Forgive me y'all, but seriously: this is the work o' the Devil.

https://onemileatatime.com/news/boeing- ... ms-suffer/

Boeing's argument in court is that their 737MAX crash victims "didn't have time to suffer," and thus its liability should be lessened.

I get that they have a right to a defense. But even as a former trial and veteran's attorney, who's had to make arguments that I'm not too comfortable with, in order to "vigorously advocate" for my client-- I don't see how these shysters can sleep at night.

Corporations are the worst.

Just disgusting. No words to describe my thoughts at this.

Is it April fools day?

Clearly suffering is limited to physical trauma to them. The same argument should be made to those same people when they want to sue for their “psychological pains”, for whatever happens to them.

This argument is just wild

“While passengers undoubtedly perceived the flight as scary, humans have a tendency to hold on to hope and not expect the worst. Ultimately, it is impossible to know the subjective experience of each occupant.”

Its gross, but it is a very typical legal argument in this kind of mass tort case.

Unbelivable! Doesn’t Boeing have any moral compass at all?

gatibosgru wrote:

This argument is just wild

“...Ultimately, it is impossible to know the subjective experience of each occupant.”

Could a seance be admissible?

gatibosgru wrote:

This argument is just wild

“While passengers undoubtedly perceived the flight as scary, humans have a tendency to hold on to hope and not expect the worst. Ultimately, it is impossible to know the subjective experience of each occupant.”

Thus what they're saying is that in the absence of any video or audio proof that each of the passengers involved experienced a very traumatzed situation, we're not ging to pay for anyone. I wonder who authorized this line of defence as this may backfire from a PR perspective.

Confuscius wrote:

gatibosgru wrote:

This argument is just wild

“...Ultimately, it is impossible to know the subjective experience of each occupant.”

Could a seance be admissible?

Looks like Boeing's lawyers would like the ghosts to say it was "thrilling".

Has it slipped their minds that the “pain and suffering” extends to the family and friends of the deceased as well? They do not owe less.

What is their point of comparison exactly ? Didn't the accident sequences last several minutes ? Hence more than most crashes, that are very sudden ?

In fact, from wikipedia, about Lion Air Flight 610 : Preliminary investigations revealed serious flight control problems that traumatized passengers and crew on the aircraft's previous flight

=> so we have a plane load of traumatized passengers who survived a similar sequence of events...

To clarify, the ET302 liability cases are now in the settlement phase, with most already resolved.

A small group of the accident families are asking the court to add pre-accident pain and suffering to the settlement. They offered expert medical testimony that passengers could have suffered g-force injuries, heart attacks, and strokes during the events that unfolded.

The established case law, is to disallow that kind of award, owing to the difficulty of assessing and/or proving those claims. It becomes entirely speculative and subjective.

So now the judge will have to decide. Most independent legal experts think he is unlikely to agree. But we will have to see.

It's notable that the same group has asked for additional settlement awards against the airline as well. This despite the cases having been merged earlier, with Boeing agreeing not to assign fault to the airline.

After watching Downfall: The Case Against Boeing on Netflix and reading up on how the McDonnell Douglas leadership takeover of Boeing forever changed it's culture has me trying to boycott Boeing planes when booking flights. It's nearly impossible to do. And I know I'm just one lowly consumer so it's laughable to think it would have any effect (except maybe on my life). But I think Boeing leadership should be punished for putting profits over passenger safety. I still cannot believe any person would design a system that can override pilots based on ONE sensor and now this despicable defense? I used to live in Seattle and I'm an American so I'm still a Boeing fan at heart, but the conspiracy theorist in me has me wondering what else is there to be uncovered . . . so best to TRY to avoid Boeing planes for now.

gatibosgru wrote:

CMA727 wrote:

I write and publish 3 different aviation related columns and today as soon as I read about the shamefull arguments of Boeing lawyers I rushed to my computer to write a new piece condeming the inhumanity of their actions. Boeing seems not to realize how bad it´s reputation is going to suffer after these actions!

Unfortunately their reputation will be fine.

As in the gutter, is that what you mean? Because it seems to be there at the moment, and steadily getting worse by the day!…….we’ll maybe only among us ANutters…

Aesma wrote:

What is their point of comparison exactly ? Didn't the accident sequences last several minutes ? Hence more than most crashes, that are very sudden ?

In fact, from wikipedia, about Lion Air Flight 610 : Preliminary investigations revealed serious flight control problems that traumatized passengers and crew on the aircraft's previous flight

=> so we have a plane load of traumatized passengers who survived a similar sequence of events...

The accident sequence would not have inflicted injury to the passengers, until possibly during the final loss of control. That part was actually pretty quick. For ET302, the aircraft dove into the ground at 600 mph, with throttles at 94%.

