Quoting Chaostheory (Reply 36):

I'm reading through the document, and it states in 3-2 e. that:

e. Airplane Certification Differences. Differences between transport category airplane certification and general aviation airplane certification regarding use of flight controls at high AOA. For example, if the roll control system is compromised and the ailerons are unable to produce the required roll recovery, the rudder may be used with care during stall prevention and recovery. To maintain structural integrity, it is important to guard against control reversals—avoid rapid full-scale reversal of control deflections.

He was already in a degraded mode, and didn't know it was specifically the rudder that caused it, so I guess rudder wouldn't have hurt, as long as you don't kick it in?

Quoting diverted (Reply 45): People will argue (and already are) the Airbus FBW logic is faulty, Boeing's better, this that or the other thing, but at the end of the day, it's irrelevant, and the crew failed to fly the plane. Colgan 3407 proved that sidestick vs yoke, if you don't have a competent crew, it doesn't matter.

Be careful with the word "proof."

The fact that other aircraft types can be crashed is not proof that the Airbus side-stick doesn't have flaws. Conflicting inputs have been a contributing factor in multiple fatal crashes involving Airbus FBW-equipped aircraft. We cannot ignore that.

Quoting Amiga500 (Reply 24): Sorry stop. Please quit with the "training" excuses. If your a professional pilot how in the name of f__k do you not know how to recognise a stall and realise what to do to recover?

Since you are not a pilot, do you know how a full aft stick stall differs from a normal stall? Do you know what to look for?

I didn't think so. Believe me do some research and them come back on here and voice your opinion! But to everyone else on here a full aft stick stall, on a swept wing aircraft is characterized by the lack of buffett, a very high descent rate (in excess of 6000 fpm) and possible wing rocking, although the wings can remain lever. Compare that with a normal stall which has buffetting and the loss of ailerons proceeds from the wing tip towards the wing root (swept wing aircraft). Until you have seen one or been in one you wouldn't know until it bit you in the ass!

Quoting Buyantukhaa (Reply 25): Still, pulling CBs in flight wasn't by the book either.

Again, nothing but a failure of CRM ans SOPs. Both Airbus and Boeing are very explicit about having flight crews resetting C/Bs inflight. It's a big NO NO!

Quoting Amiga500 (Reply 42): n this instance (bank angle of 54deg or so apparently!), I'd go to rudder before risking control reversal from aileron.

Again, your ignorance is showing. Swept wing aircraft stall from the tip inward. Your ailerons would be completely useless!!

[Edited 2015-12-01 05:11:16]

Quoting DfwRevolution (Reply 51): Conflicting inputs have been a contributing factor in multiple fatal crashes involving Airbus FBW-equipped aircraft. We cannot ignore that.

I agree. When the left hand does not know what the right is doing, you leave open the possibility for disaster.

The stick should have both feedback from the aircraft, and mirror the other stick's force & vector.

Quoting B747400ERF (Reply 35): Again, you are not a pilot, and you are talking about something you do not understand.

Actually, some of us "commenters" are pilots...in my case up to twin turboprops. 40 years ago, I had stall training before I soloed.

Quoting SAAFNAV (Reply 50): He was already in a degraded mode, and didn't know it was specifically the rudder that caused it, so I guess rudder wouldn't have hurt, as long as you don't kick it in?

Initially they looks like they were in a steep turn, that developed into a spiral dive with control inputs. Being at a high angle of bank, if you retain the bank (no additional control input) and let the nose drop below the horizon airflow will develop quicker over wings (dramatic angel of attach change) to unstall the aircraft before rolling wings level. Common recovery technique on a lawn dart.

Quoting Amiga500 (Reply 53): I agree. When the left hand does not know what the right is doing, you leave open the possibility for disaster.

When I read the report it was lacking on enough emphasis on the role of either pilot (PM/PF). If the captain wants to take over, they must explicitly say so, and I also follow up with the side stick priority button to cancel an inputs from the other side.

What I saw here was a Boeing pilot that is used to ghosting control, adding inputs without taking over. If a pilot needs to add inputs, take over so there is not ambiguity about what is happening. I make no apology in such circumstances.

