handed over control of the aircraft to the PM at 10:57:18. At 10:57:20, the PM (who was previously the PF) repeated again that there was no power from the engines. At 10:57:24 when the aircraft was at 311 feet AGL, the stick shaker was activated warning the crew that the aircraft Angle of Attack (AoA) increased up to the stick shaker threshold.

At 10:57:26, a second sequence of stick shaker warning was activated when the aircraft banked towards the left abruptly. Thereafter, the radio altitude alert for two hundred feet was annunciated, and the cricket sound and stick shaker ceased. At 10:57:32, sound of impact was heard in the CVR. The FDR and CVR stopped recording at 10:57:33 and 10:57:35 respectively.

The PF then called for “FLAPS 30” at 10:56:32, and the PM replied, “Flaps 30 and descending”. The flight data recorder (FDR) data did not record any flap surface movement at that time. Instead, the propeller rotation speed (Np) of both engines decreased simultaneously to less than 25%1 and the torque (Tq) started decreasing to 0%, which is consistent with both propellers going into the feathered condition.

ikolkyo wrote:

Latest update on the investigation

On 15 January 2023, an ATR 72-212A was operating scheduled flights between Kathmandu (VNKT) and Pokhara International Airport (VNPR). The same flight crew operated two sectors between VNKT to VNPR and VNPR to VNKT earlier in the morning. The accident occurred during a visual approach for runway 12 at VNPR. This was the third flight by the crew members on that day. The flight was operated by two Captains, one Captain was in the process of obtaining aerodrome familarization for operating into Pokhara and the other Captain being the instructor pilot. The Captain being familarized, who was occupying the left hand seat, was the Pilot Flying (PF) and the instructor pilot, occupying the right hand seat, was the Pilot Monitoring (PM).

The take-off, climb, cruise and descent to Pokhara was normal. During the first contact with Pokhara tower the Air Traffic Controller (ATC) assigned the runway 30 to land. But during the later phases of flight crew requested and received clearance from ATC to land on Runway 12.

At 10:51:36, the aircraft descended (from 6,500 feet at five miles away from VNPR and joined the downwind track for Runway 12 to the north of the runway. The aircraft was visually identified by ATC during the approach. At 10:56:12, the pilots extended the flaps to the 15 degrees position and selected the landing gears lever to the down position. The take-off (TO) setting was selected on power management panel.

At 10:56:27, the PF disengaged the Autopilot System (AP) at an altitude of 721 feet Above Ground Level (AGL). The PF then called for “FLAPS 30” at 10:56:32, and the PM replied, “Flaps 30 and descending”. The flight data recorder (FDR) data did not record any flap surface movement at that time. Instead, the propeller rotation speed (Np) of both engines decreased simultaneously to less than 25%1 and the torque (Tq) started decreasing to 0%, which is consistent with both propellers going into the feathered condition. On the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) area microphone recording, a single Master Caution chime was recorded at 10:56:36. The flight crew then carried out the “Before Landing Checklist” before starting the left turn onto the base leg. During that time, the power lever angle increased from 41% to 44%. At the point, Np of both propellers were recorded as Non-Computed Data (NCD) in the FDR and the torque (Tq) of both engines were at 0%. When propellers are in feather, they are not producing thrust.

When both propellers were feathered, the investigation team observed that both engines of 9N-ANC were running flight idle condition during the event flight to prevent over torque. As per the FDR data, all the recorded parameters related to engines did not show any anomaly. At 10:56:50 when the radio altitude callout for five hundred feet3 was annunciated, another “click” sound was heard. The aircraft reached a maximum bank angle of 30 degrees at this altitude. The recorded Np and Tq data remained invalid. The yaw damper disconnected four seconds later. The PF consulted the PM on whether to continue the left turn and the PM replied to continue the turn. Subsequently, the PF asked the PM on whether to continue descend and the PM responded it was not necessary and instructed to apply a little power. At 10:56:54, another click was heard, followed by the flaps surface movement to the 30 degrees position.

