Quoting BMI727 (Reply 149): And Boeing had the opportunity to better tailor their product to the majority of missions

Like what? And at what cost? All you have done is is voice "feelings" and nothing to substatiate your "feelings".

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 149): It wasn't a very well fleshed out concept at the time.

Yes it was.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 149): Unfortunately I don't have access to the numbers. But, I think that a new composite wing for the 737 would have significant benefits in differentiating the 737 on the most common missions without having a significant impact on EIS. It would allow Boeing to wait that much longer before launching a new narrowbody and give them time to update their other products.

Without numbers your thinking is completely baseless. You should read the posts by JoeCanuck and ContnlEliteCMH so that you understand a little bit the basics for going the MAX route.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 140): Quoting Revelation (Reply 137): This shows how desperate Boeing is to try to make up for lost time in the narrowbody segment. I think it shows how popular the 737MAX is with customers and why Boeing was forced by customers to offer it.

Compare:
A) Airbus studies the market, decides in less than a year to do a NEO, is confident enough to launch product with zero orders, has 1000 orders from airlines willing to be named
B) Boeing studies the market, continues to study the market, finds out AA has signed a MOU with Airbus to replace its entire narrowbody fleet, has to make an offer to AA without board approval

So indeed Boeing was forced to offer the MAX as you say, and is desperate to make up lost time in the narrowbody segment as I said.

Quoting ContnlEliteCMH (Reply 148): My opinion is that Boeing will also opt to upgrade 777 rather than replace it.

Hopefully whatever upgrade that might be is better than what they have talked about. If they can't get an upgraded 777 in the air before 2021, they might as well just do an all new plane.

Quoting ContnlEliteCMH (Reply 148): However, if they choose to replace it, doing MAX (new engines, no new landing gear, no new wing) might make that possible.

Not if it does not measure up to the competition and necessitates launching a new narrowbody towards the end of this decade or the early 2020s. The MAX needs to hold up until at least the mid 2020s, otherwise Boeing will be more or less locked in to a 777 upgrade no matter how late it might come.

Quoting planemaker (Reply 150): Yes it was.

Then why are we only hearing the details now? Why not launch the new airplane with the launch order? Especially when you can try and bury the lead of American ordering 300 Airbus planes? I think that American did not know exactly what they were committing to when they committed and Boeing hastily went back and filled in the details. And when they filled in the details they went with the easiest and cheapest because they were either too pressed for time to come up with anything else or just plain risk averse. That haste could end up costing them, but we won't know for years.

Quoting planemaker (Reply 150): You should read the posts by JoeCanuck and ContnlEliteCMH so that you understand a little bit the basics for going the MAX route.

I understand the basics. And I think that Boeing got painted into a corner with the American order and came up with the easiest answer they could to avert the immediate issues. Never mind that it might create issues later, they needed a plane to sell and that's what they got. It's going to hold on to what Boeing has now, but not much more than that if they need to rely on price and commonality to move merchandise. Eventually Boeing will have to move on to something better and that time might come sooner than it should and come at the expense of other important projects because they opted for minimum change now. Come the early 2020s, I think Boeing could find themselves in a logjam where they need two planes but can only make one and something will have to give.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 152): I understand the basics.

From your posts you certainly don't demonstrate that you understand the basics. Furthermore, you admit to not knowing any numbers yet come up with conclusions that are based on nothing. Moreover, you use vague statements that don't mean anything, such as:

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 152): Not if it does not measure up to the competition

Why post the above? How is the MAX not measuring up to the competition when Boeing has stated that the 737-8 will be 7 percent cheaper to operate than the NEO?

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 152): That haste could end up costing them, but we won't know for years.

You just have to do a simple search to learn just how long Boeing was examining a re-engine... there was no haste. And how is it going to "cost" them? Unless you put flesh on the bones of your assertions they are just baseless musings.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 152): avert the immediate issues

Avert what "issues"?

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 152): Never mind that it might create issues later

What later "issues"?

I'm sorry to say this but your posts are utterly vague. A lot of words but no substance.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 152): I think that American did not know exactly what they were committing to when they committed and Boeing hastily went back and filled in the details.

If Boeing didn't have formal Board approval, they certainly couldn't confirm American's order. If Boeing was still studying the possibilities, it's likely that they were close to a decision but did indeed get pressed by the AA order. That doesn't mean that there weren't details, but without formal Board approval it was all somewhat in limbo, imho.

I am like everyone else - I wanted the Boeing decision made yesterday, and to be a flashy new upgrade or all-new build. However, Boeing operates on their own timeline. That Airbus and American were ready to move sooner doesn't mean Boeing is "bad" - it just was a different, albeit unfortunate timeline. Had American been willing to wait six months, we wouldn't be having this conversation.

-Dave

Quoting planemaker (Reply 153): Furthermore, you admit to not knowing any numbers yet come up with conclusions that are based on nothing.

They're based on logic and conjecture. Not as good as numbers, but nobody will give me numbers, so I go with what I have. You don't have to believe it.

Quoting planemaker (Reply 153): How is the MAX not measuring up to the competition when Boeing has stated that the 737-8 will be 7 percent cheaper to operate than the NEO?

On what flight? How much cheaper is the 737 now, since the A320 will be getting marginally more efficient engines and a few more seats?

Quoting planemaker (Reply 153): You just have to do a simple search to learn just how long Boeing was examining a re-engine... there was no haste.

American signs a huge deal with Airbus and it just happens that Boeing was just getting turned around on their course of action? Boeing changed their mind hastily enough to get 100 commitments, but not hastily enough to counter the entire offer?

Quoting planemaker (Reply 153): And how is it going to "cost" them?

Because now I'm envisioning a situation around 2020 where Boeing needs a new narrowbody program and a new widebody program and something will have to give since two new planes at once isn't likely to happen.

Quoting planemaker (Reply 153): Avert what "issues"?

The one where American just bought 300 A320s and other customers could do the same.

Quoting planemaker (Reply 153): What later "issues"?

Having to come up with too many planes too quickly later on in order to stay competitive across the board as much as possible as I alluded to above.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 155): They're based on logic and conjecture.

But logic and conjecture has to be based on facts... yours is not.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 155): Not as good as numbers, but nobody will give me numbers, so I go with what I have.

You are ignoring all the facts that are out there which negate all your assertions. You don't need the "mumbers" to logically understand that Boeing made the best decision... that is to do a minimal change re-engine instead of an all new NB.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 155): On what flight? How much cheaper is the 737 now, since the A320 will be getting marginally more efficient engines and a few more seats?

Your statement shows that you are not familiar with the size of the 738 vs the A320. In any case, what you are missing is that the MAX completely negates your assertion that the MAX won't be competitive.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 155): Boeing changed their mind hastily enough to get 100 commitments, but not hastily enough to counter the entire offer?

