Quoting em25 (Reply 254): Absurd as it may sound, if simple parachutes were available in the cabin of GWI9525, IMHO some passengers will be now alive.

Yeah, panicked inexperienced pax will bail out at high speed and high altitude, that'll work out well...

Quoting em25 (Reply 254): Absurd as it may sound, if simple parachutes were available in the cabin of GWI9525, IMHO some passengers will be now alive.

Welcome to a.net

  Sorry to say your post makes no sense at all. Please read D.B. Cooper, The PAL airlines A330 situation, etc. Really. Read those. Google is your friend.

Why not just make every seat an ejector set?   

Quoting em25 (Reply 254): Absurd as it may sound, if simple parachutes were available in the cabin of GWI9525, IMHO some passengers will be now alive.

I just happen to be in the process of starting up a company to address that need.

For a limited time I'll allow you a ground floor opportunity to invest in the Acme parachute works!!
Don't send me e-mails send me money.

Quoting tailskid (Reply 258): For a limited time I'll allow you a ground floor opportunity to invest in the Acme parachute works!! Don't send me e-mails send me money.

Are you hiring Wile. E. Coyote as your testing staff?

Quoting AR385 (Reply 259): Are you hiring Wile. E. Coyote as your testing staff?

Our proven technology needs no testing.

We're also manufacturing hydraulic door openers.

In another revision of the door locking system how about allowing a multi-part override from the outside.

All the crew on the plane have a device which stores part of the code to override the door lock (each key forms part of a cryptographic code of which the entire code assembled is required to unlock the door) The code is generated each time the plane flies and is only on the devices the crew hold and is generated directly by the plane computer system itself. (Basically a really long unique number)

To prevent people from getting the code from the crew each member can choose to erase their device rendering the override useless. That way it takes many good people to override the door and only one person to prevent abuse by erasing their key device. Once any segment of the key is erased there is no way to open the door from the locked mode unless it is in normal mode or unlocked. This way the effort to abuse the outside override requires somehow forcing every member of the crew to hand over their key device without having someone do the right thing and erase it before they hand it over.

It should be very cheap to implement and has low risk of abuse. Having two people in the cockpit at a time is not a very good defence as no one expects a fellow co-worker to attack them and the attacker would have the element of surprise.

Edit: Also to provide plausible deniability the device does not indicate weather it has been erased or not but always displays a short numerical identifier so a crew member can know is someone fiddled with it (The code displayed isn't used as part of the actual unlock code, it just allows a crew member to realize if someone erased their key without their knowledge or switch it out with another key).

[Edited 2015-03-26 19:35:59]

Quoting tomlee (Reply 261): and the attacker would have the element of surprise.

But the "attacker" would be sitting down and belted in. There could be no surprise attack.

The new rule is just a silly PR move. A typical flight attendant could be attacked and incapacitated by a typical pilot very easily.

This is just something to make the airlines look as if they are doing something to address a threat they know they can not actually address. If the pilot wants to crash his plane, you can't stop him.

Quoting tailskid (Reply 262): But the "attacker" would be sitting down and belted in. There could be no surprise attack.

How do you know the person sitting down and belted in is the one who is attacking. Not to mention how does that stop them from punching them out or asking them to do something that puts them in range. No one is going to expect someone to try and kill them. One person defending against another just means it takes one bad person to break the system same as the current one they just have to be a bit physical but if they are willing to take everyone down with them then they probably don't care.

With a multi-person override system it takes many to open the door and in an abuse situation only one person is required to stop the override from being used.

Quoting tomlee (Reply 264):

A multi person system can work. I'll agree with that.

Part 11 is open.

Please post there.

Germanwings A320 Crashed Enroute BCN-DUS - Part 11 (by LPDAL Mar 26 2015 in Civil Aviation)

Quoting Armodeen (Reply 200):

I will freely work admit that the bugs still would need to be worked out. I am not at all sure that it should be this way or that way (as gaged by my previous posts on this issue.)

Quoting MillwallSean (Reply 246): A home where this gentleman lived a little bit to long. Most males age 28 would, if they had their own apartments, prefer to live by themselves and not with mum and dad.

Someone who learned to fly with Andreas said "He was a lot of fun, even though he was perhaps sometimes a bit quiet."

