Moderators: richierich, ua900, PanAm_DC10, hOMSaR
Also, for NZ ZQN provides no connecting opportunity with the rest of New Zealand (unlike AKL/WLG/CHC). Plus NZ is struggling to maintain their capacity at the other international ports.
NZ516 wrote:Also, for NZ ZQN provides no connecting opportunity with the rest of New Zealand (unlike AKL/WLG/CHC). Plus NZ is struggling to maintain their capacity at the other international ports.
Actually ZQN does gets transit pax for their international flights from CHC, WLG etc . Some days the afternoon ZQN departures to Australia have a lot especially when the existing CHC to Aust afternoon flights have been sold out.
NZ516 wrote:Also, for NZ ZQN provides no connecting opportunity with the rest of New Zealand (unlike AKL/WLG/CHC). Plus NZ is struggling to maintain their capacity at the other international ports.
Actually ZQN does gets transit pax for their international flights from CHC, WLG etc . Some days the afternoon ZQN departures to Australia have a lot especially when the existing CHC to Aust afternoon flights have been sold out.
a7ala wrote:NZ516 wrote:Also, for NZ ZQN provides no connecting opportunity with the rest of New Zealand (unlike AKL/WLG/CHC). Plus NZ is struggling to maintain their capacity at the other international ports.
Actually ZQN does gets transit pax for their international flights from CHC, WLG etc . Some days the afternoon ZQN departures to Australia have a lot especially when the existing CHC to Aust afternoon flights have been sold out.
They only have flights from AKL/WLG/CHC so limits transfers (I presume you are talking transfers not transits), and ZQN's location in completely the wrong place for connectivity. Around 5% of their resident travel market is from Wellington/Canterbury, and I suspect some of that will have had a few days in ZQN before flying international anyway (so not real transfers).
seat1a wrote:Curious about any more information on Pacifika? Not sure that's the correct spelling, thought they used a K. They had a plan to fly Pacific islands.
Koruman23 wrote:I would be interested in a discussion about the future Air New Zeland international network.
In the pre-Covid era, Air NZ chose to take an idiosyncratic and ultimately unique approach to international network planning.
1. They essentially bailed out of most routes which entailed significant competition.
2. They focused on monopoly and pseudo-monopoly routes wherever possible, forming anti-competitive alliances to Australia, New Caledonia, Tahiti, Singapore and Hong Kong which were arguably highly fortunate to obtain regulatory approval.
3. They operated an unusually high percentage of government-underwritten routes (Auckland to Norfolk Island, Brisbane to Norfolk Island, Auckland to Niue, Sydney to Rarotonga, Los Angeles to Rarotonga). These routes combined a lack of risk (due to government underwriting) with a monopoly market position.
4. They carried their Shanghai route through a decade and a half of losses for reasons of market development, in spite of revealing in their own financial statements that it made a loss every year except for one.
5. They converted their short-haul narrowbody international network to all-economy, a decision which was not followed by Qantas or Virgin Australia or SilkAir or Aircalin or Fiji Airways, and was only shared with Jetstar in this region.
6. They closed AKL-HKG-LHR and AKL-LAX-LHR and AKL-PPT-LAX on the basis that one-stop tickets are unprofitable. While failing to see the irony that their new Chicago, Houston and Newark routes had virtually no O+D market, and were reliant upon the airline purchasing domestic sectors on United Airlines in order to sell tickets. And again, this Air NZ "No one-stop services" dogma was never adopted by the legacy American airlines (which all run hub-and-spoke models), or by Singapore Airlines and Emirates (both of which sell more than 80% of their tickets on one-stop services). And in the case of Qantas, they rolled out PER-LHR, PER-CDG and AKL-JFK services which were actually entirely based upon feed from SYD, MEL and BNE to sell one-stop tickets.
In isolation, Air NZ's route decisions were unusual and quirky. In combination they led to the airline forging a uniquely different direction, in which it eschewed almost all competition and focused on exploiting market monopolies. In effect, the direction taken allowed for modest profits but made the airline a hostage to if and when other carriers chose to enter the market and compete. And the model of terminating European services half-way and selling onward sectors on a different carrier actually meant that the only airline with whom Air New Zealand shared a business model was Air Calin, which is a highly unusual model for an airline to choose to emulate.
So where next?
JJWess wrote:Koruman23 wrote:I would be interested in a discussion about the future Air New Zeland international network.
In the pre-Covid era, Air NZ chose to take an idiosyncratic and ultimately unique approach to international network planning.
1. They essentially bailed out of most routes which entailed significant competition.
2. They focused on monopoly and pseudo-monopoly routes wherever possible, forming anti-competitive alliances to Australia, New Caledonia, Tahiti, Singapore and Hong Kong which were arguably highly fortunate to obtain regulatory approval.
3. They operated an unusually high percentage of government-underwritten routes (Auckland to Norfolk Island, Brisbane to Norfolk Island, Auckland to Niue, Sydney to Rarotonga, Los Angeles to Rarotonga). These routes combined a lack of risk (due to government underwriting) with a monopoly market position.
4. They carried their Shanghai route through a decade and a half of losses for reasons of market development, in spite of revealing in their own financial statements that it made a loss every year except for one.
