Apparently, AA accidentally assigned a non-ETOPS 321 to their LAX-HNL (AA33/31AUG) with a non-ETOPS certified 321 (N137AA). Oops.


https://flightaware.com/live/flight/N137AA

Quoting aa777lvr (Thread starter): Oops.

Ugh...that is going to be one heck of a fine.

Assuming that Flight Aware was accurate at least...

[Edited 2015-09-11 20:29:15]

How did no one catch this? That's the scary part.

What is the fine for non-ETOPS compliance?

Quoting northwestEWR (Reply 2): How did no one catch this? That's the scary part.

Right?! This is a little disturbing. Between dispatch, a/c schedulers, any number of OCC departments...And then the flight crew and cabin crew...How did it get by everyone? You'd think the least somebody would notice there wasn't "ETOPS" in bold letters on the gear door and think "hmmm...This plane's going over the ocean..."

You might want to check that out!! I just Cannot Believe American would make that big of a mistake.
That would take Blunders in Crew Assignment, Dispatch,FO-QA, ALL of Flight ops up to the VP of OPS and the Director of Dispatch, NOOO! I CAN'T even BELIEVE THAT!!Could this have been a Proving Run FOR ETOPS to Hawaii for the A321?? Even Flight aware is not Priivy to Everything.

Quoting flyDTW1992 (Reply 3): Right?! This is a little disturbing. Between dispatch, a/c schedulers, any number of OCC departments...And then the flight crew and cabin crew...How did it get by everyone? You'd think the least somebody would notice there wasn't "ETOPS" in bold letters on the gear door and think "hmmm...This plane's going over the ocean..."

Isn't there also a pretty significant ETOPS pre-departure inspection?? Yikes.

Sure its not just Flightaware getting mixed up due to an incorrect filing of a flightplan?? Or the same flight number used for an onward connection from Hawaii?

Looking up Flightaware now I dont see any Hawaii flights for that aircraft.

Here's hoping you are all wrong...   

Yes its true. AA spokesman confirmed the error to the media.

http://www.briansumers.com/home/2015...ines-flew-the-wrong-a321-to-hawaii

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Quoting divemaster08 (Reply 6): Sure its not just Flightaware getting mixed up due to an incorrect filing of a flightplan?? Or the same flight number used for an onward connection from Hawaii?

Quoting divemaster08 (Reply 6): Here's hoping you are all wrong...

It's been fairly heavily covered by mainstream media at this point.

Quoting northwestEWR (Reply 5): Isn't there also a pretty significant ETOPS pre-departure inspection?? Yikes.

Yeah! How did MX control/line MX miss that!

Yeesh.

Didnt the pilots care?

AA is just a big operation. Pilots were confused. Maybe MX was confused. They have a LOT of A321s now, many new, in 3/4 types. Corners were cut. Everything lined up perfectly wrong.

Quoting flyDTW1992 (Reply 9): Yeesh.

  

Very very strange. You'd think the last line of defense is the pilots pre departure checklist.

Wonder if AA rule 240'd their passengers on the return leg on DL.   

Quoting aa777lvr (Thread starter): AA accidentally assigned a non-ETOPS 321 to their LAX-HNL (AA33/31AUG) with a non-ETOPS certified 321 (N137AA). Oops.

Oops indeed! Legal battles ahead for sure!

But now I just like the A321 even MORE!

Quoting flyDTW1992 (Reply 3):

i don't think AA's A321s have ETOPS written on the nose gear door.

Quoting 777way (Reply 10): Didnt the pilots care?

According to the article, both versions of the A321s are essentially the same aircraft and each has emergency life rafts required for a water evacuation. Missing ETOPS certification of the frame is a violation of the rules, however, and apparently no one noticed before departure.

[Edited 2015-09-11 21:02:30]

It definitely happened. The return flight got cancelled once they realized it was non ETOPS and was ferried as AA9644 back to LAX.

