Please carry on discussion here. Previous thread was FAA Grounds 787 Part 2 (by iowaman Jan 17 2013 in Civil Aviation)

NZ1
Forum Moderator

[Reposted from the other thread, as my post came right after the previous thread was closed]

Quoting spacecadet (Reply 196): Quoting rcair1 (Reply 169): The FAA believe it MAY BE a safety of flight issue. Read what they wrote again, carefully: These conditions, if not corrected, could result in damage to critical systems and structures, and the potential for fire in the electrical compartment. I think you and some others are parsing out the word "could" to mean "well, it hasn't happened yet, so it's not yet a safety of flight issue, and may never be." But that's not what that means.

Again, we're in the middle of an interpretation problem, due to the subtlety of english vocabulary (differences between "is", "may be", "could", "is not")

Also, you seem to be thinking along the lines of "either it is safe, or it is not". This binary representation is only valid if you have a complete knowledge of the entire situation. Or more precisely, complete knowledge of every single chain of events that could be triggered by a battery issue, and of the consequences of these chains on the rest of the aircraft, so that you can actually assess the safety of the design.

But neither the FAA nor Boeing are omniscient, and probably do not have all this knowledge.
They know the batteries have a problem, they know smoke and electrolyte is projected outside of the containement box.
But this probably invalidates several of the hypotheses used for design and certification of the battery system. So they probably do not know precisely what could happen beyond the projection of smoke and electrolyte.
And they probably have come up with several potential scenarii in which catastrophic failures are a result.

Until these potential scenarii can be confirmed as impossible or sufficently highly unlikely, then these scenarii will have to be considered as a risk, and the appropriate safety measures will have to be taken.
But as the causes of the issue also seem unknown, we can't take any preventive measures directly on the batteries, such as checks and/or replacement. The batteries (at least the MAIN) cannot be removed for flight. So that leaves only one option, to ground the fleet

So to summarize, the situation here is not "the plane is unsafe". But rather "the 787 may very well be sufficiently safe, but it may also not be. We just don't know. And until we do know, then it will remain grounded"

Information is always the key...
And I do not have much more of it than anyone else here about the actual 787 events, which is why I added "probably" or "it seems", and will qualify this entire post as "my opinion".

Go to Bloomberg's website for an article on the LI ion batteries. The problem may be due to a bad batch of these batteries from a Japanese manufacturer. Certainly possible, in that the A/C involved are recent builds. The early build planes seem to not have this problem. At he Bloomberg website they have a picture of the remains of the battery from the JAL plane in Boston. Almost nothing left but the battery box, which survived the fire intact.

Reference here:

.http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-01-18/why-the-batteries-in-boeings-787-are-burning

@HAWK - I agree on the positioning flight. I specifically asked the AI PR department about VT-ANJ and whether AI would move the aircraft to BOM which is their main engineering base (you are the more knowledgeable person on that. They told me that they would fly engineers for the service to respective cities.

We too have the FAA EAD on our site. However, it is not clear.

Also my response was referring to the statement on the previous thread about test flights of the new 787s which are being produced. If empty flights are allowed like in the case of AI, then by the same logic, test flights should also be allowed.

Photo of the damaged NH battery alongside an undamaged battery. The cover has been removed in both.

This may have been posted in the locked Parts but Boeing has suspended 787 deliveries.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-21095056

They will need a large parking lot if the grounding is extended for weeks!

Quoting traindoc (Reply 2): he problem may be due to a bad batch of these batteries from a Japanese manufacturer.

So this is a co-incidence? An aircraft with a history of electrical problems severe enough to cause arcing and fire just happens to have a bad batch of batteries installed causing yet more fires.

After reading though hundreds of posts on this subject I’m still none the wiser about this incident – The information just isn’t out there yet.

Quoting JerseyFlyer (Reply 5): This may have been posted in the locked Parts but Boeing has suspended 787 deliveries.

Why would any customer take delivery of an aircraft they could not use? A payment is made on delivery, too, IIRC.

Quoting Daysleeper (Reply 6): After reading though hundreds of posts on this subject I’m still none the wiser about this incident – The information just isn’t out there yet.

