Today, March 3 was the day THY flight 981 crashed just outside of Paris after the DC-10 lost its cargo door resulting in loss of control and the ultimate disaster. While I was a very young child at the time I do remember pictures on the news as my folks watched. A very bad airplane crash...was what they told me as we watched, and later they explaining that a door was opened up while in the air. I know there was a similar incident not long before this accident but for some reason this particular aircraft had not yet been modified. My questions are the following: What is your recollection of the crash? Were you working around planes at that time? Was there a stigma placed on the DC-10 that was later seen after the crash in Chicago? Very gruesome crash and hearing about what rescue workers initially faced...I can not imagine.

I was in the USAF flying KC-135s at the time of the crash. The DC-10s were being modified with the same style cam locking system for the cargo doors that we had (the DC-10 system was more automated than what we had). IIRC it was the deadliest crash in history up until that time (the Tenerife B-747 ground collision accident didn't happen for another 3 years) with some 350 killed in the accident.

The TK-981 accident is also known as the Ermenonville air disaster, named for the forest the wreckage fell into. The aircraft, a DC-10-10 was, IIRC the first or second DC-10 delivered to TK, after they were leased from UA, but not delivered to that airline. I believe it was around the 30th DC-10 built.

TC-JAV was the 2nd for THY and was en-route to London-Heathrow so this accident was badly felt in the UK. I'm not quoting facts here but I believe there was a similar cargo door failure on an American AL DC10 prior to the THY accident. I think the accident was put down to a manufacturing defect on the latch mechanism, but that's my recollection only. If so, presumably the THY and American aircraft came off the assembly line at similar times?

It was a design problem that allowed to close the door without really closing it.

Quoting airsmiles (Reply 2): I'm not quoting facts here but I believe there was a similar cargo door failure on an American AL DC10 prior to the THY accident. I think the accident was put down to a manufacturing defect on the latch mechanism, but that's my recollection only.

You are correct, it was AA-96, about 2 years earlier, another DC-10-10, N103AA. That was a near disaster, too. But the AA crew managed to regain control of the airplane and made an emergency landing at DTW. This was the Windsor incident.

N103AA was around the 10th or 12th airplane off the line, so it was not produced at the same time TC-JAV was built.

Quoting KC135TopBoom (Reply 4): Quoting airsmiles (Reply 2): I'm not quoting facts here but I believe there was a similar cargo door failure on an American AL DC10 prior to the THY accident. I think the accident was put down to a manufacturing defect on the latch mechanism, but that's my recollection only. You are correct, it was AA-96, about 2 years earlier, another DC-10-10, N103AA. That was a near disaster, too. But the AA crew managed to regain control of the airplane and made an emergency landing at DTW. This was the Windsor incident.

If memory correct, the TK DC-10 had not yet been modified to cover FAA recommendations following the AA accident.

Quoting airsmiles (Reply 2): TC-JAV was the 2nd for THY and was en-route to London-Heathrow so this accident was badly felt in the UK.

Many passengers were BA passengers who had been rebooked on the TK flight at the last minute due to a BA labour dispute that resulted in cancellation of the BA flight.

As a sidenote, CDG airport officially opened 5 days after the TK crash.

Quoting CairnterriAIR (Thread starter): Was there a stigma placed on the DC-10 that was later seen after the crash in Chicago? Very gruesome crash and hearing about what rescue workers initially faced...I can not imagine.

The Chicago and Paris crash were unrelated reasons

Paris was the cargo door opening up and plane depressurizing similar to the AA DC-10 at DTW as someone else mentioned. The AA Flt 191 Chicago crash was an engine falling off and damaging the aircraft causing it to roll over and crash

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Photo © M. Maibrink

For all lost their lives that day, RIP.

One of the problems with the DC10 cargo door latching mechanism was that you could force the door handle to appear to be shut with very little force. This could lead to the appearance that the door was shut when really it is not. Also to add to the problem was that the door instructions written on the door itself was only in English. And the ramp worker at CDG didn't speak English.

I believe the correction was to make the door handle harder to close if latched improperly and to put a sight window on the door so you could visually ensure that the door was truly latched.

This info comes from a book published a few years after the accident. I think it was called "The Last 10 Seconds" or something like that.

May those who were aboard TK 981 rest in peace.  

Quoting Viscount724 (Reply 5): If memory correct, the TK DC-10 had not yet been modified to cover FAA recommendations following the AA accident.