For curiosity sake, does anyone know which ships in the AA fleet are A321S and which are A321H??

Pilots are going to be in big trouble. Part of the captain's duty is to sign off on the specific aircraft, ship #, and that the aircraft is fit for dispatch for its specific route.

Reminds me of the morning in GEG about 10 years ago when a NW captain flew the wrong ship # GEG-MSP. Big time trouble. NW had 2 757-200's parked overnight at GEG and the newly minted contract station staff boarded the wrong 757 for the first AM flight. Captain didn't notice discrepancy. Believe he was suspended by NW for a while.

This seems impossible. AA deserves a huge fine for this.

Quoting n7371f (Reply 18):

Why would that matter which 757 they took?

Quoting n7371f (Reply 18): Pilots are going to be in big trouble. Part of the captain's duty is to sign off on the specific aircraft, ship #, and that the aircraft is fit for dispatch for its specific route.

I would suppose the captain signed off the aircraft assigned for that flight but the assignment was wrong.

Quoting Finn350 (Reply 15): both versions of the A321s are essentially the same aircraft and each has emergency life rafts required for a water evacuation

Doesn't matter: ETOPS cert/approval has nothing to do with being approved for over-water opps, and vice versa.

This is a *huge* error, apparently.

While this is bad, it pales IMO in comparison to the recent bigger failure of AA flying several hundred Airbus and 787 flights without proper amount of reserve fuel. These flights instead were planned and operated with a reserve fuel that may be legal for them in a few years but is currently legal on the rest of the AA fleet.

Dispatchers at AA have reportedly been trying to get the company and FAA to make workload changes. Currently there is a very high workload in dispatch and there is no time to double check things. Dispatch is a small workgroup that is not very visible to the outside world and thus the Feds and management don't give as much attention to dispatch work and safety issues.

At AA, it is the dispatcher and only the dispatchers job to verify the proper equipment is used. When you have one man working 50 flights then this is what happens. Like the Allegiant incident in GFK recently where the dispatcher missed the AD closed NOTAM for the Blue Angels, when you overwork people to the point they don't have time to do their job properly this is what happens.

The captain in this incident had reportedly never flown an ETOPS trip before and is a new captain on this fleet type. With many 737 and MD80 FOs and CAs upgrading to Airbus captains, part of the growing pains on the pilot side is not being familiar from a regulatory point that there needs to be specific Ops Spec and regulatory approval for each plane to be able to fly ETOPS. The pilot wouldn't have noticed any difference because the A321H and A321S are the same plane equipment wise. The only difference is in certification.

Quoting n7371f (Reply 18): Reminds me of the morning in GEG about 10 years ago when a NW captain flew the wrong ship # GEG-MSP. Big time trouble. NW had 2 757-200's parked overnight at GEG and the newly minted contract station staff boarded the wrong 757 for the first AM flight. Captain didn't notice discrepancy. Believe he was suspended by NW for a while.

Wow, that seems like a big overreaction for an innocent mistake that is very easy to do, I find it hard to believe a Captain would be suspended for this.


Right before the Denver Stapleton airport closed I was operating an MD80 as the FO, we had a very brief time on the
ground that. of course included an aircraft swap.


There were four or five -80's lined up in a row and, you guessed it I did the walk around on the wrong one (it was right next to the one we were assigned) in fact it was just about to push when I walked on board ready to start my pre-flight.


To my surprise there were already two pilots on board, all I could think to say was 'hey your aircraft looks good' before I walked next door, a little embarrassed to do another walk around on the correct aircraft.


An innocent mistake that harmed no one and I've see a lot worse at my airline, from Pilots landing on a taxiway to scraping the tail to overtemping engines on start.


In none of those cases was a Pilot suspended or had any 'punishment' , just sent back for retraining, perhaps a couple of Simulator sessions.


The reason being none of those mistakes were deliberate.