Re-engining has ALWAYS been an option... again, just go back through all the press coverage and discussion about it in threads on A.net., including the pictures posted on A.net of re-engine wind tunnel testing. All that the AA order did was force Boeing to drop the "797" option that they presented to AA.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 155): Because now I'm envisioning a situation around 2020 where Boeing needs a new narrowbody program

But there is absolutely no logical reason that Boeing would need a new narrowbody program in 2020.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 155): Having to come up with too many planes too quickly later on in order to stay competitive across the board as much as possible as I alluded to above.

Your alluded to possibility is not logically possible.

Quoting Revelation (Reply 151): B) Boeing studies the market, continues to study the market, finds out AA has signed a MOU with Airbus to replace its entire narrowbody fleet, has to make an offer to AA without board approval

...and gets almost 500 commitments almost immediately after officially launching the product...Five Hundred sales...for what some are saying is the obviously inferior choice...and that's without any commitments yet from Southwest, who have already stated that they have no interest in a plane other than the MAX.

Boeing was offering an all new plane and nobody in here knows exactly what else they were offering, so nobody in here can say that Boeing didn't offer a composite wing or taller gear or 757/787 cockpit, exotic aluminum structure or whatever else.

It's assumed by many that Boeing only offered all new or the MAX. Logic would dictate that Boeing offered to airlines whatever modification would get them the sales.

Airlines chose the MAX and Boeing chose to offer what would sell. Anybody remember the Sonic Cruiser? A fantastic, futuristic, bleeding edge, outside the box fantastic aircraft...yet it didn't sell a single copy.

So Boeing used some tech from the Sonic Cruiser and came up with another boring tube with wings...(that sold like hotcakes), and the bleeding edge stuff was the materials...which was part of what cost them almost 4 years of production...delays they neatly avoid with the minimalist MAX.

The Airbus tin 350 would have been a great plane...but customers wanted composite and Airbus is giving them what they want.

Boeing and Airbus chose to go with the upgrade route which will net them the most profit with the least amount of potential problems...and most importantly...with what the customers chose.

Basically, the choice came down to losing sales for 5 years to Airbus or getting commitments for about 25 billion dollars worth of product, (with more to come), right now.

So we can complain all we like about what could have been...the fact is, anything more than what is currently being offered wasn't what the customer wanted...and without customers, what you have is a hobby, not a business.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 152): I think that American did not know exactly what they were committing to when they committed and Boeing hastily went back and filled in the details.

That doesn't make a lot of sense. Boeing offers a plane and AA can choose to buy it or not based on the specs Boeing is offering. Boeing has been working on re-engining the 737 for at least 3 years. They probably have a pretty good idea what they can do. AA has been buying planes for the better part of a century so it's not like they are so naive that Boeing can snooker them on a commitment for 10 billion dollars worth of aircraft.

Boeing has some wiggle room right now since they have commitments, not sales but customers can also back out if they so choose, without any harm or penalty. The customers have nothing to lose...and Boeing says they can do it.

My opinion is that they probably know better than I what they can do, so I'm going to assume that Boeing can do what they say until it's proven that they can't.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 155): Because now I'm envisioning a situation around 2020 where Boeing needs a new narrowbody program and a new widebody program and something will have to give since two new planes at once isn't likely to happen.

In the meantime, Boeing is going to earn many billions of dollars in sales while using a minimum of resources, both of which they can use to create the 737 replacement.

By, say 2020, there should be 3 versions of the 787 in service, (most of the heavy lifting will be done by the 788), probably a serious upgrade to the 777 in the air, and I'm guessing a couple of thousand MAX's in service. They don't actually have any all new product lines in the pipeline for the rest of the decade. They should have plenty of time and resources, (and with the MAX, money), to take their time and get their new narrowbody done right.

Boeing is still going to replace the 737...just not right now. It's not like research is going to stop.

It's not all or nothing.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 155): The one where American just bought 300 A320s and other customers could do the same.

Or they could buy the MAX, like the lucky folks who committed to almost 500 of them...including AA.

Quoting Revelation (Reply 151): A) Airbus studies the market, decides in less than a year to do a NEO, is confident enough to launch product with zero orders, has 1000 orders from airlines willing to be named

I'd suggest there were many years of market research and engineering studies of the A320NEO before Airbus announced their intentions.

There may have even been a couple of years of Airbus sitting on their hands!

In the end push come to shove for Boeing, just as it did with Airbus and the original A350.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 132): Because the A320 was a greater overall leap over the 737 Classic than the A320neo will be over the 737MAX.

That may be true, though I question that the difference was big at all. The 734 was a shiny new design as well.

Quoting JoeCanuck (Reply 142): The 737 Classic managed to sell 2000 frames against the all new A320 and the NG has managed to sell over 3000 against the same competition...not exactly a tragedy...

Sure, far from it. The classics are great aircraft. They ruled the eighties. They survived, the MD80 not. Don't understand me wrong. It was good, far better than a tragedy, we might call it sufficantly good. But sufficantly for what?

The success of the classics had a dark side. The soporific stream of orders, that came in for the 734, did make Boeing blind about the threat that has emerged. In the same period the for decades knocked down European aviation industry finally raised from the ashes. They did not just raise a bit (let's say to MD levels), they pressed forward to become the number one. At about 1985 a process has started during which the Boeing arch rival (MD) was removed from the equation. And still - at the end of that process - Boeing has lost their status too and they became number two by themselves.

Now tell me any other significant reason for this than the 734 being good, but not good enough to suppress the aspiration of the Europeans. Don't tell me Airbus would have prevailed anyway. If Boeing's NB offering in 1985 would have been on par with the A320 (regarding efficiency&performance) or even have beaten it, Airbus would not nearly be in that position today.

At least we say that e.g. the new chinese and russian planes will not endanger A&B because they will be worse. In part because A&B have moved now and will lead the pack by superiority. In the eighties the A320 happened to be better and still Boeing did nothing to counter it eye-to-eye. The result is known.

And simply I say we have a situation again where the new 737 iteration migth loose eye-to-eye contact with their counterparty. An 8-10% efficiency penalty on the maximum ranges might have the same impact on the 737MAX like the 734 was impacted by not having the A320 range at all.

Quoting TP313 (Reply 139): The 734 passenger count and payload are very different from the 738, and the MAX-8.

My statements were based on the difference between 734 and A320. They are not very different. I am sure that you could put in variables to rightfully say: "the 734 was 7% cheaper to operate than the A320 was".

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 149): It could easily lead to a situation where both the narrowbody and 777 market need attention at the same time and Boeing is going to have to make a tough decision.