I recall reading a few different books that discussed these incidents...they said that the NTSB issued a recommendation to make these modifications after the AA incident, but the FAA didn't make it an Airworthiness Directive until after the TK crash. At least one of the books implied that the FAA's failure to make it an AD was the result of pressure from McDonnell Douglas, but I don't know if there's anything to back up that claim.

Quoting CairnterriAIR (Thread starter): Was there a stigma placed on the DC-10 that was later seen after the crash in Chicago?

I've seen references, both in earlier threads on here and elsewhere, to people being afraid to fly on the DC-10 for a period of time after both incidents. I wasn't alive yet when either incident happened, so I have no firsthand knowledge. With that said, there were a few books written that capitalized on (and likely hyped up) the safety issues related to the DC-10, most notably The Rise and Fall of the DC-10.

[Edited 2013-03-03 17:04:39]

Adding to the cargo door issues, was another design flaw with regard to the venting of the rear cargo hold to the cabin above. It was not sufficient, so when the rear cargo hold decompressed, the pressure differential caused the rear cabin floor to buckle.

When the cabin floor buckled, control of engine 2 was lost, as well as some flight controls. It was the loss of this control that caused the crash.

These circumstances were identical to the DC-10 of AA over YQG and landing in DTW.

In my opinion, with the loss of the second aircraft with identical circumstances ... the DC-10 should have been grounded, and the flaws fixed. The books written about that, and the alleged bribing within the FAA to keep the DC-10 flying are fascinating and worthy of Robert Ludlum!

Not just that, but running the control cables through the floors made them vulnerable to a floor collapse.


The DC10 turned out to be a fine Aircraft eventually but it had a lot of design shortcuts initially due to the race to get
it out the door before the superb L1011 Tristar.


And yes, I am biased !

It didn't help the flight was heavily booked, probably caused the floor to really cave in with all the extra weight .

Quoting type-rated (Reply 8): Also to add to the problem was that the door instructions written on the door itself was only in English. And the ramp worker at CDG didn't speak English.

Well, I'm not sure you can expect a panel to be in dozens of languages, nor a minimum wage worker to speak a foreign language. Aren't ramp workers trained for each aircraft, at least a lead one or something like that ?

Quoting Aesma (Reply 13): Well, I'm not sure you can expect a panel to be in dozens of languages, nor a minimum wage worker to speak a foreign language. Aren't ramp workers trained for each aircraft, at least a lead one or something like that ?

One would think....

Quoting type-rated (Reply 8): and to put a sight window on the door so you could visually ensure that the door was truly latched.

On the day of the crash, the little window was already there, with English and Turkish instructions. However, the ramper from Morocco (other sources say Algeria, but in both countries the languages are Arabic and French) spoke neither English nor Turkish. However, I'm not sure if his supervisor taught him to use that window.

Anyway, the DC-10 that crashed that day seems to be the 29th DC-10 produced, which still begs the question:

Quoting Aesma (Reply 13): Aren't ramp workers trained for each aircraft, at least a lead one or something like that ?

Did the ramper not have enough experience with DC-10s?

Quoting frontierflyer (Reply 12): It didn't help the flight was heavily booked, probably caused the floor to really cave in with all the extra weight .

I'm pretty sure an airliner must be certified to carry passengers and their luggage safely while being 100% full.  


David

Quoting type-rated (Reply 8): worker at CDG didn't speak English.

It did not leave from CDG, because CDG had not yet opened for business. It left from ORY. The accident report (in French only in this case is at:

http://www.bea.aero/docspa/1974/tc-v740303/pdf/tc-v740303.pdf

The report does reference the N103AA incident in June 72, and notes that the service directive was not implemented on the TK machine. No mention of mechanics not speaking English; where did you get that one? But it does mention they failed to inspect the access window, though it was very small, to check on the lock mechanism.

There is a monument at the crash site. What I recall (as a kid) is that Paris Match, a French weekly mag, ran some incredibly gory pictures of the crash site. Beyond that, it was always the litany of the worst crash ever (until Teneriffe happened three years later)

Quoting longhauler (Reply 10): Adding to the cargo door issues, was another design flaw with regard to the venting of the rear cargo hold to the cabin above. It was not sufficient, so when the rear cargo hold decompressed, the pressure differential caused the rear cabin floor to buckle. When the cabin floor buckled, control of engine 2 was lost, as well as some flight controls. It was the loss of this control that caused the crash. These circumstances were identical to the DC-10 of AA over YQG and landing in DTW.