Quoting Max Q (Reply 24): from Pilots landing on a taxiway

I agree with what you said, except this one, this one is insane to not be punished for.

Quoting MSJYOP28Apilot (Reply 23): The pilot wouldn't have noticed any difference because the A321H and A321S are the same plane equipment wise. The only difference is in certification.

Even if the ETOPS and non-ETOPS planes are physically the same, the MELs for an ETOPS flight won't be, therefore the checklists won't be. I would guess the checklists are electronic these days but do they reside in the aircraft or with the crew? If the checklists are part of the aircraft I can't imagine an ETOPS checklist would be available on a non-ETOPS frame so that should be a big alarm bell right there.

Every etops plane I've been on always has a placard in the cockpit saying Etops. Also it is supposed to be on the wheel door.

[Edited 2015-09-12 00:40:01]

Quoting northwestEWR (Reply 5): Isn't there also a pretty significant ETOPS pre-departure inspection?? Yikes.

Yep, completed by maintenance and flight crew. Unfortunately, on a plane that was not ETOPS certified.

Quoting flyDTW1992 (Reply 9): Yeah! How did MX control/line MX miss that!

As I understand AA procedures, MX Control would not be involved and line MX performed the appropriate ETOPS checks... on the non-ETOPS act.

Quoting 777way (Reply 10): Didnt the pilots care?

According to what has been reported internally, the pilots performed all procedures/checklists IAW AA procedures (as written at that time).

Quoting peanuts (Reply 12): Very very strange. You'd think the last line of defense is the pilots pre departure checklist.

As reported internally, the pilot performed all procedures/checklist IAW AA procedures (as written at that time). This includes the ETOPS pre-departure checks.

Quoting Transpac787 (Reply 17): For curiosity sake, does anyone know which ships in the AA fleet are A321S and which are A321H??

A321H aircraft are nose numbers: 850-865.

Quoting n7371f (Reply 18): Part of the captain's duty is to sign off on the specific aircraft, ship #, and that the aircraft is fit for dispatch for its specific route.

The aircraft assigned & dispatched was the aircraft flown. Unfortunately it was not one of the 16 A321H's that are ETOPS certified. Reportedly AA has instituted a number of (different) software programming changes which will (hopefully) prevent the generation of flight paperwork when a non-ETOPS acft is assigned to an ETOPS flight. IOW, when the dispatcher attempts to dispatch an ETOPS flight using a non-ETOPS acft, the dispatch software will NOT produce a flight plan (for a number of different reasons) and hence... the flight can not depart (i.e. no flight plan).

Quoting aviatorcraig (Reply 26): I would guess the checklists are electronic these days but do they reside in the aircraft or with the crew?

AA normal checklists are cardstock and carried by the flight crew.

Quoting a/c dxer (Reply 27): Every etops plane I've been on always has a placard in the cockpit saying Etops. Also it is supposed to be on the wheel door.

At AA, "ETOPS" is printed in LARGE letters on the outside of the Aircraft Maintenance Logbook. I do not believe it is printed in the cockpit nor on the wheel door(s)... but it might be in the future.

Quoting MSJYOP28Apilot (Reply 23): The captain in this incident had reportedly never flown an ETOPS trip before and is a new captain on this fleet type. With many 737 and MD80 FOs and CAs upgrading to Airbus captains, part of the growing pains on the pilot side is not being familiar from a regulatory point that there needs to be specific Ops Spec and regulatory approval for each plane to be able to fly ETOPS. The pilot wouldn't have noticed any difference because the A321H and A321S are the same plane equipment wise. The only difference is in certification.

Yep, LOTS of "new-to-A321" and "new-to-LAXI" pilots with more coming on-line quickly (plus monthly TDY's). Not an excuse, just fact. From what little I know of AA A321 fleet/procedures about the only thing that might have alerted the flight crew of a non-compliant aircraft was the lack of "ETOPS" printed on the outside of the aircraft maintenance logbook. Newly established procedures require both pilots to verify "ETOPS" is printed on the outside of the AML, ETOPS is listed in the Special Equipment List section of flight plan and a number of computer programming changes designed to prevent the flight plan from being completed (can't be released by dispatcher) when a non-ETOPS aircraft is assigned to an ETOPS flight.