5. They converted their short-haul narrowbody international network to all-economy, a decision which was not followed by Qantas or Virgin Australia or SilkAir or Aircalin or Fiji Airways, and was only shared with Jetstar in this region.
6. They closed AKL-HKG-LHR and AKL-LAX-LHR and AKL-PPT-LAX on the basis that one-stop tickets are unprofitable. While failing to see the irony that their new Chicago, Houston and Newark routes had virtually no O+D market, and were reliant upon the airline purchasing domestic sectors on United Airlines in order to sell tickets. And again, this Air NZ "No one-stop services" dogma was never adopted by the legacy American airlines (which all run hub-and-spoke models), or by Singapore Airlines and Emirates (both of which sell more than 80% of their tickets on one-stop services). And in the case of Qantas, they rolled out PER-LHR, PER-CDG and AKL-JFK services which were actually entirely based upon feed from SYD, MEL and BNE to sell one-stop tickets.
In isolation, Air NZ's route decisions were unusual and quirky. In combination they led to the airline forging a uniquely different direction, in which it eschewed almost all competition and focused on exploiting market monopolies. In effect, the direction taken allowed for modest profits but made the airline a hostage to if and when other carriers chose to enter the market and compete. And the model of terminating European services half-way and selling onward sectors on a different carrier actually meant that the only airline with whom Air New Zealand shared a business model was Air Calin, which is a highly unusual model for an airline to choose to emulate.
So where next?
IAH I can understand as having very limited O&D… but Chicago and most notably, New York? One of the most iconic and largest metropolitan cities on the planet and you would argue that there’s no O&D traffic to New York? There’s so much tourism + business travel and even VFR traffic between NY and oceania.
That aside, I think NZ has found their North America network to work well for them. So going forward, I can only see them strengthen it. Perhaps not with any new routes though, but definitely frequency increases. I think if they were to introduce any new cities, it’d be YYZ, potentially followed by IAD (UAL Hub) and maybe, just maybe, Seattle.
Singapore seems to be where they concentrate most of their Asia traffic. Contradictory to your comment on NZ’s anti-one-stop trips, I actually think Singapore for NZ forms a notable hub for them to filter passengers on to places like India, China and even onward to Europe if necessary. NZ have definitely pulled out of operating one-stop trips on their own metal - but with limited capacity and slack in their fleet, perhaps it’s for the best.
The only black hole in their network is South America. At least with Europe you can very easily be routed via SIN or north America, but South America is sorely missing on their route map. Well that and South Africa…
Koruman23 wrote:I would be interested in a discussion about the future Air New Zeland international network.
In the pre-Covid era, Air NZ chose to take an idiosyncratic and ultimately unique approach to international network planning.
1. They essentially bailed out of most routes which entailed significant competition.
2. They focused on monopoly and pseudo-monopoly routes wherever possible, forming anti-competitive alliances to Australia, New Caledonia, Tahiti, Singapore and Hong Kong which were arguably highly fortunate to obtain regulatory approval.
3. They operated an unusually high percentage of government-underwritten routes (Auckland to Norfolk Island, Brisbane to Norfolk Island, Auckland to Niue, Sydney to Rarotonga, Los Angeles to Rarotonga). These routes combined a lack of risk (due to government underwriting) with a monopoly market position.
4. They carried their Shanghai route through a decade and a half of losses for reasons of market development, in spite of revealing in their own financial statements that it made a loss every year except for one.
5. They converted their short-haul narrowbody international network to all-economy, a decision which was not followed by Qantas or Virgin Australia or SilkAir or Aircalin or Fiji Airways, and was only shared with Jetstar in this region.
6. They closed AKL-HKG-LHR and AKL-LAX-LHR and AKL-PPT-LAX on the basis that one-stop tickets are unprofitable. While failing to see the irony that their new Chicago, Houston and Newark routes had virtually no O+D market, and were reliant upon the airline purchasing domestic sectors on United Airlines in order to sell tickets. And again, this Air NZ "No one-stop services" dogma was never adopted by the legacy American airlines (which all run hub-and-spoke models), or by Singapore Airlines and Emirates (both of which sell more than 80% of their tickets on one-stop services). And in the case of Qantas, they rolled out PER-LHR, PER-CDG and AKL-JFK services which were actually entirely based upon feed from SYD, MEL and BNE to sell one-stop tickets.
In isolation, Air NZ's route decisions were unusual and quirky. In combination they led to the airline forging a uniquely different direction, in which it eschewed almost all competition and focused on exploiting market monopolies. In effect, the direction taken allowed for modest profits but made the airline a hostage to if and when other carriers chose to enter the market and compete. And the model of terminating European services half-way and selling onward sectors on a different carrier actually meant that the only airline with whom Air New Zealand shared a business model was Air Calin, which is a highly unusual model for an airline to choose to emulate.
So where next?
Koruman23 wrote:JJWess wrote:Koruman23 wrote:I would be interested in a discussion about the future Air New Zeland international network.
In the pre-Covid era, Air NZ chose to take an idiosyncratic and ultimately unique approach to international network planning.
