Quoting Revelation (Reply 199): So, you are going with the "best case" scenario where the FO feels incapacitated shortly after CA leaves to use the toilet and decides to put the plane into a descent? Why would he react to the onset of incapacitation by changing the FMS to dive the aircraft?

I'm not going with the "best case" scenario. Just pointing out that someone hearing breathing alone doesn't say much.

Quoting cbphoto (Reply 243):

I'm aware that it's not a secret. Now it's out and advertised well enough that "Hey here's my chance, what's stopping me from doing this".

Quoting cbphoto (Reply 243): There are lots of items that can be used to incompacitate the other pilot and accomplish their goal.

What? A gun? In Europe?

Wellp, that's the last time a captain leaves some 20 year old alone in his cockpit!! The rules in the U.S. sound pretty good to me. Regardless if it's a flight attendant or not, one single person in the cokcpit cannot be trusted...that's pretty obvious at this point.

One thing that comes to mind while we discuss the suicide scenario that now seems to be what actually happened.

It's a fools errand to try and rationalize suicidal behavior. The fact that he flew past a populated city and opted not to put it down there doesn't really rule out suicide. He could have committed suicide for the sake of ending in his own life, and 149 other people happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. The fact that so many other people died here doesn't necessarily mean that he had malevolent intentions towards others, at all.

If that is all true and by the time i think it is as Marseille would not go public with that if they weren't really sure. I'm just shocked.

There are victims in my neighbour town and they died for what? A lunatic co-pilot?

Oh that is devastating and so ... pff cannot even think of words describing that.

How can someone do something like this, just kill yourself in the Basement and leave others alone.

Quoting TheSonntag (Reply 247): So, with other words: We do not have firearms, we do not want firearms, and we usually are not trained to firearms. Granted, this could be changed, but I do not see the necessity. In short, I fail to see that a firearm in the hands of a pilot does anything remotely good in any possible scenario.

I totally understand where you are coming from. As above tradeoffs have already been made, but perhaps need to be recalibrated. Unfortunately a "kill or be killed" situation can arise in real life, and it's hard to argue that the best tool to deal with such a situation is a tool designed to kill. In the US a percentage of pilots feel they want such a tool and are willing to prove they are trained correctly to use it. Of course there is a risk that the pilot could use it to kill the other pilot, but such risk is deemed to be lower than the risk of a terrorist trying to take over the plane using force. There is no zero risk option. Every option has risk. Deciding to get on an aircraft is deciding to accept risk.

Just out of curiosity,

Why would a German pilot have an FAA Certification? Wouldn't he be certified by the European equivalent?

If this comes out confirmed, poor pilots who will see before and after flights hundreds of eye pairs trying to read their face for anything noticeable. Will put a lot of new pressure on this profession.

Quoting Revelation (Reply 255): There is no zero risk option.

   Ding ding.

Quoting Revelation (Reply 255): Deciding to get on an aircraft is deciding to accept risk.

As with almost everything in life.

Quoting CrimsonChin (Reply 189): Okay, so just to be clear, after the override code has been entered, whoever is in the cockpit can flip the switch to lock, so the override is rejected?

Yes - becuase its desinged to be used if the crew are incapacitated. So if they deny access of the emergency code it means they are alive/conscious.

Quoting goosebayguy (Reply 198): The only quick fix here is to have a member of the crew enter the cockpit whenever a pilot uses the toilet. That way there is always someoen to keep an eye on things and open the door when the pilot returns.

Its not a fix. Whats to say the Flight crew member doesnt attack the FA with the crash axe... OR in the USA a lot fo flight crew carry guns so they could just shoot them... I mean if they have the intent to crash the plane - they will find a way.

Quoting Scruffer (Reply 175): That is a knee-jerk reaction. Even if the door would have been easier to open it doesn't change the fact that a lone pilot can fly the plane in such a way that it is nearly impossible to re-enter an unlocked cockpit door, or get the plane into a situation that is not recoverable even if another pilot is able to gain entry.

One of the many kneejerk reactions after 9/11 was to open and inspect each and every box over 160 lbs shipped as air cargo to check if terrorists are hiding inside. Even if that box had dimensions of 80x50x20 cm which would make that impossible from beginning. The industry could convince the yoyo's who had that on mind that Screening would be more appropriate.