Quoting slcdeltarumd11 (Reply 19): This seems impossible. AA deserves a huge fine for this.

Clearly not "impossible" since it did happen; however, software programming changes are designed to make it "impossible" in the future --but every program can have "bugs" so "never say never" and "impossible" is only as good until.... "it" happens. I'm guessing AA "self-reported" this so if the FAA agrees that AA's procedural changes are enough, I doubt a fine will result --that would destroy the self-reporting immunity and therefore the self-reporting program... everywhere. OTOH, if FAA is not satisfied with AA's corrective action they will demand more and AA will comply.

The critical element of an ETOPS plane, especially for a modern narrowbody that has otherwise the same bells and whistles be it ETOPS or not, is engine maintenance. So, is engine maintenance at AA more stringent on ETOPS planes, or are they doing the same ETOPS certifiable maintenance on all A32S because it comes out cheaper in the long run to have less engine problems on the line ?

Quoting AAR90 (Reply 28):

Well, guess we can't ask for a more level-headed and informed overview of the situation than that.

Thanks sir.

Quoting UA444 (Reply 20):

Well, where do we begin. There's the simple things like not following pre-departure checklists that include ship verification. Then you have a possible issue with different sub-fleets that may be equipped differently for different missions (overwater, ETOPS, Etc). Then you get into the fact that dispatchers plan flights differently (fuel, routes, etc) based on MEL and CDL items (altitude restrictions, icing, fuel penalties to name a few). Then you start breaking FARs since the ship data on the flight release now does not match the operating equipment. There's an FAR that explicitly spells out the info required on a release.

In this case the aircraft routing folks (those who assign ships to flight sequences - an arm of the maintenance dept) also dropped the ball. Sadly the dispatcher, crew etc didn't catch it either. This is definitely rare to slip thru the cracks.

Quoting Flighty (Reply 11): AA is just a big operation. Pilots were confused. Maybe MX was confused. They have a LOT of A321s now, many new, in 3/4 types. Corners were cut. Everything lined up perfectly wrong.

What you've described is impossible there are to many departments and people involved for a mistake of this magnitude to be made. And AA has to have save guards in place to prevent such a thing from happening and then there is the all important E-TOPS check that must be done and recorded prior to departure. I know here at UA final weights can not be transmitted to the flight crew if the E-TOPS check has not be recorded. Here in load planning we get an update every 15 minutes letting us know E-TOPS check has not be recorded contact MX or dispatch. If the check is not done and recorded the system blocks final weights from being sent. There is no way AA would not have safe guards in place to prevent a this type of mistake even if every human being who is responsible for making sure the aircraft is E-TOPS certified was confused the automation or fail safe system should have kicked in and stopped the entire process. Even if they actually did perform the E-TOPS check on a non E-TOPS aircraft when MX went to record the check there should be a safe guard in place preventing the system from accepting the check do to the fact that the aircraft is not E-TOPS certified.

I just find it hard to believe that AA would not have a system of checks and balances in place to prevent this type of mistake. Here at UA the override procedures we have in place require multiple departments to get involved before the system will allow an override and send the final weights. And what makes the system work is delaying or stopping final weights from being sent should prevent a pilot from taking off.

Quoting Aesma (Reply 29): The critical element of an ETOPS plane, especially for a modern narrowbody that has otherwise the same bells and whistles be it ETOPS or not, is engine maintenance.

Sorry, I don't get it - what is actually the difference between an American Airlines 321H and 321S?
In the past at least, ETOPS a/c were equipped with life rafts and life jackets - opposite to non ETOPS planes with seat cushions as flotation devices. Is this here also the case?