I may be mistaken....not the first time....but I don't recall ever reading a description in an accident report on how a "control yoke" works......and it's "priority and lockout modes" with timers no less.

Quoting airtechy (Reply 54): Actually, some of us "commenters" are pilots...in my case up to twin turboprops. 40 years ago, I had stall training before I soloed.

Flying a swept wing like the A320 is very different from flying a prop.

My first type was a BAE prop where the stall recovery procedure included the use of full engine power. The manual said something along the lines of propwash improving airflow over the wing and thus a potential aid in recovery. Those guidelines are at odds with the recovery procedure in most jets. Have a look at A300/A310 stall events and the 737 stall into BOH to see what happens when you apply TOGA at stall.

I somehow missed this when responding earlier.

Quoting MMO (Reply 52): Since you are not a pilot, do you know how a full aft stick stall differs from a normal stall? Do you know what to look for?

There is no mention of the aircraft being in a stick stall.


Anyway, its recognised primarily off descent rate, airspeed and the attitude bubble. The key instruments on an aircraft.

Yet seemingly beyond "highly trained" pilots to grasp - i.e. AF447.

Quoting MMO (Reply 52): Again, your ignorance is showing. Swept wing aircraft stall from the tip inward. Your ailerons would be completely useless!!

If your in a sliding bank, one or both (dep. if masked) of your ailerons may be seeing significant lateral airflow - which means it can have some authority - which you may lose upon attempting to use it - particularly aggressively.



Go back to your books.

Quoting Chaostheory (Reply 57): Flying a swept wing like the A320 is very different from flying a prop.

I couldn't agree more...but the laws of physics apply to both. If a jet is above 35000 feet it should be obvious that adding power is not needed for stall recovery....nose down first....recover with controls...and then add power to prevent a secondary stall. The same would be true of a prop above some minimum altitude. You add power after wings level and airspeed recovered.

As the saying goes "altitude is insurance". In this case.....stall recovery insurance.

The accident happened at roughly 06:15 local and the report said that weather was not a factor. Shouldn't they have been able to recover by reference to the horizon and looking outside the cockpit? The AF447 crash was at night in bad weather.....different situation.

Quoting Chaostheory (Reply 32): In such a stalled stated with high alpha, it would take at least another 10 000-20 000 ft to recover. Then you've got to consider overspeed condition or exceeding g limits during recovery

True. It would have been nice though in this case and also in the case of AF447 to have seen the crews at least start the process of stall recovery, albeit ultimately running out of altitude. But in these and quite a number of such accidents in recent years, crews have not even started the stall recovery process.

There's a phenomena here that needs further analysis. Why have we had a number of accidents where pilots pull back on the sidestick (and even the yoke in some accidents) when things go pear shaped. Is this a fear of hitting the ground and natural reactive instinct is to pull back. Pulling back is great if you have airspeed and indeed in most cases it will prevent collision with the ground, but there are conditions where it will not work for you, like when you are already in a stall, or don't have (enough) power or energy to permit pulling back. As a light aircraft pilot I cannot get my mind around that and a number of others commenting on these threads feel the same.

Many here are making excuses for this problem, such as 'maybe they didn't know they were in a stall', or, ''if these circumstances happened you, you might not know either what to do."
I think we need to wake up to the fact that there are pilots flying today in the airlines who are not crystal clear how to actually fly their aircraft across a range of unusual attitudes and other scenarios. This to me is worrying.

Surely if an onslaught of electronic / computer issues occur on a flight deck, and an aircraft gets into an unusual orientation, pilots first and foremost need to revert to hands on flying, forget about the bells and chimes initially, and attempt to return the aircraft to straight and level flight using hands and feet. Then, breath a sigh of relief before going back to deal with the system problems.

or

Quoting Amiga500 (Reply 58):

A friendly piece of advice, I would dial back the lecturing of MMO until you have 20,000 hrs of flying in your logbook. I see where the oracle is coming from, it is common knowledge for those for have ability beyond what is available on google.

Feel free to ask more from those who have the knowledge, it makes us cringe to see someone with less experience than the FO of this flight new revelations of physics.