When ATC gave the clearance for landing at 10:57:07, the PF mentioned twice that there was no power coming from the engines. At 10:57:11, the power levers were advanced first to 62 degrees then to the maximum power position. It was followed by a “click” sound at 10:57:16. One second after the “click” sound, the aircraft was at the initiation of its last turn at 368 feet AGL, the highpressure turbine speed (Nh) of both engines increased from 73% to 77%.

It is noted that the PF handed over control of the aircraft to the PM at 10:57:18. At 10:57:20, the PM (who was previously the PF) repeated again that there was no power from the engines. At 10:57:24 when the aircraft was at 311 feet AGL, the stick shaker was activated warning the crew that the aircraft Angle of Attack (AoA) increased up to the stick shaker threshold.

At 10:57:26, a second sequence of stick shaker warning was activated when the aircraft banked towards the left abruptly. Thereafter, the radio altitude alert for two hundred feet was annunciated, and the cricket sound and stick shaker ceased. At 10:57:32, sound of impact was heard in the CVR. The FDR and CVR stopped recording at 10:57:33 and 10:57:35 respectively.

https://avherald.com/h?article=503c63e9&opt=0


This is starting to paint an incredibly sad situation here.

N14AZ wrote:

ikolkyo wrote:

Latest update on the investigation

On 15 January 2023, an ATR 72-212A was operating scheduled flights between Kathmandu (VNKT) and Pokhara International Airport (VNPR). The same flight crew operated two sectors between VNKT to VNPR and VNPR to VNKT earlier in the morning. The accident occurred during a visual approach for runway 12 at VNPR. This was the third flight by the crew members on that day. The flight was operated by two Captains, one Captain was in the process of obtaining aerodrome familarization for operating into Pokhara and the other Captain being the instructor pilot. The Captain being familarized, who was occupying the left hand seat, was the Pilot Flying (PF) and the instructor pilot, occupying the right hand seat, was the Pilot Monitoring (PM).

The take-off, climb, cruise and descent to Pokhara was normal. During the first contact with Pokhara tower the Air Traffic Controller (ATC) assigned the runway 30 to land. But during the later phases of flight crew requested and received clearance from ATC to land on Runway 12.

At 10:51:36, the aircraft descended (from 6,500 feet at five miles away from VNPR and joined the downwind track for Runway 12 to the north of the runway. The aircraft was visually identified by ATC during the approach. At 10:56:12, the pilots extended the flaps to the 15 degrees position and selected the landing gears lever to the down position. The take-off (TO) setting was selected on power management panel.

At 10:56:27, the PF disengaged the Autopilot System (AP) at an altitude of 721 feet Above Ground Level (AGL). The PF then called for “FLAPS 30” at 10:56:32, and the PM replied, “Flaps 30 and descending”. The flight data recorder (FDR) data did not record any flap surface movement at that time. Instead, the propeller rotation speed (Np) of both engines decreased simultaneously to less than 25%1 and the torque (Tq) started decreasing to 0%, which is consistent with both propellers going into the feathered condition. On the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) area microphone recording, a single Master Caution chime was recorded at 10:56:36. The flight crew then carried out the “Before Landing Checklist” before starting the left turn onto the base leg. During that time, the power lever angle increased from 41% to 44%. At the point, Np of both propellers were recorded as Non-Computed Data (NCD) in the FDR and the torque (Tq) of both engines were at 0%. When propellers are in feather, they are not producing thrust.