Quoting debonair (Reply 33): Sorry, I don't get it - what is actually the difference between an American Airlines 321H and 321S?In the past at least, ETOPS a/c were equipped with life rafts and life jackets - opposite to non ETOPS planes with seat cushions as flotation devices. Is this here also the case?

Don't forget that ETOPS needs a longer fire suppression system that will last for how ever many minutes the AC is ETOPS certified for. The other thing is that because you are flying longer distances from diversion airports, you need a larger supply of medical oxygen as well in case a passenger has a medical issue requiring it (happens more than you think)

Quoting apodino (Reply 34): Don't forget that ETOPS needs a longer fire suppression system that will last for how ever many minutes the AC is ETOPS certified for. The other thing is that because you are flying longer distances from diversion airports, you need a larger supply of medical oxygen as well in case a passenger has a medical issue requiring it (happens more than you think)

As stated in reply #15, both versions of the A321s are essentially the same aircraft and each has emergency life rafts required for a water evacuation.

Life rafts are required on over water flights (over 30 minutes or 100 nm) regardless of ETOPS.

You would think that the programming for dispatching aircraft would make sure only ETOPS a/c would be assigned to the flight. Now they fix it, but it should have always been in the software programs. Guess cheap IT staffing was a factor here as well as too many along the line just assuming all was right, problem is that assuming can kill.

Time to put etops on the underside of the nose and in the cockpit

[Edited 2015-09-12 06:44:07]

This event goes to show that no matter what, if something can go wrong it will, provided a lot of little mistakes align and produce these kind of blunders.

I bet AA is taking surefire measures to avoid a line up of these kind of events to occur in the future.

Nobody is perfect .

TRB

Reminds me of a place I used to work. Had 2 aircraft RON at an outstation, one for something like an 0730 departure, the other a 1000 or something similar. Ground crews towed the wrong aircraft to the gate, they boarded and departed(on a transborder flight too) and somehow nobody noticed until the next crew took over the aircraft and realized the fin # didn't match their flight plan. I'm sure someone got in pretty big trouble for it.

An algorithm in the aircraft scheduling software that matches aircraft with routes would be simplistic to write. Is the aircraft ETOPS? Does the route require ETOPS? If both are yes than allow the assignment, else, deny the assignment. Actually it would next have to accommodate ETOPS aircraft on non-ETOPS routes but that is equally simple. I am guessing I am naive in believing that something so simple is in place. Or, is it just very easy to circumvent? Or is this a merger related hiccup?

Quoting flylku (Reply 40): I am guessing I am naive in believing that something so simple is in place. Or, is it just very easy to circumvent? Or is this a merger related hiccup?

If it isn't part of the planning software then that software isn't fit for purpose imho - omitting non-ETOPS capable aircraft from ETOPS routings is one of the most basic constraints that the planning software should be handling, along with number of seats on aircraft vs number of tickets sold (you don't schedule an A319 for the route normally handled by a 777-300 for example) etc.

If the planning software came up with this pairing of equipment to routing and all the data about the route and equipment was correct (eg someone hadn't put the aircraft down as ETOPS in the system, or switched the aircraft manually), then the planning software developers will be paying the fine, regardless of it not being caught by AA employees.

Quoting Finn350 (Reply 35): Life rafts are required on over water flights (over 30 minutes or 100 nm) regardless of ETOPS.

In Canada,

less than 50 nm from shore, no life jackets or life rafts required.

From 50 nm to 60 minutes from shore, life jackets (not life rafts) are required.

More than 60 min, life rafts are also required.

Seems like the US is stricter than Canada on this.

Canadian carriers that fly to BDA, as an example, which is more than 100 miles but less than 60 minutes from either the US east coast or BDA, do not require life rafts on board.

Quoting ripcordd (Reply 37): Time to put etops on the underside of the nose and in the cockpit

Fully agree. I noticed WestJet as well doesn't have ETOPS written on the nose gear doors of its B738s and B737s.