The same preliminary sequence unfolded on JT043, with no reports of injuries. But for that flight, loss of control was averted by expected use of the electric trim and cutoff switches. As well as management of the throttles.

There's really nothing to see here. Experts are hired guns, and are paid handsomely to marshal evidence to render the best possible, most favorable, highly partisan opinion for the side hiring them. Of course Boeing wants to present evidence that the passengers experienced the least amount of pre-impact fright so as to minimize their exposure. It doesn't mean a jury has to buy it.

The expert rendering that opinion will be deposed and cross-examined at trial in an attempt to damage their credibility, and they render potentially-inflammatory opinions at their peril.

Of course, publicizing this sort of thing gets people (who are totally disconnected from the issue) foaming at the mouth, which generates clicks and impressions, so I'm not surprised by it. But this is garden-variety stuff for a wrongful death case. Not everyone wants to see how the sausage is made... what is a life worth? What is fair compensation for the families of the victims? A million dollars? $1,000,000,000? $1,000,000,000,000? This is an ugly, unpleasant process that is nevertheless conducted in a predictable way, down a well-worn path, by attorneys and experts on both sides who do this for a living.

Best to let the professionals (and they absolutely are, on both sides) do their thing without weighing in too emotionally, or impugning them with about a hair's-breadth of context.

OK. So for the folks "outranged" over this..think of it this way. The passenger's family are entitled to compensation. Period.
Let's say it's $2M per person for a young person of 21 years old. A 90 year old's family will not get as much.
This is simply how negligence pay outs work in accidents.
Like the millions of car and truck accidents that have been decided before and all other negligence accident claims.. including industrial accidents, building accidents, occupational accidents.

In an airline accident, previously.... it was decided if the passengers "suffered" more than just perishing, the families were entitled to enhanced compensation.
Let's say the front of the plane was blown off but the rest of it flew intact for a few minutes further with the passengers still alive then crashed. Or the plane crashed but then the victims died by fire on the ground by not being able to escape. Much more suffering.
So they will receive compensatory damages or enhanced compensation depending on the circumstances of the crash.

codc10 wrote:

There's really nothing to see here. Experts are hired guns, and are paid handsomely to marshal evidence to render the best possible, most favorable, highly partisan opinion for the side hiring them. Of course Boeing wants to present evidence that the passengers experienced the least amount of pre-impact fright so as to minimize their exposure. It doesn't mean a jury has to buy it.

The expert rendering that opinion will be deposed and cross-examined at trial in an attempt to damage their credibility, and they render potentially-inflammatory opinions at their peril.

Of course, publicizing this sort of thing gets people (who are totally disconnected from the issue) foaming at the mouth, which generates clicks and impressions, so I'm not surprised by it. But this is garden-variety stuff for a wrongful death case. Not everyone wants to see how the sausage is made... what is a life worth? What is fair compensation for the families of the victims? A million dollars? $1,000,000,000? $1,000,000,000,000? This is an ugly, unpleasant process that is nevertheless conducted in a predictable way, down a well-worn path, by attorneys and experts on both sides who do this for a living.

Best to let the professionals (and they absolutely are, on both sides) do their thing without weighing in too emotionally, or impugning them with about a hair's-breadth of context.

Yes, this is very close to the reality. It helps to understand that attorneys are not agents of truth, they are advocates of the maximum benefit for their clients. That is their job.

The attorneys representing the families, have understood from the beginning, that their client's negotiating position is strengthened by creating a negative public impression of Boeing. So that is what they have consistently sought to do. That is their agenda, and it's not wrong for them to do so. But it should be clear to everyone that it is an agenda, and not necessarily the truth.

In most instances, they have failed in the actions they have sought, and may fail here as well. However the value is not in whether they prevail, but in sustaining the public impression of Boeing within the news cycle, which gives them the greatest odds of maximum settlement. It's how they can best represent their clients.

eal46859 wrote:

Let's say it's $2M per person for a young person of 21 years old. A 90 year old's family will not get as much.
This is simply how negligence pay outs work in accidents.

Traditionally yes, but not always the case anymore...

....especially in relatively tort-friendly states (like here in Illinois, where the Federal court will mirror its provisions, but under Federal procedure) that have everything from "Golden Year statutes" to taking "earned income" in place of "income potential" to calculate damages.

In summary: kill grandpa under a jurisdiction like that, and you're still going to pay DEARLY.

This case shows the "benefit" of not selling a product directly to the wider public and instead to other major corporations (and their owners). If Boeing was a car manufacturer the negative press of this type of god-awful and cruel arguments to save them compensation money would seriously damage sales. They probably wouldn't even let it reach this point and look for a settlement, even if very expensive. However, Boeing sells very expensive machines to other soul-less and "rational" corporations so it won't impact sales. Passengers usually don't ever understand what aircraft they're on anyway.

argentinevol98 wrote:

This case shows the "benefit" of not selling a product directly to the wider public and instead to other major corporations (and their owners). If Boeing was a car manufacturer the negative press of this type of god-awful and cruel arguments to save them compensation money would seriously damage sales. They probably wouldn't even let it reach this point and look for a settlement, even if very expensive. However, Boeing sells very expensive machines to other soul-less and "rational" corporations so it won't impact sales. Passengers usually don't ever understand what aircraft they're on anyway.