Physics is not law, there are always exceptions.

Quoting hilram (Reply 21): Instead, pilots are being outsourced and have their health care benefits taken away. Some are contracted under a self-employment scheme, where absence due to sickness (or fatigue) means losing money or even your job. This can not all be blamed on the traveling public scrambling to save $50 on their flight. This is also due to a lack of regulations and "minimal standards" for the airlines to be accountable for the pilots flying their planes. An airline should be forced to give real employment status to the pilots flying, and make sure they are properly trained, rested and monitored health-wise. If a lack of training indeed is the cause of this accindent (possibly coupled with some shortcuts in maintenance) I hope for a gigantic class-action lawsuit against the airline, that burns them so hard that going forward they will see to that their pilots get proper training.

   there should be a plaque in top od A net with this !

Its vicious circle, cheap tickets, cheap Pax, bad pay, too much automation and bad training (or lack of), bad (cheap) maintenance and this is the end result.

I really REALLY hope I am wrong but in the future we will be seeing this more and more, with Airlines expanding like crazy with orders of 100 to 300 aircraft, and the need for thousands of pilots all while going as cheap as possible on OPs its a recipe for disaster. I really hope, th industry prepares for this because after reading this report I get this:

Crappy maintenance > faulty aircraft > Crew lack the ability to fly a compromised by systems aircraft > Lack of crew communication > Confusing situation > Bad choice of action > uncorrected flight parameters > Accident.

Quoting airtechy (Reply 22): And...as usual...the usual Airbus defenders are out proclaiming how great the Airbus control system is. Last I checked, the "sidesticks" ....and their role in the accident .. are part of that control system. How many more accidents will we need to have with a major part of the report explaining how the "sidesticks" work? In an emergency with all the urgency to make the right decision in a very short time, I'm convinced they don't work in the pilots favor.

Sorry your argument is invalid, the lack of proper training is the main issue here, and the bad maintenance of the FAC is the contributing factor.

Quoting na (Reply 34): Bad also for the Air Asia that a technical failure (cracked joint) which resulted in 24 (!) misfunctions on this plane was not repaired.

   Amazing but true! A simple solder !

TRB

Quoting MMO (Reply 52):

I think the point here is that airline crews are trained in the recognition and recovery of stalls, regardless of type. So, while a C150 pilot who's plunked down in a jet might be doing 90KIAS and -5000fpm not understanding he's stalled the airplane because it *feels* the same as normal, an A320 crew absolutely should be able to figure it out.

As Colgan demonstrated, experienced crews can do stupid things, and while we must be sympathetic (we've all done something in the sim we never thought we'd be dumb enough to do), we do not have to excuse them.

Quoting airtechy (Reply 59):

I've never flown a prop, be it a single piston or a multi turboprop, where you don't add power to recover from a nose-up unusual attitude/stall. Who taught you that you can use altitude as a deciding factor in the use of power?

I think you might be confused with nose *down* attitudes, where the goal is to level the wings and arrest the descent (thereby bringing your speed back) before adding power.

Quoting TheRedBaron (Reply 62): Its vicious circle, cheap tickets, cheap Pax, bad pay, too much automation and bad training (or lack of), bad (cheap) maintenance and this is the end result. I really REALLY hope I am wrong but in the future we will be seeing this more and more, with Airlines expanding like crazy with orders of 100 to 300 aircraft, and the need for thousands of pilots all while going as cheap as possible on OPs its a recipe for disaster. I really hope, th industry prepares for this because after reading this report I get this: Crappy maintenance > faulty aircraft > Crew lack the ability to fly a compromised by systems aircraft > Lack of crew communication > Confusing situation > Bad choice of action > uncorrected flight parameters > Accident.

Absolutely true. I wonder why IATA and other organisations don´t do anything against this trend. You can´t expect to fly on a perfectly safe plane and a top crew if you think that booking a 10 or 25 Euro ticket is ok. I admit that I fly Ryanair now and then, every other year that is, but I never do if there is a viable alternative. If for example I book LH four weeks ahead there is no reason at all to fly Ryanair (or some other LCC). I gladly pay the 50 or 100 Euros more LH usually costs more on short flights. Better save it on the hotel or by taking the bus instead of the taxi!

