airmagnac
Posts: 451
Joined: Wed Apr 18, 2012 10:24 pm

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quote:as a logical observer feel I can draw a broad inductive opinion

Yeah, let's use some logic, shall we ?

So if I'm following the anti-sidestick crowd, the reasoning goes like this
- Observation O1 : AF447 stalled out of control and crashed. It was a FBW Airbus equipped with sidestick. Confusion was apparent on the flight deck.
- Observation O2 : QT8501 stalled out of control and crashed. It was a FBW Airbus equipped with sidestick. Confusion was apparent on the flight deck.

- Cherry-Picking C1 : Even though some posters provide links to other accidents involving similar circumstances but no sidestick, such events can simply be ignored (see reply 101 or 188 for example)
- Cherry-Picking C2 : Even though there is a publicly available report on the matter, the sequence of events of AF447 can be totally re-invented as "one guy pulled all the way back for the whole duration, the other guy had no source of information other than his sidestick"

- General Knowledge K1 : Correlation always means causation
- General Knowledge K2 : Absence of evidence always means evidence of absence

Applying K1 to O1 and O2 we easily deduce that sidesticks cause confusion which in turn causes the crash. Especially in light of C2.
Then combining C1 to K2, I easily deduce that no such accidents happen with yokes
Thus sidesticks are the sole responsible for loss-of-control-in-flight events. Thus should be banned. QED.

My 5th grade math teacher would have kicked me out of class with a hurting backside if I had said proposed such a "logical" reasoning...

Regarding loss of control in flight, here is a source that I hope will be considered acceptable (yes it's a Boeing study !)

See page 22
total fatal accidents for commercial jets since 2005, following loss of control : 17 (yes, 17   )
Of which I count 3 for Airbus FBW (also including XL Airways in 2008)
In other words :
***14 yoke-equipped aircraft crashed in the last 10 years due to loss of control, accounting for a whopping 82% of all such crashes ***.
And that's not including all the yoke equipped turboprops...(the main point being the cockpit design, not the engine type)

Hey, let's count the CFIT accidents as well, as those often involve flight deck confusion.
Total fatal LOC-I + CFIT jet crashes since 2005 : 33
Of which Airbus FBW : 5 (adding Afriqiyah in 2010 and Armavia in 2006)

So that's 28 fatal accidents out of 33 (84%) on yoke-equipped jets. And that's taking a conservative view regarding the sticks, because I haven't even looked into whether or not the flight controls might have possibly perhaps contributed to the event. And as I mentioned, turboprops aren't even included.

Sidestick wins ? Of course not, the world is not black and white. And this is not a case of winning and losing anyway
Sidestick doesn't play a role in any of these accidents ? Of course not, the world is not black and white.

But the contribution of the man-machine interface is not clear-cut and must be looked at in a wider context of psycho- and social behaviors, complex system & organisation characteristics, and other such non-obvious aspects.

So can we cut the simplistic sidestick-is-evil crap, please ?
My goal as an engineer is to fill my soul with coffee and become immortal

Passedv1
Posts: 653
Joined: Sun Oct 07, 2012 3:40 am

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

From the begginning Airbus designed the FBW system to protect the airplane from the inexperienced pilots many of these Asian/European airlines are using. If everything works, it's fine...nobody notices. When the 1/1,000,000 happens and you need the pilots to step in and save the day, it's not surprising that they are not up to the task.

You cannot learn to "fly" in a modern jet. Whether it be Ab-inito or low time regional pilots...it doesn't matter if you have 20,000 hours in jets...Once you get into an airliner you flying skills start to deteriorate, if you only have 300 hours in airplanes when this happens, 300 hour pilot stick & rudder skills is what you will have, even 10k or 20k hours later.

mmo
Posts: 1851
Joined: Thu Apr 18, 2013 3:04 pm

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting mandala499 (Reply 198):Quoting MMO (Reply 197): Having a B.S in Aero myself, the term is factually incorrect. It should referred to as a "fully developed stall", not a deep stall. The deep stall is ONLY associated with T tail aircraft. I know, I'm waiting for you to join us at the laughing chamber... The engineer I was referring to was not you.

My apologies.....it was a little early and I was still waiting for my first cup of coffee!!!!
If we weren't all crazy we'd all go insane!

Amiga500
Posts: 2542
Joined: Tue Mar 03, 2015 8:22 am

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting MMO (Reply 159):I think you are the one who is confused. A deep stall involves a T tail aircraft. In a conventional aircraft, like the 320, the stall will develop into a fully developed stall. NOT A DEEP STALL.

You are the one who said:

 Quote:Secondly, the problem with an aft stick stall is the horizontal stabilizer is blanked out because of the stall characteristics of the swept wing. Normal stall recovery will not work.

Rubbish. Utter rubbish.

 Quoting MMO (Reply 159):You seem to be contradicting your self. The AOA was between 40 and 50. Did you even read the entire accident report? It would appear not!

Doesn't matter if the AoA was 90 degrees, the wing cannot mask the tailplane at stalling angles on an A320.

 Quoting MMO (Reply 159):You need to also review the stall characteristics are in a low mounted horizontal stab swept wing aircraft before you start showing just what you don't know.

I'm not the one jumping from one false assertion to another.

 Quoting MMO (Reply 159):Again, you have not answered the question about relative wind. You need to see understand that and the characteristics of a swept wing

Yes, the guy with the doctorate in aerodynamics needs to understand how to do a vector calc onto a wing :rolleyes:

I've already given a brief explanation. If descending in a bank with *aircraft* lateral velocity and retaining some *aircraft* forward velocity, all three aircraft motions (vertical velocity, lateral velocity and longitudinal velocity) are contributing to airflow along the wing aerofoil section.

[Pre bank] The change in lift from the tail relative to wing would have resulted in nose down pitch. [The A320 has a relaxed, not negative static margin.]

[Edited 2015-12-02 02:31:13]

[Edited 2015-12-02 02:31:30]

Andy33
Posts: 2519
Joined: Tue Sep 15, 2009 9:30 am

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting RickNRoll (Reply 192):Who would be an authority from outside the company who could make this call? The only one that I can think of is Airbus itself.

Well, Air Asia Indonesia is the airline and the company, but managers from Air Asia headquarters in Malaysia would certainly have the authority to intervene (or interfere, depending on point of view).