Just to add...

In the case of the AA DC-10, the rear of the aircraft was configured with a passenger lounge which was empty at the time. While the floor buckled, the cables were not severed so the aircraft remained somewhat controllable. In the case of the THY aircraft, the flight was full so the cabin floor collapsed completely from the additional weight severing all the controls.

I flew the DC-10 for World Airways in the mid 1980s. A procedure that evolved from the AA/THY accidents was to engage either autopilot if a loss of manual flight controls occurred. The wiring for the autopilot servos ran through the top of the cabin instead of the floor. That was the theory, anyway!

The DC-10 was a good airplane, as easy to fly as the 727. But the feeling was it could have used a little less McDonnell and a lot more Douglas...

Quoting HBGDS (Reply 16): No mention of mechanics not speaking English; where did you get that one?

Both the English and German Wikipedia mention the Moroccan (or Algerian) ramper who neither spoke English or Turkish, but they give no source...   


David

Quoting KC135TopBoom (Reply 1): The aircraft, a DC-10-10 was, IIRC the first or second DC-10 delivered to TK, after they were leased from UA, but not delivered to that airline. I believe it was around the 30th DC-10 built.

When put it this way, I'd imagine it would have given the sinking that could have been me feeling in the pits of several UA-employed stomachs (particularly those dealing with fleet makeup).

Any reason they didn't receive the DC-10s?

I don't understand the reference to leases from/to United? I've never heard that before so could someone add some clarification?

Quoting Aesma (Reply 13): Well, I'm not sure you can expect a panel to be in dozens of languages, nor a minimum wage worker to speak a foreign language. Aren't ramp workers trained for each aircraft, at least a lead one or something like that ?

If I was an Airline operator and I would contract an airport (or one of its subsidiaries) to handle my aircraft during turnaround, I expect every one of the workers and handlers to put the utmost care into their efforts, including going by the book where absolutely necessary. I expect trained personell and duty managers and supervisors doing a proper job.
We are not talking about a carpenter laying a wood-floor, but a tin-box carrying 300+ pax!

Quoting type-rated (Reply 8): I believe the correction was to make the door handle harder to close if latched improperly and to put a sight window on the door so you could visually ensure that the door was truly latched.

Back in the late-1970's, I worked in the USAF at Rhein-Main AB in Frankfurt. We were not allowed to close the cargo doors of the DC-10, this had to be done by an airline rep (World, TIA or ONA). I'm not sure if this was a USAF or airline directive, but regardless it was a no-no. We were allowed to open the doors but not close them. I'm sure this was a result of the issues with the door which resulted in the crash in France.

And not to hijack the thread, but I was there in '79 when AA191 went down and the subsequent grounding of the entire DC-10 fleet. The USAF had to pick up the slack to get folks back to the US, it took (4) C-141A's to match what one DC-10 could provide. The reputation of the '10 certainly suffered as a result of these major accidents..  

Quoting type-rated (Reply 8): This info comes from a book published a few years after the accident. I think it was called "The Last 10 Seconds" or something like that.

If anyone gets a chance to look, this is a very good read. Not sure if that title is correct, but I know which one you are talking about.

There was an excellent book about the crash and the development of the DC10 by a Sunday Times Insight team called "Destination Disaster". The team was lead by Paul Eddy with Elaine Potter and Bruce Page. As with all crashes it was a combination of factors which resulted in the ultimate disaster i.e as with the Tenerife Pan Am/KLM crash.

The aircraft was completely full due to BEA(Old British Airways) being on strike and a big Rugby match having been played the previous evening.

In the book much is mentioned of the effects of the take over of Douglas by McDonnell and the competition with Lockheed to be first. The term "Fly before they roll" was apparently on a banner above the assembly line. There were two very damning condemnations of McDonnell/Douglas which could have some relevance today. The first was the so call "Applegate Memo" Involves communication between Convair ( General Dynamics) who were the subcontractors on part of the fuselage including the cargo door. In this memo Convair told McDonnell/Douglas that it was an unsafe design. They were basically told to get on and built it as there were just sub contractors.

The other incident involved the so called "Gentleman's agreement" between McDonnell Douglas and the FAA after the near fatal AA 96 Windsor incident. This is where Mr Jack McGowan of Douglas and Mr John Shaffer of the FAA(a Richard Nixon appointee) agreed that Douglas would take "corrective measures' to fix the cargo door. This avoided the issuance of a FAA Airworthiness Directive on Douglas with all the negative publicity. It also went a long way to condemning the THY passenger to death. One FAA executive Arven Basnight was very dubious of this arrangement and wrote a secret memo to the files recording this arrangement to protect him and his staff. The DC 10 should in my opinion have been grounded after Paris and long before Chicago.

