The KE8702 crash in 1998 was caused by "the captain's misuse of the thrust reverser during the landing roll and his confusion over crosswind conditions." The captain and first officer of that flight had their flying status suspended for 1 year and 6 months, respectively.

I wonder if any parallels/similarities could be drawn between this crash and that one...

Any more news on this mishap?

No Tax On Rotax

Reported on NHK news tonight:
visibility should be at least 1500 metres for landing and was steady at 1800 metres until the final one minute, then rapidly dropped down to 300 metres 6 seconds before "landing". Ground radar only usable for landing in the opposite direction.

Quoting aca36 (Reply 48): It's a non-precision VOR DME approach with MDA @ 1500.

We don't know that :
There are three possible approaches on RWY 28 :
- VOR : MDA 1480 ft (413 ft) Vis 1400 m
- VOR / DME -------as above-------------
- RNAV :! DA 1500 ft (433 ft) Vis 1400 m
Considering the type of airplane, the RNAV approach is the most likely chosen.

Quoting ltbewr (Reply 39): Flaws in computerized auto-land systems.

No autoland on this approach, as aca36 already posted.

Quoting ltbewr (Reply 39): Incorrect information input into the aircraft's computer

A possibility, although cockpit procedures on an A320 non-precision approaches, especially onj a GNSS approach are very strict in terms of FMS management / briefing and crosschecks.
To me it's more a matter of execution.

Quoting ltbewr (Reply 39): Weak piloting skills in part due to overreliance on computer flight systems.

The usual red herring

Quoting ltbewr (Reply 39): Poor CRM perhaps due to culture of the pilots and/or the airline

CRM is a captain's responsibility. Let's not get into the usual xenophobia.

Quoting ltbewr (Reply 39): Pilot training flaws

Another herring on a blanket statement.

Quoting ltbewr (Reply 39): Lack of experience of landing at this airport.

Could well be the case here, among other factors.

Quoting ltbewr (Reply 39): Weather, visibility or topographical features not correctly compensated for.

All the above are taken care in the design of any approach. Piulots do not have to compensate for them : the approach plate is the guide.
However, the geometry of each approach, when one goes visual at sundown on a plateau has to be prepared for.

Quoting ltbewr (Reply 39): Not wanting to do a 'go around' with delays so forced a landing

Pure conjecture.

Quoting ltbewr (Reply 39): Overcorrection in their approach

There is basically nothing to correct for : the instrumentation is accurate enough... but they were some 60 ft below the theoretical glide path. It doesn't seem very much, but that's the error which could lead to a ~1000 ft too early touch-down... but they should have been visual 500 ft before.
Thius is the weather reported at the incident moment :
RJOA 141108Z VRB02KT 4000 R28/0300VP1800D -SHRA PRFG FEW000 SCT005 BKN012 09/08Q1006 RMK 1ST000 4ST005 6CU012 A2973 1500E FG E-S
and decoded as :
Location: RJOA
14 APR 2015
11:08 UTC
Wind: Variable in direction, Speed: 2 knots
Visibility: 4000 m
Weather: Light Showers of Rain
Weather: Partial Fog
Clouds: A few , at 0 feet above aerodrome level
Clouds: Scattered , at 500 feet above aerodrome level
Clouds: Broken sky , at 1200 feet above aerodrome level
QNH : 1006 hPa
Visibility: 1500 m direction East and South
Weather: Fog

They were close to their visibility minimums, looking west to the sundown, transitioning from a 3.5° instrument glide slope to a visual one on a 3° PAPI.
All the ingredients are there for an undershoot if one pushes his/her luck too far on a lo-vis landing.

For those interested, this is the HIroshima Airport AIP... don't know if there has been a more up-to-date one

[Edited 2015-04-16 04:04:47]

Given the similarity with the SFO accident and how early the A/C stopped (with possibly sub-optimal braking), can it be that they were not only low but also slow? I mean a low-energy situation?

Quoting Pihero (Reply 54): Considering the type of airplane, the RNAV approach is the most likely chosen.

  
According to this Asahi report, the flight was performing the RNAV approach:

http://translate.google.com/translat...H4H5JXFH4HPITB01T.html&prev=search

Quoting SocalApproach (Reply 49):

Unfortunately, for some people on this site, "this" Asiana crash is definitely on the pilots, while the SFO crash was the fault of the aircraft.

And I can't figure out why......