David L
Posts: 8551
Joined: Tue May 18, 1999 2:26 am

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting PlanesNTrains (Reply 181):Not to mention the "American flags" that absolve the aircraft and blame the CRM specifically.

There are individuals who seem to have a habit of discarding the major details and taking minor details out of context. Perhaps there's a slight geographical bias but it isn't all that clear cut.

Two key points that hinder these discussions are the persistence of the myths that the AF447 crew held "full back stick all the way down" and that the dual inputs contributed to their failure to diagnose the problem and take corrective action. The accident report contains a wealth of evidence that contradicts those myths yet they persist.

The report contains a trace of the stick movements that strongly suggest, as Mandala499 went to great lengths to explain, that the PF was targetting a particular pitch angle (12o nose up?).

The first thing to note about the dual inputs is how late in the sequence they occurred - it was well after they'd stalled. The second thing to note is that, contrary to the myth, there were only a few seconds of dual input. A whole lot of important details need to be ignored in order to come to the conclusion that the dual inputs played a significant role in the accident. As others, far more knowledgeable and experienced, have said, one pilot flies while the other monitors and there is a prescribed method for transferring control regardless of whether the aircraft has yokes or sidesticks.

As long as enough people continue to base their "knowledge" on internet gossip, itself derived from cherry-picking and misinformation, instead of hard data, these discussions will continue to go round in circles.

Thank goodness there are still a few here who are prepared to examine the details in an objective manner. I'm at a loss to understand how anyone can push aside the apparent operational short-comings and CRM failures in the QZ8501 accident and come to the conclusion that the lack of connectivity between the controls is the issue that needs to be addressed. Some of the people who complain that there's too much dependency on automation are also the ones who complain when the Airbus systems fail to come to the rescue when procedures are not followed. It's a different story when the same happens in a Boeing, MD, etc.

 Quoting Pihero (Reply 168):and BTW, we'd still be using flight controls invented here as the B planes are using a French invention by Bréguet in 1910... so it was time to see something new 75 years later

What was wrong with wing-warping and weight-shifting?

... again.

Francoflier
Posts: 5002
Joined: Wed Oct 31, 2001 12:27 pm

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting PassedV1 (Reply 201):You cannot learn to "fly" in a modern jet. Whether it be Ab-inito or low time regional pilots...it doesn't matter if you have 20,000 hours in jets...Once you get into an airliner you flying skills start to deteriorate, if you only have 300 hours in airplanes when this happens, 300 hour pilot stick & rudder skills is what you will have, even 10k or 20k hours later.

Thank you for pinpointing the real cause of the accident.

A.net is A.net and members and fanboys alike would rather debate endlessly about how much the airplane design or flight control architecture did or did not contribute to the event.
Yet at the end of the day we witnessed, once again, a pilot who, when requested to hand fly a perfectly flyable jet straight and level, flew himself and everyone else into the ground...

Airlines are struggling to fill the front seats of the thousands of jets they have been buying in the last couple of decades, yet in a constant strive to keep the costs and packages down have been reaching forever lower on the ability scale of willing applicants while at the same time have trimmed expensive training to the bare minimum.

You are absolutely right in your last statement, PassedV1, in that an airline pilot is only as good at flying a plane as he was the last time he actually flew a plane. And for many pilots these days, that last time happened on a piston Cessna right at the end of a 1 year accelerated ab-initio course.

We can continue to endlessly debate airliner design philosophies, only to ignore the real decay that is developing in modern day aviation safety.
I'll do my own airline. With Blackjack. And hookers. In fact, forget the airline.

sierrakilo44
Posts: 196
Joined: Tue Dec 13, 2011 1:38 am

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting PassedV1 (Reply 201):You cannot learn to "fly" in a modern jet. Whether it be Ab-inito or low time regional pilots...it doesn't matter if you have 20,000 hours in jets...Once you get into an airliner you flying skills start to deteriorate, if you only have 300 hours in airplanes when this happens, 300 hour pilot stick & rudder skills is what you will have, even 10k or 20k hours later.

In addition to Simulator training, perhaps airlines should look at giving each of their pilots a few hours a year in a light aircraft like a Cessna. No Autopilot, no EFIS just get in and throw it around the sky, practise stalls, rolls, loops, a few visual approaches, give pilots confidence they can hand fly again.

WIederling
Posts: 8939
Joined: Sun Sep 13, 2015 2:15 pm

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting airmagnac (Reply 200):- General Knowledge K1 : Correlation always means causation - General Knowledge K2 : Absence of evidence always means evidence of absence

IMU plain wrong.

standalone statistical corellation is worth nothing.
( tree death and radar irradiation ( looking east ) for Germany was correlated.
you say it then must be causal. i.e. tree death causes radar irradiation.

absence of visible evidence means nothing either.
( only means you haven't looked in the right places )

nonetheless you go for very popular misconceptions.
Murphy is an optimist

AirlineCritic
Posts: 1703
Joined: Sat Mar 14, 2009 1:07 pm

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting airmagnac (Reply 200):Yeah, let's use some logic, shall we ?

You, Sir, win the Internet today.

 Quoting airmagnac (Reply 200):So can we cut the simplistic sidestick-is-evil crap, please ?

Indeed.

I want to discuss something in the CRM and communication space.

I'm simply dumbfounded by the lack of communication in this case. Here is the entire sequence of verbal communication from the start of the event to the end:

 Quote: ... The sound similar auto pilot off The sound of stall warning for 1 second “level...level...level” (repeated 4 times) “pull down... pull down..” (repeated 4 times). The sound of stall warning for 4 seconds ￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼The sound of stall warning until the end of recording. “Slowly...slowly....” repeated 5 times The PIC requested to select Display Management Computer to CAPT 3. End of recording

How an earth can the crew communicate so little? They must have had *some* thoughts, right? If nothing else, at least of the I-do-not-understand-what-is-happenig kind. But hopefully something more rational, like "we are stalling". Yet they say *nothing*, or say things that do not make sense. Are they communicating with something else. Wink-wink we are stalling? Fingers pointing down? And the poor sobs probably knew they were dying (or did they?), you would think that would have caused some thinking as well. Why is none of that verbalised?

I'm really baffled, to the point of first doubting that this transcript could even be the whole thing.

