Was QANTAS flight 32 really close to being a disaster, or did the news media over react?

Quoting DDR (Thread starter): Was QANTAS flight 32 really close to being a disaster,

From Chapter 14 of the book QF 32 by Richard De Crespigny, the Pilot in Command:
"... the fire in No 2 engine was only the beginning of it: Engines 1, 3 & 4 were degraded in different forms, the fuel system was a total mess, the hydraulics and electrics and pneumatics were plundered and even our flight controls were compromised."

Sounds like "close to disaster" to me! To get the full story you need to read the whole book. I would NOT like to that close to disaster, in an aircraft or anywhere else, thank you very much!

Gemuser

It is my firm belief that QF32 was saved only by the fact that the pilots were pilots FIRST, "systems administrators," second. It was excellent airmanship and creative decision-making that saved the day.

Who among us believes that the flight would have successfully landed if the crew had displayed the skills and (more importantly) decision-making attributes which were pivotal in several recent notable airframe losses? I choose none in particular for the simple reason that I have no wish to start a holy war over culture (whether cockpit or design), but you might ask yourself which airlines' crews you want up front, when things go ops-abnormal.

Quoting gemuser (Reply 1): Sounds like "close to disaster" to me! To get the full story you need to read the whole book. I would NOT like to that close to disaster, in an aircraft or anywhere else, thank you very much!

Systems were compromised enough that they couldn't even shut off the No1 engine after landing. I'd say it was pretty dire.

Quoting DDR (Thread starter): did the news media over react?

This is one of the rare case when the media underreacted, for the same reason that they usually overreact - they had a lack of information and didn't understand the information that they did have. This was a complex incident with a series of cascading failures, any one of which probably would have been manageable but taken all together and hitting the pilots one after another in succession, they were very difficult to deal with. I remember reading something from one of the pilots to the effect that as soon as they'd clear one failure, two or three more would appear. They were getting new failures faster than they could manage the ones they already had.

People here initially underreacted too, thinking it was "just" an uncontained engine failure. That's not something that's supposed to happen to begin with but it's very rare that it can bring down an airplane. (UA232 is one exception, and this incident could have been similar in that the shrapnel affected a lot of critical airplane systems.)

Quoting DarkSnowyNight (Reply 3): Systems were compromised enough that they couldn't even shut off the No1 engine after landing. I'd say it was pretty dire.

I agree , plus didn't it take well over a year to repair that jet ?

Quoting Sooner787 (Reply 5): Quoting DarkSnowyNight (Reply 3): Systems were compromised enough that they couldn't even shut off the No1 engine after landing. I'd say it was pretty dire. I agree , plus didn't it take well over a year to repair that jet ?

The repairs of Nancy Bird was 536 days according to the attached report "the return of VH-OQA

http://www.aussieairliners.org/scrap...Airbus%20A380/QtechTalk-VH-OQA.pdf

EK413

Quoting gemuser (Reply 1): From Chapter 14 of the book QF 32 by Richard De Crespigny, the Pilot in Command: "... the fire in No 2 engine was only the beginning of it: Engines 1, 3 & 4 were degraded in different forms, the fuel system was a total mess, the hydraulics and electrics and pneumatics were plundered and even our flight controls were compromised." Sounds like "close to disaster" to me! To get the full story you need to read the whole book. I would NOT like to that close to disaster, in an aircraft or anywhere else, thank you very much!

  

Agreed about the book too; get the book and read the whole thing!  

Quoting sccutler (Reply 2): It is my firm belief that QF32 was saved only by the fact that the pilots were pilots FIRST, "systems administrators," second. It was excellent airmanship and creative decision-making that saved the day.

  

In addition, I believe that other crews might not have been able to bring it back down safely   

Quoting DarkSnowyNight (Reply 3): Systems were compromised enough that they couldn't even shut off the No1 engine after landing. I'd say it was pretty dire.

  

The crew did an excellent job with what faced them and what they had to work with.

Quoting spacecadet (Reply 4): This is one of the rare case when the media underreacted, for the same reason that they usually overreact - they had a lack of information and didn't understand the information that they did have

At least initially, the Australian media were in a frenzy... I mean the first thing I saw about it on that day was a little headline saying that wreckage from a Qantas aircraft had been found in Indonesia. By the time the nightly news was on it had landed safely, but it was still front page everywhere you went. It didn't help that QF grounded the A380 fleet.