Quoting zeke (Reply 61):

Please, for the love of god, tell me you're either A: being ironic with your statement about physical laws or B: A timetraveler from 1295AD.

More than crew training, which is indeed a very important aspect of this accident, I am worried about the fact that the rudder issue was notified 23 times BEFORE the final occurrence. That is shocking. I have never ever seen anything being reported and probably somehow improperly dealt with 23 times in any type of equipment, that's really excessive and brings questions about AirAsia's maintenance standards. This should've been taken more seriously by the airline.

Quoting DfwRevolution (Reply 51): Be careful with the word "proof." The fact that other aircraft types can be crashed is not proof that the Airbus side-stick doesn't have flaws. Conflicting inputs have been a contributing factor in multiple fatal crashes involving Airbus FBW-equipped aircraft. We cannot ignore that.

I fully understand where you're coming from--however, I beg to differ. Are conflicting control inputs and how the aircraft deals with them an issue? Sure, but the conflicting inputs shouldn't be happening. It should be a simple three word statement from the captain, who apparently had SOME sense of what was happening.

"I have control"

That's it. FO takes his hands off the stick, CA returns the aircraft to normal flight, land, debrief, give the chief pilot a call, etc.

Quoting TheRedBaron (Reply 62): Sorry your argument is invalid, the lack of proper training is the main issue here, and the bad maintenance of the FAC is the contributing factor.

Ah yes....more training...that is the answer to every accident caused by the pilots. Training to improve what? After AF447 the answer was to train for "high altitude stall recovery". Well.....here we are again....an entry into a high altitude stall and a non-existant recovery in an Airbus with the same flight control system.

So apparently it has transpired that many surgeons these days, when faced with any sort of deviation from plan such as suddenly spiking blood pressure, completely panic and blindly start stabbing the patient with their surgical knife until the patient dies. Although their training - aside from common sense - has taught them time and again that if you stab a person for a long time again and again with a surgical knife, they die. Exhaustive independent expert reports conclude that these surgeons are 100% to blame for the patients' deaths.

Seemingly, however, you may not dare "lecture" the poor, infallible surgeons unless you are one yourself.

Gee, I wonder which cultural shortcoming among surgeons may be at the core of the problem.

Quoting diverted (Reply 68): Sure, but the conflicting inputs shouldn't be happening. It should be a simple three word statement from the captain, who apparently had SOME sense of what was happening.

That is true. But in at least two accidents, the PNF did not take over and say "I have control". Accidents occur many times because a pilot did not do or say what they were supposed to. The real problem is a control system design that allows the conflicting commands in the first place and requires a secondary control system via buttons to take control of the airplane. The problem would not occur with synchronized controls....or a yoke.

Quoting PlaneInsomniac (Reply 70):

You can lecture all you want, but don't be surprised when the surgeons stop contributing to your board.

Quoting airtechy (Reply 71): The real problem is a control system design that allows the conflicting commands in the first place

Like a Boeing? If one pilot is pushing and the other pulling, you get the same result - at least until the link breaks.

Quoting airtechy (Reply 71): The problem would not occur with synchronized controls....or a yoke.

It can actually. After a certain amount of differential pressure the yokes go into split elevator condition

Airplanes with yokes have been stalled before.

The Airbus side stick has been in use for almost 30 years now. If there was something wrong with the design, the EASA would long ago have ordered a design change.

[Edited 2015-12-01 07:30:37]

Quoting KarelXWB (Reply 75): The Airbus side stick has been in use for almost 30 years now. If there was something wrong with the design, the EASA would long ago have ordered a design change.

No, it's all a conspiracy by the French government!

Quoting airtechy (Reply 69): Ah yes....more training...that is the answer to every accident caused by the pilots. Training to improve what? After AF447 the answer was to train for "high altitude stall recovery". Well.....here we are again....an entry into a high altitude stall and a non-existant recovery in an Airbus with the same flight control system.