[Edited 2015-12-02 04:11:31]

Kaiarahi
Posts: 1807
Joined: Tue Jul 07, 2009 6:55 pm

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting PassedV1 (Reply 201): You cannot learn to "fly" in a modern jet. Whether it be Ab-inito or low time regional pilots...it doesn't matter if you have 20,000 hours in jets...Once you get into an airliner you flying skills start to deteriorate, if you only have 300 hours in airplanes when this happens, 300 hour pilot stick & rudder skills is what you will have, even 10k or 20k hours later.

Yet the PIC on this flight had 14000+ hours on fighters and other military aircraft.

 Quoting CO953 (Reply 196):it's time for an independent, clear-eyed assessment of whether the sidestick system adds unacceptable ambiguity to the pilot-aircraft interface in a flight-envelope emergency.

Which is exactly what was done by BEA following AF447, through an independent group of experts who studied the human-cockpit systems interface. The outcome was that sidestick design and functionality were not cited as a factor, although other systems such as different reactions to visual and aural warnings were.
Empty vessels make the most noise.

airmagnac
Posts: 451
Joined: Wed Apr 18, 2012 10:24 pm

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

I guess the sarcasm was not sufficently obvious !

So just to be clear :
Correlation does not imply causation, never has and never will.
And absence of evidence is never proof that something did not happen. The relevant information may simply have not been communicated, or as is the case here, it might have been simply ignored.

Both are well known logical fallacies, as is "cherry-picking".
My goal as an engineer is to fill my soul with coffee and become immortal

flyingturtle
Posts: 5721
Joined: Mon Oct 31, 2011 1:39 pm

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

I've been lurking about this thread until the yoke vs. sidestick crowd has more or less disappeared... and when users came to debate how to unstall an aircraft, I felt reminded of Pihero's great words "In physics, there is no alternate law". Gravitation makes your plane fly towards terra firma, and aerodynamics, wisely applied, is what makes you avoid that fate. I think a good understanding of physics (or at least the willingness to learn physics) should be mandatory for a.nut membership.

It's very sobering and at the same time good reason for binge drinking that bad CRM has again claimed many innocent lives. I'm quite well trained in first aid, and we have our procedures: The first person to arrive at an injured person is not going to leave until a more competent person (paramedic/doctor) comes, then there's the ABCDE scheme, and then... "Hey, you bystander, if you watch us so closely you surely must be a friend of the patient. So move your ass, help him and look for a defibrillator!". It's all about consciously choosing the role of a accident responder, and not getting overwhelmed by what has happened... CRM.

I think we have destroyed the Captain as the God-like appearance Who Shall Not Be Questioned by his the lowly peasant FO. The second coming of CRM will be probably be about flight computers and understanding what they do (and what they do not), so it's Computer Resource Management. IMHO, pure flight skills (moving the flaps, gear handles, throttles and sideyokes...) have not degraded enough to pose a large accident risk.

David
Reading accident reports is what calms me down

par13del
Posts: 9560
Joined: Sun Dec 18, 2005 9:14 pm

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting francoflier (Reply 206):Airlines are struggling to fill the front seats of the thousands of jets they have been buying in the last couple of decades, yet in a constant strive to keep the costs and packages down have been reaching forever lower on the ability scale of willing applicants while at the same time have trimmed expensive training to the bare minimum.

Which is understandable since the more automation put in place the less one needs pilots but more human system monitors. The issue of the autopilot disconnecting when its inputs become invalid is a whole different story.

 Quoting sierrakilo44 (Reply 207):In addition to Simulator training, perhaps airlines should look at giving each of their pilots a few hours a year in a light aircraft like a Cessna. No Autopilot, no EFIS just get in and throw it around the sky, practise stalls, rolls, loops, a few visual approaches, give pilots confidence they can hand fly again.

I would say every quarter even if only for one hour, problem is as usual:
1. Who will pay for it
2. Those who have accepted their primary role as being a system monitor may not want to do it
3. Will the authorities mandate it
4. Who will pay for it

The OEM's and airlines are investing in automation, it may be more expensive up front but is cheaper in the long run.

seahawk
Posts: 9066
Joined: Fri May 27, 2005 1:29 am

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

CRM can overcome a lot, but to be honest I think re-thinking the user interface is a similar good idea. The plane gives the crew so much information, but it does not disclose the position of the other controller in a simple and obvious way, the yoke does. Why for example do we not get a simple graphic showing the position of the control sticks, on the cockpit screen, when there is a low speed or stall warning. Even better maybe with the graphic showing a blinking arrow to push forward. This would make sense for the yoke system as well.

flyingturtle
Posts: 5721
Joined: Mon Oct 31, 2011 1:39 pm

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

I propose a feature which disables the sidestick for one pilot, and the ECAM for the other pilot, preferentially with a optical "privacy" feature in the screen so that you can't look at it at certain angles. So one part of the crew is forced to troubleshoot, and the other one is forced to keep the bird in the air...

Addition 1: Disable the radio for the PF, but communicating comes last anyway.

Addition 2: A limitation of my idea would be pilot incapacitation... the chief FA who takes over the radio would be overloaded with QRH items...

David

[Edited 2015-12-02 06:30:36]
Reading accident reports is what calms me down

mandala499
Posts: 6592
Joined: Wed Aug 29, 2001 8:47 pm

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

OK, I thought you meant post bank...

 Quoting sierrakilo44 (Reply 207):In addition to Simulator training, perhaps airlines should look at giving each of their pilots a few hours a year in a light aircraft like a Cessna. No Autopilot, no EFIS just get in and throw it around the sky, practise stalls, rolls, loops, a few visual approaches, give pilots confidence they can hand fly again.

So, how similar is a low altitude stall with a cessna prop compared with a high altitude stall with a swept wing aircraft?
Few visual approaches? There are a few of visual approaches here.   BDO11, JOG27, SRG31... I know a few pilots at QZ who enjoyed those, but unfortunately, the regulators don't like airlines flying visual approaches unless they have to... and to those airports with no instrument approaches, the minister now wants... ILS (even in the mountains... his rule is more than 10 movements = ILS... silly). But lots of non-precision approaches, and many here prefer to go manual once they see the runway or in VMC... BDO29, SUB28, DPS09 are just a few here QZ fly to regularly.