I find that comment a bit surprising, because 'sometimes a bit quiet' is quite a strong statement about someone who just died (normally people talk about the positives in someone recently deceased), it doesn't really correlate with being a lot of fun.

Once again, part 11 is open.

Please post there and not here.

Germanwings A320 Crashed Enroute BCN-DUS - Part 11 (by LPDAL Mar 26 2015 in Civil Aviation)

Quoting LTC8K6 (Reply 269): Once again, part 11 is open. Please post there and not here.

Perhaps people should leave opening the new threads to the moderators then, as is the normal practice.

Quoting D L X (Reply 270): Perhaps people should leave opening the new threads to the moderators then, as is the normal practice.

I thought the moderator opened part 11.

Apparently forgot to close part 10.

Just trying to help.

[Edited 2015-03-26 20:22:07]

Quoting D L X (Reply 270): Perhaps people should leave opening the new threads to the moderators then, as is the normal practice.

Agreed. I'm having a hard time following a discussion that is going on in two different places at once while apparently not being moderated. This is not conducive to holding a productive and appropriately advancing discourse. I really hope a moderator will close this part of the discussion.

Best,

OMP777X

I was informed that members may open another "part" of a discussion when it reaches 200 replies (the standard archive-point), and that it is perfectly fine to do so. In any event, I already emailed the moderators to archive this thread.

-LPDAL

Looks like you forgot to "end" this thread with an announcement that you'd opened part 11?

Quoting rta (Reply 70): Airbus flight computer wouldn't have allowed a dive. Also, with a slow descent, it's not completely clear what the intentions were.

But why should the avionics allow a flight path to be entered that will eventually intersect terrain?

They also told me to not post any replies about "ending the thread", yet posting a new part is perfectly okay.
I'm just telling you what they told me, don't shoot the messenger.

-LPDAL

I have read the last few threads

First off this is truly tragic and my heart goes out to all the families who have lost loved ones.

Could the FO have had a diabetic episode?
I am type one and have, once, fainted and come around breathing very heavily after wards
Could he have had an episode, in the confusion tried to open the door and hi the wrong thing?

Just a theory

Quoting E195 (Reply 277): Could he have had an episode, in the confusion tried to open the door and hi the wrong thing?

If you've read the last "few" threads you should have a good grounding on all that. It's been discussed to death.

Quoting tomlee (Reply 264): Quoting tailskid (Reply 262): But the "attacker" would be sitting down and belted in. There could be no surprise attack. How do you know the person sitting down and belted in is the one who is attacking. Not to mention how does that stop them from punching them out or asking them to do something that puts them in range. No one is going to expect someone to try and kill them. One person defending against another just means it takes one bad person to break the system same as the current one they just have to be a bit physical but if they are willing to take everyone down with them then they probably don't care. With a multi-person override system it takes many to open the door and in an abuse situation only one person is required to stop the override from being used.

No need to be so complicated really, all the system need to have is two sets of emegency code and two sets of hijack code. For both lock out and hijack scenario.

One sets of emergency code is distribute to the pilots, one sets is distribute to the cabin crew.

If for whatever reason, the cockpit door is lock by the pilot inside, while another pilot is outside the cockpit, the people outside needs to enter both sets of emergency code and they will be able to obtain immediate access to the cockpit (no delay in unlocking), This should by pass any locking mechanism inside the cockpit. Using both code should indicated to the system that there is already a security threat in the cockpit that someone had deliberately lock other people outside. The reason why one sets of code are given to the pilot and the the other to the cabin crew is because the only scenerio someone inside can do harm to the flight without any resistance is when the other pilot are outside the cockpit. So this allow the other controlling member to immediate regain access to try to save the plane.

So why two sets of hijacks code? This is for situation where hijacker try to hijack the planes while one pilot is outside and then try to threaten to kill him and the purser and demand them to release the emergency code. So as long as one person provide the false information and provide the hijack code, and as long as one sets of hijack code were entered, the door will be permanently lock. This way, at least we know that as long as one crew member can see the big picture and one crew Member the hijack code (without the other crew knowing if it is hijacks code or not), and this allow one crew to lock the cockpit door permanently during hijack scenario. (Note: I am not trying to imply someone is going to do the right think but the chances of at least one of the two members will see the big picture and do the right think to give the hijack code to disable the cockpit door is high). The only way to resume normal operations is a system reset from the inside of the cockpit. And NO, the system needs to design in such a way so that the person can not enter the hijacks code while the door is open. This prevent someone inside to open the door, enter the hijack code,then close the door to lock out the user, hijacks codes can only be enter when the door is already in closed position.