Many interesting and informative posts from very knowlegeable a.netters, indeed. Could any of the cognoscenti hazard how long the grounding will be if it is determined that the problem is "simply" manufacturing defects in the batteries concerned? I ask because I imagine that if this were identified as the cause of the problem, it would be the simplest to resolve.

I came across this interesting piece of news today. Of course this may be not at all related to the failures of the batteries that we've seen, as the complaints raised by this employee took place during the design phase of the batteries. The article talks about how this employee feels he was fired for pointing out flaws in the design of the battery.

http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/0...ystem-fired-for-pointing-out-flaws

Of note it certainly appears that this employee had more going on in the work place than his complaint on the battery design and he did not gain Whistleblower protection from his dismissal from the company. The date on the letter from his lawyers is dated from 2011 so it does pre-date the current problems.

EDIT: This firm Securaplane is responsable for the charging unit of the battery.

[Edited 2013-01-19 06:21:49]

Quoting BLRAviation (Reply 3): Also my response was referring to the statement on the previous thread about test flights of the new 787s which are being produced. If empty flights are allowed like in the case of AI, then by the same logic, test flights should also be allowed.

The ban of operations by the DGCA was a ban on revenue operations, not all operations.

The FAA may have different policies for US-flagged aircraft. Tests certainly can take place in India.

[Edited 2013-01-19 06:21:28]

From Part 2:

Quoting spacecadet (Reply 196): I think you and some others are parsing out the word "could" to mean "well, it hasn't happened yet, so it's not yet a safety of flight issue, and may never be." But that's not what that means. No design or construction flaw has ever caused an accident before it actually caused an accident; that doesn't mean the danger didn't exist before it did. It's like saying "my house doesn't need smoke detectors because it's never burned down before." Obviously that's an extreme example - I am not saying were it not for this grounding, that there'd ever be a 787 crash due to a battery fire.

No, that's not what "could" means. It doesn't simply mean it won't happen because it hasn't happened yet, it means that it may or may not happen. That is not a certainty. The FAA are playing it safe, as it rightly should.

Quoting spacecadet (Reply 196): But the word "could" there means the potential for damage to critical systems exists. When there is a condition that can lead to potential damage to critical systems, that is a safety of flight issue. And the plane wouldn't be grounded otherwise.

Replace the word "when" with "if" and that statement is more or less correct. To use "when" suggests that it will happen. That's not what the FAA are saying.

Quoting airmagnac (Reply 1): Again, we're in the middle of an interpretation problem, due to the subtlety of english vocabulary (differences between "is", "may be", "could", "is not")

  

Quoting petteri (Reply 8): I came across this interesting piece of news today. Of course this may be not at all related to the failures of the batteries that we've seen, as the complaints raised by this employee took place during the design phase of the batteries. The article talks about how this employee feels he was fired for pointing out flaws in the design of the battery.

At a first glance, it seems to be an interesting discovery. Could this lead to a, "smoking gun" ?

Quoting boacvc10 (Reply 11):

It's the dailykos. Just saying...

Quoting JerseyFlyer (Reply 5): This may have been posted in the locked Parts but Boeing has suspended 787 deliveries.

Like they have a choice.

Quoting JerseyFlyer (Reply 5): They will need a large parking lot if the grounding is extended for weeks!

I would expect they would be allowed to perform positioning flights to other locations for storage, if necessary.

So is there any idea when the fleet will be back in the air? Can anyone summarize the latest information? Is this as easy as replacing the faulty batteries?

Quoting airmagnac (Reply 1): So to summarize, the situation here is not "the plane is unsafe". But rather "the 787 may very well be sufficiently safe, but it may also not be. We just don't know. And until we do know, then it will remain grounded"

Well, no. If we don't know then by default it's not safe enough, hence the grounding. I agree with spacecadet on this one.
The basis for certification is that many kinds of failures can happen, without downing the aircraft. If we now discover failures that were not predicted, all bets are off.