1. They essentially bailed out of most routes which entailed significant competition.
2. They focused on monopoly and pseudo-monopoly routes wherever possible, forming anti-competitive alliances to Australia, New Caledonia, Tahiti, Singapore and Hong Kong which were arguably highly fortunate to obtain regulatory approval.
3. They operated an unusually high percentage of government-underwritten routes (Auckland to Norfolk Island, Brisbane to Norfolk Island, Auckland to Niue, Sydney to Rarotonga, Los Angeles to Rarotonga). These routes combined a lack of risk (due to government underwriting) with a monopoly market position.
4. They carried their Shanghai route through a decade and a half of losses for reasons of market development, in spite of revealing in their own financial statements that it made a loss every year except for one.
5. They converted their short-haul narrowbody international network to all-economy, a decision which was not followed by Qantas or Virgin Australia or SilkAir or Aircalin or Fiji Airways, and was only shared with Jetstar in this region.
6. They closed AKL-HKG-LHR and AKL-LAX-LHR and AKL-PPT-LAX on the basis that one-stop tickets are unprofitable. While failing to see the irony that their new Chicago, Houston and Newark routes had virtually no O+D market, and were reliant upon the airline purchasing domestic sectors on United Airlines in order to sell tickets. And again, this Air NZ "No one-stop services" dogma was never adopted by the legacy American airlines (which all run hub-and-spoke models), or by Singapore Airlines and Emirates (both of which sell more than 80% of their tickets on one-stop services). And in the case of Qantas, they rolled out PER-LHR, PER-CDG and AKL-JFK services which were actually entirely based upon feed from SYD, MEL and BNE to sell one-stop tickets.
In isolation, Air NZ's route decisions were unusual and quirky. In combination they led to the airline forging a uniquely different direction, in which it eschewed almost all competition and focused on exploiting market monopolies. In effect, the direction taken allowed for modest profits but made the airline a hostage to if and when other carriers chose to enter the market and compete. And the model of terminating European services half-way and selling onward sectors on a different carrier actually meant that the only airline with whom Air New Zealand shared a business model was Air Calin, which is a highly unusual model for an airline to choose to emulate.
So where next?
IAH I can understand as having very limited O&D… but Chicago and most notably, New York? One of the most iconic and largest metropolitan cities on the planet and you would argue that there’s no O&D traffic to New York? There’s so much tourism + business travel and even VFR traffic between NY and oceania.
That aside, I think NZ has found their North America network to work well for them. So going forward, I can only see them strengthen it. Perhaps not with any new routes though, but definitely frequency increases. I think if they were to introduce any new cities, it’d be YYZ, potentially followed by IAD (UAL Hub) and maybe, just maybe, Seattle.
Singapore seems to be where they concentrate most of their Asia traffic. Contradictory to your comment on NZ’s anti-one-stop trips, I actually think Singapore for NZ forms a notable hub for them to filter passengers on to places like India, China and even onward to Europe if necessary. NZ have definitely pulled out of operating one-stop trips on their own metal - but with limited capacity and slack in their fleet, perhaps it’s for the best.
The only black hole in their network is South America. At least with Europe you can very easily be routed via SIN or north America, but South America is sorely missing on their route map. Well that and South Africa…
With respect, I am arguing about the ORD-NZ and NYC-NZ markets, rather than about the global significance of Chicago and New York.
Basically the entire North America to NZ market used to fit on one daily Air NZ and one daily Qantas 744 - and that included a lot of onward traffic to/from Australia.
When Qantas and United withdrew, Air NZ eventually increased to 2 daily 77Ws serving LAX (one of which also carried onward traffic to London) and one daily 77W to SFO.
Either way, the entire North America to NZ market has never been shown to exceed around 1000 seats per day, the vast majority of which are for US West Coast traffic.
So the Chicago, Houston and Newark routes all require the market to/from the South, the Midwest and the Northeast of the USA to be grown rapidly and massively.
It's inevitable that the Houston route will include onward traffic to Mexico and Florida and outbound traffic from places like Texas, Georgia and Florida.
Similarly the Chicago route will carry people flying onward to Toronto, or to Eli Lilly in Indianapolis, for example.
And the Newark route will carry traffic to/from Boston, Washington DC and Philadelphia as well as NYC.
All of this traffic is likely to be ticketed on the same ticket - meaning that Air NZ is going to be buying a lot of sectors from United Airlines and Air Canada. But current dogma is that an NZ ticket from Auckland to Atlanta or Miami via Houston is fine, because NZ operates only one sector, whereas an Auckland to London ticket on an Air NZ service via LAX was uneconomic. And I don't buy that logic - because it is economically illiterate.
Don't get me wrong - I'm delighted that those three new US routes are open. But I think their viability destroys the airline's own argument against AKL-LAX-LHR.
Especially when you consider that Qantas is serving JFK out of Auckland, and that Delta and United are competing too. The eventual outcome will be that Air NZ will end up having to stop the current price gouging to North America and will have to either compete or exit.
And that is where Air NZ's 2015-2020 international strategy was intellectually bankrupt and unsustainable. If you base your model around price gouging on monopoly routes, what are you going to do when competitors choose to enter the market?