Quoting KarelXWB (Reply 33): => http://twitter.com/flightradar24/status/588217217713631234

A perfect example of why it is so important to have adequate safety areas at major airports.


Dan  

Some news refers to possible encounter to a microburst that may have blown down the aircraft far below the altitude expected at the point. If this is true, the cockpit crew would be a hero who have gone through that crisis and succeeded
in letting no one killed in this accident.

Quoting smolt (Reply 59): Some news refers to possible encounter to a microburst that may have blown down the aircraft far below the altitude expected

1/- The weather at that time was about calm air with fog. That's not the weather associated with micro-bursts.

2/- "Far below the expected altitude" ?... it's just 100 ft below nominal glide slope.

Quoting whiteguy (Reply 13): Well the incident looks significantly similar to the SFO accident. Plane touched down short of runway: http://avherald.com/h?article=484c306e&opt=0 Even more similar to the AC incident in YHZ.....

Looks almost like a duplicate of AC624 with only the names and location changed, except there isn't as much of a slope at the end of the runway at HIJ compared to YHZ so the aircraft wasn't as badly damaged. And AC624 came to a stop on the runway.

Quoting hoons90 (Reply 16): Asiana is starting to remind me of Korean Air in the 90's... Hope they can get their act together.

AND Transasia airways is a bit like China Airlines through the same period. Same two countries doing it again.

I suspect root cause is with the respective national regulators.

Quoting Pihero (Reply 54): CRM is a captain's responsibility. Let's not get into the usual xenophobia.

Yes, before we get on the xenophobia phenomenon, we need to remind everyone that both OZ162 and AC624 were performing a non-precision approach (RNAV) at night in less than ideal visual conditions. AC624 had poor visibility, and OZ162 in patches of groundfog...

If let's say both cases are minima busting, then the xenophobia cards gets thrown out of the window and anyone using it is a bigot! :p At least it's still an IF...   

I don't think that anyone that talks about Korean culture possibly playing a role is a racist or bigot. It is a factor to be considered and taken into account just like any other. At this stage nobody knows for sure what happened and there needs to be an investigation, as is always the case with accidents. But obviously anyone can see that another Asiana plane crashing into the ground before the runway looks like a repeat of what happened in SFO - the scenario is very similar except that fortunately this time the damage was less and nobody was killed.

When I look at the photos, what runs through my mind is that it's lucky that they had all of that empty space with grass to the left of the runway instead of, for example, an A380 full of fuel taxying for takeoff or a big fuel tank because at the point it veered off to the left it was still moving very fast and completely out of control.

Quoting peterinlisbon (Reply 64): It is a factor to be considered and taken into account just like any other.

Well, it is, but the usual subtext in discussions about that is how to make eastern pilots act more western. Most of the CRM techniques taught to pilots around the world are based on western culture and "teamwork" concepts, which just isn't how a lot of eastern countries operate. Part of the problem may be in trying to shoehorn western-style culture into an eastern cockpit, where pilots would have little ongoing experience with such a culture outside of that cockpit. How is a captain expected to treat his first officer as an equal in the cockpit, when he will not be expected to treat him as an equal in literally any other situation? (In fact, he will be expected to do the opposite, including by the first officer himself.)

It would be a very jarring transition on an almost daily basis, and in a crisis one or both pilots is likely to fall back on life experience vs. a few sessions of CRM training. It's not only the captain - in various accidents I know of, it was actually the first officer who was afraid to speak up because he apparently felt it wasn't his place. That's tough to "teach out" when the entire culture is built around it.

Perhaps it may be time to rethink certain aspects of CRM to better reflect the culture in question. CRM seems to work best in western cultures where it's already a reflection of the way our culture works. I can't recall a recent accident in the west that was due to poor CRM, but it seems to still be a fairly common theme with Asian airlines. That's probably *not* due to poor training or implementation; it seems at least equally likely that the CRM concept as currently envisioned is fundamentally incompatible with various Asian cultures. It seems that it would be an easier solution to make CRM more compatible with the culture, rather than trying to make the culture compatible with CRM.

If you're going to ask me how to do that, I dunno. I'm just saying if we're going to talk about cultural issues with regard to CRM, we should be careful not to imply that our western way of doing things is inherently superior and they should bend to our will. Maybe someone should instead figure out a CRM concept that works better in an inherently hierarchical system.

Quoting peterinlisbon (Reply 64): I don't think that anyone that talks about Korean culture possibly playing a role is a racist or bigot. It is a factor to be considered and taken into account just like any other.