When both propellers were feathered, the investigation team observed that both engines of 9N-ANC were running flight idle condition during the event flight to prevent over torque. As per the FDR data, all the recorded parameters related to engines did not show any anomaly. At 10:56:50 when the radio altitude callout for five hundred feet3 was annunciated, another “click” sound was heard. The aircraft reached a maximum bank angle of 30 degrees at this altitude. The recorded Np and Tq data remained invalid. The yaw damper disconnected four seconds later. The PF consulted the PM on whether to continue the left turn and the PM replied to continue the turn. Subsequently, the PF asked the PM on whether to continue descend and the PM responded it was not necessary and instructed to apply a little power. At 10:56:54, another click was heard, followed by the flaps surface movement to the 30 degrees position.

When ATC gave the clearance for landing at 10:57:07, the PF mentioned twice that there was no power coming from the engines. At 10:57:11, the power levers were advanced first to 62 degrees then to the maximum power position. It was followed by a “click” sound at 10:57:16. One second after the “click” sound, the aircraft was at the initiation of its last turn at 368 feet AGL, the highpressure turbine speed (Nh) of both engines increased from 73% to 77%.

It is noted that the PF handed over control of the aircraft to the PM at 10:57:18. At 10:57:20, the PM (who was previously the PF) repeated again that there was no power from the engines. At 10:57:24 when the aircraft was at 311 feet AGL, the stick shaker was activated warning the crew that the aircraft Angle of Attack (AoA) increased up to the stick shaker threshold.

At 10:57:26, a second sequence of stick shaker warning was activated when the aircraft banked towards the left abruptly. Thereafter, the radio altitude alert for two hundred feet was annunciated, and the cricket sound and stick shaker ceased. At 10:57:32, sound of impact was heard in the CVR. The FDR and CVR stopped recording at 10:57:33 and 10:57:35 respectively.

https://avherald.com/h?article=503c63e9&opt=0


This is starting to paint an incredibly sad situation here.

I am not a pilot, that’s why I am missing a conclusion here. So did they feather the propellers in stead of setting the flaps? Any clarification would be great, thank you.

Noshow wrote:

Wouldn't they constantly monitor speed and everything? Mixing up things has happened but wouldn't the pilot flying catch it and wonder where the power is at low speed before a stall?

conaly wrote:

This is how the pedestal looks like in an ATR (this one is from the ATR42, therefore the has 4 flap-settings, the ATR72 has only 0, 15 and 30°).
That would actually be plausible: they accidentally pulled the Condition Levers from AUTO to FTR instead of the Flap Lever from 15 to 30...

However, as far as I remember, you need to unlock the Condition Levers by pulling the small levers below the handles to move them at all.

Noshow wrote:

Wouldn't every pilot lower the nose and try to glide to the next field, which they were even very close to at this moment? Confusion can happen, mistakes can happen but wouldn't the pilot flying not permanently focus on speed during an approach? How can low speed be missed?

Noshow wrote:

Wouldn't every pilot lower the nose and try to glide to the next field, which they were even very close to at this moment? Confusion can happen, mistakes can happen but wouldn't the pilot flying not permanently focus on speed during an approach? How can low speed be missed?

conaly wrote:

This is how the pedestal looks like in an ATR (this one is from the ATR42, therefore the has 4 flap-settings, the ATR72 has only 0, 15 and 30°).
That would actually be plausible: they accidentally pulled the Condition Levers from AUTO to FTR instead of the Flap Lever from 15 to 30...

However, as far as I remember, you need to unlock the Condition Levers by pulling the small levers below the handles to move them at all.

majano wrote:

As a layman, could I ask those in the know. What is the purpose of feathering the engine? In other words, why is this condition a necessary option in the controls? Is it purely economic?
Would an aural confirmation assist with this type of inadvertent selection? Or could such a confirmation have assisted the pilots in this case to realise why they were not getting power from the engines?

1.8.4 From the retrieved FDR data, the investigation team was able to recover the flight path of the event flight and another flight on 12 Jan 23, where another set of crew landed on Runway 12 of VNPR.

1.8.5 Due to the shortened final approach leg for runway 12, in both the flight the stabilization criteria for a visual approach could not be stabilized at the height of 500ft AGL