Quoting Daysleeper (Reply 6): So this is a co-incidence? An aircraft with a history of electrical problems severe enough to cause arcing and fire just happens to have a bad batch of batteries installed causing yet more fires.

Not to defend the 787 but the arcing was determined to have been caused almost certainly by metal shavings, something that could happen anywhere for many reasons (and a modification has been made to minimize the risk).

Would, could, will, when, if . . . .

Can't we all just agree that in the view of the regulators (FAA, EASA etc), anything supposed to be airborne that has not been demonstrated to be safe, is by definition unsafe? Makes life and these sort of discussions so much easier.

Thanks,
PW100

I was driving by ORD yesterday and noticed that Lot's 787 is still at ORD. Last I heard they were supposed to ferry it back to WAW on the 17th. Hopefully someone can take some pics.

Quoting Aesma (Reply 15): Not to defend the 787 but the arcing was determined to have been caused almost certainly by metal shavings, something that could happen anywhere for many reasons (and a modification has been made to minimize the risk).

I wasn’t aware that it was proven. I know they suspected it could be FOD, but as the firearc would destroy the FOD then it’s presence could only ever be theorised.

Quoting _AA_777_MAN (Reply 17): I was driving by ORD yesterday and noticed that Lot's 787 is still at ORD.

As far as LO's SP-LRA it is my understanding that there were indications in the cockpit of problems with the Air Conditioning system on the WAW-ORD flight, and the plane would have gone tech anyways - was the problem fixed?

On a similar note ...
Is the QR's 788 (canceled LHR-DOH flight on 1/16) still at LHR or was it ferried back to DOH? Was there ever any explanation as to what caused the cancelation of that flight.

Quoting PW100 (Reply 16): Can't we all just agree that in the view of the regulators (FAA, EASA etc), anything supposed to be airborne that has not been demonstrated to be safe, is by definition unsafe? Makes life and these sort of discussions so much easier.

It sounds good, it sounds common sense. But as I understand risk management (and the math et cetera they use) the statement does not make sense, and does not help define the steps that need to be taken to ensure safety.

The basic problem is "Anything ... that has not been demonstrated to be safe". In essence it asserts that regulators must prove and demonstrate a negative. You have stated an impossibility.

Quoting airmagnac (Reply 1): Again, we're in the middle of an interpretation problem, due to the subtlety of english vocabulary (differences between "is", "may be", "could", "is not")

Consider that all releases from manufacturers and regulatory generally go through their legal staff to ensure no absolutes are stated that leave room for law suits.

Scanning the morning news today I noticed some interesting comments.. One there seems to be a shift from the batteries themselves to the charging process and charging rate regulators. Second, it was noted when a battery burns, it usually destroys some of the key components needed for analysis. And third, they are looking at the a/c's extensive computer logs for everything from charging rates to first flickers of warning/informational displays.
Since 90% of the articles rehashed old stuff and boilerplate, and no conclusions were postulated, I didn't bother copying all the URLs.

Quoting ordwaw (Reply 19): On a similar note ... Is the QR's 788 (canceled LHR-DOH flight on 1/16) still at LHR or was it ferried back to DOH? Was there ever any explanation as to what caused the cancelation of that flight.

Like the FAA, EASA has grounded the 787. The Dreamliners are not going anywhere at the moment.

Quoting PlaneInsomniac (Reply 22): Like the FAA, EASA has grounded the 787. The Dreamliners are not going anywhere at the moment.

That wasn't the reason for the original cancellation, however. QR stated their was a technical issue that required the plane to overnight at LHR to await parts. QR still operated all other scheduled 787 services that day after the FAA issued the Emergency AD that grounded UA. QR subsequently grounded their flights in accordance with the AD.

Quoting Aesma (Reply 15): If we don't know then by default it's not safe enough

I'll be accused of splitting hairs, but once again that is not sufficiently precise  


First, see :

Quoting frmrcapcadet (Reply 20): The basic problem is "Anything ... that has not been demonstrated to be safe". In essence it asserts that regulators must prove and demonstrate a negative. You have stated an impossibility.