I agree. This is quite obvious. I have read people countering this argument by saying that Boeing could start building the NSA anyway before 2020. But not without leaving the 777 weak. Ok, those people would often deny anyway that a 777 really would be weak against the A350. Another potentially threatening believe for Boeing to have IMO...

Quoting planemaker (Reply 150): Like what? And at what cost? All you have done is is voice "feelings" and nothing to substatiate your "feelings".

It is the level of evidence we can have here when discussing aircraft. Certainly not different to your kind of argument. Or have I missed any hard proof for your claims?

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 152): I think Boeing could find themselves in a logjam where they need two planes but can only make one and something will have to give.

Have I said that I agree?

Quoting planemaker (Reply 153): How is the MAX not measuring up to the competition when Boeing has stated that the 737-8 will be 7 percent cheaper to operate than the NEO?

You should not accuse others to produce spin if you believe this to have any meaning. Using the variables that have led to this conlusion the 737NG was even more than 7% cheaper than the A320. And the unimportance of this scenario has been inked into the order books...

Quoting JoeCanuck (Reply 157): By, say 2020, there should be 3 versions of the 787 in service, (most of the heavy lifting will be done by the 788), probably a serious upgrade to the 777 in the air,

The 787-10 that was shown to the public was rather underwhelming. If they cannot stretch the plane more without giving up too much range, they are better off saving that money and doing a higher weight version as the -10X will not be particularly effective competing with the A350-1000. And the 777-8 and -9 concepts were supposed to be early 2020s, so not by 2020. If they won't have a 777 upgrade flying by 2020, they might as well wait a few more years and introduce a new plane.

Quoting JoeCanuck (Reply 157): Boeing offers a plane and AA can choose to buy it or not based on the specs Boeing is offering.

Based on what was announced when, I'd guess that the specs given to AA may not have gone on much beyond "It's a 737 with the Leap-X, and here's our price."

Quoting planemaker (Reply 156): But logic and conjecture has to be based on facts... yours is not.

Here's a fact: the A320's engines will burn less fuel than the 737's. Boeing had a chance to come up with something to negate the difference but did not. It may not be a big deal ordinarily, but 737's and A320s are all but interchangeable so every percentage point counts and Boeing is not likely going to be on the right side of that equation. Boeing is going to have to trade on commonality and eat into their margins to move planes.

Quoting planemaker (Reply 156): Re-engining has ALWAYS been an option... again,

...an option that was almost always dismissed by Boeing until American ordered NEOs.

Quoting planemaker (Reply 156): Your statement shows that you are not familiar with the size of the 738 vs the A320.

The 737-800 had 9 more seats in a high density configuration, but Airbus is going to rearrange some of the interior and cut the deficit to 6.

Quoting planemaker (Reply 156): But there is absolutely no logical reason that Boeing would need a new narrowbody program in 2020.

Why not? Especially if the NEO is what it is advertised to be and Boeing isn't winning any new orders, at least not without seriously cutting into their profits. If Boeing is expecting mid-2020s EIS, they'll have to start around then, right as the A350, particularly the -1000, will be hitting its stride.

Quoting JoeCanuck (Reply 157): The Airbus tin 350 would have been a great plane...but customers wanted composite and Airbus is giving them what they want.

It would have been alright, but the XWB will be a far greater success. Which is exactly what I think the current MAX vs. a more substantially upgraded MAX would be, except Airbus had the stones to pull the trigger.

Quoting JoeCanuck (Reply 157): and the bleeding edge stuff was the materials...which was part of what cost them almost 4 years of production...delays they neatly avoid with the minimalist MAX.

Some of which is no longer bleeding edge and could be incorporated into the 737 during the time they have to wait on engine development anyway without being a huge risk or cost while giving customers a better product and Boeing more flexibility going forward.

Quoting JoeCanuck (Reply 157): Boeing is still going to replace the 737...just not right now. It's not like research is going to stop.

If the eventual replacement is to a large degree the plane they didn't launch this time, Boeing will be leapfrogged fairly quickly and that will be a large investment partially negated.

Quoting Rheinwaldner (Reply 159): Now tell me any other significant reason for this than the 734 being good, but not good enough to suppress the aspiration of the Europeans. Don't tell me Airbus would have prevailed anyway. If Boeing's NB offering in 1985 would have been on par with the A320 (regarding efficiency&performance) or even have beaten it, Airbus would not nearly be in that position today. At least we say that e.g. the new chinese and russian planes will not endanger A&B because they will be worse. In part because A&B have moved now and will lead the pack by superiority. In the eighties the A320 happened to be better and still Boeing did nothing to counter it eye-to-eye. The result is known.

let's not forget, that at the time Boeing was in a more or less monopoly situation and customers hate that. So no matter how big the difference in performance was, how good the A320 was, how good of a salesman John Leahy is, airlines wanted to have a 2nd manufacturer to chose from and bring prices down....

This is an interesting article.

http://www.centreforaviation.com/ana...cy-in-a320neo-b737max-battle-58023

Quote: Low-cost carriers operate 20% of the current A320 family fleet, but account for a disproportionate 55% of A320NEO orders

Some other interesting points on LCC's and why they represent such a large proportion of NEO orders.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 135): The 737MAX has secured 500 commitments in about as many hours from only FIVE customers and to listen to some folks it's a sign the project is an absolute disaster with no real future.

And the article implies that the MAX may be outselling the NEO by November - two months away!

Quoting Rheinwaldner (Reply 159): That may be true, though I question that the difference was big at all. The 734 was a shiny new design as well.

Seriously?   

The A320 was a significant technological leap over the 737 Classic and I would think you'd be one of the first to claim as such.

Quoting Rheinwaldner (Reply 159): If Boeing's NB offering in 1985 would have been on par with the A320 (regarding efficiency&performance) or even have beaten it, Airbus would not nearly be in that position today.

Honestly, I'd probably say you would be correct.

Quoting Rheinwaldner (Reply 159): An 8-10% efficiency penalty on the maximum ranges might have the same impact on the 737MAX like the 734 was impacted by not having the A320 range at all.

It is very unlikely we'd see such a disparity and even if we did, well nobody flies more than 1500nm anyway according to Rolls-Royce (per that PP slide that keesje often posts) so it won't have any impact.  

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 160): The 787-10 that was shown to the public was rather underwhelming.

I think the 787-10X is going to have a very warm reception by the market once Boeing Sales has been granted Authority to Offer.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 160): If they cannot stretch the plane more without giving up too much range, they are better off saving that money and doing a higher weight version as the -10X will not be particularly effective competing with the A350-1000.

Even if it had 8000nm of range, the 787-10X won't be competing against the A350-1000.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 160): If they won't have a 777 upgrade flying by 2020, they might as well wait a few more years and introduce a new plane.