These cases are already in settlement. Boeing has been trying to settle with the families from the very beginning. In this instance, some of the families are trying to tack on an additional settlement. The judge will have rule on whether that's allowed in this case. Normally, it isn't allowed without forensic evidence.

Avatar2go wrote:

Aesma wrote:

What is their point of comparison exactly ? Didn't the accident sequences last several minutes ? Hence more than most crashes, that are very sudden ?

In fact, from wikipedia, about Lion Air Flight 610 : Preliminary investigations revealed serious flight control problems that traumatized passengers and crew on the aircraft's previous flight

=> so we have a plane load of traumatized passengers who survived a similar sequence of events...

The accident sequence would not have inflicted injury to the passengers, until possibly during the final loss of control. That part was actually pretty quick. For ET302, the aircraft dove into the ground at 600 mph, with throttles at 94%.

The same preliminary sequence unfolded on JT043, with no reports of injuries. But for that flight, loss of control was averted by expected use of the electric trim and cutoff switches. As well as management of the throttles.

Taking Boeing’s position not only on diminishing the suffering of those on board and also blaming the pilots. You should be a corporate lawyer

cedarjet wrote:

Taking Boeing’s position not only on diminishing the suffering of those on board and also blaming the pilots. You should be a corporate lawyer

The role of the crew is not a Boeing position, it's a matter of established fact. Please see NTSB and BEA responses to the ET302 final report.

Also Boeing did not diminish the suffering of those on board, they questioned the veracity of the medical claims put forth by the plaintiff expert witness. Which is a routine part of settlement negotiations.

It's up to the judge to decide what's fair, but both sides have the opportunity to make their case. That's how the system works. There is no presumption that one side or the other is correct, issues are decided based on precedent and evidence.

Avatar2go wrote:

cedarjet wrote:

Taking Boeing’s position not only on diminishing the suffering of those on board and also blaming the pilots. You should be a corporate lawyer

The role of the crew is not a Boeing position, it's a matter of established fact. Please see NTSB and BEA responses to the ET302 final report.

Also Boeing did not diminish the suffering of those on board, they questioned the veracity of the medical claims put forth by the plaintiff expert witness. Which is a routine part of settlement negotiations.

It's up to the judge to decide what's fair, but both sides have the opportunity to make their case. That's how the system works. There is no presumption that one side or the other is correct, issues are decided based on precedent and evidence.

I am not sure if the intent of this thread is the establishment of facts. I believe the operative phrase was "the work of the devil." That kind of sums things up.

ElroyJetson wrote:

Avatar2go wrote:

cedarjet wrote:

Taking Boeing’s position not only on diminishing the suffering of those on board and also blaming the pilots. You should be a corporate lawyer

The role of the crew is not a Boeing position, it's a matter of established fact. Please see NTSB and BEA responses to the ET302 final report.

Also Boeing did not diminish the suffering of those on board, they questioned the veracity of the medical claims put forth by the plaintiff expert witness. Which is a routine part of settlement negotiations.

It's up to the judge to decide what's fair, but both sides have the opportunity to make their case. That's how the system works. There is no presumption that one side or the other is correct, issues are decided based on precedent and evidence.

I am not sure if the intent of this thread is the establishment of facts. I believe the operative phrase was "the work of the devil." That kind of sums things up.

Yes - it's take a devil to make the holes in the Swiss cheese line-up.

A very bad mistake in design, followed by bad maintenance and training in the first crash, and inadequate notification of crews and training in the second crash according to the FAA and BEA.

DarkSnowyNight wrote:

morrisond wrote:

hh65man wrote:

As in the gutter, is that what you mean? Because it seems to be there at the moment, and steadily getting worse by the day!…….we’ll maybe only among us ANutters…

Some of you. Don't presume you speak for all of us.

Nothing in the universe is so terrible that there is not someone, somewhere, out there that does not love it just the way it is...

BeachBoy wrote:

After watching Downfall: The Case Against Boeing on Netflix and reading up on how the McDonnell Douglas leadership takeover of Boeing forever changed it's culture has me trying to boycott Boeing planes when booking flights. It's nearly impossible to do. And I know I'm just one lowly consumer so it's laughable to think it would have any effect (except maybe on my life). But I think Boeing leadership should be punished for putting profits over passenger safety. I still cannot believe any person would design a system that can override pilots based on ONE sensor and now this despicable defense? I used to live in Seattle and I'm an American so I'm still a Boeing fan at heart, but the conspiracy theorist in me has me wondering what else is there to be uncovered . . . so best to TRY to avoid Boeing planes for now.