It's rather possible these pilots didn't even receive any extra/special training after the AF447 case, it's Indonesia after all.

Quoting Chaostheory (Reply 3): Pilot flying maintains full back stick to end of recording.

Wow.

Where have we seen that before?

Quoting ahmetdouas (Reply 6): I believe that the sticks being independent of each other in the Airbus unlike the Boeing is dangerous and has contributed to AF 447 and this accident.

Normally, I'd say that it's a feature of the plane that is well known, and like other systems av or non-av, thus should be trained. But it is troublesome to hear full back stick in a stall all the way to the sea on an Airbus again. In both cases, a pilot made a mistake (it happens!) that the other pilot was not able to see and consequently fix.

Let me ask at it this way: what is the design reason to not have the two sidesticks tied to each other?

Quoting B747400ERF (Reply 29): If you are not a pilot perhaps you shouldn't judge the actions of a pilot under such situations. Plenty of experienced pilots have made simple mistakes that cost them their lives in the course of aviation history.

Are only pilots allowed to criticize pilots? I think the average non-pilot av-geek knows that stall warning = nose it down in what, 99.9% of situations. I normally agree with you, but I think this criticism is in bounds.

Don't tell us to stop criticizing when the opportunity is presented to explain why our criticism is wrong. Otherwise, it just sounds like "children should be seen and not heard."

Quoting N766UA (Reply 72): You can lecture all you want, but don't be surprised when the surgeons stop contributing to your board.

I would hope that pilots would be more thick skinned that surgeons. Unlike surgeons, whose mistakes kill their customers, pilots mistakes kill the pilots too.

If I say something a pilot thinks is stupid because I'm not as educated on the matter as he, I would hope he would choose to tell me why I'm wrong, not leave and only hang out with people who think like he does. I GET that there are some real doozies told on this board by non-pilots, but some non-pilots here have added some real interesting, and highly technical insights that I have seen pilots praise.

Quoting zeke (Reply 61): Physics is not law, there are always exceptions.

Wait, what?

Quoting Zeke reply 61
“Physics is not law, there are always exceptions.”

With all due respect you don’t really believe that, and your comment was simply satirical…right?

Quoting awthompson (Reply 60): There's a phenomena here that needs further analysis. Why have we had a number of accidents where pilots pull back on the sidestick (and even the yoke in some accidents) when things go pear shaped. Is this a fear of hitting the ground and natural reactive instinct is to pull back. Pulling back is great if you have airspeed and indeed in most cases it will prevent collision with the ground, but there are conditions where it will not work for you, like when you are already in a stall, or don't have (enough) power or energy to permit pulling back. As a light aircraft pilot I cannot get my mind around that and a number of others commenting on these threads feel the same. Many here are making excuses for this problem, such as 'maybe they didn't know they were in a stall', or, ''if these circumstances happened you, you might not know either what to do." I think we need to wake up to the fact that there are pilots flying today in the airlines who are not crystal clear how to actually fly their aircraft across a range of unusual attitudes and other scenarios. This to me is worrying. Surely if an onslaught of electronic / computer issues occur on a flight deck, and an aircraft gets into an unusual orientation, pilots first and foremost need to revert to hands on flying, forget about the bells and chimes initially, and attempt to return the aircraft to straight and level flight using hands and feet. Then, breath a sigh of relief before going back to deal with the system problems.

   This sums up the issue the best.

Quoting PlaneInsomniac (Reply 70): So apparently it has transpired that many surgeons these days, when faced with any sort of deviation from plan such as suddenly spiking blood pressure, completely panic and blindly start stabbing the patient with their surgical knife until the patient dies. Although their training - aside from common sense - has taught them time and again that if you stab a person for a long time again and again with a surgical knife, they die. Exhaustive independent expert reports conclude that these surgeons are 100% to blame for the patients' deaths. Seemingly, however, you may not dare "lecture" the poor, infallible surgeons unless you are one yourself. Gee, I wonder which cultural shortcoming among surgeons may be at the core of the problem.

And you sir, win the internet!

Quoting N766UA (Reply 72): You can lecture all you want, but don't be surprised when the surgeons stop contributing to your board.