On that point, I'm generally be in agreement with you.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 160): Based on what was announced when, I'd guess that the specs given to AA may not have gone on much beyond "It's a 737 with the Leap-X, and here's our price."

Which appears to have been sufficient to get AA to agree to order at least 100 of them and not moving to an all-Airbus narrowbody fleet.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 160): Boeing had a chance to come up with something to negate the difference but did not.

But even you don't know what that "something different" would be or how it would have changed the balance of power between the MAX and the neo.

How much weight would Boeing save making the wing out of CFRP?

How much better would it be if they re-profiled it (ala the 747-8)?

What would the effects of re-profiling it have on the 737?

Would if it introduces flutter, as it did on the 747-8?

If it does, what would it take to combat that flutter?

How would those corrections affect certification?

The more Boeing plays with the design, the more they risk "unknown unknowns" cropping up and the more that happens...well, we have first hand experience with how bad that can be with the 787 program and, to a lesser extent, the A380 and A350 programs.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 160): Why not? Especially if the NEO is what it is advertised to be and Boeing isn't winning any new orders, at least not without seriously cutting into their profits.

They have secured (effectively) 500 new orders already, with more likely based on public responses from a few airline CEOs.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 160): (The A350) would have been alright, but the XWB will be a far greater success. Which is exactly what I think the current MAX vs. a more substantially upgraded MAX would be, except Airbus had the stones to pull the trigger.

And yet, one wonders if Airbus rushing forward with the A350XWB might not have been the best decision. They've effectively made a plane where only one model really stands out - the middle one. The A350-800 faces fierce competition from the 787-9 (more capacity and likely better operating economics because of it) and the A350-1000 is so far not making much of a dent against the 777-300ER's sales momentum (and Boeing is improving the 77W yet again). Only the A350-900 enjoys absolute dominance of her market niche - she's bigger than a 787-9, flies farther than a 787-10X and is significantly cheaper to operate than a 777-200ER.

If Airbus had launched the original A350, that would have kept them directly competitive against the 787-8 and 787-9 and even the 787-10X (there was talk of an A350-1000 sized around the 777-200ER). Airbus then could have husbanded development time and development cash to come out with a true 10-abreast CFRP plane a bit longer than the 777-200 and 777-300 families offering more capacity, more range and significantly better operating economics at any load and distance giving Boeing no "wiggle-room" to try and place 777s.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 147): The true hubris would have been after the 787 fiasco to then announce another all-new airplane with a "short" time to market (assuming launch in late 2012 and EIS in early 2018) and then declare that they won't deliver 100 frames in two years (as was the plan for the 787), but 500 frames in two years (since production appears to have been planned to go from 0 to 60 frames per month in two years). And yet, they seemed to tell AA, WN, and other major 737 operators just that.

Doing some googling, I've found some of Albaugh's comments on the July 27th earnings conference call:

Quote: The direction we are heading in single aisle program is clear with the American Airlines order for 737RE. We were prepared to pursue either re-engining option with EIS in the middle of the decade or the New Small Airplane option with a 2019-2020 EIS. The challenge we have is we do not have a clear answer to a new production architecture to ramp up new technology at rates of up to 60/mo by end of decade.

And:

Quote: Q: How was 737RE decision made and what is the broader strategy in this market? How do you solve the we need a bigger airplane? Decision seemed to be made under duress. A: I understand the question, but we had been studying RE for long time so not last minute but admittedly our view changed in the last three months. The RE could deliver savings and combined with the technical risk moving to the right and the market moving to the left moved the decision.

Ref: http://leehamnews.wordpress.com/2011/07/27/

So it seems your conversation could indeed have occurred, but that would presume that the customers knew Boeing couldn't figure out how to ramp up to 60/month before Boeing itself knew that.

But the second question shows how the investors are concerned that Boeing's decision making seems to be under duress, and Albaugh admits they changed directions within the last three months, and said it was both the risks escalating on the 797 and the market wanting something ASAP that made them change their mind.

That begs the question, if you've been working on 737 replacement for "a long time" (at least since 2006), why didn't you have a very good understanding of the risks much earlier?

It makes one wonder what value Boeing is getting from the people it has doing new product research.

On top of Boeing's admitted direction change, we have Leahy saying months ago that the risk/reward for an all new narrowbody made it a non-starter.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 152): And I think that Boeing got painted into a corner with the American order and came up with the easiest answer they could to avert the immediate issues. Never mind that it might create issues later, they needed a plane to sell and that's what they got.

You seem to think:
A) Getting the resources (money, partners, etc) to do an all-new airplane
B) Accepting the risk that the new airplane might overrun schedule and/or budget
C) Asking the market to wait for the better part of a decade
Are not "issues" as well.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 152): It's going to hold on to what Boeing has now, but not much more than that if they need to rely on price and commonality to move merchandise.

And quality and performance and availability. As above, for some missions it'll be better than NEO, for many it'll be a wash.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 152): Come the early 2020s, I think Boeing could find themselves in a logjam where they need two planes but can only make one and something will have to give.

You can argue that they need two new airplanes now (737 replacement, 777 replacement) now, but have decided they can't build any. IMHO this is the direct result of the incredibly poor decision making and execution on the 787 and 747-8 programs.

Quoting PlanesNTrains (Reply 154): I am like everyone else - I wanted the Boeing decision made yesterday, and to be a flashy new upgrade or all-new build. However, Boeing operates on their own timeline. That Airbus and American were ready to move sooner doesn't mean Boeing is "bad" - it just was a different, albeit unfortunate timeline.

The market moves on it's own timeline too.

Quoting JoeCanuck (Reply 157): ...and gets almost 500 commitments almost immediately after officially launching the product...Five Hundred sales...

Sales? No.

Quoting JoeCanuck (Reply 157): Boeing has some wiggle room right now since they have commitments, not sales

Right. Not sales, just "commitments".

These could be sales, or they could be LoIs, MoUs, options, purchase rights, etc. We won't know for quite a time what they really are, but if they were all sales, Boeing would have just used the word "sales" or "orders".

Thus the MAX isn't quite the runaway success you make it to be, at least in my mind.

And while it doesn't seem to bother you that Boeing has stumbled its way into the right answer, it does seem to bother others.

Quoting JoeCanuck (Reply 157): Boeing is still going to replace the 737...just not right now. It's not like research is going to stop.

Yes, it's been going on since at least 2006.

My best guess is that we'll have to wait for 737 sales to drop to 757/767 levels (i.e. no orders for a year) before we see Boeing decide it's time to come out with a replacement.

Then they'll have to hope all their "research" is ready for prime time (unlike now) and get the new plane build before the narrowbody backlog drops to zero.

Quoting Rheinwaldner (Reply 159): It is the level of evidence we can have here when discussing aircraft.

No it is not... there is already a body of evidence with regards to cost/benefits.