To me, it is not about boycotting per se. I also live in a catchment area that is not short of good choices. There are plenty of options that do not involve MAXs and it is a very easy thing to avoid. I get that the risk is small. But why do that if I do not have to? I am good with some amount of risk in life. I just do not believe in wasting that on things I do not have to.

There are other things I avoid for similar reasons, they are just not germane to these discussions.

You don’t have to fly on the 737 Max. I now work on the program a bit post-RTS. I know what fixes were made and other improvements. I have no hesitation to get on one, actually being familiar with the airplane.

ElroyJetson wrote:

Avatar2go wrote:

cedarjet wrote:

Taking Boeing’s position not only on diminishing the suffering of those on board and also blaming the pilots. You should be a corporate lawyer

The role of the crew is not a Boeing position, it's a matter of established fact. Please see NTSB and BEA responses to the ET302 final report.

Also Boeing did not diminish the suffering of those on board, they questioned the veracity of the medical claims put forth by the plaintiff expert witness. Which is a routine part of settlement negotiations.

It's up to the judge to decide what's fair, but both sides have the opportunity to make their case. That's how the system works. There is no presumption that one side or the other is correct, issues are decided based on precedent and evidence.

I am not sure if the intent of this thread is the establishment of facts. I believe the operative phrase was "the work of the devil." That kind of sums things up.

Certainly Boeing is deserving of a lot of criticism for past mistakes. But a lot of these threads and comments are just to overdramatize things and bash Boeing.

I feel like if I express any opinion other than Boeing executive woke up and decided to murder people to increase profits or other sensationalism, I’ll be crucified.

morrisond wrote:

ElroyJetson wrote:

Avatar2go wrote:

The role of the crew is not a Boeing position, it's a matter of established fact. Please see NTSB and BEA responses to the ET302 final report.

Also Boeing did not diminish the suffering of those on board, they questioned the veracity of the medical claims put forth by the plaintiff expert witness. Which is a routine part of settlement negotiations.

It's up to the judge to decide what's fair, but both sides have the opportunity to make their case. That's how the system works. There is no presumption that one side or the other is correct, issues are decided based on precedent and evidence.

I am not sure if the intent of this thread is the establishment of facts. I believe the operative phrase was "the work of the devil." That kind of sums things up.

Yes - it's take a devil to make the holes in the Swiss cheese line-up.

A very bad mistake in design, followed by bad maintenance and training in the first crash, and inadequate notification of crews and training in the second crash according to the FAA and BEA.

The F/O in the LionAir accident didn’t even know what the Airspeed Unreliable checklist was, despite it having memory steps required to be memorized to be type rated. A prior crew flew the airplane for two hours with one Stickshaker activated. Then didn’t even properly report the issue so it could be fixed.

The Ethiopian crew never cutback to climb thrust or an appropriate thrust setting.

Have the read the description of the last moment of ET302? The G-forces and changes were massive, it's theorized by experts that the final dive would have caused everyone to throw up before they slammed into the ground. That sounds like a lot of suffering. 7 minutes of absolute fear and terror...

Corpsnerd09 wrote:

Have the read the description of the last moment of ET302? The G-forces and changes were massive, it's theorized by experts that the final dive would have caused everyone to throw up before they slammed into the ground. That sounds like a lot of suffering. 7 minutes of absolute fear and terror...

The factual record , though, is that it wasn't 7 minutes of terror. The final descent was 15 to 20 seconds, because of the very high velocity. Prior to that, the aircraft was steadily gaining altitude and airspeed, because the throttles were still at takeoff power. The pitch angle was between -4 and +8 degrees, with plus or minus 1/2 g.

No one is denying or minimizing, that those final seconds were terrifying. The first pitch-over event after MCAS was switched back on, was essentially free-fall at zero g and -20 degrees of pitch, for about 6 seconds. Followed immediately by the loss of control event over 12 seconds, with the aircraft accelerating toward the ground at up to 3 g's, and -40 degrees of pitch, at 500 knots. Passengers would have been pushed back into their seats, at that rate and angle. There was no time or ability for much of anything.

Avatar2go wrote:

These cases are already in settlement. Boeing has been trying to settle with the families from the very beginning. In this instance, some of the families are trying to tack on an additional settlement. The judge will have rule on whether that's allowed in this case. Normally, it isn't allowed without forensic evidence.

My point is that if PR was more relevant to Boeing, like it is for a car manufacturer, they’d likely be more willing to accept even the additional settlement. They’d at least be more cautious in the arguments they use. Car manufacturers have been callous in the past (notable US manufacturers in the ‘70s/‘80s) and it cost them dearly. Boeing isn’t in the same position, but it still is….well, gross.