So, stalls, rolls and loops... well, nice idea, but who's going to pay for it?
My main worry at the moment is on flying schools trying to get waivers to not do stalls, steep turns, climb / descend turns from the regulators... they're the major risk at the moment... for airline pilots, at least over here they get some handflown approaches (because they have to)... although it's getting more "difficult" to get these done.

 Quoting Kaiarahi (Reply 210):Which is exactly what was done by BEA following AF447, through an independent group of experts who studied the human-cockpit systems interface. The outcome was that sidestick design and functionality were not cited as a factor, although other systems such as different reactions to visual and aural warnings were.

The conclusion is simple... With a yoke, you can't be lazy on your arm muscles (may the strongest win unless crosslinks break beforehand)... with a sidestick, you can't be lazy on your thumb (may the person who press the button last win)... BUT, you cannot be lazy with your brain on both... and this goes for both pilots.

 Quoting flyingturtle (Reply 212):I think we have destroyed the Captain as the God-like appearance Who Shall Not Be Questioned by his the lowly peasant FO. The second coming of CRM will be probably be about flight computers and understanding what they do (and what they do not), so it's Computer Resource Management. IMHO, pure flight skills (moving the flaps, gear handles, throttles and sideyokes...) have not degraded enough to pose a large accident risk.

Let's not forget a new syndrome of "Godlike FO and his damned if you exercise authority captains"... it's a symptom of overboard CRM, happening in several Asian carriers. But yes, the second coming... you put it well... It's already being put in place at some carriers (one of which is... Indo Air Asia, not sure if they still do it though), "automation resource management"...

M499....
When losing situational awareness, pray Cumulus Granitus isn't nearby !

AIRWALK
Posts: 239
Joined: Fri Jun 06, 2014 9:33 am

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting seahawk (Reply 214):The plane gives the crew so much information, but it does not disclose the position of the other controller in a simple and obvious way, the yoke does.

Adding information is useful up until a point, after that it can just add to the confusion. Not saying that wouldn't be useful, but there is the question of how much help would it really provide.

 Quoting D L X (Reply 91):AF 447, or were you trying to get me to say something else?

No, but they weren't holding the stick back the whole time in AF447, common misconception.

 Quoting airtechy (Reply 92):Wow! You win. That has to be the best spin to justify non-synced controls I have ever read. Boeing should obviously cut the linkage between the yokes as it only ads confusion.

You missed my point, it has absolutely nothing to do with Boeing or Airbus. Sensory overload does exist.

 Quoting CALTECH (Reply 128):But what if all your attention is devoted to looking at the instruments as you try to figure out what has happened ? With one hand of the stick and devoting your eyes to the instruments, might be a good redundacy and one worth the added cost.

True, but if your hand isn't on the stick, and the stick being out of your view, the link won't help. With a big yoke in front of you clearly visible no matter where you look, linked controls makes perfect sense. Unless both pilots are holding the side stick however, the controls of one might go unnoticed to the other, linked or not linked.
I'm sure this thread will take off soon

mmo
Posts: 1851
Joined: Thu Apr 18, 2013 3:04 pm

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

[

 Quoting Amiga500 (Reply 203):Yes, the guy with the doctorate in aerodynamics needs to understand how to do a vector calc onto a wing :rolleyes: I've already given a brief explanation. If descending in a bank with *aircraft* lateral velocity and retaining some *aircraft* forward velocity, all three aircraft motions (vertical velocity, lateral velocity and longitudinal velocity) are contributing to airflow along the wing aerofoil section.

What a sarcastic response. Let me ask you is your name really Richard Head? Anyhow, you need to really understand what a fully developed stall is and then explain where the wind is and how the ailerons would be effective on a swept wing aircraft when the stall goes from the tip inward. I'd love to hear your sarcastic comments about how this works.

Oh BTW, where did you get your doctorate?

 Quoting flyingturtle (Reply 215):So one part of the crew forced to troubleshoot, and the other one is forced to keep the bird in the air...

That's one of the things that got the crew into trouble. There is no troubleshooting! It's a cookbook approach. If you have this message you look here and accomplish the following. You don't go pulling circuit breakers just because you saw it done on the ground!
If we weren't all crazy we'd all go insane!

WIederling
Posts: 8939
Joined: Sun Sep 13, 2015 2:15 pm

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting airmagnac (Reply 211):I guess the sarcasm was not sufficently obvious !

Upps.
My sarcasm detector had its circuit breaker pulled.
Give me a second to get away from trampling the flowers
Murphy is an optimist

hivue
Posts: 2012
Joined: Tue Feb 26, 2013 2:26 am

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting seahawk (Reply 214):Why for example do we not get a simple graphic showing the position of the control sticks, on the cockpit screen, when there is a low speed or stall warning.

What useful information would that provide? Stalls can occur with the stick/control column in any position. Sticks/control columns are not flight instrumentation.
"You're sitting. In a chair. In the SKY!!" ~ Louis C.K.

flyingturtle
Posts: 5721
Joined: Mon Oct 31, 2011 1:39 pm

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting MMO (Reply 218): It's a cookbook approach.

This is an insult to cookbooks! Every cookbook I've seen is a QRH for single-cook operations!

 Quoting WIederling (Reply 219): My sarcasm detector had its circuit breaker pulled.

You can do this on the ground, but not on a.nut...

I still have to read the accident report, but part of me doesn't want to do that... another CRM/Automation Resource Management failure... but this makes me open another thread soon...

David
Reading accident reports is what calms me down

Posts: 3414
Joined: Thu May 29, 2008 8:24 pm

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting Kaiarahi (Reply 210):Yet the PIC on this flight had 14000+ hours on fighters and other military aircraft.

Interesting.

WIederling
Posts: 8939
Joined: Sun Sep 13, 2015 2:15 pm

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting flyingturtle (Reply 221):You can do this on the ground, but not on a.nut...

I'll do the squirrelly thing and hide my nuts underground.

apropos:

Is there any imagery around on the mentioned ominous and broken solder joints ?

Murphy is an optimist

seahawk
Posts: 9066
Joined: Fri May 27, 2005 1:29 am

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting hivue (Reply 220):What useful information would that provide? Stalls can occur with the stick/control column in any position. Sticks/control columns are not flight instrumentation.

Give the pilot not flying a chance to see what the other is doing. AF447 might have gone different if they would have noticed that one of them was pulling back on the stick.

zeke
Posts: 14404
Joined: Thu Dec 14, 2006 1:42 pm

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting Amiga500 (Reply 111):and that is why you fail.

