|Quoting usafdo (Reply 12):|
The pilots need to be suspended immediately, and perhaps fined.
A bit harsh, don't you think?
|Quoting ac033 (Reply 21):|
All 3 crews member are now suspended UFN...
From which we should infer nothing. Standard procedure in many organisations, while the investigation gets under way.
|Quoting C680 (Reply 24):|
Our SOP is abort above 80 kts is only for Fire, Failure, Roll back or loss of directional control. A controller saying "STOP" requires a very quick judgement call. An aborted take off at high speed (in our case over 80 kts) is one of the more dangerous maneuvers you can do in a jet. If the crew cannot see an obstruction, imminent collision, or some other catastrophic problem, its probably best to keep going.
Couldn't agree more. An abort above 80 kts is considered a major event. I'd stop in fog, if I couldn't be sure there was nothing on the runway ahead, or perhaps if an intersecting runway was also active, but if a quick visual scan outside told me all was ok I'd be go-minded. At high speed, its our call. If the controller called stop and stated a reason, that would help me in the decision to comply or not.
IMHO it is much safer to continue the take off and avoid the helicopter traffic that the Japanese controler was worried about. But I don't think anyone on this forum was actually there, so this is all just standard A.NET armchair quarterbacking fun....
|Quoting soon7x7 (Reply 48):|
An why they (FAA) did away with "Position and hold" is just nonsense.
Wasn't it because "..and hold" could be misheard as "..and GO"? Or as was mentioned earlier, "..and ROLL?)
And another thing. No tinkering with phraseology is going to prevent every case of taking off without clearance. In some cases a flight reads back a line-up clearance and just continues into take-off mode. Because one pilot is for whatever reason mentally cleared for take-off and is acting accordingly, the other can easily be led into assuming they're cleared when they're not. Large segments of Human Factors courses revolve around around this sort of thing, and airlines incorporate it into recurrent training courses. Its all very well you non-pilots sitting there and thinking we're all robots. Pilots occasionally "hear what they expect to hear" rather than what was actually said, for all sorts of distractionary (is that a real word?) reasons.
This sort of thing happens in all walks/areas of life and I think the technical term is brainfart. You can legislate, devise procedures, change phraseology and incorporate technical safety nets all you like, but sooner or later a human is going to find a way through all that and get something wrong. Its a danger we are aware of and are constantly guarding against.
Certainly non-English pilots are at a disadvantage, but often taking off without clearance has nothing to do with it.
A related problem is reading back a climb/descent clearance wrongly, and the controller doesn't pick up on it for some reason (brilliant though they generally are, controllers aren't robots either). Our autopilot mode select panels now transmit to the controller the altitude we've actually dialled in, so if we're cleared to level 100 and we dial in 110, we're get a call like "confirm cleared level is 100" or similar, a tactful reminder that he's/she's noticed that we've misheard or perhaps corerectly heard but misdialled.
At this stage there is no technology for a similar safety net to be applied with take-off clearances.
regards - musang