NZ516 wrote:Koruman23 wrote:I would be interested in a discussion about the future Air New Zeland international network.
In the pre-Covid era, Air NZ chose to take an idiosyncratic and ultimately unique approach to international network planning.
1. They essentially bailed out of most routes which entailed significant competition.
2. They focused on monopoly and pseudo-monopoly routes wherever possible, forming anti-competitive alliances to Australia, New Caledonia, Tahiti, Singapore and Hong Kong which were arguably highly fortunate to obtain regulatory approval.
3. They operated an unusually high percentage of government-underwritten routes (Auckland to Norfolk Island, Brisbane to Norfolk Island, Auckland to Niue, Sydney to Rarotonga, Los Angeles to Rarotonga). These routes combined a lack of risk (due to government underwriting) with a monopoly market position.
4. They carried their Shanghai route through a decade and a half of losses for reasons of market development, in spite of revealing in their own financial statements that it made a loss every year except for one.
5. They converted their short-haul narrowbody international network to all-economy, a decision which was not followed by Qantas or Virgin Australia or SilkAir or Aircalin or Fiji Airways, and was only shared with Jetstar in this region.
6. They closed AKL-HKG-LHR and AKL-LAX-LHR and AKL-PPT-LAX on the basis that one-stop tickets are unprofitable. While failing to see the irony that their new Chicago, Houston and Newark routes had virtually no O+D market, and were reliant upon the airline purchasing domestic sectors on United Airlines in order to sell tickets. And again, this Air NZ "No one-stop services" dogma was never adopted by the legacy American airlines (which all run hub-and-spoke models), or by Singapore Airlines and Emirates (both of which sell more than 80% of their tickets on one-stop services). And in the case of Qantas, they rolled out PER-LHR, PER-CDG and AKL-JFK services which were actually entirely based upon feed from SYD, MEL and BNE to sell one-stop tickets.
In isolation, Air NZ's route decisions were unusual and quirky. In combination they led to the airline forging a uniquely different direction, in which it eschewed almost all competition and focused on exploiting market monopolies. In effect, the direction taken allowed for modest profits but made the airline a hostage to if and when other carriers chose to enter the market and compete. And the model of terminating European services half-way and selling onward sectors on a different carrier actually meant that the only airline with whom Air New Zealand shared a business model was Air Calin, which is a highly unusual model for an airline to choose to emulate.
So where next?
Some of the one stop services had a lot of competition eg HKG - LHR had CX, BA , VS as well as NZ. While PPT to LAX has TN and DL so I can see why they decided to move off them. During the time they pulled out of some one stop services they opened up new unserved markets from AKL with non stop flying which usually had lower trip costs so therefore overall higher revenue for them.
NZ516 wrote:Koruman23 wrote:JJWess wrote:
IAH I can understand as having very limited O&D… but Chicago and most notably, New York? One of the most iconic and largest metropolitan cities on the planet and you would argue that there’s no O&D traffic to New York? There’s so much tourism + business travel and even VFR traffic between NY and oceania.
That aside, I think NZ has found their North America network to work well for them. So going forward, I can only see them strengthen it. Perhaps not with any new routes though, but definitely frequency increases. I think if they were to introduce any new cities, it’d be YYZ, potentially followed by IAD (UAL Hub) and maybe, just maybe, Seattle.
Singapore seems to be where they concentrate most of their Asia traffic. Contradictory to your comment on NZ’s anti-one-stop trips, I actually think Singapore for NZ forms a notable hub for them to filter passengers on to places like India, China and even onward to Europe if necessary. NZ have definitely pulled out of operating one-stop trips on their own metal - but with limited capacity and slack in their fleet, perhaps it’s for the best.
The only black hole in their network is South America. At least with Europe you can very easily be routed via SIN or north America, but South America is sorely missing on their route map. Well that and South Africa…
With respect, I am arguing about the ORD-NZ and NYC-NZ markets, rather than about the global significance of Chicago and New York.
Basically the entire North America to NZ market used to fit on one daily Air NZ and one daily Qantas 744 - and that included a lot of onward traffic to/from Australia.
When Qantas and United withdrew, Air NZ eventually increased to 2 daily 77Ws serving LAX (one of which also carried onward traffic to London) and one daily 77W to SFO.
Either way, the entire North America to NZ market has never been shown to exceed around 1000 seats per day, the vast majority of which are for US West Coast traffic.
So the Chicago, Houston and Newark routes all require the market to/from the South, the Midwest and the Northeast of the USA to be grown rapidly and massively.
It's inevitable that the Houston route will include onward traffic to Mexico and Florida and outbound traffic from places like Texas, Georgia and Florida.
Similarly the Chicago route will carry people flying onward to Toronto, or to Eli Lilly in Indianapolis, for example.
And the Newark route will carry traffic to/from Boston, Washington DC and Philadelphia as well as NYC.
All of this traffic is likely to be ticketed on the same ticket - meaning that Air NZ is going to be buying a lot of sectors from United Airlines and Air Canada. But current dogma is that an NZ ticket from Auckland to Atlanta or Miami via Houston is fine, because NZ operates only one sector, whereas an Auckland to London ticket on an Air NZ service via LAX was uneconomic. And I don't buy that logic - because it is economically illiterate.