I’m not like other posters who have hesitation to fly on a MAX. I’m fully certain it is safe now, but that doesn’t mean Boeing hasn’t done a truly horrible job at dealing with the situation.

argentinevol98 wrote:

My point is that if PR was more relevant to Boeing, like it is for a car manufacturer, they’d likely be more willing to accept even the additional settlement. They’d at least be more cautious in the arguments they use. Car manufacturers have been callous in the past (notable US manufacturers in the ‘70s/‘80s) and it cost them dearly. Boeing isn’t in the same position, but it still is….well, gross.

I think it's really just a question of having the court adjudicate the case, rather than public opinion. That process is intentionally adversarial, within our legal system. Everyone is entitled to a defense, and the presumption is one of innocence. In a civil case, the plaintiffs have to show a preponderance of the evidence. That's their burden.

In this particular case, it helps to understand that the merger was undertaken to consolidate the case and remove the dispute between Boeing and the airline, as to apportionment of liability. The plaintiffs and defendants agreed to this because it created the path to settlement. Defendants gave up their mutual defense, and plaintiffs gave up their pursuit of punitive damages through a jury award.

When this happens, there is a ballpark figure that both sides have as an understanding of what the settlement will likely be. Then the individual negotiations begin.

Now, there is an attempt by one group among the plaintiffs, to bolster their award. Boeing has pointed out that in the absence of evidence, this could be construed as an attempt to resurrect punitive damages, by other means.

So now the court has to decide, and that is a normal part of the settlement process. But by skillful release of information, the attorneys can attempt to create the public backlash you mentioned, and thus acheive their goal. Boeing can only reserve comment and allow the legal process to play out.

BoeingGuy wrote:

The F/O in the LionAir accident didn’t even know what the Airspeed Unreliable checklist was, despite it having memory steps required to be memorized to be type rated. A prior crew flew the airplane for two hours with one Stickshaker activated. Then didn’t even properly report the issue so it could be fixed.

The Ethiopian crew never cutback to climb thrust or an appropriate thrust setting.

You cannot post about spreading blame around and then look at the simple solution when it comes to crew actions. Sure, had the crew focused on the one problem we know now after the fact both flights would have been saved. But that is not fair on those crews to do that. You have to ignore all the alarms going off at the same time to get to that point of view.

morrisond wrote:

A very bad mistake in design, followed by bad maintenance and training in the first crash, and inadequate notification of crews and training in the second crash according to the FAA and BEA.

You forgot to add not telling anyone about the design. That seems just as important a factor in the first crash if you are going to spread around blame. Also, while we are on full blame shifting again, how about laughing at the airline for asking for more training and then pointing out lack of training that caused the accident. That seems a very important point to remember while we talk about inadequate training at the airline. Boeing thought it was funny they wanted more training, now it is an important factor that needs to be reminded any time we have these discussions.

Avatar2go wrote:

The factual record , though, is that it wasn't 7 minutes of terror. The final descent was 15 to 20 seconds, because of the very high velocity. Prior to that, the aircraft was steadily gaining altitude and airspeed, because the throttles were still at takeoff power. The pitch angle was between -4 and +8 degrees, with plus or minus 1/2 g.

No one is denying or minimizing, that those final seconds were terrifying. The first pitch-over event after MCAS was switched back on, was essentially free-fall at zero g and -20 degrees of pitch, for about 6 seconds. Followed immediately by the loss of control event over 12 seconds, with the aircraft accelerating toward the ground at up to 3 g's, and -40 degrees of pitch, at 500 knots. Passengers would have been pushed back into their seats, at that rate and angle. There was no time or ability for much of anything.

Are you telling me the passengers would not have noticed something was strange from their previous flights? The only passengers that would have been oblivious would have been asleep or on their first flights. There is a flow to a flight taking off and I think it would have been obvious to those in the window seats after a couple minutes that this was not normal. The lack of altitude and scream of the engines, because they were at take off thrust all the time as we are constantly reminded, would have meant passengers would know something was wrong. I feel for the cabin crew who would have known as well as they would have caught on quickly something was wrong and their body language, should passengers have seen them, would have caused distress. All my opinion but I don't think these flights were benign for the passengers at all. I think we try to minimize what they would have experienced because empathy puts you in their shoes and that is unthinkable.

This is a standard argument, not just in plane crashes, but in industrial accident cases or even public safety cases, etc. Emotion aside, the legal case is about compensation to victims, so both sides of the case will naturally try to argue for their favored amount of compensation by "quantifying" the damage and suffering, simply because the compensation is a hard number. To argue for a hard number you want, the only way is to quantify the input of the argument. So that's what you get in such legal cases. I don't like it more than any of the people here do, but I can understand how it gets there. Logically, it makes sense.