I think there are plenty of excellent pilots that will continue to contribute to these boards. I think there are some other pilots that seem to be very overly defensive about their profession and refuse to be open to the possibility that there is a larger systemic pilot training issue at some airlines in some countries. That pilot training issue seems to be resulting in a newer pattern of airline crashes. The fact that these pilots don't seem to be open to the possibility is worrisome but I have confidence that the majority of the pilots out there are more open to solving this issue.

BravoOne has started a thread in Tech/Ops on the FAA's recent Advisory Circular regarding Stall Prevention and Recovery training:

Stall Recovery (by BravoOne Nov 30 2015 in Tech Ops)

Definitely relevant reading alongside this accident report.

Quoting D L X (Reply 78): Wow. Where have we seen that before?

Please tell us

Quoting D L X (Reply 78): Let me ask at it this way: what is the design reason to not have the two sidesticks tied to each other?

Weight + lack of purpose. You want to see what the other guy is doing? Turn your head

Quoting AIRWALK (Reply 82): Weight + lack of purpose. You want to see what the other guy is doing? Turn your head

   Plus (a) there are not supposed to be two pilots controlling the airplane at the same time and (b) flight controls are not flight instrumentation so why engineer them to pretend like they are.

Quoting KarelXWB (Reply 75): Airplanes with yokes have been stalled before. The Airbus side stick has been in use for almost 30 years now. If there was something wrong with the design, the EASA would long ago have ordered a design change.

Most people know that I know nothing about piloting planes, but this topic of yokes and sticks in high altitude stalls is fascinating. One question I have for the professionals that bring up Colgan and TK, aren't these incidents much closer to the ground with much less time to impact vs. AF 447 and this Air Asia incident? From my armchair it seems hard to believe that in a yoke environment stalling at high altitude and just spinning all the way down to death over several minutes someone in that cockpit would notice a PIC pulling that yoke back all the time.

I know the AF447 report said this had nothing to do with that crash but I still wonder if it didn't contribute in some way. In the report above it seems much more damning.

Quoting N766UA (Reply 66): Please, for the love of god, tell me you're either A: being ironic with your statement about physical laws or B: A timetraveler from 1295AD.

Quoting D L X (Reply 78): Wait, what?

Quoting cat3appr50 (Reply 79): With all due respect you don’t really believe that, and your comment was simply satirical…right?

What I posted was correct, science is always evolving, hundreds of new scientific papers are published every day. If you want to see a clear example of that have a look at the research coming out of the Large Hadron Collider to see that what you would have learned at school and university about matter and atoms does not explain the new particles and dark matter they have discovered.

Many people use Bernoulli to explain the physics of lift, when it is the wrong. A cylinder with the same curvature on the upper and lower sides can generate lift.

I don't get it. A stall warning means push the stick forwards. How difficult is that? Yet time after time pilots are pulling back. Its a very very basic manoevre.

Quoting hivue (Reply 83): there are not supposed to be two pilots controlling the airplane at the same time

That is possibly the worse reason to justify anything. Pilots are suppose to be able to recover from stalls..why have computerized stall recovery systems? In fact pilots are suppose to be able to fly planes...why have autopilots/flight envelope protections at all?

There are plenty of examples out there, from both Boeing and Airbus, of two pilots trying to control the airplane at the same time. Pilots are humans and will occasionally do things they are not suppose to, just like everyone else in the world. It is the aircraft manufacturer's and certifying agencies job to maximize passenger and crew safety in the event that the pilot does do something wrong (among other scenarios) to the fullest extent that is technically and feasibly possible.

Quoting zeke (Reply 85): What I posted was correct, science is always evolving, hundreds of new scientific papers are published every day. If you want to see a clear example of that have a look at the research coming out of the Large Hadron Collider to see that what you would have learned at school and university about matter and atoms does not explain the new particles and dark matter they have discovered.

Our understanding of physics is generally evolving on the quantum level. Classical/Macro physics, which is generally governing how the plane is behaving, is pretty well understood. Whether someone is using the right laws of physics in a particular application or has the right knowledge to talk about the physics is entirely different point that has nothing to do with rules and exceptions in physics.