Don't get me wrong - I'm delighted that those three new US routes are open. But I think their viability destroys the airline's own argument against AKL-LAX-LHR.
Especially when you consider that Qantas is serving JFK out of Auckland, and that Delta and United are competing too. The eventual outcome will be that Air NZ will end up having to stop the current price gouging to North America and will have to either compete or exit.
And that is where Air NZ's 2015-2020 international strategy was intellectually bankrupt and unsustainable. If you base your model around price gouging on monopoly routes, what are you going to do when competitors choose to enter the market?
Just a slight correction at New York, Air NZ serve JFK and not Newark. At JFK there is no feed from domestic flights as United's domestic hub is Newark. So it's nearly all O&D at JFK to AKL plus some international traffic via other European Star Alliance partners.
At this stage I would argue that Air NZ should now be looking at how to get a US pre-clearance facility at AKL. It wouldn't help in terms of EWR, with Qantas already opening JFK, but it would carry the potential to make Air NZ a carrier of choice between Australia and LAX, SFO, DFW/IAH, ORD and HNL.
tullamarine wrote:At this stage I would argue that Air NZ should now be looking at how to get a US pre-clearance facility at AKL. It wouldn't help in terms of EWR, with Qantas already opening JFK, but it would carry the potential to make Air NZ a carrier of choice between Australia and LAX, SFO, DFW/IAH, ORD and HNL.
Surely creating a pre-clearance in AKL would just mean QF,UA, AA and DL immediately push for exactly the same thing at SYD and probably MEL.
Koruman23 wrote:
So where next?
JJWess wrote:US Pre-clearance at AKL is more likely to happen than SYD or MEL. SYD just does not have the space, and MEL hardly have the flights. I know that sizeable expansion projects are in the pipeline for AKL, so it’d be a great opportunity to seize, especially for NZ.
And to be fair, you’d most likely see QF launch more US flights from AKL instead of putting up a stink about SYD not getting the facility. They know how capacity constrained it gets at peak times.
zkncj wrote:JJWess wrote:US Pre-clearance at AKL is more likely to happen than SYD or MEL. SYD just does not have the space, and MEL hardly have the flights. I know that sizeable expansion projects are in the pipeline for AKL, so it’d be a great opportunity to seize, especially for NZ.
And to be fair, you’d most likely see QF launch more US flights from AKL instead of putting up a stink about SYD not getting the facility. They know how capacity constrained it gets at peak times.
US Pre-Clearance in AKL would be so straight forward to step too, Gate 15-18 already get blocked off for USA departures.
Adding US Pre to Pier B, seems like a logical option. Add a few moveable walls so it can be either 2 or 4 gates at once.
AKL-USA must be getting close to 10x departures at peak times of the year?
JJWess wrote:zkncj wrote:JJWess wrote:US Pre-clearance at AKL is more likely to happen than SYD or MEL. SYD just does not have the space, and MEL hardly have the flights. I know that sizeable expansion projects are in the pipeline for AKL, so it’d be a great opportunity to seize, especially for NZ.
And to be fair, you’d most likely see QF launch more US flights from AKL instead of putting up a stink about SYD not getting the facility. They know how capacity constrained it gets at peak times.
US Pre-Clearance in AKL would be so straight forward to step too, Gate 15-18 already get blocked off for USA departures.
Adding US Pre to Pier B, seems like a logical option. Add a few moveable walls so it can be either 2 or 4 gates at once.
AKL-USA must be getting close to 10x departures at peak times of the year?
Well with DL in the picture (and if it’s true that AA will return LAX-AKL) then you’re looking at the 10-14 range. If NZ brings up ORD and JFK flying, and with LAX being 10 weekly… yeah you’ve got a sizeable amount of US bound departures.
On another note, with these blocked off gates - are passengers questioned/subject to any form of screening?
JJWess wrote:zkncj wrote:JJWess wrote:US Pre-clearance at AKL is more likely to happen than SYD or MEL. SYD just does not have the space, and MEL hardly have the flights. I know that sizeable expansion projects are in the pipeline for AKL, so it’d be a great opportunity to seize, especially for NZ.
And to be fair, you’d most likely see QF launch more US flights from AKL instead of putting up a stink about SYD not getting the facility. They know how capacity constrained it gets at peak times.
US Pre-Clearance in AKL would be so straight forward to step too, Gate 15-18 already get blocked off for USA departures.
Adding US Pre to Pier B, seems like a logical option. Add a few moveable walls so it can be either 2 or 4 gates at once.
AKL-USA must be getting close to 10x departures at peak times of the year?
Well with DL in the picture (and if it’s true that AA will return LAX-AKL) then you’re looking at the 10-14 range. If NZ brings up ORD and JFK flying, and with LAX being 10 weekly… yeah you’ve got a sizeable amount of US bound departures.
On another note, with these blocked off gates - are passengers questioned/subject to any form of screening?
ZK-NBT wrote:JJWess wrote:zkncj wrote:
US Pre-Clearance in AKL would be so straight forward to step too, Gate 15-18 already get blocked off for USA departures.