LAX772LR wrote:

Forgive me y'all, but seriously: this is the work o' the Devil.

https://onemileatatime.com/news/boeing- ... ms-suffer/

Boeing's argument in court is that their 737MAX crash victims "didn't have time to suffer," and thus its liability should be lessened.

I get that they have a right to a defense. But even as a former trial and veteran's attorney, who's had to make arguments that I'm not too comfortable with, in order to "vigorously advocate" for my client-- I don't see how these shysters can sleep at night.

Corporations are the worst.

My opinion would be what the majority considers correct and acceptable. I suspect "acceptable" is the view that the victims didn't have time to suffer and that the lawyers are wonderful angels. You can read between the lines.

enzo011 wrote:

BoeingGuy wrote:

The F/O in the LionAir accident didn’t even know what the Airspeed Unreliable checklist was, despite it having memory steps required to be memorized to be type rated. A prior crew flew the airplane for two hours with one Stickshaker activated. Then didn’t even properly report the issue so it could be fixed.

The Ethiopian crew never cutback to climb thrust or an appropriate thrust setting.

You cannot post about spreading blame around and then look at the simple solution when it comes to crew actions. Sure, had the crew focused on the one problem we know now after the fact both flights would have been saved. But that is not fair on those crews to do that. You have to ignore all the alarms going off at the same time to get to that point of view.

morrisond wrote:

A very bad mistake in design, followed by bad maintenance and training in the first crash, and inadequate notification of crews and training in the second crash according to the FAA and BEA.

You forgot to add not telling anyone about the design. That seems just as important a factor in the first crash if you are going to spread around blame. Also, while we are on full blame shifting again, how about laughing at the airline for asking for more training and then pointing out lack of training that caused the accident. That seems a very important point to remember while we talk about inadequate training at the airline. Boeing thought it was funny they wanted more training, now it is an important factor that needs to be reminded any time we have these discussions.

MCAS was in the maintenance manuals and as cited in the FAA and BEA reports, if the Pilots had followed the basic Airspeed Unreliable and Runaway trim required memory procedures that were assumed everyone knew as basic type training on the type (on an NG as well) their need not have been any pain or suffering.

This lawsuit should never have existed if basic training was better. Automation is going to fail through bad design or components failing in random unanticipated ways. Pilots are supposed to be the backup system. They are not just there to operate the automation.

It was not training on MCAS that was needed at both Airlines - it was basic piloting skills and basic training on the type that were inadequate. Mastery of basic flying skills and a few simple procedures is assumed on all types, as part of the certification basis and what a company designs an aircraft too - if a training program cannot train to that standard it needs to be looked at very closely to why it can't, or why pilots are getting passes through the system without those skills. That is up to a country's regulators. Not Boeing.

I find it unforgivable that the FO in the first flight was incapable of even properly trimming an aircraft just like the Pilot had 21X. That FO should never have been allowed to solo a private aircraft lacking that incredibly basic skill, let alone fly any commercial aircraft.

It was noted in his prior simulator sessions that he lacked this basic ability. He should have been fired, and gets one thinking what really is happening in some of these training organizations, and it is not just in the third world.

4 Major crashes where the automation failed and the pilots had to fly manually that resulted in the loss of all souls in the past 15 years and the same root contributor in all 4 - not knowing how to control an aircraft manually when the automation fails or goes haywire.

That is why we have Pilots in the cockpit - to provide backup when the automation fails. The backup has failed way too many times in my view and not enough has been done to look at that. Automation will fail again - however I have little faith that things will improve materially enough in training so that disasters like these 4 won't happen in the future.

So be mad at Boeing (and I am for something that should never have slipped through the cracks) but be mad at the regulators and training organizations that put those 4 pilots in those 2 cockpits as well.

So the crashes were the fault of the pilots?


P.S I am not saying the pilots were faultless but the perennial story that they were the ones to blame is frustrating. My own take on this is if I had to assign blame it would be Boeing 80+%, Airlines 10+% and the pilots >10%

StTim wrote:

So the crashes were the fault of the pilots?


P.S I am not saying the pilots were faultless but the perennial story that they were the ones to blame is frustrating. My own take on this is if I had to assign blame it would be Boeing 80+%, Airlines 10+% and the pilots >10%

No - it's not about assigning fault. Put whatever percentages you want on it. Just that those Pilots should never have been allowed to fly any commercial aircraft with their demonstrated lack of basic flying skills.

This is an aviation discussion website and I would hope that people (not you) would understand that in general you can't pin everything on one thing, as many here try to do. Boeing is not blameless or faultless in this at all.

The system is very robust and in general it's only when all parts of it fail (Design, Maintenance, regulation and Operation) that it results in disaster.

In this case, everything failed. If one part had worked there probably would have been no crashes and no lawsuits.