Second, the actions to be undertaken are different if we are talking about :
1) I KNOW the aircraft is not safe
2) I DO NOT KNOW if it is safe, and I have reason to suspect it is not

In the first case you have to take positive action to correct the situation, in this case modify the architecture of the batteries and/or systems around the batteries to prevent any impact on the systems. Which would last weeks or months, cost a lot, and make lots of noise in the media.

In the second case, you take steps to collect and analyse the necessary data. Until then, you consider any scenario is possible, and take the appropriate safety measures to prevent the worst case scenario (which does not necessarily imply grounding, BTW). Notice the "We consider this AD interim action" in the FAA emergency AD. The same formula was also used by EASA in the Emergency ADs about AOA probes on Airbus aircraft a couple months ago
Once you have the info you need, then you now know for sure what the situation is. If you now know for sure the aircraft is unsafe, then go to 1). If it's OK then case closed.


I'm insisting here because I think it's important in order to understand what's going on.

If you understand the current FAA position as "we don't know if the 787 is safe in case of a battery issue, so we're checking", then it does not invalidate previous statements by FAA management of their confidence in the safety of the plane, it does not invalidate the certification process as a whole (it just has to be completed to take into account the new experience).
Also the outcome of the checks could very well be that the 787 is deemed sufficiently safe. In which case, the 787 could be released without a major architecture change, and definitive corrections to the battery issue will come at a later date.

If you understand the current FAA position as "we know the 787 is NOT safe", then that means the FAA is negating all it has done so far with regard to the 787, and FAA management is backpedaling.
And if the plane is released without any major change, then the immediate conclusion is that the FAA is in bed with Boeing, totally corrupt, bla bla bla. And we are already seeing such reactions...


So i'm insisting because such oversimplifications are usually the starting point for all those conspiracy theories, accusations of corruption and compromising of safety etc...
I know this is not the Tech/Ops section, but I think that people on this forum are aware that aviation is complex. And we can therefore avoid oversimplifications.

Quoting kanban (Reply 21): Consider that all releases from manufacturers and regulatory generally go through their legal staff to ensure no absolutes are stated that leave room for law suits.

I'm sure they don't leave room for legal action, but there is still room for subtly different understandings of the phrasing

So it's come down to a semantics battle...

Boy, we really are a bunch of desperate nerds.

Quoting airmagnac (Reply 24): I'm insisting here because I think it's important in order to understand what's going on.

And I for one appreciate you making the effort.




I honestly don't know if the situation with the batteries warranted grounding the plane versus requiring airlines to intensively monitor the batteries and charging systems. Yes, fire is bad. Yes, smoke is bad. But at this admittedly early stage of the investigation, neither incident appears to me to have been one that with certainty would have caused a hull loss if it had occurred in a situation that prevented a quick diversion. I may be proven wrong in that belief once the investigation is done. Then again, I may not.

The 737 rudder power control unit. The A330/A340 pitot tubes (both Goodrich and Thales). The cargo door locks on the 747-100. The rear cargo hatch on the DC-10.

All of the above were known issues that could have affected flight safety, and yet the planes were not grounded while the issue was investigated. And I am sure there are more situations that could be brought up.

One can certainly argue "better safe than sorry", but with the above cases, alas we did end up with "sorry" due to the families not being grounded until the issue was fully understood and corrected as accidents happened and lives were lost.

Perhaps because so few 787s were in revenue service, it was an easier decision to order them grounded. Or perhaps the FAA felt stung by past criticism for not taking immediate and definitive action and therefore this time decided they would. Or perhaps the two together.

But as they say, it's air over the wing. The FAA has grounded the 787, compelling everyone else to ground it, as well.

However, I wonder if doing so has helped safety or hindered it, going forward.

Even with the few planes in the air and few ready to be delivered, this grounding is going to cost Boeing a significant amount of money.

If the investigation does uncover a severe error in the design of the 787's battery charging subsystem, then grounding the fleet will hopefully encourage the Regulatory Agencies to ground other planes in the face of what could be a serious safety of flight issue.