Locking the cock pit doors was another of such kneejerk reactions., What happened on Monday can be filed under Murphy's law. Terrorists have to be detected Long before they can anter an aircraft, better Long efore they can enter an aircraft. in my almost 10 years on this Forum I have always advocated that profiling must be an important factor in aviation security.

Now it is likely that149 People have been murdered by one guy who not only had Access to the Cockpit but could also lock himself in, thanks to the law which is based on kneejerk reactions after 9/11.

Common sense is what is required now.

.

Quoting aw70 (Reply 13): I don't understand why so many people here seem to be focused on foul play having occurred. All it would have taken for this to happen is for the remaining pilot in the cockpit to suffer a massive stroke or aneurysm while the other one was in the lavatory. When suffering the stroke, the pilot accidentally pressed some buttons, or pushed the stick forward.

Same reason why people are so bent on trying to avoid saying that foul play was involved. Given the times that officials have in the past tried so hard to avoid the whole "terrorist talk" anyway.

People certainly have a right to assume such possibilities and that government officials will not always want to admit when such terrorist tragedies can occur.

Please continue here:

Germanwings A320 Crashed Enroute BCN-DUS - Part 9 (by SpaceshipDC10 Mar 26 2015 in Civil Aviation)

With reference to the NY Times article, some in the media are subsequently asserting a scenario that the pilot in the cockpit likely had a catastrophic health issue (heart attack, embolism, stroke, etc.) after the other pilot left the cockpit, and couldn’t open the door. And that includes a following scenario that the (incapacitated) pilot in the cockpit likely fell on the control stick, facilitating a somewhat controlled vertical and constant heading descent….perfectly, precisely, and at just the right time.

How about an objective explanation of how, upon a pilots involuntary collapse in an incapacitation, only enough forward pressure on the stick is generated to precipitate a near perfect vertical descent via random pitch axis input only, while putting no involuntary body weight or force on the same stick in the roll axis (creating a heading change)…therefore getting a near perfect vertical descent with negligible heading change. This incapacitation scenario IMO defies technical logic.

What’s of primary importance instead, is why this flight crew apparently did not make an immediate turn toward the Mediterranean after the emergency descent began, where there were at least three suitable landing airports easily within reach to make an emergency landing at sea level, choosing instead (in an emergency) to fly straight onward into high terrain/mountainous areas where an emergency landing was essentially impossible.

The information disclosed by the NY Times indicates the more likely scenario as to what was happening in the cockpit while the second pilot was seemingly purposely locked out and the explanation of why an immediate emergency turn and descent toward an emergency landing airport close by wasn’t implemented, instead of this incapacitation and highly unlikely perfect involuntary collapse onto the control stick scenario.

Quoting VCEflyboy (Reply 133): This is unbelievable! How can a pilot in good conscience fly 150 innocent people including school children and babies into the ground? I don't believe it for a second. That was the same story they fed us for MH370. When investigators are clueless, they come up with these crazy theories that of course nobody can disprove unless they were sitting in the cockpit right when it happened. There are surely other scenarios that are more plausible than this.

Please take off your tinfoil hat. Name one other scenario!

Quoting CrimsonChin (Reply 152): According to that YT Airbus vid about doors, if someone is locked out of the cockpit and can't get in due to no response from the pilot, then there's an override code which can be used to get in which unlocks the door for a specific time. So why didn't the pilot use this?

He most likely did, but if the Pilot inside the cockpit doesn't want you to enter (because maybe a terrorist got the emergency code from the F/A) he can ACTIVELY lock you out. Therefore.....

Quoting aw70 (Reply 155): To me, this would be an indicator of an admittedly tiny, but still non-zero probability that the FO was somehow incapacitated at the time of impact. And that this event could, as unlikely as that now seems, still due to some kind of medical emergency, and not malice. Because if you want to commit suicide, you don't fly a path where you graze some trees or rocks before impacting. You aim straight for the best vertical rock face you can find. You do not want to glance off anything.

Incapacitated is impossible, because he had to ACTIVELY lock the CP out. Also he did not choose a path he "merely" entered a new FL on the dial, not knowing or caring when or what the aircraft would hit.....

Quoting anstar (Reply 259): Its not a fix. Whats to say the Flight crew member doesnt attack the FA with the crash axe... OR in the USA a lot fo flight crew carry guns so they could just shoot them... I mean if they have the intent to crash the plane - they will find a way.