Quoting Rheinwaldner (Reply 159): Certainly not different to your kind of argument.

You are wrong. I am not the one throwing out assertions.

Quoting Rheinwaldner (Reply 159): Or have I missed any hard proof for your claims?

I am not making claims.

Quoting Rheinwaldner (Reply 159): You should not accuse others to produce spin if you believe this to have any meaning.

Your statement not only has no relevance but it demonstrates that you completely miss the point of the interchange.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 160): Here's a fact: the A320's engines will burn less fuel than the 737's.

Please, you should know by now that it is not just about an engine's fuel burn.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 160): ...an option that was almost always dismissed by Boeing until American ordered NEOs.

No, it was not dismissed.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 160): Why not?

Because there is no reason to launch an all-new NB only 3 years after MAX EIS.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 160): without being a huge risk or cost

Quite the contrary.

Quoting Revelation (Reply 165): So it seems your conversation could indeed have occurred, but that would presume that the customers knew Boeing couldn't figure out how to ramp up to 60/month before Boeing itself knew that.

I think the customers did not believe Boeing could figure out how to ramp up to 60/month (within two years). And they were right to believe that.

Quoting Revelation (Reply 165): That begs the question, if you've been working on 737 replacement for "a long time" (at least since 2006), why didn't you have a very good understanding of the risks much earlier?

Boeing management is often castigated on this forum for not "being bold", instead re-treading old designs. Said castigation continues with the decision to pursue the 737MAX, in fact.

With the 787, Boeing management finally showed boldness. And I believe they wanted to continue to show that they had in fact not been cowed into huddling in a corner rocking back and forth by the struggle to birth the 787 and therefore continued to push and talk up the 797 even in the face of a competitor who in four days quadrupled their order book for the year.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 164): I think the 787-10X is going to have a very warm reception by the market once Boeing Sales has been granted Authority to Offer.

But not from people looking at the A350-1000. Boeing needs to have an answer for that (a 777NG showing up in 2021 is not it) rather than two answers to the -900. The 787-9 will be more than competitive with the A350-900 for a lot of customers, but the -1000 could be virtually unopposed for a lot of RFPs.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 164): Even if it had 8000nm of range, the 787-10X won't be competing against the A350-1000.

Which is why Boeing is going to have to go back and increase the weights to stretch it further. The 787-10 just needs to be a bigger plane.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 164): Would if it introduces flutter, as it did on the 747-8? If it does, what would it take to combat that flutter?

That's a risk they're taking anyway with hanging differently shaped and weighted objects from the wing.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 164): The more Boeing plays with the design, the more they risk "unknown unknowns" cropping up and the more that happens...

Which they would have six years to solve. It isn't as though Boeing could crank this thing out that much faster by doing less since the engines are still being developed.

Quoting Revelation (Reply 165): You can argue that they need two new airplanes now (737 replacement, 777 replacement) now,

That's a tough argument to make considering recent sales. Towards the end of this decade the picture will look different.

Quoting planemaker (Reply 166): Please, you should know by now that it is not just about an engine's fuel burn.

But it is an important factor, that Boeing doesn't seem to have much of an answer to.

Quoting planemaker (Reply 166): Because there is no reason to launch an all-new NB only 3 years after MAX EIS.

I think there certainly could be, especially if the NEO ends up being the more efficient plane. Everyone pegs mid 2020s as the time for a new plane, so the program would have to be launched around 2020.

Quoting travelhound (Reply 162): http://www.centreforaviation.com/ana...cy-in-a320neo-b737max-battle-58023

Is this **** what passes for objective analysis these days?

Yeah, conjuring up fantasies based exclusively on Boeing's PR figures is realy informative...  

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 168): That's a risk they're taking anyway with hanging differently shaped and weighted objects from the wing.

The risks are a totally different order of magnitude... and you should know that.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 168): Which they would have six years to solve. It isn't as though Boeing could crank this thing out that much faster by doing less since the engines are still being developed.

You should know that if it is discovered in flight testing it is too late. Moreover, you only have to look at every recent program - from the E-Jets on (including the third stretch of the CRJ) to realize that what you suggest is a fantasy. But that is besides the point, there is no net benefit to incorporating a CFRP wing in the MAX while it would increase the program risk by several orders of magnitude.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 168): But it is an important factor, that Boeing doesn't seem to have much of an answer to.

Test stand numbers are just that... numbers. What matters is the CASM... and the NEO doesn't have any clear cut advantage. As has already been pointed out by others, the duopoly will continue.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 168): I think there certainly could be

Only in Second Life... not in the real world.

[Edited 2011-09-05 15:16:59]

Quoting TP313 (Reply 169): Is this **** what passes for objective analysis these days?

I wasn't expecting that one!

CAPA are a well respected aviation consulting firm. They're not the media, so I'd suggest what they have to say has some weight behind it.

There is a fair amount of analysis in the article, so I would suggest it isn't an opinion piece. I thought the article was quite balanced and didn't perceive a deliberate slant towards the authors own preference.

... but, I could be wrong!

I've stood by quietly chuckling to myself, but this is now getting ridiculous. . .

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 160): The 787-10 that was shown to the public was rather underwhelming.

According to who?

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 160): If they cannot stretch the plane more without giving up too much range,

It doesn't need more range. It already has more range than it's intended target - the A330-300. For umpteen posts you've been criticizing the 737MAX for being too heavy. But now you're suggesting the 787-10X should be heavier than it needs to be?!

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 160): as the -10X will not be particularly effective competing with the A350-1000.

Which is not the market Boeing is (currently) aiming for with the -10X. They've suggested this numerous times. But since it's not your opinion. . .

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 160): Based on what was announced when, I'd guess that the specs given to AA may not have gone on much beyond "It's a 737 with the Leap-X, and here's our price."

I've read all your posts on this and the previous thread. Here's the best response I can give you:

"On behalf of the entire Boeing Company, we sincerely apologize for not constantly updating you personally on the on-going, and continuing, efforts, to improve the 737."

- note: I do not work for Boeing.

Seriously. Your continuous suggestion of. . .

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 143): so they half launched a nebulous 737 upgrade

. . . is down-right insulting to the men and women who have worked on the NSA/737RE over the course of the last few years. Many of whom have lost weekends, vacations, and countless hours of sleeping doing their damnedest to answer to a very fickle (and diverse) customer base. Dismiss their efforts all you want, it's your right. But please don't pretend to know what's best for them, and for Boeing.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 160): the A320's engines will burn less fuel than the 737's

That's an interesting fact seeing how neither aircraft, nor engines, have even reached firm configuration milestones, let alone first flight, certification and EIS. . .  

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 160): It would have been alright, but the XWB will be a far greater success. Which is exactly what I think the current MAX vs. a more substantially upgraded MAX would be, except Airbus had the stones to pull the trigger.