But if the investigation shows these were isolated cases caused by bad components (be them the battery or the chargers), then I fear the economic costs to Boeing from the grounding might make regulators around the world less likely to order a grounding in the face of a possibly serious safety issue because if they'e wrong, they've seriously hurt the OEMs.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 26): The 737 rudder power control unit. The A330/A340 pitot tubes (both Goodrich and Thales). The cargo door locks on the 747-100. The rear cargo hatch on the DC-10.

One of the difference between these cases and the 787 issue is the ratio of event numbers / total flight hours for the type.

It is much, much greater in that specific case.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 26): neither incident appears to me to have been one that with certainty would have caused a hull loss if it had occurred in a situation that prevented a quick diversion.

No certainty, but a largely reasonable amount of doubt. in flight fire is never, ever something where you can say there is no risk of losing the aircraft. Especially when it happens in an inaccessible area with little fire protection/fighting capability.

I personally would have been s#|tting bricks myself if it had happened in the middle of the night halfway across the Pacific...

Fire protection against a burning li battery is moot anyway. Either the containment keeps the fire under control or not. You would need to cover the battery in dirt or maybe some long lasting foam to extinguish the flames. Both options are not possible for a plane.

Looks like another theory has been advanced by the Japanese investigators:

http://www.flightglobal.com/news/art...na-787-battery-malfunction-381268/

(Apologies if this was posted in the locked thread)

Quoting francoflier (Reply 28): Quoting Stitch (Reply 26):The 737 rudder power control unit. The A330/A340 pitot tubes (both Goodrich and Thales). The cargo door locks on the 747-100. The rear cargo hatch on the DC-10. One of the difference between these cases and the 787 issue is the ratio of event numbers / total flight hours for the type. It is much, much greater in that specific case.

Actually at time of the first DC-10 cargo door event there were fewer DC-10's flying than 787's now but it wasn't until the second event on THY that an AD was issued. We don't need to go into the fact that MD new they had issues before the airplane ever flew in passenger service.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 26): And I for one appreciate you making the effort.

        

I raised the actual wording/meaning of the special conditions in the previous thread, and Cubsrule, airmagnac, Stitch, CM and others took it up. Like it or not, meaning and semantics are critical in a regulatory environment because manufacturers/producers design to meet the precise regulatory requirement, not "near enough", and spend large amounts of money to get there. And as others have pointed out, when the regulatory regime is risk / mathematical probability based, approximate meaning is ... meaningless.

The same issues arise whenever I cite on a.net the wording of international aviation conventions - which often results in accusations of nitpicking. But again, the words are chosen to convey a precise meaning that is understood by the specific target audience (like "fire", "exothermic", "arc", etc for engineers and firefighters). Nobody questions the precise terminology used by medical specialists to convey a specific message to others in the profession. Similarly, the special conditions set for the use of Li-Ion batteries were intended to be understood by the professional engineering risk management and design community to whom they are addressed.

That said, I would not be surprised if one of the outcomes of the FAA review is changes to the conditions.

Quoting 7BOEING7 (Reply 31): Actually at time of the first DC-10 cargo door event there were fewer DC-10's flying than 787's now but it wasn't until the second event on THY that an AD was issued.

And that AD didn't ground the fleet, even after the largest loss of life in the history of commercial aviation to that time.

AA96 also happened less than a year after the DC-10's EIS. The JL and NH incidents were over a year after EIS.

And while the FAA is concerned that a battery failure on the 787 could cause a problem with the safety of the plane, there was direct evidence of a problem with the safety of the plane on AA96.

[Edited 2013-01-19 12:44:39]

Quoting Stitch (Reply 13): Quoting JerseyFlyer (Reply 5): This may have been posted in the locked Parts but Boeing has suspended 787 deliveries. Like they have a choice. Quoting JerseyFlyer (Reply 5): They will need a large parking lot if the grounding is extended for weeks!

Interesting point - not much value in delivering a plane the airline can't currently fly. A bit like buying a car and being told you can't have the keys.