Until we know what happened and what the investigation can reveal, questioning it is fine, judging it, is not. And there is a difference between raising cultural issues and being a racist or a bigot, this discussion hasn't gone there yet thankfully.

Quoting peterinlisbon (Reply 64): But obviously anyone can see that another Asiana plane crashing into the ground before the runway looks like a repeat of what happened in SFO - the scenario is very similar except that fortunately this time the damage was less and nobody was killed.

The major difference is that SFO happened in daylight VFR. HIJ happened at night in patchy fog. We all need to know if this is a case of simple minima busting, or something else. Deliberate Minima busting has no place in IFR flying, we don't know if this was such a case and if deliberate or not... yet.

Quoting spacecadet (Reply 65): Part of the problem may be in trying to shoehorn western-style culture into an eastern cockpit, where pilots would have little ongoing experience with such a culture outside of that cockpit.

While authoritarian captains are never a good idea, what you said, IS a real problem. There are other ways to get CRM to work without using the "western style"... teamwork exists in all cultures, it's a matter of picking the right one for the particular airline.

Quoting spacecadet (Reply 65): It's not only the captain - in various accidents I know of, it was actually the first officer who was afraid to speak up because he apparently felt it wasn't his place.

Spot on!
We had a fatal accident where the Captain was a former authoritarian megalomania but turned into a CRM softie... all worked well until the day he flew with an "obey the senior and never step over a senior even if it means your life" type FO... Until the company dismissed him as "lacking mental capability to make the necessary decisions in line flying as a SIC", he still didn't understand why everyone blamed him for his failure. Airlines here are now encountering this kind of problems and are retraining or firing these types of new pilots. The problem in this case, is not the airline, but the educational establishment that produced such mentality...

In another airline, CRM was pounded into Captains' heads so much that now the airline suffer from authoritarian FOs... In a few years, we may end up back to the same cockpit culture of 20-30 years ago...

You raised some very good points there...

Quoting Pihero (Reply 54): Quoting ltbewr (Reply 39): Poor CRM perhaps due to culture of the pilots and/or the airline CRM is a captain's responsibility. Let's not get into the usual xenophobia.

What nonsense; CRM is the responsibility of the CA, FO, RO (when applicable), and the company for fostering an atmosphere which should encourage CRM to begin with. It does not rest on the shoulders of one single individual.

[Edited 2015-04-17 23:15:48]

Quoting peterinlisbon (Reply 64): I don't think that anyone that talks about Korean culture possibly playing a role is a racist or bigot. It is a factor to be considered and taken into account just like any other. At this stage nobody knows for sure what happened and there needs to be an investigation, as is always the case with accidents. But obviously anyone can see that another Asiana plane crashing into the ground before the runway looks like a repeat of what happened in SFO - the scenario is very similar except that fortunately this time the damage was less and nobody was killed.

  

And "xenophobia" is a term I had to look up; but sometimes you just can't beat the race baiters. Or those that don't have an understanding of the origins of CRM.

[Edited 2015-04-18 00:08:33]

Quoting Pihero (Reply 54): CRM is a captain's responsibility

Quoting PITrules (Reply 67): What nonsense; CRM is the responsibility of the CA, FO, RO (when applicable), and the company for fostering an atmosphere which should encourage CRM to begin with. It does not rest on the shoulders of one single individual.

Here, we're touching a major misunderstanding :

- CRM is either "Customers' relationships management"

- or it could be "Cockpit Resources Management" taught to crews with a comprehensive set of principles, of which we could highlight communication , interpersonal skills, assertiveness, SA... Gradient of authority... etc...

There has to be a manager - or a leader, if you like - in the *M* part of CRM. He/she is the one who promotes implementation of good CRM principles and he/she has the ultimate responsibility on the flight conduct... and per force the ultimate decision.
A cockpit without leadership does not - should not - exist and the role of the captain is to bring every crew member - most of the time only one - into the same page of a plan of action... and the way to achieve the goal of synergy of competences... that's where CRM lies in a cockpit.

I have seen a - fortunately very - few FOs who just retained one aspect of their training : they could voice their disagreement freely, now, completely ignoring the fact that are about civil behaviour, interpersonal skills, conflict avoidance and resolution... Guess who had to bring back the CRM principle of authority ( in particular) back to basics ?