But definitely, the people who actually know a bit about aviation downplayed it, because the severity was not known. I highly encourage everyone to read the QF32 book - it wasn't until reading that that I really understood just how messed up that aircraft was. And I don't think it's a stretch to say that it was very close to being a disaster.

This was one of those incidents that's opposite to most, because the more details you know about it, the scarier it actually becomes.

Quoting DDR (Thread starter): Was QANTAS flight 32 really close to being a disaster, or did the news media over react?

This quote from the back cover of the book "QF32" by Richard De Crespigny (the Captain who led the flight crew):
"A compelling journey of leadership and resilience. I've been in the captain's seat myself when things go catastrophically wrong, and Richard's description of a well-trained crew acting to save lives gives a unique insight into how experience and judgement can avert a disaster. Anyone who has flown, or is about to fly should read this remarkable story"

The above written by none other than Chesley "sully" Sullenberger, the Captain of US Airways flight 1549 that successfully ditched in the Hudson River on 15 Jan 2009.

And......just to reinforce the enormity of the situation the crew were faced with, and how it was handled:

"A gripping tale of overcoming seemingly insurmountable odds. In QF32, Richard de Crespigny recounts a hair raising story of responsibility and complexity as he brings 469 passengers and crew safely to earth after encountering one of the most catastrophic in-flight disasters in aviation history"

The above attributable to Neil Armstrong!!

I think the above puts it in its right context.

Quoting sccutler (Reply 2): It is my firm belief that QF32 was saved only by the fact that the pilots were pilots FIRST, "systems administrators," second. It was excellent airmanship and creative decision-making that saved the day.

Amen to that.

Quoting 777Jet (Reply 7): Agreed about the book too; get the book and read the whole thing!

Is this book available in paper in North America? I am still old fashioned and don't have an e-reader.

I would love to read this after seeing the Four Corners documentary on it and the Mayday one.

Quoting sccutler (Reply 2): It is my firm belief that QF32 was saved only by the fact that the pilots were pilots FIRST, "systems administrators," second. It was excellent airmanship and creative decision-making that saved the day. Who among us believes that the flight would have successfully landed if the crew had displayed the skills and (more importantly) decision-making attributes which were pivotal in several recent notable airframe losses? I choose none in particular for the simple reason that I have no wish to start a holy war over culture (whether cockpit or design), but you might ask yourself which airlines' crews you want up front, when things go ops-abnormal.

I have no evidence to say the result would be any different but it was very fortunate that there were check captains on that flight. IIRC there was a captain, first and second officer plus two check captains so they had QF's best and brightest working that situation.

I do agree though that they were calm and collected on how they handled the situation.

  

And they also had two extra crew on the flight on that day which shared the workload around more?

Quoting sccutler (Reply 2): It is my firm belief that QF32 was saved only by the fact that the pilots were pilots FIRST, "systems administrators," second. It was excellent airmanship and creative decision-making that saved the day. Who among us believes that the flight would have successfully landed if the crew had displayed the skills and (more importantly) decision-making attributes which were pivotal in several recent notable airframe losses? I choose none in particular for the simple reason that I have no wish to start a holy war over culture (whether cockpit or design), but you might ask yourself which airlines' crews you want up front, when things go ops-abnormal.

Quoting Sooner787 (Reply 5): I agree, plus didn't it take well over a year to repair that jet ?

Here is a YouTube link that I really enjoy still watching, about the return of the A380 VH-OQA to service. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FJlJ_6Kveaw

  

Yes, I agree, and the book is fantastic. He is also publishing another book in 2016? http://qf32.aero/2014/10/29/5858/

Quoting benjjk (Reply 8): I highly encourage everyone to read the QF32 book - it wasn't until reading that that I really understood just how messed up that aircraft was. And I don't think it's a stretch to say that it was very close to being a disaster. This was one of those incidents that's opposite to most, because the more details you know about it, the scarier it actually becomes.

  =



Another short interview link: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uZkAsnVDlbc

[Edited 2015-07-02 20:47:02]

Quoting VapourTrails (Reply 11):

Despite the cascading failures and loss of the green hydraulic system, the autopilot was still available and used to 1000 ft AGL on approach, this reduced the workload on the flying pilots considerably, it provided additional mental capacity for management. The accident was one of the clear advantages of a FBW flight control system that can reconfigure itself following significant cascading failures.