I've been following along in the background for a while now - an interesting discussion   I did a quick blog post last night on my take on it all here: http://www.carlousmoochous.com/2013/innews-787-dreamliner-grounding/ (Was going to post the full thing here but it's a bit long). In short, new things, be them airplanes, cars, computers or your phone, have issues when they first launch – that’s how innovation works – you build something, you test the crap out of it, but even after you cover off 99.9% of all bugs, once the consumer gets their hands on it, stuff is going to go wrong, and you need to fix it. We hear so much about this because when something goes wrong with a new airplane the general population and media love it! It’s a high profile story that sells newspapers.

Until the next big plane is launched (eg A350), we will continue to scrutinise the 787 just like we did with the A380 and 777 before it.

From Japan Today:
http://www.japantoday.com/category/n...-suspect-excess-voltage-in-battery

Quoting SKGSJULAX (Reply 30): Looks like another theory has been advanced by the Japanese investigators:

It was in the back of my head too on the other thread.

Let me see if I get this correctly....

Just like when you have a MacBook plugged into the wall while doing homework or whatever, the lithium Ion batteries are being charged by the engine turbines, correct?

And something should keep both the battery in my macbook from overcharging, and same goes with the lithium ion battery...correct?

Well a few weeks back something went wrong with my battery and it would always overheat, eventually bursting its containment and spilling a little bit of the battery material on the wiring that connects the screen to the rest of the computer.... something went wrong with the overcharge safe....just like with these Yuasa battery incidents on the 787, right?

This is just a hypothesis and a layman's comparison.

Also in the other thread which was locked I did bring up that both the JL and NH batteries were apparently from the same line at Yuasa. I wasn't able to confirm any of that using my news sources, was this confirmed by the investigators?

Quoting PHX787 (Reply 35): ust like when you have a MacBook plugged into the wall

I have had four separate MacBook Pros - all the way from the first version - and I can say that the battery recalls on them have been quite high for this exact reason.

Quoting rushed (Reply 34): new things, be them airplanes, cars, computers or your phone,

Or trains, like our beloved Fyra train (sorry, I couldn't resist).

The thing that surprises me is that so many here think Boeing and FAA did not think of over charging, testing this etc

Do you really think Boeing and the FAA are morons?! If yes, you better take a long look in the mirror..

Quoting sweair (Reply 38): The thing that surprises me is that so many here think Boeing and FAA did not think of over charging, testing this etc.

I fully expect they did.

But if these two batteries failed because they overcharged, why did that happen when the system should have prevented it?

If they failed because they were bad batteries, that should be positive news for Boeing because it implies the charging system in general is sound (since 787s have been charging batteries for over a year without incident). That might be enough to lift the grounding (I would expect in conjunction with regular inspections and testing of batteries).

Of course they did. Back in 2007 Boeing had to prove the FAA that the use of those batteries were save.

Now to write something in defense of some of the skeptics. We had two NASA Challenger disasters., there are repeated drug and medical devices disasters with items approved by the FDA. In almost all of these cases it did not take hindsight to know things were amiss. NASA ignored engineers. The FDA has somewhat been captured by the industry. Having diabetes I am appalled at the process which has repeatedly approved drugs, promulgated unduly rosy effectiveness. and ignored likely side effects.

There is no evidence that the multiple aviation regulatory agencies around the world have been captured by A or B. In addition there is the macabre reality that if a loved one is to die in an accident hope it is in a plane - the heirs and survivers will almost automatically get a big settlement. The safety record of newer airplanes speaks to the effectiveness of the industry and regulators. I wish that kind of culture would spread to other sectors of the economy.

Quoting _AA_777_MAN (Reply 17): I was driving by ORD yesterday and noticed that Lot's 787 is still at ORD. Last I heard they were supposed to ferry it back to WAW on the 17th. Hopefully someone can take some pics.

Why bother going back to WAW? It may be necessary to ferry the plane back to the factory for some reworking before it will fly passengers again.

Quoting airmagnac (Reply 24): I'll be accused of splitting hairs, but once again that is not sufficiently precise

I don't disagree with what you're saying but I don't see where it contradicts what I'm (and others are) saying.
I have no idea how long the grounding will last or what it will take to get the aircraft into the air again, and I'm not discussing this. I'm only discussing why it was grounded, and the reason is "we don't know so it's not safe".