[Edited 2015-12-01 08:06:03]

Quoting KarelXWB (Reply 75): The Airbus side stick has been in use for almost 30 years now. If there was something wrong with the design, the EASA would long ago have ordered a design change.

How long did the 737 hard over rudder problem exist before it was fixed? Two major accidents? And AFAIK the Airbus controls work exactly as they are designed. I just think that..."at least"...two crashes have been mostly blamed on pilots when the underlying control system ... and the way it's designed...is a significant contributor that can be improved. I guess it will take another similar accident to make that happen.

From what I have read, the airplane had a repetitive fault with the rudder control system. The type of fault where there is intermittent wiring faults with loose or dirty connectors and/or chaffed wires is just about the hardest type of fault for a mechanic to fix. Intermittent wiring faults affect all airplanes. It looks like Air Asia maintenance did not solve the problem and let the issue to continue going on with circuit breaker resets. Again since it was intermittent and likely not happening on the ground they could get away with this. Most regulatory authorities require airlines to have a chronic or repetitive defect list to catch problems like this. Air Asia may or may not have been addressing this. I would hope they get better maintenance oversight because this could easily happen again.

It appears the next problem is that when the fault happened in flight, the crew did not follow the FCOM / QRH. Correct me if I am wrong, but they tried a circuit breaker reset in the air. Was this in any of their manuals to do so? I would personally be nervous with a pilot going beyond the manuals in flight resetting circuit breakers. It is very risky when we are talking about the flight control system on a plane that has faults that are causing master caution. Resetting a coffee maker or air conditioning valve is one thing, but resetting flight control computers is a whole different thing. We will see if the FAA or EASA put out any mandatory manual changes or control system changes.

Finally it appears that the crew could not recover from a high altitude stall in an upset condition. High altitude stalls can be challenging to recover from especially with degraded flight controls. It appears that more training is needed.

So in conclusion, was the airplane at fault? Yes. Was maintenance at fault? Yes. We're the pilots at fault? Yes. All three were part of the multiple failures causing this to happen. I know a.net likes philosophical debates like stick vs yoke or fly by wire vs conventional controls, Airbus vs Boeing. I think this accident is too specific for those debates. Any plane with an autopilot can have it disconnect due to faults. Any plane can stall. There may be opportunities specific to the A320 to address this rudder control system fault and the manuals and the regulators will take action if necessary.

Quoting hivue (Reply 83): flight controls are not flight instrumentation so why engineer them to pretend like they are.

Exactly. It can actually be disingenuous to have that feedback altogether, flight path ≠ control position. Especially in an unusual situation having this feedback can add to the confusion.

Quoting zeke (Reply 85): What I posted was correct, science is always evolving, hundreds of new scientific papers are published every day. If you want to see a clear example of that have a look at the research coming out of the Large Hadron Collider to see that what you would have learned at school and university about matter and atoms does not explain the new particles and dark matter they have discovered.

That is indeed very interesting stuff they're doing over there, but what does the Higgs boson have to do with aerodynamics? Or any subatomic particle?

Quoting zeke (Reply 85): Many people use Bernoulli to explain the physics of lift, when it is the wrong. A cylinder with the same curvature on the upper and lower sides can generate lift.

And the physics remained the same. It was our understanding of the physics that changed. There aren't "exceptions" to physics.

Quoting AIRWALK (Reply 82): Please tell us

AF 447, or were you trying to get me to say something else?

Quoting AIRWALK (Reply 82): Weight + lack of purpose. You want to see what the other guy is doing? Turn your head

A couple ounces?

Correct me if I'm wrong, but the force feedback on the 777 yoke is electrical, is it not? I mean, the force feedback on my Audi A4 steering is electrical (there is no direct connection between the Audi steering wheel and the car's wheels). Other posters have identified a purpose. On top of that, before the A320 series, all planes had the two control columns operating in tandem. So the question of why Airbus would deviate is germane.

Quoting AIRWALK (Reply 90): Exactly. It can actually be disingenuous to have that feedback altogether, flight path ≠ control position. Especially in an unusual situation having this feedback can add to the confusion.