Adding US Pre to Pier B, seems like a logical option. Add a few moveable walls so it can be either 2 or 4 gates at once.
AKL-USA must be getting close to 10x departures at peak times of the year?
Well with DL in the picture (and if it’s true that AA will return LAX-AKL) then you’re looking at the 10-14 range. If NZ brings up ORD and JFK flying, and with LAX being 10 weekly… yeah you’ve got a sizeable amount of US bound departures.
On another note, with these blocked off gates - are passengers questioned/subject to any form of screening?
If AA return to LAX-AKL plus DL you could have based on current schedules around 9-10 daily US departures. I expect there could be some changes.
NZ
LAX x10
IAH x7
SFO x5
JFK x3
ORD x3
HNL x3
AA
DFW x7
LAX x7
UA
SFO x7
DL
LAX x7
QF
JFK x3
HA
HNL x3
Koruman23 wrote:
All of this traffic is likely to be ticketed on the same ticket - meaning that Air NZ is going to be buying a lot of sectors from United Airlines and Air Canada. But current dogma is that an NZ ticket from Auckland to Atlanta or Miami via Houston is fine, because NZ operates only one sector, whereas an Auckland to London ticket on an Air NZ service via LAX was uneconomic. And I don't buy that logic - because it is economically illiterate.
Don't get me wrong - I'm delighted that those three new US routes are open. But I think their viability destroys the airline's own argument against AKL-LAX-LHR.
Especially when you consider that Qantas is serving JFK out of Auckland, and that Delta and United are competing too. The eventual outcome will be that Air NZ will end up having to stop the current price gouging to North America and will have to either compete or exit.
ZKOJH wrote:Also, remember something to keep an eye on will be Air NZ's interim results which are on the 23rd of February 2023.
anstar wrote:Koruman23 wrote:
All of this traffic is likely to be ticketed on the same ticket - meaning that Air NZ is going to be buying a lot of sectors from United Airlines and Air Canada. But current dogma is that an NZ ticket from Auckland to Atlanta or Miami via Houston is fine, because NZ operates only one sector, whereas an Auckland to London ticket on an Air NZ service via LAX was uneconomic. And I don't buy that logic - because it is economically illiterate.
Don't get me wrong - I'm delighted that those three new US routes are open. But I think their viability destroys the airline's own argument against AKL-LAX-LHR.
Especially when you consider that Qantas is serving JFK out of Auckland, and that Delta and United are competing too. The eventual outcome will be that Air NZ will end up having to stop the current price gouging to North America and will have to either compete or exit.
I think the LHR route is a little different as they had to have a whole crew base dedicated for those flights at the end of the line in LHR. With QF doing JFK they are leveraging off a the Jetconnect AKL base that already flies to multiple destinations.
anstar wrote:Koruman23 wrote:
All of this traffic is likely to be ticketed on the same ticket - meaning that Air NZ is going to be buying a lot of sectors from United Airlines and Air Canada. But current dogma is that an NZ ticket from Auckland to Atlanta or Miami via Houston is fine, because NZ operates only one sector, whereas an Auckland to London ticket on an Air NZ service via LAX was uneconomic. And I don't buy that logic - because it is economically illiterate.
Don't get me wrong - I'm delighted that those three new US routes are open. But I think their viability destroys the airline's own argument against AKL-LAX-LHR.
Especially when you consider that Qantas is serving JFK out of Auckland, and that Delta and United are competing too. The eventual outcome will be that Air NZ will end up having to stop the current price gouging to North America and will have to either compete or exit.
I think the LHR route is a little different as they had to have a whole crew base dedicated for those flights at the end of the line in LHR. With QF doing JFK they are leveraging off a the Jetconnect AKL base that already flies to multiple destinations.
PA515 wrote:ZKOJH wrote:Also, remember something to keep an eye on will be Air NZ's interim results which are on the 23rd of February 2023.
Yes. There will be some changes to the "Projected aircraft in service' since 25 Aug 2022. The obvious is the delayed delivery of the GE 789s and ZK-OKO remaining. Will be interesting to see if ZK-OKO's lease has been extended or if it has been purchased. The BBAM listing for ZK-OKO on myairtrade.com was for Sale or Lease and that was removed last week. Perhaps the leases on the two domestic A320-232s due to be returned in FY2024 will be extended and A321-271NX ZK-OYE might be delivered as ZK-NNH. Anyway only three weeks to go.
Edit: I spoke too soon. ZK-OKO was relisted by BBAM on 26 Jan 2023 for Sale or Lease. The available date is 10 Nov 2023. Interesting.
PA515
Koruman23 wrote:I would be interested in a discussion about the future Air New Zealand international network.
In the pre-Covid era, Air NZ chose to take an idiosyncratic and ultimately unique approach to international network planning.
NZ516 wrote:PA515 wrote:ZKOJH wrote:Also, remember something to keep an eye on will be Air NZ's interim results which are on the 23rd of February 2023.