Quoting StarAC17 (Reply 10): Is this book available in paper in North America? I am still old fashioned and don't have an e-reader.

Not sure as I haven't been there for a while, but I'm sure you could buy it very easily on the net.

The above post should help.

I've also googled it and found several sites selling it that ship to the USA.

Perhaps you could find a used copy on amazon or the like from somebody already living in North America which would cut down shipping costs?

The scale of the incident really beggars belief but it was later analysed as control systems failures on all four engines in addition to the actual turbine disc failure on No 2, which also took out the thrust reverser on the left side, and failure of three out of four fire bottles on the left wing. Only 2 of 8 hydraulic pumps functioning. Two generators unavailable, half the AC buses faulted, RAT failed. APU failed. Flight control in alternate law. Only 40% of slat and aileron capacity available. 50% of spoiler capacity available. Compromised roll control. Reduced brake accumulator capacity. Six failed fuel pumps leading to lateral and longitudinal imbalance, with transfer and jettison failed. 8 of 11 fuel tanks unsuitable for use. Centre of gravity too far aft, 42 tonnes over MLW. Air data computer failed. Auto-thrust failed, auto-land unavailable, autopilot unwilling to remain connected. GPWS failed.

Quoting StarAC17 (Reply 10): IIRC there was a captain, first and second officer plus two check captains

As I recall at least one member of the crew was devoted purely to clearing ECAM messages for quite some time because, as spacecadet mentions, for every resolved alert there were two or three new ones. About 130 faults and 120 master cautions over two hours.

Quoting DarkSnowyNight (Reply 3): Systems were compromised enough that they couldn't even shut off the No1 engine after landing.

They tried to shut it down on the ground with water but the Trent 900 can take three tonnes of water per minute and still run. Three and a half hours after landing they finally killed it by spraying a vast amount of AFFF into it. Had they not... well, two days after the incident the aircraft was still leaking fuel and only 13 tonnes of the 72 on board had been transferred off.

Annoyingly, because the engine continued to run for so long after landing, the CVR also continued to run and so no sound record of the cockpit action exists.

And just to make everything that little bit more painful - the next day most of the QF32 flight and cabin crew were accommodated on QF6 back to SYD, operated by a B744. It suffered a compressor blade failure on climb-out and returned to SIN.

Interview with Capt. Richard de Crespigny. I don't know if this was posted before, but nearly one hour of technical detail, is just as good as reading the book, and is more more condensed and focused on the incident itself. I hadn't seen this interview before, and hopefully hasn't been posted in a thread yet.. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pEu60P1XNeg & http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0DLo2hc89h8

I agree there were a number of factors that saved this aircraft and all on board. IMHO it did come close to being a disaster. I don't think the news media over-reacted, in this incident, except perhaps in the early hours, where there were reports of a crash... with some debris found.   

A good news media story for 2012, return of the aircraft to Australia: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=52kTLnsXC2w

QF32 is available as a Kindle book in the US ... it's quite a remarkable read.

You can also read the QF32 investigation report, I have now several times. I quote it quite a lot as I work for RR and am responsible for parts for all Trent models.
A huge slice of luck and then great pilots in a great aircraft mean those people are still here today.

I am told one piece of the disc missed the fuselage by .6 of a degree, added to damage the the plane sustained that possibly would have been the proverbial straw.

I am not sure you can list all faults but above was good start. I think the main addition to that list was loss of ABS on many of the wheels meaning they had to wait to apply the brakes and be cautious or all the tyres would have exploded.
In the simimulafion film the head assessor tries to calculate if they can land on a 4000 ft runway, computer keeps saying no, until finally it says they will use 3900 feet of runway.
As has been said, they could not transfer fuel, so one wing was losing fuel so the other wing was getting heavy in comparison so the longer they flew the more unbalanced the aircraft became.

I don't know how much more could go wrong and still get home, but had it not been for the fact there were 4 pilots aboard this event may have been different.
For those who don't know there were the two pilots, a trainee pilot assessor ( who is an actual pilot ) and the Quantas chief pilot assessor. They all shared the workload after the event.