Quoting Stitch (Reply 32): And that AD didn't ground the fleet, even after the largest loss of life in the history of commercial aviation to that time. AA96 also happened less than a year after the DC-10's EIS. The JL and NH incidents were over a year after EIS. And while the FAA is concerned that a battery failure on the 787 could cause a problem with the safety of the plane, there was direct evidence of a problem with the safety of the plane on AA96.

If we follow your reasoning, either the FAA is more safety oriented now than then (which I would see as a good thing) or the 787 is more dangerous than the DC-10 was.

Quoting Aesma (Reply 42): f we follow your reasoning, either the FAA is more safety oriented now than then (which I would see as a good thing) or the 787 is more dangerous than the DC-10 was.

For the moment, at least, the 787 is less dangerous than the DC-10 as it has not suffered an accident, a hull-loss, an injury* or a fatality.

So I guess that means the FAA is more safety-oriented.


* - The injuries at TAK were part of the evacuation.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 38): If they failed because they were bad batteries, that should be positive news for Boeing because it implies the charging system in general is sound (since 787s have been charging batteries for over a year without incident). That might be enough to lift the grounding (I would expect in conjunction with regular inspections and testing of batteries).

The bad battery could still contaminate and potentially damage the electronics bay. How do you know a battery is good or bad ?? The battery has to be safe without contaminating anything, good or bad. So the problem persists.

A big part of regulatory safety oversight, are financial indicators.

With prudent oversight and enormous financial penalties for non-compliance, outsourcing approvals to manufacturers is commonsense.

A project which is running behind schedule, or an operator struggling financially, are both situations where outsourcing arrangements should be reviewed, at the very least, resulting in more 3rd party peer reviews, to the other extreme, where it's all brought back inhouse.

This is just a blip, in an industry that has transformed in the last 30-40 years. Passenger and airline confidence will be strengthened by the decisive action taken, and industry and safety authorities will be able to add to their case studies and knowledge base.

Quoting Aesma (Reply 42): "we don't know so it's not safe"

But "safe" needs to be defined, ultimately. No manufacturer can live with "we can't define safe, but we'll know it when we see it and let you know then".

Quoting ComeAndGo (Reply 44): The bad battery could still contaminate and potentially damage the electronics bay. How do you know a battery is good or bad ?? The battery has to be safe without contaminating anything, good or bad. So the problem persists.

        

Zeke has already raised the removal of the APU battery for now. That's pretty easy. For the other battery, stick the container inside another much heavier container that can be pressure sealed.

Quoting PW100 (Reply 16): Would, could, will, when, if . . . . Can't we all just agree that in the view of the regulators (FAA, EASA etc), anything supposed to be airborne that has not been demonstrated to be safe, is by definition unsafe? Makes life and these sort of discussions so much easier.

Quoting Kaiarahi (Reply 31): Like it or not, meaning and semantics are critical in a regulatory environment because manufacturers/producers design to meet the precise regulatory requirement, not "near enough", and spend large amounts of money to get there.

In a world of tax accounting and regulations semantics is very well defined and I can't see why it wouldn't be in a far more precise engineering field. Here's how tax regulations define various thresholds of risk:

- Frivolous (below 10% probability);
- Non-frivolous (at least 10%);
- Reasonable basis (at least 15%);
- Realistic possibility of success (at least 33%);
- Substantial authority (objective weighing required; at least 40%);
- More likely than not (>50%);
- Should (at least 70%);
- Will (at least 90%).

Quoting frmrcapcadet (Reply 40): We had two NASA Challenger disasters

You mean one shuttle (i.e., the whole stack, Challenger) and one orbiter (Columbia)?

Quoting KarelXWB (Reply 39): Of course they did. Back in 2007 Boeing had to prove the FAA that the use of those batteries were save.

Yet, they modified the design in 2008 to boost their service life. Interesting article from 2008, describing what appears to be last minute design changes, and FAA's overall concerns over the use of lithium ion batteries.

http://chiefio.wordpress.com/2013/01...ithium-batteries-are-not-the-same/