If you were at cruise at FL380 normal pitch attitude, normal N1 for cruise, and your speed tape reduces back 60 knots and the autopilot disconnected by itself, and you hear "STALL STALL STALL"

Do you
a) immediately perform a stall recovery
b) do nothing and clarify the problem first

 Quoting D L X (Reply 141):In 20 years, I'll ask this question that I can ask now: what unexplained aeronautical events have now been explained by subatomic particles? (Or even theorized?)

It would take things off topic too much, basically the maths used for that sort of pure physics is the same as what is used in aerodynamics (eg electromagnetic fields vs circulation). As the pure physics advances, it flows on to other areas like aerodynamics. Where you will see that sort of aerodynamics being applied first is inside an engine.

 Quoting Ruscoe (Reply 154): I would be interested to know what the arguments are, against joining the sticks movements together?

The main one would be the existing safety record of the aircraft, and retrofitting such a solution is bound to bring additional "unknown unknowns"

 Quoting Kaiarahi (Reply 210):Yet the PIC on this flight had 14000+ hours on fighters and other military aircraft.

No, 10 years in the air force. A total of 14000 hrs of jet experience, military and civil (F5, 737, A320)
Human rights lawyers are "ambulance chasers of the very worst kind.'" - Sky News

WIederling
Posts: 8939
Joined: Sun Sep 13, 2015 2:15 pm

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting seahawk (Reply 224):AF447 might have gone different if they would have noticed that one of them was pulling back on the stick.

Only they were not. ( "pulling the stick all the way down" )
Murphy is an optimist

United787
Posts: 2909
Joined: Fri May 20, 2005 12:20 pm

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

Let me throw Sully in here for a minute...

US 1549 was an Airbus 320.
He had very little altitude to work with.
The severity of his emergency was far greater than AF 447, QZ 8501 and some of the others that crashed.
He didn't panic.
I am assuming he shut off the auto-pilot and flew the airplane manually into the Hudson?

UA 232 and QF 32 also much more serious emergencies that ended up with superior flying and superior results.

Is there something different about the training these pilots are receiving? I know the CRM was far superior but CRM only goes so far if you don't know how to manually fly a plane in the first place?

No, I am not a pilot but I think these are important questions to be asking...

hivue
Posts: 2012
Joined: Tue Feb 26, 2013 2:26 am

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting United787 (Reply 227):He didn't panic.

There's no evidence the crews of AF447 and QZ8501 "panicked" either. Their problems were that they (apparently) were unable to comprehend what was happening (definitely not an issue with US1549) and were deficient in handling the emergencies (which the US1549 crew did a good -- if not perfect -- job of).
"You're sitting. In a chair. In the SKY!!" ~ Louis C.K.

Amiga500
Posts: 2542
Joined: Tue Mar 03, 2015 8:22 am

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting MMO (Reply 218): Anyhow, you need to really understand what a fully developed stall is.

No - you need to understand what the differences are between a developed stall and a deep stall where the elevators are masked by the turbulent detached flow from the wing.

Once again, to be clear, it was you who posted:

 Quote:Secondly, the problem with an aft stick stall is the horizontal stabilizer is blanked out because of the stall characteristics of the swept wing. Normal stall recovery will not work.
 Quoting MMO (Reply 218): then explain where the wind is and how the ailerons would be effective on a swept wing aircraft when the stall goes from the tip inward. I'd love to hear your sarcastic comments about how this works.

If a pilot with a supposed B.S in aero cannot understand how a swept wing (which, making it clear, is cranked on all commercial airlines due to the zero sweep trailing edge near the wing root) in a descending bank combined with lateral motion can have a lower AoA at the wingtip than the wing root, then its no surprise that so many aircraft fall out of the sky primarily due to pilot ineptitude.

 Quoting MMO (Reply 218): Oh BTW, where did you get your doctorate?

Not posting that on here.

Kaiarahi
Posts: 1807
Joined: Tue Jul 07, 2009 6:55 pm

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting seahawk (Reply 224):AF447 might have gone different if they would have noticed that one of them was pulling back on the stick.

You really should read the report. The PNF (left seat FO), at least, knew.
Empty vessels make the most noise.

mmo
Posts: 1851
Joined: Thu Apr 18, 2013 3:04 pm

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting Amiga500 (Reply 229):Not posting that on here.

Just as I thought; a scholar at everything who knows nothing. I am not going to debate you anymore as your ignorance is amazing when it comes to aero! I have asked you about 5 times to tell me where the relative wind is any your retort is snide comments.

AMF!!!
If we weren't all crazy we'd all go insane!

maartent
Posts: 47
Joined: Tue Mar 24, 2015 10:09 pm

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

Let us go back to the root cause.
I must admit only having partly read the report, because of problems with the internet. I may have missed some important remarks.

The root cause seems to be the intermittent failure of an important component of the FBW system.
In the report is mentioned that this component showed many failure in the past, and even an increasing number over the last period.

At one moment, the component was send to an official repair shop. It came back unaltered, as they didnt find the fault.

This is wrong IMNSHO.
Many years ago, in my early career days, I worked in a repair shop for electronic equipment. Sometimes. we got in amplifiers or tuners (it was Hi-Fi equipment) with this kind of vague complaints. Bad contacts (cracks in circuit boards) and bad soldering joints can be very difficult to detect, but in the end (sometimes after days on end searching) it was possible by provoking the fault with temperature changes. We used cold spray and a hair-dryer.

Sending it back to the client without doing anything is not acceptable with equipment that should work without fail.
They should at least have scrapped (and replaced) the possible faulty circuit board.

That the pilot didnt know what to do any more after having followed the prescribed procedure (with overhead switches) THREE times is something I really can´t blame him for. Pulling the circuit breaker was not the best idea, not in the air anyway, as it have seemed to have provoke a plethora of fault messages etc.
Question: If he had done NOTHING, could the plane have been still "perfectly flyable" ? With a rudder that did strange things?

caoimhin
Posts: 457
Joined: Thu Oct 23, 2014 12:30 am

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting WIederling (Reply 223):I'll do the squirrelly thing and hide my nuts underground.