Quoting zeke (Reply 12): The accident was one of the clear advantages of a FBW flight control system that can reconfigure itself following significant cascading failures.

Don't see any 'advantage'


A very complex aircraft survived a significant number of failures that were well managed by a competent crew.


Many Boeing and Douglas aircraft have survived uncontained engine failures without the benefit of FBW that can 'reconfigure itself'


In fact the complexity of the Airbus systems and associated, numerous, almost overwhelming number of messages to the crew needing to be resolved seemed to make this situation a lot more difficult than it needed to be, good thing they had that many pilots and experience in the flight deck.



Sometimes simple is better.

Quoting MrHMSH (Reply 21): Have any caused that much damage though? The only parallel I can draw from memory is UA232, where there was a lot more damage.

Yes, the cargo door that opened on United flight 811 a 747 Classic departing HNl caused massive damage, a huge hole
in the side of the aircraft was opened up.


Despite the damage and the loss of #3 and #4 engines the crew were able to return for a successful landing
14 minutes later, not spend hours in the air clearing 'messages'

Quoting TN486 (Reply 9): "A gripping tale of overcoming seemingly insurmountable odds. In QF32, Richard de Crespigny recounts a hair raising story of responsibility and complexity as he brings 469 passengers and crew safely to earth after encountering one of the most catastrophic in-flight disasters in aviation history" The above attributable to Neil Armstrong!!

In terms of compliments it doesn't come much better than that.


Cheers,
StickShaker

Quoting XAM2175 (Reply 15): And just to make everything that little bit more painful - the next day most of the QF32 flight and cabin crew were accommodated on QF6 back to SYD, operated by a B744. It suffered a compressor blade failure on climb-out and returned to SIN.

Whoa, did not know that. Sheesh, I wonder if any of them had to take a break in SIN (or even quit) after that, or did they all just suck it up and fly out immediately yet again? Poor folks!

The pilots were excellent. I think they went through 57 fault codes, whereas in training they only had to deal with a Maximum of 8. Amazing airmanship. Plus the A380 proved it was an excellent and resilient airplane. Hats off to the Airbus engineers for producing an incredibly tough bird. she is an amazing piece of engineering and built by great folks.

The Captain took four months off, don't know about any of the other crew. Haven't read the book for a couple of years, but found these on YouTube.

Qantas Captain recalls A380 near disaster near Singapore: http://youtu.be/xtWjsZji_E4

This one also came up as a similar search topic result, an interview with the Cabin Service Manager, Michael Von Reth: http://youtu.be/xdxCUr9CZKc

Quoting LAX772LR (Reply 24): I wonder if any of them had to take a break in SIN (or even quit) after that, or did they all just suck it up and fly out immediately yet again? Poor folks!

A little bit of A vs B, and an interesting PR speech about Qantas and this incident: http://youtu.be/5KA8c_nfZ_g


[Edited 2015-07-06 01:40:19]

Quoting Max Q (Reply 20): Many Boeing and Douglas aircraft have survived uncontained engine failures without the benefit of FBW that can 'reconfigure itself'

So which of the "many" included the combined effect of cutting the controls to the engines, which included the loss of half of hydraulics, and included loss of flight control surfaces, and included the loss of electrics.... NONE ?

Which of those Boeing accidents were people able to use the autopilot again so they could manage the situation ? NONE ?

The Captain of QF32 was a very experienced 747 captain and he himself stated that QF32 would not have been survivable if it were a 747. Given your background is just on light twins, I take his opinion well over your, as he was the person in the hot seat and has flown both.

Quoting Max Q (Reply 22): Yes, the cargo door that opened on United flight 811 a 747 Classic departing HNl caused massive damage, a huge hole in the side of the aircraft was opened up. Despite the damage and the loss of #3 and #4 engines the crew were able to return for a successful landing 14 minutes later, not spend hours in the air clearing 'messages'

And United told the investigators for total bill of repairs was just 14 million, the damage was no where near as extensive as QF32. Where was the damage to the control surfaces, where was the loss of hydraulics, where was the inability to shut down engines, where was their use of the autopilot ?

NTSB accident report http://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR92-02.pdf

Quoting Max Q (Reply 22): Despite the damage and the loss of #3 and #4 engines the crew were able to return for a successful landing 14 minutes later, not spend hours in the air clearing 'messages'

They weighed up the alternatives, a quick return to the airport or a calculated one where they tried to fully assess the situation and be as fully in control of the situation as possible.