So let me get this straight, when Airbus is painted into a corner, and is 'forced' to abandon one project in order to launch another because of overwhelming customer feedback, they are to be congratulated. But when Boeing is 'forced' to choose between two different projects, before even launching either one, for the exact same reason (overwhelming customer feedback), they are "scared" and "shell-shocked." Have I got that right?

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 160): Especially if the NEO is what it is advertised to be and Boeing isn't winning any new orders, at least not without seriously cutting into their profits.

The 737-800 currently maintains a slight resale/leasing premium over the A320, in large part because of Boeing's pricing policy. Both the MAX & NEO will have premiums over the current-generation. The MAX will not cut into Boeing's profits any more than the NEO will erode Airbus/EADS's (i.e. it won't).

Quoting Revelation (Reply 165): But the second question shows how the investors are concerned that Boeing's decision making seems to be under duress, and Albaugh admits they changed directions within the last three months, and said it was both the risks escalating on the 797 and the market wanting something ASAP that made them change their mind.

  

There should be no question that Boeing wanted to do the NSA. But suggestions that they were not concurrently looking at other solutions re-737RE is ludicrous.

Quoting Revelation (Reply 165): That begs the question, if you've been working on 737 replacement for "a long time" (at least since 2006), why didn't you have a very good understanding of the risks much earlier?

I'm sure they knew all along. It took so much time because, in my opinion, it was a mind-set of "is there another way?" In other words, they knew the issues, but they also saw the opportunity. Thus they tried to exhaust every possible way to overcome the production issue/risks. And because they understood the risks is why the 737RE was developed concurrently to the NSA.

Quoting Revelation (Reply 165): The market moves on it's own timeline too.

LOL! I think that's in the running for "Understatement of the Year."   

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 168): But not from people looking at the A350-1000. Boeing needs to have an answer for that (a 777NG showing up in 2021 is not it)

It is if the A350-1000 'shows up' in 2019 or 2020. . .

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 168): Which is why Boeing is going to have to go back and increase the weights to stretch it further. The 787-10 just needs to be a bigger plane.

No, it really doesn't.


After 170 posts, this is still the most insightful:

Quoting JoeCanuck (Reply 142): While some may revel in the silly and inane A v. B squabble, market share means nothing without profit and these planes have been, (and will continue to be, judging from initial sales of the NEO and commitments for the MAX), the bread and butter for both makers...regardless of who was 'winning' the sales race.

Regards,

Hamlet69

Quoting Rheinwaldner (Reply 159): And simply I say we have a situation again where the new 737 iteration migth loose eye-to-eye contact with their counterparty. An 8-10% efficiency penalty on the maximum ranges might have the same impact on the 737MAX like the 734 was impacted by not having the A320 range at all.

There are 500 commitments that say they whatever Boeing is offering, is sufficient that for the customers, it IS the superior plane, FOR THEM...regardless of specs. It suits their requirements which means that neither planes is all thing to all people.

If the MAX wasn't good enough, it wouldn't get any sales, (or commitments),...simple as that.

So folks can spit out and spin specs and anything they like...what matters to the makers is sales which generate profits...everything else is moot.

Boeing has made billions upon billions of dollars of profit since the A320 came on to the scene...in fact their sales improved once Airbus introduced their narrowbody.

As I've said before...the market is big enough for both makers...proven by past sales and current backlog...and there is nothing to suggest that it won't continue to be. In fact, there are manufacturers spending billions of dollars with the idea that the market is big enough for four or five makers in the same market segment.

Different airlines have different needs...and since the MAX and NEO are different planes, customers have choice...some with choose either...some both.

Proof is in sales...all else is merely how they get sales. If those commitments to Boeing fail to become sales, then the MAX haters can celebrate their insight.

I doubt that will happen. My opinion is that Boeing and Airbus will continue to almost equally share the narrowbody market for the next decade much like they have for the past few decades.

Nothing has happened that gives any reason for me to change my mind. The NEO is selling...the MAX is selling, (yes, I know commitments...I choose to assume they will become sales...if I'm wrong, folks can neener, neener me to their hearts' content),...the rest of the decade will probably be another boring decade of further thousands of sales for both...despite supposedly drastic differences.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 160): Based on what was announced when, I'd guess that the specs given to AA may not have gone on much beyond "It's a 737 with the Leap-X, and here's our price."

Then AA is run by idiots. Who does that? Especially when they also have a competitor they are buying from at the same time? If they commit to Boeing, they lose slot positions at Airbus the longer they waffle on the Boeing offer. If Boeing didn't come up with something tangible, AA wouldn't have committed to it...simple as that.

Quoting Revelation (Reply 165): And while it doesn't seem to bother you that Boeing has stumbled its way into the right answer, it does seem to bother others.

It actually doesn't matter in the least what bothers me...or anyone in here for that matter. The important thing is; does it bother potential customers? So far, it seems it doesn't bother them after all.

Quoting Revelation (Reply 165): Yes, it's been going on since at least 2006. My best guess is that we'll have to wait for 737 sales to drop to 757/767 levels (i.e. no orders for a year) before we see Boeing decide it's time to come out with a replacement.

Right...and since Both makers have said that most of the gains will come from engines, (even on an all new plane), and the engines won't be ready for another 4 or 5 years, there's not much either maker could do to upgrade their planes until now.

I think you will wait a very long time for 737 sales to drop to zero, (or close to it), for a year. Sure, it could happen but since we can't know when...we'll just have to wait for it and point and laugh at Boeing then for being so silly.

Basically, either they made the best business decision or not...and I think they did, under the circumstances.

Quoting JoeCanuck (Reply 173): I think you will wait a very long time for 737 sales to drop to zero, (or close to it), for a year. Sure, it could happen but since we can't know when...we'll just have to wait for it and point and laugh at Boeing then for being so silly.

Just curious to know what you and/or others think will trigger A and/or B to launch an all-new narrowbody.

It seems to me replacing a strong-selling product will always be problematic, thus my speculation about waiting till it's not selling.

Quoting Hamlet69 (Reply 172): According to who?

Me. The 787-10X Boeing showed is not going to be large enough to compete with the A350-1000 much at all. The 787-9 should compete with the -900 in a lot of cases anyway, but Boeing has nothing that is a real alternative to the A350-1000 once it enters service. The 787-10 should grow to at least be closer in size to the A350-1000 and be a more than competitive alternative on shorter flights.

Quoting Hamlet69 (Reply 172): It doesn't need more range. It already has more range than it's intended target - the A330-300.

What could possibly go wrong planning a product line to beat yesterday's competitors. A330 orders will be winding down by the time any 787-10 enters the market.