You can't eliminate a risk 100%. But it reduce the risk significantly. The presence of a second person in the cockpit does make things safer.

Bear in mind that most people commit suicide alone. A suicidal person is much less likely to act in the presence of a witness. Of course a determined individual can find a way, but the simple presence of a second person there provides an additional margin of safety, both psychologically and practically.

So what's next... 3rd crew, multi codes, secret chant, twirl and click your heels three times etc to gain access?
The only real fix is to take the locks off, imo.

Quoting Karadion (Reply 251): Quoting cbphoto (Reply 243): I'm aware that it's not a secret. Now it's out and advertised well enough that "Hey here's my chance, what's stopping me from doing this". Quoting cbphoto (Reply 243): There are lots of items that can be used to incompacitate the other pilot and accomplish their goal. What? A gun? In Europe?

Terrorists trained in flight schools for 9/11 any system you devise will need to be taught to 1000s of pilots and 1000s of FAs. It will not stay secret. In any large group of people that are trained or know something secret, you can bribe, or convert them into teaching you the information.

You can disable someone with many items in the aircraft. A hard blow by a fire extinguisher can kill or knock someone out quite easy. Fire axe..... ect.

This is just shocking. I've been thinking about this accident last couple of nights and this is worse than I hoped. I'd like to hear what that ex-A320 pilot now who was talking on France24 the other night how the A320 has too much automation. I'm slightly tired that this goes on after every single Airbus crash, even if it rarely is a problem in the man-machine interface. I do understand that if you've flown most of your career on a Caravelle there is a change in the way how the plane is flown, but still... Aviation has just gotten more safe during the last decades.

Quoting seahawk (Reply 176): The standard, where a code known to both pilots and the pursuer opens the door, regardless of what the pilot in the cockpit does. And a second one which is activated by pressing emergency buttons hidden in the cabin, where only a person in the cockpit can open the door from inside.

I don't get your suggestion. If it's the first one, the problem is:

- a terrorist can force a pilot to enter the code and thus will gain entry into the cockpit.

If it's the second one:

- the mentally ill pilot will press the emergency button and become the only person who can open the cockpit door.

Quoting TheSonntag (Reply 247): So, with other words: We do not have firearms, we do not want firearms, and we usually are not trained to firearms. Granted, this could be changed, but I do not see the necessity. In short, I fail to see that a firearm in the hands of a pilot does anything remotely good in any possible scenario.

Indeed. I fail to see how a situation with a mentally ill pilot in the cockpit would be any better with an addition of firearms.

Boarding my plane in 50 minutes.

Quoting PanHAM (Reply 260): Now it is likely that149 People have been murdered by one guy who not only had Access to the Cockpit but could also lock himself in, thanks to the law which is based on kneejerk reactions after 9/11.

It's not a kneejerk reaction. Many more have been killed because of terrorists gaining access to the cockpit than due to suicidal pilots. So if you need to chose between two options, preventing access to the cockpit is a better trade-off than allowing terrorists to get in.

I think aviation has to step back and rethink access to the cockpit.

The authorities were shocked after 9/11 about the possibility that airplanes could be overtaken by terrorists and used as weapons against government institutions. That is the main reason for the locked cockpit door. It brings little protection for passengers and crew apart from the pilots actually flying the airplane. Any determined terrorist could kill all passengers and should be able to crash the plane without access to the cockpit.

Perhaps it is needed to rethink the locked cockpit door with the persons inside the cockpit being able to override any attempt to unlock the door.

Perhaps in the name of safety it is necessary to remove the lock on the door again or have a sure way to bypass it.

Quoting trnswrld (Reply 252): Wellp, that's the last time a captain leaves some 20 year old alone in his cockpit!! The rules in the U.S. sound pretty good to me. Regardless if it's a flight attendant or not, one single person in the cokcpit cannot be trusted...that's pretty obvious at this point.

Would an FA recognize the difference of a pilot reaching for a cup of coffee and adjusting the FL? No offense but this is still valid. Then again, an FA would most likely want to engage the pilot in chit-chat and that alone would be enough I suppose.