Quoting zeke (Reply 27): So which of the "many" included the combined effect of cutting the controls to the engines, which included the loss of half of hydraulics, and included loss of flight control surfaces, and included the loss of electrics.... NONE ?

United 811 had far more damage to the aircraft than this A380, there was a hole in the side of that 747 big enough to fly a 'light twin' through.


Despite that and the loss of two engines on one side that crew was able to return to the airport within 14 minutes, they didn't need to stay airborne for hours to figure out what was working, it was obvious.


In 1965 a Pan Am B707 lost the #4 Engine and all the wing outboard of it (the engine separated from the aircraft) in the severe fire, despite that damage the crew made a safe landing.


A DC8 lost its #1 engine and all of the wing outboard of it in severe turbulance, that crew made a safe landing.


In 1972 a RAM B727 was attacked by fighters, despite extensive damage it was able to land safely, without the autopilot


Shortly after delivery in 1971 a Pan Am B747 was extensively damaged on take off from SFO, despite the loss of all but one hydraulic system, damage to the wing and horizontal stabilizer, only one operating thrust reverser and one main landing gear that would not extend they made a safe landing, neither of these aircraft had a FBW system that could 'reconfigure itself' just a superbly engineered Boeing aircraft.


Just to quote a few examples.


They didn't even need the autopilot to land, they were not dependent on it like some Airbus pilots.


Simpler is often better.


The Captain of QF32 did a superb job, but it was his skill and experience, along with the other pilots in the cockpit that day that made the difference.


Not the aircraft.

Quoting XAM2175 (Reply 15): The scale of the incident really beggars belief but it was later analysed as control systems failures on all four engines in addition to the actual turbine disc failure on No 2, which also took out the thrust reverser on the left side, and failure of three out of four fire bottles on the left wing. Only 2 of 8 hydraulic pumps functioning. Two generators unavailable, half the AC buses faulted, RAT failed. APU failed. Flight control in alternate law. Only 40% of slat and aileron capacity available. 50% of spoiler capacity available. Compromised roll control. Reduced brake accumulator capacity. Six failed fuel pumps leading to lateral and longitudinal imbalance, with transfer and jettison failed. 8 of 11 fuel tanks unsuitable for use. Centre of gravity too far aft, 42 tonnes over MLW. Air data computer failed. Auto-thrust failed, auto-land unavailable, autopilot unwilling to remain connected. GPWS failed.

Besides the skill of the pilots this incident shows the robustness of the A380. It was like a cluster bomb attached to the left wing exploded.

Can't recommend the book highly enough. Burnt through it in an evening after seeing this thread. Both the technical details and the leadership/crisis management insights were great.

Quoting Max Q (Reply 29):

You have not shown any of those incidents has more damage than QF32, I provided you with the UA NTSB report, just 14 million dollars worth of damage. One engine costs more than that these days.

I suspect you have not read the QF32 or UA811 accident reports, if you did you would realize the damage difference with UA811.

Quoting Max Q (Reply 29): hey didn't even need the autopilot to land, they were not dependent on it like some Airbus pilots.

Who said anything about being dependent on the Autopilot ? the fact is being the most advanced FBW in the sky today allowed the aircraft to automatically reconfigure itself so the crew could use the autopilot. That is a significant improvement in safety, it unloaded the crew to manage the complex failure.

If you read the report, you will see how complex the failure was.

Quoting Max Q (Reply 29): The Captain of QF32 did a superb job, but it was his skill and experience, along with the other pilots in the cockpit that day that made the difference. Not the aircraft.

They had failures in 21 out of 22 systems, no other aircraft accident in the world I know of has ever had such significant damage. No passengers hurt, aircraft returned to service.

Actual interview with the captain http://youtu.be/L6HlTye0GJQ

KARL STEFANOVIC: Richard's first task was to make sure the crippled aircraft could still fly. Then he needed to find out what did and didn't work any more.