So just a simple door logic changes like this will have prevented Various kind of scenario from happening.

Regards.

Pete

I'll try once more.

Here is the link to part 11.

It's been open for a while now.

Germanwings A320 Crashed Enroute BCN-DUS - Part 11 (by LPDAL Mar 26 2015 in Civil Aviation)

That sounds very workable.

Quoting wowpeter (Reply 279):

If you allow people to know the code and depend on one person doing the right thing under intense stress your risking a lot of allowing a potential 9/11 from occurring again. Having crew members with key devices (very simple things its just a keycard basically). Using duress codes runs the risk a crew member leaks or fails to perform under threat of death.

With my system the crew members do not actually know the code it is impossible to get it out of them and all it takes is one crew member to use covert actions to foil a door override abuse. (It would be virtually impossible to get all the keys to work in that model and there is zero risk a person will give up the key code)

Doesn't solve the problem since you have to be aware that people know of the system if the other pilot has the 2nd emergency code if the pilot kills him by surprising him when he returns to the cockpit then your still screwed as you just lost the two part code.

In my system they would have to kill/attack crew members in the cabin to stop the system from working at which point a crew member could erase their key and the pilot could use the lockdown mode without a working override.

There is no point in my system in forcing people to do anything because you can assume they already erased their devices as per regulation. Hijacking prevented under pressure reaction needed.

Quoting LTC8K6 (Reply 280): It's been open for a while now.

Still not a moderator...

Quoting 32andBelow (Reply 285):

Which is why you just give every crew member an access pass (they probably have to have some ID card in any case) that gets updated when they check in to the plane they are supposed to be on with a unique code the plane generates as a part of the override system.

This way no human even needs to remember any passwords or codes that they could either forget or be forced to give up the code. Since the plane is air-gapped no outside observer could intercept or otherwise hack the cryptographic exchange which uses standard industry encryption to protect the exchange which occurs when they step onto the plane (crew exchanges are easy).

The only thing the crew needs to know if a 9/11 situation occurs erase the code on their card alone and their job is done. Only a few crew members would have to do so to protect the flight deck. The chances of an attacker being able to get enough keys simultaneously without them erasing their code is very low.

This method would allow a non-malicious cabin crew/passengers to fight back against a malicious person(s) in the flight deck.

Quoting 32andBelow (Reply 287):

You need to steal every crew member's card without being noticed. It is just a better door lock you swipe when you walk onto the plane and in flight if you need to use it a certain number of crew need to swipe to override a lockdown. Any one crew member can erase their code easily and it can be detected by that crew member alone. This way people can be alerted that they are under attack or have had their card stolen/swapped. We have electronic passes now don't we and it isn't actually that complex or expensive. You could do this with off the shelf door access hardware. (obviously you would want to adapt it to meet regulations for aerospace but the door hardware is very simple we are talking about access cards my university has had for decades on classroom doors) This isn't even a weight problem as the hardware required is tiny it just is a single door access solution that is stand alone in operation.

[Edited 2015-03-26 22:32:46]

Quoting D L X (Reply 283): Still not a moderator...

A moderator didn't open part 9, or several other parts of several other threads.
It's normal, apparently.

It's just that this one has not been closed for some reason.

It's been reported, and a mod will truncate this one.

Quoting rlwynn (Reply 72): I do not see how the two people in the cockpit rule would help in any way.

I had a similar thought as rlwynn - that having a second person in the cockpit would not prevent pilot suicide if the pilot was intent.
Thinking of Egyptair, the airplane was pointed nose down when one pilot was out of the cockpit... but he returned and tried to help recover the aircraft, only to discover that the dive was deliberate. What happened next is important - there was a struggle between 2 pilots, which ended up putting the aircraft through so many twists and turns that the structure failed.

If the co-pilot knew that the captain could get back in, he still could have done it (it just would have been a more abrupt...).

Part 11:

Germanwings A320 Crashed Enroute BCN-DUS - Part 11 (by LPDAL Mar 26 2015 in Civil Aviation)

wilco737