The system is broken and it does not appear that all parts are being adequately addressed.

morrisond wrote:

MCAS was in the maintenance manuals

Do you think pilots read the maintenance manuals?

Boeing deliberately withheld information about MCAS from the one group that most critically needed to know about it. All in a desperate attempt to be able to claim that pilots needed no training to transition from NG to MAX (apart from a few slides on an iPad).

The implementation of MCAS was shamefully incompetent and hiding a system from the pilots that would pitch the plane down in certain circumstances, simply in order to save money was appalling.

But the impression given by the way I read your remarks is the it was the pilots (the last link in that broken chain) who were at fault. Sorry this is how I interpret the statement.

Wow, great messaging, which in this day and age won’t leave the courtroom, oh wait.....
So the image they are going for is Union Carbide with wings?
(If you don’t get the reference google ‘Bophal Diaster’ the US CEO of that negligent company died an old man in his bed, decades of requests to the US for him to account for the companies actions).

Wonder what some of the responses here would have been if any US registered MAX’s had gone down on a domestic flight?

morrisond wrote:

A very bad mistake in design, followed by bad maintenance and training in the first crash, and inadequate notification of crews and training in the second crash according to the FAA and BEA.

I do hope some in Boeing are less uneducable. Otherwise I see black for this company in the next 10 - 15 years.

scbriml wrote:

Boeing deliberately withheld information about MCAS from the one group that most critically needed to know about it. All in a desperate attempt to be able to claim that pilots needed no training to transition from NG to MAX (apart from a few slides on an iPad).

The implementation of MCAS was shamefully incompetent and hiding a system from the pilots that would pitch the plane down in certain circumstances, simply in order to save money was appalling.

I think his point was that MCAS training had nothing to do with the accidents, but basic airmanship skills had everything to do with them.

In the broadest possible sense, the MAX accidents occurred because the crews did something Boeing had presumed no crew would ever do: fight the stabilizer with the elevators. That's a physical impossibility because the elevators have only a fraction of the surface area of the stabilizer.

This has been known since the all-moving stabilizer was introduced in the 1960's. It's far more efficient and provides better trim control of the aircraft. But it has the drawback that a malfunction will absolutely overwhelm the control column.

For that reason, all such aircraft have a means of stabilizer disablement, and all pilots are trained to use it, rather than pushing back with the control column. This method and practice has been successful for 50 years. Until it wasn't.

In the House Transportation Committee report, there is an e-mail from a Boeing engineer, who was asked about the safety risk of multiple MCAS activations. His response was that it wouldn't be an an issue, unless the pilots tried to fight the stabilizer. The report claims this is evidence that Boeing knew MCAS contained a fatal flaw. But the true context of the response, was that everyone knows not to do that, therefore no one would.

It's notable that this was also the approach of the FAA, in requiring Boeing to address the MCAS issues. Boeing was told, you cannot within your safety analysis of automation, presume a crew action to avoid a catastrophe. Instead your analysis must presume the crew takes an action other than the correct one. And the aircraft must remain stable and controllable while they figure it out.

That was the basis of the flight control software rewrite, that went far beyond MCAS. The FAA asked Boeing to remove any similar dependence on crew actions. The aircraft has to tolerate the crew not responding, or responding incorrectly.

This is also why the debate between "blame the pilots" and "blame Boeing" is so completely and utterly pointless. The aircraft unifies the crew and the automation into a single system. Both have to perform in accordance with their design and training. And if they don't, then they have to fail gracefully together.

Boeing is guilty of making a presumption that did not provide for a graceful failure, in the event of crew error. The presumption was made for a benign version of MCAS which could apply less than 10 pounds of force to the control column, and which also had a redundant accelerometer check on the AoA vane. That system could not produce a fatal crash.

When the MCAS authority was increased, such that the applied column forces reached 35 to 40 pounds, and the accelerometer was removed, the system was no longer benign, and the presumption & safety analysis based on it, became invalid. That is totally on Boeing.

The crews were guilty of not executing their training for stabilizer malfunction, as well as committing other errors in basic airmanship. This is why the FAA required demonstration of those skills, before resuming MAX duties. That is totally on the airlines, who were guilty of not having the programs in place to assure quality airmanship.

Lastly, the FAA found in random pilot testing, that this situation was not unique to those two airlines. Crews were found to sometimes stray from their memory and QRH checklists, and in some cases, not recovering. So this is an ongoing problem and issue in the industry. The FAA and EASA both have in their charters, to work with ICAO to encourage high training standards around the world, and to improve the design and training around automation. That's being done for a reason.

StTim wrote:

But the impression given by the way I read your remarks is the it was the pilots (the last link in that broken chain) who were at fault. Sorry this is how I interpret the statement.

I actually put very little on the pilots, other than they should have had the professionalism to know that they lacked basic skills and take it upon themselves to get the training their airlines were not providing them.