RICHARD DE CRESPIGNY: Engine number two, overheat and failure. Engines one and four degraded two levels in thrust. Electrically, the left-hand side of the aircraft was dead. We lost 50% of the hydraulic systems. The brakes underneath the wings were reduced to 30% braking efficiency, and anti-skid was inoperative. Fuel system, 3 tanks out of 11 functioned, no transfer system was available. No jettison system. We had multiple holes in the wing, which disrupted the airflow over the wing and caused the stall speed to increase.

KARL STEFANOVIC: Is the A380 safe?

RICHARD DE CRESPIGNY: Absolutely. This was the biggest testament to Airbus. Some people might think the aircraft collapsed under the onslaught, but no aircraft is ever designed to take the beating that this aircraft got. The wing was cluster-bombed. The aircraft had phenomenal damage in all systems, and it didn't just recover, it performed brilliantly. It is indestructible.

KARL STEFANOVIC: They said that about the 'Titanic'.

RICHARD DE CRESPIGNY: 'Titanic' sank.

Funny how it seems that we take Capt. Sullenberg's word as gospel on here and seem to think he is someone that needs to be respected through and through for his actions, though it seems as Capt. De Crespigny doesn't carry as much weight for what he did and how he did it. Both of them acted with extreme courage and both of them are responsible for saving lives.

In both incidents they had to act under extreme pressure. They were both helped by the aircraft, although in different hands the outcome could have been different. The fact that the design that is so easy to attack on anet (give me a aircraft that I can fly, not the computers) is partly responsible for saving lives is all too easy to overlook.

I am just glad that there are Captains still out there with the skill needed in an emergency, in saying that I am also encouraged that the current new crop of pilots will use these examples and learn from these 2 pilots and their experiences.

Quoting Enzo011 (Reply 34):

The American Media believes that. Ask the majority of the pilots and we have other opinions of him. Capt. Sullenberger excelled at 1 thing. Making a decision and sticking with it. That is all!

Wingnut

Quoting XAM2175 (Reply 15): As I recall at least one member of the crew was devoted purely to clearing ECAM messages for quite some time because, as spacecadet mentions, for every resolved alert there were two or three new ones. About 130 faults and 120 master cautions over two hours.

That was the FO Matt Hincks that was working the messages.

He has a really good quote after the incident. His son broke his arm and the doctor said to him "We'll give him the Rolls Royce treatment" he replied, "No Thanks". I thought that was really awesome.

Quoting Max Q (Reply 20): In fact the complexity of the Airbus systems and associated, numerous, almost overwhelming number of messages to the crew needing to be resolved seemed to make this situation a lot more difficult than it needed to be, good thing they had that many pilots and experience in the flight deck.

I'm no expert but the computer power on these modern jets I assume can correct the flight controls to make the plane remain flyable much more than in a non FBW aircraft. In a non FBW aircraft I reckon that the pilots would not be able to control the plane efficiently enough to land it safely.

The crew was also aware of every system that was compromised on the aircraft so they were aware of what they had and didn't have. Older aircraft

Quoting Max Q (Reply 20): Don't see any 'advantage' A very complex aircraft survived a significant number of failures that were well managed by a competent crew.

The crew absolutely needs to be acknowledged for landing this flight safely.

One flight that probably saved QF 32 is UA 232 where they installed redundancies to ensure if hydraulic lines were cut the plane will still retain fluid to maintain some control.

Quoting Enzo011 (Reply 34): Funny how it seems that we take Capt. Sullenberg's word as gospel on here and seem to think he is someone that needs to be respected through and through for his actions, though it seems as Capt. De Crespigny doesn't carry as much weight for what he did and how he did it. Both of them acted with extreme courage and both of them are responsible for saving lives.

The American media made Sulley a celebrity which is what the American media does well.

Australian media is much less dramatic and he was acknowledged for saving the plane but he did his job at the end of the day.

Quoting wingnutmn (Reply 35): The American Media believes that. Ask the majority of the pilots and we have other opinions of him.

I am really curious; what other opinions do you think the majority of other pilots have of Captain Sullenberger? What percentage of other pilots have you questioned on this matter?

I happen to believe that Sullenberger and de Crespigny are both excellent airmen and deserve much praise for all of their flying abilities and leadership qualities.

Douglas, Lockheed, Boeing and Airbus all made or are still making excellent aircraft that are capable of doing remarkable things. The same thing applies to Rolls Royce, Pratt and Whitney, General Electric and CFM with respect to engines. It is absolutely insane to get into a flame bait contest over this issue. There are different design philosophies at work in this industry, and all of them have their pluses and minuses. However, I believe that all of the pluses and minuses average out the same for pretty much all of the manufacturers.