I like this. I might have to use it, with appropriate citation of course.

ltbewr
Posts: 14502
Joined: Thu Jan 29, 2004 1:24 pm

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting hivue (Reply 228):Quoting United787 (Reply 227): He didn't panic. There's no evidence the crews of AF447 and QZ8501 "panicked" either. Their problems were that they (apparently) were unable to comprehend what was happening (definitely not an issue with US1549) and were deficient in handling the emergencies (which the US1549 crew did a good -- if not perfect -- job of).

With US 1549 vs. this and other cases, perhaps part of it is the mentality and personality of the pilot(s) themselves, to have 'the right stuff' when things go very wrong as well as good CRM. That is something that just may not be learned or from experience. As noted as to QX8501 crash, the PIC was very experienced, but he also made or allowed to be made, serious mistakes in 1) flying a plane with an ongoing mx issue, then 2) compounded it by cycling the circuit breaker, then 3) failing to see the compounding problem and making the right decision.

enzo011
Posts: 1726
Joined: Tue Jun 21, 2011 8:12 am

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

I am open to correction but Capt. Sullenberg switched on the APU almost immediately which allowed the A320 to continue giving protections with the FBW and allowed for the safe ditching in the river. A case where the Airbus protections saved lives that is often overlooked.

 Quoting maartent (Reply 232):The root cause seems to be the intermittent failure of an important component of the FBW system.

Yes, the part was failing, but the captain also went with a procedure he saw a engineer perform on the ground on the same aircraft a few days earlier, but being in the air the results were unexpected and caused the confusion for the PF. Once again you have multiple factors that led to the accident, not just one incident that can be looked at improving. It is easy to try and pinpoint one particular point in such an event and run with it, i.e. sidesticks are the devil, when the truth is there were multiple factors that led to this accident.

CabSauv
Posts: 35
Joined: Thu Jun 11, 2009 8:54 am

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting WIederling (Reply 223):Is there any imagery around on the mentioned ominous and broken solder joints ? pretty please!
http://avherald.com/img/indonesia_as...a320_pk-axc_java_sea_141228_14.jpg

maartent
Posts: 47
Joined: Tue Mar 24, 2015 10:09 pm

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting enzo011 (Reply 235):Yes, the part was failing, but the captain also went with a procedure he saw a engineer perform on the ground on the same aircraft a few days earlier, but being in the air the results were unexpected and caused the confusion for the PF.

Yes, that is in the report, but that was after THREE times performing the correct procedure without solving the problem.

Anyway, my point was that the component, while insufficiently investigated, shouldnt be allowed in active service
That is not pilot error, or bad CRM. or an Airbus design problem. It is a maintenace and QA problem.

[Edited 2015-12-02 12:33:28]

David L
Posts: 8551
Joined: Tue May 18, 1999 2:26 am

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting Kaiarahi (Reply 230): Quoting seahawk (Reply 224): AF447 might have gone different if they would have noticed that one of them was pulling back on the stick. You really should read the report. The PNF (left seat FO), at least, knew.

Another example of an internet soundbite taking precedence over the facts. "You're going up", "Stop going up", "You need to go down", etc.

 Quoting United787 (Reply 227):No, I am not a pilot but I think these are important questions to be asking...

Good questions, in my non-expert opinion, but I would suggest that another difference was that in the cases of US1549 and QF32 things were "as bad as they seemed" while in AF447 and QZ8501 things were not as bad as the crews thought they were. But that's all I've got on that issue.

flyingturtle
Posts: 5721
Joined: Mon Oct 31, 2011 1:39 pm

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

The link doesn't seem to work. Use the normal AvHerald article for the picture of the cracked soldering joint: http://avherald.com/h?article=47f6abc7/0028&opt=0

David
Reading accident reports is what calms me down

litz
Posts: 2349
Joined: Wed Dec 24, 2003 6:01 am

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting United787 (Reply 227):I am assuming he shut off the auto-pilot and flew the airplane manually into the Hudson?

I'm going off memory from the NTSB report, but I believe the autopilot wasn't yet engaged, because they were still in climbout (and even if so, wouldn't it automatically have disengaged with the twin rollbacks?).

What they did do, that likely saved their bacon, was immediately switch on the APU.

This preserved electrical power, allowing the flight control limits to remain in place.

Sully flew the lower end of these limits, allowing the computer to basically balance the plane all the way into the water, while remaining at the slowest possible non-stall speed.

As it turned out, this was the absolutely perfect attitude to be at for a ditching and we all know the results.

WIederling
Posts: 8939
Joined: Sun Sep 13, 2015 2:15 pm

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

Thankee very much.

This is a rather regular issue with electronics.
I've seen similar on regular basis.
Vanishing errors are hell.

In a safety relevant environment you can't return these into circulation.
Murphy is an optimist

Pihero
Posts: 4318
Joined: Mon Jan 31, 2005 5:11 am

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting Ruscoe (Reply 154):I would be interested to know what the arguments are, against joining the sticks movements together?
 Quoting Ruscoe (Reply 177):t Airbus decided in the case of the side sticks. to not tie there movements together.
 Quoting 777Jet (Reply 178):I too would like to know the Airbus reason for this. Not the A fanboy reason that sometimes appears on a.net, but the actual Airbus reason.

It could be surprising for most on this forum that the first reason was / has been and still is redundancy :
In case of a jammed stick, on another brand, basically one has to uncouple the two sides of flight controls, hence losing half of perfectly functional flight surfaces. Here, the usable sidestick can operate all surfaces.
As a matter of fact, two serious incidents have highlighted that quality : an LH A320 with a misz-riggedc capt's stick and an RAF Voyager with a jammed LH stick ( by a camera ).
The same thing will occur in cases of jammed flight controls : there is no prefered side .
The second reason is, of course, simplicity . What most posters do not realize is that if one links both sides one has to provide a mechanism to uncouple them if need be.
I know quite a few Boeing captains here who would really resent their FO having their hand on their yoke when it's an LHS manual flying.
So I wonder why the hullabaloo about double inputs. The air in the cockpit could become blue if he/she interfered with my handling, whether it's a 'Bus or anything else.
Magic words : I_Have_Control. it means keep your hand wherever you want them but off my stick !

 Quoting airtechy (Reply 28):Actually, a steep bank should have hastened the entry into a nose down attitude.

Yeah !?!
Have you done any aerobatics ?

 Quoting Amiga500 (Reply 30):Kick the rudder to pull the nose into the bank.

...and then increase your spin rate, isn't it ?