"Quoting maxpower1954"
"The DC-10 was a good airplane, as easy to fly as the 727. But the feeling was it could have used a little less McDonnell and a lot more Douglas..."

Yes I think that is correct. If one reads some of the posts on the "FAA Grounds 787" thread then maybe the same applies to Boeing regarding the effects of McDonnell on them too.

"Quoting winstonlegthigh"
"When put it this way, I'd imagine it would have given the sinking that could have been me feeling in the pits of several UA-employed stomachs (particularly those dealing with fleet makeup).

Any reason they didn't receive the DC-10s?"

The aircraft were originally ordered by Mitsui of Japan who hoped to sell them on to ANA. ANA were a L1011 Tristar customer but the L1011 was experiening problems due to the Rolls Royce bankrupcy. In the end ANA stayed loyal to the Tristar and these aircraft needed a new home. I think that is where the UA lease came from.

I remember following the news about the troubles with the DC-10s through the years. "Destination Disaster" was, in my opinion, an excellent source about the entire history of the cargo door problem. I bought the book and read it while on a business trip. I was flying from PHL to EWR on a NW DC10 one night. There were only about four of us on the flight so they told us to take seats in first class. I sat in my seat and started to read the book. A few minutes later one of the flight attendents stopped by and asked me if I wouldn't mind putting the book away. She explained that given the subject and where we were it didn't make her feel comfortable.

I flew DC-10s beginning in '77 constantly throughout the 80's. It was a wonderful aircraft, but it certainly did have it rough spots with this and then the AA accident at O'Hare, and the UA crash in Sioux City.

Art

I recall reading the details about this in the book Destination Disaster. I was in my early teens when the book came out and it was quite an education about events that lead to the incident and the history of air safety.

I do remember it well. It was the day after the France England rugby international: with the BA flight cancellation, many Englishmen were transferred to the flight at very short notice, who would never have been on the flight
RIP

Quoting cv990coronado (Reply 24): The first was the so call "Applegate Memo" Involves communication between Convair ( General Dynamics) who were the subcontractors on part of the fuselage including the cargo door. In this memo Convair told McDonnell/Douglas that it was an unsafe design. They were basically told to get on and built it as there were just sub contractors.

The most amazing part is the aft cargo bulk door blew open BEFORE the AA/THY accidents during a ground pressurisation test at San Diego (General Dynamics/Convair was the contractor for the entire DC-10 fuselage.)

MCD basically told them to mind their own business. They ignored the opinion of a peer manufacturer of the technically excellent 880/990 jet transports because of the costs redesigning the over center latches and lock. Unbelievable.

Quoting airsmiles (Reply 2): and was en-route to London-Heathrow so this accident was badly felt in the UK

Purely FYI....On the 2nd March, France had played England at the Parc des Princes in Paris in a 5 Nations rugby international. A large number of the passengers had been returning from that match on the THY flight. On the 20th April 1974 a charity match between England and France was played at Twickenham to raise money for the families. The final score I believe was ironically the same as the game on the 2nd March, 12-12

The England team could have been on the THY flight, but they managed to catch an earlier AF flight instead.

Very tragic accident.

Random fact... My late grandfather was booked on this flight and missed it.
Until the day he passed away, he wouldn't ever speak of it.

Quoting CairnterriAIR (Thread starter): Was there a stigma placed on the DC-10 that was later seen after the crash in Chicago?

I don't remember much about TK 981, I was in HS at the time, it was distant, and the sad fact of those days was that air disasters were not terribly unexpected. There was a lot of news coverage of this flight and you could tell that no one had a chance in the forest. The door latch seemed to be a solvable problem that would be corrected.

For American 191, I worked in an office building in downtown Chicago. Word spread around the floor that the big column of black smoke to the northwest was from an airline crash near ORD, and we all could see when we looked out the north and west windows.

In the weeks that followed, most of the media didn't know a lot about aviation, but had a lot to say about the DC-10. The FAA revoked the type certificate and then allowed the DC-10 to fly again after all pylons had been inspected and corrected. A few months later, a WA DC-10 landed on a closed runway and hit a maintenance truck in Mexico City, killing all aboard, and it was reported as "another DC-10 crash". That was about the tone.