Part 9 available:

Germanwings A320 Crashed Enroute BCN-DUS - Part 9 (by SpaceshipDC10 Mar 26 2015 in Civil Aviation)

wilco737
  

Quoting Revelation (Reply 210): Quoting Mortyman (Reply 194): A lever in the cockpit gives the crew in cockpit opportunity to shut the door completely during emergencies. If the door is locked in this way inside the cockpit, it is not possible to open the door from outside , even if a pilot or flightattendant on the other side knows the code. http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/ur...-vare-alene-i-cockpit-7959816.html Yes, that is correct. Here is another link: http://www.efbdesktop.com/airplane-general/sys-1.3.1.html For mode LOCK: Momentarily placing the cockpit door switch to LOCK illuminates the red cockpit access panel light, rejects keypad entry request, inhibits aural alerts, and prevents further access code entry for 20 minutes. The cockpit door switch returns to NORM when released, but remains in locked mode for 20 minutes or until UNLOCK is selected. This is different for mode NORM: When NORM is selected, it allows the door to be locked when closed. It also allows the door to be opened after an emergency access code entry and 30 second delay in case of pilot incapacitation. So we see once the switch is moved to LOCK the door will NOT open for 20 minutes unless the switch is put into NORM or UNLOCK.

----------------------------------------------

I see some continuing confusion here about the locking procedure for the cockpit door. I'm not a pilot, but I have carefully watched the Airbus youtube video. The link quoted by Revelation above to a screenshot helps clarify the Airbus youtube video posted upthread. I urge everyone who has questions about the locking procedure to view the link above, and also the entirety of the Airbus youtube video, found here, because it takes a bit of thinking to understand the various modes:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ixEHV7c3VXs

-------------------------------------------

Let me try to encapsulate the procedure as I understand it from the links:

In the YouTube video - First at the 2:40 mark, it shows the procedure for the pilots locking and unlocking the door, after they have locked it due to a perceived threat (in the video, it's a flight attendant forgetting the proper procedure). It clearly shows the captain reacting to a possible threat, toggling the switch to "LOCK" (it springs back to the "NORM" position, but now the "LOCK" mode has been triggered). The "LOCK" mode can only be overridden by the pilot's lifting up the switch and moving it to the "UNLOCK" position. The video says that the entry keypad is disabled for 5 minutes after the "LOCK" mode is toggled.

Then, at 3:55, the video proceeds to the emergency-entry override scenario, in which the pilots are unconscious and the attendant has to enter a code, wait 30 seconds, and then, if no action is taken by the pilots, has 5 seconds to get in the door. But what the video doesn't directly say, which has confused me until repeated viewings of the video, is that this emergency-entry method in the video was run from the "NORM" mode - it only works if the system has not already been set to "LOCK." It works only if the system was in "NORM" mode before the pilots became unconscious.

One discrepancy: the "efbdesktop.com" link at the top confuses things a bit when it states that if the switch is toggled to "LOCK," the external emergency override is disabled for 20 minutes, not the 5 minutes stated in the video. So I don't know whether the co-pilot could have locked the other pilot out for 20 minutes or for 5 minutes. But it backs up the video when It says that only in the "NORM" mode (which is different from the "NORM" POSITION - because even in "LOCK" mode the toggle springs back to the "NORM" position) can the external emergency override trigger the 30-second warning before the door opens.

From what I can tell, the video and the link are saying that if the "LOCK" mode is selected from inside the cockpit, the emergency override code cannot even be entered, until either 5 minutes or 20 minutes expire, whichever would be correct for a Germanwings A320. It would seem that the only communication then would be to use the interphone to request entry.

Could some more knowledgeable Airbus pilots please confirm that I have it correct? I'd like to try to consolidate the understanding of the door lock system.

i've never understood the purpose of the locked cockpit door.

it was brought to us by 9/11, but if 9/11 taught us anything, it's that the days of old-fashioned hijackings are over. negotiations are not necessarily the purpose of the terrorists. therefore, in a hijacking situation, it's all able bodied men to the front of the cabin. if you're going to die, you might as well die fighting. keeping the door open actually helps in that situation, as passengers and crew could work together to incapacitate terrorists. the locked door -- if they (or a suicidal captain) -- are smart enough to employ, only makes fighting back that much harder.

it looks to me that this is a classic case of unintended consequences... in an effort to make airlines safer, lockable doors are now responsible for 150 deaths. and you could speculate that helios might have had a better chance with an unlocked door too.