 Quoting Chaostheory (Reply 32):Don't touch the rudder in a stall!

Appartently some engineers don't know that

 Quoting Amiga500 (Reply 38):Its somewhat concerning that you cannot differentiate between that document and an aircraft that has already stalled, entered a steep bank and will be slipping off. Which only reinforces my notion of training being rigid, inflexible and often inappropriate to deal with what pilots experience in emergencies

The day engineers manage to provide us with post stall equations that would allow software engineers to provide us in turn with simulators that can demonstrate airplanes'post stall behaviour and escape techniques.
Then these enginjeers would be right to criticize pilots'training.
Not before.

 Quoting Chaostheory (Reply 40):I'm not current on the A320 but going off memory for stall recovery, it emphasised nose down followed by wings level. Adjust thrust if needed. No mention of the rudder. The BAE, Dassault, Airbus and Boeing test pilots I have spoken to in the past have all managed to recover from upsets without its use.

You've got the gist of it... If you're in Rome, do what the Romans do.

 Quoting airtechy (Reply 117): Every time I see that Airbus fly into the trees, I wonder if an additional .1 or .2 degrees of pitch up would allowed him to clear the trees. Alas, the hard protection didn't allow him to take advantage of the predicted "hard limit stall speed" vs. the actual stall speed

Hogwash that shows your absolute lack of knowledge on the control laws involved in that accident... it has nothing nothing nothing nothing nothing nothing to do with stall speed.
As it's been on the net for 25 years, I have some right to question either your bias and agenda or your laziness.

 Quoting airmagnac (Reply 200):So can we cut the simplistic sidestick-is-evil crap, please ?

+1

 Quoting David L (Reply 205):What was wrong with wing-warping and weight-shifting?

My girlfriend has wider, more muscular hips than me. I'd hate to see her being better at flying airplanes.
Funny you are talking about wing warping : do you know that in French we're still using the word *gauchissement* ( exact equivalent of *warping* ) when we talk about roll input even though the French invented the term *aileron*?

 Quoting United787 (Reply 227):Let me throw Sully in here for a minute...

Please don't. In many ways, he certainly is not an example of what / who an airline captain should be.
His best ( enormously good ) quality was quickness and clarity of decision making. That was enough to save the plane as the rest of his actions could be - and have been - criticized.
Contrail designer

777Jet
Posts: 6977
Joined: Sat Mar 08, 2014 7:29 am

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting PlanesNTrains (Reply 181):Quoting coolian2 (Reply 179): Has any mentioned the lack of CRM in this accident, or is it just American flags blaming sidesticks? How about: Quoting Ruscoe (Reply 177): So does anyone know what that reason or reasons were? Australia flag Quoting 777Jet (Reply 178): I too would like to know the Airbus reason for this. Australia flag Not to mention the "American flags" that absolve the aircraft and blame the CRM specifically. -Dave

Oh brother!

 Quoting par13del (Reply 183):Quoting 777Jet (Reply 178): I too would like to know the Airbus reason for this. Not the A fanboy reason that sometimes appears on a.net, but the actual Airbus reason... I get the question but I would respond by asking why, and why the answer has any relevance. Even if they said we made a mistake or it was an oversight, then what, personally I do not see Airbus making any change unless and until some authority suggest or mandate a change, and since no accident report has ever listed them as a cause, the response will be like those seen in all accident threads.

"" I do not see Airbus making any change unless and until some authority suggest or mandate a change,""

The following is an interesting point on that note:

 Quoting CO953 (Reply 196):TBTF = "Too Big To Fail." I'm afraid I take the cynical, realist view of corporate macro-behavior: At this point, Airbus, as a profitable corporation, would/can never, ever admit a flaw with the independent sidestick design. Any such admission would put them on the hook for too many deaths.

I agree with the TBTF issue.

The implications of it are something worthy of consideration.

However, I do also agree with you on the following:

 Quoting CO953 (Reply 196):Just because they are an aviation corporation, I have no more confidence that Airbus would exhibit any more saintliness than an automobile manufacturer, a la Ford Pinto.

I would hope that the days of the McDonnell Douglas like "Gentleman's Agreement" are done and dusted.

 Quoting David L (Reply 205):Quoting PlanesNTrains (Reply 181): Not to mention the "American flags" that absolve the aircraft and blame the CRM specifically. There are individuals who seem to have a habit of discarding the major details and taking minor details out of context. Perhaps there's a slight geographical bias but it isn't all that clear cut.

I agree that the geographical bias " isn't all that clear cut " in the A v B argument.

 Quoting mandala499 (Reply 216):The conclusion is simple... With a yoke, you can't be lazy on your arm muscles (may the strongest win unless crosslinks break beforehand)... with a sidestick, you can't be lazy on your thumb (may the person who press the button last win)... BUT, you cannot be lazy with your brain on both... and this goes for both pilots.

Well said!

 Quoting Pihero (Reply 242):It could be surprising for most on this forum that the first reason was / has been and still is redundancy : In case of a jammed stick, on another brand, basically one has to uncouple the two sides of flight controls, hence losing half of perfectly functional flight surfaces. Here, the usable sidestick can operate all surfaces. As a matter of fact, two serious incidents have highlighted that quality : an LH A320 with a misz-riggedc capt's stick and an RAF Voyager with a jammed LH stick ( by a camera ). The same thing will occur in cases of jammed flight controls : there is no prefered side . The second reason is, of course, simplicity . What most posters do not realize is that if one links both sides one has to provide a mechanism to uncouple them if need be. I know quite a few Boeing captains here who would really resent their FO having their hand on their yoke when it's an LHS manual flying. So I wonder why the hullabaloo about double inputs. The air in the cockpit could become blue if he/she interfered with my handling, whether it's a 'Bus or anything else. Magic words : I_Have_Control. it means keep your hand wherever you want them but off my stick !

Thank you for your detailed explanation.
DC10-10/30,MD82/88/90, 717,727,732/3/4/5/7/8/9ER,742/4,752/3,763/ER,772/E/L/3/W,788/9, 306,320,321,332/3,346,359,388

747megatop
Posts: 1750
Joined: Wed May 23, 2007 8:22 am

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting hivue (Reply 228):There's no evidence the crews of AF447 and QZ8501 "panicked" either.