Quoting Hamlet69 (Reply 172): For umpteen posts you've been criticizing the 737MAX for being too heavy. But now you're suggesting the 787-10X should be heavier than it needs to be?!

Different markets and different missions. If the current 787 cannot support a further stretched variant (length 72-74m, the -10X was about 68-69) with sufficient range with the current combination of wing and landing gear, Boeing is going to have to redesign it and up the weights.

Quoting Hamlet69 (Reply 172): Which is not the market Boeing is (currently) aiming for with the -10X. They've suggested this numerous times. But since it's not your opinion. . .

Right, which makes me think they're going after the wrong target as they'll not have anything to provide a real alternative to the A350-1000. Even a 777NG would have to rely in large part on increased capacity to get its CASM on par with the A350.

Quoting Hamlet69 (Reply 172): . . . is down-right insulting to the men and women who have worked on the NSA/737RE over the course of the last few years.

I think that when the AA order came down Boeing new they needed to offer a re-engined 737, they just didn't know which one and set about answering those questions as quickly as possible. Once most of it was nailed down, they unveiled the MAX.

Quoting Hamlet69 (Reply 172): Both the MAX & NEO will have premiums over the current-generation. The MAX will not cut into Boeing's profits any more than the NEO will erode Airbus/EADS's (i.e. it won't).

The issue is that in situations where Boeing cannot rely on commonality as a major selling point they are going to have to cut margins and buy themselves orders. The 737 may be a bit pricier now, but I expect that trend will reverse itself when the NEO and MAX hit the street.

Quoting Hamlet69 (Reply 172): It is if the A350-1000 'shows up' in 2019 or 2020. . .

The -1000 is now scheduled for 2017. Relying on the competition to screw up is not a very confidence inspiring way of doing business.

Quoting JoeCanuck (Reply 173): Proof is in sales...all else is merely how they get sales.

Proof is in profit.

Quoting JoeCanuck (Reply 173): Then AA is run by idiots. Who does that?

People who know a great deal when they see one.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 175): What could possibly go wrong planning a product line to beat yesterday's competitors. A330 orders will be winding down by the time any 787-10 enters the market.

The 787 was developed to replace the 767, as the A330 was eating its lunch. To more effectively compete against the A350-1000 Boeing will look at a 777NG of some sort. The 777 has been a market leader since its initial design and has won the majority of sales (at the A340's expense). To compete Airbus listened to clients and came up with the A350XWB. A replacement for the 767 and competitor for the A330 should not be expected to effectively compete with the 777's new competitor.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 175): Even a 777NG would have to rely in large part on increased capacity to get its CASM on par with the A350.

If that ends up being what they have to do, then they will do it. However, it will be a 777NG of some kind that will compete with the A350 and not a 787 variant.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 175): Me. The 787-10X Boeing showed is not going to be large enough to compete with the A350-1000 much at all. The 787-9 should compete with the -900 in a lot of cases anyway, but Boeing has nothing that is a real alternative to the A350-1000 once it enters service. The 787-10 should grow to at least be closer in size to the A350-1000 and be a more than competitive alternative on shorter flights.

The 787-10X is the size of the 777-200ER, so, that certainly does make sense now doesn't it?

NS

Quoting Revelation (Reply 174):

Basically, the market will tell them and the market killed any idea for an all new plane for now...not forever. By 2020, composite technology, exotic metals and more mature engine designs will be available to design and produce a plane that will blow the current offerings out of the water.

So it will be a combination of market demand and technological capability that will decide the successors to the 737 and a320.

The 787 has made everyone gunshy about: if you build it, they will come. While it is a wonderful plane, it has shown that bleeding edge can be a double edged sword...better in many ways but introducing so much uncertainty to make it almost not worth the effort...for customers or producers.

While the 787 was being delayed time after time, (more often than not by very experienced suppliers), the 330 sold like hotcakes...and will be providing airlines with profitable service for maybe decades...every one of which makes Airbus a ton of cash...unlike the 787 which is still not quite up to spec and may produce a profit once every plane they've sold is handed over.

There is too much uncertainty in the airline biz to take a lot of chances...too much competition, uncertain fuel prices, political unrest, ever tighter environmental regs...to take any more chances than they have to. The 737 and a320 are proven over decades of reliable service...they are something one can rely on.

So airlines are forced to settle for certainty, reliability, better economy, smaller environmental footprint and predictable delivery dates.

What they give up, and weren't willing to take chances on, are vague economic promises, uncertain delivery dates and more delays in updating their fleets.

Aircraft design is rarely revolutionary anymore...it's evolutionary. These will be the last iterations of these planes and by far the best ones. They will be significantly better than the current models for airlines.

Ultimately, airlines weren't willing to pay or wait for perfect...they were willing to pay and wait for good enough.

Quoting Revelation (Reply 165): The market moves on it's own timeline too.

Of course. Everyone has their own needs and abilities.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 175): Me. The 787-10X Boeing showed is not going to be large enough to compete with the A350-1000 much at all. The 787-9 should compete with the -900 in a lot of cases anyway, but Boeing has nothing that is a real alternative to the A350-1000 once it enters service. The 787-10 should grow to at least be closer in size to the A350-1000 and be a more than competitive alternative on shorter flights.

So now the 777 is irrelevant? I thought the 777NG was the -1000 competitor, but I guess I was wrong. The 787 is supposed to be able to compete with everything above the A321 and below theA380.

Interesting.

-Dave

Quoting gigneil (Reply 177): The 787-10X is the size of the 777-200ER, so, that certainly does make sense now doesn't it?

This is part of where Boeing really screwed themselves when they botched up the 787. They were pressed for time and manpower so they dropped the modified wing on the -9. Had they not had to make that choice, they could have stretched the -9 before design freeze to what is basically the -10X now and had their A350-900 competitor and 777-200 replacement right there, both in terms of size and capability.

But that didn't happen. They cocked up the 787 and the -9 ends up being what it is and there is no bigger wing for a further stretched -10 to have sufficient range. Instead the -10X is only a 5-6 meter stretch over the -9 with a pretty straight tradeoff for range. It will only compete with the A350-900 on relatively short routes and likely doesn't offer enough capacity to dent the A350-1000 at all. In my opinion, that is a variant Boeing might as well do without and just put that money and effort into getting the wing and landing gear they need to stretch the 787 more and have more payload range with it.

I don't think that the 777-8 and -9 concepts shown are particularly great either, primarily due to timeframe. If those will only arrive in the early 2020s Boeing might as well take a few extra years and bring an all new plane to market, particularly seeing as the A350-1000 has been bumped back to 2017. A 777NG would rely in large part upon having more seats (making 10 wide standard) to drag CASM down to A350 levels, which could make it on the large side for a lot of customers, though Emirates and Cathay would likely be quite happy with it. I think the best course for Boeing is to bring an all new 777 replacement (which would be -300ER size and up) to market in the mid 2020s. I suppose that if Boeing wanted the big score they could try and do that in the same sort of timeframe they were talking about for the 737 replacement until the MAX was launched, considering the experience gained on the 787 and lack of scaling issues, but that is likely too much risk, leaves too many holes in the portfolio, and would cut whatever momentum the 747-8 and 777 have at the moment off at the knees.