Yes. There will be some changes to the "Projected aircraft in service' since 25 Aug 2022. The obvious is the delayed delivery of the GE 789s and ZK-OKO remaining. Will be interesting to see if ZK-OKO's lease has been extended or if it has been purchased. The BBAM listing for ZK-OKO on myairtrade.com was for Sale or Lease and that was removed last week. Perhaps the leases on the two domestic A320-232s due to be returned in FY2024 will be extended and A321-271NX ZK-OYE might be delivered as ZK-NNH. Anyway only three weeks to go.
Edit: I spoke too soon. ZK-OKO was relisted by BBAM on 26 Jan 2023 for Sale or Lease. The available date is 10 Nov 2023. Interesting.
PA515
So Air NZ might have done an extra 12 months lease on ZK-OKO and don't plan on holding onto it after 10 Nov. Perhaps their plan is just 6 77Ws for the next few years.
aerohottie wrote:Koruman23 wrote:I would be interested in a discussion about the future Air New Zealand international network.
In the pre-Covid era, Air NZ chose to take an idiosyncratic and ultimately unique approach to international network planning.
Network planning and therefore fleet planning, which then impacts network decisions.
With the 787-9 original order in mid 2000's-ish, I completely get how and why that decision was made.
But my opinion is that the 772 replacement with more 787's was the wrong one, particularly when factoring in the future 773 replacement.
I can't help but feel that a combined 787-9 (12-14 aircraft) and A350 (7ish A359 and 7 A35X) would've provided a more capable and resilient fleet for NZ going forward. In particular, the A359's would be far more capable on the ORD and JFK routes.
We can always rehash history, and hindsight is 20/20 and all that. But still worth considering these decisions and the impacts they've had and will have going forward.
ZKNZR wrote:Back in the days of NZ AKL-LAX-LHR crew were out of AKL for 7-8 days on those sectors. That costs.
planemanofnz wrote:All this discussion about LAX-LHR is missing the possibility that NZ could return to LHR down the line, non-stop from AKL. 10-15 years ago who'd have thought we'd have AKL-DXB/DOH/ORD/JFK - doesn't seem to be that far-fetched that AKL-LHR could become a reality.
DavidByrne wrote:Reading some of the comments on the future direction of NZ, I'm interested to see that most people have focused on the past, rather than the future, though there have been a few interesting comments on the future.
I'd take issue with some of what K'man said about the network strategy being essentially "point-to-point" - it most emphatically is not. Looking east, the strategy is publicly stated as being to provide own-metal connectivity from Australian ports to the Americas, and most recently it was stated that further Australian ports were possible (though as I noted a couple of days ago, no decision on CBR until some time next year). The number of Australasia to North America city pairs has grown enormously in the last few years. Looking west, the own-metal offering is more about point-to-point, I'd acknowledge, but when partner airlines are taken into account, there's a big focus on hubbing - especially at SIN.
The argument about one-stop services is primarily to do with the expense of such an operation. Much of that cost is a consequence of crew being away from home for long periods and being accommodated, or the costs of marketing a low-frequency sector where there is relatively low brand awareness (ie LAX-LHR). However, if the intermediate point was located in Australia, and local crews hired at that base, then much of the argument about crew costs would disappear, and we know that NZ's brand awareness in Australia is high - to the point where a couple of years running in the not-too-distant past, NZ was voted the must trusted brand in Australia.
So for the future, I'd like to see NZ view itself as more of an Australasian airline than as a NZ carrier - it should play to its strengths. There's been a lot of discussion about the possible reinstatement of an LHR link - I say, why not consider PER as a hub for services to Europe and India? It's not too wacky an idea to think that you could run AKL-PER-LHR daily, with a scissor hub operating at PER for CHC-PER-FRA 3x weekly, for example. And Australian connectivity could be provided by running (say) WLG/ZQN-SYD/BNE/MEL-PER, for example, with connections at PER also to BOM or DEL, perhaps. We know that PER-LHR has been extraordinarily successful for QF.
Bottom line is that New Zealand is a very limited market on its own, and NZ has never really taken up the opportunities offered by the Single Aviation Market in a meaningful way. After all, what I'm suggesting here is no different to what QF is already planning for toward the Americas, and not that dissimilar to what NZ already does to the Americas, so from a philosophical point of view there's no major innovation.
Perhaps the leases on the two domestic A320-232s due to be returned in FY2024 will be extended and A321-271NX ZK-OYE might be delivered as ZK-NNH. Anyway only three weeks to go.
aerohottie wrote:planemanofnz wrote:All this discussion about LAX-LHR is missing the possibility that NZ could return to LHR down the line, non-stop from AKL. 10-15 years ago who'd have thought we'd have AKL-DXB/DOH/ORD/JFK - doesn't seem to be that far-fetched that AKL-LHR could become a reality.
Very true. I had asked the question about aircraft capability to operate AKL-LHR with either 787 or 350. Answer I got in the tech ops post was that the A359 could do it, and possibly A35X depending on seating configuration.
Another point raised was that AKL-LHR and LHR-AKL flights could operate eastbound in both directions, which makes the flight similar or less than SYD-LHR westbound in terms of flight time at approx 19 hours and 15 minutes
Sprite8806 wrote:Why don't United Airlines fly Auckland to Chicago? It's a no brainer
ORD is United's biggest hub, and Air New Zealand only fly Auckland to Chicago 3x weekly, surely United could do the other 4 days? It would make sense, I'm not sure why they don't fly it yet.