Let's simply salute these remarkable airmen for their great accomplishments in saving lives.

Quoting Enzo011 (Reply 34): Funny how it seems that we take Capt. Sullenberg's word as gospel on here and seem to think he is someone that needs to be respected through and through for his actions, though it seems as Capt. De Crespigny doesn't carry as much weight for what he did and how he did it.

And you measured this how, exactly?

Quoting wingnutmn (Reply 35): The American Media believes that. Ask the majority of the pilots and we have other opinions of him.

And you measured this how, exactly?

Quoting wingnutmn (Reply 35): Capt. Sullenberger excelled at 1 thing. Making a decision and sticking with it. That is all!

Riiiiiiight.  

I was posting off memory and of course it's metres and not feet. In the documentary I watched I can only remember 4 being in the cockpit but again I am happy to be corrected.

Quoting LAX772LR (Reply 38): And you measured this how, exactly?

No measurement really, just by reading posts on accidents and incidents and where a comparison is made on the skills of a pilot, Captain Sullenberger is held in high esteem on anet. Now whether this is due to the media or not I have no idea. This is not to say that I have a belief about the abilities of either pilot. I hold them both in high esteem for their actions, whether is was pure luck or absolute skill.

There is a slight paradox here.

If the situation is *that* critical and this was an aircraft crippled to the point of catastrophe, you get the aircraft on the ground ASAP. You don't spend hours in the air circling trying to troubleshoot a stream of systems errors being alerted to you via the FMS.

Which actually, is what I think should have happened. It was quickly clear that the aircraft had suffered major structural damage, which generated a continuous stream of almost nonsensical failure codes through the FMS. From this situation it would be an extremely small step for a sudden catastrophic unrecoverable situation to occur.

Hindsight has shown they made the right call, and handled it brilliantly but............... based on the information they had at the time I think they should have got the aircraft on the ground immediately.

History has given several examples of pilots going into 'let's troubleshoot" mode when they should have gone into "land immediately" mode. Alaska 262 and Swissair 111 are two such cases. QF32 could easily have been another.

[Edited 2015-07-06 16:19:20]

Quoting zeke (Reply 32): You have not shown any of those incidents has more damage than QF32, I provided you with the UA NTSB report, just 14 million dollars worth of damage. One engine costs more than that these days.

Prices have gone up a little since 1989 Zeke but its interesting that that is your yardstick for the level of damage suffered and, as usual you're missing the point, United 811 had severe damage to the structure and lost power on two engines on the same side, despite suffering incredible damage the crew was able to return for an immediate landing, they did not have to spend hours in the air clearing messages and attempting to understand what had happened to their aircraft.


That is the advantage of a simpler design, they didn't call it 'reconfiguring' back then it was known as redundancy.

Quoting nikeherc (Reply 37): I am really curious; what other opinions do you think the majority of other pilots have of Captain Sullenberger? What percentage of other pilots have you questioned on this matter?

Quoting LAX772LR (Reply 38): And you measured this how, exactly?

The only way a pilot knows how. By talking with other pilots. You fly day in and day out with other people with an opinion on everything. For every 1 pilot that likes the guy for what ever reason, you will hear scathing opinions from 8 or 9 others. I feel that he has flawed opinions of other pilots abilities compared to his own that he likes to make known on any panel, news channel or government group that allows him to speak. Is my opinion right? Maybe, maybe not. But it is my opinion and all I can tell you is what we pilots talk about. I know this much though, I would believe the majority of pilots opinions over uninformed news anchors and even less informed Joe publics.

Wingnut

Quoting Max Q (Reply 42): United 811 had severe damage to the structure and lost power on two engines on the same side, despite suffering incredible damage the crew was able to return for an immediate landing, they did not have to spend hours in the air clearing messages and attempting to understand what had happened to their aircraft.

A few differences.

There was damage yes but how much of it was attributed to flight controls and lost systems as the damage on the UA 811 was not on the wing. Two engine failures is manageable for the 747, the damage to flaps made for a faster approach and the brakes were operating at or near optimal.