Also much was made of AA using a forklift to raise the pylon to the wing. Later it was also said that UA and CO did the same thing, but things had been cooled down by then.

In addition to seeing the smoke, my train home (Milwaukee Road NW line) passed by the southern end of ORD. Also I had a ORD-LAX trip booked for late June on CO. That flight was rebooked from a DC-10 to a 727. CO had to contact everyone by phone to tell them of the rebooking.

Sad for me. Lent my camera to someone who was on the plane.

The DC-10 was a good airplane, as easy to fly as the 727. But the feeling was it could have used a little less McDonnell and a lot more Douglas...[/quote]

A very astute observation...!

Quoting cv990coronado (Reply 24): Reply 24, posted Mon Mar 4 2013 05:21:57 your local time (9 hours 35 minutes 45 secs ago) and read 6459 times: There was an excellent book about the crash and the development of the DC10 by a Sunday Times Insight team called "Destination Disaster". The team was lead by Paul Eddy with Elaine Potter and Bruce Page.

Another very good book about the DC-10 cargo door debacle is "The Last Nine Minutes" by Moira Johnston. I read both back in the 70's . IMHO Johnston's book is rather better written and a has detailed account of the "gentlemen's agreement" between McDonnel Douglas and the FAA to make the cargo fix a service bulletin rather than an airworthiness directive. It also discusses how the real problem was the in inadequate venting between the main cabin and the cargo compartment.

I sometimes believe that the DC10 / L1011 race for the first trijet should be mandatory reading for college level business classes.....

I recall the incident as a teenage, and can recall the TV shots of the carnage. I read "CDG" above in one of the posts, but thought it was orly airport that was the departure....

I did see an excellent documentary on TV years after the accident. My recollection (I have no sources for this other than my limited memory) was that a bulletin was issued by the manufacturer after the "Windor Incident" with a kit of parts and sent to all operators of the aircraft. Similarly, a change bulletin was issued for all new builds to include the mods. But what was forgotten were the two aircraft in final systems test, one being the accident aircraft and the other not affected- but found to be without the mods once the manufacturer figured out how come the accident aircraft wasn't modified.

Bruce.

According to the episode "behind closed doors" of air crash investigation, the maintenance records of TC-JAV said that the modifications were done while this wasn't true...

Quoting TK1244 (Reply 35): According to the episode "behind closed doors" of air crash investigation, the maintenance records of TC-JAV said that the modifications were done while this wasn't true...

Yes, that was in one of the books I read about this crash. It was thought that the mods were done at the factory before delivery, so even if it became an AD before the crash, this aircraft still would not have been modified, as records showed it was already done!

It was my understanding that per existing regulations the size and number of the "blowout plugs" in the passenger floor were sized based on those required of the 707 and DC-8. They should have been much larger because cargo doors had gotten much bigger. If one blew open, the plugs were not large enough to quickly equalize the pressure above and below the floor so the floor collapsed jamming or breaking the control cables which ran underneath the floor.

This is of course in addition to the door issue.

Jim

Quoting lh526 (Reply 22): If I was an Airline operator and I would contract an airport (or one of its subsidiaries) to handle my aircraft during turnaround, I expect every one of the workers and handlers to put the utmost care into their efforts, including going by the book where absolutely necessary. I expect trained personnel and duty managers and supervisors doing a proper job.

But do you expect to pay for that ?

Quoting lh526 (Reply 22): We are not talking about a carpenter laying a wood-floor, but a tin-box carrying 300+ pax!

Well, that carpenter is making two or three times what a ramp rat makes.

Here's a random movie trivia fact: The movie Snatch (with Brad Pitt, excellent film btw) has a character in it whose nickname is "Turkish." The movie explains that he got the nickname because his parents were killed in an airplane crash.

Today I loaned "Destination Disaster" from the university library. Until now, it has been a absorbing read.


David

There is another book that was written about the DC10, called - oddly enough - "The Rise and fall of the DC10"; it had very good coverage of the Paris crash, including the initial news report.

Coincidentally, the accident happened on the day that CDG was formally opened.

@ flying turtle Enjoy ! When I first read it there were still DC10's to fly on. Sometimes one wasn't so pleased to have read the book when sitting at 30000ft. It's a pity so many people died in Paris, Chicago and Sioux City. Had they done many of the things mentioned in the book with the door and the hydraulics system at that time, they would be alive today. In the end it became a good aircraft although for me you can't beat the DC8-62/63. They were Douglas's finest in my opinion.