Reading through pages 59 to 61 of this report - http://kemhubri.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_home/ntsc.htm seems to indicate that there is enough evidence that the crew of QZ 8501 were in panic mode.

roseflyer
Posts: 9602
Joined: Fri Feb 13, 2004 9:34 am

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting Pihero (Reply 242): It could be surprising for most on this forum that the first reason was / has been and still is redundancy : In case of a jammed stick, on another brand, basically one has to uncouple the two sides of flight controls, hence losing half of perfectly functional flight surfaces. Here, the usable sidestick can operate all surfaces. As a matter of fact, two serious incidents have highlighted that quality : an LH A320 with a misz-riggedc capt's stick and an RAF Voyager with a jammed LH stick ( by a camera ). The same thing will occur in cases of jammed flight controls : there is no prefered side . The second reason is, of course, simplicity . What most posters do not realize is that if one links both sides one has to provide a mechanism to uncouple them if need be. I know quite a few Boeing captains here who would really resent their FO having their hand on their yoke when it's an LHS manual flying. So I wonder why the hullabaloo about double inputs. The air in the cockpit could become blue if he/she interfered with my handling, whether it's a 'Bus or anything else. Magic words : I_Have_Control. it means keep your hand wherever you want them but off my stick !

Separate independent and redundant control inputs are required by the FARs. There have to be two independent paths for flight control input from the pilot all the way to the control surface. Boeing uses linked controls with breakout mechanisms. The Boeing designs have either override springs or linkages that will disconnect above a specific force. I believe the Airbus does not mechanically link anything, but it is all done through the flight control software and control system. I can't imagine a mechanical interconnect system between the sidesticks. That would be a nearly impossible mechanical linkage, so if Airbus was going to try to link them, they'd have to use backdrive actuators. I believe (not certain) that Airbus does not use any backdrive actuators in the flight controls. The autothrottle doesn't move the thrust levers and the autopilot does not move the side stick.
If you have never designed an airplane part before, let the real designers do the work!

TheRedBaron
Posts: 3276
Joined: Tue Mar 29, 2005 6:17 am

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting mandala499 (Reply 188):Or simply put in an AoA gauge... *shock! Horror!*

LOL ! but as I said before nothing can be foolproof, no matter what...

 Quoting mandala499 (Reply 188):This is a problem that the industry has failed to address so far, with or without attempts to do so, the result is clear... we haven't solved it.

Agree, and accident will keep happening because just by chance and statistics, when numbers go up, chances of something going wrong go up likewise.

 Quoting airmagnac (Reply 200):So can we cut the simplistic sidestick-is-evil crap, please ?

Amen. I bet that if Asiana Crash in SFO were a Airbus it would be a perfect example of those darned evil sidesticks.

 Quoting David L (Reply 205):Thank goodness there are still a few here who are prepared to examine the details in an objective manner. I'm at a loss to understand how anyone can push aside the apparent operational short-comings and CRM failures in the QZ8501 accident and come to the conclusion that the lack of connectivity between the controls is the issue that needs to be addressed. Some of the people who complain that there's too much dependency on automation are also the ones who complain when the Airbus systems fail to come to the rescue when procedures are not followed. It's a different story when the same happens in a Boeing, MD, etc.

 Quoting francoflier (Reply 206):Airlines are struggling to fill the front seats of the thousands of jets they have been buying in the last couple of decades, yet in a constant strive to keep the costs and packages down have been reaching forever lower on the ability scale of willing applicants while at the same time have trimmed expensive training to the bare minimum.

Hence my lack of faith on this terrible tragedies to become more rare in the future.

 Quoting francoflier (Reply 206):We can continue to endlessly debate airliner design philosophies, only to ignore the real decay that is developing in modern day aviation safety.

Again, right on the mark.

TRB
The best seat in a Plane is the Jumpseat.

seahawk
Posts: 9066
Joined: Fri May 27, 2005 1:29 am

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting Pihero (Reply 242):It could be surprising for most on this forum that the first reason was / has been and still is redundancy : In case of a jammed stick, on another brand, basically one has to uncouple the two sides of flight controls, hence losing half of perfectly functional flight surfaces. Here, the usable sidestick can operate all surfaces. As a matter of fact, two serious incidents have highlighted that quality : an LH A320 with a misz-riggedc capt's stick and an RAF Voyager with a jammed LH stick ( by a camera ).

But today you could use a force feedback style solution, where small actuators move the stick, but apply so little force that you can always override them by using a bit more force.

The same with activating more info displays for the crew when flying in alternate law. Most of the code is there already, as it is used to limit the control input in normal law, if you would just add GPS data you could probably improve the help given by the plane in critical situations under alternate law.

For a stall warning with a display that shows the position of each stick and a symbol to push forward, you could probably work with rate of climb, speed and height above ground to make a sensible code to help the crew. Most of this would be done in normal law any way, you probably would just need to take in GPS data and compare it to the other sensors, just in case one sensor is faulty.

A display that shows:

- stick positions
- speed by sensor vs. speed by GPS
- height by sensor vs. height by GPS
- rate of climb by sensor vs. rate of climb by GPS

and a steering suggestion, does not seem to hard to do imho.

airtechy
Posts: 742
Joined: Sun Dec 24, 2006 7:35 am

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

Interesting article....exactly how it should be done. Some manufacturers get it right.

http://airwaysnews.com/blog/2015/03/...ctive-sidesticks-a-new-way-to-fly/

.....and another.

http://www.researchgate.net/publicat...s_Awareness_during_Stall_in_Cruise

[Edited 2015-12-03 00:43:46]

...even better one..

http://aviationweek.com/technology/a...ick-controls-make-commercial-debut

[Edited 2015-12-03 00:53:49]

litz
Posts: 2349
Joined: Wed Dec 24, 2003 6:01 am

### Air Asia Crash: Final Report Released - Part 1

 Quoting flyingturtle (Reply 239):The link doesn't seem to work. Use the normal AvHerald article for the picture of the cracked soldering joint: http://avherald.com/h?article=47f6ab...opt=0

Ouch ... that's a classic circular fracture ... I've fixed zillions of those things in pinball machines, on square pin header posts. That's obviously a high-vibration environment, and it causes this exact kind of failure.

Is there a lot of vibration wherever this particular PCB is mounted in an A-320?

esp. from repeated takeoff/landing cycles + taxiing, could be enough to trigger a fracture over time.

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