But how does this figure in with the 737MAX? The scenario I can see is that Boeing announces their Y3 program sometime late this decade for mid 2020s EIS and the next day Airbus announces their A320 replacement. Just like that Boeing could find themselves 4-5 years behind in the narrowbody market. And I don't think that the MAX as currently constituted could weather that storm as well as it should. Boeing could find themselves having to make a very tough choice that could lead to them having a knife at a gunfight in some portion of the market. They'll sell plenty of 737s now, but will people still want them in 2022? Is it good enough to hang on in the market during the next decade even if Airbus already has a new plane hitting the market? I'm not convinced it is. Making more of an investment now would give Boeing an offering that is competitive both today and won't risk becoming a lame duck in the next decade.

Quoting PlanesNTrains (Reply 179): So now the 777 is irrelevant? I thought the 777NG was the -1000 competitor, but I guess I was wrong.

I think that the short bodied 777 will not continue to be a factor beyond the second half of this decade. Most of the orders (and indeed this has been the case recently) will be for the -300ER and the smaller variants will have to be replaced in Boeing's portfolio by 787 variants. It will need modifications (as did the 777 to create the -300ER) but it can be done and done well.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 164): The A320 was a significant technological leap over the 737 Classic and I would think you'd be one of the first to claim as such.

It is almost funny but I don't. You may remember that I always argued that even if the NSA would only be 5%-10% better than the A320NEO it would not be a problem. Likewise I say that though the A320 was a new design, introduced more range and offered a ground breaking system architecture, the efficiency and operationg cost were not a big leap. It was at max 5-10% better than the 734 and on short ranges probably even worse IIRC. I would say that the 787 is a larger technological leap over A330 than the A320 was over 734.

I would also say that the gap between 737MAX and A320NEO will be smaller than the gap between 734 and A320 was. But in some cases the gap could still approach similar dimensions. Which may be an indication that the outcome could tend in the same direction too. Especially if we consider the obstacles that the A320 had to overcome (compared to the A320NEO).

Quoting planemaker (Reply 166): there is already a body of evidence with regards to cost/benefits.

Then show the proof that BMI727's claim was wrong. Just saying "there is" does not qualify for it. Show it.

Quoting planemaker (Reply 166): I am not making claims.

nClaimCount++; (Increment operator applied to variable nClaimCount)....

Quoting Hamlet69 (Reply 172): That's an interesting fact seeing how neither aircraft, nor engines, have even reached firm configuration milestones, let alone first flight, certification and EIS. . .

It should be allowed to look at the preconditions and draw conclusions with some legitimation. Assuming that the preconditions between A320 and 737NG will not make a difference needs quite some denial...

Quoting JoeCanuck (Reply 173): It suits their requirements which means that neither planes is all thing to all people.

Quoting JoeCanuck (Reply 173): If the MAX wasn't good enough, it wouldn't get any sales, (or commitments),...simple as that.

In the exact post from which you quote me I said exactly this with a strong emphasis.

I repeat that thousands of 737MAX will be sold. My doubt is not that the 737MAX will not be very successful. My doubt is that the 737MAX might only be successful if you look at it isolated. In comparison with others it could be notably weaker. But let's wait and see... I don't say that I could not be wrong...

[Edited 2011-09-06 01:19:42]

Quoting rheinwaldner (Reply 181): I repeat that thousands of 737MAX will be sold. My doubt is not that the 737MAX will not be very successful. My doubt is that the 737MAX might only be successful if you look at it isolated. In comparison with others it could be notably weaker. But let's wait and see... I don't say that I could not be wrong...

Well, presumably those who made commitments had looked at the NEO before making said commitments and they chose, (or will choose), the MAX. I would be very surprised if Airbus didn't have a campaign with each of them.

For all we know, those that committed to the MAX may also order the NEO.

Nothing is done in a vacuum...and AA has shown that commonality won't prevent a mixed fleet.

Some airlines will choose the MAX, some will choose the NEO, some will choose both but all of these airlines will compare the two against each other.

Quoting rheinwaldner (Reply 181): Then show the proof that BMI737's claim was wrong. Just saying "there is" does not qualify for it. Show it.

It is BMI727 that is making the claim that Boeing should put a new wing on the MAX... with no "proof" - none, that it has a positive cost/benefit... yet he doesn't have to prove it since that aligns with your bias.

I had to burst out laughing at your logic... or lack of it! It really is too funny! Anyone can make unsubstantiated claims as long as they are anti-MAX.

Quoting BMI727 (Reply 180): This is part of where Boeing really screwed themselves when they botched up the 787. They were pressed for time and manpower so they dropped the modified wing on the -9. Had they not had to make that choice, they could have stretched the -9 before design freeze to what is basically the -10X now and had their A350-900 competitor and 777-200 replacement right there, both in terms of size and capability.

If reports are to be believed, the aero is good enough that the loss of the 4m of span aren't really going to hurt and it does make the 787-9 a bit easier to work with at an airport.


What hurts the 787-10X is the fact that the 787 is "undercarriage limited". To my knowledge, the undercarriage is rated to 252t and that is now the Maximum Ramp Weight of the 787-9. So there is no more TOW growth available and the 787-10X has to trade structural weight for fuel load weight and therefore will offer less range than the 787-9.

And let us not forget that a significant part of the 787-9's MTOW growth from the original 227t to todays 251t is not related to covering for higher-than-planned OEW, but instead was driven by 787-9 customers who wanted a plane that could tank more fuel at design range so it could lift more payload farther. The original 8500nm figure was for passengers (at 8-abreast) and bags, but 787-9 want to carry more passengers (9-abreast), their bags and cargo (since the 787-9 has such volumonous holds).



So the only option for Boeing is to develop a new undercarriage for the 787-10X and main gear well (Section 45). And modifying Section 45 may require changes to Section 44 and maybe Section 46.

And that is a significant expense for just a single model.

Now Boeing can leverage that costs across a future 787-11X, 787-12X, a 787-9LR and a 787-9F. But if they decide to add those models, then they will also need to push the wing out to 65m (and maybe a bit more, if they can get away with it in terms of airport compatibility). So that will likely mean changes to the center wing box (Section 11) and that would likely require changes to Section 44 and perhaps Section 43.

So now you're making significant changes to half the airframe.

[Edited 2011-09-06 10:47:40]