Some would say : "there is no time for civil words in a tense situation !"
It's often true, but in fact CRM has seeped into SOPs
- A captain flies a fast approach, flaps not in the landing position on short finals : SOPs require just one simple call out :
"One thousand feet... Not stabilized " .That captain has only one resource left to him : Go around.
Same thing on a Cat III approach : whatever the height "Alarm" from the FO means go around... etc... etc...

so, after Mandala499's statement :"In another airline, CRM was pounded into Captains' heads so much that now the airline suffer from authoritarian FOs",
your "What nonsense" is an illustration of an attitude not conducive to the fostering of a non-antagonistic interpersonal relationship in a cockpit..?. Who has to correct that ? I ask you.

Quoting Pihero (Reply 69):

I agree there must be leadership in the cockpit, and that responsibility is the Captain's as he is the final authority.

The quote you were replying too - "Poor CRM perhaps due to culture of the pilots [plural] and/or the airline" suggested (correctly so IMHO) a possible issue with cultural influence affecting the level of CRM at the airline. But to suggest that the responsibility of CRM lies solely on the Captain and not the rest of the crew isn't telling the complete picture. Lets say for example we have a very authoritarian CA ("my way or the highway") who does not set the proper tone during his preflight brief and is not open to input from his crew. If the First Officer is versed on the roll he plays regarding good CRM in the cockpit, I would still expect him to speak up when warranted or offer helpful input as opposed to let a situation deteriorate - even if it is to the indignation of that CA. The "C" in CRM stands for Crew (or Cockpit), not Captain. I think that may be an issue facing Asiana.

[Edited 2015-04-18 14:38:35]

I feel we are getting ahead of ourselves. What we know is that this is an *accident*, just like the one in Canada. Possibly for the same reasons, possibly for some other reasons. We will see in due time

In any case, a serious situation that in both cases could have ended much worse. In Canada the margin to a loss of all lives was razor thin, IMO, and while it was apparently not quite so in Hiroshima, it was still a bad situation.

And indeed, many factors could have played a role. From equipment malfunction to lax approach practices, from CRM issues to get there-iris to simple mistakes. Probably some combination of all of the above. Lets not judge a culture before we even know what happened.

Quoting PITrules (Reply 70): The "C" in CRM stands for Crew (or Cockpit), not Captain.

We are in total agreement and it's because we live it everyday of our flying life and CRM principles have to be adhered to and implemented all the time.

AF447 is a case in point touiching two of the aspects of "crm" ( low case letters as I'm no longer talking in theory ) :

- The first is the captain's very lax type of command : no definite plan of action, not listening to the FO or acknowledging his concern for a higher cruise level / no hand over briefing / not laying down a clear plan of action during the ITCZ crossing / not taking care of the dynamics of the cockpit in his absence or trying to solve the apparent possible interpersonal conflict between his juniors...(there is more...)

- The second point is about the two FOs inability to perform as an efficient crew and failing to apply even the basic SOPs to the resolution of the problem at hand : task distribution / ECAM procedures / identification of failures ....( there is more but I think you get my point ).

There is no end to crm during a flight until the crew say good-bye and thank you at base :
The Sioux City DC-10 is a demonstration of that principle : All went well after the flight controls failure, the augmented crew functioned as a very tight team, very efficient... until the moment the plan of action fell apart : the captain was intent on landing ; the one at the throttles was seeing a low-energy state at too important a height leading to stall... the captain won, the other one was right. ( I am not judging, just stating facts ).

Yes, CRM training and applied principles have made air transport a lot safer.
Maybe we could extend it to airline culture, the way is to look at those multi-cultural airlines first and see where they are successful at having good cockpit synergies.

In western countries, it's rather easy : it's basically a matter of being / flying with gentlemen ( gentlewomen ?).

Thanks for being one.

Quoting Pihero (Reply 72): The Sioux City DC-10 is a demonstration of that principle : All went well after the flight controls failure, the augmented crew functioned as a very tight team, very efficient... until the moment the plan of action fell apart : the captain was intent on landing ; the one at the throttles was seeing a low-energy state at too important a height leading to stall... the captain won, the other one was right. ( I am not judging, just stating facts ).

Is this really true? I was under the impression that plane was going extremely fast in a high energy state (I could be wrong). Not only that, but we're they even in a position to consider a go around? That aircraft was barely controllable and considering going back up could have resulted in even more deaths if they lost control in a different state of flight. Maybe I read or took your statement wrong, but you almost make it seem like they should have just performed a go around. Based on my limited knowledge in this accident, I feel that airplane needed to be on the ground the first time just as they did. Who knows, maybe had it not been for the wing spar or gear issues that has caused other cart wheels in similar types maybe it would have stayed upright and mostly intact.