Kiwiandrew wrote:Sprite8806 wrote:Why don't United Airlines fly Auckland to Chicago? It's a no brainer
ORD is United's biggest hub, and Air New Zealand only fly Auckland to Chicago 3x weekly, surely United could do the other 4 days? It would make sense, I'm not sure why they don't fly it yet.
Maybe they see more opportunity to make money using the aircraft elsewhere, though with another 100 787s on the way anything is possible, but in the short term they seem quite happy to leave most of the NZ-US flying to their joint venture partner NZ
ZK-NBT wrote:Kiwiandrew wrote:Sprite8806 wrote:Why don't United Airlines fly Auckland to Chicago? It's a no brainer
ORD is United's biggest hub, and Air New Zealand only fly Auckland to Chicago 3x weekly, surely United could do the other 4 days? It would make sense, I'm not sure why they don't fly it yet.
Maybe they see more opportunity to make money using the aircraft elsewhere, though with another 100 787s on the way anything is possible, but in the short term they seem quite happy to leave most of the NZ-US flying to their joint venture partner NZ
UA won’t run ORD-AKL LAX I could see and maybe IAH longer term.
I thought SFO is UA largest hub?
NZ516 wrote:Perhaps the leases on the two domestic A320-232s due to be returned in FY2024 will be extended and A321-271NX ZK-OYE might be delivered as ZK-NNH. Anyway only three weeks to go.
I'm not sure if they will change the plan of having a total domestic A321 fleet of 7. So OYA to OYG will come as planned. But they certainly could do with a top up order for the international 320/321 fleet eg NNH or NHF or more but might be a long wait.
zkncj wrote:NZ516 wrote:Perhaps the leases on the two domestic A320-232s due to be returned in FY2024 will be extended and A321-271NX ZK-OYE might be delivered as ZK-NNH. Anyway only three weeks to go.
I'm not sure if they will change the plan of having a total domestic A321 fleet of 7. So OYA to OYG will come as planned. But they certainly could do with a top up order for the international 320/321 fleet eg NNH or NHF or more but might be a long wait.
I don’t see any more a320NEO’s being purchased, I feel any more future orders will be for a321NEO’s.
They seemed to have proved them self very well, the fact that they are now buying them for domestic shows they work well for NZ.
NZ just 10 years ago, they were flying around 133 seater 733s on domestic.
NZ516 wrote:ZK-NBT wrote:Kiwiandrew wrote:
Maybe they see more opportunity to make money using the aircraft elsewhere, though with another 100 787s on the way anything is possible, but in the short term they seem quite happy to leave most of the NZ-US flying to their joint venture partner NZ
UA won’t run ORD-AKL LAX I could see and maybe IAH longer term.
I thought SFO is UA largest hub?
Chicago O'Hare is their largest hub by number of departures, passengers carried and destinations served.
https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/f ... /96983530/
DavidByrne wrote:Reading some of the comments on the future direction of NZ, I'm interested to see that most people have focused on the past, rather than the future, though there have been a few interesting comments on the future.
I'd take issue with some of what K'man said about the network strategy being essentially "point-to-point" - it most emphatically is not. Looking east, the strategy is publicly stated as being to provide own-metal connectivity from Australian ports to the Americas, and most recently it was stated that further Australian ports were possible (though as I noted a couple of days ago, no decision on CBR until some time next year). The number of Australasia to North America city pairs has grown enormously in the last few years. Looking west, the own-metal offering is more about point-to-point, I'd acknowledge, but when partner airlines are taken into account, there's a big focus on hubbing - especially at SIN.
The argument about one-stop services is primarily to do with the expense of such an operation. Much of that cost is a consequence of crew being away from home for long periods and being accommodated, or the costs of marketing a low-frequency sector where there is relatively low brand awareness (ie LAX-LHR). However, if the intermediate point was located in Australia, and local crews hired at that base, then much of the argument about crew costs would disappear, and we know that NZ's brand awareness in Australia is high - to the point where a couple of years running in the not-too-distant past, NZ was voted the must trusted brand in Australia.
So for the future, I'd like to see NZ view itself as more of an Australasian airline than as a NZ carrier - it should play to its strengths. There's been a lot of discussion about the possible reinstatement of an LHR link - I say, why not consider PER as a hub for services to Europe and India? It's not too wacky an idea to think that you could run AKL-PER-LHR daily, with a scissor hub operating at PER for CHC-PER-FRA 3x weekly, for example. And Australian connectivity could be provided by running (say) WLG/ZQN-SYD/BNE/MEL-PER, for example, with connections at PER also to BOM or DEL, perhaps. We know that PER-LHR has been extraordinarily successful for QF.
Bottom line is that New Zealand is a very limited market on its own, and NZ has never really taken up the opportunities offered by the Single Aviation Market in a meaningful way. After all, what I'm suggesting here is no different to what QF is already planning for toward the Americas, and not that dissimilar to what NZ already does to the Americas, so from a philosophical point of view there's no major innovation.