|Quoting BEG2IAH (Reply 61):|
Again, who said we should just blame the pilots and leave it at that? This notion of how bunch of us don't care about aviation safety is a self-serving blame game pilots came up with so we feel really bad we even dare to question someone's skills.
Problem is you don't have much to defend yourself ; Comments like "Pïlot error. period. / Pilot effed up. / passengers expect to be flown from point A to point B without being killed as they assume pilots who possess a professional pilot license are properly trained.
...it goes all into the problematic misconception I referred to.
I don't know how long you've been in this forum. There is a repetitive characteristic : thousands of posts of speculation and blame... until the official report is published. Then you'd be lucky to have 50 posts ( AF447 is the excep^tion that confirms the rule, but in fact the feeding frenzy kept going on as people weren't happy with the way the report was written ).
So, pleeeaase, I know bull when I see or read one.
Yes, pilots make mistakes. The best of us do . The role of those involved in flight safety is to put enough safeguards to minimize the extent / results of these mistakes : CRM is evolving everyday and so are technological improvements.
To illustrate my points, on both the human aspect of an error and how it's effect was reduced, I'd take Captain Sullenberger's Hudson ditching.
Nobody on this forum ever noticed that after the birdstrikes, Captain Sullenberger made a big mistake : He immediately called for the QRH referenced "DUAL ENGINE FAILURE
" check-list. It's a five-page, multiple branching check-list which is fairly complex to deal with.
The problem was he lost his F/O to execute all the items of that procedure, run the risk of losing further systems - hydraulics come to mind - as the F/O went into shutting / relighting the running engines... etc... Had the crew taken the time to read the ECAM, they would have discovered that the engines were still running, albeit at a low thrust - one at sub-idle.
As his quick decision of ditching into the Hudson river was the new project and strategy, he would have the F/O execute the ditching check-list, just the 13 lines of it ; they would have kept on having good synergy and the F/O could have advised him on two important points : landing with full flaps and "Ditching " switchlight depressed...
As it happened, Captain Sullenberger's made-up-as-it went-along procedures worked on that day : the touch-down wasn't too hard at that high speed and that high a nose-up attitude and everybody survived.
We come again to the *hindsight bias* : everybody survived. Period. The pilot did a sterling job. Period. Let's pass on...
Did he do everything right ? Or shall we just forget all about the circumstances ?
Fortunately for aviation safety, quite a few training departments I know have made it their job to analyze what really happened.
That Captain Sullenberger is a rather exceptional pilot shouldn't hide the fact that at the very least he made things a lot more complicated for himself than they should have been.
|Quoting BEG2IAH (Reply 61):|
Regarding this accident, even if you are a professional pilot you are just as much of an armchair expert as anyone else posting here. No one here has access to the NTSB investigation, so this is all speculation be it from pilots or us "bad-wishers".
The huge difference is that the professional pilots on this forum have - almost unanimously - refrained from blame, be it on the pilots, the aircraft or the green little men. They've also refrained from speculations as there are very few facts to base a theory on... Fact as : *factors leading to the accident*.
The USALPA doesn't say anything different.
To be perfectly honest, pointing at some perceived civilisation criteria
, lack of training, resistance to CRM... etc... to me is quite obscene.
Just my two cents.[Edited 2013-07-20 17:50:20][Edited 2013-07-20 17:55:31]
[Edited 2013-07-20 17:57:52]