Hiroshima airport closed today due to low visibility. Due to damage to the localizer, the airport has been operating under visual approaches only. Information available from ANA website. Due to the geography of the location of Hiroshima airport, there is a regular occurrence of fog. Hope the antennas are fixed ASAP.

/// For passengers who are flying to/from Hiroshima airport ///

The closed runway at Hiroshima airport has reopened from April 17.
However, flight operation is depended on the local weather conditions, as there are still restrictions caused by the airport facility damages.

April 20:All flights has been canceled due to low visibility.
Extra flights to/from Iwakuni airport has been scheduled.

*NH1301 Tokyo Haneda 7:00 Departure - Iwakuni 8:40 Arrival
*NH1304 Iwakuni 9:20 Departure - Tokyo Haneda 10:55 Arrival
*NH1305 Tokyo Haneda 18:00 Departure - Iwakuni 19:40 Arrival
*NH1308 Iwakuni 20:25 Departure - Tokyo Haneda 22:00 Arrival

If you are able to adjust your schedule, we highly recommend for you to modify your itinerary.

Please check "Flight Status" for your flight.

Quoting trnswrld (Reply 73): Is this really true? I was under the impression that plane was going extremely fast in a high energy state (I could be wrong).

Remember it was a flapless approach.
I'd welcome a discussion on the subject, provided there won't be any judgement of the crew ( some hope ! ).
here it will be OT and a thread hijack.
Instead, have a look at the accident report and compare page 23 with the Appendix D "Controllability with all hydrauilic failure ", page 116 and following

The url got lost .

here it is :http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR90-06.pdf

So what's the latest on HL7762 ? A definite write-off or towed out from where she stopped for assessment ?

Quoting Pihero (Reply 69): Who has to correct that ? I ask you.

In flight is the Captain still (to save the flight), off flight, it's the Company (to change the environment's attitude).   

Quoting PITrules (Reply 70): The "C" in CRM stands for Crew (or Cockpit), not Captain.

LOL! We had several of those types years back... (C for Captain and not Crew)... "Consider your recent type rating as a farewell present from the company," were quoted in the severance letters.   

Quoting aca36 (Reply 74): Due to damage to the localizer, the airport has been operating under visual approaches only.

But with ILS10 inop, there's still VOR 10 and VOR 28 as well as RNAV 28 approaches. Why "visual approaches only" ?

hmm, news says investigation by Airbus engineer progresses. It turn out that when first the aircraft hit the ILS localizer antenna, debris was blown into the engines both side right and left then they almost lost their power.
Damage seems like something much more severe than just one sight.

In what I feel Asiana is rather a lucky company. It always gets the slightest damage in an accident that possibly should have been the worst misery.

Quoting smolt (Reply 79): In what I feel Asiana is rather a lucky company. It always gets the slightest damage in an accident that possibly should have been the worst misery.

Wasn't the 777 in SFO w/o'd tho?

Quoting spacecadet (Reply 65): If you're going to ask me how to do that, I dunno.

Would it be enough to ask: If you see something, say something?

I agree, with your take on east versus west culture, and CRM. The issue is that this very different than giving way in a parking lot; many lives are at stake. I cannot think of a different way to run CRM which is "Eastern" friendly, but at a minimum, would not the pilot witnessing the impending disaster want to live? I am flying 4 A380 flights on OZ in June / July on a family holiday to JFK and I want the pilots free to speak up if they see something wrong. At least if something does go wrong we have also learned that the FAs for OZ are superstars.

At the Regal Hotel in HK, I saw the OZ crew getting ready for departure, one of the pilots was an American (3 stripes) I think. How many Western crew does OZ have? Anyways, PPRUNE is full of stories about local pilots treating Western pilots like crap, but the American and Korean captain seemed to be laughing and joking around waiting for the FAs to check out. Hope these two are working the 12:30am flight in eight weeks or so...  

Quoting PHX787 (Reply 80): Wasn't the 777 in SFO w/o'd tho?

It absolutely was ...

But it should have been 80 zillion itty bitty pieces ... and wasn't ... I think that's what was meant by "lucky"

Quoting TC957 (Reply 77):

AirFleets.net has it listed as "written off," while Planespotters.net has it listed as "stored." The Aviation Safety Network website does not yet have an assessment on its condition.