Wow! You win. That has to be the best spin to justify non-synced controls I have ever read. Boeing should obviously cut the linkage between the yokes as it only ads confusion. If not already, you are destined to be a politician. Congratulations!

Quoting Polot (Reply 87): Pilots are humans and will occasionally do things they are not suppose to,

Right. Like pulling back on the stick when airplane is stalled or near stall. Unfortunately, we live in a universe where there are some (perfectly human) mistakes that you just can't make.

Quoting zeke (Reply 61): A friendly piece of advice, I would dial back the lecturing of MMO until you have 20,000 hrs of flying in your logbook. I see where the oracle is coming from, it is common knowledge for those for have ability beyond what is available on google.

MMO may be the exact kind of person that this problem could affect.

Some pilots falling back on rigid training which slot problems into neat little boxes instead of letting the pilots learn to fly the planes. Experience seems not to be relevant to their subsequent actions.

The AF447 pilots had over 20k hrs accumulated between them - didn't stop a disaster occurring. The AirAsia pilots were in the same boat. Pilot over 20k hrs and co-pilot over 2k hours.



Two questions for MMO - you don't have to answer of course.

(1) When is the last time you flew an aircraft (or glider or simulator) around the sky exploring the limits of the flight envelope?
(2) When presented with an alarm, what is your first thought - pigeon-hole the problem, start checklisting, or primary instruments?

[Edited 2015-12-01 08:20:41]

[Edited 2015-12-01 08:21:30]

Quoting D L X (Reply 91): It was our understanding of the physics that changed.

It's our understanding of the physics that's imperfect. I think this may have been Zeke''s point and it's a valid one.

A lot of debate over the wrong question.

Here the pilot was not trying to recover from a stall. He didn't know he was in a stall.

This isn't the first time. It seems to happen with depressing regularity.

Why?

Sorry, humble question here: with respect to the A v. B argument here regarding inconsistent control inputs, I seem to recall that the Egyptair 767 that crashed off Nantucket had a similar issue where the (presumptively suicidal) copilot was actively putting the plane into a dive while the captain who returned to the cockpit was trying to pull up. So isn't it the case that even in a Boeing the difference in control architecure doesn't in and of itself the problem of inconsistent control inputs canceling each other out? Thanks.

M

Quoting Buyantukhaa (Reply 4): - The cracking of a solder joint of both channel A and B resulted in loss of electrical continuity and led to RTLU failure.

I have to wonder if this was a "cracked" solder joint, or the result of solder "whiskering". This problem was brought about when lead was banned from solder used in electronic components for "the good of the environment".

Quoting D L X (Reply 91): That is indeed very interesting stuff they're doing over there, but what does the Higgs boson have to do with aerodynamics? Or any subatomic particle?

Ask me again in 20 years when we understand what they have found. It does not matter what techniques you use, you cannot predict aerodynamics with 100% precision, there are always assumptions.

Quoting D L X (Reply 91): And the physics remained the same. It was our understanding of the physics that changed. There aren't "exceptions" to physics.

When you get to the subatomic or quantum level everything changes. Since hitting 22 nm computer chips we have had a very significant slow down on building faster computer chips.

Quoting Amiga500 (Reply 94): MMO may be the exact kind of person that this problem could affect. Falling back on rigid training which slot problems into neat little boxes instead of letting the pilots learn to fly the planes.

And what is your experience in flying passengers for a living ? zero hours ?

Quoting Amiga500 (Reply 94): (2) When presented with an alarm, what is your first thought - pigeon-hole the problem, start checklisting, or primary instruments?

Mine is to do none of your answers, clarify what the issue is first before acting.

Quoting kurtverbose (Reply 96): Here the pilot was not trying to recover from a stall. He didn't know he was in a stall. This isn't the first time. It seems to happen with depressing regularity. Why?

That is a very valid question, and which has not been answered. Most of the report to me was cut and paste from other manuals, not a lot of original work, lacks asserting original hypothesis, and no defending a thesis. It is like a street directory, it is left up to the reader to work out the directions on the map.