I took Business Analytics (basically my first statistics class ever) this past spring as part of my MBA coursework (my previous educational background is communication/media focused with a very odd aviation-flight operations degree thrown in on the side, ha ha), and one thing that I took away from that course is that while you can design something so that it will work properly every time as long as it is done properly every time, the chance of it not working properly due to operating error is proportional to the number of correct steps it takes to make it work. And the more times you do it, the greater likelyhood that at some point things will go awry.

So when you have a baggage door with the design of the DC-10, and it needs to be closed before every flight on hundreds of airplanes multiple times a day, your n goes up, up and up.

Finally the right combination of factors lines up (the accident "swiss cheese") and an event like this happens. It's an interesting engineering and human factors problem.

Quoting planespotting (Reply 43): So when you have a baggage door with the design of the DC-10, and it needs to be closed before every flight on hundreds of airplanes multiple times a day, your n goes up, up and up.

It makes sense in theory, but in reality there are many examples of multi-step operations on airframes. Shoot, look at the Embraer doors alone, with their vent flaps .. very similar to the DC-10 door. The difference is the design. The DC-10 door was flawed, they knew it was flawed, it was allowed to continue.

Quoting planespotting (Reply 43): Finally the right combination of factors lines up (the accident "swiss cheese") and an event like this happens. It's an interesting engineering and human factors problem.

The Reason model works, but perhaps not in the way you think. You see, the first slice of Swiss Cheese is the design itself. Both the flawed design of the door, also the flawed design of the rear cabin floor, and to an extant the flawed decision to route all control cables through that flawed cabin floor. But ... in my opinion, they are all the same (first) slice of Swiss Cheese.

But bringing Human Factors into it ...

The next slice might be training and checklists for ramp employees, as I am sure you have considered.

In my opinion another slice might be a push to get the aircraft out on time, forcing the door closed, but also ... building the DC-10 on time, competing with the L1011.

But ... in my opinion the last slice of Swiss Cheese that could have saved those passengers was in the FAA itself! In some very high office, it was known the aircraft was unsafe, and nothing was done. It is Human Factors in spades, and I have often wondered if there was one man that looked himself in the mirror knowing he could have saved those passengers, but ignored it.

Understand, I am not arguing with you. I find this area interesting, and it is my area of education as well.

Quoting longhauler (Reply 44): Understand, I am not arguing with you. I find this area interesting, and it is my area of education as well.

Me too! If you want to see how the regulation covering the design of fuselage doors has attempted to minimise the possibility of this type of accident happening again, read the latest FAR 25.783 here.

Quoting longhauler (Reply 44): Understand, I am not arguing with you. I find this area interesting, and it is my area of education as well.

Totally understand, and I also find it very interesting as well. I really enjoyed the one human factors class I was able to take in college.

I also didn't mean that all the design factors were the only holes involved individually - I definitely think of them as "one" hole as well. I guess I feel that every new element or layer of "fail opportunity" you bring into the sequence is an obstacle to overcome in preventing an accident (starting with design; manufacturing; operations/procedures; variable factors such as timing, new employees, etc.; and finally luck - the fact that the AA flight in Windsor didn't have any passengers sitting in the back over the control cables that day, while the Turkish flight was full up).

They do have a memorial wall for the crash victims, at Paris' famous Pere Lachaise cemetery, incidentally.

Quoting HBGDS (Reply 16): The report does reference the N103AA incident in June 72, and notes that the service directive was not implemented on the TK machine. No mention of mechanics not speaking English; where did you get that one? But it does mention they failed to inspect the access window, though it was very small, to check on the lock mechanism.

From the book "The Last Nine Minutes" by Moira Johnston. It's a very good book about this accident and is available on Amazon.
Maybe you should read it?

Quoting Type-Rated (Reply 48): The report does reference the N103AA incident in June 72, and notes that the service directive was not implemented on the TK machine. No mention of mechanics not speaking English; where did you get that one? But it does mention they failed to inspect the access window, though it was very small, to check on the lock mechanism. From the book "The Last Nine Minutes" by Moira Johnston. It's a very good book about this accident and is available on Amazon. Maybe you should read it?

Oh that one... Only an American journalist would expect everybody outside the US to speak English and take a swipe at the French that way. It is a good book, but it's all about the human dimension explained to a wider public. Read it when it came out. Thanks for the reminder.