Whatever proportion of blame you attribute to anyone other than Boeing and the FAA - IMO 95% should go the airline and its regulator for allowing those pilots into a cockpit and only 5% the pilots themselves.

Avatar2go wrote:

scbriml wrote:

Boeing deliberately withheld information about MCAS from the one group that most critically needed to know about it. All in a desperate attempt to be able to claim that pilots needed no training to transition from NG to MAX (apart from a few slides on an iPad).

The implementation of MCAS was shamefully incompetent and hiding a system from the pilots that would pitch the plane down in certain circumstances, simply in order to save money was appalling.

I think his point was that MCAS training had nothing to do with the accidents, but basic airmanship skills had everything to do with them.

In the broadest possible sense, the MAX accidents occurred because the crews did something Boeing had presumed no crew would ever do: fight the stabilizer with the elevators. That's a physical impossibility because the elevators have only a fraction of the surface area of the stabilizer.

This has been known since the all-moving stabilizer was introduced in the 1960's. It's far more efficient and provides better trim control of the aircraft. But it has the drawback that a malfunction will absolutely overwhelm the control column.

For that reason, all such aircraft have a means of stabilizer disablement, and all pilots are trained to use it, rather than pushing back with the control column. This method and practice has been successful for 50 years. Until it wasn't.

In the House Transportation Committee report, there is an e-mail from a Boeing engineer, who was asked about the safety risk of multiple MCAS activations. His response was that it wouldn't be an an issue, unless the pilots tried to fight the stabilizer. The report claims this is evidence that Boeing knew MCAS contained a fatal flaw. But the true context of the response, was that everyone knows not to do that, therefore no one would.

It's notable that this was also the approach of the FAA, in requiring Boeing to address the MCAS issues. Boeing was told, you cannot within your safety analysis of automation, presume a crew action to avoid a catastrophe. Instead your analysis must presume the crew takes an action other than the correct one. And the aircraft must remain stable and controllable while they figure it out.

That was the basis of the flight control software rewrite, that went far beyond MCAS. The FAA asked Boeing to remove any similar dependence on crew actions. The aircraft has to tolerate the crew not responding, or responding incorrectly.

This is also why the debate between "blame the pilots" and "blame Boeing" is so completely and utterly pointless. The aircraft unifies the crew and the automation into a single system. Both have to perform in accordance with their design and training. And if they don't, then they have to fail gracefully together.

Boeing is guilty of making a presumption that did not provide for a graceful failure, in the event of crew error. The presumption was made for a benign version of MCAS which could apply less than 10 pounds of force to the control column, and which also had a redundant accelerometer check on the AoA vane. That system could not produce a fatal crash.

When the MCAS authority was increased, such that the applied column forces reached 35 to 40 pounds, and the accelerometer was removed, the system was no longer benign, and the presumption & safety analysis based on it, became invalid. That is totally on Boeing.

The crews were guilty of not executing their training for stabilizer malfunction, as well as committing other errors in basic airmanship. This is why the FAA required demonstration of those skills, before resuming MAX duties. That is totally on the airlines, who were guilty of not having the programs in place to assure quality airmanship.

Lastly, the FAA found in random pilot testing, that this situation was not unique to those two airlines. Crews were found to sometimes stray from their memory and QRH checklists, and in some cases, not recovering. So this is an ongoing problem and issue in the industry. The FAA and EASA both have in their charters, to work with ICAO to encourage high training standards around the world, and to improve the design and training around automation. That's being done for a reason.

A great post as always. Thank you

LAX772LR wrote:

Forgive me y'all, but seriously: this is the work o' the Devil.

https://onemileatatime.com/news/boeing- ... ms-suffer/

Boeing's argument in court is that their 737MAX crash victims "didn't have time to suffer," and thus its liability should be lessened.

I get that they have a right to a defense. But even as a former trial and veteran's attorney, who's had to make arguments that I'm not too comfortable with, in order to "vigorously advocate" for my client-- I don't see how these shysters can sleep at night.

Corporations are the worst.

Similar to UPS’ public comments regarding the cost to their business if the part 117 rest rules were applied to cargo operations. Their argument can be paraphrased as, ‘cargo crashes usually only kill the crew, thus are not worth the cost to implement.’ That, apparently, was a good enough argument.

Avatar2go wrote:

I think his point was that MCAS training had nothing to do with the accidents, but basic airmanship skills had everything to do with them.

Then how do you explain, or put into context, the fact that during the investigation and recertification process US pilots failed to correctly recover in the simulator.....even when expecting the testing situation? By that logic then they did not show basic airmanship skills. Or does that somehow not count?

morrisond wrote:

In this case, everything failed. If one part had worked there probably would have been no crashes and no lawsuits.

And the one most important part being the flawed design of the plane, no matter what way your PR tries to spin it.