View Large View Medium

Photo © Joe heeney


[Edited 2015-09-12 08:22:46]

Quoting Finn350 (Reply 35): As stated in reply #15, both versions of the A321s are essentially the same aircraft and each has emergency life rafts required for a water evacuation. Life rafts are required on over water flights (over 30 minutes or 100 nm) regardless of ETOPS.

You ignored what I wrote. Yes they are the same plane...but the H has longer lasting fire suppression system and more Medical Oxygen for emergency purposes. Without the added fire suppression equipment, which the S and Ts do not have...you don't have ETOPS. This is almost impossible to pick up with the naked eye without getting into the cargo bin and inspecting the fire equipment.

Quoting Max Q (Reply 24):

I wonder, are you supposed to confirm something unique to a particular aircraft, like a tail number, before working on it?

Quoting thenoflyzone (Reply 42): In Canada, less than 50 nm from shore, no life jackets or life rafts required. From 50 nm to 60 minutes from shore, life jackets (not life rafts) are required. More than 60 min, life rafts are also required. Seems like the US is stricter than Canada on this.

I have always found the idea surviving a "water landing" errr, ahhh ... ditching, in the open ocean amusing. Most found the results of the Hudson riving ditching miraculous and that water was relatively calm.

Quoting jayunited (Reply 32): What you've described is impossible there are to many departments and people involved for a mistake of this magnitude to be made.

What do you mean impossible? This whole thread is about the fact that this actually happened. Something that happened is, by definition, not impossible.

Quoting jayunited (Reply 32): What you've described is impossible there are to many departments and people involved for a mistake of this magnitude to be made.

I worked in safety in the chemical industry for years. Some critical ops there have all sorts of checks: certain hardware, in software, on checklists, and by signoffs. What we found was, the more people involved, especially as required signoffs, the worse the record of compliance.

How is that?

People are busy. After they get the rhythm of the specific checking, they begin to trust all "the other guys" on the signoffs. After all, surely one of THEM checked it, right? Indeed, in the past, the person signing without checking may have asked, and found that "Joe checked it, and Mary too." Always. Only, this time Joe was distracted, and Mary trusted Joe.

I'm not saying that caused or contributed here. Maybe, maybe not. The investigation should find that out. Whenever we found that problem, though, we reduced the number of checks and signoffs, and put more responsibility where it would do good. And trained the heck out of the requirements too, to be sure...

Quoting hoMSaR (Reply 46): What do you mean impossible? This whole thread is about the fact that this actually happened. Something that happened is, by definition, not impossible.

Ok impossible meaning I can't believe that either AA's safe guards couldn't prevent this from happening. AA is not new to E-TOPS operation it obvious multiple failures across several divisions happened and the fact that fact that not a single person or computer system noticed the problem is alarming. Even if the technology put in place to prevent this from happening failed UA has so many procedures in place before any one person can override I'm just shocked that this happened at AA I thought or assumed AA would have multiple layers of protection/policy/procedures in place to somehow prevent this from happening. So when I say impossible its more shock not me say it didn't happen.

Quoting moo (Reply 41): If it isn't part of the planning software then that software isn't fit for purpose imho - omitting non-ETOPS capable aircraft from ETOPS routings is one of the most basic constraints that the planning software should be handling, along with number of seats on aircraft vs number of tickets sold (you don't schedule an A319 for the route normally handled by a 777-300 for example) etc. If the planning software came up with this pairing of equipment to routing and all the data about the route and equipment was correct (eg someone hadn't put the aircraft down as ETOPS in the system, or switched the aircraft manually), then the planning software developers will be paying the fine, regardless of it not being caught by AA employees.

Ditto. Im no expert in AA systems but Dispatch software should have prevented the hiccup had it been properly programmed I would think. Now a question could be whether the software/system built in-house at AA or purchased from a vendor in case liability needs to be established.