QF32 penetrated the wing and disabled and compromised many systems such as brakes and flight controls on the wing, ailerons, flaps and slats. From the Mayday on this it took Hinks 55 minutes to respond to each ecam message and the reason that they didn't rush back to the airport according to De Crespigny is that the plane was airworthy, sufficiently controllable and there were not critical damage to the hull to cause an explosive decompression unlike UA 811.

Quoting ianhAU (Reply 31): Can't recommend the book highly enough. Burnt through it in an evening after seeing this thread. Both the technical details and the leadership/crisis management insights were great.

I downloaded it for Kobo today and it is a really good read thus far.

Quoting MrHMSH (Reply 43): For QF32, that may have been problematic when they landed only to find that a lot of the electronics didn't work and consequently go off the end of the 4000m runway. They made it with 300m to spare, it's just as well they figured out what was working so that they could calculate whether they'd make it or not.

Their computer was damn near perfect.

This thread is running a somewhat out of control.

The facts are that QF32 was extremely badly punished, but this time the hydraulic and electric redundancies worked as intended. Hopefully it will never be "tested" better than this.

The flight crew chose to spend time on investigating the full extent of their problems, acted accordingly, and landed the plane successfully.

Historically other planes have suffered comparable, but different punishments. Some survived, some did not. Only airliner designers with the full knowledge of those accidents/incidents can draw conclusions from that. Even them, often only incomplete conclusions.

Over and over again it is stated that "#1 engine couldn't even be shut down". Since when has the ability to shut down an engine after landing become a safety issue? It is completely irrelevant.

Quoting Max Q (Reply 42): That is the advantage of a simpler design, they didn't call it 'reconfiguring' back then it was known as redundancy.

Reconfiguring and redundancy are two different things. In the QF32 case reconfiguring (due to lateral and CoG imbalance) was an advantage which at least reduced crew workload, and also made flying on autopilot possible. And it made hand control of final approach easier.

We don't know if reconfiguring was the straw which saved the day. Hopefully we will never know. But it was an advantage, and it worked as intended.

Why can't we just discuss the facts? Why do we keep on kicking dead horses?

Quoting gasman (Reply 41): History has given several examples of pilots going into 'let's troubleshoot" mode when they should have gone into "land immediately" mode. Alaska 262

I've heard this before but never really understood it. Do we know that the outcome of AS262 would have been any different if they had just headed for another airport? They still had to use the controls and fly the thing and it's not clear to me that they understood what the problem was in order to prevent the final outcome.

With the QF32 vs UA811 thing, I don't really understand the relevance? It seems like QF32 was about as close to disaster as you can get, while with UA811 it may or may not have been as precarious but it certainly didn't seem as complex.

-Dave

Quoting Max Q (Reply 42):

The scenario of UA811 is practiced by all crew, every pilot on a 747 knows how to fly a depress, with and without damage. Every pilot as part of the type rating and recurrents do two engine out approaches. Everything had been seen before in the simulator, the procedures are published in the FCTM/QRH, and they had a flight engineer. I have done it many times on the 744, it is no more complex on the A340. The A340 is easier with two engine out as it is FBW making control easier, and the APU can be started in flight.

Two engine failures and depress only takes a few minutes on ECAM, it is just an electronic checklist, same as what is in the QRH/FCOM.

No pilot ever trains for, or has been exposed to the scenario of QF32, you obviously have not read the report. No one has seen failures on 21 out of 22 systems before. If you had to run QRH procedures for failures in 21 systems, you would make mistakes, and would you not do them in the order they are required.

They had loss of electrics and hydraulics, they did not have the brakes available to land overweight, could not dump fuel, and could not transfer fuel into the tanks that had holes in them to get rid of fuel. To reduce landing weight your only option then is to burn it off.

They were able to control the aircraft effectively while reducing weight, and bring the aircraft back for a safe landing in Singapore.

Quoting PlanesNTrains (Reply 47):

Same soapbox talking about the same thing, Boeing is always better, even when the captain of QF32 says otherwise.

Quoting Enzo011 (Reply 40): No measurement really

Indeed.

Quoting wingnutmn (Reply 44): The only way a pilot knows how. By talking with other pilots.

Soooo, in other words: an anecdotal and entirely subjective method, free of any tangibly quantifiable/objective measure? Hmm.... figures.